AMERICAN LACK OF COMMITMENT IN THE MIDDLE EAST

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP70B00338R000300060014-4
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 2
• Document Creation Date: January 4, 2017
• Document Release Date: July 15, 2005
• Sequence Number: 14
• Publication Date: October 3, 1968
• Content Type: OPEN

Approved For Release 2005/07/25 : CIA-RDP70B00338R000300060014-4
October 3, 1968 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - HOUSE
tween $3.53 to $2.55 in favor of the for-
eign steel producers.
The difference 'between the United
States, Western Europe, and Japan in
employment cost in the production of
steel is about $25 per ton in the case of
Europe and $40 per ton in the case of
Japan. The disparities in hourly employ-
ment costs between the steel industries
of the United States and the other major
producers are so. great that steel labor
productivity here would have to be two
and one-half times that of the Europeans
and four and one-half times that of the
Japanese to equalize unit labor costs.
Following World War II, while the
American steel industry was still in the
process of recovering from the drain
upon its resources resulting from the war
)and the reconstruction abroad, there
were fully modern steel-making plants
being constructed overseas, in great part
financed by the United States and built
with the output of American mills.
In a special report on steel in Busi-
ness Week of June 1966, it was pointed
out that since 1947 the United States
had shifted from a net exporter, with an
annual export surplus in steel mill prod-
ucts of 6 million tons, to a net importer.
While the United States had net steel
exports of about 4 million tons in 1957,
by 1965 this had been replaced by net
steel imports of 8 million tons. On bal-
ance, the total loss to foreign steel
amounted to 12 million tons.
A factor in the loss of steel exports
by the United States is the nontariff
barrier-the extent to which foreign
countries are charging fees in addition
to straight duty charges which, in fact,
provide effective protective barriers from
imports. These nontariff barriers in the
past have not received adequate con-
sideration when tariff agreements have
been entered into by the United States.
As an example, welded carbon pipe
may be imported into the United States
from Belgium, France, or West Germany
for a duty charge of $12.50. To export
the same product from the United
States to Belgium results in charges of
$30.53; to France, charges of $57.32; and
to West Germany, charges of $30.07.
As another example, carbon plates can
be imported into the United States from
these three countries for a duty charge
of $8. To export this product results in
charges per $100 of product of $14.25 to
Beligum; $42.07 to France; and $21.08 to
West Germany.
The American steelworkers, along with
all Americans, have, through the taxes
they have paid to their Government,
helped to subsidize their foreign competi-
tion through our foreign aid programs.
That competition is thriving, is using in
many instances-by our standards-sub-
standard, low-cost labor, and is com-
peting with our American workers who
ought to continue to receive wages that
are commensurate with what people
working in the most prosperous great na-
tion the world has yet known should re-
ceive. This consequently constitutes both
strong and unfair foreign competition.
Certainly, at the very least the Ameri-
,can worker is entitled to some protec-
tion from the consquences of our Gov-
ernment's use of his own tax dollars.
There is no indication in the foresee-
able future that the import pressures will
lessen in the steel industry and other
domestic industries affected by the con-
tinuing rise in import of many commodi-
ties, and also faced with the serious dis-
parity of employment costs. At the same
time many foreign countries have quan-
titative controls protecting their own in-
dustries against import of some com-
modities.
In steel, on a world basis, foreign gov-
ernments have a 42 percent financial in-
terest in their own steel industries, and
in the countries of Western Europe,, a 28
percent financial interest. Resulting
Government concessions again add to
the cost gap between foreign and domes-
tic production cost. In addition, except-
ing the Soviet bloc, Western Europe and
Japan have an excess of 55 million tons
in production capacity.
To establish any effective tariff con-
trol in the import of steel would require
an increase of alr,_ost 1,000 percent-ob-
viously not a practical consideration.
With other Members of Congress, I
have introduced legislation to establish
annual quantitative limitations on U.S.
imports of steel products-orderly quota
controls which would provide a fair and
flexible method by which a reasonable
protection could be established for our
American steelworkers and their indus-
try.
Our American steelworkers are en-
gaged in the production of products not
only vital to our Nation's economy, but
essential to our national defense and se-
curity.
It is time the Congress gives considera-
tion to import controls which will safe-
guard their future.
AMERICAN LACK OF COMMITMENT
IN THE MIDDLE EAST
The SPEAKER pro t ernpore. Under a
previous order of the House, the gentle-
man from California [Mr. BELL] is rec-
ognized for 15 minutes.
Mr. BELL. Mr. Speaker, I have just
returned from a week's tour of frontier
sections of the Middle East. Now con-
trolled by Israel as a result of the 6-day
war.
I made the trip as a result of growing
personal concern over the last 60 days
that the cease-fire in the Middle East
was disintegrating and that early re-
sumption of war was possible.
My visit was reassuring, insofar as
the short-term outlook is concerned.
Given, however, the irrationality of
the surrounding Arab nations, an irra-
tionality which produced the 6-day
war in 1967, no observer has a right to
be completely secure in making optimistic
predictions.
But despite fairly frequent exchanges
of gunfire across the Suez and at, the
central Jordanian border in and near
the west bank, and despite undoubted
sponsorship of Arab terrorist activity by
the Government of Syria, the peace on
this day seems relatively stable.
What is omnious in the Middle East
is:
First ' The gradually shifting balance
of military power to the Arab coalition,
1I 9491
and particularly to those Arab nations
which are fanatically insistent upon
continued war and elimination of Israel;
Second. The extraordinary support
given these Arab nations by Russia with
the resulting Russian emergence as a
Mediterranean power and as a poten-
tially dominant influence in the Red
Sea;
Third. The somewhat naive belief of
some officials in the United States and
elsewhere that, through negotiations,
the basic Arab obsession with the de-,
struction of Israel can be changed, or
that the expansion of Russia into the
Mediterranean and the Red Sea can be
terminated.
This combination of factors could pro-
duce in the next 2 to 3 years an explo-
sion in the Middle East far more severe
than any we have known in this century.
The Middle East has as much, and
perhaps more, strategic significance as
Southeast Asia.
Yet we seem to be balancing our mas-
sive involvement and interventionist
policies in Vietnam with an astringent
near neutrality in the Middle East.
If we are overinvolved with support of
an ally in Southeast Asia, we most as-
suredly are underinvolved in support of
a substantially more deserving ally in
the Middle East.
Russia lost $1 billion worth of military
equipment in the 6 days of the war of
1967.
Within a year that equipment has
been replaced.
More importantly, it has been re-
placed with more modern, more sophis-
ticated weaponry.
It is now estimated that more than
2,000 Russian military advisers are lo-
cated in Egypt.
Syria, with a more easily managed
Government, has become virtually a So-
viet arsenal.
There is every indication that equip-
ment lost by the Arabs in 1967 has been
replaced, yet Russia continues the arms
buildup.
Arab Air Force losses as a result of
the 6-day war have, for the most part,
been replaced by the Mig-21, a newer
and substantially improved model.
And reports have been circulating for
some months that commitments have
been made for delivery of Mig-23 air-
craft, a highly advanced and sophis-
ticated fighter.
Now we hear that the initial ship-
ments of these advanced air strike units,
as well as offensive rocket launchers, are
on their way to Egypt.
There is no fighter aircraft in Israel
today equal to the Mig-23.
The Mirage jet fighters purchased
from France for $60 million are not, as
a result of an edict by De Gaulle, allowed
outside of France and are, thus, of no
value as a deterrent or as instruments
for Israel defense.
Israel is asking the United States only
to sell her 50 Phantom jets which would
counter the Mig-21 deliveries, not the
more advanced Mig-23's.
Our procrastination has exceeded all
reason.
Even if a much-desired big power de-
cision to halt the Middle East arms race
Approved For Release 2005/07/25 : CIA-RDP70B00338R000300060014-4
 H 9492
Approved For Release 2005/07/25 : CIA-RDP70B00338R000300060014-4
CONGRESSIONAL RECORD .-HOUSE October 3, 1968
were achieved this year, the commit-
ment of 50 Phantom jets would be
needed to offset the new Arab weapons.
As a practical matter, however, the
prospects for suspension of an 'arms
buildup are as bleak as they possibly
could be under present circumstances.
Russia supplies the Arab Governments
to secure her new power position in the
Mediterranean and the Red Sea.
She also supplies the Arabs to pressure
Israel into relinquishment of territory
which has been under Israel control
since the 6-day war.
Not the least of the reasons for this is
the importance to Russia of the Suez
Canal which will surely remain closed
until there is a peace settlement, or until
Israel retreats from the Sinai.
But it must be understood that Sinai,
the Golan Heights, and certain portions
of occupied Jordan are natural military
barricades, profoundly important to the
defense of Israel.
The stronger, the more threatening
the Arabs become, the more vital these
occupied barriers become to Israel mili-
tary planners.
Withholding of the Phantom jets, par-
ticularly while Russia is supplying equiv-
alent aircraft to Cairo, virtually forces
Israel to feel she must rely on herself
and thus to be uncompromising in the
maintenance of her present defenses.
Everyone in the United States would
be able to understand this position per-
fectly if our own borders were similarly
threatened.
I fear we do not understand the subtle
result of our failure to supply the Phan-
tam jets.
In a sense it causes an aggravation of
a continuing concern which I suspect is
felt by Israel officials.
It is the concern that is inevitable
when all reassurances from the United
States are privately spoken, all public
statements seem neutral, and our actions
seem more in agreement with our public
statements than with our private state-
ments.
It is true that we have supplied Israel
with military equipment.
Sometimes it has been direct.
Sometimes it has been indirect, such
as the Patton tanks and heavy artillery
captured by Israel from Jordan in 1967.
But even our military assistance has
not conveyed the full element of sup-
port that it ought to have conveyed.
When we sell military hardware to
West Germany which is subsequently
resold to Israel we fool nobody, and least
of all the Russians and the leaders of
the hostile Arab nations.
But we do create a doubt in the minds
of all, particularly the Israelis, about our
real position in the event of a show-
down.
The combination of Russian commit-
ment and American lack of commitment
is producing a vague and thus increas-
ingly dangerous situation in the Middle
East with all participants performing in
a way different from what might be ex-
pected If the true United States position
were understood.
I believe it is imperative that we com-
mit the Phantom jets to Israel and com-
mit them now.
And with this commitment I believe
we should declare that our association
with Israel, and our dedication to her
permanence as a nation, is one of the
keystones of American foreign policy.
POLISH VESSEL TRADING AT U.S.
PORTS DESPITE BLACKLIST
The SPEAKER pro tempore. Under
previous order of the House, the gentle-
man from Michigan [Mr. CHAMBERLAIN)
is recognized for 10 minutes.
Mr. CHAMBERLAIN. Mr. Speaker,
several days ago I brought to the atten-
tion of my colleagues and- the American
people the fact that a Polish vessel, Hugo
Kollataj, which has carried supplies to
North Vietnam, was calling at five Amer-
icans ports to carry on trade on a busi-
ness-as-usual basis. I pointed out that
while this ship was blacklisted by the U.S.
Government to prohibit it from carrying
U.S. Government-financed cargoes out of
the country there was presently nothing
legally wrong with the same vessel com-
ing to our shore to make profits on pri-
vate trade. I further pointed out that
while I have for a number of years spon-
sored legislation to close our ports com-
pletely to such vessels that the Depart-
ments of Commerce and State reiterated
their opposition to my bill just a few
days before the Hugo Kollataj entered
U.S. waters.
On September 14 I wrote the President
urging that the administration re-
examine its policy of condoning such
trading in our ports and I have now re-
ceived a reply dated September 30 and
signed by W. W. Rostow, Special Assist-
ant to the President. From this response
L can only conclude that the administra-
tion is not really concerned with taking
effective action.
First of all, while Mr. Rostow gives no
indication that anything could presently
be done about this problem, I am satisfied
that there already exists fully sufficient
means to the executive branch that would
have prevented the Hugo Kollataj from
unloading its cargo if the administration
really wanted to do something about it.
I am therefore confirmed in my belief
that in view of the attitude of the present
administration, legislation is the only
answer.
Second, Mr. Rostow apparently would
leave the impression that the Hugo Kol-
lataj has only been to North Vietnam
once when in fact, according to informa-
tion made available to me by the Depart-
ment of Defense it has been there more
than once.
Third, Mr. Rostow claims that legisla-
tion is not needed because-
We have no information indicating that
ships calling at North Vietnamese ports will
begin calling at United States ports.
If that were the sole consideration
there would obviously be no need for a
blacklist to prevent such vessels from
carrying U.S. Government-financed car-
goes from the U.S. ports either. The
point is, how can we hope to obtain full
cooperation from other free world coun-
tries to stop their ships from going to
North Vietnam when we at the same time
officially condone the use of our ports
to the same vessels and in fact to the
vessels of a Communist country.
Fourth, my bill not only would bar U.S.
ports to any vessel that has been to North
Vietnam but also to all other vessels
owned by the same shipping Interest. In
Communist Poland, of course, there is
only one shipping interest; namely, the
Government of Poland. I am advised by
the Maritime Administration that be-
tween January 1', and July 31 of 1968, 11
Polish ships entered American ports a
total of 124 times.
Fifth, I am amazed that Mr,. Rostow
gives no indication that the administra-
tion has made any representations to the
Polish Government concerning the Hugo
Kollataj.
In conclusion may I say that it is ap-
parent that this is but another example
of the administration's indifference and
failure to use all the diplomatic, eco-
nomic; and legal resources at its com-
mand to increase pressure on the en-
emy's seaborne sources of supply.
Another example is provided by the
sharp- increase `in free-world-flag ship
traffic to North Vietnam during 1968
which is about double the 1967 rate. I
have been advised by the Department of
Defense that during September, 14 more
free world ships arrived In North Viet-
nam; 11 were flying the British flag, one
Cypriot, one Singapore, one Kuwaiti.
This brings the total for the year to '112
under nine different flags as compared
to 57 arrivals during the same period in
1967.
At this point in the RECORD I include
copies of my letter to the President, Mr.
Rostow's reply and a chart indicating the
number of free world ship arrivals in
North Vietnam so far this year.
SEPTEMBER 14, 1968.
Hon. LYNDON B. JOHNSON,
President of the United States,
The White House,
Washington, D.C.
MY DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: A vessel, Hugo
Kollataf, currently "blacklisted" by the Mari-
time Administration for trading with North
Vietnam is presently calling at. American
ports.
This ship was first listed by the Maritime
Administration in its report No. 9 issued
January 13, 1967, and classified Department
of Defense information contains confirming
reports as to the dates of its arrivals in North
Vietnam. The Hugo Kollataj, owned by the
Polish government, entered Boston Harbor
on September 1, 1968, New York Harbor on
'September 8, 1968, and is scheduled to make
other stops at Philadelphia, Baltimore and
Norfolk. This past Wednesday morning I per-
sonally watched the unloading of tons of
Polish steel from Its hold onto the docks of
Pier 8 in Brooklyn.
While this ship is only legally barred from
carrying U.S. Government-financed cargoes
out of the United "States I would respectfully
urge that the Government re-examine its
policy and extend this prohibition to cover
private trade in U.S. ports as well, as recom-
mended in my bill, H.R. 365. Though it may
be true that this commerce, in terms of
tonnage and perhaps dollar value, does not
amount to much, I feel very strongly that
there is a deep moral question involved which
compels me to ask why a vessel which has
been helping to supply the enemy should be
permitted to make profits in American ports
Approved For Release 2005/07/25 : CIA-RDP70B00338R000300060014-4