RUSSIANS DEBATE NUCLEAR 'VICTORY'

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP70B00338R000300090070-9
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 1
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 9, 2006
• Sequence Number: 70
• Publication Date: February 21, 1967
• Content Type: NSPR

Approved For Release 2006/01/ CIA-RDP70B00338R000300090070-9
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Soviet military men are
arguing these days over
whether a nuclear war can be
"won."
The end of the debate is not
yet in sight, but the main lines
have been developed. It is of
more than scholarly interest
to U.S. specialists because if
the "no-win" side comes out
on top, it will make possible a
number of East-West agree-
ments that the "win" group
would oppose.
Under Nikita S. Khru; h-
chev's "peaceful coexistence"
leadership, military men
tended to admit that nuclear
war was likely to be militarily
unmanageable-that nobody
could win such a war. Khrush-
chev obviously was rankled by
heavy defense expenditures,
and seemed to be happy with
a deterrent program that,
while inferior to the United
States, was felt to be strong
enough to persuade the United.
States not to attack first.
After Khrushchev's fall, the
matter remained quiet for
awhile, although some mili-
tary men began pressing for
additional funds.
The current debate came
into the open in September
1965, in the "Communist of the
:'Armed Forces," official,
journal of the political depart-
ment of the defense ministry.
An article by a Lt. Col. Ye.
Rybkin . attacked such well
known Soviet writers as
Nicolai Talensky for having
spread the "fatalistic" doc-
trine that it is no longer
possible "to find acceptable
forms of nuclear war."
While admitting that nuclear
war would cause great havoc,
Rybkin said no one should
By BERNARD GWER ZMAN
succumb to the view that
victory in nuclear war is
imnossidie.
"Any `a priori' rejection of
the possibility of victory is
harmful because it leads to
moral disarmament, to a
disbelief in victory, and to
fatalism and passivity. It is
necessary to wage a struggle
against such views and atti-
tudes," he wrote.
with these statements until
just last month, in a long
unsigned article in "Red
Star," official newspaper of
the defense ministry. It
seemed to speak for the top
leadership.
It took issue directly v,:
the views stated by Rybkin
add Bondarcnko and specifi-
cally attacked Rybkin by
name. The article stressed
that Rybkin was acting "in-
victory was feasible if the, dependently" and did not
country conducted nuclear speak for anyone but himself.
war in such a way as to in a significant paragraph,
minimize damage to itself. He the article said that progres-
seemed to stress the need for sive people in the West realize
Russia to step up its pro,:uc- "what results a world nuclear
tion of offensive nuclear war could cause and that such
missiles and at the same time- a war, has ceased to ' be an
to develop a missile defense.
Rybkin's ideas were carried
further, a year later in t ha
same journal, by Lt. Col. V.
Bondarenko in an article
called ":~iuitary-Tech~iolo ical
Superiority-a Most Important
Factor is the Reliable Defense
of the Country."
Bondarcniko argucd that the
key to victory lies in military
superiority to be attained only
through a large-scale commit-
ment of resources in advanced
weapons development and
production.
implicit in his article was an
attack on the policy of Soviet
Premier Alexei N. Kosy, n,
who has stressed the primacy
of thou consumer sector in the
expedient means of politics
and a means for the achieve-
meat of certain political and
economic objectives."
"Assertions of this, type
express above all a condemna-
tion of a nuclear war, and its
dangers and inoxped;c:,cy are
emphasized," the article said.
"All peace-loving anfl anti-
imperialist forces oppose a
world nuclear war as,a means
of the continuation- ?of
tics."
The "Red Star'.' article
aroused particular interest in
;Vashington because' i', came
at a time w,-,en the. adminis-
tration had begun to., sound out
the Russians on an agreement
for a freeze on both defensive
econoniy. i3o?darcnko makes ? and offensive weapona.
it clear he is ihinlain ; of it is quite possible that the
developing some new ,,w , pon, leadership ordered "the Red
which he says "can abruptly Star article in order to tell the'
change the relationship of West that the militarists in the
forces in a short period of ? army were not making policy
time." -and that Moscow was still
The Communist party open to arms control meas-
leadership did not take issue ores.
Approved For Release 2006/01/30 : CIA-RDP70B00338R000300090070-9