SYSTEMS OF NUCLEAR DEFENSE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP70B00338R000300100041-9
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 6
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 10, 2006
• Sequence Number: 41
• Publication Date: June 12, 1967
• Content Type: OPEN

June 12, 1967 Approved FotB 2Mff4 f3Q P7g~?,PA3000300100041-9 S801 But the manner in which this election alone on the will of the majority, but hours of canvassing produced 15 job
is held is of equal importance to its out- rather on the will of the "enlightened" placements. During a more extended pe-
come. If the election is held in such man- majority. The right of the individual riod, in Providence, R.I., 464 man-hours
ner that the people of South Vietnam citizen to know about the candidates and of effort by RIDES employees placed 306
are satisfied that it was fairly held, so the issues is, of course, balanced by his people and eased the labor shortage of
that the will of the people has been ex- responsibility to be informed. But the manufacturers.
pressed on an intelligent and informed responsibility cannot be carried out Especially significant to me, Mr. Pres-
basis, the "other war" which must be without the right. ident, is the fact that out of these 306
won as well as the military war will be The eyes of all Asia and of many coun- placements, some 21.9 percent came from
well on the road to victory. tries throughout the world will be fo- the 16 through 21 age group, wherein
We recognize that there are special cused on South Vietnam to see how this unemployment is an extremely serious
problems which obviously prevent an election is conducted. If it is conducted problem. This apparent responsiveness
election being conducted there as if it in keepjrfg wither ight of the people of youth to the door-to-door canvassers
were being conducted in the United to kn rw, the new Gove ent will stand should be noted. It indicates not only a
States, Japan, Korea, the Philippines, or well:' not only with its o people, but desire to work, but also the possession of
some other country which is not suffer- with other governments whi pay heed skills to fill available job openings.
ing the torment of war within its borders. to ;the right of their citizens t know. This unique placement approach of
Thus, for example, it is most understand- it might be helpful for the Asian acific the State employment service eliminates
able that the ruling junta only yesterday Council to send observers to South iet- the unfortunate impersonality inherent
ratified its decree barring pro-Com- nbm during the month preceding he in some bureaucratic agencies. People are
munist or pro-neutralist candidates from election to make suggestions to the Go - responding because individual interper-
running for President; although, as ernment regarding its censorship poli 1 sonal contact is achieved. They are made
pointed out by Richard Critchfield in ties and to report to the Council regard- to feel needed and are therefore eager to
today's Washington Evening Star: ing the freedom of speech and of the ontribute their services to the employer.
Pro-neutralist is usually narrowly defined Press which prevail during the election \ This program, Mr. President, is a suc-
in Vietnam as someone who advocates form- gampaigns. ce sful, continuing one which merits
ing a coalition government with the Viet The Council is an informal association wi spread adoption. It will be most suc-
Cong. of Pacific states, consisting of Korea, cess ul, however, as part of a series of
After the violence and terror which J pan, Nationalist China, Malaysia, progms in an all-inclusive approach
the Vietcong and North Vietnamese in- 4ustralia, New Zealand, the Philippines, which provides for training and retrain-
vaders have deliberately brought to so hailand, and South Vietnam. Each of ing to Viake available the skills required
many people in that country, the junta's t ese countries is deeply concerned over by our dyer-increasing technology. I must
action would be expected, if not de- t e war in Vietnam, and most of them reiterate",, that such imaginative and ef-
manded, by the great majority of the a e directly involved. Each must know fective p'ograms as I have mentioned
tat an election in South Vietnam, rest- should b,6, examined and adopted if we
people. Government censorship already exists i on a solid foundation of democratic are to fulfill our commitments to the
in South Vietnam, and there is nothing p nciples, will mean a shorter war and American people and the aims .of the
particularly new or unusual about this, a uicker return to peace in their area. Manpower }Development and Training
taking into consideration the circum- A the same time, the Government of Acts, as am4nded.
V tnam should welcome an opportunity
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dimensions according to the circum-stances. However, people the world over ui ely free election campaigns were per- SIDERS BILL TO OUTLAW GENO-
m tted. This would give the lie to Com- CIDE
who live in a democracy have come to ex-
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pact that free speech will receive oits w ich is almost certain to come. recently been galled to my attention that
maximum m recognition during politicaal
campaigns. This, of course, does not Mr. President, I yield the floor, the Legislature! of the State of California
mean that libel and slander are to be is presently considering a bill designed
permitted. Nor would it seem proper to ORKER RECRUITMENT PROGRAM to outlaw the 4rime of genocide in that
permit someone sympathetic with the OF RHODE ISLAND State. Assemblyman Lester A. McMillan,
Communist cause to masquerade under of Los Angele, introduced AB 141 on
some other cloak than a pro-Communist Mr. PELL. Mr. President, I again in- January 17 of 4 this year and hearings
or pro-neutralist in order to abuse fre vite the attention of the Senate to an were held by the committee on criminal
speech by taking the Communist or ne - imaginative and viable approach to the procedure on April 18, at which time it
tralist line. But there should no v- problem of recruiting employees to fill was taken under submission to be con-
ernment censorship of issues w are the present acute labor shortages in cer- sidered later with another bill on the
vital to the future of the Government of tain areas of my State. I refer to the same subject, LAB 2535 by Assemblyman
South Vietnam and which trouble a great worker recruitment program conducted Sieroty.
many of its people-issues such as land by the Rhode Island State Employment Mr. President, this is a grave reflec-
reform, education, the economy, corrup- Service. This effort is a neighborhood, tion on the Senate. That elected officials
tion in the Government itself, and the door-to-door search by individual inter- of the State of California have taken
like. These are matters which demand viewers seeking those who wish full or such action is, at the same time both
free speech in election campaigns. They part-time employment. This service par- commendable and reprehensible. I com-
are not matters which should be sub- ticularly affects those individuals who mend Assemblymen McMillan and Sier-
jected to Government censorship. These wish to combat the pressure of rising oty for having taken the initiative in a
are matters which candidates should be prices by supplementing their income praiseworthy effort to establish the com-
permitted to discuss openly, without fear through employment. In this group we mission of. genocide as a crime in the
of reprisal. Newspapers and other press find the housewife and the retiree, who State of California. At the same time, I
media should be permitted to carry cam- have learned job skills which are not be- express Jny own regret that the Senate
paign advertising and to report fairly ing fully utilized. which ?would have and should have out-
and fully what the candidates say about I am happy now to report the progress laaed this crime by ratifying the Geno-
them. Editorial comment should, of of this program, as indicated by the tide Convention has failed to do so.
course, be permitted to confirm and sup- status report submitted to me by the Indeed it is the Senate of the United
port or to ridicule and rebut statements Rhode Island Department of Employ- States and not the Assembly of the State
by candidates. But the general voting ment Security. One of the most inter- of California nor the legislatures of any
public must have an opportunity to hear esting facts found in the report is the of our States which should proscribe the
and read about the issues if it is going ratio of total man-hours spent canvass- commitment of a crime so atrocious as
to be an informed electorate. ing to the total number of job placements. genocide. It is up to us, Mr. President,
Thomas Jefferson once wrote that the From March 1 to March 31, in the city to ratify the Convention on the Preven-
success of a democracy depends, not of Pawtucket, R.I., it was found that 66 tion and Punishment of the Crime of
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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ---SENATE June 12, 1967
Genocide, a treaty which was presented
to us 18 years ago by President Truman,
a treaty upon which we have not yet
acted.
[n the hearings before the California
Legislative Committee on. Criminal Pro-
fcedure, an old and thoroughly discred-
ited refrain was sounded once again by a
handful of opposition witnesses: "My
God was murdered by a minority group-
the Jews." Several scriptural references
were cited to emphasize divine distrust
and contempt for all Jewish people.
It is this sort of distorted ranting
Which, unfortunately, the Senate has
failed to refute. By stepping forward and
atoning for our inactivity of 18 years, we
shall also bemoving in the direction of
peace and human dignity. We are being
asked today by the citizens of California,
indeed by the citizens of the world, to act
favorably upon the Genocide Convention.
Let us not disappoint them any longer.
1s T'?r !J
SYSTEMS OF NUCLEAR DEFENSE
Mr. TOWER. Mr. President, this
month's issue of Fortune magazine con-
tains a perceptive article written by
Richard J. Whalen, concerning systems
of nuclear defense and the effect of the
present Soviet buildup upon U.S. policy
in this critical area.
Mr. Whalen-formerly a member of
the Fortune board of editors-is pres-
ently with the Georgetown University
Center for Strategic Studies.
I ask unanimous consent that the ar-
ticle be printed in the RECORD.
There being no objection, the article
was ordered to be printed in the RECORD,
as follows:
[From Fortune magazine. June T, 19671
THE SHIFTING EQUATION OF NUCLEAR DEFENSE
(By Richard J. W:aalen)
(NOTE.-The author, a former member of
Fortune's board of editors, is currently
writer-in-residence at the Georgetown Uni-
versity Center for Strategic Studies.)
On his desk in the Kremlin, Nikita
Khrushchev used to keep a laser-scarred
piece of steel, a reminder to himself and
visitors of the potential for Soviet superiority
in advanced military technology. He often
dreamed aloud of the terrible wonders of
the future, as when he said in 1960: "The
armament which is being created and which
is to be found in the folders of the scientists
and designers is truly unbelievable." In his
bold Cuban missile adventure, Khrushchev
impatiently ran ahead of his strategic weap-
onry, and the retreat from the brink led to
his overthrow. But the oronise symbolized
by the prized piece of steel also fascinates
his dour, methodical successors. Under their
more efficient management, Soviet scientists,
engineers, and technicians are turning ideas
into hardware at an accelerating rate. The
current swift buildup of Soviet strategic
offensive and defensive systems reflects Mos-
cow's evident determination to forge ahead
in a new technological arms race.
The U.S., preoccupied with Vietnam and
anxious to preserve the hope of detente, has
made a studied effort so far not to over-
react. Addressing the Russians early this
year, President Johnson spoke of the com-
mon "duty" to slow down the race and
warned that a renewed arms spiral "would
impose on our peoples, and on all mankind,
an additional waste of resources with no
gain in security to either side." He proposed
negotiations to halt the Soviet deployment
of antiballistic-missile (ABM) defenses, re-
ceiving in return Soviet Premier Aleksei Ko-
sygin's unenthusiastic consent "to discuss
the problem of averting a new arras race,
both in offensive and defensive weap>ns."
While negotiations have not even begun, So-
viet ICBM ar..d antiballistic-missile deploy-
ments are continuing.
The one-sidedness of concern is increasingly
apparent and puts U.S. leaders under rising
pressure. Secretary of Defense Robert Mc-
Namara, overriding for the second time the
unanimous recommendation of the joint
Chiefs of Staff, has further deferred the
crucial decision on whether to begin pro-
duction of the U.S.'s own Nike-Y :anti-
ballistic-missile system. McNamara argued
his position at length before Cong ess last
January, and later circulated a confidential
memorandum among his staff, the military,
and defense contractors, urging the widest
possible dissemination of the message con-
tained in his Congressional Posture State-
ment.
"The foundation of our security," Mc-
Namara declared in his statement, "is the
deterrence of Soviet nuclear attack. We be-
lieve such an attack can be prevented if it is
understood by the Soviets that we possess
strategic nuclear forces so powerful as to
be capable of absorbing a Soviet first strike
and surviving with sufficient strength to im-
pose unacceptable damage on them." Mc-
Namara conceded that the kind and amount
of damage the United States would have to be
able to inflict to provide this deterrent "can-
not be answered precisely," but :he ventured
the "reasonable" assumption that the
destruction of one-fifth to one-fourth of
the Soviet Union's population and one-half
to two-thirds of its industrial capacity
"would certainly represent intolerable
punishment." The U.S. ability to inflict such
punishment, regardless of Soviet defensive
counter-measures, is the key to the deter-
rence philosophy of "Assured Destruction."
But McNamara went further in his re-
markable document, which may deserve a
place among the most important state
papers of our time. The Secretary gave
the Russians cost-effectiveness advice on
their own best; defense interests. "If our as-
sumption that; the Soviets are also striving
to achieve an Assured Destruction capability
is correct, and I am convinced that it is,"
said McNamara, "then in all probability all
we would accomplish by deploying ABlvl
systems against one another would be to
increase greatly our respective defense ex-
penditures, without any gain in real security
for either side." This line of reasoning was
clearly intended to reinforce the President's
plea to the Soviet leaders for negotiations
on arms limitation. But it fell on some ears
in Washington, particularly those of weli-
informed members of Congress, as disturb-
ing evidence of the amount of faith that
U.S. defense policy was putting into a hypo-
thetical equation under rapidly shifting
circumstances.
THE UNEASY ENVIRONMENT OF SURPRCSE
The experts who read the intelligence re-
ports on Soviet activity are aware, as the
public is not, that the enormous U.S. advan-
tage in weaponry and technology of the
1950's and early 1960's is steadily being nar-
rowed. Not only has the Soviet Union run
harder; the U.S., wishing to avoid leading an
arms race, has also deliberately limited ,Iro-
duction and deferred deployment of major
new offensive and defensive weapon s;'stems.
The Russians, in effect, have been told: "We
won't build it if you won't." The appealing
notion has prevailed that weapon technology
stands on a "plateau." As former White
House scientific adviser Jerome B. Wiesner
declared in 1963, the "scientific military re-
volution" has "stabilized."
The limited nuclear test-ban treaty, which
ushered in the present period of search for
a detente, has been widely interpreted as a
joint U.S.-Soviet admission that further arms
competition was pointless. A "stalemate psy-
chology" has spread, which takes for granted
and even discounts the military superiority
the U.S. has enjoyed throughout the trials of
the cold war. Reductions have been made in
"'soft" firs;-strike weapons such as bombers,
and the U.S, missile deterrent force, after
rising rapidly throughout the early Sixties,
is now leveling off. It consists of 1,000 Min-
utemen, 54 Titan II's (to be phased out in
1970), 656 missiles aboard 41 Polaris subma-
rines (about half of which are on station at
any given enomer.,t), and 680 strategic bomb-
ers, which will be cat back to 465 in 1972.
From a peak of $11.2 billion in fiscal 1962,
U.S. outlays for strategic forces declined to a
low of $6.8 billion in fiscal 1966 and stood at
$7.1 billion in. fiscal 1967.
The relatively stable level of R. and D.
spending ever this period conceals a signifi-
cant shift in emphasis, away from innovation
and toward refinement of existing weapon
systems. The U.S. has chosen not to main-
tain the initiative, while the U.S.S.R.. has
visibly bent every effort toward seizing it.
Now a new era is opening in which the
U.S. and the U.S.S.R. can be expected to pos-
sess increasingly coraparable military tech-
nology. Far from being an omen of "stabil-
ity," that elusive nirvana of the thermonu-
clear age, the environment of near parity
promises to be extremely unpredictable and
therefore marked by much apprehension. The
U.S., to be sure, has carefully hedged against
foreseeable Soviet capabilities; over the past
few years, for example, more than $1 billion
has been spent to prepare advanced warheads
and sophisticated penetration aids to defeat
the newly installed Soviet ABM defenses.
However, this kind oi' hedging leaves the U.S.
vulnerable to surprise in the form of an
unforeseen or successfully concealed weapon
advance on the Soviet side.
In a congressional hearing more than a
year ago, General John P. McDonnell, Air
Force Chie:' of Staff, warned: "We know ...
the Soviet? today are engaged in a massive
program of research and development in
military weapons systems of all types. In a
program of such great scope, the possibility
of technological surprises or dramatic break-
throughs cannot be overlooked, particularly
when such surprises could erase the margin
of strategic superiority which we currently
enjoy." In spite of improved U.S. satellite
surveillance, the Russians have simultane-
ously improved 'their skill in the arts of
concealment, and they are now capable of
deploying weapons that the West has never
seen tested.
Close observers of the unfolding Soviet R.
and D. enterprise wcrry because the adver-
sary has a dynamic view of military capability
and strategy, as contrasted with the static
conception of technology and strategy im-
plicit in the 'U.S. posture. Deterrence depends
not only on existing forces; it also depends
on the adversary's state of mind. The very
rationality of Soviet leaders, which the U.S.
relies upon to restrain attack, could find in
advancing technology the incentive to con-
sider the gamble of a first strike. A veteran
analyst of the nuclear balance observes:
"Never has fundamental strategy been so
sensitive to a. few-a very few-technical
parameters."
The intentions of the uncommunicative
Soviet leaders are a mystery, perhaps even
to themselves, but; it requires a minimum of
theorizing to grasp the point of what they are
currently doing. They are altering the exist-
ing balance of strategic forces that favors
the U.S., and they are doing it ata pace that
startles the most knowledgeable American
students of Soviet military capability. Just
two years ago McNamssa said the Soviet lead-
ers "have decided that they have lost the
quantitative race, and they are not seeking
to engage us in that contest." Now Pentagon
authorities are no longer sure. In contrast
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to the earlier false alarms of the bomber scheduled to replace the Minuteman I, and tion," however Soviet planners may define it,
and missile "gaps," based on projections of the submarine-launched Poseidon, the suc- through the use of multiple warheads on
potential that went unfulfilled, the present cessor of the Polaris A-3, will he equipped their growing missile force.
rate of confirmed Soviet hardware deploy- with MIRV, decoys, and penetration aids. Until last year MIRV was considered so
ment is forcing upward revisions of Russia's When they are in place within the next three
potential. years, McNamara declares that these formid- i sonal that defense even members ittees had of the oo heard com NOW WE SEE THE THREAT able missiles will surely be capable of pene- about onal it in executive . not heard
trating the Soviet anti-missile defenses cur- multiple a -warhead cutive tive contracts session. were Reports of
Soviet production of intercontinental mis- published
siles has surged ahead, from an annual rate rently being deployed. And so they doubt- in the technical press late last year, and
of 30 to 40 in 1962 to 110 to 120 last year, less will-if they are ever fired in anger, discussion began in earnest last November
and this rate appears to be accelerating. By preparing to meet a changing offensive when McNamara announced the accelerated
Since Khrushchev backed down in the mis- threat and defensive capability with an im- program to produce and deploy the Poseidon
sile confrontation of the fall of 1962-and proved offense only, however, McNamara dis- in ? the Polaris fleet. Oddly enough, within
the date is relevant because of the long lead plays the weak side of his strategic philos- four months after MIRV came into public
times involved-the operational Soviet ICBM ophy. The development of MIRV in mis- view, it was abruptly covered up again by
force based on land and sea has grown from siles means that a new way of calculating the Secretary's order. No longer a secret, it
fewer than 75 to an officially estimated 470 striking power is needed, and therefore a new has become an un-word scarcely ever uttered
(as of October, 1966) and a likely current way of appraising the U.S. deterrent. The in the Pentagon. "It's ridiculous, this trying
figure of close to 600. By mid-1968, according long-vaunted U.S. lead in ICBM boosters, to stuff the genie back in the bottle," com-
to informed estimates, land- and sea-based currently estimated at three to one, no longer ments a dissenting official. "Apparently we're
Soviet ICBM's could leap to between 800 and provides the reassurance It once did, and concerned that the Soviets might be alerted
900, or more than half the U.S. force. And Pentagon officials now quietly downgrade to their own capability. It's part of trying
there is no reason to assume the Soviets such rough numerical comparisons. As Mc- not to be provocative."
will halt there. Namara himself said in his Posture State-
The rapid growth in numbers, however, is ment, "It is not the number of missiles THE MOVE TO ABM
less significant than the qualitative improve- which is important, but rather the charac- The mounting uncertainties facing deci-
ments, apparent and suspected, between the ter of the payloads they carry; the missile sion makers in the White House and the
first and second generation of Soviet ICBM's, is simply the delivery vehicle." Pentagon center on the Soviet construc-
Two new missiles-the SS-9 and the SS-11- He did not add that, with all the addi- tion of extensive new ABM defenses. Recon-
have been identified as entering the opera- tional payload weight resulting from multi- naissance satellites and monitoring radars
tional inventory in dispersed and hardened pie warheads and penetration aids, the thrust alerted the Joint Chiefs of Staff to this
silos. The SS-9 is a large three-stage missile of the delivery vehicle also becomes a critical activity in 1965. In January, 1966, McNamara
propelled by storable liquid fuel, which is factor-and in the case of the U.S. at the secretly briefed the members of the con-
not necessarily a sign of inferiority when present, a sharply limiting factor. Except for gressional defense committees, and last No-
compared to solid-fueled U.S. missiles. Stor- the relative handful of Titan II's, which umber he publicly disclosed that the U.S.
able liquid and semi-liquid fuels provide are scheduled to be phased out, the lift cap- had "considerable evidence" of the Soviet
greater thrust than solids. The SS-9 is acity of U.S. missiles averages about one ABM deployments without being specific
roughly comparable in size to the U.S. solid- megaton for each booster. Soviet boosters, about their nature and location. However,
fuel Titan II, but it carries a warhead twice in contrast, can carry an average warhead he declared: "I think it is important that
as heavy, estimated at over twenty megatons. load of more than seven megatons. If these we assume [the Soviet ABM system] is effec-
The SS-11 is a small single-stage missile, missiles are, in addition, capable of being tive, and, of course, that will be the assump-
propelled by either solid or storable liquid fitted with multiple warheads, the U.S. boost- tion on which we base the development and
fuel. It resembles the early Minuteman in er advantage of three to one over the Rus- deployment of our own ICBM's." This pru-
range and ability to carry a similar one- sians could quickly become a fiction. The dent assumption leaves unanswered to the
megaton warhead. new SS-9 could be fitted, at least in theory, urgent question: how effective are the Soviet
The Russians, well ahead of the buildup with ten or more individually guided war- defenses?
schedule assumed until recently by American heads. In one fashion or another, MIRV in- The U.S. possesses a good deal of intelli-
defense planners, are fast approaching a troduces a new kind of missile math-a rela- gence data, but it does not support defini-
critical point in the development of their tively inexpensive means for the U.S.S.R. tive judgments. If experience counts for any-
ICBM force. If their missiles are equipped swiftly to achieve parity or better with the thing, as it surely does in this esoteric resins
with the advanced warheads and the more U.S. In terms of deliverable megatonnage. of weaponry, the U.S.S.R.'s capabilities
accurate guidance systems known to be They are known to have tested the compo- should be taken very seriously. It is known
within their technical ability, their force nents of a multiple-warhead system. There- that the Russians, heeding their doctrinal
could quickly become a real threat to the fore, U.S. watchers on the outside, peering imperative of balance between offensive and
hardened Minuteman missiles that are the through the cracks in a closed society, are defensive military forces, began concurrent
backbone of the U.S. deterrent. In designing anxiously anticipating an operational cap a- development of missiles and anti-missiles as
the U.S. deterrent forces, Pentagon planners bility because of the short lead time involved. early as 1948. By the early 1960's they had
have weighed the alternatives open to an As little as eighteen months could separate built what was apparently the prototype of
aggressor: a strike against our cities; a our discovery of a MIRV development pro- a defense system aimed against medium-
"counterforce" strike against our retaliatory gram and the operational deployment of So- and intermediate-range missiles, and they
missile sites; or a combination strike aimed viet missiles carrying multiple warheads. deployed it at Leningrad. U.S. intelligence
at some key population centers and some Those who would know whether such a de- rated this system capable of handling as
portion of the land-based ICBM's. The U.S. velopment program has been detected are many as five targets simultaneously, but it
has sought to deny an aggressor the "counter- quite properly silent. was regarded as ineffective against ICBM's.
force" option by building and deploying a In a rare secret session of the Senate in
THE IMPLICIT AND EXPLICIT THREAT ,,.,?,. ,.
The memory of the nonexistent ICBM Carolina, a member of the Armed Services
enough number of targets to be safely be-
yond productive and economic capacity gap" debated during the 1960 presidential Committee, warned that Russia had an op-the of the Russians. This estimate on their ca- campaign may prompt a certain skepticism erational ABM system, and he urged that
pabilities has new been rudely shaken. toward the potential new danger implicit in the U.S. proceed at once with the Nike-Zeus,
"As recently as a year ago," says a high- a Soviet resort to multiple warheads. This then ready to go into production. Soon after-
ranking officer in the Pentagon, "we didn't time, however, the Soviet missiles that might ward, the U.S. turned to the improved Nike-
think the Soviets could get a "We counterforce be fitted with such warheads already exist; X system (see "Countdown for Nike-X,"
capability, Now we see the threat." It could the numbers are growing rapidly; and the FORTUNE, November, 1965).
materialize by the mid-1970's. new missile math suggests the advantages of The Zeus ABM system, which grew out of
their going the route of MIRV if they can, the Nike-Hercules anti-aircraft defenses de-
THE "NEW MATH" OF MIRV The kind of targeting problem that the U.S. ployed in 1958, had a limited range and
The U.S. itself has discovered how to use poses for Soviet war planners provides the "kill radius," and its effectiveness against
a single ICBM launcher to carry several in- logic for traveling that route. The major a large-scale attack was doubtful. The suc-
dividually propelled warheads, which can be U.S. cities, In which population and industry cessor Nike-X (the X stood for "unknown")
guided accurately to different targets hun- are concentrated, have long been the pre- exploited major breakthroughs in radar
dreds of miles apart. The multiple individ- sumed targets of a relatively few Soviet technology, which greatly increased the num-
ually guided reentry vehicle, known as MIRV, ICBM's fitted with high-yield warheads. So ber of targets the system could handle; and
could revolutionize nuclear strategy if the long as an ICBM could deliver only one war- it also supplemented the Zeus missile with
Soviet capability should match our own, head to one target, the small Soviet missile a new high-acceleration interceptor, Sprint,
The strong side of Secretary McNamara's force was believed to be checkmated by the which was designed to provide last-ditch
philosophy of deterrence is apparent in the sheer number of U.S. Minuteman and Titan defense against ICBM's that,got past Zeus.
improvement of U.S. striking power. The missiles in their dispersed and hardened Even with the improvements, however, the
entire front end of new missiles is being re- silos. But the problem of multiple targets Nike-X remained a "point" defense intended
designed. The land-based Minuteman III, could be brought temptingly near "solu- to protect a single target by engaging in-
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coming ICBM's in a 'bullet-to-bullet" duel
in the atmosphere. An area defense," which
would protect several targets at once, would
be much more effective, but this kind of
ABM requires a long-range missile equipped
with a large warhead that can intercept
ICBM's above the atmosphere. In 1965 the
U.S. began development of such a missile,
named the Spartan, which will replace Zeus
in the Nike-X system. But by this time the
Russians had abandoned the Leningrad ABM
and were well along in the development of
more advanced concepts.
Incomplete and often contradictory infor-
mation currently available on the Soviet
antiballistic-missile defenses has caused
some divergence of opinion within the U.S.
intelligence community. There is no ques-
tion that an "area defense" system has been
deployed in the vicinity of Moscow. The com-
mand center, containing radar scanners and
computers, is a multi-level structure built
entirely underground. A large phased-array
radar is located northwest of the city, and
It is integrated with small tracking radars
at several points.
THE TALLINN ABM S'CSTEM
A quite different type of :Lnstallation has
appeared in an are extending several hundred
miles along the northwestern border of the
country, and this is the focus of disagree-
ment within the U.S. Known as the "Tallinn
line" after the Estonian city where one of the
defensive sites has been detected, this deploy-
ment has been. subject to various interpre-
t Itions - as an advanced anti-aircraft system,
p y
and ap-
clearly had been planned years in advance.
Among their seventy-One shots were proof
tests, weapon-system tests, effects tests, and
tests with missiles and radar. The Russians,
obviously extending their ABM technology,
on two occasions during the tests launched
an ICBM, intercepted it with a nuclear blast,
and then fired a second missile, presumably
to determine whether its warhead was af-
fected by the radiation resulting from the
prior explosion. They also studied the black-
out effects of the blasts on their radar.
another type of ABM, or perhaps a combina- An experienced defense scientist cautions TIro DDaTS ABOUT AN UMBRELLA
tion of both. Existing Soviet SAM-2's and against overdrawing Soviet capabilities from Such sophisticated Soviet tests could not
SAM-3's would r pr ample de- scant information ("generalizing from the have been matched at the time by the U.S.
fen to against air craft, craft, , earticul a cularly in view heel of the dinosaur"), but he adds: "If In the summer of 19511 the U.S. had detonated
Moreover, the U tth he pr principal cipal you're honest, you can't say flatly that the
M, the line sits athwart its first hig'.n-altitude explosions, code-named
Soviets can't no what some people say they "Teak" and "Orange." These megaton-range
launch over cover the North Pole land-based from the U.S. are doing. We just don't know." explosions produced astonishing results that
nt WEAPONRY IN THE VOID clearly heralded the dawn of a new era in
It is the It is the unanimous s judgment of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff that the Tallinn line is an Easily the most important area of uncer- weapo:cr effects. Communication links in the
anti-missile system, but McNamara so far re- tain knowledge, and one where secrets and Central aPacis fewere blacked out for sever Aral
mains publicly unpersuaded. doubts are kept most carefully guarded, con-
In addition to the Moscow and Tallinn de- cerns the effects of high-yield nuclear ex- titles trapped in the earth's magnetic field.
ployments, informed sources report a great plosions in the thin upper atmosphere and In the Argus series that quickly followed, the
deal of activity elsewhere in the Soviet Union above. This is the environment in which our U.S. exploded three kiloton bursts, which dis-again at existing anti-aircraft installations and new own and Soviet ABM missiles would f unc- rupted d shortwave made radio and radar am d par-
sites as well. Some of these sites are in the tion. Questions about the precise "kill mech- produc rilan- belts of
South and may represent the early stages of anism" of an 2.BM have aroused intense spec- titles. The creation of these belts suggested,
defenses directed against Polaris missiles ulation and prompted official reassurance, at least in theory, the possibility of a trans-
launched from U.S. submarines on station in with the result that the known fads often ient "i " lmb ella" AA BMs defe in
the Mediterranean. Other sites spotted east get lost in a welter of alarming or com- provided the parties could
of the Ural Mountains face Red China. The forting words. Much of the confusion is sufficient density. However, U.S. scientists
small tracking radars along the Tallinn line penetrated by a scholarly, relentlessly fac- concluded that the belts formed by the Argus
apparently are tied together with the phased- tual new book, The Test Ban Treaty: Mill- shots were too weak at injure a per head
he the. at five d it s seed that
array radar at Moscow. As evidence of such tarp, Technological, and Political Implice- pp ad. Ev through
accumulates, the likely scope of Soviet tions, by James H. McBride (Regnery),
ABM plans expands, confirming McNamara's which draws together the highlights of eight- the obvious ABM problems of early warning,
statement to Congress last January: ". . . we can months of hearings conducted by two discrimination, and precision tracking could
must, for the time being, plan our forces on Senate committees on the treaty that at- be greatly compounded by the mysterious ef-explos the assumption that they will have deployed tempted to curb the fearful competition in f e is of hniggh-altitute
Soviet nucltestsear the U.S. ions.
some sort of an ABM system around their nuclear-weapon technology.
major cities by the early 1970's." Not only "All witnesses agreed," McBride writes, a hastily prepared and politically restricted
the cities, of course, would be defended, but "that at the current state of the art in nu- series in 1962-63, which provided valuable
also military installations, particularly hard- clear technology the greatest need for nu- data but also disclosed great gaps in our
ened offensive missile silos within a vast ter- clear testing is in the area of weapons scientific knowledge. Dr. Edward Teller,
ritory. effects.. " Again and again in the quoted testifying on the test-ban treaty, revealed
ILEETINC MIRV IN 5IID-COURSE testimony, the word "void" crops up, as when that the U.S. had not even completed
Debate continues inside the Pentagon con- Dr. John S. Foster Jr., then directs-r of the theoretical studies of some of the high-yield
cerning the characteristics of the antiballis- Lawrence Radiation Laboratory and now di- effects the Russians had actually tested. Im-
tic missile (or missiles) that the Russians are rector of Defense Research and Engineering, pressed by recurrent descriptions of the
told the Foreign Relations Committee: "The "void" in U.S. nuclear technology, the Sen-
shown in. In November, Lde3, a missile the most serious void has to do with the effect ate Preparedness Subcommittee concluded
shown a Moscow ABM c for which the that nuclear explosions have on the opera- that the treaty "wil.l affect adversely the
West- ru nc claimed an ABM capability.
missile tion of the system, whether it is an offensive future quality of this Nation's arms, and ...
Russia
ern officials, who code-named the toward or defensive explosion or an offensive or will result in serious,, and perhaps formidable,
Griffon, were skeptical, and inclined toward defense system." This point is absolutely military and technical disadvantages."
the belief that was pri t and ende their eir
interception of supersonic ac aircraft rcritical because the U.S. has adopted a With the signing of the treaty banning
air-to-surface missiles; but they did not rule second-strike posture, which means its weap- atmospheric testing, the U.S. put its sn-
out the possibility that it had been developed ons must survive the effects of a fist strike genuity to work underground and discovered
originally to counter the medium-range Thor, and then penetrate enemy defenses to de- that more could be learned there than its
Jupiter, and. Polaris A-1. Griffon was not stroy their assigned targets. experts had believed. Under a top-priority
credited with an exoatmospheric (above the The effects of nuclear weapons vary prin- program, the Atomic Energy Commission has staging reflecting atmosphere) now a oil the though
of subsequent altitu at which they are exploded. (Other sons in deep, inst: ument-crainm dl tunnels
pace some
Soviet advances, believe it should have been. factors, including, the Urne of day a weapon
An advanced model of Griffon, in fact, may is exploded, also play a significant role.)
be deployed on the Tallinn line; or the ABM The predominant effects of weapons designed
missile there may be one the West has never to be detonated in the atmosphere are blast
seen. and heat; weapons for use above the atmos-
The missile used in the Moscow ABM sys- pher are designed to maximize the release of
tern was first shown a year later than Griffon, energy in the form of radiation, the most
in 1964, when 'tractors dragged it through useful effect in this environment. Witnesses
Red Square coyly concealed in its protective who testified during the test-ban hearings
canister. Given the unglamorous code name generally assumed that the U.S. held a
Galosh, it is believed to be a solid-fueled, marked lead in the technology of smaller-
long-range interceptor carrying a high-yield yield (one megaton and below) weapons
warhead. Estimates of Galosh's range cluster while the Russians were well ahead in the
around a few hundred miles, comparable to very-high-yield (twenty megaton and above)
the Spartan missile the U.S. is now develop- range.
ing. But a minority opinion maintains it The advantage in the intermediate range
could have a much longer range, perhaps as (one to twenty megatons) was open to de-
much as 2,000 miles. bate, but there was no arguing the fact
This minority view begins with the fact that the Russians, during their massive
that the best antiballistic-missile system the 1961-62 'test series thit broke the de facto
U.S. has been able to devise uses two missiles moratorium, had exploded many more weap-
and several types of radar. It is suggested ons than the U.S. in this intermediate range
that Galosh, true only missile deployed at both in the atmosphere and above, providing
Moscow, may combine the long range of Them with the opportunity to learn more
1 their knowldge The Soviet tests
the companion short-range interceptor of the
Nike-X system. If this is the case, or if the
missile used in the Tallinn line has such a
performance capability, the Soviet Union
could engage incoming ICBM's far away from
their territory and above the atmosphere
where fallout would not be a problem--in
mid-course of the missiles' trajectory, before
multiple warheads and penetration aids
could separate. An effective mid-course
ABM would provide a formidable defense
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from which the air has been pumped to
simulate as nearly as possible the vacuum of
space. But the apprehensions brought to
light almost four years ago in the test-ban
hearings have scarcely been buried. At bot-
tom, the present controversy over the Soviet
ABM capability revolves around whether
these half-forgotten fears of technological
surprise are now being realized.
Recent uninformed speculation has sug-
gested the possibility that the Russians, by
exploding very-high-yield weapons above the
atmosphere at the proper altitude and lati-
tude, might be able to create dense belts of
charged particles and so establish a "shield"
type of ABM defense. U.S. scientists, extrap-
olating from data provided by tests of
much-smaller-yield explosions, are reported
to have erred by a factor of 1,000 in estimat-
ing the number of such particles that would
be caused by a 100-megaton blast. The AEC
isn't saying what its latest calculations have
disclosed, but a high-ranking AEC official
emphatically declares: "Right now, we don't
see how the effects of any radiation belt
could be made to persist." An impressive
body of scientific opinion, within and out-
side the government, says there is no techni-
cal foundation for theorizing about what
a Pentagon R. and D. official calls the "ping,"
or residual umbrella defense. Before the man-
made radiation belts could achieve a parti-
cle density lethal to warheads the earth's
magnetic field would prove too weak to sup-
port them, and the umbrella would "leak."
THE ANTIMISSILE THAT GOES "ZAPP"
The improbability of a "shield" form of
defense does not rule out other possible de-
fenses using radiation effects. Quite the
contrary; the U.S. intends to use such ef-
fects in the improved Nike-X system now
under development. The Spartan missile
carrying a warhead of more than one mega-
ton will rely upon what is believed to be the
most efficient anti-missile defense above the
atmosphere-the so-called "zapp effect,"
that is, the tremendous surge of thermal or
"hot" x-rays produced by a high-yield ex-
plosion. As Dr. Foster has explained to the
Senate Armed Services Committee: "Nuclear
explosives have a very small surface area to
them ... When they release [their] energy,
they get very, very hot. A small surface that
has to release enormous energies in a very
short time cannot do so without getting so
hot that it radiates its energy away. This
radiation [is] ... of such a temperature that
it is in the x-ray region."
As much as 75 percent of the total en-
ergy of the detonated ABM warhead would
escape in the form of such x-rays and flash
over thousands of miles in the near-vacuum
of space. Within the much smaller "kill ra-
dius," which would vary with the yield and
design of the warhead and the altitude at
which it was exploded, the thermal x-rays
would deposit -their immense energy within
any unshielded object, such as a missile war-
head, causing its components to explode in-
ternally. An ABM system using the x-ray
effect can provide an "area defense" cover-
ing thousands of square miles with relative-
ly few installations. Moreover, the require-
ments for guidance accuracy are greatly
reduced, a factor worth bearing in mind
when the Soviet radars are described as
somewhat "crude."
The U.S. takes the x-ray threat from So-
viet ABM defenses seriously enough to be
engaged in costly modification of missiles
whose components are vulnerable. For exam-
ple, the fine gold wires (which readily ab-
sorb x-rays) are being replaced in the guid-
ance computer circuitry of the Minuteman
II, and the change is being incorporated
into the design of Poseidon and Minute-
man III. Because reflective coatings used to
protect a missile nose cone from the heat of
re-enry are ineffective against thermal x-rays,
new hardening techniques and shielding ma-
terials are being sought. The test ban makes
it impossible to expose such materials to
actual thermal x-rays and underground ex-
plosions are no substitute, so experimenters
are using newly created electron beams of
comparable energy-beams capable of de-
positing energies inside a test material a
thousand times greater than the pulse from
the most powerful production laser.
U.S. missiles have been modified more than
once to counteract any unforeseen or newly
arising hazard. During the test-ban hear-
ings, many military officers, nuclear scien-
tists, and informed Senators dared not give
publicly a major reason for their opposition
to the treaty. They feared that the Russians,
through their high-yield testing, had dis-
covered a kind of "ultimate ABM," and might
be able to use nuclear-weapon effects to turn
much of the U.S. missile force into a
Maginot Line. An offensive first strike would
simultaneously achieve a defensive objective,
not only destroying American cities with
blast and heat, but also creating electro-
magnetic pulse (EMP) effects extending well
beyond the radius of destruction that might
deactivate the electronic systems of missiles
in their silos. The U.S. has since revised
the electrical circuits in the Minuteman silos,
and has modified and shielded missiles, war-
heads, computers, and guidance systems to
protect them against electromagnetic pulse.
These countermeasures, of course, can be
only as effective as our grasp of such phe-
nomena.
GROWING DOUBTS, BRAVE CERTAINTIES
Last fall, an extraordinary study known as
"Strat-X" (for "Strategic Exercise") was
launched by Secretary McNamara's order to
lay out the full range of alternatives for im-
proving the posture of U.S. offensive forces
through the mid-1970's Strat-X will evaluate
offensive missile and warhead designs in
terms of different sea and land basing op-
tions, and it will weigh the resulting force
"mixes" against various levels of threat from
the Soviet Union and Red China. In this
study the Nike-X is being considered only for
the defense of U.S. offensive missile forces-
not cities. This shift of emphasis is striking
because up to this point the whole debate
about Nike-X has concentrated on its use in
city defense. This new turn in the thinking of
key officials is a clear indication of the
changing Soviet threat. A preliminary report
will go to the Secretary in a few weeks and
a final report is due in September. Little has
been said about this highly secret study, and
an official in the Office of Defense Research
and Engineering tersely summarizes the ob-
jective of Strat-X: "more survivable pay-
load." Another high defense official, con-
cerned about appearances, confides: "From
the outside, it may look as though we're not
sure of the deterrent. That's not so. We
are sure."
The determined air of confidence in the
upper reaches of the Pentagon does credit
to earnest men performing difficult tasks.
What worries informed observers on the out-
side is the apparent assumption that the
U.S. can safely confine itself to reacting
within 'familiar parameters to a changing
threat. The perils of losing the initiative
are coming plainly into view. In a recent
speech Dr. Harold Agnew, the forty-six-year-
old head of the weapon division at the
AEC's Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory, said
the "apparent drift in national policy on the
concept of balance of power and stability is
resulting in a stifling of innovation." Be-
cause U.S. scientists are authorized to build
or consider only those systems that respond
to a clearly defined threat, "We are contin-
ually in danger of coming up with answers to
threats which have changed." The prevail-
ing official attitude of certainty may not take
account of a steadily widening range of un-
certainty.
THE ULTIMATE UNBALANCING FACTOR
It Is Secretary McNamara's firmly held
conviction that the possession of secure "see-
S 8005
ond-strike" (retaliatory) missile forces by
both the U.S. and the Soviet Union creates
a stable condition of mutual deterrence. As
he told a British television interviewer
earlier this year." , . technically it's a rela-
tionship thats very difficult for either of us
to move out of unless the other simply fails
to act in a rational fashion." By deploying an-
tiballistic-missile defenses, the Russians,
according to McNamara's logic, are behaving
irrationally. The U.S. has reacted by making
preparations to upgrade its offensive missile
forces to the point where the effect of the
Soviet defenses will be negated and the
prospect of "Assured Destruction" by a U.S.
second strike will be maintained. However,
the hoped-for maintenance of stability de-
pends not only on the U.S.'s estimate of the
situation, but also on the Soviet Union's, and -
the Russians are clearly moved by their own
judgments and not McNamara's. Their belief
that they have upset the U.S. deterrent
would be, as McNamara himself has declared,
"The ultimate unbalancing factor."
In the radically altered strategic circum-
stances that may lie just ahead, the Russians
could begin to doubt the U.S.'s capacity and
willingness to inflict unacceptable damage
upon them. As General Earle G. Wheeler,
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, testi-
fied earlier this year: "Should the Soviets
come to believe that their ballistic-missile
defense, coupled with a nuclear attack on
the United States, would limit damage to
the Soviet Union to a level acceptable to
them, whatever that level is [italics FOR-
TUNE'S], our forces would no longer deter,
and the first principle of our security policy
is gone."
It should always be remembered that the
vast U.S. deterrent force exists solely to in-
fluence Soviet behavior. If it ever must be
used, deterrence has failed and catastrophe
looms. The threat of its use was a rational
instrument of national policy during the
days of overwhelming U.S. preponderance
under Eisenhower and Dulles, and even as
recently as the Kennedy Administration's
eyeball-to-eyeball confrontation with Khru-
schev. Now, however, such a, U.S. threat made
in the face of the Soviet offensive buildup
would amount to an irrational summons to
mutual suicide. The Russians soon may be
able to use their deterrent to inhibit the
U.S. and gain for themselves greater freedom
of maneuver. Short of an all-out Soviet at-
tack, it is difficult to imagine a provocation
sufficiently extreme to warrant U.S. resort to
the means of assured self-destruction.
Though the emerging second-strike capa-
bility on both sides may satisfy the definition
of "stability" favored by McNamara and the
Pentagon's defense intellectuals, this sym-
metry of opposing offensive forces is upset by
the Soviet commitment to ABM defenses.
Add to this the possible first-strike, counter-
force use of the proliferating Soviet ICBM's
and "stability" vanishes. Though offensive
capabilities may match up neatly, intentions
and therefore uncertainties do not. The de-
terrent equation is in danger of becoming
unbalanced by the one-sided shift of uncer-
tainty to the U.S. side.
U.S. behavior is already being influenced
by the Soviet deterrent. The likely failure
of the diplomatic attempt to talk the Rus-
sians out of their "worthless" ABM defenses
has forced the U.S. into offsetting offensive
steps involving major spending--e.g., the
$3.3-billion accelerated development and de-
ployment of Poseidon. And the anticipated
Soviet counterforce capability is shifting all
serious discussion of deploying Nike-X-at
least within McNamara's sphere--from de-
fense of cities to defense of "super-hardened"
Minuteman silos.
WOULD THE PRESIDENT PUSH THE BUTTON?
If present trends are allowed to continue
and U.S.-Soviet forces grow more asymmetri-
cal, the situation by the mid-1970's could
become menacing. An ARM defense lends
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itself superbly to bluffing and blackmail. The
mere existence of Soviet defenses would exert
psychological influence on both sides. It is
easy to imagine a suddenly belligerent So-
viet attitude toward Western. Europe. Would
the undefended U.S. react strongly if the
defended U.S.S.R. appeared willing to risk
war? It is possible to imagine a threat aimed
directly at the U.S. itself, perhaps even the
execution of the threat by the obliteration
of a selected city. Would the President choose
automatically to avenge the limited number
of dead Americans by ordering a response
certain to end civilized life .n this country?
Soviet planners, as they "war game" with
the forces of the 1970's surely ask them-
selves such questions.
The U.S. must soon recognize that a grad-
ual but almost certainly irreversible change
is occurring in the nature of deterrence. The
Assured Destruction concept, founded on
the superiority of the offense in modern war-
fare, has been challenged by technology and
Its application to defense. The technology of
missile defense is now advancing more rapid-
ly than the technology of offense. The rela-
tive costs and effectiveness of ballistic-mis-
sile defense are measured within the Penta-
gon through the "cost-exchange ratio." A
few years ago, the high costs and ineffective-
ness of defense were officially expressed in a
cost-exchange ratio of between 10:1 and
100:1-that is, every $100 spent on defense
could be offset by spending from $1 to $10 on
increased offense. Now, however, by Secretary
McNamara's own reckoning, the ratio is be-
tween 4:1 and 1:1, or parity. Of course, such
numerical comparisons take no account of
the relative burdens imposed on the U.S.
and Soviet economies by higher arms spend-
ing. If the technological trend continues over
the next decade, defense could gain a margin
of superiority.
The improving prospects for defense are
welcomed by the Russians, as their respected
military commentator, Major General Niko-
lai Talensky, has written: "The creation of
an effective anti-missile missile system en-
ables the state to make its defenses depend-
ent chiefly on its own capabilities, not only
on mutual deterrence, that is, on the good
will of the other side." More is involved here
than a Soviet state of mind that Secretary
McNamara dismisses as "an absolute religious
fanaticism on the subject of defense." An-
other Soviet military strategist has em-
phasized the balanced nature of the emerg-
ing Soviet offensive-defensive deterrent: "It
must be remembered that victory in war is
determined not merely by the character of
weapons but by the relationships of forces
of the combatant sides."
In future psycho-political conflict, which
uses wepons as manipulative symbols, the
decisive advantage could lie with the side
that possesses defenses. Even though these
may be ineffective, the undefended side can-
not determine this without exposing itself to
mortal risk. A. situation in which both sides
had defenses would balance uncertainties
and might well produce greater stability than
the previous state of anxious nakedness.
The case for a prompt U.S. commitment to
a limited deployment of Nike-X is com-
pelling. Though Secretary McNamara argues
that an antiballistic-missile defense would
not reduce American casualties "in any
meaningful sense," a Nike.-X system might
save thirty to fifty million :fives and as Gen-
eral Wheeler testified, this would be "mean-
ingful, we believe, in every sense." There is
little time to act if the President in the mid-
1970's, whoever he may be, is to have avail-
able a full range of policy alternatives. Clear-
ly the effect of the present policy is to fore-
close options for the future President.
From the moment of a decision to proceed,
five to seven. years would be required to
deploy Nike-X around twenty-five major
cities and key defense installations. Lieuten-
ant General Austin Betts, Chief of R. and
D. for the Army, who has overseen the de-
velopment of Nike-X, be:ieves the "opti-
mum" moment has arrived for a decision to
begin production. Further delay could mean
the breakup of contractor teams and the
onset of obsolescence in important com-
ponents.
THE SYSTEM THAT'S READY
An argument can be made that it is better
to postpone deployment of Nike-X if fur-
ther R. and D. could produce a more ad-
vanced ABM-and it probably can. But Nike-
X is the only defense system that can be
deployed by t:oe mid-1970'x. Secretary Mc-
Namara's projected cost of $40 billion for a
full-scale depaoyment of Nike-X includes
such "damage limiting" measures as inter-
ceptor aircraft and shelters. However, this
forbidding figure would be spent over ten
years. Senator Russell describes it as "a sort
of Congressional deterrent." Beyond the
question of how many billions of dollars are
involved lies the uncertainty about the per-
formance of Nike-X systems in a nuclear
environment. These questions cannot be re-
solved entirely in the laboratory. A decision
to go ahead might stir demands for a re-
sumption of :nuclear testing, which would
surely arouse a world outcry.
But every objection to the limited de-
ployment of Nike-X can be met with soundly
based apprehensions about the grave risks
of not having at least a measure of defense
in the next decade. A light attack ("thin")
defense has been estimated to cost perhaps
$4 billion and. could be modified or super-
seded by new technology. Such a defense
would serve several purposes: it would at
once restore strategic balance and reassure
the Russians that the U.S. is not obsessed
with the offense and tempted to strike first;
it would cope with the accidental firing of
a missile; it would counter the threat ex-
pected from Red China until well into the
late 1970's; and it could help check the re-
cent estrangement from our European and
Asian allies by enhancing the credibility of
our promise to defend them. Should the
Soviet threat become more extreme, NATO
might be rebuilt around a sharing of defen-
sive nuclear weapons.
Perhaps most significant of all, the de-
ployment of a limited Nike-X defense sys-
tem, combined with the vigorous pursuit of
an improved ABM, would signal the Soviet
Union that the U.S. has not, after all, mis-
understood the dynamic force of technology.
The American. will to lead the technological
race and to maintain superiority is the most
enduring deterrent.
FEDERAL RESEARCH PROGRAMS IN
FIELDS OF THE DISADVANTAGED
AND HANDICAPPED
Mr. MORSE. Mr. President, the Office
of Education recently put forth a report
listing the principal research programs
in the field:; of the disadvantaged and
the handicapped.
Because the report contains, in short
compass, the essential facts which would
be helpful to researchers seeking fund-
ing for programs, I feel that it can be of
great interest to my colleagues and for
that reason I ask unanimous consent
that the report to which I have alluded
be printed at this point in my remarks.
There being no objection, the report
was ordered to be printed in the RECORD,
as follows:
FEDERAL RESEARCH PROGRAMS IN FIELDS OF THE
DISADVANTAGED AND HANDICAPPED
(Prepared by the Information Center Office
of Programs for the Disadvantaged U.S.
Office of Education, Department of Health,
Education, and Welfare, Feb. 10, 1967)
PREFACE
The Department of Health, Education, and
Welfare, the Office of Economic Opportunity,
andthe Department of Labor support a wide
range of research anad demonstration pro-
grams in fields of the disadvantaged and
handicapped. State agencies, private and
public Institutions of higher education, other
organizations, and interested individuals
may be eligible to receive grants or contracts.
Because of the variety of research and dis-
semination projects in fields of the disad-
vantaged and handicapped and similarity in
program objectives, the Office of Programs
for the Disadvantaged believed that it would
be useful to program administrators and
interested applicants to compile a list of
these research programs describing purpose,
program focus, fiscal year 1967 priorities, as
well as other information. The listing is
intended to inform program administrators
of the existence of other on-going research
programs with similar interests. The com-
pilation serves several purposes It may be
used as a guide for ;program administrators
to refer research proposals which they may
not be able to fund, to another program. It
may indicate to program officials of certain
identities or focal points among research
programs such as growing interest in juve-
nile delinquency. It may be used to help in-
form applicants of the different kinds of
research programs that exist in fields of the
disadvantaged and handicapped and aid
them in applying to a program suited to
their goals and Interests.
The research programs listed have been
selected because of their special relationship
to the disadvantaged and handicapped. This
list will be modified, revised or supplemented
as additional Information on research pro-
grams in these fields becomes available.
REGINA GOFF,
Assistant Commissioner.
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, EDUCATION, AND
WELFARE-OFFICE OF EDUCATION
Research program., of the Office of Educa-
tion are administered by the Bureau of Re-
search. The Bureau receives proposals from
colleges, universities, private profit and non-
profit organizations, State educational agen-
cies, and individuals for research and
research-related projects and programs. Pro-
posals are evaluated by Bureau staff and by
field readers and consultants outside the
Office of Education. After approval by the
Commissioner, a grant or contract is nego-
tiated and. awarded. Projects are monitored
by the Bureau of Research.
The following programs administered by
the Bureau of Research are particularly per-
tinent to the disadvantaged and handi-
capped:
Research, surveys, and demonstration
Purpose.--To support research into the
process and content of education and to
devise new applications of this research.
Who May Apply.-Universities and colleges,
other public or private agencies (profit or
nonprofit), institutions, organizations, and
individuals.
Project Deadlines.-No deadlines.
Matching of Federal Funds.-Some match-
ing of Federal funds may be required.
Program. Focus.--The program supports
basic educational research, research in cur-
riculum development for all levels Of educa-
tion from pre-school through adult educa-
tion and for all subject areas and main-
tains research and development centers at
different universities.
Fiscal Year 1967 Priorities.-Educational
research projects are grouped under several
inter-related headings, basic research, cur-
riculum iraprovement, and developmental ac-
tivities. Basic research projects are concerned
with the development and strengthening of
educational theory and obtaining a greater
understanding of the fundamental processes
of education. Items in need of extensive basic
research include learning theory, guidance
and counseling, measurement and evaluation,
administration, teacher education, curricu-
lum development, originality, and analysis of
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