ANTI-BALLISTIC MISSILE RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP70B00338R000300100034-7
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 4
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 10, 2006
• Sequence Number: 34
• Publication Date: June 28, 1967
• Content Type: OPEN

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June 28, 1967 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? HOUSE 11 8213
territorial adjustments. Yet adjustments
must be made if a stasis is to be effected
in the Middle East and peace is to be pre-
served. I salute Israel for its efficiency
and bravado, and I am assured that her
success will in no way tempt her to devi-
ate from those principles that she was
fighting for: freedom, political inde-
pendence, and territorial integrity.
If these proposals are carried out,
then, in President Johnson's own words:
That land, known to everyone of us since
childhood as the birthplace of great religions
and learning for all mankind, can flourish
once again in our time.
Mr. Speaker, although history never
actually repeats itself, it sometimes
comes very close. The history of this con-
flict has many lessons to each to all. It
is my hope that these lessons have been
well learned. Freedom is a precious thing,
and free men everywhere are willing to
die for it. Israel showed once again that
a people cannot be intimidated by belli-
cosity and saber rattling, that they do
not shrink from an enemy who is dis-
proportionately larger or stronger, when
the existence of their nation is at stake.
Indeed, true men would rather die on
their feet than live on their knees. And
this, Mr. Speaker, is no less true today
than it was 191 years ago when our fore-
fathers stood with their flintlocks and
fought for their independence against
the strongest empire in the world.
Let this be a lesson to all those who
would underestimate the hearts of men
or try to subjugate them to the blind
forces of power hunger or ideology.
(Mr. DORN asked and was given per-
mission to extend his remarks at this
point in the RECORD and to include an
address by the President of the United
States.)
[Mr. DORN'S remarks will appear
hereafter in the Appendix.]
bill
ANTI-BALLISTIC MISSILE RE-
SEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT
(Mr. GERALD R. FORD asked and
was given permission to extend his re-
marks at this point in the RECORD.)
Mr. GERALD R. FORD. Mr. Speaker,
many of us here in the House have long
been concerned about our national pol-
icy, or lack of policy, on the question of
an anti-ballistic missile defense. This
has not been a partisan concern, but
one of profound differences of judgment
between the President and the Secretary
of Defense on the one hand, and entire
Joint Chiefs of Staff and many of the
most knowledgeable members of Con-
gress, Republicans and Democrats, on
the other.
In recent weeks my concern over this
question has greatly increased. However,
in view of the presence of Premier Kosy-
gin in this country and the prospect of
his talks with President Johnson I have
withheld detailed comment until now.
June 17, 1967, Red China exploded her
first Hydrogen Bomb. That was 11 days
ago.
October 16, 1964, Red China detonated
her first nuclear device. That was 2 years
_ and 8 months ago.
The first atomic explosion by Com-
munist China was rated around 20 kilo-
tons. The latest thermonuclear blast was
estimated between 2 to 7 megatons?at
least 100 times as powerful as Red
China's first atomic explosion.
Each of Red China's six nuclear tests
has evidenced more rapid technological
progress and greater sophistication than
most U.S. experts had predicted.
It took the United States 6 years and
3 months to get from the first Alamo-
gordo atomic test to the first H-Bomb
at Eniwetok.
It took the Soviet Union 3 years and
11 months to cover the same stages of
development, after the United States had
shown the way.
Red China took 2 years and 8 months
to join the H-bomb club.
Throughout that entire period of peril,
a one-sided debate has paralyzed ad-
ministration policy on the life-and-death
question of an anti-ballistic missile de-
fense system for the United States. The
almost unanimous opinion of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff, the Nation's toP pro-
fessional military experts, and the
cognizant committees of the Congress
has been in favor of proceeding with
some form of ABM development and de-
ployment which, the Defense Department
estimates, might save millions or tens of
millions of American lives.
The debate has been one-sided because
President Johnson, as Commander in
Chief, and Secretary of Defense Mc-
Namara, his civilian deputy, have re-
peatedly deferred this decision and de-
clined to spend preproduction funds
appropriated by Congress for ABM
defense.
At first, the administration argument
was that an ABM defense was imprac-
tical and would be a waste of money.
When rumors first spread, through press
reports, early in 1963, that the Russians
apparently were developing an ABM de-
fense, Secretary McNamara engaged in
semantic hair-splitting with congres-
sional questioners which seemed to deny
that the Soviet Union had an ABM
"system"?defining system in the tech-
nical sense of a complete weapons sys-
tem?and thus implying that the United
States was at least even with the U.S.S.R.
in this technological race. That was 4
years ago.
More recently, the administration line
has shifted to the theme that Soviet
leaders might be persuaded, in a hopeful
atmosphere of detente, to agree to stop
the costly ABM race on which they were
well along and the United States had
not yet decided to start. But, despite
numerous authoritative articles and dis-
cussions in the press, there was no of-
ficial administration confirmation of the
deployment of a Soviet ABM defense
until November 10, 1966-2 days after
the 1966 national elections?when Sec-
retary McNamara announced there was
considerable evidence to this effect. He
also said it was "much too early to make
a decision for a deployment against the
Chinese threat." The Red Chinese had
just tested a nuclear-tipped 400- to 500-
mile ballistic missile on October 27, 1966.
That was 8 months ago.
In his latest state of the Union mes-
sage, January 10, 1967, President John-
son noted two developments, an increase
during the past year of Soviet long-
range missile capabilities and the begin-
ning of an antiballistic missile defense
around Moscow. But his main emphasis
was on what he termed his "solemn duty
to slow down the arms race between us?
the United States and the U.S.S.R.?if
that is at all possible, in both conven-
tional and nuclear weapons and
defenses."
That was 5 months and 2 weeks ago.
In the Republican appraisal of the
state of the Union delivered January 19,
1967,1 said:
The Administration has finally admitted
to the American people that the Soviet
Union has increased its Intercontinental
Ballistic Missile capability and is deploying
an Anti-Ballistic Missile Defense System. In
anticipation of a life-and-death decision on
just such a development, Congress has voted
millions of dollars which the Administration
did not seek and apparently has not used.
The Congress did its duty and gave the
President a clear expression of its will and
the means to carry it out.
Before more precious time is lost, Congress
and the American people are now entitled
to a clear explanation from the President of
the perils and problems facing the United
States in the new global balance of strategic
power.
We, too, seek to avoid a costly new round
In the nuclear arms race. But the least the
Nation must do now is to speed up its readi-
ness to deploy Anti-Ballistics Missiles in a
hurry if our survival requires its.
That was 5 months and 1 week ago. I
repeat it again today.
In his budget message to Congress on
January 24, 1967, the President spelled
out his decision on an ABM defense for
the United States, pledging that during
fiscal 1968 he would?
Continue intensive development of Nike-X
but take no action now to deploy an anti-
ballistic missile (ABM) defense; initiate dis-
cussions with the Soviet Union on the limita-
tion of ABM deployment; in the event these
discussions prove unsuccessful, we will re-
consider our deployment system.
That was 5 months ago.
Soviet Premier Alexei N. Kosygin gave
an oblique answer at a news conference
in London on February 9, 1967. This is
from the New York Times' account:
Premier Kosygin suggested dt a news con-
ference today that defensive anti-ballistic
missile systems were less dangerous to man-
kind than offensive systems, and therefore
more desirable even if they should prove
more costly.
While avoiding a direct answer to a ques-
tion on the subject, he gave no encourage-
ment to hopes for a moratorium on anti-
ballistic missile defense development as a
means of limiting the arms race between the
great powers....
His reply was that "a system that serves to
ward off an attack does not heighten the ten-
sion but serves to lessen the possibility of
an attack that may kill large numbers of
people."
It is difficult not to agree with the
Communist leader in the way he dis-
missed the cost-effectiveness argument
favored by Mr. McNamara.
It might be cheaper to build offensive than
defensive systems.
Kosygin said?
But this is not the criterion upon which
one should base oneself in deciding this
problem.
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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD HOUSE ?lune 28, 1967
This was 4 months and 2 weeks ago.
Nevertheless, President Johnson con-
tattled to support Secretary McNamara
or vice versa. Testifying March 6, 1967,
before the House Defense Appropriations
Subcommittee, McNa.maxa conceded the
continuing split between. himself and the
entire Joint Chiefs of Staff, represented
by their Chairman, Gen. Earle G.
Wheeler, on the ABM question.
General Wheeler told the House
Armed Services Committee that he had
ttatc. to President Johnson, on his own
initiative, to present the Joint Chiefs'
rase to the Commander in Chief in this
impoetant difference of opinion with the
Settretary-of Defense.
heavily censored transcript of
eoramittee testimony, it is evident that
Mr, McNamara still felt that the Rus-
so:vas were wasting their resources on
defenstve measures against a missile at-
tack and that the United States should
not follow suit. He argued that the U.S.
response to a Soviet ABM system should
not be a U.S. ABM system, but a step-up
in our deterrent offensive capability. If
we embarked upon an ABM defense, Mr.
McNamara assumed that Soviet planners
would use the same reasoning as he used
and increase their offensive capability.
At the same time he acknowledged that,
oven though the United States had
windy advertised that it was not proceed-
ing with any ABM deployment, the
ttottiet Union was increasing its offensive
missile capability anyway. But he per-
sisted in the view that the United States
should not expedite an ABM deployment.
General Wheeler took the position that
"the Soviets will undoubtedly improve
the Moscow system as time goes on and
extend ABM defense to other high-pri-
ority areas of the Soviet Union." He esti-
mated that they have the resources to
do so and are willing to spend whatever it
takes to gain strategic superiority or
strategic parity with the United States.
On behalf of his colleagues of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff, General Wheeler testified
that the Soviet objective?both in offen-
sive and defensive strategy?is "to
achieve an exploitable capability, per-
mitting them freedom to pursue their
national aims at conflict levels less than
general nuclear war."
While the debate on the desirability of
a U.S. ABM defense system has concen-
trated until very recently on sharply
varying U.S. estimates of Soviet inten-
tions and capabilities, Red China's
breakthrough into the select group of
four thermonuclear superpowers injects
an entirely new factor.
The timing of Red China's H-bomb
breakthrough was most significant. It
came as the whole world was groping to
assess the lessons of the Israel-Arab war
and the near-conirontation of great
,vers that had been averted. The most
immediate conclusions from this crisis
are:
leirst. As proved by Israel, a sudden
and preemptive air strike has not been
summarily discarded by military plan-
ners of other nations. This is especially
trite if the odds against a successful de-
fense are very unfavorable.
Second. As proved by Nasser, fanatic
and authoritarian regimes do not neces-
sarily act rationally or evaluate risks by
the same 'standard we do. Furthermore,
they can suffer what a Western govern-
ment would consider inacceptable hu-
man and material losses and still survive
politically.
Third. As proved by the United States
and the Soviet Union, when the two su-
perpowers neutralize each after with
their mutual nuclear deterrents, lesser
nations are pretty much left free to se-
solve regior.al issues by force.
None of these lessons, I am sure, was
lost on Red China or on the other na-
tions of Asia.
I hope they are not lost upon Secretary
McNamara; and will cause him quickly
to reverse his 1966 postelection VieW
that it is "much too early to make a de-
cision for a deployment against the Chi-
nese threat."
Even those who cherish the roost op-
timistic hopes that Russian Communist
leaders will act reasonably and with re-
straint in their thermonuclear strategy
cannot possibly put the Chinese C'onimu-
nist leaders in the same category. Peipjng
itself does not.
Red China's capability in the field of
nuclear weaponry consistently has been
downgraded and underestimated by ad-
ministration policymakers. When Red
China achieved atomic status, Americans
were told it would take many years for
them to perfect advanced systems for
delivering a nuclear weapon. When,
within 6 months, Red China mo noted an
atomic warhead on a 500-mile ballistic
missile. Americans were reassured that it
would be many more years before the
Chinese could pose any interconeiner ml
threat to the United States.
Secretary McNamara testified or. Jen-
uary 25, 1966 before the House Armed
Services Committee that "the 'Chinese
Communists have detonated two nuclear
devices and could possibly develop and
deploy a small force of ICBMs by the
mid-to-latter part of the llt,70ts."
Whether this estimate is better or worse
than Mr. McNamara's previous esti-
mates on the Vietnam war, the neces-
sity of a U.S. merchant marine, the use-
fulness of Reserve forces and the tuture
of manned aircraft and nuclear-pow-
ered ships, cannot yet be determ med. His
danger date, however, is only 8 to 10
years away.
Other Pentagon officials have pointed
out that a primitive submarine-munched
nuclear-tipped missile could be developed
by Red China in a much shorter period,
and conceivably could already exist.
Fortune magazine in an authoritative
June 1967 article on ABM defense esti-
mates that 5 to 7 years, from the time
the go-ahead is given, would be needed
to deploy even a thin U.S. anti-ballistic
missile defense. Cost estimates, depend-
ing upon the degree of protection pro-
vided, range from $3 billion to $40 bil-
lion, spread over a period of years.
The article quotes Lt. Gen. Austin
Betts, Chief of the Army's Nike X re-
search and development, as beliaring the
optimum moment has arrived to begin
production. It points out that further
delay could mean the breakup of con-
tractor teams and the onset of obsoles-
cence in components.
There appears to be general agreement
that the current :Ascal 1968 Defense Ap-
propriation, voted 407 to 1, contains as
much money as could be used in the
coming 12 months?some $908 million
on top c,f the $4 billion previously pro-
vided fcr antiballistic missile research
and development. This includes the extra
$167.8 million which Congress voted last
year for initial deployment which the
administration declined to use.
I can :no longer see any logic in delay-
ing this cranial decision for an indefinite
time while the United States attempts to
get agreement with the Soviet Union to
slow dcwn an expensive ABM race.
Premier .Flosygin threw cold water on
any ABM moratorium at his U.N. news
conference Jane 25 and President John-
son has not revealed any progress on this
subject clueing their private talks at Holly
Bush.
What it perlectly clear is that U.S.
reluctance to move forward on ABM de-
fense deployment, has in no way slowed
the Sovietnarogram, defensively or offen-
sively, nor impaired the thermonuclear
progress at Red China. Both are moving
full speed ahead.
Gen. Harold Johnson, the Army Chief
of Staff, summed up the sentiment of
professional mtlitaxy leaders whets he
told the House Defense Appropriations
Subcommittee on March 10, 1967:
Now, one criminit argue against discussion
the issues that are to be discussed with the
Soviets you cannot argue that at all. How-
ever, the uneasiness that I feel is basically
this: When do 7,09 stop discusaing and whior
do we reach a deasion point?
That was 3 months and 2 weeks ago.
ftepreSeIltatiVe GLENARD P. LE?SC0141.k
of California, ranking Republican on the
subcommittee, summed up the House
Appropriations Committee's answer to
the President and Secretary McNamara,
on the House floor June 13, 1967. He
said:
In commenting on the reluctance to begin
to deploy the Nike-X system on the part of
the Administration, our committee report
crates :
"It would appear that the initiation of de-
ployment; of Egli,. or thin defense, new, may
very well be a mart useful first step toward
whatever level Cf ballistic missile defense
ultimately appears necessary." In other
words the report, adopted unanimously by
the committee, says: "Get Going!"
That was 2 weeks ago. The key word
is "now."
Four days after the House overwhelm-
ingly endorsed this view of the urgency
to get going or. ABM, the Red Chinese
H-bomb was exploded.
Initial reports on this significant
event, overshadowed by the U.N. wrangl-
ing on the Middle East, quoted Washing-
ton weapons spectalists as surmising that
"Red China would be more likely to set
it off on a test stand so that its yield
and other effects could be measured more
precisely"---another disturbing sign of
assuming a potential enemy thinks ex-
actly as we do.
Later, after Japanese atomic scientists
said thajr analysis showed the bomb had
been exploded at a high altitude. the
Washington Pets on June 22 quoted
Washington intelligence officials as be-
lieving the Red Chinese H-bomb was
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June 28, 1967 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? HOUSE 118215
dropped from an airplane. It added
that?
The Pentagon has said of the Chinese H-
bomb that it does not require any change in
H.S. military strategy.
I disagree.
With the United States and the
U.S.S.R. standing each other off in nu-
clear deterrents, the possession of even
one Red Chinese nuclear weapon that
can be carried in one conventional bom-
ber radically alters the balance of power
in East Asia and the Western Pacific?
areas which President Johnson has spe-
cifically proclaimed as vital to America's
national interest and the fate of the free
world.
If the elementary weapons system rep-
resented by what Red China evidently
has already produced is not an immedi-
ate threat to the continental United
States, or even to Alaska, Hawaii and
Guam, what about its threat to Japan,
South Korea, Formosa, South Vietnam,
Thailand, and the Philippines which the
United States has solemn treaty obliga-
tions to defend?
Time, unlike money, cannot be re-
covered. Wasting time is therefore a far
more serious matter than wasting funds.
The arguments about the cost effective-
ness of ABM defense which Mr. McNa-
mara has argued for years and years,
backed by the President, must now give
way to the unanimous opinion of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff and the cognizant
committees of Congress that the United
States cannot risk running second in any
aspect of this grim game.
If any practical step could conceivably
save 100 million American lives?or 1
million or 1,000?how much is too much
to spend on it? Yet what we lack is not
the money but the decision to "Get go-
ing." The funds have been provided. I
call upon President Johnson to act with-
out another day's delay.
PREPARING FOR POWER FAILURES
(Mr. SAYLOR asked and was given
permission to extend his remarks at this
point in the RECORD and to include ex-
traneous matter.)
Mr. SAYLOR. Mr. Speaker, power
failures occurring in the East over the
past year or so can provide invaluable
lessons in thwarting tragedy and mini-
mizing inconvenience if plans for future
breakdowns are effected at once.
The most serious aspect of blackouts
to date has been the generation of bu-
reaucratic demands for further Govern-
ment intrusion into the electric power
business, but nevertheless the conse-
quences of sudden power losses could
have grave implications unless the Na-
tion is prepared to meet them.
Earlier this month a tower carrying
high voltage transmission lines in the
Pennsylvania-New Jersey-Maryland in-
terconnection was severely damaged by a
heavy vehicle presumably deliberately
driven into it. The section of the line is
a link between a generating facility in
northern West Virginia and the Key-
stone plant in Indiana County, Pa., and
will delay new capacity that is needed on
the Atlantic seaboard.
The incident should serve as a new
warning that industry, business, institu-
tions, and the general public must co-
operate to reduce the danger of elec-
tricity shortages. Further emphasis was
provided a week ago last Friday when
there was emergency curtailment of
power in the Philadelphia area after
temperatures climbed into the 90's and
air-conditioning equipment was put to
work overtime.
Faced with many weeks of hot summer
weather, we might be well advised to
anticipate that utilities will have to cut
service in various areas for short periods
of time after advance notification to
power customers. The plan has worked
successfully in other parts of the country
and can help to avert overtaxing of gen-
erating equipment that sometimes re-
sults in wholesale power failures.
Meanwhile, more attention must be
given to emergency measures that would
be needed when unexpected power cut-
offs occur. For example, all elevators
should be equipped with independent
lighting facilities and with openings for
proper ventilation. I have read of a num-
ber of incidents in which persons have
been trapped in elevators for an hour
and more, an experience that could have
serious results for a person with a heart
condition or with an extremely sensitive
nervous system.
One group caught for an hour and 10
minutes in a pitch dark elevator reported
to me that the air was so bad that there
was a very real fear of suffocation. The
manager of the apartment house ex-
plained that there was a plastic panel
that could have been removed from the
roof of the car, but the fact is that the
passengers had no way of knowing about
it because it would have been too dark
to read the instructions even if there
had been any such information available.
So it is time to get ready for such
emergencies or one of these days we are
going to read about fatal consequences.
Our electric utilities are doing an out-
standing job of keeping up with the surg-
ing demands created by increased in-
dustrial activity, growing population,
and a continually rising use of air-con-
ditioning equipment. When the great
mine-mouth generating plants in cen-
tral and western Pennsylvania go into
operation, there will be a sharp increase
in supply of electric power for the East.
But it is unlikely that our vast power
networks will ever be completely im-
mune to mechanical failure or sabotage,
and the way of the wise is to begin at
once to take all possible precautions
against resultant hardship.
THE IMPORTANCE OF SOUND
HUMAN RELATIONSHIPS
(Mr. HALEY asked and was given per-
mission to extend his remarks at this
point in the RECORD.)
Mr. HALEY. Mr. Speaker, I have asked
permission to place in the CONGRESSIONAL
RECORD at this time one of the interest-
ing articles that is so typical of my
friend, Editor 0. A. Brice, of the Lake
Wales, Fla., News. His column of June
22, 1967, is a reminder of the importance
of sound human relationships. As he so
well points out, youth must learn respect
and tolerance for the old.
The editorial column follows:
OVER IN MY CORNER
(By 0. A. Brice)
I sat in a restaurant the other evening
and watched a group of young people enjoy-
ing their half hour lunch. They all seemed
to be youngsters who came from first class
homes?boys and girls who held their parents
in high regard and who normally would go
out of their way to give assistance to some
older person.
I admired young America as I saw it in
flesh, with bright eyes and glowing cheeks
and I thought of the wonderful opportuni-
ties which faced these young people as they
emerge from their school duties and then
take on the responsibilities of life.
Then suddenly the whole scene changed
so far as I was concerned, and I altered my
opinion as to the kind of future they faced
if they failed to see the "red light" that
caused them to show the disrespect for some-
one less fortunate, which I witnessed.
The occasion arose when an old lady, wear-
ing a sun-bonnet, walked in and quietly
took a seat at a nearby table. With a half
smile (just to be courteous), she looked to-
ward the youthful crowd, maybe thinking of
the days when she was young and gay, but
without any sign of envy or criticism for
their mirth.
True her face was wrinkled and still truer
was the fact that she had difficulty in select-
ing from the menu the food she desired for
the evening meal, but she finally made her
wants known and the waitress most gra-
ciously then went on to fill the order.
But the "snickers" which were plainly
heard by me from the group of youngsters,
reached the old lady's earls and she was hurt
to a point where it was embarrassing to
others who saw the incident.
Somehow the old lady seemed to grow in
stature with me even though her stooped
shoulders had lessened her in inches over the
years gone by. Somehow that wrinkled face
and the eyes which had lost most of their
sparkle made her stand out as someone who
should be eulogized instead of mocked.
Regardless of the mirth the youngsters
enjoyed over her appearance and her dif-
ficulty in understanding the menu, the fact
remained that she was "somebody's mother",
and that perhaps those lines in her face
had been brought about in an endeavor to
build the very society which now permitted
these nattily dressed youngsters to enjoy the
freedom they were finding.
The whole incident impressed me with the
lack of tolerance we often find these days,
not only in our modern youth but in our
adult lives as well. It isn't everyone who has
enjoyed huge prosperity during the epoch
through which we are passing.
Everyone hasn't been privileged to par-
take of the good things of life in abundance
and not everyone has had the advantages
which we see now bringing forth so much
independence these days.
Sometimes I think I am too observing of
the little things which may not be meant to
be wrong. Thinking over the other night's
incident I feel pretty sure the young people
involved brought a little heartache to the
old mother all unconsciously, yet through
their little act, they made her feel uncom-
fortable and as she thinks of modern youth
she may become cynical and a trifle narrow
in her appraisal of what education is doing
for them.
I delayed my cup of coffee a few moments
to watch the old mother leave the cafe table.
She arose, gave a smile to those nearby,
equally as sweet as the one she wore when
she entered, and she walked to the door, not
as an "old-fashioned woman" who deserved
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R216 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD -- HOUSE June 28, _1967
enickers of others, but more saintly and
it die thin she would have been had she
not been able to show her tolerance in the
atehion wnich she chid.
t net wood will never reach the point of
re?Jennie where we all live as "one world,"
efitii bold, old and young [earn and under-
:dead that tolerance, respect and love form
to; keystone upon which genuine good
congithors can exist. And respect for old age
mest never be thrown aside as debris if our
mger eeneration is to get: the most out
I Is and the future they are responsible
;-oyniding.
UilfIrE SOVEREIGNTY OF THE
PANAMA C .AN AL
4 llyte. HALL asked and was given per-
mission to address the House for 1 min-
ute and to revise and extend his re-
marks.)
2(r. HALL. Mr. Speaker.. today I have
introduced a House concurrent resolu-
tion, joined by several other Members,
expressing the sense and will of Congress
that the administration maintain and
protect its sovereign rights and jurisdic-
tion over the Panama Canal and that the
administration in no way forfeit, cede,
negotiate, or transfer any of these sov-
ereign rights or jurisdiction to any other
sovereign nation or international orga-
nization.
the prime reason for the introduction
of th:.s concurrent resolution is a pro-
posed new treaty between the Republic
of Panama and the United States. The
terms and the treaty itself have come to
light in the past few days. Only through
the careful scrutiny of our two col-
leagues the gentleman from Pennsyi-
va Ina I-Mr. FLOOD I, anti tile gentlewom-
an from Missouri I Mrs. Sur..,LrvAxl, have
thJ?, American public been made aware of
tins -sell out' of the U.S. sovereignty
and juriediction in the Panama Canal
Canal Zone.
Therefore, Mr. Speaker. I urge my col-
lee g.ues to join me and my cosponsors in
expressing the will of Congress that it is
for maintenance and preservation of U.S.
sovereignty and, jurisdiction in the stra-
tegically important Panama Canal. A
(opy of the resolution follows:
1. Cole. RES. 389
A ,7!7, t current resolution expressing the sense
it Congress on the Panama Canal
Whereas it is the policy of the Congress
:Ind the desire of the people of the United
St tea that the United States maintain its
sovereignty and jurisciiiition over the Panama
"CP ied Zone; and
Whereas -under the Hay- Pauncefote Treaty
of 1.401 between Great Britain and the
rOnted States, the United States adopted the
:erinciples of the Convention of Constanti-
nople of 1888 as the rules for the operation.
regulation, and management of said Canal;
iii
Wheeeas by the terms of the Hay-Bunau-
Vacilla 'Treaty of 1903, between the Republic
or Panama and the United States, the per-
petuity of use, occupation, control construc-
tion, maintenance, operatifon, sanitation, and
protection for said Canal was granted to the
United States; and
Whereas the United States has paid the
Republic of Panama almost $50,000,000 in
the form of a gratuity; and
Whereas the United States has made an
aggregate investment in said Canal in an
,;nou nit CH over $4,889,000.000.00: and
Whereas said investment or any part there-
iii never be recovered in the event of
Panamanian seizure or United States aban-
donment; and
Whereas 70 percent of the Canal Eon ?Sc either originates or terminates in liTtlited
States ports; and
Whereas said canal is of vital strategic im-
portance and imperative to the hemispheric
defense and to the security of the !Baited
States; and
Whereas a treaty has been proposed be-
tween the United States and the Republic of
Panama which in effect would greaty im-
pair if not all but eliminate the known end
admitted sovereign rights of the linited
tee in said canal: :Ind
Whereas undsr said proposed treat-, said
canal becomes 'he property of a non-samert-
can-governmem: authority; and
Whereas the Suez Canal has been cloteiel
twice in the past ten years, subject so the
discretion of tie Efryptian Government e
that the most recent closing, this June iii67
has meant a very substantial increase in
United States ;,hipping costs: Now, there-
fore, be it
Resolved by mite Rouse of Represen,atiM.i
(time Senate concurring) That it is the sense
of the Congress that the Government of the
United States maintain and protect i's sov-
ereign rights and jurisdiction over said Canel
and that the United States Governm?wit Li
no way forfeit, cede, negotiate, or transfer
any or these sovereign rights or jurisdiction
Co any other sovereign nation or interna-
tional organization..
NEI.. GERALD R. FORD (at a e -quest of Mr. BURKE of Florida) was
granted permission to extend Ins re-
marks at this point in the RECORD and to
include extraneous matter.)
[Mr. GERALD R. FORD'S remarks
will appear hereafter in the Appendix.]
VIETNAM: THE MODERATE a'DLCI-
TION, ADDRESS BY JOHN :JEN.-
NETH GALBRAITH
(Mr. KUPFERMAN (at the recun,,st of
Mr. BURKE of Florida) was grantee. per-
mission to extend his remarks al, tnis
point in the RECORD and to include ex-
traneous matter.)
Mr. KUPFERMAN. Mr. Speakeo, our
justifiable concern for the situation in
the Middle East has shunted into the
background our deep and misguided in-
volvement in the conflict in Vietnam,
which continues to devour our young
men and to waste our substance.
The most recent view of the sitLation
was expressed today by our former
Ambassador to India, John Kenneth
Galbraith, and I bring it to the con-
sideration of ray colleagues.
VIETNAM: THE MODERATE SOLUTIO
(Address bir John Kenneth Galbraith Peu
M. Warburg professor of (icon:end es
Harvard University at "Negotiations Now:
A National Citizens Campaign To Eu d the
War in viittrain," in Washington, D.17,..
June 28, 1967)
A singular and well-observed feat, re of
war is for the 'dew in retrospect to spire
radically from that which attended tl be-
ginning. Dangees which at the out; et of
hostilities seenied to justify the meal
sanguinary steps in the perspective of years
seem slight, sometimes frivolc:us. And
prospects which at the beginning of ccriflict
seemed easy and brilliant come to measure
only the depth of the miscalculation Tee
case of men who in the last thirty years have
planned expeditions against Moscow, Pearl
Harbor and Pusan not to mention Jerusalem
and Tel Aviv sufficiently establishes In is
point. At the same time: war turns reason into
stereotype. Acceptance: of what In the be-
ginning is an eseimate, of national interest
becomes: an article of faith, a test of con-
stancy, a measure of leatriotism. At least
while it lasts, war has a way of freeziag all
participants in their original error.
The war in Vietnam, by various calcula-
tions, has Haw gone en for more than helf
a decade ar d. with mounting intensity :or
three years. It has shown these el:is:steal
tendendies. The march of history has m
undermined the assumptions whi 111 n-
t ended and justified our original ineolne-
ment. No part of the: original just:Moe:ion--
I do not esa.ggerate--remains intact. Mere
remarkable.. perhaps, very few of the as-
sumptions that supncrted our involvement
ere any longer asserted by those who defend
the conflict. Yet the congealing intellectlial
processes of war have worked to the full. Pe:-
tion which :,s not dafended As still aclheddi
to as a dogged manifestation of faith. Let
me also be fair. Those who are committed not
to support cf this venture but to opposition
have also shown, a tendency to become frozen
in fixed positions. Fe:: the first time sinee
1815 we are engaged in a conflict to whieh
a very large part of the population is Op-
OOSOCI , The unanimity kale which has previ-
ously elharacterized cur national conflicts
does no'; exist_ Those :who defend and theee
who attack both loet some of their teatime-
ity to eccommodate their thoughts to new
evidence.
My purpose here is to see if, however
slightly one can rise above these rigidities,
I do not wish to pretend to view our eitua-
ton in Vietnam With any special insight or
wisdom. These I do not; claim, and even if
I did so, I Vd u Id be cautiously aware of our
well-recognized and exceedingly valualJie
tendency to greet such pretension wirth
something between skepticism and outright
vulgarity. I :would like merely to inquire how
this conflict win look when minds, theta
of supporters and adversaries alike, ace no
longer subject to the congealing influenn:s
of war. And I would like then to propoite
the course of action--f venture even to cell
it the solut on--that emerges from such a
view.
Many wilt iitirk that in labeling Vats a
"Moderate Solution" I have made an :un-
happy choice cf words, Moderation in thee to
days is :not in high repute. The term ctse!1:
in some degree, has ecime to imply pompoes
and comfortable and well-padded inaJnion,
Thus, it rightly ,arouses suspicion. And ie-
ereasingdy men are divided between those
who want the catharsis of total viotent!C
and those win: want the comforts of total
encape, Yet if our national mood Op pOS:?3
moderation, history favors it. It does
vouchsafe LIE simrp, :wen-chiselled solutions.
It gives us blurred edges and dull I theS.
'Whatever the ultimate bang or whimper,
we can be sure that in between there will
be only compromises. Let me begin with the
terrible treatment that history has accorded
our original justification for this confliet.
T!
No one can completely rationalize our
iii-
'alvemeut ir. Vietnam. 'We are there part y
as a res;ult of a :long: series of seemingly
minor steps. Each of these steps, at the
time, seemed mere attractive?less pregnant,
with domestic political controversy and cri ti-
n:ism?than this alternative which was 'ii
call a firm halt on our involvement. The at;
gregate cif these individnal steps?more weap-
ons, more advisers, a combat role for our
men, progre 3Si ve increases in our troop
strength, bombing of North Vietnam, a
widening choice c,f targets?is larger by far
than the sum of the Midividual parts. The
resulting involvement on the Asian mainland
is not a development that all who asked or
acquiesced it. the individual actions wished
to see or even foresaw.
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