ANOTHER ARMS RACE?

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP70B00338R000300090120-3
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 4
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 9, 2006
• Sequence Number: 120
• Publication Date: January 16, 1967
• Content Type: NSPR

Approved For Release 2006/01/30 :CIA-RDP70B00338R000300090120-3
Tan:~~~.~ ?~, Y967 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD -SENATE
American consumer and whose goals are
for even better perfol?rrlance. They are
the real contributors to the stability of
our great American free enterprise sys-
i;em.
Clearly, the Consumer Subcommittee
a.nd Congress have their work cut out
for them in this field of consumer action,
both in reviewing the old and in formu-
lating the new. We expect to work
closely with the strong chairman of the
House Interstate and Foreign Commerce
Committee f.Mr. STeccEasl, who has long
demonstrated his devotion to the cause
of the consumer.
We have set ourselves strenuous goals.
This will be neither a short nor an easy
session for the members of the Commerce
Committees. But we are prepared to
do what must be done.
Mr. COTTON. Mr. President, will the
Senator from Washington yield?
Mr. MAGNUSON. I yield.
Mr. COTTON. I repeat my commen-
dation to the Senator from Washington
for his presentation today. That does
not necessarily mean that I endorse
everything which has been suggested-
Mr. MAGNUSON. No, no.
Mr. COTTON. But the Senator has
obviously given great attention to these
problems. It is my privilege not only
to serve on his committee but I trust also
that it will continue to be my privilege to
serve on the Consumer Subcommittee.
I want to say to the Senator that he
will have my absolute cooperation, and
I am sure that of the minority members
of the subcommittee, and the full com-
mittee, in seeking to face these grave
questions which he has so well raised in
the Senate today.
Mr. MAGNUSON. I thank the Sena-
tor from New Hampshire. He has al-
ready made great contributions to the
consumer bills which have been previ-
ously passed. '~
!~'%
ANOTHER ARMS RACE?
Mr. CLARK. Mr. President, the New
York Times magazine of January 15
contains an article by Roswell L. Gil-
patric, formerly Deputy Secretary of
Defense, which I hope that every Mem-
ber of the Senate and the other body
will read. It is entitled "Are We on the
Brink of Another Arms Race?"
The article argues against producing
and deploying an antiballistic missile
system or ABM. Mr. Gilpatric sums up
the main philosophical argument in one
terse statement, saying that a decision
to go ahead and develop an ABM system
"will signalize a U.S. determination to
do the Soviet Union one better in a new
struggle for world power through force
of arms and to base its relations with the
Soviets more on a philosophy of conflict
i;han on one of accommodation."
Mr. Gilpatric discusses not only the
military implications of such a decision
but also the political and econamic con-
siderations. These include such ques-
tions as: whether it would then be neces-
sary to furnish ABM systems to our
allies-and whether the Soviets would
then consider that they would have to
follow suit; the effect such a decision
would have on other disarmament meas-
ures; and the cost to the United States
and the sacrifices that would be involved
in other Federal programs.
I will have more to say on this subject
in a report I will issue within a week
reporting on my study mission in Novem-
ber to the Soviet Union, Poland, Yugo-
slavia., and Czechoslovakia.
For the present, I commend Mr. Gil-
patric's article to the attention of my
fellow Senators and ask unanimous con-
sent that it be printed in the RECOan at
this point.
There being no objection, the article
was ordered to be printed in the RECORD,
as follows:
BANE OF MANKIS7I~-ARE WE ON THE BRINK
OF ANOTHER ARMS RACE
(By Roswell L. Gilpatric)
For many people, the idea of an "arms
race" acquired its sinster connotation some
20 years ago with the begininng of the nu-
clear-weapons age. Yet in fact rivalry in
arms, even in its earlier and simpler mani-
festations, has always been a bane of man-
kind. Whenever two nations have found
themselves in competition to develop, pro-
duce Rnd deploy new arms, the results have
been to divert national energy, resources
and time from peaceful uses, to exacebate
relations between those nations in other
fields by engendering fear and distrust, and,
above all, to provide the ingredients of easily
ignited conflict.
Notwithstanding the almost universal de-
sire to contain competitive armament strug-
gles, our generation has never been free of
-them. Since World War II the United States
has gone through two cycles of competition
with the Soviet Union in strategic arma-
ments, and the signs are multiplying that
we may be on the brink of engaging Sn still
another arms race.
The first step-up in U.S. armaments after
World War II grew out of Soviet actions and
attitudes during the Berlin blockade of
1948-49 and the general intransigence of the
Stalin regime on all international-security
issues. When it became evident that the
United States would have to provide itself
with a strategic deterrent against Soviet ag-
gressiveness, a decision was taken in the
early nineteen-fifties to develop and produce
a post-war generation o8 medium- and long-
range jet bombers, fiI?st the subsonic B~7's
and B-52's and later the supersonic B-58's.
These manned-bomber programs were paral-
leled by other major technological advances,
such as the development oP more compact
nuclear weapons through improvement in
the yield-to-weight ratio of atomic war-
heads, and also by the production of jet tank-
ers and the introduction of air-refueling
techniques to make it possible for our bomber
fleets to reach the heartland of Russia.
The Soviets reacted in two ways. First,
they developed their own fleet of medium-
and 1?ong-range bombers, the so-called Bears
and Bisons; second, they installed elaborate
defensive systems consisting of wide belts of
antiaircraft cannon and missile emplace-
ments supplemented by large fleets of inter-
ceptor aircraft.
These moves, in turn, led to extensive U.S.
countermeasures, including the establish-
ment of a far-flung radar network, known
as the Distant Early Warning Line, whose
outer perimeter extended from Alaska across
the northern reaches oP Canada to Green-
land. Picket ships and plane-borne radar
extended the bomber-warning systems along
both the East and West Coasts. The U.S.
also set up, under joint command with Can-
ada, numerous air-defense centers consisting
of fighter aircraft and antibomber surface-
to-air missiles. Finally, to tie together all
of the elements in this vast complex for the
defense of North America, there was Installed
S 321
during the mid-nineteen-fifties what was
called the Semi-Automatic Ground Environ-
ment (SAGE) system.
All these offensive and defensive measures
cost the U.S. many billions oP dollars before
much of the equipment involved was ren-
dered obsolete by the advancing state of the
military art.
From the start of the first post-World War
II arms race, fundamental difference., became
apparent in the Soviet and U.S. responses to
each other's strategic-weapons programs.
The U.S. sought to emphasize and to invest
more of its resources in offensive capabilities,
whereas the Soviets have always stressed de-
fensive measures. In Consequence, as the
Russians built up stronger defenses, the U.S.
added to the number of its strategic forces
and provided them with the capacity to pen-
etrate Soviet defenses. At the same time we
learned that beyond a certain level of defense,
the cost advantage lies increasingly with
offense.
The next la.p in the arms race, beginning
in the late fifties and continuing into the
early sixties, was characterized chiefly by a
partial shift from manned bombers to bal-
listic missiles, in both offensive and defen-
sive roles, and by improved intelligence
through satellite-based reconnaissance about
what the other power was up to. After what
at first appeared to be, but never in fact
materialized as, an early Soviet lead--the so-
called "missile gap" of 1950 and 1960-the
U.S. forged ahead in both the quantit~? and
the quality of its intercontinental ballistic
missiles (ICBM's).
Quickly on the heels of the first genera-
tion, liquid-fueled Atlas and Titan Inissile~,,
launched from "soft"-that is, vulnerable--
land-based sites, came the Minuteman and
Polaris families of ICBM's, solid-fueled and
fired either from "hardened"-protected-
underground silos or underwater from sub-
marines. With a force destined soon to
comprise 1,000 Minutemen and 656 Polaris
missiles, U.S. ICBM's have consistently out-
numbered the SDViet missile force by a ratio
of 3 or 4 to 1. Moreover, for some time So-
viet missiles were of less advanced types,
being liquid-fueled and deployed in soft or
semiprotected sites and hence vnuerable to
attack.
During this same period of the early
nineteen-sixties, both U.S. and Soviet de-
fenses against bomber attacks were strength-
ened by the development and installation of
successively improved models of surface-to-
air missiles of which, characteristically, the
Soviets deployed by far the greatest numbel?.
To cope with tougher Soviet defenses, U.S.
bombers were modified to carry air-launched
missiles in addition to gravity bombs and
were equipped with electronic countermeas-
ures to confuse Russian radar,
Both sides began developing antiballistic
missile (ABM) systems, but it was only
toward the end of 1966 that our Government
acknowledged publicly that the Soviets had
moved from the development stage to the
quantity production and deployment of
ABM's. In contrast, the U.S. has kept its
ABM effort at the engineering design and
development level and continued to I>lace its
principal reliance on the capacity of its
strategic-weapons-delivery systems, whether
bombers or missiles, to penetrate any type
of Soviet defense, no matter how sophisti-
cated.
After the Russians had been stood down
during the Cuban missile crisis of 1:)62 anti
had reached an accord with the U.Ei. for a
partial test-ban treaty in 1963, it appeared
that the Soviets might accept the then-
existing military equation with the if.S. anti
not challenge us to another round in the
strategic arms race.
For a period after the present Soviet lead~-
ership headed by Brezhnev and Kosyg;in took
over from Khrushchev, it seemed to be So-
viet policy to seek a dete~ate with the U.S.
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 Approved For Release 2006/01/30 :CIA-RDP70B00338R000300090120-3
:3~~.~ COhTGRF.SSIONAL RECOT:D -- SENATE ~I~rnzt.a'~?i/ ~~, a967
tour C3+:.vernrnent there tore felt safe in level-
iug olf its strategic 'Drees at least until the
ti:rr.e---tl~:at expected before 1975-80-when
the Chinese Communists might develop their
-awn nuclear weapons to T;he point of being
::~bL to threaten. the continental United
:notes.
_., _i1e36 drew to a close, however. the
~.n: erican people were told that not only
.vcrc ilia Soviets proceeding with a compre-
>.eusive installation of :9BPd's, but in addition
:acre setting out to b~x11d a larger force of
:nl-d-fueled and invulac;rtbly sited ballistic
;aissiles. Such a built?-up might, it was in-
c_icated, reach a point, beginning in 1968,
~,rttere, tyre U.S. strategic torte of some 1,650
~!iinutemen and Polaris missiles would no
r: z_?;;ar enjoy its present overwhelming mar-
,iti- of superiority.
it t us became apl arent that, in deier-
enintn:r how to responc to these new develap-
~nents, the IJ.S. is once .tgain facing the possi-
+;ilii:y vi a, stepped-acne race with the Soviet
l7nlon of even ix:ore rri.tical and dangerous
?Ir,oporttons than the two previous cycles.
tee he reviews the coming year's military
?:r?cxpos:ils and budgets. President Johnson is
therefore confronted. with some hard choices
.,aiding new wea.puns systems. Among
9,hr,m are the following:
I j ~iiouJ.d the CJ.~. now produce and
-lsploy. either on a Lull or limited scale. an
r:r,ibaahstic missile :.ystem'? The current
:~rsion. is known as t' e .Nike X (consisting
i>L' two r:ucleartipped interceptor missile,, one
hnrtr~.rige called. Spr+nt and the other ex-
i;xitded-r:Lnee. the improved Zeusj, supple-
xr~.~nted with large t2umb~~rs of a new high-
iE~-&Irxnance interceptor aircraft, the F-1'L,
+.d a;r. extensive (civil Defense program for
^rovid:eig on a nutrcn~./ide scale fallout shel-
,E~c protection.
'?) t'r should i:he U.a, instead rely for
+; Inairi tenaxice of its `:~e~oxxd strike" strate-
;.~ia deterrent on :a new generation of IUBM's
++~ xsistdng oY MInut?eria.n III and Poseidon
i._ri:riles-tot;:ether referred to as improved
r ,.aaaility Missiles (1CM's)-with the capac-
;r,y to penetrate or sa:orate the new foviet
c sile~ detenaes?
?) :Should the U.1 ., in addition to pro-
s :?ing the new IClvI'~,, equip its Air Force
r +,2 :~+ tnt;ities cf rn Advanced Married
I- e;; e A;r+~.ra.f`% l-~P.CSAj io take over the
.a~>rnber role Yrom the aging E3-62 fleet; and
+; ,lrn:ti:ely Crone t.ie n.'w supersonic jet
=~?.~mber. the B-lll, tt~?Y, will became opera-
i+?na;l stew years hence:'
;,.?-:,.heed decis:.dr; n:r the first, or the
:, cad tiri:d, ~Y .h::e proposals will sig-
,altae :. [7.5, detertr:ination to do the Soviet
,?an ?=ne better in a new struggle for world
;,;~.;er tiirur.~h Yorce cY' a-ms and to base its
r. i.on;> wirar i;.ic xr?isas more on a p11it-
~r;b.~; of ren.iL~t ;iiiri en one of accom-
u,euit,:nn. t.et us first consider the military
,r,ic.tians of snob a cL+=ice-
ttC=rt e -.Bret + y .vlc~~~x..ara states L~xt,
-
;.y pL.nn~d U..~. offensive force of
'ten
: an:!. borbrrs wa: specifically de-
,~i?e-r ter than expected bvthe intelL;;ence
males; and, seccod. that the Soviets
-i;`=#*ttY, +rtnharK uoor_ t;ny one of severui pos-
=blr; . dn- or possibly a redu+ Lion in--
strat,egic deli ery vehicles.
In the event off' a new arm; ra'e, sir Ch Ls
effort, and the partial foundatio~ts :hereby
constructed for ntrther disarrnam ant r+ veer
will go by the board, and whatever 1 e;n,Jway
has peen buirt up, both at the L-.7V ar it i_t
the 18-nail ~n disarmament con'eri., [ aG
Geneva, will be lost. indeed, e rep it the
Soviet Union and the U.S. should ii .their o?.v.n
interests come co terms on a nonprch.e!- ?loin
treaty, it is hardly to be expecte i ta.~ the
mafor nuclear have-not nations. such as
India an3 Japan, will sign aw;a,y _. ir. sigh*s
to fcin the nuclear club at a time when iu
two charter members, Russia and the U. ~., art
bulldirig up rather than cutting down their
nuclear arsenals.
Staff another dt.nger inherent in, ~ rc-
rewed alms rice lies fn its short-term clfe+ r.
in Europe. For the 1J.S. to press ahe;tc wilt:
a new strategic a:rrnament program would
further weaken the NATO alliance, whose 1a,v+;
meeting in Paris stressed the twin ttlernes n:
dete;v,te wil;h tY.e Soviet Unfon a'ari tl_e
"dim.inished threat: of military aggression"
rather than. the need for greater detenstce
measures. '.the a.liance, already under strait.
because of our allies' concern over tole heal y
U.S. involvement hr the Vietnam war, wottJd
suffer another blow if U.S.-U.S.S.R. relations
took: a turn COr >he worse.
In. approtrching its decisions, the Adminu;-
tratlon ,viii presu;nab[y take into aacounc
positve as well as negative emanations from
the Soviet Union. Among the faverahle de-
velopments in 17.5.-U.S.S.R. relations are the
recently annou:ncerc.c 4v ,r'V.i15o'i0'i.
Burtca, 4Vai.am A., F''v3155554.
Buti_~r, -4`viai. ~,.cn. .3., F'V3&3:3`262.
Bw;tertieYl, Fiugli G., FV3134033.
Cade, 17 chart C:., FV31447f,4.
Caldwell. Jtcibert 4V... FV"3154753.
Caldwell, 't'h~omes M., F V31BOe7'L.
Ca,Ytu.:ut, .?oYtn. l'., F'V3Y.34;511.
Cannon, ~~~eorge B., Jr., F"V3143603,
Ca:ntr Yi c;el:: O., F'V3119765.
Catlin isr yard A., FV3156296.
Cac9s in Dean M., h'V3133496.
Carr, William 'E. FV3146939.
Carroll, Robc;rt C., FV3144815.
Carson, Ronald 1V., F'V3134067.
Cather~/eod, CEeor;e A.. FV3155555.
ChandL.x~, Will.ian:. P., FV3154689.
Chaptn. Richard H.., FV31:33ii31.
Christian, Ala:a C., FV'J155'L'33.
Chcistofolts, V/rlliirn,F'V31451.63.
Ch ristophrr, De;b art 1.., Jr., F',73145846,.
Cis?eii, JamesZV., I'~Blt:;4264.
Claris, .John B., Jr , F V314691'3.
Clarke, Thorcu~s VG ., _r V3145388.
Claud, 'Ni !liam D., F'V314539 L
Clouser, Gordon L., FV'3155950.
Coddingtc~n, 1;'eiI _~., FV31456'38.
Cotlinger, Maral.n L{.,'r'V3145406.
Coggburn, Dennis 5:., F'V3145066.
Cnlser: Me~?le L., F'V3I47209.
Co~.l.!ns.. Ava I FV3154023.
Ca.het Fc!mond J, FV313248f.
Co.lix_s G:~orge,J.. J'r.. FV'3133127.
Collins Peter, FV3146572.
Concutlly, George C., FV3155265.
Coombs , ISacid 1bL :E'V3132766.
Cooper,GrierH 1'1;3156113.
Conl~ier R:cha.rd C., FV3147159.
Corbett, Jos~?Fih T., FV3145883.
Corbett;, F'strick FL, F'V3118703.
Corti,ran, Jame:; ]''., FV3145837,
Cordell, W111i tr PrC.. FV3144572.
Ccrlev, Rx~beri ('., Jr., FV3154972.
Counts, VI'iLonE.,7E'V3145111.
Ccwn.n, Jeffrey Y., F'V3'_44805.
Crrwger, :Ron gad L, I~13155073.
Cex, ("Yarles O, FVa131649.
Cox. 7arrrpa E. FV31.55735.
Cox. Joseph R., Flt? 146352.
Craig, Ro': L., FTMJ 132739.
Crain. Do;iald L.. F"V3145684.
CranfbrcL, Eugene EL, FV3133221.
Crigger, .J Imes C.. Jr.. FV3132.827.
Cronetiberg, David .9., FV3133633..
Crus;a. Ja nes M.. FV3157196.
CttnningY.am, Ro'r'[i.. I~ V:3154317.
Dahl. Ma.r yin J.. FV3155634.
Dr;hLstrotr;, l7aeid [r., FV3146379.
Drdbe_y. I,:~rry R... F"U3146864.
Defy, Thomsrs J . F1i3146634.
Dt:r.;r;il, i?:'ilaam D...7r., FV3144495,
Dc~vlas, Richard L., FV3134104.
Davi ] ra rxY: H. F'V""3145983.
D~.vi;. Ph: lip C., F V3120281.
Dean, F'hi Clip ~ .. 1' V8138755.
Deaton, Dona:.d R., FV314(i37ti
De~&t+.?re, F'inls IvL. Jr., F+'V:3145612.
Daford, Ted E., ]^x'3145238.
Det,rwtar. Wayne E., FV3134105.
Denington. MEcitael R.. FV3144531.
Denson, Lawrence C., FV3154620.
Denton, J,tn:es 1Z., ]S'V3146234,
Derby, Ar:hur E., FV3146015.
Devore, Gale 11., FV3144468.
Diekmeier, Raymcstd C-., FV3144448.
Dinning :7oaaLi .3.:. FV31391EA.
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