OFFICIALS IN WASHINGTON DISAGREE ON MEANING OF SUCH A PROGRAM

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP70B00338R000300100057-2
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 1
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 12, 2006
• Sequence Number: 57
• Publication Date: September 10, 1967
• Content Type: NSPR

:CLUSTER MISSILE
Approved For Releas
Officials in Washington
Disagree on Meaning
of Such a Program
By WILLIAM BEECHER
Special to The New York Times
WASHINGTON, Sept. 9 -
A secret report circulating al
the highest levels of the John-
son Administration declares
that the Soviet Union is giving
top priority to efforts to de-
velop multiple warheads for its
big missiles.
If the report is correct and
if the Soviet effort succeeds,
it means that Moscow could
increase severalfold its ability
to hit a number of targets in
the United States simultane-
ously.
One intercontinental ballistic
missile with a cluster of war-
heads could conceivably direct
different warheads at Boston,
New York, Philadelphia, Pitts-
burgh, Baltimore and Washing-
ton.
Officials are reluctant to dis-
cuss the report further, except
to say that it is based on a
thorough analysis. The report
does not base its conclusions
on test firings.
Administration 'officials dis-
counted news reports late last
year that the Russians were.
working on multiple warheads.
Now, after an exhaustive in-
vestigation, the new intelligence
analysis being studied in the
Johnson Administration asserts
that the Russians are indeed
making a major effort in this,
direction.
Administration strategists
disagree on the consequences
of this development. Some are
concerned; others insist there
is as yet no cause for alarm.
All agree that the United
States is well ahead in multiple-
warhead technology, with work-
ing models of two improved
ICBM's carrying such warheads
ready for use in 1969 and 1970.
The Russians are thought to be
at least five to seven years
away from operational multi-
ple warheads.
Fuel Added to Debate
The report is adding fuel to
the debate among American nu-
clear planners over the shift-
ing balance of power between
the United States and the So-
viet Union.
Committee gave notice of its
growing concern recently when
it requested a panel of. retired
officers to study the strategic
balance between the United
States and the Soviet Union.
Working from nonsecret
sources, the panel, headed by
Gen. Bernard A. Schriever, re-
tired, commander of the Air
Force Systems Command, re-
ported:
"The preponderance of evi-
dence points to a conclusion
that the Soviet Union is suc-
ceeding in its massive drive
toward strategic military su-
periority and that the United
States is cooperating in this
effort by slowing down its
side of the arms race."
Feel Report Missed Point
Administration planners, no
matter what their position in
the internal debate, tend to
agree that the Schriever re-
port missed the point in focus-
ing on the total "megatonnage"
of nuclear bombs and missiles
that each side could rain on
the other, rather than on the
total number of warheads each
would be able to launch with
existing ICBM's and those soon
to be ready.
Since each warhead mounted
on a multiple-warhead missile
can be guided accurately to a
predetermined target, the old
arguments about relative num-
bers of ICBM's are obsolete,
Government analysts agree.
The resulting argument is be-
tween those who want to pur-
sue a strategy of "assured de-
struction" and those who favor
"damage limitation."
Secretary of Defense Robert
S. McNamara and some of his
civilian aides would, essential-
ly, limit United States strategic
weapons to that number and
kind that would provide assur-
ance that no matter how the
enemy might choose to start
nuclear war, he would lose
tens of millions of his popula-
tion, and much of his industry
under United States retaliation.
That, they argue, should de-
ter any rational decision to
start a nuclear exchange.
This is the "assured destruc-,
tion" strategy; its emphasis is-
on offensive rather than de.
fensive missiles.
The Joint Chiefs of Staff,
and some others, would go fur-
ther. They urge construction of
enough offensive and defensive
systems so that if deterence
fails and nuclear war results,
deaths in the United States mays
be limited.
visers doubt that this is fea-
sible. The Russians, they say,
would be compelled to counter-
act a bigger American effort,
leading only to a speedup of
the arms race with no one the
better or safer.
The Joint Chiefs take the
position that limits of economy,
technology and productivity
would effectively prevent the
Soviet Union from matching or
overcoming a larger American
effort.
Point to New Finding
Some officials guardedly
pointed to this new finding as
a vindication of Mr. McNama-
ra's argument that Moscow
would respond to weaponry
moves by Washington with
proper countermoves.
In their view, the Soviet
Union has decided that the
United States will deploy the
Nike-X antimissile system
around the country and it wants
to make sure it can penetrate
the system by being able to
send swarms of warheads
against it to exhaust the de-
fense.
It was because of a similar
assumption - that the Russians
would put in a broad antimis-
sile defense - that the United
States?went ahead with multi-
ple warheads for the Minute-
man-3 and Poseidon missiles,
these officials say.
The Administration is expect-
ed'to go ahead this fall with
a fairly thin deployment of
Nike-X missiles designed to
withstand a modest Chinese
missile attack. Some analysts
point out that the Russians
have to guard against the pos-
sibility that this may later be
expanded to defend against a
heavier Soviet assault.
Other analysts, however, are
more concerned. The Russians,
they say, now have about 450
!'BM's and are building new
ones at the rate of about 150
to 200 a year. A significant
number of these missiles are
large enough to carry sizable
packages of warheads, perhaps
five, ten or more.
Since the United States has
publicly limited Itself to 1,000
sites, this argument goes, the
Russians might be trying tc
achieve the ability to destroy
enough of these missiles in a
first strike so that their de.
fense then could intercept most
of the Minutemen, Polaris and
Poseidon missiles that would be
left.
These analysts do not expect
the Soviet Union to build fever-
ishly to the day when they
might consider a surprise at-
tack. Rather, they see them try-
ing to reverse the strategic bal-
ance so that they can pursue a
bolder foreign policy, perhaps.
with more "wars of national.
liberation," such as the one in
Vietnam in greater confidence
that if a nuclear war should
i erupt, Soviet society could sur??
vive it.
But other officials argue that
if it later appears that Mos-
cow is bent on such a course,
the Minutemen can be replaced
by a mobile missile system that
would be harder to destroy in
a surprise attack, and that
more multiple warheads can be
deployed to overwhelm any de-
fense the Russians might con-
struct.
A Pentagon official explained'
the new mathematics of multi-1,
ple warheads with the follow-!
ing hypothetical missile choice:!
If you had to choose be-
tween a new missile that would!
carry either one 10-megaton
warhead or a package of a,
dozen 50-kiloton warheads,;
which would make more sense?I
At first, the larger, single war
head would seem the best
choice, since it would provide
almost 17 times more explo-
sive force. (A megaton yields
explosive power equivalent to
a million tons of TNT; a kilo-
ton to 1,000 tons.)
Approved For Release 2006/01/30 : CIA-RDP70B00338R000300100057-2