SOVIET REPORTED WORKING ON BOMB FIRED FROM ORBIT

Document Type: 
Collection: 
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
CIA-RDP70B00338R000300110015-7
Release Decision: 
RIFPUB
Original Classification: 
K
Document Page Count: 
2
Document Creation Date: 
December 19, 2016
Document Release Date: 
January 9, 2006
Sequence Number: 
15
Case Number: 
Publication Date: 
November 4, 1967
Content Type: 
NSPR
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PDF icon CIA-RDP70B00338R000300110015-7.pdf209.32 KB
Body: 
rpved _FQ,r__,e //3 Ip-Rnp7~ 0 3 000110015-7 :Heen sal uner que's hi-ib 3@v21i5en of'(lrould not sim 1 u SOVI ing that this warhead was about could be initiated at any time, [moo FOSS wea oris tin norbii the same size as those carried ,for relatively rapid deployment, C lour anal ses conclude `that itY around the earth disguised as " on o of the 650 submarLne-_, wouid? not improve our stra ordinary space satellites _ and 1tJRK1I6 ON BOMB launched Polaris missiles the tegic offensive posture and hen fire their warheads at the United States has deployed. consequently we have no in- LUnited States at the last minute Polaris warheads are often `ention of revising the decision jin a surprise attack, Mr. Mc- 11 It nade ears a "' Nara said thatthis would do FIRLI!1 n FI0M ORBIT referred to as City DUSLers, Mr. J McNamara mara said that and d one to three megatons is is once the warhead was fired,. considered sufficient to demol- ,;here would be only about three., 'Nuclear Weapon Could Be Put in Operation by Next Year, McNamara Says BUT HE ISN'T CONCERNED Defense Chief Sees Serious Disadvantages in System and Rules It `Out for U.S. ish the city of. New York. minutes' warning before it hit The Soviet tests have been in its target. progress since September of The Intercontinental Ballistic 1966. Soviet military leaders IMsssile System that is now de- talked as early as November, ployed, Mr. McNamara ex- a 1965, about an "orbital missile" piained, fires a warhead into high trajectory above the earth that could deliver nuclear war- I like a bullet until the warhead s,..:,. the fi n other 41reaches a eak alt;+?de of e,_i' '--- d- "_ n r a y p p Ulu- {back into the. atmosphere o- give us more warning time' Uncertainty Conceded ward its target. against a full-scale attack using. Mr. McNamara said it was But the orbital bomb, he said,' FOBS missiles than BMEWS still "impossible to be certain" is initially launched "into a does against the ICBS launch." exactly what the tests were very low orbit about 100 miles Under subsequent questioi bove the earth" in h w h id h g, a o ever, e sa t at th for and that the Russians could Abe "testing space vehicles for Re-entry Path Followed over-the-horizon radar could J conceivably provide "roughly some re-entry program." "At a given point generally 15 minutes" of warning of, a I "I think it more likely," he before the first orbit is com- FOBS weapon attack, about the lete- rocket en ine is fir d a g e said, however, ""that they are P 'could warning time the BMEWS Text of McNamara statement h FOBS they which slows down the payload' could give of an ICBM assaut: ra is printed on Page 2. By NEIL SHEEUAN $pecial to The, New York Times WASINGTON, Nov. 3 - The S Soviet Union is almost certainly developing an orbital nuclear s bomb that could be put into operation as early as 1968, Sec: retary of Defense Robert S.. McNamara said today at a?, Pentagon news conference. working on t e and causes it to drop out of Mr. McNamara said that the than on re-entry vehicles. It's orbit," he said. "The navload too early to be sure, but the weight of the evidence points toward the former. "If this turns out to be true, it is conceivable that they could achieve an initial opera- tional capability during 1968." Despite this prospect, Mr. McNamara. said that he was cpntinurd nn Page 2. Column.2 gence information gathered by ? the United States about a series not concerned,? nulnber~ of,reasons and that the Unit- of space tests now being con- ed States had no Intention of !ducted by the Soviet Union developing its own orbital nu- I hd l d to th l th on i e c usion e e c n a . clear bomb. month or so that the testy . , were aimed at "the possible He asserted that the FOBS development by the Soviet of weapon had serious disadvan- :ages compared with the Inter- something we have called a continental Ballistic Missilei Fractional Orbital Bombardment System, which, along withI System or FOBS. manned strategic bombers, the He explained that the FOBS. United States depends on for was called a Fractional Orbital its nuclear offensive capability. Bombardment System because AdvBnntages Offset the warhead would normally, The deployment of a new not make a full orbit, or com- lRussians long-range, over-the-horizon ra- ,plete circuit of the earth,' before dar by hte, United States in it was fired at a target on the February of 1968 would also gr und. offset whatever advantage the P would,gain from the W, arhead Weight Estimated deployment of the FOBS weap- on, he contended. Asked how heavy 'a warhead "Some years we our- the FOBS could . ari , Mr. Mc- selves examined INamara` said it could war 1`roth i ty of the FO ere Iequivaler t o" q r mil land military le alders ttiat there[ as no need for our country lion tons o __ -__ ? such Appr'rwed Tor, Release 2006/01/ then follows a re-entry-path similar to the re-entry of a bal- listic missile." The long, low trajectory of the orbital bomb gives it the advantage of being able to avoid detection by the Ballistic Missile Early Warning System radar, which the. United States has deployed. The EEMEWS is designed to detect incoming . warheads at a much higher tra- jectory. The other principal advan- tage of the FOBS weapon, he said, is that the defending forces could not determine the target "until ignition of the rocket engine that deboosts t"he payload out of orbit-roughly three minutes and 500 miles from the target'" But the FOBS weapon has the two serious disadvantages, Mr. McNamara said, of being "significantly less" accurate than an ICBM and of being limited to a nuclear warhead "but a fraction" of the weight of an ICBM payload. Because of its capability to detect warheads or other space vehicles approaching on a long, low trajectory, Mr. McNamara said, the new American over- the-horizon radar will negate both advantages of the B weapon. The over-the-horizon. _.radhr would detect the FOBS weapon the Soviet Union no good. To be effective, he said, 'the Russians would have to launch a large number of FOBS weap- ons simultaneously, and the over-the-horizon radar would give the United States adequate' warning of this obviously, hos- tile development. In a statement at the begin- ning of the news conference, Mr. McNamara asserted that ment of the over-the-horizon radar about 60 days ago after several. years of development' and used the system to help provide intelligence on the ap- parent Soviet development of a FOBS weapon. Accuracy Questioned He also contended that the FOBS weapon "would not be accurate enough for a satisfac- tory attack upon United States Minuteman missiles, protected in their silos." Mr. McNamara was then asked why the Russians would conceivably develop such a weapon if It was going to be of so little use to them. "I think the most logical ex- planation," he said, "is that we have maintained a very large bomber force in contrast to their relatively smaller bomber; force and we will continue to maintain them (the bombers) in' the future. "They think they can eliml nate the bomber force by elimi- nating the warning time that the bomber force needs to survive." TThI~y Irnited;States has about ]630 "B12 and B-58 strategic1 soon after it is launched rj4 would therefore provide much more warning time than Amer- ican defenders might have if they had to wait until the war. 00300110015-7 $ Ilen,asked if the Russians Approved For Release 2006/01/30 : CIA-RDP70B00338R000300110015-7 bombers in servilce i'- tg A z s to maintain 465 B-52's an d new F-111 bombers in operation through the early nineteen- seventies. The Soviet Union has 20a to 250 strategic bombers. Mr. McNamara explained that the 15-minute warning of an ICBM attack provided by the early-warning radar system en- able the bombers on a perma- nent 'airborne alert to move toward their targets and those on ground. alert to take off. "What the FOBS does," Mr. McNamara said, "is to circ~nn vent the BMEWS. But we coun- ter their action with a reaction to gain early warning with the over-the-horizon radar and sol we recapture the warning time." I mation -here this morning to' confirm the statement by Mr. McNamara that the Soviet Union was developing an orbital nuclear bomb. Moscow Silent MOSCOW, Saturday Nov. 4 (Reuters)-Theie,w0 no Approved For Release 2006/01/30 : CIA-RDP70B00338R000300110015-7