'BANE OF MANKIND' ARE WE ON THE BRINK OF ANOTHER ARMS RACE?

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP70B00338R000300090108-7
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 6
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 9, 2006
• Sequence Number: 108
• Publication Date: January 15, 1967
• Content Type: MAGAZINE

NEW YORK TIMES MAGAZINE
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By ROSWELL L. GILPATRIC
" "'?"'j OR many people, the idea of an
"arms race" acquired its sinster
connotation some 20 years ago
with the beginning of the nuclear-
weapons age. Yet in fact rivalry in
arms, even in its earlier and simpler
manifestations, has always been a
bane of mankind. Whenever two na-
tions have found themselves in com-
petition to develop, produce and de-
ploy new arms, the results have been
to divert national energy, resources
and time from peaceful uses, to ex-
acerbate relations between those na-
tions in other fields by engendering
fear and distrust, and, above all, to
provide the ingredients of easily ig-
nited conflict.
Notwithstanding the almost uni-
versal desire to contain competitive
armament struggles, our generation'
has never been free of them. Since
World War II the United States has
gone through two cycles of competi-
tion with the Soviet Union in strategic
armaments, and the signs are multi-
plying that we may be on the brink
of engaging in still another arms
race. ?
HE first step-up in U.S. arma-
ments after World War II grew out
of Soviet actions and attitudes during
the Berlin blockade of 1948-49 and
the general intransigence of the Stalin
regime on all international-security
issues. When it became evident that
the United States would have to pro-
vide itself with a strategic deterrent
against Soviet aggressiveness, a deci-
sion was taken in the early nineteen-
fifties to develop and produce a post-
war generation of medium- and long-
range jet bombers, first the subsonic
13-47's and B-52's and later the super-
sonic B-58's. These manned-bomber
programs were paralleled by other
major technological advances, such
as the development of more compact
nuclear weapons through improve-
ment In the yield-to-weight ratio of
atomic warheads, and also by the
Both sides began developing anti-
ROSWELL L. GILPATRIC served three built up stronger defenses,
, the U.S.
ballistic missile (ABM) systems, but
as Deputy Secretary of Defense added to the numbers of its strategic
under Secretary NcNamare. He is now in forces and provided them__w_ ith. the.., it was only toward the end of 1966
private law practice i New Yo capacit 06)0-1189-t, - +' that our Government acknowledged
ApNproved For Release 0f~8 N099Oq had moved'-
penetrate Soviet defenses.' At the same
time we learned that beyond a certain
level of defense, the cost advantage
J lies increasingly with offense. i
production of jet tankers and the
Introduction of air-refueling tech- FIE next lap in the arms race,
niques to make it possible for our beginning in the late fifties and con- ';I
bomber fleets to reach the heartland +i tinuing into the early sixties, was
of Russia. f characterized chiefly by it partial
The Soviets reacted in two ways. shift from manned bombers to ballis-
First, they developed their own fleet .;1 tic missiles, in both offensive and de-
of medium- and long-range bombers, fensive roles, and by improved Intelli-
the so-called Boars and Bisons; sec- :., genes through satellite-based recon-
ond, they installed elaborate de- " naissance about what the other power,-
fensive systems consisting of wide was up to. After what at first ap=
belts of antiaircraft cannon and mis- peared to be, but never In fact ma-
sile emplacements supplemented by '~' terlallzed as, an early Soviet lead-
large fleets of interceptor aircraft. ?y the so-called "missile gap" of 1950.
These moves, in turn, led to exten- and 1960-the U.B. forged ahead in ..'
sive U.S. countermeasures, including 7 both the quantity and the quality of *:I
the establishment of a far-flung radar
network, known as the Distant Early
Warning Line, whose outer perimeter
extended from Alaska across the
northern reaches of Canada to Green-';!
land. Picket ships and plane-borne
radar extended the bomber-warning
systems along both the East and West
its Intercontinental ballistic missiles..'
(ICBM's).
Quickly on the heels of the first
-generation, liquid-fueled Atlas and .~
Titan missiles, launched from ."soft" .i
-that ' is, vulnerable-land-based
sites, came the Minuteman and Po-
laris families of ICBM's, solid-fueled i,
Coasts.- The U.S. also set up, under j and fired either from "hardened"- - ?
joint command with Canada, numer- protected-underground silos or un- r?1
ous air-defense centers consisting of derwater from submarines. With' a'
fighter aircraft and antibomber sur- force destined soon to comprise 1,000
face-to-air missiles. Finally, to tie1 Minutemen and 656 Polaris missiles,
together all of the elements in this U.B. ICBM's have consistently out-
vast complex for the defense of North numbered the Soviet missile force by
America, there was installed during , a ratio. of 3 of 4 to 1. Moreover, for
the mid-nineteen-fifties what was some time ' Soviet missiles were of, I
called the Semi-Automatic Ground less advanced types, being liquid-
.-.
All these offensive and defensive
measures cost the U.S. many billions
of dollars before much of the equip-
ment involved was rendered obsolete
by the advancing state of the mili-
tary art.
FROM the start of the first post-
World War II arms race, fundamental
differences became apparent in the
Soviet and U.S. responses to each
other's strategic-weapons programs.
The U.S. sought to emphasize and to
Invest more of its resources in offen-
sive capabilities, whereas the Soviets
have always stressed defensive meas-
ures. In consequence, as the Russians
protected sites and hence vulnerable
to attack.
During this same period of the
early nineteen-sixties, both U. S. and
Soviet defenses against bomber at
development and Installation of suc-
.
to-air missiles of which, character-
istically, the Soviets deployed by"
1
far the greatest number. To cope with .
ers were modified to carry air-
,J launched'. missiles In addition to ;?
with electronic countermeasures to
confuse Russian radar.
 kept its ABM cfforApllrbvei Release'2006101/30: CIA7RDP70B00338R000300090108-7 .
conunueo co place its principal reit-
ance on the capacity of its strategic-
weapons-delivery systems, whether
fro; bombers or missiles, to penetrate any
type of Soviet defense, no matter how
sophisticated.
After the Russians had been
ntood down during the Cuban missile
trisLq of 1962 and had reached an
dreord with the U. S. for a partial
tesl-ban treaty in 1,963, it appeared
that the Soviets might accept the
then-existing military equation with
the U. S. and not challenge us to an. i.
For a period after the present So-
viet leadership headed by Brezhnev
and Kosygin took over from Khru
shchev, it seemed to be Soviet policy
to seek a d&ente with the U.S. Our
Government therefore felt safe in
leveling off its strategic forces at
least until the time-not expected be-
fore 1975-80-when the Chinese Com-
munists might develop their own nu-
clear weapons to the point of being
able to threaten the continental Unit-
w V t"" Y(l~
ed State.
As 1966 drew to a close, however, V r
the American people were told that I",iti+:* ' `i
not only were the Soviets proceeding
with a com
rehensive installation of
t 4
?
J I ?, I N4 }
p
.
,r
fi,-~~ -~; .. `. -, Y ,, - , ABM's, but in addition were setting r; _ ' ` ?~! t i r , , :,' t r~" ;
?
/
\ _ out to build a larger force of solid-
4
invulnerably sited ballistic ?~ "?- fueled and invulnerably
j'? missiles. Such a build-up might, it NIKE X-America"sABM system would consist of (right) the nuclear-tipped,
was indicated, reach a point, begin- -
ning in 1968, where the U. S. strata- extended-range Zeus missile, plus the nuclear-tipped, short-range Sprint,
._ ._
ic force of
e 1
650 Mi
t
g
som
nu
emen
,and Polaris missiles would no longer
enjoy its present overwhelming mar-
gin of superiority.
It thus became apparent that, in
determining how to respond to these'?
new developments, the U. S. Is once
again facing the possibility of a
stepped-up arms race with the Soviet
Union of even more critical and dan
gerous proportions than the two pre-
4`:15 he reviews the coming year's
military proposals and budgets, Pres-
ident Johnson is therefore con...':
fronted with some hard choices re- -
garding new weapons systems. Among
them are the following:
(1) Should the U. S. now produce
,.and deploy, either on n full or limited
scale, an antiballistic missile system?
The current version is known as the-
Nike X (consisting of two nuclear-
tipped Interceptor missiles, one short-..,
range called Sprint and the other,-
extended-range, the improved Zeus),
supplemented with large numbers of
a new high-performance interceptor
aircraft, the F-12, and an extensive
more on a philosophy of conflict than
Civil Defense program for providing on one of accommodation. Let us first
on a nationwide scale fallout shelter - consider the military Implications of
protection. such a choice.
(2) Or should the U. S. instead Defense Secretary McNamara states -
rely for the maintenance of its "sec- that the currently planned U.S. offen-
and strike" strategic deterrent on a sive force of missiles and bombers
new generation of ICBM's consisting was specifically designed to hedge
of Minuteman III and Poseicjon mis- against several different contingen-
sites-together referred to as Im- cies, including the possibilities "first,
proved Capability Missiles (ICM's) that a Soviet ballistic-missile defense
-with the capacity to penetrate or, might be greater than expected by
saturate the new Soviet missile de- the intelligence estimates; and, sec'
fenses? end, that the Soviets might embark';
(3) Should the U.S., in addition upon any one of several possible of?-
to procuring the new ICM's, equip its fensive build-ups, including variations
Air Force with quantities of an Ad- in their target doctrine, variations in
vanced Manned Strategic Aircraft the technological sophistication of
(AMSA) to take over the bomber their weapons systems, and varia?-
role from the aging B-52 fleet and tions In the speed of deployment of
het bomber, the B-111, that will be-
come operational a few years hence?
Z71 GO-AHEAD decision on the first,
or the first and third, of these pro-
posals will signalize a U. S. determi.
nation to do the Soviet Union one
better in a new struggle for-world
-
f
In thus taking into account possi-
ble Soviet threats over and beyond
those projected in the latest national
intelligence estimates, Secretary Mc-
Namara explains that "we have done '.
so because an assured destruction ca-
pability, a capability to survive the
- - -- --- --6-? -11 o
arms and to power to det thttk
sroye aacer, is the
base its , relations with the Soviets vital first objective which must be -;
JAN 1 181;% Approved For Release 2006/01/30 CTA-RDP70B0b338Rd00300090108=7 ead~wed
 0
met in full regardless of the cost un- systems also be placed in Europe, and treaty, toward which the Soviets and
der all foreseeable circumstances and ifso,,~swill not the countries on the the U.S. have of late been making',
regardless of anydi#fi tie~
ul ~rl e0 ReIeaS~ LW~/U PL,3Ue_ti]' -KUPi d 6 BR~; f[.iuluD~U.j~>f_/',long been i~hder
opment of Minuteman III, the accel-
erated development of the Poseidon
missile and moving ahead on new
penetration aids to insure our weap-
ons getting through any defenses the
Soviets may put in place, the U.S.
has in effect anticipated and insured
against the latest moves by the So-
viet Union. Notwithstanding a Rus-
sian ABM system and more and bet-
ter Soviet ICBM's, he concludes that
the U.S. strategic forces will continue
to maintain their present power to
survive a Soviet first strike with suf-'
ficient capability to destroy the at-'
tacker, which is the foundation of the
deterrent power upon which our na-.
tional security depends.
The conclusions of the Secretary
of Defense are being severely ques-
tioned in a number of quarters. In
the first place, there are indications
that most of the professional military
organization, from the Joint Chiefs
of Staff on down, believes that the
United States should go ahead with
both production and deployment of an
ABM system and also with a new
generation of manned bombers as
well as the new ICM's.
This military judgment will find
strong support in the Congress, espc-
cially among the influential leaders
of the Armed Forces committees, and
will be backed by substantial sectors
of public opinion, particularly in the
.South and on the Republican right.
There is also likely to be consider-
able pressure from segments of the
defense industry, backed by the com-
.' munities that would benefit from In--'
creased armament production, for this
nation to embark on a new round of
Bible that'the Secretary of Defense's
ourselves, and to the bloc countries
by the Soviets, and at whose cost?
Will our action to go ahead with an
ABM deployment play into the hands
of the Communist Chinese efforts to
disrupt U.S.-U.S.S.R. relations? How
far will we and the Soviets go beyond
ABM's in building active defenses
when the costs involved are measured
by tens of billions of dollars, with
enormous strategic implications and a
long-lasting political impact?
The effects would be felt especially
in Europe but also, as Communist
Chinese nuclear capabilities develop,
in India, Japan and other countries on
the periphery of the Chinese mainland.
NEW arms race will produce
other casualties. I Besides the hoped-
port even within the Johnson Admin
listration.
UT apart from the military impli- N
cations of these new weapons choices,
there are a number of political and
economic Issues which, so far as the
public knows, may not have been fully
considered.
If the U.S. decides to Install ?ABDI:'s
to protect Its population,' should such
(Z,
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An unckramun ,nn4rn -.4- .4, w KC..Asni.n L.....
It is in constant touch with SAC headquarters,'Omaha.
scan disarmament negotiators a se-
ries of other arms-control measures,
These include the extension of the
partial test ban to include under-
ground testing, the establishment of
nuclear-free zones, a cut-off in the
production of nuclear materials and
a freeze on-or possibly a reduction
in-strategic delivery vehicles.
In the event of a new arms race,
all this effort, and the partial founda-
tions thereby constructed for further
disarmament moves, will go by the
board, and whatever headway has
been built up, both at the U.N. and
in the 18-nc.uon disarmament confer-
ence at Geneva, will be lost. Indeed,
even if the Soviet Union and the U.S.
should in their own interests come to
terms on a nonproliferation treaty, it
is hardly to be expected that the ma-
 jor nuclear have-not nations, such as The latest increase in the Soviet Union, or should it strive for more
India and Japan, will sign away their defense budget is likewise equivocal. . progress toward arms control and the
rights to join the 161YS'0 :1 IIQR 76aOO3 ROOD O0ONitN47cconomic'find
time when its two c r er members, per con , is not in itse o menacing
sociological measures for
ilit
0
Russia and the U.S., are building up proportions, although in announcing
rather than cutting down their nu- the rise in defense spending the so-
of military aggression" rather than
the need for greater defensive meas-
ures. The alliance, already under
strain because of our allies' concern
over the heavy U.S. involvement in
the Vietnam war, would suffer an-
other blow if U.S.-U.S.S.R. relations
took a turn for the worse.
In approaching its decisions, the
Ad ministration will presumably take
Into account positive as well as nega-
tive emanations from the Soviet Un-
ion. Among the favorable develop-
last meeting in Paris stressed the
twin themes of detente with the So-
viet Union and the "diminished threat
clear arsenals. viet authorities spoke of "recently
Still another danger inherent in a sharpened international -tensions" and
renewed arms race lies in its short- the increased "danger of a new world
term effect in Europe. For the U.S. war" because of "aggressive acts" of
to press ahead with a new strategic U.S. "imperialists."
armament program would further !t?
weaken the NATO alliance, whose r- -.SIDE from these vital questions
ments in U.S.-U.S.S.R. relations are
the recently announced agreements
for commercial air services between
the two countries and for banning
weapons of mass destruction from
outer space.
Apart from their intrinsic signifi-
balance. It not only is in keeping
with the ultimate' in defensive pos-
tures but may also have resulted
from military pressures within the
Soviet regime rather than from a
far-reaching decision to abandon the
ddtente objective.
...: _
cance, these developments indicate
that the Soviet Union has not con-
sidered itself entirely inhibited from
reaching agreements with the U.S.
despite its predicament over Vietnam.
This condition cannot, however, be ex-
pected to last if the Soviets feel them-
selves put in the position of counte-
nancing U.S. bombing raids in the
Hanoi area which produce civilian
casualties. Undoubtedly, the present
state of U.S.-U.S.S.R. relations would
rapidly worsen if a significant inten-
sification occurred in the scale of our
air attacks against North Vietnam.
At worst, Soviet intentions regard-
ing a renewed arms race should be
treated as ambivalent and unclear
rather than entirely negative. Their
ABM deployment can be accounted
for otherwise than as indicating a
desire to alter the strategic power
affecting international relations, the
effect on our economy of a U.S. deci-
sion to proceed with ABM deploy-
ment and new strategic weapons
would be tremendous. Depending on
the timing and extent of these pro-
grams, the U.S. defense budget would
be inflated by at least $5-billion to
$6-billion a year, with the probable
result that the present level of mill-
Lary expenditure, which will stay in
the $70-billion to $75-billion-a-year
range during the period of the Viet-
nam war, would thereafter remain
at that order of magnitude instead
of receding to the pre-Vietnam budget
level of around $50-billion a year.
The effect of this Federal spending
and diversion of national resources
might well be to reduce or delay fur-
ther funding of U.S. space and super-
sonic transport programs as well as
to forestall further financing of the
Great Society programs such as anti-
poverty projects, Federal aid to edu-
cation, demonstration cities and the
like.
It is not, however, the economic
cost of a decision to deploy ABM's
as well as to add to the level of our
bomber and missile forces that is the
most disturbing aspect of a renewed
arms rata. With the U.S. gross na-
tional product estimated to rise to
$790 billion during 1967 .and to grow
at 4 per cent a year thereafter, pro-
jecting defense expenditure at 9 per
cent of G.N.P. (compared to 15 per
cent of G.N.P. during the Korean
m
ary
force as means for insuring world
peace?
In these terms, the question comes
down to how the United States will
exercise its acknowledged strength
and world leadership-whether toward
heightening the tension that will come
from renewed emphasis on arma-
ments and accelerated advances in
weapons technology or in the direc-
tion of arms limitation and the solu-
tion of world problems through peace- i
ful means.
Should the decision be reached dur-
ing 1967 to proceed with any of the
major new weapons systems now be-;
ing pressed upon the President by ;
some of his advisers, their opposite
numbers In the Soviet would obviously
be in a stronger position to insist on
corresponding increases in Russian
weapons projects.
The reaction in political terms would
be even more dangerous, jeopardizing
not only the detente so ardently .Y
sought after by our allies but also
the fragile gains achieved ,through
Soviet restraint in recent years in
such troubled areas of the world as'
Africa, Latin America and on the ,i
India-Pakistan subcontinent.
H
T
E decisions which the President :
now faces are made doubly difficult
by the national mood of frustration
over the way the war is goring in Viet-
nam. All-too-ready distrust of the So-
viets' intentions, coupled with anger
at their growing aid, -to Vietnam,)
would prompt many of our people to
view with suspicion or antagonism a
national policy of forbearance in deal-.
ing with the Soviet Union. For others,
an effort to moderate the competition '
in arms would be regarded as a sign
of weakness and a peril to our na-
War) would produce a defense Yet President Johnson has recog-
Wa
r) of over produce
a year, :? nized, as did President Kennedy, that budget which should not prove an intolcr- if a third world war is to be avoided
able burden on our economy. The ? the United States, as -the most ad-,
vanced of the superpowers, must take
price tag of another arms race, while the lead in demonstrating a willing-
staggering, is not in itself an argu- ness to practice
lf
a,
se
-
self with the power to apply force.
V, HAT the United States faces is The present situation puts to a criti-;^
a major watershed In national secu- cal test our national determination 1
rity policy. Should it re-engage in an. not to be swerved from the rightness .t
armament contest with the Soviet and sanity of, that course. ^
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Continued
 Lea::. 4~rrw.~...-...'.~y~+..w.......tJa.:-f... ^~~....; b? _ - ~-t n - ~t 1 ~~i.. ~+_rr++it
The postwar arms race was on.
of 1946-49, convinced the U.S. of the need for a strategic deterrent.
Hiroshima, a year alter the bomb.
Tk.r:.:;2:Q;N-A%'Z C--The end of World War II marked the opening
of the nuclear weapons age. Then Stalin, notably by the Berlin blockade
:;7i;iU*Wa.G,C D4c,1rti3E:vr^_A new generation of
capability, of striking the Soviet heartland.,.
bombers, compact nuclear weapons and refueling
techniques in the early '1950's gave the U.S.' the
DELIVERY SYSTEM-The Russians relied heav-
ily on antiaircraft missiles and guns for defense,
but they also built a fleet of medium. and long-
range bombers.'
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C.ontiuued
E..
Soviet atomic test (1962).
GOL G UP-By 1949,- Russia had
,an atomic bomb. By 1953, both sides
had 'the hydrogen bomb. The arms
 0
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b
DEW Line radar station in the Arctic..
DEFENSE SYSaE._Through the 1950's there was much talk about "the
missile gap," but the immediate danger was still the manned bomber.
The U.S. built an elaborate radar warning network, but it was destined
soon to become obsolete.
Minuteman missile is launched.
TNVULNE1 BLE?-._.The
solid-fuel missile, ready for in-
stant firing, brought a new ele-
ment into the race in the '60's..
Soviet missile in silo.
Ed?OSTE--Russia countered
with its own offensive missiles
in "hard"- attack-proofed--
emplacements.
f 9"I'Y'i
Guided missile catches target plane.'
Zti a EFICEPTOII1 Technology was
moving apace. Not only were there
short-range guided missiles, but liquid-
fueled ICBM's by the end of the 'S0's.
Experimental ABM (Sprint) blasts off.
NEXT STEP?-Now Russia has "
fensive sytem. Should the U.S.
reply--despite the cost-by go-
ing ahead with its own ABM, now
at development level?
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JAN zz'7