NUCLEAR TEST-BAN TREATY SAFEGUARDS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP70B00338R000300110058-0
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 4
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 9, 2006
• Sequence Number: 58
• Publication Date: November 30, 1967
• Content Type: OPEN

November 30, 4woved For aftit? A/~0R - P70 i3 2000300110058-0 s 17415
That is why I made the recommendations
I did.
Mr. WILLIAMS of Delaware, Mr. Pres-
ident, if I may have an additional min-
ute, that is the reason why I made these
remarks here today. I believe the Ameri-
can dollar is sound, but it will not remain
in a sound position unless certain safe-
guards are taken. If the American dollar
falls, it will be as a result of the negli-
gence on the part of both the Johnson
administration and the Congress in fail-
ing to stand up to meet our responsibil-
ities In time. If we proscrastinate and put
the decision off until next year I think
it will be too late to correct much of the
damage.
It is an outrageous situation where for
10 months the administration has been
talking about expenditure reductions and
tax increases, yet It took the devaluation
of the British pound to shake them up
to the point where they would submit
their bill to the Congress.
Even now I detect a backstage ma-
neuver of the administration to talk big
but, postpone action until next year. It is
still not too late for the administration
to get action on this measure before Con-
gress adjourns if it will place the same
emphasis upon the consideration of its
tax proposals as it does upon its spend-
ing programs.
U.N. SECURITY COUNCIL CONSID-
ERATION OF THE VIETNAM CON-
FLICT - UNANIMOUS-CONSENT
AGREEMENT
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I ask
unanimous consent that when the pend-
ing business, Senate Resolution 180, is
laid before the Senate, there be a time
limitation of not to exceed 21/2 hours, the
time to be equally divided between the
majority and minority leaders or who-
ever they may designate.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there
objection? Without objection, it is so
ordered.
AMENDMENT OF FEDERAL FARM
LOAN ACT AND FARM CREDIT ACT
OF 1933
Mr. TALMADGE. Mr. President, I ask
the Chair to lay before the Senate a
message from the House of Representa-
tives relating to S. 2565.
The PRESIDING OFFICER laid be-
fore the Senate the amendment of the
House of Representatives to the bill (S.
2565) to amend the Federal Farm Loan
Act and the Farm Credit Act of 1933,
as amended, and for other purposes,
which was, strike out all after the enact-
ing clause and insert:
That the Federal Farm Loan Act and the
Farm Credit Act of 1933, as amended, are
amended as hereinafter provided to remove
the 6 per centum interest rate limitations
therein on loans made by Federal land banks
.and banks for cooperatives; and to permit
interest rates on such loans and on loans
made by production credit associations to
be determined as provided in such Acts of
Congress to cover the cost of loan funds and
other expenses and reserves so that the
lending may continue on a self-sustaining
basis.
SEC. 2. Section 12 of the Federal Farm
Loan Act, as amended (12 U.S.C. 771), re-
lating to loans made by Federal land banks, tem around Moscow, and our best intel-
is amended by substituting "such rate of ligence is that they will expand and im-
Interest as the board of directors of the bank prove that system over the years. Mean-
shall from time to time determine with the
approval of the Farm Credit Administration" while, through her six nuclear and ther-
for "6 per centum per annum" in paragraph monuclear tests to date, Communist
Third thereof and for "6 per centum per China is emerging as a thermonuclear
annum" in the first and second sentences of power with all the potentialities for trou-
paragraph Ninth thereof. ble that foreshadows. Communist China,
SEC. 3. The Farm Credit Act of 1933, as of course, was not a signatory to the nu-
amended, is amended- clear test-ban treaty, and has stated she
(a) by inserting the following sentence will not agree to the nuclear nonpolifera-
between the present first and second sen-
tences of section 23 thereof, relating to loans tion agreement now being considered in
made by production credit associations (12 Geneva.
U.S.C. 1131g) : "Such loans shall be made These recent developments constitute
on such terms and conditions, at such rates a serious challenge to the strategic su-
of interest, and with such security as may periority of U.S. power on which our
be prescribed in such rules and regulations."; defense planners have counted to main-
and
(b) by deleting from each of the second
sentences in sections 34 and 41 thereof (12
U.S.C. 11341 and 1134c), relating to loans
made by banks for cooperatives, ", but in no
case shall the rate of interest exceed 6 per
centum per annum on the unpaid principal
of a loan".
Mr. TALMADGE. Mr. President, I
move that the Senate concur in the House
amendment.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The
question is on the motion of the Senator
from Georgia.
The amendment was concurred in.
4
NUCL AR TEST-BAN TREATY
SAFEGUARDS
Mr. JACKSON. Mr. President, I ask
unanimous consent that, notwithstand-
ing the existing rule, I may be permitted
to speak for 15 minutes.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there
objection? The Chair hears none, and
it is so ordered.
INTRODUCTION
Mr. JACKSON. Mr. President, 4 years
have passed since the Nuclear Test-Ban
Treaty was favorably considered here in
the Senate following extensive hearings
by the responsible committees. That
treaty, welcomed by so many, was
counted on by some as a first step in a
continuing march on arms limitation and
control agreements to be negotiated be-
tween the nuclear powers and also
among the nonnuclear countries. Unfor-
tunately, the yearned for series of agree-
ments on the control of arms has not
progressed far beyond the first limited
step. It is noteworthy that while mean-
ingful arms limitation agreements have
eluded our efforts the danger to our na-
tional security and that of other
countries as well, has been Increased by
determined moves by Soviet Russia and
peace. As I read events, where Moscow
acts with circumspection, it is because,
to use the Kremlin's phrase, "objective
conditions" impose this policy. Where
the "objective conditions" are favorable,
however, Moscow is encouraged to act
boldly to expand the frontiers of its
influence and to enter into distant con-
flict situations around the globe. The
circumstances are thus created for the
most dangerous confrontation-a show-
down between nuclear powers.
Even when the Soviets have been in a
condition of admitted strategic inferior-
ity to U.S. power, Moscow has periodi-
cally pursued adventurous policies-in
Berlin and the Cuban missile probe-
and to take advantage of opportunities
for mischief in the less developed areas
of the world. This is exemplified by the
Kremlin's recent strong encouragement
to the radical Arab forces in May and
June 1967.
As Prof. Philip Mosely, of Columbia
University, testified in the recent hear-
ings of our Military Applications Sub-
committee, in each of these past
probings:
The strategic inferiority of Soviet power
has set definite limits to the extent of the
risks that the Soviet policymakers were will-
ing to run. It is painful and disturbing to
contemplate the far wider range of risks
which the Kremlin might have accepted if
it had been confident of possessing an equal-
ity or a superiority of over-all deterrent
strength.
Professor Mosely
that :
,
e
angerous range of risks in
Red China in the vital field of nuclear order to pursue its declared long-range am-
arms. bition to reshape the world according to its
With respect to offensive weapons, own dogma.
Moscow has been working hard to nar- Also, we must take into consideration
row the missile gap that limited its range the possibility of facing not only the con-
of options in the Cuban missile crisis of tinuing strategic threat of the Soviet
1962. It has recently doubled the number Union, but that threat combined with the
of its operational ICBM's, and the larger new threat of China. Distinguished
missile payload it can mount on Its big- American experts on Sino-Soviet affairs
ger missiles gives it the capability to de- predict that Communist China and the
ploy higher yield nuclear warheads per Soviet Union will be cooperating again 2
missile than we can. Moscow is also de- or 3 or 5 years after Mao's death or inca-
veloping the capability to launch orbit- pacitation. Obviously, if Moscow and
ing nuclear bombs ready for suddenly at- Peking begin to coordinate their strat-
tack from relatively low altitudes. With egies in Asia and the Middle East, the
respect to the defensive weapons, the So- United States will be in for a very dan-
viet leaders have deployed an ABM sys- gerous time. For example, if the Soviet
In any future period in which Moscow
might attain either nuclear equality of nu-
clear superiority, however that may be meas-
ured in terms of the ratio between offensive
and defensive systems, we would be prudent
to assume that Soviet policy would be
tempted to undertake a more extensive, more
acute
and mor
d
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Union and Communist China agreed on
a plan of action, and Moscow by then
considered that it had nuclear equality
or even superiority over the United
States, the Chinese nuclear power could
be used to blackmail China's neighbors,
while the Soviets neutralized the major
United States nuclear capability. This
may be what some Chinese leaders are
looking forward to.
Looking ahead, if we are to maintain
the necessary posture of strategic su-
periority, there are two prime require-
ments :
The first requirement is a strategic of-
fensive capability which will be able to
penetrate Soviet ABM defenses whatever
their nature several years from now. This
means we will need another generation of
land-based ICBM's with larger payload
capacity and reliance on multiple inde-
pendently targetable reentry vehicles-
MIRV's. This also means we will need
another generation of nuclear sub-
marines with more and larger missiles,
and reliance on MIRV's.
A second requirement is the best ABM
defense in the West that science and
technology can provide us, to protect our
retaliatory second-strike force and to
safeguard our people and our society,
and to take into account the needs of
our allies. For if the Soviet Union comes
out ahead in the search for an effective
antimissile system, the relationship of
forces on which the U.S. has depended
to discourage adventurism and a diplom-
acy of blackmail will be reversed. The
consequences for the West could be dis-
astrous. We can now begin to deploy a
"light" ABM system which will be use-
ful at least in the near future against
any Chinese threat and to provide some
protection for our nuclear retaliatory
force. But we do not yet have the tools
for an effective missile defense against
the kind of missile attack that today
only the Soviet Union could launch. The
development of such a defense is in the
hands of the scientists and engineers.
At this stage the need is for a high prior-
ity R. & D. program to develop, if we can,
an effective defense against a full-scale
Soviet type missile attack.
I would like now to report briefly on
the implementation of the nuclear test-
ban treaty safeguards because they are
of central importance in giving us the
flexibility and the opportunity to take ac-
tions to meet these prime requirements
for U.S. strategic superiority.
BACKGROUND OF THE TEST-BAN TREATY SAFE-
GUARDS
By way of a quick review, it will be
recalled that in 1963, when the Senate
committees were reviewing the then pro-
posed Limited Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty,
the Preparedness Investigating Subcom-
mittee shared with the Joint Chiefs of
Staff a serious concern about the treaty
and whether it would serve the best in-
terests of the United States. The Joint
Chiefs informed the Senate that in their
opinion certain "safeguards" would be
necessary if the treaty was r}ot to operate
against our national security interests.
At the request of the Preparedness Sub-
committee and the Committee on Armed
Services, the Joint Chiefs developed a
-statement of the specific requirements to
implement the necessary
they had defined.
are being developed.
The Atomic Energy Commission has
been somewhat handicapped this past
year in nuclear testing, first by contin-
uing labor difficulties at the National
Nuclear Test Site in Nevada from early
July through early November, and, sec-
ond, by the lack of a suitable test site for
the detonation of high yield weapons
underground safely and in compliance
with the treaty. However, in spite of these
problems, a large number of under-
ground tests were conducted and very
significant advances made in the area of
weapons technology development, new
and radically different weapon design
concepts, and in the science of peaceful
uses for nuclear explosives.
The basic aims of upcoming under-
ground tests are for the furthering of
our knowledge of weapon effects, for
improving weapon reliability, increasing
penetration capability, and advancing
technology.
The AEC and the DOD determined in
mid-1966 that it was essential to estab-
lish a capability for conducting higher
yield tests underground than was deter-
mined to be possible at the national nu-
clear test site in Nevada. Originally, the
Pahute Mesa, at the north end of the reg-
ular test site, was thought to be suitable
for higher yield tests, but experience dis-
proved this hope and other sites have
been selected. The first, still in Nevada,
is about 70 miles northwest of Tonopah,
Nev., in an area named Hot Creek Val-
ley. This area is thought suitable for go-
ing beyond the yields possible at the
Pahute Mesa site. Next, an uninhabited
island near the western end of the Aleu-
tian chain, Amchitka Island, is being
developed for possible higher yield ex-
plosions.
In the high-yield area the U.S.S.R. has
conducted nuclear tests of higher yields
both in the atmosphere and underground
than has the United States. In their
nuclear testing it is interesting to note
that the U.S.S.R. has, on at least three
occasions, technically violated the Nu-
clear Test Ban Treaty, in that nuclear
debris from their tests was detected out-
side the continental boundaries of the
Soviet Union. Upon being challenged by
the United States, the U.S.S.R. has
either denied the charge or said it was a
negligible accident and unworthy of
further concern.
The safeguards, in brief, are: First, the
conduct of comprehensive, aggressive,
and continuing underground nuclear test
programs; second, the maintenance of
modern nuclear laboratory facilities and
programs; third, the maintenance of
the facilities and resources to resume
promptly atmospheric testing should it
be deemed essential to our national se-
curity or should the treaty be abrogated
by others; and, fourth, the improvement
of our capability to monitor and detect
violations of the treaty, and to maintain
our knowledge of foreign nuclear activity.
It is significant that the assurances
to the Senate given by President Ken-
nedy in August of 1963 that he would
fully and effectively implement the safe-
- guards were reaffirmed in their entirety
by President Johnson in April 1964.
The Preparedness Subcommittee, be-
cause of its role in the formulation of the
safeguards, has assumed the role of
monitoring the implementation and of
making an annual report to the Senate
on the implementation. The Joint Com-
mittee on Atomic Energy likewise has a
deep interest in the safeguards imple-
mentation and for the past 3 years
the safeguards monitoring and reviewing
has been a joint undertaking. The staff
members of both committees follow the
safeguards throughout the year and
the committee members then conduct a
periodic review of progress, the latest of
which has just been completed, and this
fourth annual report to the Senate on
the implementation of the safeguards is
a result of that review.
The implementation of the Nuclear
Treaty safeguards is the joint responsi-
bility of the Secretary of Defense and
the Chairman of the Atomic Energy
Commission. To facilitate coordination
of the activities of the two agencies in
support of the safeguards, the Secretary
and the Chairman, in June 1964, for-
mally established joint procedures for
the development and periodic review of
a national nuclear test program. That
program has been developed and sub-
mitted to the President, and as directed
by the President, plans for implementa-
tion are being maintained. The latest
White House approval of the current
nuclear test program was made in early
July 1967.
Turning now to the first safeguard,
underground testing. During the past
year the Department of Defense, charged
with the responsibility of determining
the effects of nuclear weapons, has con-
tinued to develop methods of conduct-
ing underground tests in which results
are being obtained that were previously
thought impossible under the treaty re-
strictions. The accelerated underground
test program of the DOD for the next 18 more was required. This year, for fiscal
to 24 months consists of a relatively large year 1968, the same situation has de-
number of tests on new reentry vehicles, veloped and again the Joint Committee
guidance systems, and our antiballistic added $15 million to the funds for weap-
missile systems now under development, because oselo af the i and tesce i a. and d vitality did of mportan As a result, the actual detailed test pro- the undertheground nd testing sting and
f
the program and
gram has developed into a fast moving because we thought the 20-percent cut
and changing program because of nu- by the Bureau of the Budget in the
merous scientific discoveries and pro- amount requested by the Atomic Energy
guards implementation to the Senate last
year that we thought the money being
provided for underground nuclear test-
ing was insufficient and that the Joint
Atomic Energy Committee added $10
million to the fiscal year 1967 funds for
this. Later the Atomic Energy Commis-
sion determined that even this additional
$10 million was not enough and a supple-
mental budget request for.,$20 million
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Commission was too heavy handed. For
fiscal year 1968, the Department of De-
fense increased their planned expendi-
tures in this underground testing area
by some 50 percent over the amount re-
quested in fiscal year 1867, and this in-
crease is stated by the responsible officials
to be sufficient. However, we have been
told recently that there are some planned
reductions in the DOD funds from the
amounts requested in their budget for
safeguards support. I would hope that
these cuts, if made, will not be applied
in this most important area of under-
ground testing.
SAFEGUARD NO. 2: THE MAINTENANCE OF
MODERN LABORATORIES
As to the second safeguard, our nu-
clear laboratories and their support and
work, we very recently had an opportu-
nity for lengthy and detailed discussions
with the directors of our national nu-
clear and weapon laboratories and
they assured us that their laboratories
were well supported, excellently staffed
and completely loaded with.work. A pos-
sible concern we might have for this
safeguard is not on present status, but a
caution that in the near future more
money will need to be provided for the
construction of some new facilities and
the purchase of some new expensive
equipment, such as additional com-
puters.
The problems and work of the labora-
tories are exceedingly complex and re-
quire a systematic analysis of many re-
lated phenomena, many of which re-
quire new theoretical and experimental
techniques. This program has some ad-
vantages over full-scale nuclear tests.
Laboratory experiments are generally
less expensive, they can be performed
many times, and the important param-
eters can be more easily controlled. To
provide positive correlation between
laboratory research and the actual
effects of nuclear explosions, laboratory
results are tested in the underground
nuclear test program to the maximum
extent possible.
Increased emphasis is being placed on
high altitude phenomenology because of
the degrading effects of nuclear weapons
upon military radar and communications
systems. This is a particularly urgent re-
quirement in light of the antiballistic
missile system deployment decision.
These effects are of prime significance
In the employment of offensive and de-
fensive tactics and operational tech-
niques for our missiles, aircraft, and
command and control systems.
SAFEGUARD NO. 3: READINESS TO RESUME
ATMOSPHERIC TESTING
The third safeguard, readiness to
quickly resume nuclear testing in the
now prohibited environment;; in the
event the treaty is abrogated, is in a con-
dition of effective support but also Zone
of change and study.
During the year since my last report
here, the overseas testing facilities at
Johnston Atoll and the Hawaiian Island
complex and the equipment there have
been maintained in a high readiness
status and thoroughly exercised and
tested. During fiscal year 1968 it is ex-
pected that maintenance and reliability
improvement efforts will continue com-
patible with the laboratory-generated
advances in technology and with certain
specific replacements of test equipment.
Airdrop readiness exercises, both on the
continent and overseas based, have been
conducted to maintain and increase
technical proficiency and to exercise the
airborne diagnostic capability.
Recent evaluation of the AEC-DOD
nuclear test readiness program indicate
that it should be updated. The majority
of tests in the present readiness pro-
gram were derived from the most press-
ing questions in weapons development
and efforts that existed in 1963 when the
treaty was ratified. Since 1963, however,
the testing capabilities and problems
have changed considerably. In particular,
the ability to acquire data in the under-
ground test program has been better
than had been expected. The AEC and
the DOD are now studying revisions in
the readiness plans, including the scope
and frequency of exercises, for the pur-
pose of updating the program should
testing restrictions be removed. It is our
intention that the Committee staffs will
be kept informed on a day to day 'basis
of changes as they are planned in the
program and that periodic updating
brieflings will be presented to the Com-
mittee members who follow the safe-
guards implementation.
SAFEGUARD NO. 4: TEST DETECTION AND FOREIGN
NUCLEAR PROGRAMS
The fourth safeguard is the mainte-
nance and improvement of our capability
to monitor and detect nuclear explosions
by other countries and to maintain and
improve our knowledge of foreign nu-
clear programs. In the past 4 years, in
addition to the United States, the United
Kingdom, the U.S.S.R., France, and
Communist China have all conducted
nuclear tests. A great deal of effort is
required to keep informed of these tests
as they might bear on the national secu '
rity of our country. Our present Atomic
Energy Detection System-AEDS--de-
signed to detect and identify nuclear det-
onations, now represents a facilities in-
vestment of some $85 million. Commenc-
ing in fiscal year 1964, a $100 million
program was initiated to increase the
number of stations and modernize the
equipment. About $58 million has been
provided in the past 4 years for this effort
and it is planned that about $16 million
more will be spent for this purpose in
fiscal year 1968.
The national research program for the
development and systems design effort
aimed at improving our ability to detect,
identify, locate, and verify the occurrence
of a nuclear explosion in all environ-
ments is called Project VELA. This proj-
ect includes developments applicable to
the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty and also ad-
ditional results to increase the capability
for detection, identification, location, and
verification of underground nuclear ex-
plosions now legal under the treaty, but
which would be barred if ever a total test
ban is agreed to between all nations. The
VELA program to detect nuclear tests
in the atmosphere and in space is di-
rected toward development of satellite
based instruments and systems. A broad
variety of radiation detectors and asso-
ciated electronics and logic circuitry has
been developed and fabricated for incor-
poration into satellite payloads and
placement into earth orbit. There have
been four successful launches on four
attempts: October 1963, July 1964, July
1965 using Atlas-Agena boosters, and the
last in April 1967 using a Titan 111-C
booster, each resulting in the placement
of two satellites in near circular earth
orbits on opposite sides of the earth. This
program with its four successful launches
in four attempts and long-lived payloads,
is recognized in the field of space tech-
nology as a highly successful endeavor.
All satellites, including those from the
first launch, continue to operate and pro-
vide mission data.
A fifth launch is planned for 1968 using
a Titan III-C'booster to place two earth-
oriented spacecraft into near circular
orbits. The detectors to be used will be
similar to those for Launch IV with a
general upgrading together with addi-
tional capabilities for optical and electro-
magnetic-pulse systems and with an
added diagnostic capability.
CONCLUSION
In summary, it is our belief that all
of the four Nuclear Test Ban Treaty
safeguards are being supported and
implemented in a satisfactory manner.
The programs have permitted us to de-
tect and improve what might have been
fatal shortcomings in our strategic mis-
sile systems, to develop the warheads for
our forthcoming ABM systems, and to be
kept aware of the developments in other
countries.
The costs Involved in the four safe-
guards are significant and are indicative
of the sincerity of purpose of the United
States in maintaining and protecting our
national security. In fiscal year 1964 the
costs were $706 million; in fiscal year
1965, $724 million; fiscal year 1966, $697
million; fiscal year 1967, $702 million;
and in fiscal year 1968 are budgeted for
$753 million.
The members and staffs of the Joint
Committee on Atomic Energy and the
Preparedness Investigating Subcommit-
tee of the Committee on Armed Services
will continue to follow the safeguards im-
plementation, will make inquiry and con-
duct hearings on these matters, and will
periodically, as I have done again today,
make the appropriate reports to the Sen-
ate.
Mr. MOSS. Mr. President, I ask unani-
mous consent to proceed for 15 minutes.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without
objection, it is so ordered.
Mr. MILLER. Mr. President, will the
Senator yield to me for a minute or two,
before he begins his speech?
Mr. MOSS. I am happy to yield to the
Senator from Iowa.
Mr. MILLER. I thank the Senator.
THE WORLD FOOD AND POPULA-
TION PROBLEM
Mr. MILLER. Mr. President, on Oc-
tober 24, an outstanding address was
delivered in Des Moines, Iowa, at the
Governor's United Nations Youth Day
meeting by Mrs. Frances Humphrey
Howard, a career civil servant in our
Agency for International Development.
Mrs. Howard is currently the chief of
liaison to nongovernmental organiza-
tions and the special project branch in
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the office of the War on Hunger, and
her words were based on a rich back-
ground of experience in social, economic,
and particularly food problems of the
developing nations.
I was particularly pleased to note that
she singled out the Food and Agricul-
tural Organization of the United Nations
for special emphasis and praise for its
work, with our strong support, in helping
to meet the deeply serious challenge of
an expanding world population and the
food production required to sustain it.
She takes an optimistic view, as do I,
that the challenge will be met.
I have said many times that FAO has
the potential to lead the way in meeting
this challenge. The potential can only
be realized if all the members-and not
just a few of them, including the United
States, remain united in a common goal
and do not let any other considerations
disrupt this unity. At the recently con-
cluded biennial conference of FAO,
which I had the privilege of attending
as a congressional adviser to the Amer-
ican delegation, it was the cause of con-
cern to many delegates that some mem-
bers were tending to lose sight of the
supreme goal-the one Mrs. Howard so
ably describes.
I ask unanimous consent that her ad-
dress be printed in the RECORD.
There being no objection, the address
was ordered to be printed in the RECORD,
as follows:
THE CRUCIAL FOOD/POPULATION WORLD
PROBLEM
(Address by Mrs. Frances Humphrey
Howard)
I am delighted to be here with you and
participate in the Governor's United Nations
Youth Day. I am happy to see the smiling
faces of so many high school boys and
girls, who, I understand, are outstanding
in scholarship and conduct.
It Is most appropriate indeed to hold such
all-day youth meetings on the occasion
of this auspicious 22nd Anniversary of
the founding of the United Nations.,
In celebrating this happy anniversary, we
are reminding ourselves that the U.N. today
represents the hope that the peoples of the
world can live together in harmony, uniting
their strength to maintain international
peace and security and to promote eco-
nomic and social advancement of all
peoples.
The United States supports the United
Nations because the U.N. Charter expresses
our fundamental aims in this difficult world.
Fulfillment of the aims declared in the
Charter will best advance the vital interests
of the United States-peace founded on jus-
tice and freedom and economic and social
progress for ourselves and for all peoples.
We must continue to maintain the vision
to which the United Nations has always
aspired. Only by so doing can we make the
United Nations the instrument of the world-
wide community of hope which its founders
intended it to be.
. Today, the United Nations and its related
agencies are helping the governments of
150 countries and territories speed their own
efforts to raise the living standards of their
own people and to build sound self-sus-
taining economies.
The United Nations Development Pro-
gram makes available to developing nations
the combined knowledge, expertise and ex-
perience of all the U.N. specialized agencies.
And through its day-to-day operations, this
U.N,, program advances the cause of inter-
national cooperation and strengthens the co-
hesiveness of the world community.
I note that the theme for this year's youth
program is: "World Hunger and the Role
of Youth in Alleviating it."
I understand, Mr. Pressly of the National
4-H Foundation will follow me on this ros-
trum with a discussion of rural youth efforts
at home and abroad. I should therefore not
attempt to "steal the thunder" from this
very distinguished gentleman, even if I could.
If I may, I should like to discuss briefly
with you the world food problem; the need
for massive Increase In fertilizer production;
and our efforts in a world war on hunger.
The stark fact facing humanity is that the
world is running out of food. We are pro-
ducing people faster than we can feed them,
just as the English economist Thomas Mal-
thus predicted in 1789, that we would. Unless
trends now gathering force are checked, the
Malthusian nightmare will become a reality.
According to an FAO report, in less than a
decade, world food supplies must Increase at
least 34 percent over the present level in order
to avert the threat of widespread famine.
Already the low-income countries have to
Import $4 billion worth of food each year
simply to maintain nutritional standards
that, in most cases, fall below the minimum
necessary both for health and working efn-
ciency.
The United States is, of course, one of the
leaders in trying to find a solution to the
problem. Congress has authorized the use of
up to $7.5 billion over the next two years in
launching a world war on hunger.
The funds voted by Congress will mobilize
greater United States technology and re-
sources by transferring American farming
techniques and equipment to the developing
countries; constructing fertilizer and pesti-
cide chemical plants; establishing more ex-
tension services, and financing research for
better and nutritious crops.
To emphasize the Importance attached to
this effort and to better coordinate its ele-
ments-food, family planning, nutrition, ag-
ricultural, technical and financial assist-
ance-President Johnson seven months ago
created a new central office in the Agency for
International Development of the Depaxt-
-ment of State devoted to the War on Hunger.
The office is headed by a very able govern-
ment official, Herbert J. Waters.
Throughout the world, Americans are at
work helping to build more self-sustaining
agricultural economies in nations without
them.
And this includes everything, from build-
ing rural schools, roads and clinics, to help-
ing rid Africa of the tsetse fly, to developing
new strains of wheat, to introducing basic
conservation and fertilization techniques to
peasants who have never known them before.
In India, for example, where food supply
has been precarious, we are helping its Gov-
ernment to take hard, practical steps of self-
assistance: To develop a price incentive pro-
gram for food grains, a long-range soil and
water conservation program, and agricultural
research among other things.
A.I.D. projects are helping to Irrigate more
than a million acres In India, a half million
acres In Pakistan, a hundred thousand or
more each in Korea, Afghanistan, Ecuador,
Morocco, and Tunisia.
Every year about 5,000 foreign technicians,
scientists, teachers, and other agriculturally
oriented people come to the United States
for training-training particularly related to
their own countries.
Even in war-torn South Vietnam, modern
agricultural methods are being adopted. New
crops have been Introduced, as well as im-
proved strains of traditional crops. The pro-
duction of pigs has been going up and rice
production is constantly increasing.
The primary credit for this achievement,
of course, belongs to the Vietnamese peasants
and their hard work and Initiative. They
learn quickly. But we have helped.
We have provided guidance on reorganiza-
tion of Vietnamese agriculture, and are pres-
ently recruiting country extension agents to
go to Vietnam to do the same work there.
We have taken initiative, too, toward de-
velopment of the whole Mekong River Delta-
development which would benefit many mil-
lions of people and several nations.
The technical skills of the more advanced
countries will, of course, help produce more
food. Our own agricultural history shows
what can be done.
A century ago, one American farm workers
met the food and fiber needs of himself and
five others. Today, he provides for 37. One
hour's farm labor today produces five times
more than it did forty years ago.
What has been done in the United States,
can be done In the developing countries.
The awakening peoples of the developing
countries could make great progress by using
better fertilizer and tillage methods through
the control of pests and doing the self-help
things progressing nations have to do.
Scientists are confident that it is tech-
nically possible to double and triple food
production in the less developed countries
through better seed varieties, careful irriga-
tion, pesticides, and so forth.
But this involves a painstaking job of
teaching modern technologies to illiterate
peasants, wedded to centuries-old methods
that are steeped in superstition and folklore.
Fertilizer would be the catalyst to send
food production in the less developed coun-
tries spinning upward.
The experts tell us that the best fertilizers
are mostly in the form of urea, ammonium
sulphate, various nitrates and ammonium
phosphates, or carefully worked-out "NPX"
(nitrogen, phosphate and potash) combi-
nations.
Farmers in the developed countreis have
grown accustomed to using them over the
past 25 or more. years. But such fertilizers are
almost as precious as diamonds and as un-
known as the instruments of an air-space
vehicle to the peasants of Asia, the campe-
sinos of Latin America and back-bush vil-
lagers of Africa.
What fertilizers can do was emphatically
proved by widespread, controlled field tests
and demonstrations with rice, beans, corn,
wheat and other staples. In several hundred
thousand individual demonstration plots, the
Indian Government has shown substantial
yield increases-in some cases of as much
as 300 percent.
The fertilizer revolution aims at producing
73 million tons more of plant nutrients an-
nually by 1980. In the opinion of one of the
world's leading chemical economists, Dr.
Raymond Ewell, "if Asia, Africa and Latin
America are not using quantities of fertilizer
approaching 30 million tons annually by 1980,
they are almost certain to be engulfed in
widespread famine."
The fertilizer revolution breaks down Into
three main campaigns. First, tactical-to
ship immediate exports of fertilizer to the
affluent countries. Second, strategic-to build
new fertilizer plants. Third, educational-
to show farmers in the less developed coun-
tries how to use the stuff.
As of mid-September 1966, there were ap-
proximately 800 plants in the free world pro-
ducing basic fertilizer raw materials and
fully 400 new plants either under construc-
tion or planned to go "on steam" by 1970.
More than 100 of these will be in the less
developed countries.
In. this endeavor the United States indus-
try is taking a bold lead. Dozens of American
companies are involved, all of them engaged
in a head-spinning variety of operations: set-
ting up branches, forming local affiliates, par-
ticipating in joint ventures with local pri-
vate Investors and/or governments; expand-
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