ADDRESS BY ROBERT S. MCNAMARA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP70B00338R000300100105-8
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 4
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 12, 2006
• Sequence Number: 105
• Publication Date: September 18, 1967
• Content Type: OPEN

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y~ieptember 18, 198T CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - LIOXJSE
V
Last but not least we ask for and urgie the
f'tllleat enfdreement of the clvit rights laws,
federal, state or local, so that all Americans,
including servicemen and veterans, shall be
able tro enjoy without threat of reprisal their
personal freedom of movement, their politi-
cal rights, and the opportualty to pursue life,
liberty and happiness', as vouchsafed in our
Iloclaration of Tndependenco.
Equal opportunities In Government
contracts
Equality of Opportunity as It affects those
who hold contracts with the C+overnment Sa
rtlrrently regulated by Executive Order
7.71248, !n which the ultimate sanction, if the
ter. us to postpone a decision on whether or not a
an ABM system against the Soviet nuclear The plain Pact of the matter is that we light ABM deployment might be advanta-
threat. are now lacing a situation analogous to the genus as a countermeasure to Communist
To begin with, this is not in any sense a one we laced in 1981: we are uncertain of C gut the time will shortly be right for us to
new Lssue. We have had .bath the technical the Soviets' intentions.
possibility and the strategic desirability of At that time we were concerned about initiate production it we desire such a
an American ABM deployment under con- their Potential offensive capabilities; now we system.
stant review since the late 1950s. are concerned about their potential defen- China at the moment is caught up in in-
Whfle we have substantially improved our save capabilities. ternal strife, but it a~eems likely that her
technology in the field, it is important to But the dynamics oP the concern are the basic motivation in developing a strategic
understand that none of the systems at the s~e? nuclear capability is an attempt to provide
present or foreseeable state of the art would YNe must continue to be cautious and con- a basis for threatening her neighbors, and to
provide an impenetrable shield over the servative in our estimates-leaving no roam clothe herself with the dubious prestige that
United States. Were such a shield possible, in our calculations for unnecessary risk. And the world pays to nuclear weaponry.
we would certainly want it--and we would at the same time, we must measure our own We deplore her development of these weap-
certainly build it, reeiponse in such a manner that it does not ens, just as we deplore it in other countries.
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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - H~USE ~ep~ember I8, 19~'6~'
to the. development of all new nuclear weap-
onry. If a weapon system works-and works
well-there is strong pressure 'from many
directions to procure and deploy the weapon
out of all proportion to the prudent level
required.
The danger. in deploying this relatively
light and reliable Chinese-oriented ABM
system is going to be that pressures will
develop to expand it into a heavy Soviet-
oriented ABM system.
We must resist that temptation flrmly-
not because we can for a moment afford to
relax our vigilance against a possible Soviet
first-strike-but precisely because our great-
est deterrent against such a strike is not
a massive, costly, but highly penetrable ABM
shield, but rather a fully credible offensive
assured destruction capability.
The so-called heavy ABM shield-at the
present state oP technology-would in effect
be no adequate shield at all against a Soviet
attack, but rather a strong inducement for
the Soviets to vastly increase their own offen-
sive forces. That, as I have, pointed out,
would make it necessary for us to respond
in turn-and so the arms race would rush
hopelessly on to no sensible purpose on
either side.
Let me emphasize-and I cannot do so
too strongly-that our decision to go ahead
with a Zimited ABM deployment in na way
indicates that we feel an agreement with the
Soviet Union on the limitation of strategic
nuclear offensive and defensive forces is any
the less urgent or desirable.
The road leading from the stone a,xe to the
ICBM-though it may have been more than
a million years in the building-seems to
have run in a single directipn.
Ii one is inclined to be cynical, one might
conclude that man's history seems to 'be
characterized not so much by consistent
periods of peace, occasionally punctuated by
warfare; but rather by persistent outbreaks
oP warfare, wearily pu+, aside from time to
time by periods of exhaustion and recovery-
that parade under the name of peace.
I do not view man's history with that de-
gree of cynicism, but I do believe that man's
wisdom Sn avoiding war is often surpassed
by his folly in promoting it.
However coolish unlimited war may have
been in the past, it is now no longer merely
foolish, but suicidal as well.
It is said that nothing can prevent a man
from suicide, if he is sufficiently determined
to commit it.
The question is what is our determination
in an era when unlimited war will mean the
death of hundreds of millions-and the pos-
sible genetic impairment of a million genera-
tions to follow?
Man is clearly a compound of lolly and
wisdom-and history is clearly ,a consequence
of the admixture oP those two contradictory
traits.
History has planed our particular lives in
an era when the consequences of human folly
are waxing more and more catastrophic in the
matters of war and peace.
In the end, the root of man's security does
not lie in his weaponry.
In the end, the root of man's security lies
in his mind.
What the world requires in its 22nd Year o1'
the Atomic Age is not a new race towards
armament.
-What the world requires in its 22nd Year of
the Atomic Age is a new race towards reason-
ableness.
We had better all run that race.
Not merely we the administrators. But we
'the people. ~"
Thank you, and good afternoon.
We oppose nuclear proliferation because we
believe that in the end it only increases the
risk of a common and cataclysmic holocaust.
President Johnson has made it clear that
the United States will oppose any efforts of
China to employ nuclear blackmail against
her neighbors.
We possess now, and will continue to pos-
sess for as far ahead as we can foresee, an
overwhelming first-strike capability with re-
spect to China. And despite the shrill and
raucous propaganda directed at-her own peo-
ple that "the atomic bomb is a paper tiger,"
there is ample evidence that China well ag-
preciatea the destructive power oP nuclear
weapons.
China has been cautious to avoid any ac-
tion that might end in a nuclear clash with
the United States-however wild her words-
and understandably so, We have the power
not only to destroy completely her entire nu-
clear. offensive forces, but to devastate her
society as well.
Ia there any possibility, then, that by the
mid-1970s China might become so incautious
as to attempt a nuclear attack on the United
States or our allies?
It would be insane and suicidal for her to
do so, but one can conceive conditions under
which China might miscalculate. We wish i;o
reduce such possibilities to a misrLmum.
And since, as I-have noted, our strategic
planning must always be conservative, anal
take into consideration even the possible ir-
rational behavior of potential adversaries,
there are marginal grounds for concluding
that a light deployment of U.S. ABMs against
this possibility is prudent.
The. system would be relatively inexpen-
sive-preliminary estimates glace the cost at
about $5 billion-and would have a much
higher degree of reliability against a Chinese
attack, than the much more massive anal
complicated system that some have recom-
mended against a possible Soviet attack.
Moreover, such an ABM deployment de-
signed. against a possible Chinese attack
would have a number oP other advantages.
It would provide an additional indication to
Asians that we intend to deter China from
nuclear blackmail, and thus would contribute
toward our goal of discouraging nuclear
weapon proliferation among the present non-
nuclear countries.
Further, the Chinese-oriented ABM deploy-
ment would enable us to adds a concur-
rent benefit-a further defense of our Min-
uteman sites against Soviet attack, which
means that at modest cost we would in feet
be adding even greater effectiveness to our
offensive missile farce and avoiding a much
more costly expansion of that farce.
Finally, such a reasonably reliable ABM
system would add protection of our popula-
tion against the improbable but possible a