THE STRATEGIC BALANCE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP70B00338R000300110055-3
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 2
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 9, 2006
• Sequence Number: 55
• Publication Date: November 22, 1967
• Content Type: OPEN

Approved For Release 2006/01/30 : CIA-RDP70B00338R000300110055-3
November 22, 1967 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE S 17087
have that willingness-you have that en-
ergy-and I know you will succeed.
FARMERS HOME ADMINISTRATION
COMBATS POVERTY IN MAINE
Mr. MUSKIE. Mr. President, one of
the most effective lines of direct. action
in the war on poverty is the program of
small loans to rural families who ask
only for a change to work and earn their
way.
Rural Americans boxed In by poverty
frequently have little to hope for except
a, better opportunity for self-employ-
ment. Industrial and business jobs they
can perform may be scarce or nonexist-
ent in their rural communittes. The
farm, or some small nonfarm enterprise,
offers their best hope for a decent living.
The rural American caught in these
Circumstances can never make a start as
an independent entrepreneur unless he
can obtain tools, supplies and a place to
work.. He has no savings, nor extra in-
come or conventional credit for staking
have given people the opportunity to
do so.
Mr. President, every family who Is able
to start moving through this program
may be subtracted from the distress rolls
of rural America.
~Q THE STRATEGIC BALANCE
Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. Mr.
President, an interesting article, entitled
"The Strategic Balance," appeared in
the November-December 1967 issue of
Ordnance. The author of the article, Dr.
James D. Atkinson, suggests that the
United States use its technological re-
sources to develop a variety of offensive
,and defensive systems to limit an
enemy's capabilities.
Dr. Atkinson, a native of Weston.,
Lewis County, W. Va., is professor of
government at Georgetown University,
research associate in the Georgetown
Center for Strategic Studies, and a mem-
ber of the British Institute for Strategic
Studies. He is author of numerous books
military-technological competition, for upon
these depends our future security.
The July 1967 study of a special subcom-
mittee of the National Strategy Cornrnittee
of the American Security Council, "The
Changing Strategic Military Balance: U.S.A.
vs. U.S.S.R.," gives a blunt warning with ref-
erence to trends to the power equilibrium.
The study states:
. For 1971 it appears that a massive
megatonnage gap will have developed. U.S.
delivery capability Is estimated to range be-
tween 6,000 megatons and 15,000 megatons,
whereas the estimated high for the Soviet
delivery capability Is 60,000 megatons, and
the projection of the established Soviet
range-curve indicates a low figure for the
Soviets of approximately 30,000 megatons. On
the basis of this projection, the U.S. and the
U.S.S.R. will have reversed their roles in a
10-year period."
This study also points out a continuing
strategic problem for the United States-the
high yield of Soviet ICBM's and the resulting
possibility of electromagnetic pulse or other
unexpected weapons effects that might neu-
tralize an entire U.S. ICBM complex however
we might harden or shield it.
Allied to this Is the possibility of a com-
plete blackout of communications and the
consequent transmission failure of a retalia-
tory order by the President. This is so since,
as a result of the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty,
"the United States can only guess at what
unique effects might occur when very high-
yield weapons are exploded. But the Soviets
know."
Because of these and other serious ques-
tions raised, the study has received wide at-
tention In the American press. The New York
Tines, for example, In a front-page story on
July 12, 1967, stated that "the Defense De-
partment did not directly contradict the
study's findings, but argues that deliverable
megatonnage was not an accurate indicator
of 'true military Capability.'"
The Christian Science Monitor--in an rx-
tensive analytical article on July 20, 1907---
stated that "there is growing concern that
the Soviet capability may exceed, now or
soon, that of the United States. Allied with
that is a concern that the United States is
taking insufficient steps to maintain its
position."
In an important public address in San
Francisco on September 18, 1907, Secretary
of Defense Robert S. McNamara announced
"a light deployment of U.S. ABM's" against
the possibility that, in future, the Chinese
Communist "might miscalculate" and launch
a nuclear attack against the United States.
The Secretary of Defense rejected large-
scale ABM deployment by arguing that this
would be directed against the Soviet Union
and that the Soviet response would he a
step-up in its offensive capabilities which
would "cancel out our defensive advantage."
Although Mr. McNamara stated that "there
is no point whatever in our responding by
going to a massive ABM deployment to pro-
tect our population, when such a system
would be ineffective against a sophisticated
Soviet offense," the Joint Chiefs of Staff--as
well as a number of informed Senators and
Congressmen on the Senate and House Armed
Services Committees-believe . that a large-
scale missile defense is a requirement In
view of the rising Soviet military-techno-
logical threat.
Furthermore, it is by no means clear that
the Soviet economy is capable of reacting
fully to a large-scale U.S. deployment of
ABM systems: for example, one which would
include both land-based and sea-based mis-
sile-defense systems.
The evidence of more than two decades
following the Second World War suggests
that it has been the stabilizing factor of U.S.
military-technological superiority which has
prevented a general nuclear war. Today, pri-
marily under the impact of the Soviet
military-technological thrust-but to some
himself to what it takes for a beginning. . and articles In the field of defense anal-
This is the need fulfilled by economic ysis and national security affairs and
opportunity loans administered in rural recently served as a member of a special
areas, by the Farmers Home Administra- committee of the American Security
tion for the Office of Economic Oppor- Council headed by Gen. Bernard A.
tunity. Schriever, which prepared a study for the
We have far to go before we reach all House Armed Services Committee en-
the people we must among the 15 mil- titled "The Changing Strategic Military
lion disadvantaged in rural America.
However, this program has reached more
than 52,000 low-income rural families
since it began in January 1965.
Individual loans not exceeding $3,500
each have been made to 44,500 families,
to help them make a better living on
small farms or go into nonagricultural
enterprises that can yield them a better
living in their home communities.
Fainilies served through the economic
opportunity loan program have taken up
and made a success of more than 350
different types of occupations.
Groups of low-income people, totaling
another 7,500 families, have formed
cooperatives to acquire and operate ex-
pensive farm machinery that no one
family can afford, or supply other goods,
services, and working facilities the mem-
bers can use in order to earn a better
family income.
There are,numerous examples I could
cite of the successes individuals have
made with economic opportunity loans,
but permit me to give this example of a
lobster fisherman In Penobscot, Maine.
Married, with two teenage children, he
had worked as a share fisherman for
37 years, using another man's gear for'
25 percent of the net profit and ekeing
out a bare living of about $2,000 a year.
In 1965 this fisherman qualified for a
$2,500 economic opportunity loan from
the Farmers Home Administrajox>,, to get
his own lobster boat, small truck, and
other equipment. Now, as an independent
lobster fisherman, he can net more in
6 months than he did working on shares
the entire year. Last year he earned
about $4,500 or more than $2,500 above
what he earned the year before.
This is but one example of some 300
loans to fishermen in the coastal areas of
the State, and 1,000 loans in rural Maine
that have enabled low-income families to
make immediate headway with loans that
I ask unanimous consent to insert the
article in the RECORD.
There being no objection, the article
was ordered to be printed in the RECORD,
as follows:
THE STRATEGIC BALANCE: RATHER THAN
SEEK MERE NUCLEAR PARITY WITH THE
SOVIETS, THE UNITED STATES SHOULD USE ITS
TECHNOLOGICAL RESOURCES To DEVELOP A
VARIETY OF OFFENSIVE AND DEFENSIVE SYS-
TEMS To LIMIT AN ENEMY'S CAPABILITIES
(Dr. James D. Atkinson)
It has been said that U.S. military-tech-
nological progress forces the Soviet Union to
react to a particular development. DLit is this,
in fact, correct? Do our strategic patterns sot
the pace for Soviet developments, or do the
Soviets pursue their own strategic goals quite
independent of us?
It- can be argued that in some areas we
may be able to influence Soviet policy. We
of the United States might be able to con-
vince the U.S.S.R. that we can and will main-
tain superiority in the production of long-
range missiles.
But it is unlikely in the extreme that the
Soviets can be convinced that they are pre-
cluded from achieving scientific . and tech-
nological breakthroughs in particular areas-
such as reentry vehicles or advanced anti-
ballistic missile (ABM) systems-which
might lead to a high level of weaponry and
give them superiority over the United States
at a given moment in time.
Indeed, authoritative Soviet Spokesmen and
military journals bluntly indicate that the
Soviet effort Is directed toward the attain-
ment of superiority. Thus Communist of the
Armed Forces (No. 3, 1966) has stated that
"winning and maintaining technical superi-
ority over any probable enemy while there Is
still peace is today of decisive importance."
Especially under the impact of long lead
times, the essence of strategy today is not
so much the now; it is, rather, the 5 years
from now-and the 10 years from now.
It is important, of course, whether or not
we now have over-all strategic superiority
over the Soviet Union. But it is even more
Important to understand the trends in the
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 S 17088
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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD -- SENATE November 22, 1967
extent from Chinese Communist efforts-
that stability appears to be threatened.
If, ,for example, the Soviet strategists can
achieve, or believe they have a very high per-
centage of achieving, an area-kill factor of
incoming missiles (so that there is no prob-
lem of discrimination with reference to de-
coys and live warheads), they may at some
point in time be tempted to launch a sur-
prise nuclear strike upon the United States.
The deployment of a large-scale American,
ABM system or systems is one answer to the
stabilization of power in the world. But it is
not an end in itself.
If the military-technological revolution of
our times teaches us anything, it is that
there are no permanent plateaus in military
technology. Instead there is constant change
and rapid development.
To avoid a nuclear war and to safeguard
the national security, therefore, we need to
move forward with a mixture of both de-
fensive and offensive weapon systems and to
consider, for example, new types of air and
sea-based strike systems made feasible by
technological advances. The variety of our
possible choices of action adds immeasurably
to an enemy's planning problems if he at-
tempts to prepare responses to a broad spec-
trum of capabilities.
A mixture of options-not reliance on one
or two-compounds the task of the enemy
and makes deterrence meaningful to him.
There are many uncertainties and unknown
factors in working out the problems of of-
fense and defense alike, since the, acid test
is--and only is-actual war.
Those things--such as too great reliance
on fixed missile systems-which simplify the
problem, also reduce the uncertainties and
unknown factors posed to the opponent.
Simplification of our options may, in fact,
tempt the enemy to consider a surprise
attack.
Most of all, however, a. "mix" of options is
significant in the load factor which it places
on a potential enemy's military structure.
The Soviet Union is faced with a number of
constraints. If we make the Soviet leaders
consider a new option, it tends to limit their
capabilities-as well as blunting their de-
sires-for playing the game of strategic black-
mail in world politics.
SOCIAL SECURITY COVERAGE OF
EMPLOYERS OF MASSACHUSETTS
TURNPIKE AUTHORITY
Mr. KENNEDY of Massachusetts. Mr.
President, 'section 124a of the Senate
committee bill would permit the Secre-
tary of Health, Education, and Welfare
to terminate the social security coverage
of employees of the Massachusetts
Turnpike Authority at the end of any
calendar quarter following the filing of
notice, as required by section 218(g) (i)
of the Social Security Act.
This amendment to existing law is the
product of amendment number 423,
which I submitted on October 25, 1967,
and certain changes suggested during
consultations among representatives of
the Department of Health, Education,
and Welfare, the Finance Committee
staff, and myself. It is very important to
the 950 employees of the Massachusetts
Turnpike Authority, and for that reason
I was glad to submit it, when it became
apparent that only legislation could bring
the benefits of the new State retirement
system to these employees without im-
posing a harsh double payroll tax on
them for two years.
Mr. President, I have a series of let
ters to and from various individuals, in-
cluding the Governor of the Common-
wealth, which make clear the need for
this provision in the committee bill. Since
they speak for themselves, I ask unani-
mous consent that they be printed in the
RECORD.
There being no objection, the letters
were ordered to be printed in the RECORD,
as follows:
MASSACHUSETTS TURNPIKE AUTHORITY,
Boston, Mass., September 21, 1967.
Hon. JOHN W. GARDNER,
Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare,
Washington, D.C.
DEAR MR. SECRETARY: This is to bring to
your official attention the desire of 950 em-
ployees of the Massachusetts Turnpike Au-
thority, and the Authority as well, for termi-
nation within a reasonable time of an agree-
ment under section 418 of title 42, U.S.C.A.,
whereby social security benefits are extended
to such employees. Adherence to the require-
ment of a two year notice for such termina-
tion, as provided in section 418(g) (lb), would
work such a hardship upon these employees
that it would appear to be entirely incon-
sistent with the manifest purpose of the
social security legislation.
It was at the instigation of the labor union
representing operating employees that the
Massachusetts Turnpike Authority appointed
a staff committee to investigate and recom-
mend a suitable pension plan for its em-
ployees. The committee was assisted in its
work by Martin E. Segal Company, Inc., a
nationally recognized consultant on welfare,
health and pension programs. After a com-
prehensive review of numerous public and
private pension plans, many of which were
combined with social security benefits, the
committee recommended adoption of a pen-
sion system under Chapter 32 of the Massa-
chusetts General Laws which governs con-
tributory retirement systems for pubile em-
ployees in the Commonwealth; and termina-
tion of the existing social security partici-
pation. This recommendation was approved
by the Authority and accepted by the vast
majority of union members voting by secret
ballot.
Necessary legislation to enable the Au-
thority to establish a pension system within
the framework of the State's retirement plan
was recently enacted by the Massachusetts
legislature and approved by His Excellency,
Governor John A. Volpe. It was only then
that it was discovered that a two year notice
would be required before the social security
plan for Authority employees could be termi-
nated. Since the cost of the State pension
system in addition to social security pay-
ments would impose an intolerable burden
upon both employees and the Authority, the
only alternative would be to defer operation
of the State system for two years.
Delay for such a long period would work
a serious hardship upon employees of the
Authority who would thereby be deprived
of the liberal retirement, disability and death
benefits of the State system.
Because a two year notice requirement for
termination of social security participation
seems to be grossly in excess of any apparent
necessity and because such notice will un-
necessarily delay, and may even deprive,
many employees of the Authority of the sub-
stantial benefits to which they would be
entitled under the new pension system, I
urge,you to exercise whatever power or dis-
cretion you may have to relieve this un-
conscionable situation.
Your sympathetic consideration of the
problem is sincerely apreciated.
Very truly yours,
JOHN T. DRISCOLL,
Chairman.
THE COMMONWEALTH
OF MASSACHUSETTS,
Boston, September 25, 1967.
JOHN W. GARDNER, Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare,
Washington, D.C.
DEAR MR. SECRETARY: As Treasurer and Re-
ceiver-General for Massachusetts, I am Chair-
man of the State Board of Retirement which
is the agency of this Commonwealth through
which the insurance system established by
Title II of the Social Security Act is extended
to services performed by employees of cer-
tain instrumentalities of the State, Includ-
ing the Massachusetts Turnpike Authority.
Recently the Legislature enacted Chapter
597 of the Acts of 1967 which provides for
establishment of the Massachusetts Turnpike
Authority Employees' Retirement System.
This system would operate under the same
statutory provisions as the 99 State, County
and Municipal pension systems throughout
the Commonwealth and would give em-
ployees of the Authority the same contribu-
tory retirement rights that are now enjoyed
by other public employees.
But, because of the substantial expense
involved, the Authority must terminate the
participation of its employees under Social
Security before the State pension system can
be made applicable to them. A federal re-
quirement of two years' notice for such ter-
mination would deprive Authority employees
of the substantial benefits under the state
retirement law until 1970.
It may be helpful to you, in determining
what action is appropriate to assist the Au-
thority's personnel, to know something of
the benefits provided under Chapter 32 of
the Massachusetts General Laws, the State's
contributory retirement statute.
The basic benefit under this law for an
employee retiring at or after age 65 is com-
puted as 21/2 per cent of average salary over
the three highest consecutive years times
the number of years of employment. Thus,
a thirty years employee retires at 75 per
cent at his highest three-year average sal-
ary; a twenty-year man retires at 50 per
cent; and the twenty-five year man at 621/2
per cent. .
In addition, the law provides significant
benefits for retirement on account of ordi-
nary disability and on account of occupa-
tional disability; as well as for ordinary or
accidental death before retirement. To illus-
trate-if an employee becomes permanently
disabled as a result of an injury, in the
course of his employment, he receives an
annual pension of
1. Two-thirds of his final salary; plus
2. $312. for each child under eighteen;
plus
3. A supplemental pension that is equal to
the actuarial value of his accumulated con-
tributions;
4. To a maximum of 100% of his final
salary.
As you-would expect, this comprehensive,
liberal retirement program Is expensive. After
allowing for the employee contributions,
which are 5 per cent of salary, the estimated
cost to the employer-Authority will average
,14 per cent of payroll over the next thirty-
five years.
The State Board of Retirement, as con-
tracting agency for the Commonwealth is
prepared to take whatever action is required
on its part to terminate the "Plan" sub-
mitted by the Massachusetts Turnpike Au-
thority for extending the benefits of Title II
of the Social Security Act to Authority per-
sonnel. It is my earnest hope that you can
find the means to terminate the "Plan" on
the part of the federal government within
a reasonably short time.
Very truly yours,
ROBERT Q. CRANE.
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