COUNTER DETERRENCE AND THE ABM EXTENSION OF REMARKS OF HON. E. ROSS ADAIR OF INDIANA IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES WEDNESDAY, OCTOBER 25, 1967

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP70B00338R000300110023-8
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 2
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 9, 2006
• Sequence Number: 23
• Publication Date: October 25, 1967
• Content Type: OPEN

October 25, 1967ApprovecLFa&ZA1 g"IfL/0 386 --RDXJP WNR000300110023-8 A 5239
in the ability of the purchasers of their
products to pay for them, eventually, in gold.
Regardless of how fancy the printing, or how
many optimistic claims are made for it, it
is still paper of no intrinsic value. It simply
starts the printing presses rolling in inter-
national affairs, and probably the result will
be no different than the national inflation
the printing press money has caused in the
United States.
Our dollars continue to flow outward, along
with our gold reserves, and an annual deficit
for many years now decreased our gold sup-
ply to its lowest point. As long as this situa-
tion continues, and as long as world faith
in our credit lives, there will be many coun-
tries which will see little need, or desirability,
for the Special Drawing Rights.
Any loss of faith in our credit, causing a
substantial demand for gold in exchange for
dollars held, by foreign nations would, how-
ever, certainly not be mitigated by any
"paper gold" in existence. On the contrary,
since the use of such a scheme is expected
to enlarge the debt structure, while causing
no improvement in the deficit problem, it
could hasten the loss of faith and accelerate
the demand of many nations for true value
in metallic gold.
Gold is one of the most powerful incen-
tives. Gold and the power it provides cause
dictatorships to come into being, personal
rights to be violated and civilizations to fall.
Our inflation would not have progressed as
it did, if it were not for the printing press
money made possible by its low percentage
of backing in gold. Our national debt would
cause much greater concern among influen-
tial financiers, and probably would not have
reached its towering height, if it were not
for the "gold" represented by the interest
being earned by national and international
interests, which in many cases also profit
from the sale of a large share of the goods
paid for by the borrowed money.
As long as financial gain of those in con-
trolling positions would be adversely affected
by sound programs, we will continue to see
plans similar to the "paper gold" scheme
advanced as panacea for world problems.
We will find such schemes generally ac-
cepted on the basis that intelligent world
leaders would not be supporting them un-
less they were workable and beneficial.
There probably was never a dictator in
history who was not intelligent, but benev-
olence and altruism are not virtues which
must accompany high mental capacity.
EXTENSION OF REMARKS
or
HON. CLARENCE D. LONG
OF MARYLAND
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Wednesday, October 25, 1967
Mr. LONG of Maryland. Mr. Speaker,
the Bronze Star has been awarded post-
humously to Pfc. Robert L. Johnson, a
young soldier from Baltimore who was
killed in action in Vietnam.
I would like to include the following
article in the RECORD in memory of Pri-
vate First Class Johnson:
VIETNAM VICTIM GETS BRONZE STAR
The Bronze Star has been awarded post-
humously to Pfc. Robert L. Johnson, who waS
killed August 1 while on reconnaissance pa-
trol for the 1st Squadron, 10th Cavalry, in
Vietnam.
A native of Baltimore, Private Johnson
was the son of Mr. and Mrs. Garnie Johnson,
of 3005 Georgetown road. He attended the
high school divison of Baltimore Bible Col-
lege, and had planned to study for the min-
istry when he left the Army.
Private Johnson had been in the Army for
a year. In the citation, he was praised for his
versatility, bravery, and professional com-
petence.
Counterdeterrence and the Ay B
EXTENSION OF REMARKS
OF
HON. E. ROSS ADAIR
OF INDIANA
TN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Wednesday, October 25, 1967
Mr. ADAIR. Mr. Speaker, our Secre-
tary of Defense has recently announced
the start of work on a so-called thin anti-
ballistic-missile system. This is a step
forward, in spite of the fact that it is only
to take into account the threat of Red
China. It is my feeling that something
more must be done to meet the Soviet
threat. In this connection, I commend
the following article, entitled "Counter-
deterrence and the ABM," by Prof.
James D. Atkinson, of Georgetown Uni-
versity, which appeared in the Washing-
ton Report of the American Security
Council of August 21, 1967.
The article follows:
COUNTERDETERRENCE AND THE ABM
(By Dr. James D. Atkinson)
That trenchant observer of the American
scene, Will Rogers, once observed that in the
field of disarmament Americans had a tend-
ency to scrap battleships while their oppo-
nents tore up blueprints. Something of this
American tendency of an almost extremist
goodwill is in evidence today with reference
to the question of anti-ballistic missile de-
fense. We talk and talk in the hope that
we can persuade the Soviet Union to dis-
mantle its present anti-ballistic missile sys-
tem and to refrain from going ahead with
further missile defenses. The Soviets stall in
the negotiations while continuing to build
and deploy their ABMs.
SOVIET CAPABILITIES AND INTENTIONS
The recent study prepared by a special
sub-committee of the National Strategy
Committee of the American Security Council
entitled "The Changing Strategic Military
Balance: U.S.A. vs. U.S.S.R.," has stated that
"the preponderance of evidence points to
the conclusion that the Soviet Union is
succeeding in its massive drive toward stra-
tegic military superiority ... (and that) the
year 1967 falls in a crossover period with
the U.S.S.R. estimates ranging between 16,000
and 37,000 (deliverable) megatons, to equal
or exceed the U.S. estimated range of be-
tween 8,000 and 29,000 (deliverable) mega-
tons "This study, with its graphic docu-
mentation of the Soviet thrust for military-
technological superiority, has received, and
continues to receive, widespread attention
from leading editors and authorities in both
the daily and the periodical press. The New
York Times, for example, in a front page
story on July 12, 1967, stated that ". . . the
Defense Department did not directly contra-
dict the study's findings, but argued that
deliverable megatonnage was not an accurate
indicator of `true military capability'."
(Emphasis added.)
It has been argued in some quarters in the
West, however, that Soviet capabilities as
illustrated by the Soviet deployment of an
ABM system need not be a cause for alarm
since Soviet intentions are peaceful and the
Cold War is, in fact, over.
But are the Soviet leaders mellowing? Un-
fortunately, the most recent evidence would
appear to indicate that storm flags are flying
in the Kremlin. Some storm signals are:
(1) The official pronouncement of the
Communist Party of the Soviet Union issued
June 25, 1967, in a summary of 50 years of
Bolshevism. It stated that, "The domination
of imperialism on the world scene has ended"
because of the growth of Soviet military
power. The statement also singled out the
United States as the "main enemy" of the
national liberation warfare movement and
charged the state of Israel with aggression.
(2) Appointing (for the first time since
Beria's execution in 1953) the Soviet secret
police chief a member of the ruling Politburo.
This is Yuri Andropov, whose promotion was
announced June 22, 1967. Since the KGB
(the Soviet secret police) have vast respon-
sibilities for waging unconventional warfare
around the world, it would appear that giving
Andropov such power indicates stepped-up
Cold War operations.
(3) Writing in the official Soviet Armed
Forces newspaper, Red Star, on June 3, 1967,
Bulgarian Minister of Defense, General of the
Army Dobri Dzhurov said: "The Soviet Union
has always been and will continue to be the
main political and material base of the world
revolutionary process." (Emphasis added.)
The general also went on to say that "The
Soviet Union constitutes the main support of
fighting Vietnam."
(4) Soviet escalation of the Vietnam war
is another example of the Soviet's true in-
tentions. Soviet shipping going into North
Vietnamese ports has shown a marked in-
crease this year over 1966.As of June 1967 the
rate was eighteen per month with an addi-
tional 2 to 5 Soviet satellite ships per month.
Indicative of this escalation is the Moscow
Radio broadcast of July 28 which stated that
Soviet ships "leave Odessa practically every
day with cargoes for Vietnam."
(5) The recent hard-line in the Soviet
press, which continually attacks Israel, "Zion-
ism," and the United States. In reporting this
trend from Moscow, the Washington Post of
August 8, 1967 stated that the press cam-
paign was one which "to some senior diplo-
mats here recall the worst days of the Cold
War."
These indicators of increasingly "stormy
cold war weather" indicate that Soviet
strategists understand quite well that rev-
olutionary agitation and propaganda, "peace
marchers" in London and New York, guer-
rillas in Africa and Latin America are tech-
niques of conflict on a par with guided mis-
siles and nuclear submarines. But does it fol-
low that these same Soviet strategists are un-
aware of the possibilities for nuclear black-
mail of the West in the event that they at-
tain strategic military-technological superi-
ority? Indeed, one may well ask whether the
present U.S. limitations on air strikes against
military targets in North Viet Nam result
from the steady accretion of Soviet military-
technological power?
CHINESE COMMUNIST NUCLEAR WEAPONS
DEVELOPMENT
Even if it were possible to disregard the
evidence of the Soviet deployment of an
ABM system or systems and the counter-
deterrence which this poses to the an-
nounced U.S. policy of deterrence, it would
be still more difficult to close our minds to
the ominous developments in China.
The Chinese Communists exploded their
first H-bomb on June 17, 1967. It was appar-
ently a sophisticated implosion type in the
two-to-seven megaton range. The compli-
cated electronic triggering and measuring
devices that would appear to have been re-
quired, in this and other nuclear tests, would
be of great assistance to the Chinese in
building an intercontinental missile. Since
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the Chinese progress in nuclear weapons de-
velopment has been faster and more effective
than had been anticipated by Western
sources, it may be that they will also develop
a nuclear ICBM delivery capability sooner
than the mid-1970's, which is the time phase
previously estimated by Western sources.
Moreover, the Chinese now possess the design
capability for a multimegaton thermonu-
clear weapon which can be delivered by
aircraft.
The possibilities of the Chinese Commu-
nists exercising nuclear blackmail against
Southeast Asian countries, Japan, or, in-
deed, against the United States are under-
scored in a report released August 3, 1967, by
the Joint Congressional Committee on
Atomic Energy. The Committee said: "We
believe that the Chinese will continue to
place a high priority on thermonuclear
weapons development. With continued test-
ing we believe they will be able to develop a
thermonuclear warhead in the ICBM weight
class with a yield in the megaton range by
about 1970. We believe that the Chinese can
have an ICBM system ready for deployment
in the early 1970's. On the basis of our pres-
ent knowledge, we believe that the Chinese
probably will achieve an operational ICBM
capability before 1972. Conceivably, it could
be ready as early as 1970-1971."
The Joint Committee then went on to
sound a warning about the direct threat to
U.S, national security posed by Chinese
Communist nuclear weapons developments
by pointing out that "Most significant for
the United States is the fact that a low
order of magnitude attack could possibly be
launched by the Chinese Communists
against the United States by the early 1970's.
At present we do not have an effective anti-
ballistic-missile system which Gould repel
such a suicidal (for the Chinese) but never-
theless possible strike."
In the final analysis, the value of a system
.of deterrence is that which the enemy be-
lieves about it. If the Soviets believe that the
U.S. deterrent offensive force can be neutral-
ized by their ABM systems to a point at
which the Soviet war-making capability will
sustain only an acceptable level of damage
(and, of course, their acceptable level may
be much higher than ours), then they have
achieved a counter-deterrence posture which
may lead them to risk-at a given crisis in
international relations-a nuclear war.
Equally, if at some future point the Chi-
nese Communists should believe (in the ab-
sence of a U.S. ABM system) that there is
somewhat more of a "suicidal" element for
the United States than for them in a nuclear
war, they might, in a given confrontation,
launch a surprise nuclear attack on America.
The evidence of the post-World War II
period suggests that it has been the stabiliz-
ing factor of U.S. military-technological
power which has prevented a general war.
Today, under the impact of both the Soviet
and Chinese Communist military-technolog-
ical thrust, that stability appears to be
threatened. Would the production and' de-
ployment of a U.S. ABM system-perhaps
even on a crash basis as a clear demonstra-
tion of credibility-have a definite stabiliz-
ing value on world politics? That it might
well do so is indicated by the thoughtful and
carefully measured words of the Senate Ap-
propriations Committee. In reporting on the
Defense Department Appropriation Bill for
fiscal 1968 (August 4, 1967), the Committee
said: "It is the view of the Committee that
the deployment of the NIKE-X antiballistic
missile system should be initiated imme-
diately, and the Committee urges the execu-
tive branch of the Government to take action
accordingly."
Address by Hon. Paul A. Fino in
Support of Our Boys in Vietnam
EXTENSION OF REMARKS
OF
HON. CARLETON J. KING
of NEW YORK
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVE~
Wednesday, October 25, 1967
Mr. KING of New York. Mr. Speaker,
I would -like to bring to the attention of
this House an address given by our col-
league, the Honorable PAUL A. F1:NO, at
,the conclusion of the October 22 Bronx
War Veterans rally in support of our boys
in Vietnam. Mr. Faro's speech, which was
extremely well received, puts Vietniks,
beatniks, and their political allies in ex-
actly the right perspective. We need more
of these rallies and more men like PAUL
FINO to support them. The voice of pa-
triotism is so rarely heard these days
that I agree with my colleague our men
in Vietnam must know that the vast ma-
jority of Americans have not abandoned'
them. We do support them 100 percent.
Mr. FINO's remarks follow:
ADDRESS BY CONGRESSMAN PAUL A. FIND
Mr. Chairman, Admiral Clark, Reverend
Clergy, Distinguished Guests and Fellow
Americans :
At the outset, let me say that I am proud
to be here today and privileged to partici-
pate in these patriotic ceremonies.
Whether we agree or disagree with our
tactics and policy in Vietnam is unimpor-
tant and immaterial. The essential thing to
remember is that our American boys are
fighting and dying over there, fulfilling their
duty to their country, and it is our great
obligation to give our fighting men all the
material and moral support they need. They
must know that their sacrifice is important
and that it is appreciated and that we stand
behind them 100%.
I cannot think of anything that makes
me more ashamed than the actions of some
high officials of our land who shun patriotic
parades to meet with Soviet poets; who shun
flag-raisings but applaud flag-burnings; and
who mock the sacrifices of our young men in
Vietnam while prancing around with hip-
pies and peace-niks.
I cannot think of anything that dis-
turbs me more than the persistent attempts
by this Administration to build trade
bridges with the Soviet bloc while we are
engaged in a brutal conflict in Vietnam in
which, Red Russia is supplying our enemies
with massive arms, weapons, ammunition
and equipment.
I cannot think of anything that bothers
me more than the demands of some of our
politicians who urge that we reduce support
of our boys in Vietnam so that priority can
be given to domestic needs.
I cannot think of anything that makes
my blood boil more than the actions of our
city brass who justify the presence of ex-
communists in our poverty program and
identify them as "distinguished public
servants."
I cannot stand here today and say that
our involvement in Vietnam is the height
of w{sdom, because, like General MacArthur,
I believe that it was a mistake for the United
States to get involved in an Asian land war
but I say to you that since we are heavily
involved and committed in Vietnam we have
an obligation to support our fighting men
over there. We have an obligation to keep
the flag-burners, the Vietniks, the draft-card
burners, the peaceniks and the hippy-cod-
dling politicians from stabbing our fighting
men in the back,
The purpose of these ceremonies is to show
the world that we, in America, will not
ignore the valor and sacrifice of our boys
in battle.
We want the whole world to know that
we will give our fighting men all the mate-
rial support they need.
We want the whole world to know that
our moral support is total.
We want our fighting men in Vietnam to
know that their sacrifice is important and
that it is appreciated. It. is our duty as
Americans to give them our fullest and com-
plete support. That is what we pledge here
today.
The Kee Report: Panama Canal Treaty
EXTENSION OF REMARKS
OF
HON. JAMES KEE
OF WEST VIRGINIA
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Wednesday, October 25, 1967
Mr. KEE. Mr. Speaker, under leave to
extend my remarks in the RECORD, I in-
clude last week's public service television
and radio newscast, "The Kee Report."
The subject discussed in this report is
the proposed new treaty with Panama,
governing the canal. The report follows:
This is Jim Kee-bringing you the Kee
Report.
I believe the American people take pride
in the fact that building the Panama Canal
was one of the greatest engineering feats in
history. Every school boy knows that the
primary purpose in building this waterway
was to shorten the distance between the At-
lantic and Pacific and thus, help both our
commerce and our national defense.
This marine highway has now been open
to ocean traffic a little more than half a cen-
tury. During this time, which included two
world wars, the canal has proved its useful-
ness in a substantial way. Although Ameri-
can cargo comprises the bulk of canal traffic,
the ships of foreign nations pay the same
tolls as our own. This has been helpful to
the maritime nations and also to the coun-
tries of South America, because much of their
import and export traffic passes through the
canal.
Because canal traffic is expanding at a
rapid rate, experts predict that another deep-
sea channel between the two oceans will be
urgently needed before too long. In fact, the
need is so apparent that a Federal commis-
sion is now studying the project.
Meanwhile, the Republic of Panama has
complained so loud and so long, that a new
treaty has been prepared governing the oper-
ation of the canal. While this new treaty is
still unpublished here, its terms have been
freely discussed in Panama. Several radical
changes are in the making, including dual
operation of the canal and much higher
payments to Panama to be paid for by in-
creased tolls. I have no wish to prejudge
this agreement, but experts are warning that
a heavy boost in canal tolls could hit some
American industries very hard, including the
coal industry of West Virginia. In recent
years, the industry has enjoyed a growing
export business, helped in large part by the
low carrying charges- of ocean going vessels.
Thus, coal from our West Virginia fields is
transported by rail to the Eastern Seaboard,
and thence by ship through the canal to
Japan.
If canal tolls are revised upward to the
extent now contemplated by Panama, the
coal export trade .to Japan would simply dis-
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