THE ORBITAL BOMBARDMENT SYSTEM

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP70B00338R000300110045-4
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 4
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 9, 2006
• Sequence Number: 45
• Publication Date: November 14, 1967
• Content Type: OPEN

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November 14, .1967 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - HOUSE H 15245
THE GOVERNMENT LABORATORIES the uranium mines from which the nuclear guides beforehand. This was fine. But trwor
It is also safe to predict that a searching industry gets. its basic raw material. These things blew apart. FRC met on May 4th and
examination of what already is known as the have been m}Ich in the headlines recently there was a split decision. The object was
"government laboratory problem" is in the and the Joint Committee still is in the midst to get together again and make one. But,
offing. Within the AEC itself the issue is how of extensive hearings on the uranium miner somebody lost the script. The Secretary of
many and what kind of laboratories it should lung cancer problem. In the 1950's the na- Labor overreacted, bolted and put out his
operate. Without being specific, I think the tional interest dictated discovery and pro- proposed regulation. This pre-empted FRC
answer will be "less,"'not "more." Also within duction of vast w aratities of uranium are. action and, even more seriously, the proposed
the AEC is the broader issue of the logic or il- The AEC fully and veiy-.. successfully order by Labor was garbled in a number of
logic of its budgetary and management re- establ d a program of prizes a'hd_ incen.- technical aspects.
sponsibility for large and expensive basic re- tip which accomplished the objective. It In summary the way we laid things out
search programs which are loosely atomic s done a reasonably good job since of wI'tli- when we passed the statute setting up the
related but might more appropriately come 7drawal in favor of private industry as thb, FRC broke down and something has to be
within the province of some agency more prime force sponsoring additional explora- '% done about it. What should be done? Abolish
fundamentally oriented toward basic scienc tion and production. However, from the re- 'BC and reorganize the executive to handle
only. I have in mind here the high energ cent request of the Colorado Springs Opera- th'gse problems? Strengthen the FRC to take
accelerators as well as the possibility of re tions Office for money to spend on large scale carb,of this job? Or what?
vising and enlarging the charter of some geological surveys, ore benefication research I n t have the answers-only the ques-
thing like the National Science Foundatio and the like, I gather that the spirit of tions ut I do know, as you know, that not
to encompass their operation, or rescopin bureaucratic empire building is not entirely only ss ety in the mines, but safety thro'iigh-
the AEC as the government's R. & D. Agency dead within the AEC. Resurgent activity in out t e nuclear industry as well as public
the mining and milling industry leads me to safe t depends on getting them. And further,
todian
l
t
.
om cus
l as a
as we
Laboratories operated by the Defense De- believe, however, that it will be able to that the entire matter of standards and spec-
partment and many other government agen- , upply the new surge of yellow-cake demand ifications in the broad sense is critical to the
ties are part of this total picture as well liven if Colorado Springs does not get all the growth and development of the nuclear
as the nongovernmental laboratories and rl\oney it asked for. power industry. They are needed by the pur-
universities with which extensive research n its past efforts to spur uranium produc- chasers of reactors. They are needed by the
contracts are maintained. Because of the "in- tiokthe Commission logically and wisely re- manufacturers and by their suppliers. They
house" laboratory problem is government- frai ed from attempting to nationalize the are needed in order to avoid a breakdown
I think the mini g industry or regulate the mines. That of the licensing and regulation process in the
i
ng,
wide and because it is press
AEC and the JCAE well might take an initia- was recognized as an area of state jurisdic- face of the avalanche of new nuclear power
tive in solving it in order both to set a tion ai i responsibility. On that basis it was plant orders.
government-wide example and to prevent left to the states. Yet the Joint Committee Milton Shaw deserves great credit for zero-
AEC, if it fails to take early action, from and the :Commission because they did so, ing in on this particular problem and work-
being swept into some generalized scheme have beeri. subjected to the severe criticism ing with all concerned to come up with
of reform which may not particularly fit its that they have been neglectful in the mat- some of the answers.
needs. ter of rado4 daughter induced lung cancer ADVANCED CONVERTERS AND BREEDERS
amongst the uranium miners. As pitiful. a
AEC PERIPHERAL ACTIVITIES Mention of Shaw's name, of course, brings
Somewhat akin to the laboratory problem,
because it does involve research as well as
development, is the issue of how much AEC
should continue . to promote peacetime
civilian nuclear applications in such fields
as medicine, biology, food preservation and
similar activities. Those who sternly predict
that once government gets into any kind of
business "it never gets out" must be amazed
to see how swiftly and voluntarily AEC re-
linquishes its isotope production activities
the moment private operators can supply the
market. The activities from which the ABC
might recede I am talking about at this par-
ticular moment, however, fall into a differ-
ent category than isotopes.
In medicine, biology and like areas we do
not find a large involvement of private en-
terprise. The traditional responsibility has
been one of government at some level, univer-
sities, research foundations and so forth. So
the question really is, should the AEC be
financing and managing the efforts because
they are nuclear related, or should the AEC be
urging those who traditionally have operated
in an area to assume its nuclear related as-
pects as quickly as possible? I favor the sec-
ond alternative.
In food processing and other applications
of ionizing radiation by private industry the
question boils down to the rate of progress
you want to make as a matter of national
policy. Perhaps we have tended to overesti-
mate the economic and prestige rewards from
moving here at forced draft rather than at
a pace determined and financed by industry
itself.
By way of contrast, space nuclear power
has just one customer, the government, so
private enterprise in this area is limited to
the prime and subcontractor role. The ques-
tions government has not satisfactorily an-
swered respecting it are simply what do we
want to put in space and when. Space auxil-
iary nuclear power is another matter. The
rapid penetration of industry into the ocean
environment which makes similar power de-
mands, brings government and industry back
into partnership on this one.
RAW MATERIALS
Having just taken you quickly from outer
space to under the oceans, I'd now like to
take you to inner space for a moment-into
these cases fire, it seems to me that we up the bitter issue of the best way to go
adopted a notional philosophy of weaving about developing breeder reactors-a pro-
the emerging clear, industry into our ex- gram in which private enterprise and gov-
ist;ing politica1l, conomic and social fabric ernment enterprise find themselves in am-
as normally as p ssible and therefore, that biguous, uneasy, but necessary partnership.
Labor Secretary 'llent Wirtz's hasty move
to put the the goverment into the mines by Milt wants to go the component development
route. Industry wants a comprehensive ap-
way of Wash-Healey. Act regulation is not proach, on the theory its objective is not
wise. building components, but whole reactors.
His regulation, a d to testimony, - When listening to Shaw I find myself favor-
ing and d unenfofo?cea eable. Instruments- ing his approach and when listening to in-
tion does not exist by witch the required .3 dustry I favor its approach. I like to feel that
working level radon con entrations can be this is not because I am wishy-washy but be-
monitored. Already the r gulation has had cause I believe that the magnitude of the
to be amended to cure def4ets in the defini- job-and the resources both government and
tion of the .3 level and nd to avoid closing industry eventually will. devote to it-will
down all our mines. permit both approaches.
STANDARDS AND SPECIFICATIONS Nor do I wish, by this emphasis on the
I believe the basic fault in~this instance, breeders, to imply any belief that advance
if it can be pinpointed at all, is. a lack of converters are in danger of disappearing from
proper standards to guide the `states in es- the mix of nuclear power systems this na-
tablishing their safety regulati$ s. tion and the world eventually will end up
In 1959 the Joint Committee A tempted. to with. It long has been ?the^custom of a?feQw
ent and
o
er
i
f
ll
ith
v
?_
-
"_. g
n
orma
y w
guides for exposure to radiatiol. It gave
statutory recognition to the Fedelal Radfa- dustry representatives to exchange views on
,.
ifi
major
robleme We have listened
ec
c
p
in.g talents and responsibilities in t 4e field-
AEC, HEW, Labor and others. coolants. I think the time is reasonably close
he Joint when we should bring them all together at
p a formal hearing and get a better. fix on
The first major radiation problem
Committee recognized and hande FRC in when and in what proportion these various
1961 was the development of pr ection ac- types of reactors can be expected to capture
tion guides covering radioactiv fallout. At their markets.
the time, on will recall, at spheric weap-
ons tests we pots. In this case CONTROLLED THERMONUCLEAR REACTORS
we got the FRO to come through, but; it I believe, in evaluating these markets, we
ilit
th
t
l
i
a
poss
b
y
wasn't easy. cannot neglect the very rea
We had to call hearings in both 1962 and controlled thermonuclear reactors may be in
1963 to keep things moving. We also wrote the picture, too. The Joint Committee ac-
a lot of letters and finally got the protec- tively supports the program and regularly
tion guides in 1964. endorses an ever increasing budget. Prog-
As soon as these were out FRC work was ress in understanding and suppressing plas-
ma instabilities is excellent. It. would be reck-
directed toward radiation exposure of ura- less to expect a quick breakthrough in CTR.
nium miners. I have no doubt that its staff But it would be even more reckless to expect
worked hard to come up with the needed none at all. When it comes I am certain in-
in-
guides, but it was obvious the progress was dustry will move swiftly to exploit it.
too slow. Again, the Joint Committee jumped
in to move things along. As soon as we sched- PLOWSHARE
uled hearings, the next meeting of the Coun- Since some of you probably think I am
cil was moved up to complete action on the pretty far out on the fringes talking about
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111 26 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD -- HOUSE November 14, 1967
'filled fusion and since my time is about
exhausted, to conclude I will just switch
to another area many believe is on the fringes
but I do not.. It is Plowshare. Recently
EG&G's Herb Grier, wearing his hat as Presi-
dent of CER Geonuclear Corporation, ex-
plained why his company, Continental Oil
and Reynolds Electric are pouring substan-
tial sums not only into the Gasbuggy Proj-
ect to liberate natural gas locked in hard
shale, but to set themselves up in the general
nuclear rock crushing business on a perma-
nent basis.
Where else, asks Grier can you buy TNT
for 30? a ton? And, how else can you stuff
kilotons of it underground through an eight-
inch hole?
Considering the locked up reserves of
natural gas alone, Grier estimates that in
five to ten years there will be 1,000 shots a
year and a total of 30,000 shots is needed in
the United States alone. This is a lot of
business. I hope the enterprises amongst you
will not let CER get it all.
But that is only one area of Plowshare
application. Its techniques should be appli-
cable to oil as well as natural gas recovery.
As of this week the AEC has a team in Penn-
sylvania looking into the use of Plowshare
to create vast underground storage cavities
for natural gas imported into that state from
elsewhere.
Our old friend Norman Hilberry of Argonne
Laboratory went to Arizona to retire but
instead he is developing a scheme to use
Plowshare to solve that state's critical water
shortage. He would use underground nuclear
explosives to develop giant catch basins to
retain the State's rainfall, 98% of which is
otherwise That to evaporation.
Then there is the intriguing idea Plow-
share heat sinks. Where there is a potential
thermal pollution from a new power plant,
before its construction a Plowshare under-
ground cavity could be blasted which would
"cool down" while the plant is built. Then
the excess btu.s from cooling might be
dumped in the cavity as an alternative to
thermal pollution or dissipation from towers.
Some people think the heat sink idea might
even be practical for systems of central heat-
ing in winter and cooling in summer for
entire cities. I close with these far-out
thoughts mostly to underscore my estimate
that our atomic industry today really is still
in the Model T era and that great oppor-
tunities and great rewards lie ahead for any-
one with enterprise.
SATO SHOULD LIFT EMBARGO ON
TEST RIFLES TO UNITED STATES
(Mr. FINDLEY (at the request of Mr.
RUPPE) was granted permission to ex-
tend his remarks at this point in the
RECORD and to include extraneous mat-
ter.)
Mr. FINDLEY. Mr. Speaker, while the
Prime Minister of Japan, Eisaku Sato, is
here in Washington, seeking major con-
cessions from the United States, I be-
lieve it is timely to draw to the attention
of Congress and the public an important
concession of vital interest to U.S. secu-
rity that the Government of Japan has
refused to grant this country. .
Since last April, the Sato government
has declined to approve an export permit
to allow the shipment to this country of
75.American-designed AR-18 rifles, pro-
duced under license in Japan, which the
U.S. Air Force wishes to test.
As my colleagues may recall, it was
the Air Force in 1962 that led the way in
the testing and adoption of the M-16
rifle, when the Army was still fighting
procurement of that weapon.
Now, the Air Force wants to buy test
quantities of the newer AR-18 rifle,
which is similar to the M-16-but lacks
some of its more troublesome features
for three reasons: First, because of the
Air Force's long-established policy of
seeking the best possible weaponry for
its personnel; second, because the Air
Force has been unable to get the quanti-
ties of M-16 it wants as quickly as it
would like; and third, because of the
problems that our forces have encount-
ered with the M-16.
Prime Minister Sato is now conferring
with President Johnson and other key
American officials seeking several con-
cessions of vital interest to Japan, name-
ly, the return to Japanese control of the
strategic island of Okinawa, as well as
the Ryukyus, which the United States
have held since World War II. Indeed, so
important is the Okinawan question that
it has been publicly suggested that the
Sato government may fall if the Prime
Minister fails to negotiate return of the
island to Japan.
Therefore, as a member of the Foreign
Relations Committee, I believe it is in
bad grace and bad faith for Mr. Sato-
the head of a friendly nation-to seek
such concessions from this country, when
his own Ministry of International Trade
and Industry-MITI-will not even ap-
prove the export to this country of 75
AR-18 rifles for test purposes.
And it could further be suggested that
blocking this AR-18 shipment, valued at
about $10,000, is in particularly poor
grace when it is recalled that earlier this
month, the United States turned over to
the Japanese Government the "technical
package" on America's Nike Zeus and
Nike Hercules rockets, worth millions of
dollars, so that Japanese manufacturers
could produce these weapons for defense
of the Japanese homeland.
Officially, the Japanese Government
has given no explanation as to why the
shipment of 75 AR-18 rifles is being held
up. But unofficially, Japanese officials
have made clear that they fear release
of the rifles to the U.S. Air Force might
prove embarrassing to the Sato govern-
ment.
The Japanese -Constitution forbids its
Government to give direct aid to any for-
eign nation which is a combatant in an
armed conflict. And the United States, of
course, is deeply engaged in Vietnam.
So strong is the antiwar and anti-
American feeling among the politically
powerful left-wing extremists in Japan
that the Sato government apparently
fears this shipment of rifles, if released,
might provoke some kind of a domestic
incident.
But the facts of the situation mitigate
against that possibility. For these guns
are to be shipped to Lackland Air Force
Base, for stateside testing, not to Viet-
nam. Here is the history of the situation:
The AR-18 rifle was designed and is
owned by the Armalite Corp., of Costa
Mesa, Calif. This is the same firm. that
developed the AR-15 rifle, which has
been adopted by the U.S. military as the
M-16. While Armalite sold manufactur-
ing rights for the M-16 to Colt Indus-
tries, licensing it is as world's sole manu-
facturer, it has retained rights to the
newer AR-18, which is also a light, fast-
firing .223-caliber weapon.
That rifle is now being produced for
Armalite, under license, by the firm of
Howa, in Nagoya, Japan. It is from Ar-
malite-Howa that the Air Force has con- -
tracted to buy 75 AR-18s.
And it is the export of those rifles to
the United States which the Japanese
have refused to approve since last April,
despite eff orts by the Air Force and the
U.S. Department of State.
Air Force interest in the AR-18 was
sufficient, at the outset of its discus-
sions with Armalite, that the service
sought to buy 150 of the weapons. Sev-
enty-five of the rifles were to go for the
tests at Lackland, and 75 were to be
flown to Vietnam, for trial under combat
conditions.
But the U.S. State Department, fully
appreciating the difficulties faced by the
Japanese Government, ordered the Viet-
nam part of the order canceled. So there
can be no doubt of their intended test-,
use solely in this country.
Mr. Speaker, there is apparent in this
Congress a rising protectionist sentiment
on matters of world trade. It is a trend
of which I personally do not approve.
And it is a trend that alarms many of the
friendly nations with which we trade-
particularly Japan, which sells consid-
erable steel on the U.S. market.
It is my opinion that an incident like
this one, involving an adverse action
by the Japanese Government on this
small quantity of AR-18 rifles, can only
further stir the ire of many Members
of Congress, and enhance the possibility
that some kind of retaliatory action
available to Congress-such as the vot-
ing of steel, import quotas-may result.
Mr. Speaker, I do not see how Mr. Sato
can seek concessions from this country,
such as the return of Okinawa and the
manufacturing data on the Nike mis-
siles, while withholding approval for the
shipment of 75 rifles to the United
States.
As a Member of Congress with a long
record of active interest in obtaining
top-quality weapons for American fight-
ing men. I do not see how the Japanese -
action in this situation can be described
as anything but deplorable.
Mr. Sato wishes American concessions,
and wishes to retain the - good will of
Members of Congress. I believe he should
release the AR-18 rifle shipment.
(Mr. KEITH (at the request of Mr.
RUPPE) was granted permission to ex-
tend his remarks at this point in the
RECORD and to include extraneous mat-
ter.)
[Mr. KEITH'S remarks will appear
hereafter in the Appendix.]
i; So?)
THE ORBITAL BOMBARDMENT
SYSTEM
The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr.
EDMONDSON). Under previous order of the
House, the gentleman from. California
[Mr. LIPSCOMB] is recognized for 15 min-
utes.
Mr. LIPSCOMB. Mr. Speaker, Secre-
tary of Defense McNamara lifted the veil
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November 14, 1967 CONGRESSIONAL
of secrecy and silence on the status of a
far-reaching threat to our national se-
curity when he disclosed November 3,
1967, that the Soviets have been testing a
s: stem capable of placing in orbit and
detonating on command a nuclear
bomb-the orbital bombardment sys-
tem-which could become operational in
1968.
A capability in the hands of the Sov-
iet Union to bombard this Nation from
orbiting missiles is a matter of grave con-
cern, for it is a weapons system of awe-
some significance.
It cannot be otherwise, ' for it means
that weapons of mass destruction can be
orbiting the earth and the impact point
of their warheads cannot be determined
until they are.about 3 minutes from the
target. -
In spite of efforts of the Secretary of
Defense and other spokesmen to down-
grade the importance of the orbiting
bomb, there is widespread apprehension
about the potential of this weapon. For
example, the Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff said on November 8, 1967,
the weapon "could grow to be a threat of
considerable proportions."
There is no quarrel with any attempts
which may be made to allay public fears
concerning this weapon. Obviously, we
cannot allow this or any other develop-
ment to have a weakening or immobiliz-
ing effect upon actions which may be
required to do our best to safeguard our
Nation's security and sovereignty.
But the apparent indifference of offi-
cials of the Defense Department as to the
seriousness of the threat to us repre-
sented by the orbital bomb is a matter of
deep concern.
This indifference, which is perhaps
best described as an arbitrary refusal to
see the orbital bombardment system and
its potential for actual and psychological
warfare for what it really is, has per-
sisted over the years.
When Secretary McNamara appeared
at the House Defense Appropriations
Subcommittee hearings on February 20,
1964, he described the threat of attack
from enemy satellites as "not an impor-
tant threat for the immediate future."
Shortly after that, Dr. Harold Brown,
then Director of Defense Research and
Engineering and now Secretary of the
Air Force, testifying before the House
Defense Appropriations Subcommittee
on March 11, 1964, said:
It is therefore clear that [orbital bombard-
ment System] weapons are not very great
threats to us in the near future, and that
they are unlikely ever to be. Such weapons
would be largely anti-population in nature
and would not appear to alter Soviet mili-
tary posture sufficiently to justify the sev-
eral obvious difficulties involved in their
deployment.
He further testified during those hear-
ings that "we have not more than three
or four people" studying the question
of orbital bombardment, and "we are
not doing any hardware work."
Dr. Brown came up with such reasons
for this as:
It is not a very good idea.
There now is a U.N. resolution which we
subscribe to and the Soviets have Subscribed
to, not to put bombs in -orbit.
RECORD - HOUSE - 1-115247
And- -
Apparently neither the Russians nor. we
believe it is a very important strategic
weapon.
In the meantime, the Soviets have ag-
gressively applied space to military pur-
poses, and in the case of the orbital
bombardment system they appear to be
far ahead of the United States.
When President Johnson transmitted
to the Congress the sixth annual report
on the accomplishments of the Arms
Control and Disarmament Agency on
February 17, 1967, he said:
The United States has anticipated the fu-
ture by putting all of Antarctica, and more
recently outer space, off limits to weapons of
mask destruction.
Ironically, at the very time the state-
ment was made that we put outer space
off limits to weapons of mass destruc-
tion, according to press reports the
Soviets had already fired three of 11
space shots from a military ICBM launch
complex, a series of shots Secretary Mc-
Namara reportedly referred to when he
revealed there was evidence that the
Soviet orbital weapon system conceivably
could be operational in the near future.
The situation we are confronted with,
therefore, is that soon the orbital bom-
bardment system could be an, accom-
plished fact as a major weapons system
in the Soviet arsenal.
In spite of this, at his November 3,
1967, news conference Secretary McNa-
mara clearly indicated a continued lack
of concern over the Soviet orbital bom-
bardment system.
Secretary McNamara revealed that we
are still relying on a concept of some-
thing which he calls "deterrent" as a
basic defense against this offensive
weapon.
Many have at times felt that the de-
velopment of U.S. defense -forces-par-
ticularly the strategic forces-under the
stewardship of Secretary McNamara has
been intentionally constrained, and that
this seems to be bringing us into a posi-
tion of parity with the Soviets.
In the application of space to military
purposes there should exist no doubt
that what the Soviets seek is superiority,
not parity.
The development of an orbital bom-
bardment system gives added evidence
that the Soviet objective is to achieve
strategic nuclear supremacy over the
United States.
By attaining strategic nuclear superi-
ority, the Soviets could: Complicate the
problem we have in targeting and direct-
ing our strategic forces against the
Soviet Union, reduce U.S. confidence in
our ability to penetrate Soviet defenses
and our ability to destroy Soviet targets,
and achieve an exploitable capability
permitting them freedom to pursue their
aims without resorting to general nuclear
war.
It is the military capabilities which
the Soviets now possess or control which
helps permit the Soviets a freedom to
pursue their aims in North Vietnam and
elsewhere without resorting to general
nuclear war. I
If one were to utilize a term often used
by the Secretary of Defense, one could
say that the Soviets have a deterrent.
It is that Soviet deterrent which ap-
parently deters this administration from
successfully countering against the So-
viet economic, political, and military
support activity which the Soviets sus-
tain against us in North Vietnam.
Furthermore, there is every reason to .
believe the Soviet leaders could, with an
orbital bombardment system, be in a po-
sition to even more freely pursue their
aims.
Officials in our Department of Defense
and others in high positions seem to
place extraordinary faith and reliance on
mere words on paper as the means to
deter the Soviet orbital bombardment
system.
Throughout the story of the Soviet suc-
cess and our failure to develop an orbital
bombardment system there is a consist-
ent theme of reliance on "agreement" or
"resolution" or "understanding" or "ar-
rangement" with the Soviets regarding
weapons in space.
Assurances along these lines have
been repeatedly advanced over the years
and were again repeated in Secretary
McNamara's recitation on November 3
that one of the reasons the Soviets were
not likely to use the orbital missile as a
weapon is that-
It's a violation of an agreement they've
entered into.
This was, of course, a reference to the
Treaty on Outer Space. One of the major
provisions of the treaty is- designed to
bar the orbiting or stationing of nuclear
or other weapons of mass destruction in
outer space. In this regard, many are
puzzled and dismayed over Secretary Mc-
Namara's apparent eagerness to absolve
the Soviets of any violations of the Space
Treaty.
The Los Angeles Times, as one ex- -
ample, in a November 7, 1967, editorial
entitled "Soviets Bend Space Treaty,"
asserted:
But it is nothing short of incredible that
the Johnson Administration seems unwilling
to challenge Russian actions as a violation
of the U.N. treaty banning nuclear weapons
from outer space.
Certainly the American people are unlike-
ly to be satisfied with McNamara's explana-
tion of why Soviet development and testing
of the new weapons system does not violate
the treaty, which the Russians signed only
last January.
Secretary McNamara's announcement
of the Soviet orbital bombardment sys-
tem culminates a case history of an ad-
ministration failure which we certainly
cannot permit to be repeated. -
The psychological or physical harm
which may be inflicted upon the world by
the Soviet's possession of the orbital
bombing system may be of great sig-
nificance. It could in fact determine our
Nation's future.
Greater progress is needed to develop
our own capability to counteract Soviet
strategic weapons systems. Certainly we
are faced with the necessity of develop-
ing a system to defend against orbiting
bombardment missiles. -
Our Nation and the world would be
better off, too, if we challenged the So-
viets on this- weapon as a violation of the
space treaty.
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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD -- HOUSE November 14, _1967
But -mere words alone will not ade-
quately shield the Nation.
Hard work and hardware are required
to deal with weapons of mass destruction
in space.
EVALUATION OF U.S. FOREIGN AID
POLICY
The SPEAKER -pro tempore. Under
previous order of the House, the gentle-
man from New York [Mr. IIALPERN] is
recognized for 10 minutes.
Mr. HALPERN. Mr. Speaker, before
we begin debate on the foreign assist-
ance and related agencies appropriations
bill of 1968, I should like to offer for the
consideration of our colleagues an evalu-
ation of our overall approach to foreign
assistance as embodied in the Foreign
Aid Authorization Act, accepted last
week by this body.
U.S. foreign aid policy has, of late,
been subject to much criticism. But criti-
cism is easy. The harder task is develop-
ing a realistic approach to U.S. foreign
aid and defining the reasons for U.S. ex-
penditures. My examination of our
recently passed foreign aid conference
report, excluding provisions for military
and supportive assistance, convinced me
that our approach to foreign aid is
basically sound.
The United States has a crucial inter-
est in the direction of development of the
rest of the world. She cannot expect
countriesto follow similar paths of mod-
ernization. But she can affect the direc-
tions and rate of change. To keep peace
during this time of turmoil and to help
make other nations' interests compatible
with her own are reason enough to con-
tinue foreign aid.
The foreign aid bill of 1968 recognizes
that the problems developing nations
.face today are qualitatively different
from those of both this Nation at in-
ception and post-World War II Europe.
Many countries have yet to achieve a
sense of their own nationhood. The de-
veloping nations' insistence on immedi-
ate modernization, on a total changing
of society without first developing the
necessary technology, education, funds,
and other equipment have led to bottle-
necks and violence.
How do these conditions affect U.S.
aid policies? No Marshall plan can solve
the problems of underdeveloped nations.
Modernization can only be achieved by a
long-term process and the foreign aid bill
of 1968 recognizes this. The U.S. ap-
proach must be a pragmatic and flexible
one. She must constantly reexamine her
policies and results of these policies and
change them to fit the needs of in-
dividual countries now receiving aid. She
must realize that she can expect no as-
surance that economic growth will lead
to social and political changes desirable
to herself and yet that she cannot stop
her efforts. Finally, she must be willing
to experiment and make mistakes.
S. 1872 is a step in the right direction.
In his foreign aid message of 1967,
President Johnson called self-help "the
lifeblood of economic development."
This bill recognizes that this country and
other donors can supply only a small
fraction of the resources needed for
modernization; the initiative and. much
of the human and physical resources
must be provided by the recipient coun-
try. Sections of the bill place further
emphasis on the principle of self-help. It
combines 20 years of experience by
setting the criteria to judge the efforts of
recipient countries to improve them-
selves.
This bill further recognizes the limita-
tions of U.S. aid attempts. The United
States cannot support the world. Thus,
this Nation has selected 16 key target
nations for her major aid ventures.
This bill further recognizes the limita-
tions of U.S. efforts by selecting areas of
priority. Although much of the under-
developed world is still agrarian, many
nations are still incapable of feeding their
own populations. Thus, the bill continues
the 1961 provisions to increase the tech-
nology, marketing techniques, and to
make recommendations of the most ad-
visable crops a country should produce.
While efforts are being made in the field
of long-term improvements in agricul-
ture, Public Law 480 provides unfore-
seen emergency famine relief. Recogniz-
ing that the world population cannot be
fed in the future if current growth rates
continue, the United States has increased
h. er program urging voluntary family
planning. Modernization is impossible
unless a country's population is healthy
and skilled; thus, S. 1872 continues U.S.
priorities in these two areas also.
S. 1872 is a sound law because it allows
the necessary flexibility of policies for
development of countries. It provides the
guidelines for project-tied and develop-
mental aid, aid with and without strings,
and both grants and loans of funds.
Project aid enables the United States
to direct a country's development. By al-
locating funds and technology for specific
projects, the United States can provide
the necessary impetus for projects such
as the Indus Basin project which
a country without aid might never
attempt. The United States also has other
means of directing a nation's develop-
ment besides specific project aid. She can
attach strings, as demands for monetary
or political reform to her" contributions.
But no nation can delegate upon herself
the responsibility of determining the
course of another country's development,
and this H.R. 12048 recognizes. Thus, the
1968 bill has supplemented project aid
and aid with strings with development
aid and "soft aid," allocations for which
the recipient country can determine her
own uses, free from strings. A combina-
tion of these types of aid gives the re-
cipient freedom to plan her own develop-
ment. '
Current U.S. aid places further empha-
sis on loans rather than grants. Thus, a
"pipeline" or revolving fund for future
aid ventures is created. The merits of this
policy are apparent. But, I believe that
future efforts in this direction should be
tempered because of the fear of fiscal
difficulties it creates in the recipient
countries. U.S. accumulation of foreign
currency lowers the circulating currency
in developing nations and creates the fear
that some day U.S. stockpiles of foreign
currency will be released, flooding the
market and leading to economic up-
heaval in the country receiving aid.
I must repeat that the United States
can expect no mirror image of her own
paths of development in the developing
nations today. Private enterprise and
nonprofit organizations do have an im-
portant role in our foreign aid which
part II of the current bill recognizes. But
we should neither demand that a nation
buy our own products nor demand free
enterprise as the only principle upon
which an economy can be built.
Rapid change often demands regula-
tion by the government and more regu-
lated ownership than free enterprise.
The United States should continue to
support the free enterprise system and
her own corporations, but be willing to
make sacrifices. More orderly control by
the government is often more of an as-.
surance for the conditions in which de-
mocracy can flourish than a disorderly,
bottlenecked, free enterprise system in
which frustration and violence can be-
come more rampant. -
These efforts mentioned are limited to
about 16 countries. But technological aid
under title II of the development assist-
ance program benefits a total of 40 coun-
tries. The United States is thus helping
to train people in the necessary skills
needed for modernization, and makes
her foreign aid program a broader one.
Foreign aid is not simply a bilateral
venture by this Nation. Some of the more
promising features of this bill are con-
tained in the provisions for U.S. support
of international organizations such as
the World Bank and Inter-American
Development Bank, groups of nations
acting in consortia, and the agencies of
the United Nations. These groups have
the potential of providing more funds
and aid free from the pressure of the
demands of any one government. My re-
cent trips to Latin America and Africa
have convinced me that, although these
groups are now limited in scope and
effectiveness, they have the potential to
play a large part in the efforts of devel-
oping nations.
Just as the donor is not always one
country, the recipient of aid may be an
entire region. Countries are political
boundaries and are not economically
viable. Many projects like the Indus Ba-
sin project and plans- like the Colombo
plan must deal with an entire region to
be effective. They can benefit a great
area as well.
Through its Foreign Assistance Au-
thorization Act, Congress has played an
important role in creating U.S. foreign
policy. Congress has provided the broad
outlines and necessary flexibility for our
foreign aid. The effectiveness of this im-.
proved foreign aid bill now depends upon
efficient administration and implementa-
tion of its provisions.
I support this bill as a good definition
of the needs of developing countries and
hope that Congress will continue to play
a role in this field by examining the im-
plementation of policies throughout the
duration of S. 1872.
IS THE SECRETARY OF LABOR
ABOVE THE LAW?
The SPEAKER pro tempore. Under
previous order of the House, the gentle-
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