MILITARY PROCUREMENT AUTHORIZATION, 1968
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CIA-RDP70B00338R000300090026-8
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Document Creation Date:
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Publication Date:
March 21, 1967
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March 21, 1967Approved FVpeN1t/i$QPWRg8R000300090026-8
Yarmouth Castle. was one of those ships,
built in 1927.
basic ship st
Fire barriers
ture must be of steel.
one before it, except that 1948 convention is
still in effect for some parties. The pending
amendments do not replace the 1960 conven-
tion, and in fact, by reference, revive certain
provisions of the 1948 BOLAS.
The U.S. Government took a very active
part in the negotiations of the amendments.
On its motion, the Maritime Safety Com-
mittee of the Intergovernmental Maritime
Consultative Organization (IMCO) met in
an extraordinary session in May of 1966 to
formulate the present amendments, which
were then agreed to with minor changes by
an extraordinary session of the IMCO As-
sembly in November 1966, at which 48 coun-
tries were represented.
At the same meeting, the assembly also
approved a recommendation by the Maritime
Safety Committee, that these amendments
are so vital to safety of life at sea that con-
tracting governments should not await their
formal entry into force but should act imme-
diately to put the recommended measures
into effect to the maximum extent and as
soon as possible. The entry-into-effect date
is 12 months after the date on which the
significant advance in intern
safety for ships.
Implementing legislation will I o be re-
quired to make these amendments ffec-
tive for the United States, since the n-
subcommittee was told that there is no
opposition domestically to these stand-
ards. A few foreign countries thought
that they were too high but the adminis-
tration believes that even they will ratify
these amendments.
The Senate has already passed once
on the substance of these amendments
when it passed the bill which became
Public Law 89-777.
Mr. President, I ask unanimous con-
sent that excerpts from the report be
printed in the RECORD at this point, fur-
ther to explain the treaty now before the
Senate.
There being no objection, the excerpts
were ordered to be printed in the RECORD,
as follows:
PURPOSE OF THE AMENDMENTS
These amendments to the 1960 Safety of
Life at Sea (BOLAS) Convention are de-
signed to improve the fire protection of
ships, particularly passenger vessels. The
principal methods of doing this is by elimi-
nating from the existing BOLAS Conventions
the so-called grandfather clauses which
exempted vessels built before their effective
date from many of the safety standards em-
bodied in them.
The effect of these' amendments is to elim-
inate from the international passenger trade
vessels with wooden hulls, decks, and deck-
houses. The basic structure of a ship will
be required to be of steel. Steel fire barriers
not more than 131 feet apart will be required
on ships to isolate any fire that does start.
Accommodation places for passengers will be
separated by steel bulkheads and decks from
such hazardous places as cooking, cargo, and
machinery spaces. The various rooms within
the passenger quarters will have to be sepa-
rated by incombustible partitions or sprink-
ler systems will have to be provided.
In sum, when these amendments are ap-
proved, the wood structural contents of the
old ships used for passengers will have to be
eliminated or these ships will have to be
scrapped.
BACKGROUND
Just as the sinking of the Titanic in 1912
in part led to the first BOLAS Convention-
that of 1929-and the collision at sea of the
Andrea Doria and the Stockholm in 1956 led
to the 1960 BOLAS Convention, so the burn-
ing of the Yarmouth Castle in 1965 has re-
sulted in the proposed amendments to the
1960 BOLAS Convention.
In between 1929 and 1960, there ' was also
the 1948 BOLAS Convention which took into
account technical advances and broadened
the application of the 1929 standards. Each
succeeding BOLAS Convention replaced the
In t meantime, the Yarmouth Castle fire
with its isastrous ,the of American lives be-
came a tter of domestic concern as well.
A subcom ittee of the Senate Commerce
Committee eld 5 days of hearings on the
question of fety of life at sea in April and
June of 1966. It had available to it during
the latter part this consideration the May
1966 recommen dons of IMCO's Maritime
Safety Committe and on this basis, the
following provisio of Public Law 89-777
(approved November , 1966) was enacted:
"* * * any foreign r domestic vessel of
over 100 gross tons havi berth or stateroom
accommodations for 50 more passengers,
shall not depart a Unite States port with
passengers who are United tates nationals,
and who embarked at that t, if the Secre-
tary of the Department in w ch the Coast
Guard is operating finds that such vessel
does not comply with the standar set forth
in the International Convention for the
Safety of Life at Sea, 1960, as modifle by the
amendments proposed by the thirteen f
of the Maritime Safety Commit of
tive Organization * * * dated May 19
* * *?
The effective date of this provision is the
date of entry into force of the amendments
now under consideration or November 2, 1968,
whichever is earlier.
No further implementing legislation will
be required since there is considered by the
administration to be no conflict or incon-
sistency in substance between Public Law 89-
777 and the final amendments adopted by
the IMCO Assembly shortly thereafter.
U.S. passenger ships already meet very high
safety standards and no significant changes
will be involved for the industry. For exist-
ing U.S. ships the BOLAS amendments and
recommendations are covered by Coast Guard
regulations to which only minor amendments
will be made. Foreign vessels, however, pick-
ing up U.S. passengers at U.S. ports, however,
upon entry into force of these amendments,
will have to meet their fire safety standards.
COMMITTEE ACTION AND RECOMMENDATION
The amendments were submitted to the
Senate on February 27, 1967, and referred
to a subcommittee consisting of Senators
Lausche (chairman), Dodd, McCarthy, Carl-
son, and Case on March 3, 1967. At a public
hearing on March 16, the subcommittee
heard testimony by William K. Miller, Direc-
tor, Office of Maritime Affairs, Department of
State, and Adm. Willard J. Smith, Command-
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ant, U.S. Coast Guard, Approval was strongly
urged by these witnesses and they stated that
there was no opposition to the amendments
within the United States known to them.
The prepared statement of Mr. Miller is ap-
pended to this report.
On March 20, the subcommittee recom-
mended approval of these amendments to
the full committee which endorsed this ac-
tion.
As the leading proponent of these amend-
ments, it appears to the committee to be
entirely appropriate that the United States
should be the first to ratify them.
While domestically, the U.S. Government
has already taken appropriate steps to in-
sure the safety of passengers embarking from.
U.S. ports, the safety of all American travel-
ers embarking from ports anywhere is at
stake and can be assured only through inter-
national agreement.
For these reasons the Committee on For-
eign Relations urges the Senate to give
prompt advice and consent to their ratifica-
tion.
Mr. LAUSCHE. Mr. President, the
amendments are designed to improve fire
protection of ships, particularly pass-
enger ships. The amendments are
technical, as are the 1948 and 1960
Safety of Life at Sea Conventions-
SOLAS-to which they apply. Their
principal effect is to eliminate from
these conventions the so-called grand-
father clauses which exempted old ships
from most of the safety standards laid
down by them. The present amend-
ments will eliminate from the interna-
tional passenger trade vessels with
wooden hulls, decks, and deckhouses.
Steel fire barriers not more than 131 feet
apart will be required as well as the
separation of accommodation spaces by
steel bulkheads and -decks from such
hazardous areas as galleys, machinery
spaces, and cargo spaces.
The fires aboard the Yarmouth Castle
and Viking Princess around the turn of
1965 sparked the drive for improving the
fire safety of passenger vessels, which
was led by the United States. The
United States called for the May 1966
meeting of the Maritime Safety Com-
mittee of the Intergovernmental Mari-
time Consultative Organizations-
a ted with only minor changes by the
Thi Extraordinary session of the
IMC Assembly in November 1966.
On t e basis of the May 1966 recom-
mendati s of IMCO's Maritime Safety
Committe Congress enacted Public Law
89-777 aft thorough hearings con-
ducted by th Commerce Committees of
the House and enate. According to the
letter of the Sec tary of State transmit-
ting the treVIM he President, there is
no conflict istency in substance
between these ame dments and Public
Law 89-777 and no f ther implementing
legislation will be re wired.
The PRESIDING O ICER. Without
objection, the convents n will be con-
sidered as having pass through its
various parliamentary sta s up to the
point of consideration of the solution of
ratification, which the clerk 1 state.
The assistant legislative cl k read
the resolution, as follows:
Resolved (two-thirds of the Se tors
present concurring therein), That the Be ate
advise and consent to the ratification of e
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Approved For RCONGRESSIONAL RECORI7 - SENATE 0300090026.8arch 21, 1967
amendments to the International Conven-
tion for the Safety of Life at Sea, 1960, an-
nexed to the Resolution A. 108 (ES. III) by
which they were adopted on November 30,
1968, by the Assembly of the Intergovern-
mental Maritime Consultative Organization-
(IMCO) at its Third Extraordinary Session,
1?.eld in London November 28-30, 1966. (Ex-
ecutive E, 90th Congress, 1st session).
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, it is
not my intention to ask for a vote at this
time, but at an appropriate time I will
ask that there be a vote at a time cer-
tain; and then, at a further appropriate
time, I will ask for the yeas and nays.
LEGISLATIVE SESSION
On request of Mr. MANSFIELD, and by
unanimous consent, the Senate resumed
thkconsideration of legislative business.
ILITAI*Y PROCUREMENT
AUTHORIZATION, 1968
The Senate resumed the consideration
of the bill (S. 666), a bill to authorize
appropriations during the fiscal year
1968 for procurement of aircraft, mis-
siles, naval vessels, and tracked combat
vehicles, and research, development, test,
and evaluation for the Armed Forces,
and for other purposes.
The PRESIDING OFFICER.. The
question is on agreeing to the committee
amendment.
The committee amendment was agreed
to.
Mr. RUSSELL. Mr. President, the al-
most $21 billion in authorization of ap-
propriations this bill provides is a foun-
dation for a Defense program in 1968
that amounts to-$75.3 in new obligational
authority and about $73.1 in expendi-
tures. It will be seen that of a total
national. budget of $144 billion, the func-
tions of the Department of Defense ac-
count for more than half.
Seventy-five billion dollars is a lot
of money by any standard of comparison.
I know most Members of the Senate re-
gret the necessity for spending it. It
would be fallacious to assume, however,
that if our security did not requfse this
funding, the $75 billion would be spent
for education, medical care, housing; or
other social benefits. For those who view
defense spending with excessive regret
because of a view that social spending is
thereby preempted, I remind them of the
quotation from Sir John Slessor's "Strat-
egy for the West" that "the most impor-
tant social service that a government can
do for its people is to keep them alive and
free." That is the purpose of this bill.
I think we can agree that the defense
we need should be provided as efficiently
as possible. Since later in my remarks
I intend to indicate some differences with
his recommendations, perhaps this is a
good place to say that I think Secretary
of Defense McNamara is entitled to the
highest praise for the administration he
has brought to the Department of De-
fense. Sometimes, I wish he was a little
less sensitive about the few areas in
which the views of the Congress differ
from his and that he did not have to
react so defensively and combatively to
the exercise of our responsibilities. But
it should be said that except for the
progress he L,largely responsible for in
such activities: as refining the calculation
of requirements, eliminating unneces-
sarily costly frills, and shifting to more
competitive forms of procurement, the
defense budget would be much larger,
indeed, by billions of dollars.
The war in Vietnam heavily influence
the size and form of the 1968 defense
program. When presenting the supple-
mental authorization and appropriations
requests for :.967 to the Senate earlier,
I expressed rr.y opinion that the conflict
in southeast Asia is causing us to spend
$2 billion a n onth more than we other-
wise would be spending. By way of sum-
mary, I arrived at that estimate by
beginning with the approximately $50
billion annually that was spent by the
Department in the last year before we
became signi7icantly involved in. south-
east Asia. To this, $5.4 billion for pay
increases in the last 2-years was added.
The sum was subtracted from :the $73.1
billion in expenditures expected in 1968
to produce a difference of about $17.7
billion annually or about $1.5 billion per
month. Secretary McNamara came up
with a figure of about- $22- billion an-
nually by going through each appropria-
tions account and trying to isolate spe-
cific costs that would not be incurred
except for Vietnam.
Neither method takes into account the
depletion of s socks and supplies that were
already on hand and neither makes any
allowance for diverting resources to Viet-
nam from tasks to which they were as-
signed before With a reasonable allow-
ance for stock depletion and diversion
of resources, the cost of the Vietnam war
probably exceeds $24 billion annually.
Also, in discussing the 1967 supple-
mental funding, I informed the Senate
that unless circumstances change dras-
tically, the Department does not plan
to submit a major supplemental in fiscal
year 1968. In determining its funding
requests for 1968, the Department has
included enough to last through the pro-
curement lee.dtime following the time
when the fiscal year 1969 obligational
authority will be given to it--normally,
this would be in the summer of. calendar
year 1968. This means that on such
things as ammunition, which has a 6-
month leadt_me, the fiscal year 1968
funds will finance requiremerts through
December of 1968. For aircraft, which
has a leadtirae of 18 months, the 1968
program funds requirements through
December of 1969.
Members c?f the Senate need not be
told there is no- absolute defense in to-
day's world. In defense as in many
other aspect:; of life it always is hard
to know how much is enough-. Logistics
objectives arc based on judgments of the
threat we face and assumptions on the
kind and location of the combat our
forces might have to partic:;pate in in
defense of oir national objectives. In
carrying out our responsibilities as
Members of Congress, an examination
of the strategic concepts and the postu-
lates on which our level of forces are
proposed is fundamental.
TRATEGIC FORCE$
In the area of strategic forces, there
is a high level of understanding and
commendable: public support for the
proposition' that we must have a nuclear
strike force: t:aat could survive an attack
initiated by an enemy and then retaliate
against that enemy with such destruc-
tive power' that the attacker would
be destroyed. There can be little doubt
we have -.ueh a force today. This force
is c:ompored of nearly 1,000 Minutemen
missiles, Polaris missile-firing subma-
rines that will number 39 by the end of
this fiscal year, and strategic bomber
forces-horyever, not modern-of about
550 B-52-s and 80 B-58's. Likewise, 54
Titan missiles are in the force for the -
next few years.
The vital point now is to maintain
this abili y to respond with overwhelm-
ing force to a nuclear attack. There is
evidence the Soviet Union is deploying
an antiballistic missile defense and that
she is building more offensive intercon-
tinental in ssiles than we thought she
might at this tithe. The former-that
is, the defensive missiles-might inter-
cept and destroy a substantial number
of our retalitory missiles. The latter-
that is, ,he offensive missiles-if they -
have the ability to destroy hardened
targets, might destroy a significant
number atf ( Minuteman missiles we are
dependin,.; on. as a large part of our sec-
ond-strike strength.
In trying to keep our strategic offen-
sive forces{ ahead of the defense, the
1968 defense program includes the con-
tinued development and production of
the Poseidon missile and a contingent
funding or an antiballistic missile sys-
tem to protect Minuteman sites from an
intercontitner..tal ballistic missile attack.
The PoseAon missiles, which will have
a vastly ifiproved power to penetrate
a ballistic missile defense, will be substi-
tuted for Polaris missiles aboard our
fleet ballistic missile submarines in a
retrofit program over a period of several
years. For the entire Poseidon pro-
gram con.tentplated, the cost is $3.3 bil-
lion, of which $900 million is included
in the 196$ ;program, in the bill before
us.
I shall have more to say about the an-
tiballistic neissile system later in my re-
marks. :I,ar now though, I should also
say that a large part of our Minuteman
force will be equipped with reentry ve-
hicles de:ddned to penetrate an antibal-
listic missile defense, that the Depart-
ment of ;defense is studying theneed to
develop as new intercontinental ballistic
missile system, and that the SRAM
standoff type missile is being developed
for installation on the 210 FB-111
bomber f orpe and for possible use on the
255 B-52's of the G and H series that will
be retained after the other B-52's have
been inactWated.
In my opinion, there is little justifica-
tion for any contention that the United
States is not doing enough to maintain
its capab;aity to launch a devastating nu-
clear retaliation.
But th..er"e are honest differences of
opinion con:whether our strategic defen-
sive forces: are all that they should or
could be. Foremost among these differ-
ences is the continuing controversy over
beginning procurement for deployment
of a ballistic missile defense. Another
prominent consideration is the desirabil-
ity of procuring a new manned inter-
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ceptor to replace the aging and obsolete
aircraft upon which we now depend to
defend against a bomber attack.
In the committee's hearings that are
available to the Senate, and in a cen-
sored form to the public, there was ex-
tensive testimony and questioning about
the decision of the executive branch
that our deploying a ballistic missile de-
fense would touch off a new and expen-
sive arms competition with the Soviet
Union without really affecting the bal-
ance of terror and that there is plenty
of time to wait and see whether we
should deploy such a system against the
growing Red Chinese nuclear threat.
In my opinion, and I think in the
opinion of a majority of the committee,
there are some defects in the reasoning
that leads to these conclusions.
I do not wish to do an injustice to the
case against deployment by summarizing
it at too short a length, but to respond
to the argument, the argument should be
stated in brief. It runs generally that
our deploying an ABM will cause a re-
sponse in offensive capability by the
Soviet Union, resulting in no diminution
in the risk of a Soviet nuclear attack and
no meaningful reduction in the damage
to the United States from a Soviet nu-
clear attack if deterrence should fail.
Concomitant arguments are first, that
it would take longer for Communist
China to develop and deploy a signifi-
cant ICBM force than it would take for
us to produce and deploy a missile de-
fense against; and, second, that to pro-
tect our Minuteman sites against the kind
of heavy, sophisticated attack the Soviets
may be able to launch in a few years, it
may later be desirable to provide a mis-
sile defense for some of the Minuteman
sites. About $377 million is included in
the 1968 budget to permit a start on
some such system of missile defense if
negotiations with the Soviet Union on an
agreement restricting the deployment
of an ABM system are not successful.
Mr. CLARK. Mr. President, will the
Senator yield?
Mr. RUSSELL. I yield.
Mr. CLARK. Would the $377 million
be for the actual deployment of our pres-
ent antiballistic missile system, which I
understand is the Nike X?
Mr. RUSSELL. It is to begin long
leadtime procurement for the deploy-
ment of the latest we have, the Spartan
and the Sprint. I do not know that it
would actually result in the deployment,
but it would start the procurement pro-
gram, because of the long leadtime in-
volved, which would enable us to make a
start in the deployment of the anti-
ballistic missiles.
Mr. CLARK. The Senator from Ten-
nessee [Mr. GoRE] is chairman of a sub-
committee of the Committee on Foreign
Relations which has been holding hear-
ings in some depth on the antiballistic
missile system. I attended most, if not
all, of the hearings. I must talk with
caution because of what was disclosed in
executive session, where classified infor-
mation was given. The Senator from
Tennessee [Mr. GORE] is on the floor.
He can correct me if I am wrong. It is
my understanding, from the views ex-
pressed by intelligence officials, officials
from the Atomic Energy Commission,
and from the.CIA., that both the Spartan
and the Sprint were several years away
from being capable of being deployed. I
had thought- they were several years
away in terms of research development
and being able to be procured. Can the
Senator enlighten me on that?
Mr. RUSSELL. I do not think that
information conforms to that which we
have, though, as I have stated, they can-
not be deployed immediately.
Mr. CLARK. Because they have to
be procured.
Mr. RUSSELL. That is what I say;
you have to procure the long leadtime
items.
If the Senator will permit me to finish,
I shall be glad to discuss the matter with
him at such length as he may desire.
Mr. CLARK. Certainly.
Mr. RUSSELL. In trying to support
its conclusion that it is expensively futile
to build an ABM defense against the
Soviet Union, the Department of Defense
presented an involuted series of assump-
tions, hypotheses, and assumptions upon
assumptions. In its latter stages, this
exercise gets too esoteric for me to fol-
low. If one accepts every premise in
this syllogism, he will arrive at the con-
clusion the Department desires. In a
way, this is a little like the crack about
the statistician who drew a straight line
from an unwarranted assumption to a
foregone conclusion. More seriously, the
Department's case is based more on what
General Wheeler, who disagrees with the
Department's conclusion, referred to as
the assumption that the reaction of the
Soviet Union to our ABM deployment
would be "equal, opposite, feasible, and
possible."
From 1955 through fiscal year 1967,
the United States will have spent about
$4 billion in research on ballistic missile
defense, including Nike-Zeus, Nike-X,
and Project Defender. As a result, we
have developed concepts and equipment
for a system that competent evaluators
consider would provide valuable, if im-
perfect, protection against a relatively
light, unsophisticated attack. It could
provide nearly perfect protection against
an attack of the accidental type or of the
type that Communist China right be able
to launch in the 1970's. From a fairly
basic beginning that provide -1 a thin area
defense for the entire United States and
a more concentrated defense for some of
our missile sites at a cost of slightly
more than $4 billion, this system could
be expanded to provide more defense
against Soviet missile attack for 25 cities
at a total cost of just under $10 billion
or .the same kind of defense for 50 cities
for a total. cost of slightly more than $19
billion.
To these cost estimates Secretary
McNamara adds predictions of cost over-
runs, the cost of procuring a new inter-
ceptor force to prevent a bomber attack
from negating our missile defense, and
the cost of an expanded fallout shelter
program to arrive at his conjecture that
we would eventually spend $40 billion
once we started. I referred only partly
in jest to this figure as being intended
as a congressional deterrent. Any part
of this that is spent would be spread over
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a period of 5 to 7 years. I do not agree
that we would inevitably spend this, and
even if we did, it is not staggering in rela-
tion to the importance of the objective,
our ability to pay it, or what we are
spending annually in Vietnam.
Of greater concern than the cost is
the Secretary's belief that even expendi-
tures of this magnitude would not reduce
U.S. casualties in the slightest if the So-
viet Union reacted to the deployment of
an ABM defense here by increasing the
second strike damage potential of their
offensive forces. I referred earlier to
the uncertainty and skepticism, appa-
rently shared by General Wheeler and
the members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff,
that the Soviet Union would respond in
such a way that our defense would be
negated. If they did not, even the De-
partment's figures estimate that the $10
billion investment would save 80 million
Americans and that investment of the
$19 billion would save 90 million Ameri-
cans in the event of a Soviet first strike.
It seems to me that the objective in de-
fense should be to prepare to save all
that you can, even if you are unable to
save everything and everyone.
Last year the committee took the ini-
tiative in recommending an additional
$167.9 million to begin production for
the deployment of a missile defense sys-
tem. This action has been erroneously
attributed elsewhere but the record will
show that it originated in this commit-
tee and in the Senate. That amount,
which has not been used; and the $377
million that is in the budget for possible
use in 1968 are enough, when combined,
to finance the first year's cost of any one
of several possible deployments. Fortu-
nately, it is not necessary to decide now
what the ultimate scope of the deploy-
ment need be.
The committee, of course, does not op-
pose negotiations with the Soviet Union
on an agreement banning the deploy-
ment of complicated, expensive, and ex-
tensive missile defense systems. We be-
lieve, however, that these negotiations
should take into account that a bilateral
agreement would leave us vulnerable to
a possible nuclear attack from Commu-
nist China, from future members of the
nuclear "club," or even an accidental at-.
tack. The committee feels that full con-
sideration should be given to permitting
deployment of at least the "thin" ABM
defense. If an agreement that fully pro-
tects the interest of the United States
cannot be consummated within a reason-
able period, the committee strongly be-
lieves that the available funding should
be used to begin production for deploy-
ment of a missile defense system, a pro-
grain that requires several years to ac-
complish.
This position is shared with some high-
ly competent company, including the
Joint Chiefs of Staff, and I noticed in
the press last week, I believe, that Dr.
Harold Agnew, the head of the Scientific
Laboratory Weapons Division of the
Atomic Energy Commission's Los Alamos
laboratory, now holds to this view.
In an article in the Washington Post
of March 17, Dr. Agnew was quoted as
fearing that the companies working on
Nike X are now ready for the next step
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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE March 21, 1967.
but might disband their technical teams
and convert their facilities to other uses
if the system is kept in suspension an-
other year. I also like his deprecation
of the suggestion that anything good for
us militarily also has to be good for our
potential adversaries. In addition, he is
reported to have criticized the idea that
any increases in our capability can be
considered good only if they contribute
to stability. To his disapproval of these
notions, I say "hear, hear," and his will-
ingness to stick his neck out in this re-
spect I salute.
In the bomber field, the Department
of Defense still has not been persuaded
that the Air Force should develop the new
bomber that has become known under
the acronym of AMSA, standing and ad-
vanced manned strategic aircraft; $26
million will be spent for work on engines
and avionics for such a new bomber but
there is no decision to proceed with con-
tract definition, which is a prerequisite
to getting down to business on produc-
tion. I did not note any great enthusiasm
by the Secretary of Defense in that direc-
tion. For bombers, the Department's
plans still call, for producing 210 FB-
ill's, the bomber version of the TFX
that will be equipped with the air-to-
surface standoff missile called SRAM,
and retaining 255 of the later model B-
52's.
Under the Department's plans, the
earliest we could get anything. better
would be fiscal year 1976. By adding
extra authorization and appropriations
for this purpose for several- years, the
Congress has demonstrated its convic-
tion that we will need a new bomber in
the middle 70's. By refusing to acceler-
ate the bomber development, the civilian
heads in the Defense Department have
shown that they doubt very much that
a follow-on bomber has any purpose in
our strategic forces. It probably would
be futile to try to change their mind
again this Year, but I would not want
the lack of any additional authorization
this year to be construed as a change of
my view that the Department should be
moving faster to provide another long-
range bomber with a large weapon-
carrying capacity and high speed at both
high and low altitudes.
Having dwelled for perhaps too long
on only one phase of our defense ef-
forts-although perhaps the most con-
troversial-I should move along to other
subj ects.
GENERAL PURPOSE FORCES
Thus far I have referred not at all to
our general purpose forces, those that
are deeply involved in the fighting in
Vietnam and the kinds that would be
used in resisting aggression against
Western Europe, at least in the early
stages. Most of the Army's combat units,
nearly all the Navy forces except the
Polaris submarines, the Marine Corps,
and the tactical units of the Asir Force
are in this category.
One of the reasons for the steep in-
crease in military spending since the end
of fiscal year 1965 is that by the end of
this fiscal year, we will have about
730,000 more men on active duty than
we had when the decision to send U.S.
combat forces to Vietnam was made.
The pending bill is an authorization of
appropriations or purposes other than
personnel costs, but more personnel
requires more weapons and equipment,
and therefore the level of forces and
their deployment are important deter-
minants of major procurement and
therefore de:sense spending.
Our ground force strength objective
for fiscal year 1968 is 311/3 division force
equivalents, it term defined as a division
itself plus all its supporting forces. The
Army will have 181/3 active division
equivalents and the Marine Corps will
have four. C f these 221/3 active divisions,
81/3 will be deployed in southeast Asia-
61/3 Army an I two Marine Corps-five in
Europe, and two in Korea. Seven di-
visions-five Army and two Marine
Corps-will be held in the United States
as a central reserve. In addition, there
are nine divisions in the reserve-eight
Army and or.e Marine Corps. These are
the ground forces upon which we would
rely for response to any expansion of the
war in southeast Asia or if fighting to
which our security interest requires us
to respond breaks out elsewhere in the
world.
To suppl:' these forces with the
weapons, equipment, ammunition, and
supplies they need in combat, procure-
ir,,ent objecitves are established generally
on the basis of how much is needed to
keep our forces fighting before produc-
tion can be:.ncerased enough to replace
those items consumed in combat.
ARMY
In progressing toward the Army equip-
rr.ent authorization of 261/3 division sets,
the 1968 prccurement program involves
continued purchase of the Iroquois,
Cobra, Chinook, observation, and heavy
lift helicopters and Mohawk fixed-wing
observation aircraft. Missile systems re-
ceiving funds are ground support equip-
ment for the Pershing, the Lance divi-
sion support missile that will replace
Honest John, the Tow and Shillelagh
antitank miasiles, and the ]:z,edeye and
Chaparral missiles for air defense of
troops in the field.
There is tentative approval for the
conversion of an Army airborne division
to an airmobile type like the 1st Air
Cavalry Division that has g:iven such a
good account of itself in Vietnam. The
timing of the s conversion will depend on
details of a conversion plan to be formu-
lated by the Army and the Joint Chiefs
of Staff, but it has been provisionally
scheduled for the early part of fiscal year
1169.
NAVY
The Navy'.; carrier force program is for
a fleet of 15 attack carriers and 12 air
wings. No new carrier is in this year's
program, but it is understood that a
nuclear-powered one probably will be in
the fiscal year 1969 request. The ship-
building program approved by the De-
partment of Defense for 1968 is substan-
tially smaller than the one that had
been projected earlier. Changes include
reductions in the approved number of
nuclear-powered attack submarines from
five to threc, in amphibious ships from
17 to one, and in logistics ships, from. 15
to three. These reductions are unre-
lated to the Committee's decision to dis-
approve cgnatruction of a new class of
so-called f st deployment logistics ships
that I shalt discuss in a few moments.
The Navy is designing a new class of
escort snips now called DX that may be
procured under the total package pro-
cu,?ement concept. The same system
may be used for it closely related develop-
ment of a' new class of guided missile
ships ncw designated DXG. Both of
these new types could have the same hull
but emp:';oy different weapon systems or
they may have common bow and stern
sections, tiu~ different midsections for
each type.; Also under development for
possible procurement under the single
package plan. is a new kind of amphibious
ship, designated LHA, that will be
capable of',providing over-the-beach and
vertical envelopment assault tactics for
the Marine Corps. It will be designed to
launch : a>tiding craft as well as heli-
co,pters and will combine the character-
istics now in two different amphibious
types, th ; I PH and the LPD.
Ylajor types o:; aircraft to be procured
by the Navy and Marine Corps include
the RA5 C for reconnaissance, the A6A
for all-w rather attack, the EA6B for elec-
tronic countermeasures, the A7A for
close support, interdiction, and light at-
tack missions, the OV1OA for counterin-
su:rgency missions, and the P3B for anti-
sulomarineiwarfaare patrol.
In Nasryai.rcraft, I have purposely left
until last the F--111B, the Navy version
of the high:y controversial TFX. The
Navy intention is to use this aircraft,
equipped, with the new Phoenix missile,
that will }se capable of detecting several
different hostile aircraft at long ranges
and laui thing raissiles to destroy them,
as an interceptor. But this plane has
had marry problems, notably weight. It
has yet to be demonstrated that the air-
craft cars be made suitable for carrier
operatioirs The Secretary of the Navy
insists that all alternatives to it have
been. carefully explored and that the
Navy has lassed the point of no return
in its commitment to the E-111B for the
period when this aircraft will be needed.
Based on these assurances, the Commit-
tee has 'eft the authorizationfor it un-
touched, but before appropriations
aeainst this authorization are made, fur-
ther evideice of progress in solving the
many nrnblems that have beset develop-
ment of this aircraft will be needed.
AIR FORCE
Major aircraft procurement for Air
Force general purpose forces will be of
the F-111A, -,he F -4E, and the A-7. There
has been. some problem in matching the
engine to the airframe of the F-111A,
but there is little doubt that this will
prove to lie an effective attack aircraft
for the P..JrForce.
AIRLIFT AND SEALIFT
Disapprgved by the committee was a
proposal to begin the construction of
seven fa:;tideployment logistics ships to-
ward a planned force of 30 of these ships.
In concept, these vessels would have been
loaded with :heavy, bulky equipment used
by ground forces in combat and they
would have been constantly deployed in
forward areas throughout the world.
Theoretically, ground troops would be
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flown to a combat area to find the heavy
equipment already there.
The committee was concerned about
the psychological effect, both at home
and abroad, of being committed to de-
ployment of these huge floating arsenals
all over the world. In the judgment of
the committee, we should not unilaterally
assume the function of policing the
world. Some nations would consider this
facility for intervention anywhere, any-
time as an intimidation. As for the ef-
fect of too much pre-positioning on our
own decisions, there is reason to think,
to put it colloquially, that if it is easy
for us to go anywhere and do anything,
we will always be going somewhere and
doing something.
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, will
the Senator yield?
Mr. RUSSELL. I yield.
Mr. MANSFIELD. Do I correctly
understand the Senator to say that we
had contemplated seven ships initially,
fully supplied logistically, with an ulti-
mate goal of 30, to be stationed every-
where or anywhere throughout the
world?
Mr. RUSSELL. All over the seven
seas.
Mr. MANSFIELD. Would that not in
effect make us a world policeman and
make us subject to actions for which we
might not assent in Congress?
Mr. RUSSELL. Mr. President, that
was one of the beliefs that moved the
committee to reject this proposal. As I
have just stated, we did not think that
we should go any further in a unilateral
effort to police the entire world or impose
a pax Americana.
Of course, if these large ships, each of
40,000-ton displacement and loaded with
heavy equipment, were scattered
throughout the world, one of them would
be constantly positioned near any pos-
sible danger spot. The demand would
be for Uncle Sam to use the ships and
send troops to take care of the situation.
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, it
appears to me that this would be an in-
vitation on our part which I think should
be foreclosed.
Do I correctly understand the Senator
to say that this proposal was eliminated
by the committee?
Mr. RUSSELL. The committee has
recommended that it be eliminated, and
the Senate has agreed to the amendment
which eliminates it.
Mr. MANSFIELD. I am delighted.
Mr. RUSSELL. I thank the Senator.
Reduction of the Navy's shipbuilding
authorization request by $301.1 million
to effectuate the committee's action does
not mean the Armed Forces are left
without provision for the heavy equip-
ment they would need in combat over-
seas. In many areas where we are com-
mitted by treaty or, otherwise to resist
aggression it is po?sible to pre-position
this equipment on land. This has been
done in Western Europe. Moreover, we
already have some Victory class ships
that can provide a limited amount of
pre-positioning at sea, if this is a wise
course to follow. Furthermore, the
C-5A, a new, very large, air transport
that is being developed, will be capable
of carrying 98 percent of the equipment
an Army division needs. Incidentally,
since the C-5A will be produced in my
own State of Georgia, I anticipate criti-
cism that my reaction to the FDL was
influenced by the hope that production
of the C-5A might thereby be increased.
While it might be argued that without
the FDL's we should need even more
C-5A's, I suspect that there was at least
a mild attempt to coerce me during these
hearings in the suggestion that if one
does not accept the necessity for a rapid
deployment capability of the FDL type,
the numbers of C-5A required might
have to be reduced. I think the com-
mittee's action demonstrates that what
was perhaps a veiled threat did not color
my judgment of the issue.
Incidentally, Mr. President, since the
C-5A will be produced in my own State
of Georgia, I anticipate criticism that
my reaction to the FDL was influenced by
the hope that the production of the C-
5A might thereby be increased. That
argument could be made, of course, but I
suspect there was at least a mild attempt
to coerce me during the hearings by the
suggestion that if one does not accept the
necessity for this vast fleet of ships of
the FDL type, the numbers of the C-5A
required might have to be reduced. I
think the committee's action demon-
strates that what was perhaps a mildly
veiled threat did not color my own judg-
ment on this issue.
I think it would be inadvisable for us
to pre-position some thirty of these
mighty floating arsenals all over the
world. There is no limit to what it could
eventually cost us. ' If we are engaged in
a war with a nation using sophisticated
weapons, these ships would be sitting
ducks for submarines and aircraft. Es-
cort ships would be required, and there
is no way to ascertain at the present time
just how much it would cost to protect
each one of these ships in pre-positioned
locations.
RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT
Although my statement already has
run to probably excessive length, I must
comment at least briefly on the $7.2 bil-
lion this bill provides in authorization of
appropriations for research, develop-
ment, text, and evaluation.
In reviewing the requests of the mili-
tary departments and the defense agen-
cies, the Secretary of Defense made re-
ductions of about $900 million in these
requests. The committee has decided to
recommend no further reductions, al-
though it recognizes that much of this ef-
fort is, by the very nature of research,
unproductive.
Considering the $7.2 billion as a meas-
ure of research effort is misleading, be-
cause about $2.4 billion of this is for de-
velopment work on systems that have al-
ready been approved for deployment.
Much of the rest of the R. & D. author-
ization is for development work less ad-
vanced than that on systems approved
for deployment.
A more accurate measure of the effort
devoted to the technology base for fu-
ture weapons development is to combine
the $409 million budgeted for research,
one of the five sequential steps into which
the Department organizes its R. & D.
effort, with the $988 million budgeted for
exploratory development, another of the
sequential steps and the second most
elementary of them.
In 1968, $27 million has been budgeted
for the program started in 1967 that has
the objective of broadening the geo-
graphic base of the Department's pro-
gram of research conducted by colleges
and universities. This program, which
is styled THEMIS, was initiated in re-
sponse to frequent congressional com-
plaints against undue concentration of
defense research in a few institutions of
higher learning. Defense participation
will at first be directed to participating
in about 50 new centers of excellence in
science and technology, with each center
receiving support of not less than about
$200,000 per year from the Department.
A detailed discussion of the major
research and development that will be
prosecuted next year would detain the
Senate unreasonably. For those Sena-
tors who wish more information, there
is some elaboration in the committee re-
port and more in the hearings to which I
invite your attention. I should point out,
though, that for its part in maintaining
four specific safeguards relating to the
test ban treaty, the Department of De-
fense has budgeted $255 million in fiscal
year 1968, compared with $224 million
in fiscal year 1967 and about $238 million
in fiscal year 1966.
Earlier in my remarks I commented
that the size of this authorization and
the amount of the whole Defense De-
partment budget are substantially en-
larged by our efforts in South Vietnam.
But if we had never tried to help there,
we would still need a large authoriza-
tion of this type and in my judgment
the defense budget would be in the 50
billions, at least.
In presenting the 1967 supplemental
authorization and appropriations to the
Senate, I tried to make clear my strong
conviction that so long as our forces are
committed in southeast Asia there is no
alternative to unstinting support of
those forces. Yet, we should not allow
ourselves to become so preoccupied with
events in that part of the world that we
do not safeguard our even more vital
interests elsewhere. The bill before the
Senate is directed more toward general
and varied military power than to a
specialized capability without utility
when the war in Vietnam is over.
Among the nations of the earth, each
attaches an importance to defense that
is proportionate to its valuation of its in-
stitutions, resources, traditions, and in-
dividual rights. The United States has
more that is worth protecting than has
any other nation, and I am thankful that
our citizens are willing to pay the price
of its defense. I trust this will always be
true.
Mr. LAUSCHE. Mr. President, will
the Senator from-Georgia yield?
Mr. RUSSELL. The distinguished
Senator from Maine, who is the ranking
minority member of the Committee on
Armed Services, desires to make a state-
ment. When she has finished, I shall be
glad to yield to the Senator from Ohio.
Mrs. SMITH. Mr. President, I am
glad to join the chairman of the Com-
mittee on Armed Services in urging the
approval of the bill.
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S 4176 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE
March 21, 19O
I hope the authorization and appropri- I am not convinced that the ground
ations requested by the Department of placements of what may appear to be
Defense for fiscal year 1968 are enough Russia's anti-ballistic-missile defense
to do what needs to be done. The Secre- system are what they sceir. but that
tary of Defense informed the committee rather they may be decoys of classic de-
he-had reduced the -requests of the mili-
tary departments and the Defense agen-
cies for 1968 by $17.6 billion.
I suppose It Is standard procedure to
request a little more than you expect to
receive in Defense, as elsewhere, but It Is
hard for me to believe that all the pro-
grams this $17.6 billion would have
funded were recommended by respon-
sible officials only in the expectation that
there would be some reductions.
I think the committee has done the
right thing in disapproving the initia-
tion of what could be a costly new pro-
gram for the construction of logistics
ships that would be constantly deployed
throughout the world.
Perhaps a few new ships of this type
can be justified, but apparently the profit
on the construction of a small number
of ships would be inadequate to subsi-
dize the construction of new shipbuild-
ing facilities the Department of Defense
considers necessary.
I would hope the Department might
make further efforts to modernize exist-
ing shipbuilding facilities and that the
existing shipbuilding industry could find
a way to produce the needed ships at a
reasonable cost.
The committee report contains an
explanation of the reasons for including
military assistance to South Vietnam,
other free-world forces there, Laos, and
Thailand in the budget. of the Depart-
ment of Defense. For some time I have
thought the relationship between mili-
tary assistance and functions of the
Department of Defense is so close that
authorizations for both should be con-
sidered by the same committee.
The action proposed this year is, in
my opinion, a large step toward this
objective. I am concerned, though,
about what could be the very open.-ended
nature of this authorization.
The level of assistance provided to
Laos and Thailand could affect the
safety of U.S. forces in southeast Asia.
For this reason I have not insisted on
adopting a ceiling on the amount that
may be furnished as military assistance.
It was with considerable reluctance
that I joined in the committee's ap-
proval of the authorization with respect
to the deployment of an anti-ballistic-
:missile defense system. I can give no Mr. MANEFIELD. Mr. President, I
assurance that I will do so again next ask unanimous consent that the .vote on
year. the pending business, the military au-
I am becoming more and more inclined thorization bill, be taken at 3:30 p.m.:.
to believe that the Secretary of Defense that if any amendments are to be offered
its right-but for the wrong reason-on in the meantime, there be a limitation
this Issue. I am not convinced that the of debate on each amendment; of 1 hour,
state of the art on an anti-ballistic- the time to be equally divided between
missile defense system has reached a the proposer of the amendment and the
relatively static status. manager of ':he bill, the Senator from
I am not convinced that the state of Georgia [Mr RUSSELL], and that rule
the art has leveled off on a plateau to XI!I be waived. I should have said that
the extent that we can safely make the the vote will be held not later than 3:30
assumption that Russia is on such a p.m., but I assume it will be around that
plateau of development and does not time. I also ask that the vote on the
have a potential-if not actual-capabil- treaty come mmediately after the vote
Sty of a completely different and more on the pending bill.
effective defense system than that on The PRESIDING OFFICER,.: Is there
which present thinking is based. objection? Hearing none, it is so ordered.
ception designed to motivate us to a very
costly defense system that may be ob-
solete or become obsolete in the near
future.
Consequemly, I am becoming more
and more inclined to believe that the
Secretary of Defense is right--but'for the
wrong. reasor.--on this issue.
Obviously, this authorization and ap-
propriations ')ased on it are riot all that
the military departments and the De-
fense agencies would like. But. I believe
the programs this bill would authorize
will add sig.iificantly to our military
strength.
In supporting the bill, I want to ac-
knowledge the great leadership and fair-
ness of the chairman on this bill and the
very admirable manner in wlr:,ch he con-
ducts the wcrk of the committee in a
strictly nonpartisan character.
I also wan'; to commend Mr. William
Darden, the chief of staff of the com-
mittee, and the staff members who did
such an exce.lerit job on this legislation
and on whoa. we are so dependent.
Mr. RUSS"PLL. I thank the distin-
guished Sena ;or from Maine. She is one.
of the best informed and most, valuable
members of the Armed Services Corn-
m: ttee.
Mr. MANE FIELD. Mr. President, I
suggest the absence of a quorum.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The
clerk will cal the roll.
The assistrnt legislative clerk pro-
ceeded to call the roll,
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I
ask unanimous consent that the order
for the quorum call be rescinded.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without
objection, It is so ordered.
Mr. MANE FIELD. Mr. President, I
ask for the yeas and nays on the pend-
ing bill.
The yeas Sad nays were ordered.
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I
ask unanimous consent that it be in order
now to request the yeas and nays on the
treaty, which has already been discussed.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without
objection, It is so ordered.
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I
ask for the yeas and nays on the treaty.
Mr. M'AKSFIELD. Mr. President, I
suggest th? absence of a quorum.
The :IPI.ESIDING OFFICER. The
clerk will call the roll.
The assilstant legislative clerk pro-
ceeded to cal:. the roll.
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I
ask: unanlnlous consent that the order for
the quorum call be rescinded.
The PF.ES]DTIG OFFICER. Without
objection, i :is so ordered.
Mr. BYLI) of West Virginia. Mr.
President, I suggest the absence of a
quorum.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The
clerk- will call. the roll.
The a: s start legislative clerk pro-
ceeded to call the roll.
Mr. YOUNG of Ohio. Mr. President, I
ask unarnhjicus consent that the order
for the quo}um call be rescinded.
The PF.ES]DDIG OFFICER. Without
objection, i` :s so ordered.
THE GRAN[ WAR COUNCIL
Mr. YOUNG of Ohio. Mr. President,
we Amer:.dins have always claimed with
pride that qre are the most revolutionary
people in the world. In the past that
was true, Unfortunately our policy in
this admn9stration has come to the sad
situation where we are now regarded as
the most uxnrevoiutionary nation In the
entire world.
The win 4s of freedom have been blow-
ing throng cut the world, especially in
southeast Asia during the entire time
from imr:rddiately following the end of
World War; 11. They have been blowing
In a manner and to an extent almost
beyond bi:lief.
The Guam War Council was supposed-
ly for President Johnson, Secretary of
State De:;n Rusk, and other top admin-
tration o Vials to review with our mili-
tary and naval leaders In Vietnam and
our newly nominated Ambassador to Vi-
etnam and, lets associates the progress
of the war and to discuss future plans for
the war. Unfortunately, our President
included, o} :perhaps considered that he
was blac!kj4cked into including, Prime
Minister K and the South Vietnamese
chief of :ate' of the militarist regime in
Saigon. :1 nlour Revolutionary War when
we wrenc bed our freedom by force from
the oppr ?s$ion of England, there were
thousands of American colonists in all of
the Thirteen Colonies who opposed their
fellow Americans who were asking.liber-
ation I ro i G-reat; Britain. The patriots
who foughta and won the Revolutionary
these who opposed their efforts of libera-
tion.
Unfort.ulately in the miserable civil
war. In Victira.m In which we had been in-
volved to 8 small degree by President
Eisenhower: and now in a gigantic way
under President Johnson, we are sup-
porting end upholding the "Tories" of
South Viet am against the forces of the
National U eration Front. At the Guam
Conferenre1 X y, the flamboyant Prime
Minister of the Saigon regime who was
a pilot in the French colonial army at
the time thle French were oppressing his
fellow co;rritrymen, has been strength-
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