INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATES U.S.-SOVIET DEFENSES COMPARED

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP70B00338R000300080047-6
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 1
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 9, 2006
• Sequence Number: 47
• Publication Date: December 17, 1967
• Content Type: NSPR

Sundut. Ti-. 1'. I' 1a'
Reds Adopt Flexible Response
Approved For Release 2006/01/30 : CIA-RDP70B00338R000300080047-6
Pho!u bs Ta>s from So'lotu
The Soviet SS?9 ICBM, shown in the 3loscon November parade, is believed to have a ':5-megaton warhead.
Intelligence tstiutates
U.S.-Soviet Defenses Compared
Missiles: Unpublished defense intelligence estimates
predict that the Soviet Union could have as many as
1100 intercontinental ballistic missiles by 1971. This
would give the Russians as many ICBMs as the pro-
jected United States arsenal at that time unless the
Pentagon changes its plan to limit the Air Force Minute-
man arsenal to 1000 missiles. Both the United States and
the Soviet Union plan to use multiple warhead missiles,
the so-called MIRV (multiple-
independently-tai-getable-re-entry vehicle). The argument over which country will
have the biggest ICBM punch, as Defense Department
analysts see it, will hinge on which nation builds the
greatest accuracy and survivability into its system.
Naval forces: London's Institute for Strategic Studies,
which conducts authoritative surveys of international
military developments, estimates that the Soviet nuclear
submarine force has grown from 40 to 50 between 1965
and 1967. Pentagon sources estimate the number of sur-
face warships plying the Mediterranean has increased
tenfold in the last three years. Amphibious forces also
have been strengthened, with emphasis on construction
of helicopter-carrying ships and landing craft that could
deploy Soviet marines in a hurry for limited warfare.
Bomber production: While the lJ,S. has stopped pro-
ducing strategic bombers, the Soviet Union still has the
Bison and Blinder bombers in production. The Pentagon
plans to use the TFX fighter-bomber for the strategic
bomber role. The Soviets also have showed off a variety
of new fighter prototypes, including ones with variable
sweep wings like the TFX.
By George C. Wilson
W-11insloft Past Staff Writrr
The Soviet Union is engaged in a
broad effort to build the capacity for
flexible response to military challenges
111rou.hout the world.
In doing so, the Soviet Linion is fol
lowing the lead taken by the United
Rates during the early 1960s when the
!'ennedy Administration built beyond
ne''massive retaliation" forces of the
I'Isenhower era.
Military and diplomatic leaders her,
believe the buildup represents the So
Viet Union's determination to be a full
equal of the United States-both mili-
tarily and diplomatically. They do not
think the Soviet, are building up for a
lvar.
Extending Guns' Range
The Soviet shun of force in the .Aled-
iterranean theme days-sonic 40 war
hips-is part of this general effort to
fill in the military gaps, as top mili-
tary leaders see it. Thev contend the
Soviets will not rest until they achieve
their centuries-old ambition for a warns
water port.
One genet al said: "Russia is out to
rxtenl.i the range of her guns. She
always has been very tough when site
iras been under her own guns."
Both military and diplomatic offi-
cials look back upon the Cuban missile
crisis as the last. time the Soviet Union
will rely solely on massive retaliation.
One State Department Soviet special-
ist said Russia, by sneaking missiles
into Cuba, had hoped to close her mis-
sile gap with the U.S. "on the cheap."
But the confrontation denied the Su-
viet Union parity by that route. Hcr
niplomatic position on Cuba was
backed up by too drastic a weapon-
nuclear missiles which would bring on
\\ orld War III if fired.
Bomb-in-Orbit System
So now the Soviet Union is taking
the longer road to parity with the
United States. This means improving
ICBMs for nuclear retaliation, build-
ng the non-nuclear forces for limited
wars like Vietnam and continued prob-
n., For a Spotnik-type breakthrough in
t`eapoury-
One theory in both the Pentagon
.and state Department is that the
planned Soviet bomb-in-orbit system
meets the Soviets' cost-effectiveness
tests, it not the Pentag;im's, in this
chive toward parity. The orbiting bomb
-;wstem is seen as a quick counter to
the superior U.S. bomber force. The
,pare weapon also forces the Pentagon
to direct resources for satellite deter
lion, it;pectiou and destruction.
Behind this front ling of a with.
ranging Navy, improved missile anc-
oal and flexible conventional forces.
the Soviets have built a solid mans
trial and scientific base. fiiehard
ilelms, director of the Central Intelli-
,ence Agency, has been emphasizing
the importance of this base during I,(,
cent Congressional briefings on gruw-
mg Soviet power.
Last month Soviet Marshal Sokolui-
sky said:
"Today the defense of socialism in-
cludes insuring the sccur.iti of the
whole socialist community. The armed
forces of the U.S.S.R., in militant unity
,with the armies of the countries of the
re\v world, are called upon to guard
the wb-torie.s of the people who are
constricting socialism and commu-
nism."
In the same vein, Soviet Patty Chief
Brezhnev demanded last April that
the U.S. remove its Sixth Fleet from
the Mediterranean.
Peace Through Balance?
Privately, Conrmuni't diplomats
here state that since the Gaited States
will not withdraw its fleet front the
;tlediterranean, the Soviet Union will
have to keep one there, too. "We can't
preserve the peace in the Middle East
if only one of us has a fleet there,"
said one Soviet diplomat. "Put both
fleets there, and we'll sink or swim to-
gether."
,Alilitary leaders oppose U.S.-Soviet
equality. They argue that the United
States must maintain the "Cuban envi-
ronment." This is the terra Gen. Earle
G. i6heeler, chairman of the Joint
Chiefs, of Staff, uses to connote the
military superiority the United States
had during the Cuban missile crisis
The sir's the Soviets are placing on
amphibious forces eventually will giye
then the capability to intrude in d1s-
lant conflicts-as the toiled States
h.iio in Lebanon and Fietnani.
1 State Department Soviet speciah,l
aid there is no sign the Soviet-.
have a \ictnam war type of enp;rgc.
nenl. But Nations tend to do what
hcy can do," he said. This is rw-hv th,
Soviet "flexible response" strategy i-
avorrisome to the diplomats.
The military answer to the grownlr
-lrength of the Soviets is to -,,,o then
''m, better. Defense Secretary Robert
S llc.Aannra--now on his way oft ul
?Ilia-has frustrated these ambition-
to the point, that the Joint Chiefs hate
iten up on getting money for another
ecneratiun of ICBMs. or example. ho
1 wo v ('gars.
\lcAamara has argued that nuclear
.nrai;es and military strength are nut
,ropurlioned in this day of the II
bomb. MIN have enou!~h bombs to kill
everybody in the ivorld 10 time,, Over"
re argues.
But the Chiefs use the sci aw anal
rgy in giving their side of the nuclear
parity . irgument. A seesaw is most >[a
hie when it has a heavy weight at onr
nd: least stable when it is perfectly
balanced They want the United States
to be the heavy end, arguing that thi-
Comnunlsts have never abandoned
their goal of world conquest.
Presidents Kennedy and Johnson
since 1961 have tried to slow the arms
race. There is widespread belief anion-
military leaders in the Pentagon that
both Administrations favor a strat.;g~
of nuclear parily, of letting the RU,,
sians catch up.
The present visibility of Soviet
strength is bringing the nuclear parity
issue to the lore. 'l'ire question will he
argued in Congress and in the presi-
dential campaign of 1968. The Senate
Preparedness Investigating Subconi-
mittee-focal point of the bombing
Issue this ,year-is expected to be tht,
focus next y car of the parity issue as it
examines the relative strengths of the
United States and U.S.S.R.