CONSULAR CONVENTION WITH THE SOVIET UNION

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP70B00338R000300050011-8
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 35
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 28, 2005
• Sequence Number: 11
• Publication Date: March 10, 1967
• Content Type: OPEN

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March 10, 1967 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE
unions and farmer co-ops in thousands more
rural towns and villages, but these have not
been enough!
Grange Community Progress Programs, in-
volving hundreds of thousands of rural citi-
zens and millions of dollars, have initiated
community self-help projects in more than
5,000 communities annually. But, these have
not been enough!
For the past one hundred years, the
Grange has sponsored continuous social and
cultural programs which have strengthened
family and *community ties. But, this has
not been enough!
In short, local initiative, alone, has not
been enough!
Today, more than 250 government techni-
cal, financial assistance programs are avail-
able to local communities for development
or redevelopment, Each new session of Con-
gress seems to create new federal programs
to aid rural America. Billions of dollars
have been appropriated for this purpose.
Agricultural price support payments, while
but a fraction of total monies spent in de-
velopment programs, have accounted for bil-
lions more.
Obviously, government assistance programs
alone have not been enough. Nor, has gov-
ernment assistance, coupled with local initia-
tive, been enough!
In the past 35 years since the Depression
30s, a succession of government, business and
community programs have been tried and
failed to energize rural America.
At the same time, mechanization of farm
and industry has displaced job opportunities
In rural America, notably in mining, steel,
etc. The visible deterioration of rural com-
munities was generally in areas where coal,
gold, silver, timber and oil resources have
been depleted and/or industrial progress had
outmoded river-port, railroad towns and
marginal farming areas.
Agriculture, by far is, and has been Amer-
ica's largest industry. The reduction of farms
In the past decades, due to mechanization
and the disappearance of marginal farms,
has now brought the loss of economic op-
portunity in rural America to crisis propor-
tions.
More than three million farm job-oppor-
tunities have disappeared. These must be re-
placed!
Fortunately, Mr. Freeman's national chal-
lenge comes at a crucial moment when
America is on the threshold of a population
explosion which is predicted to double the
number of Americans by the turn of the cen-
tury.
The United States can look forward to
an unprecedented era of expansion, produc-
tivity, opportunities and prosperity if we
prepare now to meet it.
Clearly, we have no more time, no more
alternatives and no more excuses. We must
move now to meet the challenge!
The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tem-
pore (Mr. METCALF). Is there further
morning business? If not, morning
business is concluded.
CFO
CONSULAR CONVENTION WITH THE
SOVIET UNION
The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tem-
pore. The Chair lays before the Senate
the pending business, which the clerk
will state.
The ASSISTANT LEGISLATIVE CLERK. A
Consular Convention between the United
States of America and the Union of So-
viet Socialist Republics, together with a
protocol relating thereto, signed at Mos-
cow on June 1, 1964 (Ex. D., 88th Cong.,
second sess.)
The Senate resumed the consideration
of the convention.
Mr. FANNIN. Mr. President, I very
much doubt that there is anything new
or different to be said either for or
against the consular accord. The sub-
ject has been exhausted in congressional
hearings, in statements made on the
floor, in the editorial columns of the Na-
tion's press and wherever concerned men
gather. But like other Members of the
Senate who must weigh and then vote
on this important question, I want to
make my position unmistakably clear.
I join with the President and all other
men of good will in the hope that inter-
national tensions can be minimized.
But, unlike the President, I do not con-
sider the consular accord a step in that
direction, and I will therefore oppose it.
The administration and several of my
colleagues have undertaken to convince
the American people that the accord is
weighted heavily in favor of the United
States, primarily because Americans
traveling in the Soviet Union will be af-
forded greater protection. But I reject
this argument. The consular accord,
even if it were to safeguard the rights
of Americans, must be viewed not in iso-
lation, but as the first in a series of steps
toward a detente with the Soviet Union,
the total thrust of which is not at this
time in our national interest. By the
President's own admission, his bridge-
building efforts soon will be extended to
East-West trade, to the United Nations
agreement on the peaceful use of outer
space, and to mutual destruction of nu-
clear weapons.
At this time I shall read, from an arti-
cle by the noted columnist, James J.
Kilpatrick, his conclusions in regard to
this consular pact.
He says it is more a moral than a po-
litical issue, and concludes his editorial
as follows:
Thus the merits of the case. The towering
questions rise above the merits. Do we want
to build bridges at all just now? At a time
when Soviet weapons are killing American
troops, does the Congress wish to embark
upon any new gestures of friendliness toward
the Communist East? This is more a moral
than a political issue. It strikes at the in-
herent hypocrisy involved in simultaneously
sipping tea in Leningrad and spilling blood
in Vietnam. Some of us on the anti-Com-
munist Right may be "primitive" in the Ful-
bright-Kennan-Schlesinger view, but we
would urge that the teadrinking be post-
poned to another and better day.
No one can argue with the point 18,000
Americans who each year travel to the
Soviet Union need greater protection.
But the protection they require?
notification of arrest within a reason-
able period of time and the right to
visitation with American officials?
should not have to be negotiated. It
should be extended to all men as mem-
bers of civilized society. But the Soviets,
even until today, have demonstrated no
sincere inclination to extend these ordi-
nary laws of decency and good will. In
fact, since the Consular Treaty was first
signed in 1964, more than 20 arrests or
detentions of American citizens have
taken place, and not once did the Soviet
Union notify U.S. diplomats within the
agreed upon 3 days.
Therefore, how sincere can the Sov-
iets be? Even though Congress had not
approved the accord, as it has not done
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even to this day, the President of the
United States entered into the agree-
ment in good faith, a term apparently
unfamiliar to Soviet officials. If they
were truly interested in establishing
friendly relations with the West, it seems
to me that they might have started by
abiding with the terms of the agreement
which was in force in spirit if not in
law.
Without question, the consular accord
promises greater protection for Ameri-
cans traveling in the Soviet Union. In
fact, it promises rights greater than
those granted to Soviet citizens in Rus-
sia. But rights and protection are one
thing, and the promise of them quite
another, Given the Soviet Union's rec-
ord of violating the terms of one treaty
after another?including the 1933
Roosevelt-Litvinov agreement, which
guaranteed American officials the right
of access to American citizens impris-
oned in the Soviet Union?there is no
assurance that the promised protection
will be transferred from paper into prac-
tice. No, none whatever.
Even our ally Great Britain?a nation
which time and again has been in the
forefront of efforts to reduce East-West
tensions?has not ratified the accord,
and primarily because Members of Par-
liament, like many Senators, are uncon-
vinced of the sincerity of the Soviet
promises. And how could they be other-
wise. Even though Britain signed a
consular agreement with Russia in 1965,
the Soviets have refused to allow British
officials to visit regularly with Gerald
Brooke, a British lecturer recently sen-
tenced to 5 years in prison for al-
legedly smuggling anti-Soviet literature
Into Moscow, Once again the Soviet
Union has demonstrated its contempt for
the spirit, though not necessarily the
letter, of such an agreement.
But even if we concede for the purpose
of argument that the Soviet will honor
their promise to give Americans greater
protection than they give their own
citizens?even if we concede that point,
the agreement will not change the Rus-
sian system of justice, where, unlike in
the United States, all men are not equal
before the bar, nor are they necessarily
Innocent until proven otherwise. All too
often the Soviet Union has regarded
Americans on trial as little more than
pawns in the cold war. No, the consular
accord, whatever its merits, will not
alter, cannot alter, Russian justice.
Surely it is unnecessary to remind my
distinguished colleagues and the Ameri-
can people that any meaningful change
in policies and practices must follow a
change in heart. And I personally know
of no evidence to indicate that the Sovi-
ets have had a change in heart in their
attitude toward the rights and aspira-
tions of man. And until such time as
that change occurs, until such time as the
rights of man are given a higher pri-
ority than the rights of states, the United
States cannot hope to alter substantially
the protection of its citizens in the hands
of Communist justice.
In my opinion, therefore, the adminis-
tration and other supporters of the ac-
cord have completely overstated its im-
portance, its protection.
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11.
CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE March 10, 19.67
Another consideration is whether the
agreement will lead to Yeciprocal con-
sulates being opened in the Soviet Union
and in the United States, as of course it
will. The administration has exhausted
considerable time and energy seeking to
convince the American public that it al-
ready has the authority to enter into
such agreements, a point I find little dis-
puted. The President does possess such
authority. Therefore, if additional con-
sulates are required to protect Soviet
and American citizens traveling in the
other's country, why does the adminis-
tration push for the new accord?par-
ticularly when, as I previously indicated,
diplomatic immunity for representatives
of both countries was established in the
1933 agreement.
Of course, the immunity provisions In
the consular accord are far more absolute
than those provided for in the Litvinov
Agreement and in the Vienna Conven-
tion, which the United States and 31
other nations signed in 1963. In fact, by
exempting from arrest or detention all
consular officers or their employees, the
new accord will extend protection to the
Soviets heretofore not provided even to
our closest allies.
The effects such a provision could
have on our internal security at such
time as the Soviets open a consulate in
this country, already have been thor-
oughly explored, and I therefore will not
comment at length on the point. But
I want to state my belief that many
of the Americans who join with me in
opposing this accord are misdirecting
their fire at the espionage issue?which,
while important, seems to me to be not
the most important reason for opposi-
tion. J. Edgar Hoover, a man whom I
greatly admire, has stated that Rusin
consulates in this country would make
the work of the Federal Bureau of In-
vestigation more difficult. And it doubt-
less would. But I personally have great
faith in the ability of the FBI, given
additional funds and more manpower,
to deal effectively with the threat of
expanded espionage activities.
Of greater importance to me, in addi-
tion to the fact that the consular accord
is not a quid pro quo agreement, is the
effect our ratification of the treaty will
have on other nations of the world, espe-
cially those which have aimed them-
selves with the United States in the pro-
tracted struggle against communism.
There are two possible reactions. Either
they will interpret our action as a sign
of weakness, in which case they will move
from under America's protective wing,
or they will themselves rush Into a simi-
lar agreement with the Soviets, the end
result of which would be disastrous.
Most countries, lacking an internal se-
curity organization anywhere near as
effective as our own, simply could not
counteract Soviet espionage programs
operating out of its embassies and con-
sulates. Consequently, the very instru-
ment by which nations seek to reduce
tensions will be the catalyst for more
subversion and revolution, and nowhere
more so that in Latin America, I truly
am concerned that our ratification of
the treaty could affect the balance of
power in the world greatly in favor of
the Soviets.
Another question for which a satis-
fac,tory answer has not been provided
Is the possible effect the consular ac-
cord will have on U.S. policy regarding
the status of the Baltic States. Many
informed Americans, Including the re-
spected and knowledgeable Georgetown
University professor, Lev Dobriansky, be-
lieve the move would be tantamount to
recognizing the Soviet's illegal and im-
moral seizure of those countries. And
I am inclined to accept their viewpoint,
Each of the aforementioned reasons
is, to my way of thinking, justifiable
grounds for not entering into the con-
sular accord with the Soviet Union at
tills time. However, my primary reason
for opposition is that the d?nte?of
which, as I previously indicated, the
treaty is only one part?comes at a time
wien the United States is engaged in a
costly war in Vietnam which Soviet aid
alone makes possible. Only this week,
the administration requested and re-
ceived from the Congress an additional
$4 5 billion appropriation to "block Com-
munist aggression in Asia." Now, Con-
gress is being asked to enter into an
agreement with the Soviet Union which
could lead to better relations and to a re-
laxation of world tensions, This cold
war rhetoric is difficult to understand,
much less to justify. There is no factual
difference between the Soviet Union de-
siring peace on the one hand and the
Communist aggression killing American
boys on the other. They are one in the
same.
If the 'U.S.S.R. truly is interested in
better relations with the West, let it
begin by demonstrating that interest on
other than the rhetorical front. Let it
begin by withholding support from the
war which is costing thousands of lives,
Americans and Vietnamese, and con-
suming our resources,
Personally, I know of no responsible
American who does not fervently pray
for better relations among all nations,
in the hope that men everywhere some-
day can live in a peaceful world. But
a meaningful peace requires more than
words, more than diplomatic agree-
ments: it rewires application of the
principle of "live and let live," and that
principle the Soviet Union has neither
applied nor practiced, nor is there rea-
son to suspect It will.
Congress must make certain that any
bridges built to the east carry two-way
traffic. That is, that they will serve the
interests of the United States and the
Soviet Union to the same approximate
degree. It does not appear to me, for
the reasons I have mentioned, that the
consular accord meets this basic re-
quirement, and I will therefore oppose it
when it comes LA a vote.
Further, in support of my position, I
would like to refer to the testimony given
by Warren McDonald in behalf of the
American Legion. Concerning the
treaty, Mr. McDonald had this to say:
What is the purpose of this Consular Con-
vention from the viewpoint of the Kremlin?
It seems obvious to us that the purpose of
this treaty from the Soviet side is exactly the
opposite from that expressed by its U.S. pro-
ponents. To the Soviets, we think the main
purpose of this treaty definitely Is to re-
establish their consulates In this country,
with a zlew and unusual rule to apply to all
of ita agents posted to those consulates;
that is, absolute protection against prose-
cution by the United States for any crimes
committed by them, including the crime of
espionage against the United States! This
is the Intent of Article 19, section 2, to the
Sovie:s.
The treaty's provisions rsgarding "notifi-
cation and access" in arrest cases (i.e., Article
12) is hardly the "purpose" of the treaty
from the Soviet viewpoint. Those are simply
what they gave up?on paper, at least?to
gain new islands of diplomatic immunity in
America's industrial and transportation
heartland.
If Isis were not true. the Soviet negotia-
tors would have had no interest in the treaty.
They definitely would not have troubled
themselves if the document were to have been
restricted to the provisions of its Article 12
and the protocol related thereto. They had
nothing to gain in that regard; we have al-
ways given them prompt notification about
and ..inrestricted access to any of their na-
tionals whom we might arrest here. To
them, the extension of full and absolute dip-
loma-Jo immunity to their consular officers
is the quid pro quo which outweighs the
concession they made, on notification and
access, as to our nationals arrested in their
coun:ary. Communists have never been
known to enter into an agreement With non-
Communists which they did not expect to be
of greater advantage to them.
We infer from the available public record
that It was the Soviet negotiators who in-
itially raised the matter of full diplomatic
Immunity for purposes of this Consular Con-
vention. (See Committee's print of Hearing
July 30, 1965, pg. 30). The provisions of
full diplomatic immunity for all consular
officer's has not been a part of our general
practice. It was not a feature of our Con-
sular Convention with Japfm, which entered
Into force on August 1, 19C4, and which, we
assume, was negotiated at about the same
time as the pending Convention with the
Soviet Union. More significantly, it was not
made a feature of the multilateral Vienna
Convention on Consular Relations which was
signed by a U.S. representative, and by the
representatives of 31 other nations, on April
24, 1963. Representatives of 20 additional
nations have since added their signatures,
making a total of 52 signatories.
I will refer further to the Vienna multi-
lateral convention on conaular relations in
another connection. At this point, I only
wish to stress the point neat its immunity
providons, set forth in Article 41 thereof,
follow the usual and tractional rule; that
Is, consular officers shall not be liable to arrest
or detention (Ln the receiving State) "except
in the case of a grave crime and pursuant
to a decision by the competent judicial au-
thor:ty." Consulates have long demon-
strated that they can perform their proper
functions without the cloak of full diplo-
matic immunity for their employees.
Article 19(2) of the pending treaty with
the Soviet Union provides, on the other hand,
as fellows:
"Consular officers and employees of the con-
sular establishment who are nationals of the
sending state shall enjoy irtmunity from the
criminal jurisdiction of the receiving state."
Thus, under this rule, if a Soviet consular
officer, posted in Chicago for instance, com-
mits or attempts to comnut a serious crime,
our only recourse is to demand his expulsion.
This is true no matter how monstrous the
offense, and no matter how vital its bearing
on our national security. And, however
often we declare a Soviet ?total persona non
grata, we may be sure the Soviet government
will soon thereafter demard the recall from
that country of a comparable U.S. official.
Under this treaty, reasons for such action
need not be given; but, in previous cases of
this nature, It has been Soviet practice to
make, and to publicize widely, false spy
charges against the U.S. official concerned.
(This game of diplomatic tit-for-tat can
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March 10, 1967
CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE
have, temporarily at least, a disruptive in-
fluence on a mission's efficiency. We should
not unnecessarily take steps that would
surely serve to increase its incidence).
With regard to the immunity provisions of
the treaty, Senator Cotton of New Hamp-
shire has observed that the Soviets nego-
tiated this Consular Convention, "not as a
bilateral pact for improving Soviet-American
relations, but as a cold war maneuver to
enhance and expand the intelligence gather-
ing network of the U.S.S.R." We, too, are
satisfied that the Soviets have every inten-
tion of utilizing any consulates they estab-
lish here as centers for espionage and
subversion.
The Soviet intelligence services have reg-
ularly used that government's diplomatic
and other establishments in this country as
bases from which to carry on their espionage
activities. These activities are known to
increase in proportion to the number of So-
viet representatives here.
Those who recall the previous abuse by
the Soviets of their consular privileges in
this country fear that this treaty will provide
Soviet agents with increased opportunities
for the intimidation, extortion, bribery,
blackmail, or even the kidnapping or mur-
der, of persons living here but who have
relatives or property in the Soviet Union.
At a minimum, new Soviet consulates in
any of our major cities will facilitate the se-
curing, by Communist "consular officers,"
of all manner of technological data which
could serve to promote the Soviet Union's
war-making potential. Also, these con-
sulates would doubtless be used as centers
for the distribution of Communist propa-
ganda, aimed primarily we feel sure at the
more receptive elements on our college
campuses.
The counter-argument to much of the
foregoing is that we would be enabled,
through our new consulates outside of Mos-
cow, to gain equivalent benefits in terms of
Information about their society. This is
unconvincing. The Soviets are still oper-
ating a closed society in which it remains
extremely difficult for an American official
to make any contacts or secure any informa-
tion not previously sanctioned by Soviet
officials, Furthermore, we could, be sure
that whatever "premises" the Soviets helped
us acquire for our consulates, in accordance
with Article 5, these would be thoroughly
"bugged" with the latest in electronic lis-
tening devices, just as has been the case in
all offices we occupy in Communist countries.
We stated earlier that we believe the dip-
lomatic immunity provisions of this treaty
establish, for the U.S. at least, an unwise
precedent. We may soon find that other
countries, with which we have a consular
treaty that contains the so-called "most-
favored-nation" clause, will request exten-
sion of the greater immunity protection
to their consular employees in this country.
While this would be reciprocal in its ap-
plication, the spread of this new rule on a
haphazard, bilateral basis could well work
to our detriment.
It is our understanding that as many as
33 existing consular treaties between the
U.S. and other countries include "most-
favored-nation" provisions, The State De-
partment has estimated that if all of these
countries exercised their option, we would
be extending criminal immunity in this
country to an additional 400 or more for-
eign nationals!
The countries involved include Com-
munist Rumania and Yugoslavia. While
Rumania now has no consulates in this
country (other than its consular section in
its Washington embassy), it might?follow-
ing the lead of the Soviet Union?seek to
establish one or more, with full diplomatic
immunity as would be Rumania's privilege
under the "most-favored-nation" rule. Also,
Yugoslavia now operates a number of con-
sulates in this country, as was dramatically
brought to our attention last Sunday morn-
ing. These are in New York, San Francisco,
Chicago, and Pittsburgh, in addition to their
combined consular staff in Washington. We
may soon find that we will have a great
deal more than only "10 or 15" new Com-
munist agents in this country with full dip-
lomatic immunity!
Poland already has a consulate in Chicago.
Following the model of our :treaty with the
Soviet Union, that country could be ex-
pected to seek to complete negotiations on a
similar consular convention with us. And,
considering our "bridge-building" advances
to the other Communist countries of East-
ern Europe, all of them may shortly be seek-
ing consulates here, with the same immunity
provisions.
But where the "most-favored-nation"
clause is applied, we will not necessarily gain
back the quid pro quo we received in our
negotiations with the Soviet Union! Where-
as, we there exchanged the "diplomatic im-
munity" provisions for the "notification and
access" provisions, the same exchange would
not be applicable in the case of a third coun-
try asking for the "diplomatic immunity"
privileges for its consular officials. All, we
would get back then is reciprocity on that
score alone. This is an important considera-
tion in the case of the Communist countries
of Rumania and Yugoslavia.
The same disadvantageous development
might occur in the case of several non-Com-
munist countries which do not provide our
consular officers with ready access to our
nationals when they have been arrested.
Italy and a number of other countries, the
laws of which have been derived from the
Roman Code, hold their prisoners incom-
municado until completion of investigation,
In Mexico this can go on for as long as 18
months. Our consular officials are barred
from seeing imprisoned Americans under
such circumstances, just as they have been
in the Soviet Union and most other Com-
munist countries.
The U.S. has been unable to secure "noti-
fication and access" rights from Italy and
several others with similar laws. Yet, we
have a consular treaty with Italy that
includes a "most-favored-nation" clause.
Thus, if this Consular Convention with the
Soviet Union is ratified, we may be asked
by Italy to extend to its consular officers here
the diplomatic immunity provisions of Arti-
cle 19, but we will not get the "notification
and access" provisions of Article 12 in return.
Should these new immunity provisions
spread generally, due to the precedent of
this Consular Convention, they will even-
tually facilitate the spread of the Soviet Un-
ion's subversive influence almost everywhere.
Others have pointed out with logic that our
friends in Latin America would have diffi-
culty in resisting the establishment of Soviet
Consulates in their cities, once the barrier
to their re-establishment in this Hemisphere
is broken, through ratification of this treaty.
It is not difficult to imagine how the Com-
munists would turn this to their advantage,
especially when armed with full diplomatic
protection for all their agents in Latin Amer-
ica, Surely the establishment of Soviet con-
sulates there would result in intensified po-
litical warfare throughout that continent.
Castro would get a large boost in his plans
to export his (and the Soviets') brand of
revolution.
While our government may well be en-
abled to cope with a small to moderate in-
crease in Communist agents here, are we cer-
tain that the intelligence services of the
developing countries can do so? It is ques-
tions such as this that have caused so many
opponents of the Consular Convention, and
its special immunity provisions, to wonder if
we are not about to open a door which we
will not be able to close.
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For the reasons I have enumerated, I
will oppose the Consular Convention.
Mr. ELLENDER. Mr, President, I look
upon this Consular Convention between
the United States and Russia as a way
of bringing about closer contacts between
the Russian and American peoples.
Those familiar with my record should
know that this is a view that I have long
entertained. While I abhor the evils of
communism as much as anyone in this
body, or in the Nation for that matter,
I have long felt that our country should
be doing everything possible to stimulate
a closer relationship between us and the
Russian people.
For those not familiar with my record,
I might say here that this belief is based
on four extensive tours that I had the
privilege of making through the U.S.S.R.
These tours were made in 1955, 1956, 1957,
and 1961. The first of these took place
only 2 years after Stalin's death and I
daresay that I have seen as much or more
of the vast Russian territory as any
American citizen. My travels and ob-
servations inside Russia, as well as other
parts of the world, have made it obvious
to me that our then current foreign pol-
icy?the so-called policy of contain-
ment?has not worked as well as its pro-
ponents hoped that it would.
Since the end of World War II, we
have spent in excess of $120 billion in
foreign economic and military assistance,
justified primarily as a means of contain-
ing the threat of spreading communism.
Today, Russia is internally stronger than
ever before and external communism has
also gained in strength in several im-
portant areas. I will not dwell on this
point at length here, except to say that
in the recent national elections in
France, the Communist Party did far
better than expected and seems to be on
the rise. In Italy, a country where we
have poured in billions of dollars of eco-
nomic and military assistance, we find
the largest single Communist Party out-
side the Soviet Union.
Under the policy of containment, we
have worked for 20 years to construct a
ring of steel around Russia. This has
provided meager results, at a consider-
able cost to our Treasury. The ring of
steel, however, has resulted in fomenting
hatred, fear, and suspicion among the
Russian people toward the United States.
Our policy may be said to be similar to
that of the British attempt to encircle
and contain Germany, by treaty, prior
to World War I. The Russian attitude,
at least in 1961, was marked by the sus-
picions and resentments displayed by
Germany against the British.
For the last 12 years, I have advocated
changes that would, in my opinion, put
our policy toward the U.S.S.R. on a more
realistic basis. All of these changes
were aimed first at bringing the Russian
and American people closer together.
Secondly, they were aimed at disspelling
the suspicion and fear that exists be-
tween our countries, at least where those
fears are groundless. For instance, I
have long advocated a realistic exchange
of persons program between the United
States and the U.S.S.R.
It has always seemed very strange to
me that we are willing to spend millions
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of dollars to bring citizens from our so-
called Western allies to our shores but
are unwilling to make the same effort to
bring citizens from Russia or the Eastern
bloc over here. This is strange to me be-
cause France, Britain, Italy, and other
Western European countries are sup-
posedly our friends and do not need to
be persuaded to follow our way of life.
On the other hand, citizens of Russia
and the Eastern bloc nations know little
of our way of life and cannot honestly
say whether they should feel friendly or
unfriendly toward our Government. All
they know and all they have heard is
that our system of government should be
as abhorrent to them as theirs is to us.
There is presently great intellectual
and economic change taking place in the
Soviet Union, and if a policy of enlight-
enment had been started and enthusias-
tically carried out years ago, we could be
reaping great rewards.
Tied in with a realistic exchange of
persons program would be a realistic in-
formation program carried out by our
Government and aimed at presenting the
accomplishments of Americans to the
Iron Curtain peoples, It would do no
good for this program to place emphasis
on any negative aspects of the Cora-
monist way of life. The Russian people
are much better off today than they ever
have been before and they attribute this
to their own hard work. To a certain
degree, they also attribute it to the so-
cialistic form of government under which
they live. If we do not men this and
attempt to criticize their accomplish-
ments, we might as well spend our time
shouting into the wind.
The policies which I have advocated
are based on bringing better understand-
ing between the two great powers of the
world, while at the same time protecting
our own interest and maintaining a
strong system of defense. I am con-
vinced that if ways and means can be
found to bring more and more Russians
in contact with the American way of life,
we will not come out the losers in any
comparisons which may be made. In
other words, I would not be frightened
to open our society to Russian visitors.
I am confident we will come out ahead
and that the Russian yearning for a
better way of life would be fed and
nourished.
I spoke a moment ago of great changes
which have taken place in the Russian
way of life since the death of Stalin.
These have been documented by me in
each of my reports submitted to the Sen-
ate in past years. Briefly put, the
changes can be broken down into two
categories?intellectual and economic.
Since the death of Stalin on March 5,
1953, the entire Russian society has been
bubbling and simmering. In 1956, based
on a visit made to Russia, 2 years after
Stalin's death, I reported as follows:
found that, as a whole, the educated
Russians I spoke with were extremely curi-
ous about our mode of life In the United
States, and, even more important, demon-
strated a desire if not a compelling urge to
go behind catchy Red slogans, and to do
their own thinking. I have no doubt that
the Russians of today are better off than
they have ever been. Most of them seem
satisfied, for the reason that they know no
better way of life than that which they are
now enjoying.
As more Russians become educated, they
will become less and less prone to accept at
face value the propaganda-loaded descrip-
tior of life In the United States which the
Red propaganda system dins insistently Into
their ears. The Russian people are curious
by nature; they are becoming increasingly
more curious about Americans, about life
In America, and about the freedoms we en-
joy.
In 1957, I reported that the process of
Intellectual ferment was picking up
steam. My report of 1957 states:
The Soviet Union is undergoing a process
of evolution?not revolution but evolution
* s' The people are demanding more and
more autonomy in the hope of gaining more
voice in their local affairs ? ? Having
placed their people In a position where they
are more and more able to think for them-
sehes. the Soviet leadership is gambling with
Its own future. The time is now ripe for
free world action designed to properly capi-
talize upon this new advent within the So-
viet's borders ' ? ? They will doubtless be-
come dissatisfied when they learn there is
a better way of life than that which they
are now enjoying, and, as a result, will de-
velop an urge to imitate OM,
I felt then and I feel now that our pri-
mary objective should be to assist that
development.
The second great change that has oc-
curred in Soviet society has been eco-
noinic. It is universal' recognized that
tremendous economic progress has been
made in the U.S.S.R., but it takes a series
of visits spanning 5 or 6 years to appre-
ciate the magnitude of this progress.
The extent of the economic changes
made between the mid-1950's and 1961
is documented extensively throughout
my 1961 report. Huge hydroelectric
dams, surpas.sing those in our own coun-
try, have been constructed. Entire new
cities have grown up in areas once bar-
ren wasteland. Industry has marched
forward and a reasonable amount of
progress has been made in agricultural
production.
This progress has been brought about
primarily because of a decentralization
which came into existence after the
death of Stalin. The Russian leaders
with whom I spoke on my various tours
admitted this fact. My 1961 report
points out that the Russian people them-
selves felt "that this tremendous surge
In industry has come about because they
have been able to force the central Gov-
ernment to give them more autonomy in
determining their own needs and in
carrying out the plans for increasing
production."
Mr. President, I interpolate here to
state that when I first went to Russia in
1955, all production and all distribution
was centralized in Moscow. In the
meantime, between the visit I made in
1955 and the one I made in 1961. there
was a great decentralization of that au-
thority to the peoples in the various so-
called subdivisions or states of Russia.
Th.is change did not come about because
the leaders desired it, but because the
people demanded it. That is the reason,
as I pointed out in my report in 1961,
this great progress has occurred.
With the progress made through de-
centralization, we now see the profit mo-
tive becoming more and more accepted
March 10, 197
as a principle of industrial production.
A story in the March 8, 1967, issue of
the Washington Post is headlined as
follows: "All Soviet Industry To Use
Profit System." The story carries a
Moscow dateline and indicates that the
Sovie; Union intends to bring all of the
country's industry under the profit sys-
tem by the end of 1968. Twenty-five
percent of the nation's industry was al-
ready operating on a profit motive in
1966. Under this system, if a factory
is profitmaking, the manager on the
local level may reward employees with
raises and bonuses. If that is not a
form of capitalism, I do not know what
It is. We should encourage such a trend.
Mr. President, I ask unanimous con-
sent to have printed in the RECORD, the
article to which I have just referred.
There being no objection, the article
was ordered to be printed in the RECORD,
as follows:
MOECOW, March 7.?The Eoviet Union in-
tends to bring all of the country's industry
under the profit system by the end of 1968,
a leading economist said today.
Alexel Rumyantsev, editor of the weekly
newspaper Economic Gazette, said that in-
dustries already under the system showed
a 25 per cent profit in 1966. By contrast,
Soviet industry as a whole produced only a
10 per cent profit.
Under the Soviet profit system, introduced
last year by Premier Kosygin, managers make
day-to-day decisions on on ering materials,
assigning workers and other matters which
formerly needed Communist Party approval.
If a. factory makes a pro;it, the manager
may reward employes w th raises and
bonuses.
Rusnyanstev said 10 per cent of the labor
force operated under the prcfit system at the
end of 1966. and that 50 per cent will work
under the new system by the end of this year.
In a related development, a government
labor planning official said about 20 per cent
of the products turned out by Soviet heavy
industry were sold at a loss at present whole-
sale prices.
Boris Sukharevsky, deputy chairman of the
State Committee on Labor and Wages, told
reporters the extension of new wholesale
prices to all Soviet industry, planned for later
this year, would help to wipe out the loss.
The average increase on existing wholesale
prices when the new ones come in will be
around 12 per cent, Sukharevsky said.
Mr. EILENDER. Now, Mr. President,
any consideration of the Consular Con-
vention now before the :3enate for ap-
proval must make mention of the fact
that a consulate is fundamentally a busi-
ness office. A consulate is designed to
assist foreign nationals in solving day-
to-day problems which they may run
Into while on foreign soil. In recent
years, the number of Americans visiting
the U.S.S.R. has increased to about
18,000 per year, as against 1,000 Russians
who annually visit our shores. It is clear
to me that if advantages Ere to be gained
from the Senate approva' of this treaty,
most of the advantages will be on the
side of our people.
Foreign visitors not uncommonly get
into ;rouble of one kind or another, both
in the United States and Russia. This
convention sets forth avenues whereby
State Department Officials will be able to
have access to American nationals ar-
rested on Soviet soil. This is a commit-
ment not presently in force today, as too
many Americans can testify. The argu-
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March 10, 1967 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? S ENATE
ment can be made, of course, that the
Russian Government will not honor this
commitment, and will not allow our. offi-
cials to visit and provide assistance to
any Americans arrested on their soil.
That, of course, is always a possibility,
but the answer to the problem is simple.
If the commitment were not honored,
our President could take the steps neces-
sary to shut down any Russian consu-
lates which might be doing business over
here. This is of course, no guarantee
that the access will be provided, but it
does provide a powerful lever that can
be used to retaliate against any breach
of the treaty.
Concerning the question of diplomatic
immunity which the Convention pro-
vides for consulate officials and employ-
ees, here again we have a decided ad-
vantage. Such immunity represents no
great danger to this Nation, for any Rus-
sian thought to be committing crimes
against our people or subversion against
our Nation can be packed up and sent
home without further ado. On the other
hand, we in this country are not prone
to arresting people and holding them
incommunicado for weeks or months on
end. We have always maintained the
policy, when any abuse of diplomatic im-
munity was discovered, of naming the
official as persona non grata and send-
ing him home. This procedure is not
necessarily followed by the Soviet Union
and the immunity granted to our people
serving in the U.S.S.R. is an important
and necessary protection.
This whole question must be consid-
ered in light of the fact that we have
an open society, whereas the Russian
society still remains closed. In other
words, we have very little to hide. If
secrets are to be discovered, I would
think it obvious that we could learn
much more about current developments
in Russia by opening consulates than
they could learn about us. I daresay
that Russian agents can learn as much
by reading our daily newspapers as they
could gain by opening a consulate in
any of our cities.
In conclusion, it seems to me that here
we have a chance to take steps which
might ease somewhat the cold war ten-
sion now affecting the world. Even if
this convention does not prove to be a
step in that direction, its ratification
would at least prove to be advantageous
to our own national interest. I person-
ally would have advocated such an agree-
ment years ago, and I support Senate
approval of the convention now. In
these short remarks, I have listed several
of my reasons for supporting this action.
Many of these are already contained in
my 1956, 1957, and 1961 reports to the
Senate. To set forth the record more
fully, I ask that a few short passages
from these reports, pertinent to this
issue, be printed at the conclusion of my
remarks.
Mr. President, these passages were
taken from my reports of 1956,1957, and
1961.
In my report of 1961, in the fourth
paragraph of the part I am asking to be
put in the RECORD at this time, I set out
that:
I have summed up my observations of
these three earlier visits, and they can be
found in the appendix marked Exhibit 14,
p. 333.
I ask unanimous consent that it be
printed in full at this point In the RECORD,
together with the passages from the re-
ports.
There being no objection, the extracts
were ordered to be printed in the RECORD,
as follows:
EXCERPT FROM ELLENDER REPORT OF 1956
* * I was not in Russia during the
school months. However, I did have occa-
sion to talk to Russians in almost all walks
of life. The Soviets are placing great em-
phasis upon educational training. A modi-
fied form of merit system is in effect, with
students selected for certain training on the
basis of ability and aptitude; they attend
college at Government expense; subsidies
are paid to scholars, particularly in the tech-
nological fields and in both theoretical and
applied sciences, I was informed.
Too, Russian children are being exposed
to a universal educational system. In cities
of 10,000 and more, from the 1st to the 10th
grades ip a must and in all other areas, from
the 1st to the 7th is compulsory. While the
Russian school curriculum is spiced heavily
with Communist doctrine, the Soviet leader-
ship has not yet found a way to communize
such basic principles as the chemical com-
position of water, or the Pythagorean theo-
rem in geometry. I am firmly convinced
that it is the Russian educational system
that offers the greatest hope for ultimate
Russian freedom. The people are beginning
to think for themselves and as time goes
on, it will be more and more difficult for the
leaders to keep them in line.
I found that, as a whole, the educated
Russians I spoke with were extremely cu-
rious about our mode of life in the United
States, and, even more important, demon-
strated a desire if not a compelling urge to
go behind catchy Red slogans, and to do
their own thinking. I have no doubt that
the Russians, of today are better off than
they have ever been. Most of them seem
satisfied for the reason that they know no
better way of life than that which they are
now enjoying.
Joseph Stalin grew to power in the midst
of ignorance and poverty. I am convinced
that because of the changed conditions in
Russia the people will not permit another
despot to assume such powers as those ex-
ercised by Stalin.
As more Russians become educated, they
will become less and less prone to accept
at face value the propaganda-loaded descrip-
tion of life in the United States which the
Red propaganda system dins insistently into
their ears. The Russian people are curious
by nature; they are becoming increasingly
more curious about Americans, about life in
America, and about the freedoms we enjoy.
During my stay in Russia, I visited the
Crimea, where former royal palaces have
been turned into worker hotels and resorts.
People gathered around me in the street, at
the hotels, and on the boardwalks, eager to
feel the quality of my clothing, to see the
kind of leather from which my shoes were
made, and to hear me speak (through our
interpreter) of life in America. They were
astounded to learn that American workers
are not starving in the streets of New York,
and that Negroes are not lynched by the
hundreds in the Deep South, They thought
it unbelievable that almost every American
family has its own automobile, and that the
people of the United States do not want war
with the people of Russia.
They were extremely curious about the
prices of food and goods in the United States,
They displayed doubt when I told them my
S 3523
shoes cost $17.50, compared with $65 to $75
in the Soviet Union. The cheapness in price
and abundant availability of goods in
America created amazement and disbelief
among these people, who are charged $220
for an 8-inch television set and $500 for a
small electric refrigerator, and to whom own-
ing an automobile is an almost unheard of
luxury for the average worker.
This curiosity, it strikes me, offers the free
world a fertile area in which can be planted
the seeds of freedom for Russia. I therefore
recommend that, subject to reasonable se-
curity regulations, we broaden our exchange-
of-persons program with the Soviet Union,
and that we bring more of the Russian peo-
ple into the United States, to see at first
hand how our people live. I recommend, too,
that our Information Service increase its
efforts to reach behind the Iron Curtain with
the message of freedom. In this connection,
it is of vital importance that our magazine,
our broadcasts, and so forth, to the people
of Russia contain no criticism of their way
of life. Although we abhor communism, in-
stead of disparaging it we must stress the
positive aspects of our own system. We
should say, in effect: "We give you credit for
believing in communism as an economic
system; that is your right, But, here is what
a free people, living under a democratic sys-
tem of government, have both in physical
and spiritual things." A better plan would
be to extoll the virtues of democracy and
completely ignore their system,
I do not pretend to be a psychologist, but
I do know that the surest way to shut the
ears of the Russian people to the story of
our way of life is to criticize their existing
form of government. As the old saying goes,
"You can catch more flies with honey than
with vinegar."
I am sincere in my belief that by bringing
more Russian farmers, more Russian indus-
trial workers, doctors, teachers, more Rus-
sian housewives and children and others, to
our country, perinitting them to see at first
hand how we live and the benefits available
to us under a free system, we can demon-
strate that communism cannot hold a can-
dle of democracy in furthering the cause of
individual freedom or bringing a better way
of life. This exchange of persons, coupled
with objective reporting of our American
way of life, will?I believe?create a mighty
force for peace with its genesis among the
Russian people, a force which the leaders of
Russia could ignore only at their personal
peril.
As a matter of fact, the Russian leadership
has done much to make any effort on its part
to generate a warlike spirit extremely diffi-
cult. Throughout the countryside were pos-
ters bearing the legend: "Peace." The Rus-
sian radio repeated the message that Russia
desires only peace. The Russian people have
been conditioned to expect peace, and I feel
it will be extremely difficult for Soviet lead-
ers to plunge them into a major conflict
without creating fearsome conditions within
the U.S.S.R., conditions which could per-
haps result in a violent reaction among the
Russian people.
The Russian people with whom I spoke
believe that the United States fears Russia,
and that present American policy is de-
signed with one ultimate objective?the forc-
ible destruction of the Soviet Union. There-
fore, they fear us. As patriots (and the
Russian people love their land if not their
present government), the people of Russia
would be willing to fight for their existence.
Soviet leadership has capitalized upon this
fear; through this medium, they have been
able to keep living standards low in order
to forge a military machine. If it were pos-
sible (and I think it is) to dispel this fear,
to eliminate the distrust of American mo.
tives among the Russian people, then rela-
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S 3524 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE
tions between our two countries would im-
prove overnight. We must make every ef-
fort to convince them that our preparations
are not for war or aggression, but for de-
fense.
To illustrate what I am driving at, while
visiting the great dam at Stalingrad, I asked
the engineer in charge, if it were not true
that the dam was started in 1050 or 1951
and that suddenly orders came from Rus-
sian leaders to stop building the dam. I
asked why that was done. He said because
the money was needed for other purposes.
"And what were those purposes?" I asked.
He said it was political and he did not care
to answer. I chided him and said "I sup-
pose you spent the money to make weapons
of war to fight us." He smiled, but insisted
that the question was political and he would
not discuss it further. I then asked "When
did you resume work?" He said, "After the
Geneva Conference, when your President in-
dicated to the world that America wanted
peace and not war."
The older Russian citizens with whom I
spoke, people who had lived under and could
recall the rule of the Czars, were unanimous
in their belief that "things are better now
than then." They have more food, more
clothing, and a greater sense of their indi-
vidual wdrth. as I indicated earlier in my
remarks. However, there is much discon-
tent within Russia?discontent that, nour-
ished by exposure to America and Ameri-
cans, could blossom into such a powerful
force that communism could receive a tell-
ing blow.
These factors?increased education, nat-
ural curiosity, and a desire for self-improve-
ment?are available to the United States for
intelligent use as the foundation for an ul-
timate rejection by the Russian people of
communism as both a way of life and an
economic system.
I therefore regard as most unwise our
Government's recent shutdown of exchange
of persons between Russia and the United
States. I think it was stupid. The reaction
of the Russian people, fostered by the Com-
murist propaganda machine, will be:
"America fears us?she fears that we will
see her poverty and her ignorance?she does
not want us to see how weak she is and how
her people are oppressed." In addition, this
action will lend credence to the repetitive
pror ouncements of Moscow propaganda
mediums that the United States wants war,
while Russia wants peace. This, of course,
will create an atmosphere which could ignite
like tinder should even a tiny spark fail.
Since my return to the United States, I
have been referred to by some mediums as
having been "brainwashed" by Khruhchev.
This I most vehemently deny. I believe I
have noted basic factors which, if only capi-
talleed upon by our country, can result in
the destruction of dictatorial rule in Russia.
The people of Russia bear within their great
IIThaieS the seed of American victory in the
cold war?a victory which can result not
only in benefiting the free world, but in
rekindling the light of freedom behind the
Iron Curtain. It is now time for us to begin
nourishing this seed, to the end that fear
will be replaced with trust, ignorance with
knowledge, and, ultimately, cold war with
warm friendship between the people of Rus-
sia and the people of the United States.
EXCERPT PROM ELLENDER REPORT CI 1957
CONCLUSION
Tie Soviet Union today is undergoing a
process of evolution?not revolution, but
evolution. There is a great surge of decen-
traezation taking place. The people are de-
manding more and more autonomy in the
hope of attaining more voice in their local
affairs. Sparked by increased emphasis upon
universal education?an emphasis which
carries with it a growing desire for individ-
ual leadership, an eagerness for information,
and an abundant curiosity regarding events,
deselopments, and peoples outside the Soviet
borders?the present Russian leadership is
taking a calculated, but evidently necessary,
risk.
Having placed their people in a position
where they are more and more able to think
for themselves, the Soviet leadership is
gambling with its own future. The time is
now ripe for free world action, designed to
properly capitalize upon this new advent
within the Soviet's borders.
If, by increased exchanges of delegations
in every walk of life?such as engineers,
fanners, legislators, scientists, students,
teschers, to name but a few?of motion pic-
tures, of television programs, of radio broad-
cuts; if, by increasing the-point's of contact
be:ween East and West, particularly, the
United States and Russia, we can lay the
full picture of western culture, development,
and individual freedoms before the masses
of Russia, as well as other peoples of the
world closely associated with Russia, there
is no doubt in my mind that they will be-
come envious of our way of life. They will
doubtless become dissatisfied when they
learn there is a better way of life than that
which they are now enjoying and as a result,
will develop an urge to imitate ours.
This should be our primary objective.
The free world, particularly the United
States, secure in the absolute belief that our
economic and political systems have nothing
to fear from a fair comparison with Soviet-
style communism, must leave no stone un-
turned in placing before the people of Rus-
sia and the world an unbiased picture of the
way we live. We should?yes, we must?
open the way for peaceful competition be-
tween the United States and the U.S.S.R.,
with the understanding that all peoples will
be free to choose the form of government
under which they prefer to live.
This is a competition which the free world
would most certainly win. It would bring
a tremendous victory to us, for either the So-
viet leadership would be compelled to give
its people a more abundant way of life, or
the Soviet people would compel a change in
their leadership.
Either of these alternatives would repre-
sent a basic step forward in the winning of
the cold war.
In the past, the tendency in the United
States has been to be somewhat apologetic
about the abundance we enjoy?to regard
our blessings as the result of more good
fortune than anything else. The Soviet
Union on the other hand, has consistently
credited the progress it has made since 1917
es the result of two things: First, the alleged
euperiority of the Socialist system, and, sec-
ond, the constant hard work of the Soviet
people.
Concerning the latter, no effort is spared
in Russia to acquaint the people with the
progress being made, and to heap praise and
credit upon the workers. Propaganda within
Resale, is one of the chief weapons of the
Communist leaders in maintaining the Com-
munist way of life. Radios are installed in
all public places, Including factories and
farms, and they constantly blare out the
accomplishments of Russia's economy and its
people.
Awards are made for workers excellence.
Competition between areas producing the
same commodities, or manufacturing the
same goods, is fostered. Region vies against
region in an endless productivity contest.
Specific projects?such as the construction
of a power darn, for example?are recorded
step by step on motion-picture !Dm. First
the ground breaking, where thousands as-
semble, then the river closure, then the in-
stallation of the first generator and so on.
Awards are made to the best workers at each
function.
These elms are then exhibited across the
length and breadth of the Soviet Union, with
abundant praise heaped upon the "workers"
March 10, 1967
who made such projects possible and with
added emphasis that they are the bene-
ficiaries.
In the so-called neutralist or other nations
experiencing a Soviet economic and political
offenelve, the progress ach.eved within the
Soviet Union since the advent of communism
Is constantly cited as an example of what can
be accomplished in an underdeveloped area
under the socialist system.
Instead of, in effect, apologizing for our
abundance, instead of fostering and follow-
ing a philosophy dedicated to the proposition
that because America has no much it must
be shared with those who have so little, the
United States should point out that our pres-
ent national wealth was created and obtained
throegh the hard work and ingenuity of
Americans, laboring under a free-enterprise
system, to tame a wilderness and devote its
resources to the betterment of all our people.
Ineeed, it must be remembered that the
United States as we know it today is only
5 pass older than the Soviet Union as it now
exists.
Only with the admission ,af Arizona as the
48th State in 1912 did tie United States
really begin its great rise and progressively
forge to the forefront of the world's nations.
Russia began its climb with the deposing of
the czars in 1917.
Yet in this relatively short space of time,
the United States has achieved a much great-
er advance than the U.S.S.R. in all fields?
without subjecting our people or our econ-
omy "A the iron rule and iniexible discipline
that communism imposes.
In ther words, if it were possible--as I be-
lieve it is?for the United States to place its
record of achievement beside that of the So-
viet Union for the people at Russia to ob-
serve. there can be no doubt which would
prove the more attractive.
It is necessary for us as leader of the free
nations to realize and understand shat the
Russians have progressed ender their pres-
ent farm of government, and that we must
recognize that progress?nos disparage it?in
our dealings with the Russian people.
It has become increasingly obvious during
recent years that a new Approach to the
problems plaguing East-West relationships
Is not only desirable, but urgently neces-
sary?particularly to the United States, upon
whom rests the greatest by rdens of present
policies.
Since 1948, the year the Marshall plan
began, our Nation has spent over $50 billion
ostensibly to roll back the Red tide of com-
munism. Initially, these espenditures were
designed to restore the war-ravaged nations
of Western Europe, In order to place them in
a position to be of aid to the free world
should the Soviet Uaion attempt an armed
aggression. Later, when proposed goals were
reached and even surpassed, the program was
transformed from one of rehabilitation into
one of development and mutual defense.
Huge amounts were suppLed to a host of
countries to help build armies, for capital
development, for technical aid.
?
?
Viewed in the light of these vast expendi-
tures, the record of achievement thus far is
a dismal one.
Eusope, fully restored to economic health,
and enjoying unprecedented prosperity, still
leans on the United States for participation
in her home defenses?still refuses to bear
her fair share of the free world's burdens,
particularly in the Middle East, southeast
Asia, Formosa, and South Korea.
Many other nations which we have assisted
lavishly in the past are either actively prac-
ticing or moving in the direction of neutral-
ism if not outright alignment with the Soviet
Union.
A iew make no bones of the fact that they
pursue a policy of pitting she United States
agairst the Soviet Union in order to obtain
the maximum aid from both countries.
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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD SENATE
Russia, and her satellites?who are avowed
opponents in the global cold war?are not
weakening, nor do their policies seem to
suffer defeat or even frustration as a result of
the heavy-spending .approach we have used
in the past. On the contrary, some of our
advisers contend that the Russians are mak-
ing gains in the Middle East, in southeast
Asia, in Africa, and even Latin America,
They are increasing their domestic agri-
cultural and industrial bases, as my report
amply demonstrates.
Their technology is constantly improving.
Sputniks I and II offer abundant proof of
this.
In almost every imaginable way, by almost
any comparison that might be made, the
United States today is in a much less favor-
able position in its international relation-
ships?and particularly in its competitive
position with the Soviet Union?than it was
in 1948, despite the expenditure of over $50
billion of our dwindling national wealth.
As I have often stated, our country can-
not continue on its present course without
inviting not only ultimate international de-
feat, but national disaster.
Our present policy involves the continued
expenditure of gigantic sums for foreign aid
purposes (over and above funds appropriated
for the maintenance and modernization of
our own Armed Forces); large appropriations
for an Information Service; continuation of
an almost unbearable and destructive tax
rate that threatens to destroy initiative; the
constant threat of near stagnation in the
proper protection and preservation of our
precious natural resources; and the promise
of continued neglect of other vital areas of
our national economic progress, particularly
public power, housing, commerce and others.
The recommendation I have advancd for
the past 3 years is reemphasized at this time;
that is, the time has come?in fact, it may
even have already passed?for us to take
stock and to take a new look at our foreign
policy.
Given a continued or heightened cold war
of indefinite duration, the pursuance of our
present policies must eventually result in the
strangulation of our free-enterprise system,
either by a continued decline of individual
initiative and increasing reliance upon Gov-
ernment control and regulation of the econ-
omy, or eventual collapse of our total econ-
omy under the pressures of constantly-grow-
ing Government spending and a swelling
debt load.
Either of these alternatives would be dis-
astrous.
The first would represent an easy default
victory by state socialism over the forces of
free enterprise, the second would carry with
It the full realization of a basic tenet of
Marxist communism; namely, that given a
long-term crisis to face, the free enterprise
(capitalistic) nations must fall of their
weight.
The three visits I have made to the Soviet
Union, the impressions I have gained during
them, and the information I have gathered,
have resulted in the following suggestions,
which I offer for the consideration of the
committee?indeed, for the consideration of
all our people.
RECOMMENDATIONS
I recommend that the United States re-
examine its approach to the waging of cold
war. Recognizing that our actual adversary
in this conflict is the Soviet Union, I rec-
ommend that this reexamination be under-
taken in the light of the following, the
implementation of which will help to dispel
the fear of each other prevailing among the
peoples of the East and the West, and restore
mutual confidence, which is necessary if we
are to achieve a lasting world peace.
1. Our information program directed to
the Iron Curtain and particularly to the
Soviet peoples should be expanded. In this
expansion, all propaganda in its traditional
forms should be abandoned. Instead, a posi-
tive approach should be applied uniformly.
No reference to communism per se should
be permitted. Accurate, factual, reporting
of the news and conditions in the free world
must be stressed. Every effort should be
made to objectively depict the enormous ad-
vantages of our way of life, without disparag-
ing the system presently in effect in the
Soviet Union or behind the Iron Curtain.
2. An expanded and realistic exchange of
persons program between the Soviet Union
and the United States should be inaugurated
at once. This expansion can be achieved
with no additional cost, by simply discon-
tinuing many so-called information pro-
grams operated elsewhere that are unneces-
sary. As detailed in the body of my report,
I am convinced that most of the peoples of
the Soviet Union are sincere in their belief
that the form of government and the eco-
nomic system under which they live are
second to none. This conviction flows from
their inability to compare their present-day
living standards, industrial and agricultural
techniques, cultural progress and techno-
logical development with anything other
than those existing within the. Soviet Union's
borders in prior times. By exchanging
delegations, from every walk of life?scien-
tists, technicians, workers, farmers, students,
legislators?the people of Russia would have
the opportunity to see at firsthand the
boundless advantages which a free-enterprise
system, founded on the bedrock of repre-
sentative government, has to offer. In this
program, however, extreme care must be ex-
ercised. Under no circumstances should a
bona fide exchange program be permitted
to become a means for infiltration of our
burders by Soviet agents.
3. With the change of emphasis in our
cold war policy toward' the Soviet Union
outlined in recommendations 1 and 2, de-
signed to dispel the fear which exists be-
tween the peoples of the United States and
the U.S.S.R., and to create a climate of
confidence, should also come increased
willingness upon our part to meet as often
as possible with leaders of Iron Curtain
countries, or the Soviet Union. Despite the
record of broken promises which prior Soviet
leaders have left in the wake of prior talks,
our failure to join and participate in top-
level conferences?even summit confer-
ences?provides powerful ammunition for
the Soviet propaganda machine. It eases the
task of Red information agencies to picture
the United States to the people of the Soviet
Union?along with other lands throughout
the world?as unwilling to discuss peaceful
solutions of world problems.
The committee is well acquainted with
the desire of all Americans to attain and
maintaining a lasting world peace, a peace
secured in dignity and made lasting through
mutual trust. However, our Government's
failure to show a willingness to confer with
Soviet leaders on the peaceful solution of
world tensions is being broadcast throughout
the length and breadth of the world as in-
dicative of our aggressive intentions. With a
weapon such as this at the command of
expert Communist propagandists, we are
constantly losing ground in our effort to
maintain sympathy for and understanding
of our international objectives.
4. I recommend that our policy of at-
tempting to create full-fledged modern
armies in small underdeveloped countries
be terminated, and that our assistance be
confined to a realistic technical-aid effort.
This move would be designed to create a
broad base of trained native peoples, a base
which would attract private investment cap-
ital, or which?at the very least?could prop-
erly utilize any government-to-government
capital which might later be made available
for development purposes. An approach of
this type would strengthen the economic
stability of the country, while at the same
S 3525
time allowing the country to maintain its
prestige and self-respect by standing on its
own feet.
By encouraging underdeveloped countries
to main military forces far beyond their
capabilities to support, we are actually creat-
ing conditions tailor made for the advance
of communism.
As the Comptroller General noted in his
report to Congress on an examination of the
military assistance program on March 31,
1957, the extension of arms aid to a number
of nations has not always been motivated
by purely military considerations, nor has
the impact of this aid been properly evalu-
ated in advance, or in conjunction with, its
availability:
"The military force objectives presently
approved for United States support in cer-
tain allied countries are not always realistic
In terms of recipient country manpower and
financial capabilities, are not always mu-
tually acceptable to the countries concerned,
and are not always motivated by military
considerations (Report, supra, p. 2).
"In a number of countries the United
States has programed and is delivering mili-
tary equipment in excess of that which can
be effectively absorbed and utilized by the
recipients at their existing stage of develop-
ment. The recipients either have not been
able to use the aid furnished because of
their financial and economic incapacity and
their manpower limitations or they have not
desired to use the assistance for the pur-
poses intended by the United States (Report,
supra, p. 3)."
As it now stands the hasty application of
great amounts of economic and military aid
to newly independent, underdeveloped na-
tions is often working to our extreme dis-
advantage.
First, in those nations whose economies
are not sufficiently developed to maintain a
military force of the capabilities desired by
United States advisers, the gap in national
income created by heavy military expendi-
tures is sought to be filled by America ex-
tending so-called defense-support assistance.
As administered in the past, this type of
economic aid has frequently failed to trickle
down to the masses. In a number of coun-
tries, particularly in the Middle East, and
southeast Asia, living standards remain vis-
ably unchanged for the great majority of
people despite large United States expendi-
tures there. There are, in these countries,
two economic strata?the very rich, and the
miserably poor.
The latter are, without exception, the ob-
ject of constant Soviet propagandizing.
United States policies, requiring the main-
tenance of large standing military forces,
are blamed for low living standards. "Cap-
italistic" America is also blamed for lining
the pockets of the rich while caring little
for the poor.
In these same countries, as the body of my
report demonstrates, the wealthy pay little
or nothing in the way of income taxes, or,
for that matter, all taxes as compared to
us. Thus, as the whole burden of defense
and economic growth in a given nation may
be ours: so is the blame for that nation's
poverty heaped upon our shoulders.
5. I again recommend, as I have for the
past 3 successive years, that immediate steps
be taken to solve the Arab-Israeli dispute.
Unless and until this is done, the Middle
East will remain an open, festering wound?
one which poses a constant threat of infec-
tion to the entire world.
Our attempts in the past through military
and economic assistance, to appease both
sides in the hope that the problems will
solve themselves have not worked and will
never work. That part of the world offers
the U.S.S.R. a great opportunity to keep
its propaganda machine almost certainly
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S 3526 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? SENATE March 10, 1967
at work in its efforts to keep the world in
turmoil.
While I am convinced that the implemen-
tation of these recommendations would re-
sult in a much higher degree of success than
a continuation of our present policies, it Is
not my view that they will work miracles
overnight. On the contrary, the "new look"
I have advocated should take place concur-
rently with the maintenance of a strong
defense by the United States. We must not
lower our guard. A modern, efficient De-
fense Establishment is the best guaranty
we have against any attempt on the part
of would-be world conquerors to follow the
path of aggression instead of peaceful in-
terns tional competition.
In essence, the burden of my recommend-
ations involves the maximum use of the
single greatest resource our Nation posses-
ses?not dollars, but the tremendous abun-
dance of both material and spiritual ad-
vantages which freedom has to offer.
America is the world's greatest showplace
for the accomplishments of a free economy
dedicated to providing a free people with
the highest standard of living in the world.
With such an exhibit of the fruits of our
labors, it should be readily apparent that, in
compariton with our growth over the rela-
tively same period of time, Russia's advance
has been accomplished despite, rather than
because of, the dictates of socialist theories.
and perhaps owes its success more to the
hard work of her people than to any tenet
or theory set forth by Lenin, Marx, or Stalin.
Let us open wide the doors to our show-
place; let us welcome all who would come
to see?to compare?to imitate.
Let us lay the foundation for trade and
a restoration of commercial contacts be-
tween the East and the West.
Let us not apologize for our abundance,
but, rather, let us display it to the peoples
of the world as an example of what hard
work can achieve for all who are willing to
work.
Let us be honest enough to caution those
who are to choose between socialism and
freedom that such miracles are not wrought
overnight, but must come gradually and
through self-help.
Above all other things, let us not fear an
honest competition with Soviet communism.
1The approach I have outlined involves
only the realization that it is time for our
country to choose a more advantageous
ground upon which to wage this most cru-
cial battle of the cold war.
We have been confronted in recent years
by what amounts to nothing more than an
all-out effort on the part of the Soviets to
defeat the democratic nations by peaceful
means. Rather than see victory go to them
by default, I urge our Government to pour
its full effort into a massive fight for the
minds of men?all men, everywhere.
EXCERPT FROM ELLENDER REPORT OF 1961
Teis was my fourth trip to the Soviet
Union since 1955. I visited this vast country
on three sucessive years-4955, 1958, and 1957.
Thus, my most recent trip came after a lapse
of 4 years.
Following my return to Washington, I
reviewed the reports I had made to the
Senate following my three previous visits
to the U.S.S.R. I found that the observations
and recomendations I had made following
these trips are still applicable. What I
recomended at that time bears repetition and
reemphasis today.
The conclusions I reached in 1955, 1958,
and 1957 were criticized quite freely by some.
In f tet, there were some who accused me
of being brainwashed, yet I And that today,
more and more people are in agreement with
my thinking. I have summed up my ob-
servations of these three earlier visits, and
they can be found in the appendix marked
"Exhibit 14," p. 333.
I was very much Impressed with the
industrial expansion which has obviously
taken place in 4 years in the areas I had
visited before. As to those areas I had not
seen before. I was surprised at what I found
in she way of old cities being modernized,
new cities springing up, housing being con-
structed at phenomenal speed, and all sorts
of industries being fostered where formerly
there had been little if any industrial de-
velopment. Particularly is this true in
what I would classify as the most backward
areas of this vast country known RS the
U.S.S.R.?I have reference to places like
Turkmenstan, Uzbekstan, Tadzhikstan, and
Armenia, to name only a few. As a matter
of lact, the industrial expansion throughout
the Soviet Union, as evidenced by what I saw
with my own eyes at all the places I have
visited, is nothing short of amazing. True,
there is still a long way to go before Soviet
industry can approach our own industrial
facilities and capabilities, but when one con-
siders that only a few years ago the new
areas I visited were of the most backward
in Russia, It Is a revelation to And there
thriving industries which are for the most
part being operated and managed by local
people.
In some areas of southern European and
Asiatic RUSSIFL I found that the people seem
sonsider that their provinces or republics
are peculiarly their own, even though a part
of the U.S.S.R., and they show what I would
term strongly nationalistic tendencies in
the pride they exhibit in the accomplish-
ments of their regions since the revolution.
They apepar satisfied with their progress
thus far, but they seem to look forward to
mill greater accomplishments through their
own efforts rather than those of the Cen-
tral Government. They give the impression
that this tremendous surge in industry has
come about because they have been able to
force the Central Government to give them
more autonomy in determining their own
needs and in carrying out the plans for in-
dut trial production.
EXHIBIT 14
PREVIOUS RECOMMENDATIONS
This might be a good time to review some
of the comments I made following ray previ-
ous visite to the Soviet Union. Following
my 1955 trip I submitted a report to the
Senate Appropriations Committee, which in-
cluded a resume of my meeting with Anastite
Mikoyen. The report read as follows:
" I stated that I believed a more
cordial relationship between the U.S.S.R. and
the United States was desirable and that
this goal was obtainable through the medium
of increased exchanges of visit Involving in-
dustrial, agricultural, and similar delegations.
I pointed out that I had been in the U.S.
Legislature for nearly 19 years, during which
time I had voted billions of dollars to help
defeat Hitler in the common cause with U.S.
wartime allies.
"I told Mr. Mikoyan that the American
people find the mutual suspicions which
characterize U.S.-Soviet relations strange
and not in keeping with wartime relations.
I said that I felt that these suspicions and
strained relations were due in large mea-
sure to misunderstanding. I expressed the
belief that frequent exchanges of visits
would do much to eliminate these misunder-
standings and that while the United States
would not expect the Soviet Government. to
open its arsenals to American inspection,
nelertheless I felt that If there was an in-
cresse In the movement of Soviet citizens
visiting the United States the Soviet people
would be able to clear away their suspicions
about U.S. intentions. I stated that I came
as s humble American citizen to express my
thoughts to Mr. Mikoyan in the hope that
something good would come of my visit. I
added that if Mr. Mikoyan cared to make any
comments on my statements I would be glad
to her them.
"Mr. Milloyan replied thet he fully con-
curred in my statements and that he felt
that the American and Soviet peoples had no
differences on points of view expressed by
me. He stated that the type of system per-
taining in individual countries was a matter
of chcice of the people invols ed.
"I replied that so far as I new, the Ameri-
can people as a whole don't care about the
system prevailing in the Soviet Union and
regarded that as the business of the Soviet
people. I did state, however, that somehow
the American people have the idea and are
concerned that the U.S.S.R. is spreading a
doctrine which is harmful to American in-
terests, and that I felt th it relations be-
tween the two countries would be much
more cordial if this fear co ild be dispelled.
I stated that the American people may be
wrong in this assumption but that there
was, severtheless, much evidence that the
assuir ption was correct."
? ?
" " Mr. Mikoyan asserted the belief
that if 100 Americans came to study in the
U.S.S.R. and returned to the United States
that this would not result in the establish-
ment of a Communist regime in the United
States. He said that the question of com-
munism versus capitalism is a matter for
peoples and not for governments. He said
that governments cannot impose doctrines
and asked what the Soviet Union can do if
people read Communist literature. He said
that le thought the differences of opinion
and strained relations were the fault of the
United States and asserted that the more
you attempt to prevent the spreading of a
doctrine the more you actually contribute to
the propagation of it.
"I explained that in America the rank and
file of Communists are not molested, but
that the Government is protected by law
against those who attempt ihe violent over-
throw of our governmental system. I told
him that the views expressed by the im-
prisor ed American Communist leaders to
which our Government objected had been
obtained from the U.S.S.R.; that these Com-
munists had certainly had a fair trial which
lasted 8 months, but that the evidence was
clearly against them.
"Mr. Mikoyan rejoined that he did not
wish to approve or disapprose of the actions
of the U.S. Government versus the American
Communists. He stated this was not his con-
cern hut that of the United Elates. He added
that it was extremely possible that there was
a con:section between the ideas expressed by
the American Communists and the Soviet
Unior, but that he could not control this.
He said there can be no frontiers to ideas.
I stated that the American people and our
Government do not object to the idea of com-
munism In a country, but do object to any
attempt by a country to impose these ideas
on others by force. Mr. Mikoyan repeated
that this entire affair did not concern the
U.S.S.R. I remarked that many Americans
had been informed, through various sources,
that ;he peoples of Poland. Czechoslovakia,
Rumania, and Hungary frequently referred
to as satellite states, were not free and that
comn-unism had been imposed on them by
the U.S.S.R. I stated that if this were true,
that if the U.S.S.R. had anything to do with
the establishment of the governments in
Eastern Europe, that this was the type of
thing which caused concern and fear in the
minds of American people, and that any-
thing that could be done to dispel this fear
wouic lead to improved relations between the
United States and the U.S.3.R.
"Mr. Mikoyan said that lithe U.S. people
have this fear they need to be educated
properly. He said the Sosiet troops com-
pletely withdrew from Czechoslovakia at the
end of the war. He said that United States
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has many bases abroad, whereas the Soviet
Union has not and that he believed there
were more U.S. troops stationed abroad than
Soviet."
In 1956 I traveled extensively through the
agricultural areas of the Soviet Union, I also
visited many industrial centers. I made
numerous comments then which I still be-
lieve hold true. I criticized at that time
certain agricultural practices being under-
taken by the U.S.S.R. as being impractical.
I also pointed out industrial shortcomings.
The gist of my comments on the Soviet Un-
ion are as follows:
'Russian agriculture suffers tremendously
from the concentration of production in
either collective or state farms. Many of the
Russian farmers have no desire to increase
production or become more efficient, since
they have lost their identity as individual
entrepreneurs. The old saying 'What's every-
body's business is nobody's business' can be
successfully applied to the collective farms.
"As to Russian industry, I saw some mod-
ern processes (such as a most unique shoe
production line), along with great evidence
of expansion, but for the most part, Russian
industry seems to be crude and backward
when compared with our own. I saw only
five different models of passenger cars, two
models of passenger buses, one for short
and the other long haul, two models of refrig-
erators, one standard model of trucks. I do
not desire to leave the impression that this
status may long remain, for great efforts are
being made to modernize Russian industry,
and to expand production?particularly in
the area of heavy industry. Dams, both for
navigation and power generation, are being
constructed. More factories are rising. The
industrial base is being widened, and with-
in the next 5 to 10 years, Russia will un-
doubtedly become a mighty industrial power.
That will come about by the increasing de-
mand for more and more consumer goods.
I am firmly convinced that it is
the Russian educational system that offers
the greatest hope for ultimate Russian free-
dom. The people are beginning to think for
themselves and as time goes on, It will be
more and more difficult for the leaders to
keep them Inline.
"Joseph Stalin grew to power in the midst
of ignorance and poverty. I am convinced
that because of the changed conditions in
Russia the people will not permit another
despot to assume such powers as those ex-
ercised by Stalin.
"As more Russians become educated, they
will become less and less prone to accept at
face value the propaganda-loaded description
of life in the United States which the Red
propaganda system dins insistently into their
ears. The Russian people are curious by na-
ture; they are becoming increasingly more
curious about Americans, about life in Amer-
ica, and about the freedoms we enjoy.
"I therefore recommend that, subject to
reasonable security regulations, we broaden
our exchange-of-persons program with the
Soviet Union, and that we bring more of the
Russian people into the United States, to
see at first hand how our people live. I rec-
ommend, too, that our Information Service
increase its efforts to reach behind the Iron
Curtain with the message of freedom. In
this connection, it is of vital importance that
our magazine, our broadcasts, and so forth,
to the people of Russia contain no criticism
of their way of life. Although we abhor
communism, instead of disparaging it we
must stress the positive aspects of our own
system. We should say, in effect; 'We give
you credit for believing in communism as
an economic system; that is your right.
But, here is what a free people, living under
a democratic system of government, have
both in physical and spiritual things.' A
better plan would be to extoll the virtues of
democracy and completely ignore their sys-
tem.
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"I do not pretend to be a psychologist,
but I do know that the surest way to shut
the ears of the Russian people to the story
of our way of life is to criticize their existing
form of government. As the old saying goes,
'You can catch more flies with honey than
with vinegar.'
"I am sincere in my belief that by bringing
more Russian farmers, more Russian indus-
trial workers, doctors, teachers, more Russian
housewives and children and others, to our
country, permitting them to see at first hand
how we live and the benefits available to us
under a free system, we can demonstrate
that communism cannot hold a candle to
democracy in furthering the cause of indi-
vidual freedom or bringing a better way of
life. This exchange of persons, coupled with
objective reporting of our American way of
life, will?I believe?create a mighty force
for peace with its genesis among the Russian
people, a force which the leaders of Russia
could ignore only at their personal peril.
"As a matter of fact, the Russian leader-
ship has done much to make any effort on
its part to generate a warlike spirit extremely
difficult. Throughout the countryside were
posters bearing the legend: 'Peace.' The
Russian radio repeated the message that
Russia desires only peace. The Russian
people have been conditioned to expect
peace, and I feel it will be extremely difficult
for Soviet leaders to plunge them into a
major conflict without creating fearsome
conditions within the U.S.S.R., conditions
which could perhaps result in a violent
reaction among the Russian people.
"The Russian people with whom I spoke
believe that the United States fears Russia,
and that present American policy is designed
with one ultimate objective?the forcible
destruction of the Soviet Union, Therefore,
they fear us. As patriots (and the Russian
people love their land if not their present
government), the people of Russia would be
willing to fight for their existence. Soviet
leadership has capitalized upon this fear;
through this medium, they have been able
to keep living standards low in order to
forge a military machine. If it were possible
(and I think It is) to dispel this fear, to
eliminate the distrust of American motives
among the Russian people, then relations
between our two countries would improve
overnight. We must make every effort to
convince them that our preparations are not
for war or aggression, but for defense.
"To illustrate what I am driving at, while
visiting the great dam at Stalingrad, I asked
the engineer in charge, if it were riot true
that the dam was started in 1950 or 1951
and that suddenly orders came from Russian
leaders to stop building the dam. I asked
why that was done. He said because the
money was needed for other purposes. 'And
what? were those purposes?' I asked. He
said it was political and he did not care to
answer. I chided him and said 'I suppose
you spent the money to make weapons of
war to fight us.' He smiled, but insisted
that the question was political and he would
not discuss it further. I then asked 'When
did you resume work?' He said, 'After the
Geneva Conference, when your President
indicated to the world that America wanted
peace and not war,'
"The older Russian citizens with whom I
spoke, people who had lived under and could
recall the rule of the czars, were unanimous
in their belief that 'things are better now
than then.' They have more food, more
clothing, and a greater sense of their individ-
ual worth, as I indicated earlier in my re-
marks. However, there is much discontent
within Russia?discontent that, nourished
by exposure to America and Americans, could
blossom into such a powerful force that corn-
munism could receive a telling blow.
"These factors?increased education, nat-
ural curiosity, and a desire for self-improve-
ment?are available to the United States
For Release 2005/11/21
S 3527
for intelligent use as the foundation for an
ultimate rejection by the Russian people of
communism as both a way or life and an eco-
nomic system.
"I therefore regard as most unwise our
Government's recent shutdown of exchange
of persons between Russia and the United
States. I think it was stupid. The reaction
of the Russian people, fostered by the Com-
munist propaganda machine, will be:
'America fears us?she fears that we will
see her poverty and her ignorance?she does
not want us to see how weak she is and how
her people are oppressed.' In addition, this
action will lend credence to the repetitive
pronouncements of Moscow propaganda me-
diums that the United States wants war,
while Russia wants peace. This of course,
will create an atmosphere which could ig-
nite like tinder should even a tiny spark fall.
"Since my return to the United States, I
have been referred to by some mediums as
having been 'brainwashed' by Khrushchev.
This I most vehemently deny. I believe I
have noted basic factors which, if only cap-
italized upon by our country, can result in
the destruction of dictatorial rule in Russia.
The people of Russia bear within their great
masses the seed of American victory in the
cold war?a victory which can result not only
in benefiting the free world, but in rekindling
the light of freedom behind the Iron Cur-
tain. It is now time for us to begin nourish-
ing this seed, to the end that fear will be
replaced with trust, ignorance with knowl-
edge, and, ultimately, cold war with warm
friendship between the people of Russia and
the people of the United States,"
Following my 1957 trip I filed another re-
port with the Senate Appropriations Com-
mittee. My general impressions of the So-
viet Union were as follows:
"Perhaps the most significant aspect of my
findings on this visit was change, and, with
respect to the various goods and services
available to the Russian consumer, the
change was invariably for the better. Also,
people are more talkative?they were more
prone to assert themselves. Generally speak-
ing, I found a much higher degree of con-
tentment, among the peoples of Russia than
on my previous visits. In addition, I found
considerable national pride?a pride which
was visibly increased when the people
learned of the successful firing of the first
space satellite. I was in Russia when the
event occurred and the news was made pub-
lic, and there was much jubilation among
the Russian masses.
"Thus, in prefacing any account of my
journeys through the Soviet Union, I feel it
important to impress upon the committee
my three major impressions of postsatellite
Russia.
First, there is an atmosphere of confidence.
-2 "Second, there is apparent domestic con-
tentment, but a rising curiosity about Amer-
ica and an urge to forge ahead of us.
"Third, there is a growing belief among
the Russian people that their system is
suprier in all respect to ours in the West,
"These three factors must certainly re-
ceive primary consideration in any policy
our Government undertakes vis-a-vis the
Soviet Union. But, in considering these
factors, they must be read against a back-
ground of Russia as it stands today com-
pared with the pre-Bolshevik Russia of the
czars.
"Only by measuring present-day conditions
in Russia by the comparative yardstick of
conditions as they existed a quarter cen-
tury ago can any proper perspective con-
cerning this vast nation be attained, In
addition, the conditions existing in the So-
viet Union under communism and, the Gov-
ernment's abolition of private property are
Important circumstances to be weighed
before reaching any conclusion concerning
future policies toward that country.
"In Russia, the Government is supreme.
Nothing else matters?only the Government.
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S 3528 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE March 10, 1967
Every square inch of land belongs to the Gov-
ernment. All commerce and industry are
Government controlled, Under no circum-
stances is an individual able to go into busi-
ness for himself, not even as a barbershop
owner or a taxi operator.
'Instead, all crafts, in fact, all businesses,
are incorporated into state-managed en-
titles where everyone works together for what
Sav et leaders declare to be the common good
of the state. Revenue-producing invest-
ments by the individual of any of his sur-
plus funds are limited primarily to state in-
stitutions that lend money. The money de-
posited by the individual bears a small rate
of interest, depending on the length of time
it le left on deposit. This type of social and
economic organization exists through all
strata of Russia.
"Under sucia a controlled system. in which
the welfare of the individual is evidently
sacrifled to the good of the state. Russia has
been able, within a short span of years, to
pull itself up from a weary, downtrodden
nation, wracked by internal strife and bear-
ing the heavy burden of a hungry, desperate
class of peasant serfs under the old czarist
system, to its present leadership of obviously
high technological development.
"Many Russian people today may have only
black bread, cabbages, beets, potatoes, and
a pot of tea?but today it is enough to fill
their stomachs. To a hungry population,
the mere advance of a crust of bread is an
accomplishment?and one, which whether or
not we agree with the manner in which It is
done, must be recognized as a form of prog-
ress.
"From the days of 1916, when almost all of
Russia hovered together in abject poverty,
In hunger, In a state of serfdom, and serv-
ing a fantastically rich nobility, the older
people of Russia today can see visible signs
of their march forward?toward national
pride, better living standards, and industrial
develoment?a march which today places
them among the vanguard of the world's
nations.
"The younger people, who have known
nothing but communism in their lifetime,
and who have had no opportunity to ob-
serve any other form of government, glory
in their country's progress?and in the cor-
responding rise in the welfare of their fellow
countrymen.
"This, above all, we must recognize. And
in that recognition we must. I believe. aban-
don the approach of some who, because they
dislike or perhaps fear communism?indeed,
I am sure they abhor this system of govern-
ment as I do?will not hear or even listen
to the spoken words of its accomplishments.
"The mark of an intelligent soldier is to
recognize the capabilities of his opponent.
To mock a foe is to mock yourself.
"Communism will not vanish because we
ignore it. Neither will it disappear because
we vilify it. It exists. It is functioning.
"It has brought a new way of life to a
people once left far beyond progress in the
wallow of inner conflict. It has provided
a better standard of living?no matter if we
care to dismiss it as still far below our own?
for an entire nation of people.
"Of course, in the U.S.S.R. there is noth-
ing remotely resembling the freedom of in-
dividual choice, action, and enterprise which
we in the United States enjoy today. How-
ever, it must be recognized that in the Soviet
Union, such freedom has never existed. Rus-
sian history bears ample witness to the lack
of what we regard as basic principles of free-
dom. Under the czars, which is the period
with which the typical elder or middle-aged
Russian compares his life today, there was
no freedom of the press, no freedom of ex-
pression, no freedom of economic choice for
the average Russian. Opposition to the then-
existing Government was ruthlessly ferreted
out by a secret police whose methods were
uot basically different from those used by
the Communists.
"Perhaps the most astonishing accom-
plishment of the Russia of today LS RS rapid
transformation into an industrial empire.
That the tremendous growth of Russia's in-
dustrial economy has been reached in the
short span of one generation testifies to the
bard work done by the Russian people. To
those who would dismiss, or soften the im-
pact of this achievement by merely pointing
out that It was accomplished by a ruthless
leadership holding the combined noses of
an entire people to the Marxist grindstone,
It again must be remembered that compul-
sion Is nothing new to the average Russian.
Under the Communists, he exchanged the
compulsion of the czarist aristocracy for the
compulsion of a totalitarian state. The only
change in the picture, insofar as Ivan is con-
cerned, is that at least part of the nation's
Increased wealth has trickled down to him
Instead of all of It remaining in the pockets
of a very few persons of supreme social
status.
"In other words, in assessing the present
temper of the Russian people, not their
present leadership, but their people, we must
always bear in mind that there are no shades
of gray in the picture of Russian develop-
ment since 1917. Instead, there Is only
absolute contrast between the days prior to
the October Revolution and those now upon
the colossus of Europe and Asia. The term
asspitalism,' as applied by the Communist
leadership In describing the United States,
does not reflect the system which our coun-
try actually enjoys today, but instead is
used as a synonym for the system prevalent
In Russia during czarist times. By Insisting
that all economic systems are either capital-
istic (1.e., czarist) or socialist (i.e., that now
in effect in the Soviet Union) the Soviet
leaders have been able to keep their people
convinced that the Russian system today is
the ultimate of perfection.
"The Western World is now at a great
disadvantage in waging a positive campaign
to change this unbalanced and untrue pic-
ture laid before the Russian people, because
there are not words available to convince
them of the progress we have made, of the
abundance we enjoy. To the average Rus-
sian, a system which would prove more
beneficial than the one under which he now
lives is inconceivable, simply, because he has
no knowledge of anything other than abso-
lute exploitation under the czars compered
with a much better way of life under com-
munism.
"As It stands, then, we must realize that
the Russian people?as of this day, at inst?
ate apparently well content with their way
of life. The individual may not have pro-
gressed much, by our standards, but he has
progressed?he is much better off than he
has ever been."
In my 1957 report I also included a for-
malized presentation of conclusions and
recommendations. I think that these, too,
are worth repeating in the light of today's
events.
They are as follows:
"CONCLUSION
"The Soviet Union today is undergoing
a process of evolution?not revolution, but
evolution. There is a great surge of de-
ccntralization taking place. The people are
demanding more and more autonomy in the
hope of attaining more voice in their local
affairs. Sparked by Increased emphasis upon
universal education?an emphasis which
carries with it a growing desire for individual
leadership, an eagerness for information,
and an abundant curiosity regarding events,
developments, and peoples outside the Soviet
borders?the present Russian leadership is
taking a calculated, but evidently necessary,
ri3k.
"Having placed their people in a position
where they are more and more able to think
for themselves, the Soviet leadership is gam-
bling with its own future. The time is now
ripe for free world action, designed to prop-
erly capitalize upon this nevi advent within
the Soviet's borders.
"If, by increased exchanges of delegations
in every walk of life?such as engineers,
farmers, legislators, scientists, students,
teachers, to name but a few?of motion pic-
tures, of television programs, of radio broad-
casts: if, by increasing the points of contact
between East and West, particularly, the
United States and Russia, we can lay the full
picture of western culture, development, and
indlaidual freedoms before the masses of
Russia, as well as other peoples of the world
closely associated with Russia, there is no
doubt In my mind that they will become
envious of our way of life. They will doubt-
less become dissatisfied when they learn there
is a 'oetter way of life than that which they
now are enjoying, and, as a result, will de-
velop an urge to imitate ours.
"This should be our primary objective.
"The free world, particularly the United
States, secure in the absolute belief that our
economic and political systems have nothing
to fear from a fair comparison with Soviet-
style communism, must leave no stone un-
turned in placing before the people of Russia
and ;he world an unbiased picture of the way
we live. We should?yes, we must?open the
way for peaceful competition between the
United States and the U.S.S.R., with the
understanding that all peoples will be free to
choose the form of government under which
they prefer to live.
"This is a competition which the free
world would most certainly win. It would
bring a tremendous victory to us, for either
the &yid leadership would be compelled to
give its people a more abundant way of life,
or the Soviet people would compel a change
in their leadership.
"Either of these alternatives would repre-
sent a basic step forward in the winning of
the cold war.
"In the past, the tendency in the United
States has been to be somewhat apologetic
about the abundance we enjoy?to regard
our blessings as the result of more good for-
tune than anything else. The Soviet Union
on Sae other hand, has consistently credited
the progress it has made -since 1917 as the
resu:t of two things: Firs the alleged su-
periority of the Socialist system, and, second,
the constant hard work of the Soviet people.
"Concerning the latter, lio effort is spared
in Russia to acquaint the people with the
progress being made, and to heap praise and
credat upon the workers. Propaganda within
Russia is one of the chie weapons of the
Communist leaders in maintaining the Com-
munist way of life. Radios are installed in
all public places, including factories and
farms, and they constantly blare out the ac-
complishments of Russia's economy and its
people.
"Awards are made for worker excellence.
"Competition between areas producing the
same commodities or mfinufacturing the
same goods, is fostered. Region vies against
regim in an endless productivity contest.
"Specific projects?such as the construc-
tion or a power dam, for example?are re-
corded step by step on motion-picture film.
First the ground breaking, where thousands
assemble, then the river closure, then the
instillation of the first generator and so on.
Aws,Als are made to the bat workers at each
function.
"These films are then ex'albited across the
length and breadth of tne Soviet Union,
with abundant praise heaped upon the
"wolkers" who made such projects possible
and with added emphasis that they are the
beneficiaries.
"I:a the so-called neutralist or other na-
tions experiencing a Soviet economic and
political offensive, the progress achieved
within the Soviet Union shoe the advent of
communism is constantly cited as an exam-
ple of what can be accomplished in an under-
developed area under the socialist system.
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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? SENATE S 3529
"Instead of, in effect, apologizing for our
abundance, instead of fostering and follow-
ing a philosophy dedicated to the proportion
that because America has so much it must
be shared with those who have so little, the
United States should point out that our
present national wealth was created and
obtained through the hard work and in-
genuity of Americans, laboring under a free-
enterprise system, to tame a wilderness and
devote its resources to the betterment of
all our people.
"Indeed, it must be remembered that the
United States as we know it today is only
5 years older than the Soviet Union as it
now exists.
"Only with the admission of Arizona as the
48th State in 1912 did the United States
really begin its great rise and progressively
forge to the forefront of the world's nations.
Russia began its climb with the deposing of
the czars in 1917.
"Yet in this relatively short space of time,
the United States has achieved a much
greater advance than the U.S.S.R. in all
fields?without subjecting our people or our
economy to the iron rule and inflexible disci-
pline that communism imposes,
"In other words, if it were possible?as I
believe it is?for the United States to place
its record of achievement beside that of the
Soviet Union for the people of Russia to
observe, there can be no doubt which would
prove the more attractive.
"It is necessary for us as leader of the
free nations to realize and understand that
the Russians have progressed under their
present form of government, and that we
must recognize that progress?not disparage
it?in our dealings with the Russian people.
"It has become increasingly obvious dur-
ing recent years that a new approach to the
problems plaguing East-West relationships is
not only desirable, but urgently necessary?
particularly to the United States, upon whom
rests the greatest burdens 'of present
policies.
"Since 1948, the year the Marshall plan
began, our Nation has spent over $50 billion
ostensibly to roll back the Red tide of com-
munism. Initially, these expenditures were
designed to restore the war-ravaged nations
of Western Europe, in order to place them
in a position to be of aid to the free world
should the Soviet Union attempt an armed
aggression. Later, when proposed goals were
reached and even surpassed, the program
was transformed from one of rehabilitation
into one of development and mutual defense.
Huge amounts were supplied to host of
countries to help build armies, for capital
development, for technical aid.
?
"Viewed in the light of these vast expendi-
tures, the record of achievement thus far
is a dismal one.
"Europe, fully restored to economic health,
and enjoying unprecedented prosperity, still
leans on the United States for participation
in her home defenses?still refuses to bear
her fair share of the free world's burdens,
particularly in the Middle East, southeast
Asia, Formosa, and South Korea.
"Many other nations which we have as-
sisted lavishly in the past are either actively
practicing or moving in the direction of neu-
tralism if not outright alinement with the
Soviet Union.
"A few make no bones of the fact that
they pursue a policy of pitting the United
States against the Soviet Union in order to
obtain the maximum aid from both coun-
tries. ?
"Russia, and her satellites?who are our
avowed opponents in the global cold war?
are not weakening, nor do their policies seem
to suffer defeat or even frustration as a re-
sult of the heavy-spending approach we have
used in the past. On the contrary, some of
our advisers contend that the Russians are
making gains in the Middle East, in south-
east Asia, in Africa, and even Latin America.
"They are increasing their domestic agri-
cultural and industrial bases, as my report
amply demonstrates.
"Their technology is constantly improv-
ing. Sputniks I and II offer abundant proof
of this.
"In almost every imaginable way, by al-
most any comparison that might be made,
the United States today is in a much less
favorable position in its international re-
lationships?and particularly in its com-
petitive position with the Soviet Union?
than it was in 1948, despite the expenditure
of over $50 billion of our dwindling national
wealth.
"As I have often stated, our country can-
not continue on its present course without
inviting not only ultimate international de-
feat, but national disaster.
"Our present policy involves the continued
expenditure of gigantic sums for foreign aid
purposes (over and above funds appropriated
for the maintenance and modernization of
our own Armed Forces); large appropriations
for an Information Service; continuation of
an almost unbearable and destructive tax
rate that threatens to destroy initiative; the
constant threat of near stagnation in the
proper protection and preservation of our
precious natural resources; and the promise
of continued neglect of other vital areas of
our national economic progress, particularly
public power, housing, commerce and others.
"The recommendation I have advanced for
the past 3 years is reemphasized at this
time; that is, the time has come?in fact, it
may even have already passed?for us to
take stock and to take a new look at our
foreign policy.
"Given a continued or heightened cold
war of indefinite duration, the pursuance of
our present policies must eventually result
? in the strangulation of our free-enterprise
system, either by a continued decline of in-
dividual initiative and increasing reliance
upon Government control and regulation of
the economy, or eventual collapse of our
total economy under the pressures of con-
stantly-growing Government spending and
a swelling debt load.
"Either of these alternatives would be
disastrous.
"The first would represent an easy default
victory by state socialism over the forces of
free enterprise, the second would carry with
it the full realization of a basic tenet of
Marxist communism; namely, that given a
long-term crisis to face, the free enterprise
(capitalistic) nations must fall of their
weight.
"The three visits I have made to the Soviet
Union, the impressions I have gained during
them, and the information I have gathered,
have resulted in the following suggestions,
which I offer for the consideration of the
committee?indeed, for the consideration of
all our people. .
"RECOMMENDATIONS
"I recommend that the United States re-
examine its approach to the waging of cold
war. Recognizing that our actual adversary
in this conflict is the Soviet Union, I reco:m-
mend that this reexamination be undertaken
in the light of the following, the implementa-
tion of which will help to dispel the fear of
each other prevailing among the peoples of
the East and the West, and restore mutual
confidence, which is necessary if we are to
achieve a lasting world peace.
"1. Our information program directed to
the Iron Curtain and particularly to the
Soviet peoples should be expanded. In this
expansion, all propaganda in its traditional
forms should be abandoned. Instead, a
positive approach should be applied uni-
formly. No reference to communism per se
Should be permitted. Accurate, factual re-
potting of the news and conditions in the
free world must be stressed. Every effort
should be made to objectively depict the
enormous advantages of our way of life, with-
out disparaging the system presently in effect
in the Soviet Union or behind the Iron Cur-
tain.
? "2. An expanded and realistic exchange of
persons program between the Soviet Union
and the United States should be inaugurated
at once. This expansion can be achieved
with no additional cost, by simply discon-
tinuing many so-called information programs
operated elsewhere that are unnecessary. As
detailed in the body of my report, I am con-
vinced that most of the peoples of the Soviet
Union are sincere' in their belief that the
form of government and the economic system
under which they live are second to none.
This conviction flows from their inability to
compare their present-day living standards,
industrial and agricultural techniques, cul-
tural progress and technological development
with anything other than those existing
within the Soviet Union's borders in prior
times. By exchanging delegations, from
every walk of life?scientists, technicians,
workers, farmers, students, legislators?the
people of Russia would have the opportunity
to see at firsthand the boundless advantages
which a free-enterprise system, founded on
the bedrock of representative government,
has to offer. In this program, however, ex-
treme care must be exercised. Under no
circumstances should a bona fide exchange
program be permitted to become a means for
infiltration of our borders by Soviet agents.
? "3. With the change of our emphasis in
cold war policy toward the Soviet Union
outlined in recommendations 1 and 2, de-
signed to dispel the fear which exists be-
tween the peoples of the United States and
the U.S.S.R., and to create a climate of con-
fidence, should also come increased willing-
ness upon our part to meet as often as possi-
ble with leaders of Iron Curtain countries,
or the Soviet Union. Despite the record of
broken promises which prior Soviet leaders
have left in the wake of prior talks, our
failure to join and participate in top-level
conferences?even summit conferences?pro-
vides powerful ammunition for the Soviet
propaganda machine. It eases the task of
Red information agencies to picture the
United States to the people of the Soviet
Union?along with other lands throughout
the world?as unwilling to discuss peaceful
solutions of world problems.
"The committee is well acquainted with
the desire of all Americans to attain and
maintain a lasting world peace, a peace se-
cured in dignity and made lasting through
mutual trust. However, our Government's
failure to show a willingness to confer with
Soviet leaders on the peaceful solution of
world tensions is being broadcast throughout
the length and breadth of the world as in-
dicative of our aggressive intentions. With a
weapon such as this at the command of ex-
pert Communist propagandists, we are con-
stantly losing ground in our effort to main-
tain sympathy for and understanding of our
international objectives.
"4. I recommend that our policy of at-
tempting to create full-fledged modern
armies in small underdeveloped countries
be terminated, and that our assistance be
confined to a realistic technical-aid effort.
This move would be designed to create a
broad base of trained native peoples, a base
which would attract private investment capi-
tal, or which?at the very least?could prop-
erly utilize any government-to-government
capital which might later be made available
for development purposes. An approach of
this type would strengthen the economic
stability of the country, while at the same
time allowing the country to maintain its
prestige and self-respect by standing on its
own feet.
"By encouraging underdeveloped countries
to maintain military forces far beyond their
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S 3530 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE
capabilities to support, we are actually creat-
ing conditions tailor made for the advance
of communism.
'As the Comptroller General noted in his
report to Congress on an examination of the
military assistance program on March 31,
190, the extensions of arms aid to a num-
ber of nations has not always been motivated
by purely military considerations, nor has
the impact of this aid been properly evalu-
ated in advance, or In conjunction with, its
availability.
The military force objectives presently
approved for United States support in cer-
tain allied countries are not always realistic
in terms of recipient country manpower and
financial capabilities, are not always mutu-
ally acceptable to the countries concerned.
and are not always ITIOLIVated by military
considerations (report, supra, p. 2).'
"'In a number of countries the United
States has programed and is delivering mili-
tary equipment in excess of that which can
be effectively absorbed and utilized by the
recipients, at their existing stage of develop-
ment. The recipients either have not been
able to use the aid furnished because of their
financial and economic Incapacity and their
manpower limitations or they have not de-
sired to use the assistance for the purposes
intended by the United States (report, supra,
p. 3 ).'
"As it now stands the hasty application of
great amounts of economic and military aid
to newly independent, underdeveloped na-
tions is often working to our extreme dis-
advantage.
"First, in those nations whose economies
are not sufficiently developed to maintain a
military force of the capabilities desired by
United States advisers, the gap in national
income created by heavy military expendi-
tures is sought to be filled by America ex-
tending so-called defense-support assistance.
"As administered in the past, this type of
economic aid has frequently failed to trickle
down to the masses. In a number of coun-
tries, particularly in the Middle Fast, and
southeast Asia, living standards remain via-
ably unchanged for the great majority of
people despite large United States expendi-
tures there. There are in these countries,
two economic strata?the very rich, and the
miserably poor.
"The latter are, without exception, the
object of constant Soviet propagandizing.
United States policies, requiring the main-
tenance of large standing military forces,
are blamed for low living standards. 'Cap-
italistic' America is also blamed for lining
the pockets of the rich while caring little for
the poor.
"In these same countries, as the body of
my report demonstrates, the wealthy pay
little or nothing in the way of income taxes,
or, lor that matter, all taxes as compared to
us. Thus, as the whole burden of defense
and economic growth in a given nation may
be ours, so is the blame for that nation's
poverty heaped upon our shoulders."
?
"While I am convinced that the Lmple-
mer Lation of these recommendations would
result in a much higher degree of success
than a continuation of our present policies,
it if, not my view that they will work mir-
acles overnight. On the contrary, the 'new
look' I have advocated should take place con-
currently with the maintenance of a strong
defense by the United States. We must not
lower our guard, A modern, efficient De-
fewe Establishment is the best guarantee
we have against any attempt on the part of
would-be world conquerors to follow the
path of aggression instead of peaceful inter-
national competition.
"In essence, the burden of my recom-
mendations involves the maximum use of
the single greatest resource our Nation
potsesses? not dollars, but the tremendous
abundance of both material and spiritual
advantages which freedom has to offer.
'America is the world's greatest showplace
for the accomplishments of a free economy
dedicated to providing a free people with the
highest standard of living in the world.
'With such an exhibit of the fruits of our
labors, It should be readily apparent that,
In comparison with our growth over the rela-
tively same period of time, Russia's advance
has been accomplished despite, rather than
because of, the dictates of socialist theories,
and perhaps owes its success more to the
hard work of her people than to any tenet or
theory set forth by Lenin, Marx, or Stalin.
"Let us open wide the doors to our show-
place: let us welcome all who would come to
see--to compare?to imitate.
' Let Us lay the foundation for trade and a
restoration of commercial contacts between
the East and the West.
'Let us not apologize for our abundance,
but, rather, let us display it to the peoples
of the world RS an example of what hard
work can achieve for all who are willing to
work.
? Let us be honest enough to caution those
who are to choose between socialism and
freedom that such miracles are not wrought
.overnight, but mut come gradually and
through self-help.
'Above all other things, let us not fear an
honest competition with Soviet communism.
'The approach I have outlined involves
only the realization that It Is time for our
country to choose a more advantageous
ground upon which to wage this most critical
battle of the cold war.
? We have been confronted in recent years
by what amounts to nothing more than an
all-out effort on the part of the Soviets to
defeat the democratic nations by peaceful
means. Rather than see victory go to them
by default. I urge our Government to pour
its full effort Into a massive fight for the
minds of men?all men, everywhere."
Mr. FONG. Mr. President, for the
past few weeks I have carefully studied
all aspects of the Consular Convention
between the United States of America
and the Union of Soviet Socialist Repub-
lics, together with a protocol relating to
that convention.
I have read with great care the exten-
sive testimony before the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee and the Commit-
tee's reports both in 1965 and 1967. I
have studied the President's messages
and have followed the speeches Senators
have made, together with the floor de-
bate, on this extremely important matter.
I have withheld final judgment until
I have had the opportunity to study
thoroughly all the evidence and all the
views of our Nation's most knowledgeable
persons.
In arriving at my decision, I have been
impelled by one paramount considera-
tion, and one consideration only: Is this
convention in the best Interests of Amer-
ica?
Many factors?diplomatic, military,
political, historic, judicial, and others?
enter into the decision as to what con-
stitutes the best interests of America.
After evaluating all these factors, and
after weighing their relative importance,
I have concluded that, in balance, ratifi-
cation of this Consular Convention and
its protocol is in the best interests of our
country. For this reason, and for rea-
sons which I will subsequently outline,
I have decided to vote for ratification.
March 10, 1967
HISTORT OF THE CONVENTION
Mr. President, when the United States
first established relations with the
U.S.S.R. In 1933, an exchange of letters
between President Roosevelt and Soviet
Foreign Minister Litvinov stated that it
had been agreed that a consular con-
vention would be negotiated "immedi-
ate4 following the establishment of rela-
tions between our two countries."
Soviet consulates were then opened in
New York and San Francisco in 1934
and in Los Angeles in 1937. In 1941 we
opened a consulate in Vladivostok. But
In 1948, the Soviet Government closed its
consulates in the United States and
shortly after that we closed our con-
sulate in Vladivostok. Before these con-
sulates were closed, we had requested and
received permission to open a consulate
in Leningrad, but we have never done
so.
Although there have been these con-
sulates In the Soviet Union and the
United States, there has never been ne-
gotia td a consular convention between
the two countries. It was only many
year later that negotiations were
started.
At the 1955 Geneva Summit Confer-
ence. President Eisenhower's proposal for
"conlrete steps" to lower "the barriers
which now impede the opportunities of
people to travel anywhere in the world"
led to a relaxation by the Bulganin-
Khrushchev regime of tight Stalinist.
controls. This in turn led to greatly in-
creased American travel to the U.S.S.R.
As more and more American travelers
went to the Soviet Unica, we began to
realize that we needed tc protect Amer-
ican citizens by negotiating an explicit
consular convention with the U.S.S.R.
At the Camp David talks in 1959. Secre-
tary of State Christian Herter proposed
such a treaty to Soviet Foreign Minister
Grorayko. Drafts were exchanged in
early 1960, but there was little further
activity, because of subsequent strains in
United States-Soviet relalons, until Sep-
tember 1963, when formal negotiations
began in Moscow.
After 8 months of hard negotiations,
the convention and the protocol were
signed on June 1, 1964, and submitted to
the Senate by the President on June 12,
1964.
PROVISIONS OF THE CONVENT:ON AND PROTOCOL
The convention regulaies the consular
affairs of each country in the territory
of the other and the tTatment to be
accorded to consular officials and em-
ployees. The convention covers such
matters as the status of a consular estab-
lishment, the duties and functions of
consular officers, and the rights, privi-
leges, and immunities of the consular
personnel of each country stationed in
the territory of the other country.
Al such, the conventior, in effect estab-
lishes the ground rules for the two coun-
tries?ground rules on setting up a kind
of business office in each other's country.
However, the convention does not itself
authorize the opening of consulates or
specify the number which may be opened.
It merely provides the legal framework
for the activity of the accredited consular
officers, whether attached to an Embassy
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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? SENATE S 3531
or to consulates which might be opened
as a result of separate negotiations.
The convention follows the pattern of
other bilateral consular conventions to
which the United States is a party,
formalizing what is normally a routine
bilateral exchange of officials. But this
particular convention and protocol is dis-
tinctive in several ways.
It contains two provisions relating to
the protection of American citizens,
which would be operative immediately, as
follows:
First. It requires the receiving state to
notify consular officers of the sending
state of the arrest or detention of a na-
tional of the sending state within 1 to 3
days from the time of arrest or detention
depending on conditions of communica-
tion.
Second. It provides that consular offi-
cers of the sending state may visit and
communicate with a national of the
sending state who is under arrest or de-
tained in custody by the receiving state
within 2 to 4 days of the arrest or de-
tention, depending on his location, and
on a continuing basis thereafter.
The convention also states, for the first
time in any consular agreement to which
the United States is a party, that con-
sular officers and employees of the send-
ing state will be immune from the crim-
inal jurisdiction of the receiving state.
This provision extends to consular of-
ficers and personnel the same unre-
stricted immunity from criminal prose-
cution that embassy officers and em-
ployees now enjoy. In other consular
conventions to which the United States
is a party, the immunity granted con-
sular officers and employees has gen-
erally been limited to misdemeanors,
The proposed convention extends the
immunity to felonies.
These immunity provisions do not go
Into effect automatically. They only be-
come effective when consulates are
agreed upon as a result of separate nego-
tiations and are subsequently estab-
lished.
The proposed convention contains
provisions designed to guard against pos-
sible abuse of this criminal immunity.
The receiving state has the explicit right
to declare consular officers persona non
grata and consular employees unaccept-
able. Moreover, all persons enjoying im-
munity from criminal jurisdiction are
obliged to respect the laws and regula-
tions of the receiving states, including
traffic regulations.
The convention also contains a num-
ber of measures to safeguard against the
danger of subversion. If, after ratifica-
tion of the convention, the United States
agrees to the opening of a Soviet con-
sulate here, the officers and employees
of the consulate will be subject to the
same screening and entry controls as
officers and employees of the Soviet Em-
bassy in Washington. They will also be
subject to the same travel restrictions as
those which apply to diplomatic per-
sonnel.
Finally, the convention may be termi-
nated on 6 months' notice by either
party,
From this brief sketch of the provi-
sions of the convention and protocol, it
is evident that this is an unusual treaty,
rather than a routine agreement relat-
ing to consulates.
This treaty represents the first bi-
lateral agreement we have ever nego-
tiated with the Soviet Union, It is the
first between the world's two super-
powers.
? The proposed Consular Convention is
the first between our country and a coun-
try which has been our adversary in the
tense, trying, and costly cold war of some
20 long years?a country which has been
supplying arms, aircraft, missiles, oil, and
other weapons and material to the North
Vietnamese and the Vietcong?the same
weapons and material used against
American troops in our effort to stem
Communist aggression in southeast Asia.
It is no wonder, then, that so much
concern and objections have been ex-
pressed over the question of the treaty's
ratification.
THE SOVIET UNION AND THE WAR IN VIETNAM
Many Americans are opposed to the
timing of this treaty. They feel it should
be deferred until settlement of the Viet-
nam war. They point out that the
United States is now engaged in a bloody
conflict in Vietnam with an enemy which
is being substantially equipped and aided
by the Soviet Union.
They question the wisdom of our mak-
ing any kind of conciliatory gesture--or
any gesture that may be so interpreted?
toward the Soviet Union, as long as
American blood continues to be shed in
that conflict. Why should we render any
degree of respectability to a regime
which continues to mobilize world opin-
ion against us, to send massive infusions
of military aid to our enemies, and which
has called us "worldwide public enemy
No. 1?" they ask.
These paints are indeed well worth
considering. For while it may be pointed
out that the monolithic international
Communist partnership is a thing of the
past as a result of the Sino-Soviet split,
they are nevertheless firmly united
against all Western forms of democracy
and are actively abetting Hanoi's aggres-
sion.
Moreover, there are absolutely no in-
dications that ratification of this treaty
will halt the flow of Soviet war material
to Hanoi; nor is there any evidence that
ratification will bring an end to the cold
war.
As valid as these points may be, the
real question is: Should Soviet aid to
North Vietnam and her various differ-
ences with us blind us and prevent our
two nations from arriving at agreements
on any and all matters, especially those
more beneficial to us?and at the same
time affording a relaxation of tensions
between our two nations, no matter how
slight? Are the best interests of our
country served by adamant and stubborn
refusal to meet on common grounds
whenever such is possible?
We have learned, and learned well,
since World War II, that grave crises be-
tween the U.S.S.R. and the nations of
the West occur with grievous and calcu-
lated regularity. At the same time, we
have also learned that the road to the
mitigation of these tensions and, even-
tually, world peace, cannot be built by
prolonging and deepening the cold war,
but rather by painstakingly and patiently
searching for areas on which we might
find mutual agreement.
The pending convention and protocol
is, to me, a symbol?admittedly a small
one?of the willingness of the two coun-
tries to separate emotion and ideological
differences from interests which are
basic and compatible to both. The treaty
is not so much a gesture of conciliation,
as it is an agreement that the mutual
interests of both countries will be ad-
vanced, however slightly, by the estab-
lishment of missions designed to serve
nondiplomatic interests.
Like the Limited Nuclear Test Ban
Treaty, the Civil Air Agreement, and the
Treaty on Outer Space, the convention
represents another small, tentative step
to reduction of world tensions, an ex-
periment in cooperation between our
two countries.
INTERRELATIONSHIP OF TREATY TO OTHER
PROPOSALS
Arguments have been advanced that
ratification of the Consular Convention
would be used as an opening wedge and
prelude to proposals relaxing East-West
trade relations.
Mr. President, I fully appreciate this
argument. But I am not convinced
that ratification of this pending treaty
will create an irresistible momentum
leading to the hasty consideration and
adoption of the East-West trade bill. It
is tantamount to saying that because
we did ratify the Limited Nuclear Test
Ban Treaty and the Civil Air Agreement,
we will be forced to pass the East-West
trade bill. This is absurd.
Proposals such as the East-West trade
bill, while affecting our overall relations
with the Communist bloc, deal with a
completely different subject.
I am fully aware of the fact that pas-
sage of the East-West trade bill might
result in the transshipment of strategic
war supplies to North Vietnam via Soviet
Russia?material that would be used di-
rectly against American troops. It
might also result in the shipment of so-
called nonstrategic goods to the Soviet
Union, thus enabling her to free her
manufacturing potential to produce war
supplies for use in the Vietnam war. I
am confident that this East-West trade
proposal will be carefully and thorough-
ly considered on its individual merits.
I am equally confident that each new
measure proposing some degree of re-
laxation of East-West tensions will be
done with a long memory and a healthy
skepticism about Communist intentions,
and a determined vigilance to maintain
all safeguards essential to America's
long-term security interests.
SOVIET TRUSTWORTHINESS
Mr. President, I am well aware of the
long record of treaty violations by the
Soviet Union. The catalog of such vio-
lations is far too long to repeat here.
They may be found in a study prepared
by the Department of State in 1961, en-
titled "Background Information on the
Soviet Union in International Rela-
tions."
Because of this background of un-
trustworthiness, many Americans right-
fully raise the question, Can the Soviets
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S 3532 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? SENATE March 10, 1967.
be relied upon to observe the terms of
the proposed Consular Convention and
protocol?
A careful analysis of the history of
United States-Soviet relations shows
that Soviet violations of international
agreements and treaties took place
largely during the Stalin period. De-
spite its earlier record of repeated viola-
tions of international obligations, the
Soviet Government?particularly in re-
cent years---has increasingly found it to
be in its interest to live up to it-s com-
mitments.
It has been found that the Soviet
Union is a party to a number of multi-
lateral and bilateral agreements which
it has not violated. Among the most
important of these agreements are the
Austrian State Treaty, 1955; the Antarc-
tic 'rreaty, 1959; and the Limited Nu-
clear Test Ban Treaty, 1963.
Treaties between sovereign govern-
ments are negotiated on the basis of
mutual seLf-interest, not as rewards for
good conduct or as evidence of good
faith. According to the most knowl-
edgeable persons in this field, there are
a number of areas in which the inter-
ests of the United States and the Soviet
Union coincide; the problem is to care-
fully delineate and thoroughly explore
them before even embarking on explor-
atory talks.
Examples of such areas of mutual self-
interest are those embodied in the Lim-
ited Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, the Treaty
on Outer Space, and the treaty on the
nonproliferation of nuclear weapon?
which is still under discussion. Each of
these agreements either has built-in
safeguards or is self-enforcing.
Similarly, the proposed Consular Con-
vention was carefully drafted to provide
protections against abuse. As I pointed
out earlier, if the Soviet Union should
violate its terms, the United States could
suspend it or, with 6 months' notice, ter-
minate it. If a Soviet consulate should
be opened later on in this country and
its personnel violate our laws or the
standards of behavior we would expect,
we could expel them or close the con-
sulate.
TIIE THREAT OF ESPIONAGE
Mr. President, every American is
rightly concerned about the increased
opportunity for espionage on the part
of Soviet agents if a Soviet consulate is
eventually opened here. Consequently,
the convention could present a threat to
the security of America.
Without a doubt, the Communists are
most adept and vigorous at using their
diplomatic posts as centers of espionage
activities. I am equally certain that
they would not hesitate to use their
American consular offices in the same
way.
However, as I mentioned earlier, the
treaty neither authorized the opening
of consulates nor specifies their number,
so ;hat Senate ratification will not auto-
matically result in the establishment of
even one Soviet consulate. The pro-
posed convention merely provides the
legal framework for their operation if
and when they are established as a re-
sult of new negotiations after ratifi-
cation.
It is my understanding that there are
presently no formal proposals or plans
pending for the opening of consular of-
fices in either country. If, at a later
date, such negotiations were Initiated,
we have the assurance of the Department
of State that members of the Senate
Foreign Relations Committee and other
concerned Senators would be fully con-
sulted, along with the municipal authori-
ties of any American city under consid-
eration as a consular site.
We are also assured that, in the event
a Soviet consulate were established in
this country, the United States would
insist that the number of Soviet consular
personnel enjoying immunities under the
convention be strictly limited, and in no
case, would it exceed the number of
Americans to receive identical immuni-
ties in the consulate we would open in
the U.S.S.R,
According to the Department of State,
the total number of Soviet citizens now
enjoying full diplomatic immunity in the
United States is 452. If a consular of-
fice were opened, his would add another
10 or 15. Thus, the small scale of the
threat is readily apparent. Indeed, as
Mr. Hoover himself has said on this
point a few weeks ago:
The F.B.I. can definitely handle any addi-
tional responsibilities brought, about by the
approval of the treaty. The (extra) ex-
penditure in funds . . could be absorbed
within our current appropriation.
In addition the United States would
also be authorized by the treaty to screen
the personnel of a Soviet consulate be-
fore agreeing to their assignment here.
The screening process makes it much
easier to scrutinize the activities of po-
lit.cal agents who enter the country as
registered representatives of a foreign
government than when they enter clan-
destinely.
We are also authorized by the treaty
to prevent them from travelling to sensi-
the areas in the country and to expel
them if they prove to be undesirable.
We could close a Soviet consulate in the
United States whenever we wished, and
we could cancel the Consular Conven-
tion?as I said earlier?on 6 months' no-
tice.
All of the treaty's provisions, of course,
cut both ways. If Soviet consular per-
sonnel are eventually allowed into the
United States, we would, reciprocally,
send to the Soviet Union an equal num-
ber of such personnel.
Given the closed character of Soviet
society, however, it seems evident that
the United States stands to gain far
more information from consular surveil-
lance than does the Soviet Union. As
conditions stand today, our sources of in-
formation within the U.S.S.R. are very
limited. I believe that the more openings
we have into the Soviet Union to shed
light on the operations and dealings of
the Soviet Government, the better.
DIPLOMATIC IMMUNITY FOR CONSULAR
PERSONNEL
Mr. President, besides the fear of the
increased threat to our internal security,
many of our citizens have expressed a
deep concern about the treaty provisions
granting full diplomatic immunity from
criminal prosecution to the consular
staffs of both countries. They consider
this f, dangerous carte blanche for Soviet
espionage and other forra3 of subversion.
The United States has consular con-
ventions with many other countries, they
point out. None of them includes a pro-
vision granting full diplomatic immunity
from criminal prosecution to consular
staffs. Why, then, should such a provi-
sion he included in this proposed conven-
tion with the Soviet Union?
As I have already noted, in terms of
the number of additions', personnel in-
volved, the screening of Soviet personnel,
and ;ravel restrictions W2 could impose
on them, the risks involved in this grant
of diplomatic immunity appear to be few.
E,crially important, we favor the diplo-
matic immunity clause tecause we feel
that it is important to have the same
protection for American consular officers
and employees in the Soviet Union.
Since 1946, 31 Americans at our Em-
bassy in Moscow have been expelled by
the Soviets, most often on allegations of
espionage. Without diplomatic Munn-
nity from criminal prosecution, our con-
sular employees could be jailed or suffer
even harsher punishment on similar
trumped-up charges.
Furthermore, whenever a Soviet citi-
zen is arrested in this country for espio-
nage Soviet authorities might be tempted
to take retaliatory action against an
American consular employee who is not
accorded full diplomatic immunity.
Other governments similarly protect
their consular officials and employees
serving in the U.S.S.R.: for example,
the British and the Japanese recently
negotiated consular conventions with
the Soviet Union containing immunity
pror-sions modeled afte: those in the
U.S.S.R. agreement.
While this immunity provision would
prevent our taking punitive action
against a Soviet official caught spying,
we can expel him from the country, sus-
pend or close the consulate altogether as
countermeasures.
EXTRUSION OF DIPLOMATIC IMMUNITY TO CON-
SULAR PERSONNEL OF OTHER COUNTRIES
President, even those who concur
with the diplomatic immunity provisions
of It e pending convention are concerned
about its portent for the future.
The United States now has 35 agree-
ments in force with other countries
which require us to extend most-favored-
nation treatment to consular officers, and
In some cases to consular employees.
Twenty-seven of these countries?in-
cluding Yugoslavia and Rumania?now
have consular offices here, with a total of
about 577 personnel.
Under the most-favored-nation clauses
of the treaties we have with these coun-
tries, if those nations agree to grant im-
munity from criminal jwiscliction to the
424 American consular personnel sta-
tioned there, the United States would
have to extend the sane treatment to
their people here.
The Department of State recently
asked our embassies in tlese 27 countries
to estimate whether their host nation
would ask for most-favored-nation treat-
mer t. The replies indicated that, at
most, 11 might make such requests; 290
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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD
people would be involved and, of this
number, only a few are from Communist
nations. The 290 figure also represents
a very small proportion of the estimated
total of 9,400 foreign diplomatic officers,
members of their families, and employ-
ees, who now enjoy full diplomatic im-
munity in the United States.
PROTECTION OF AMERICANS TRAVELING IN THE
Among the most important and signif-
icant provisos in the Soviet Consular
Convention are those which permit the
United States promptly to protect and
assist its citizens when they are arrested
and detained in the Soviet Union. These
provisions, which I cited earlier, require
that American consular officials be given
immediate notification and access to
Americans who are accused of wrong-
doing and arrested by Soviet officials.
These requirements would go into ef-
fect immediately upon ratification, even
if no consulates were ever to be opened
by the two countries.
Under the proposed treaty, the Rus-
sians would have to notify us within 48
hours of an arrest, and we would have
continuing access after a period not to
exceed 2 to 4 days. We now have no such
rights.
The significance of these provisions is
underscored by the, fact that under So-
viet law a person can be held, incom-
municado, for months?without the right
to notify his embassy, without charges
being lodged against him, and without
the right to counsel.
Thus, under the terms of the treaty,
the Soviet Union would be giving to
American citizens rights far in excess of
those provided under their own law to
their own citizens. Moreover, the Soviet
Union acquires no rights under these
provisions in the United States which
they do not already enjoy?rights which
we could not, even if we wanted to do so,
withdraw, because our Constitution re-
quires the extension of these rights to
noncitizens as well as citizens.
It is true that these rights of access,
continuous communication, notification
of the charge,, and of counsel do not bulk
large when compared to the extremely
high standards of individual liberty
guaranteed by the Constitution of the
United States. But in the context of the
totalitarian Soviet legal system, under
which even Soviet citizens are not
granted such elementary procedural due
process rights, they are, indeed, of great
importance.
These rights assume even greater sig-
nificance when one considers the fact
that American visitors to the Soviet
Union outnumber Soviet visitors to the
United States by a ratio of about 18 to 1.
It has been estimated that some 18,000
Americans visit the U.S.S.R. annually,
and this number is expected to grow.
Soviet visitors to this country, on the
other hand, have remained at the 900-
per-annum level in the past 5 years.
To most Americans who are accus-
tomed to the vigilance of our courts in
protecting the rights of arrested persons,
it is rather difficult to accept the fact that
under Soviet law access to an arrested
person can be refused while the case is
under investigation?for a period of
weeks, months, even Rroved For R
SENATE S 3533
To recall some of the more recent
cases, in 1961 American student Martin
Makinen was held from July 21 to Sep-
tember 4 before the U.S. Embassy was
even notified of his detention. A more
famous case involved the U-2 pilot Gary
Powers, who was held incommunicado by
Soviet authorities for 21 months.
Another case was that of Yale Pro-
fessor Barghoorn, whose arrest in 1953
the United States learned about only
after 12 days, and whom Americans offi-
cials were never permitted to see in
prison. Another was the tragic case of
Newcomb Mott in 1965. Nine days
elapsed before any American official was
allowed access to him, and then for only
1 hour. Only three other consular meet-
ings were allowed in the next 10 weeks
prior to trial. Mott was sentenced to 18
months in prison; apparently, he was in
a very despondent state because of the
isolation in which he had been held, He
died shortly afterward in circumstances
that have not yet been fully explained.
Peace Corpsman Thomas Dawson was
apprehended by Soviet border guards on
September 11, 1966, while gathering sea-
shells barefoot near the Soviet-Iranian
border. Our Embassy was never notified
of his arrest, and it was not until Sep-
tember 20 that consular access was
accorded.
In just the 32 months since the pending
convention was signed, we know of at
least 20 cases where Americans have been
arrested and detained by the Soviet ro-
lice. In none of these cases have we
been notified of the incident or allowed
to visit the American within a reasonable
period of time?and certainly not within
the time limits specified by the terms of
the treaty.
Probably, if the pending Consular
Convention and protocol had been in
force, the United States could not have
prevented any of these Americans from
being jailed in Soviet prisons. But the
standards provided by the treaty would
have greatly assisted American officials
in their efforts to assure them signifi-
cantly more protection.
It is also important that if the con-
vention had been in effect, it would have
rendered unnecessary the repeated rep-
resentations by the United States at
very high political levels, in order to
secure even late and limited access to
our citizens. The rights of international
due process which the treaty would pro-
vide should be available without ques-
tion, without delay, and without the
need for continuous and insistent high-
level diplomacy. They should be ac-
corded as a matter of course.
It is this very minimal standard, but
nonetheless a very important one, which
is sought by the provisions of the treaty.
These protections are not the only
ones which would be available to all
American citizens traveling in the So-
viet Union. Any American who has
traveled abroad will realize that there
are many occasions in which they might
require the assistance of a consular of-
fice.
Under the terms of the convention,
consular officials would be allowed to
look after the nondiplomatic transac-
tions of their citizens. This assistance,
ggiiiingtgiciuhl2elqetclAglkit9OfitigDO
ters as notary rights, birth and marriage
certificates, wills, and travel documents.
Consular service would also provide
Americans with translation help, advice
about domestic laws, and assistance in
personal and professional dealings with
the Soviet Government or Soviet citi-
zens.
CONVENTION IS SMALL STEP TO PEACE
Mr. President, the sole, relevant ques-
tion to be asked, after thoroughly and
carefully studying all of the considera-
tions I have outlined, is: Does the pro-
posed Consular Convention and the pro-
tocol with the Soviet Union serve the
best interests of the United States?
After thoughtful study of the implica-
tions of the pending treaty, I have con-
cluded that it does.
I am satisfied that America's defense
posture, military strength, and firm
vigilance will be maintained and our se-
curity safeguarded.
I support the treaty, because, although
the treaty alone will not eliminate all
the differences which separate the So-
viet Union and the United States, it will
help bring more understanding to them.
Although it will not eliminate the po-
litical harassment of American citizens
by the Soviet Union, it will help reduce
its incidence.
Although its ratification represents a
risk, I believe that the risk is manageable.
Although the treaty is not a panacea,
it does provide for the faint beginnings
of increased protection of American citi-
zens abroad. Moreover, along with the
Limited Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, the
convention, and protocol may represent
another tentative step toward the easing
of tensions, and perhaps even the im-
provement of relations between the
world's two superpowers.
This treaty is in a sense an experiment
In trust which might produce sufficient
mutual confidence to lead eventually to
other steps toward increasing the pros-
pect of a lasting world peace.
I do hope that the Senate will ratify
the treaty.
Mr. President, I suggest the absence
of a quorum.
The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. MON-
DALE in the chair). The clerk will call
the roll.
The legislative clerk proceeded to call
the roll.
Mr. MUNDT. Mr. President, I ask
unanimous consent that the order for the
quorum call be rescinded.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without
objection, it is so ordered.
Mr. MUNDT. Mr. President, I would
like to address myself for a while today
to the two "good faith" reservations
which I introduced in the Senate yester-
day. Both of these reservations call
upon the parties to the Consular Conven-
tion between the United States and the
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics to
exhibt and exemplify good faith as a
condition precedent to the treaty and as
a continuing condition if the treaty is to
be ratified and kept in operation.
The pending reservation which will be
voted on Tuesday stipulates that there
will be no exchange of instruments of
ratification of the convention until the
Soviet Union has agreed to two condi-
tions. It is before us, identified as "Ex-
Seggt diriffokil) PIP28 l'm We are,
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S 3534 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE
therefore, calling for good faith in this
instance on the part of Russia. I shall
also discuss today, later in my speech,
some of the reasons why I believe my
second good-faith resolution should be
approved, calling upon the President to
notify Congress that Russian supplies of
weapons and petroleum are no longer
prolonging the war in Vietnam as a con-
dition precedent to the implementation
of this Consular Treaty.
The two conditions are, first, that we
ix! allowed to distribute to the Soviet
press announcements of U.S. public
policy, both foreign and domestic, and
answers to any ciiticism of such policy
contained in the Soviet press; and,
second, that the Soviet Union remove re-
strictions on the number of U.S. press
representatives permitted in that coun-
try so long as that number does not ex-
ceed the number of Soviet press repre-
sentatives entering the United States, and
provides that no restriction of expres-
sion or movement be imposed upon our
American press corps representatives in
Russia which do not prevail for Russian
press representatives in the United
States.
Mr. President, through an inadvert-
ence, the resolution identified as Execu-
tive Reservation No. 1, as printed in the
RECORD yesterday, and as lying on the
desk of Senators, is incomplete because
one clause was omitted in the printing
through no fault of anybody except the
present speaker.
I ask unanimous consent that the full
text of the reservation, as it will be re-
printed and appear on the desks of Sen-
ators on Monday, and as proposed by its
coauthors, be printed at this point in my
remarks.
There being no objection, the reserva-
tion was ordered to be printed in the
RECORD, as follows:
EXECUTIVE RESERVATION 1
Reservation intended to be proposed by
Mr. MUNDT. DOMINICK, and FIRUSKA to the
-;:esolution of ratification of the Consular
Convention between the United States of
America and the Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics, together with a protocol relating
thereto, signed at Moscow on June 1, 1984:
Before the period at the end of the resolu-
tion of ratification Insert a comma and the
i7o11owing: "subject to the reservation that
no exchange of Instruments of ratification
of the convention shall be entered into on
behalf of the United States until the Union
of Soviet Socialist Republics shall have
agreed (1) to permit the distribution to the
Soviet press or any segment thereof by
United States diplomatic and consular offi-
cers of announcements of United States
public policy, both foreign and domestic,
arid answers to any criticism of such policy
contained in the Soviet press, and (2) not
to impose or enforce any limitation on the
number of United States citizens permitted
to be in the Soviet Union at any time as
representatives of the United States press
which would effectively reduce them below
the number of Soviet press representatives
entering the United States, or to impose upon
them any conditions of travel or objective
reporting which do not prevail for Soviet
press representatives within the United
States."
Mr. MUNDT. Mr. President, before I
go into the particulars of these two
points, I would like to comment on the
atmosphere in which they are offered.
During the hearings before the Foreign
Relations Committee in which this Con-
sular Convention was considered and
also In the hearings on China and south-
east Asia, witness after witness testified
to the theory that Russia had mellowed,
that it was no longer the totalitarian
police state it once was. What was true,
they said, in Stalin's time is no longer
true under the present regime. The is
Indeed, encouraging news?if true. I
know one way to find out. That is to al-
low representatives of our press, for
whom I have the highest regard for
factual reporting, to examine and report
on the programs of freedom throughout
the Soviet Union and to permit our diplo-
matic officials in Russia the same op-
portunities to be heard and read that are
enjoyed and exercised by Russia's diplo-
matic officials here in the United States.
If the Union of Soviet Socialist Republic
has mellowed, then it would seem to me
that they would be willing, even desirous,
to observe this reservation as a quid pro
quo. For few would deny that a truth-
ful press is the bulwark of freedom and
that an wiemcumbered and uncensored
press is the enemy of totalitarianism.
Has communism in Moscow mellowed,
then, or has it not? Is this a new Rus-
sia or the old one in new raiment? Are
they willing to accept a free press and a
free discussion of public affairs or are
they not? Now is the time to answer
all these questions and to utilize this
Consular Treaty as a proving ground to
measure theory against fact.
In this regard, as a start, I propose that
our press corps, and more particularly
our diplomatic officers, be allowed to
function within their boundaries as their
Russian representatives are allowed to
operate within owl. Let both sides be
allowed to tell their side of the story to
the people of both sides without inter-
ference. What is the opportunity for one
should be the opportunity for the other.
Reciprocity?full reciprocity?should be
the basic characteristic of any realistic
treaty between the U.S.S.R. and the
United States.
If a situation should arise in which one
party believes it should speak out, they
should say so?as the Soviet Union did
here in the United States in August of
1965 when it characterized the situation
in Watts as follows?and I read the
statement made by the Soviet diplomatic
mission in Washington:
There are momenta when one cannot keep
silent. Shocked to the depth of the soul by
the monstrous massacre of the population
of the Negro ghetto in Los Angeles, we are
addressing these words to express our in-
dignation, sorrow, and pain. .
We say this because we feel and see that
the carnage In Los Angeles Is no isolated
event. The disgraceful trail of violence
against the Negro population Is growing
longer from year to year. And the main
thing Is: There Is no end in sight. How long
will this go on? What "Great Society" is this
where people are brought to despair and then
In full daylight, before the eyes of the whole
world, shot by automatic rifles and machine
The events in Los Angeles cannot but be
associated In the minds of the people with
he barbarous actions of the American sol-
diers in Vietnam and the Dominican Re-
public,
Mr. President, I think I should repeat
that comment made by Russian diplo-
March 10, 1967
=tic officials in the United States be-
came I want everyone to know just what
they are saying, as part of the evidence
of this "detente" about which the State
Department talks so much but which it
is never able to define.
Here is what the Russian diplomatic
officials put out:
The events in Los Angeles cannot but be
associated in the minds of the people with
the barbarous actions of the American sol-
diers in Vietnam and the Dominican Re-
public.
Mr. President, they describe our heroic
American Armed Forces in Vietnam as
batarians. I think we should note that
and remember it and recall the state-
ment was made in the United States by
diplomatic personnel attached to the
Russian Embassy on 16th Street, Wash-
ington, D.C.
read on now from their statement:
In the rumble of the blocks tumbling don
In Los Angeles we hear the echo of the walls
of the ancient town of Santo Domingo crum-
bling under the pressure of tanks. The
flames flaring up over tie Negro ghetto re-
minded us of the burning towns and vil-
lages of Vietnam. . . .
That is the end of the quotation from
the statement of the diplomatic mission
in the United States from Moscow.
Should the United States be equally
entitled to "report" the recent riots on
Red Square between tin Chinese and the
Russians as a "slaughter," "bloodbath,"
and so forth, and relate it to the limo-
cent murders of thousands of South
Vietnamese by the Vietcong and the
North Vietnamese? No, not really, be-
cause we have been raised in the tradi-
tion of integrity of the press as much as
freedom of the press. But it is not out
of line to expect our press representa-
tives and diplomatic officers to tell the
true story of what happened at Watts or
in Moscow or Peking and have it print-
ed--that is, of course, if there really is to
be reciprocity between our two countries,
If there really is a detent, if there really
is going to be a continuing condition of
amity. In other words, what is sauce
for the Russian goose must not become
only stop for the American gander.
Mr. President, unless we correct this
treaty and plug up this deficiency, we
will bow low and appease the men in
Moscow without getting a quid pro quo
to which we are rightfully entitled in a
treaty of this kind.
if this is actually it two-way street
between openminded nations, surely the
Russians should exercise no objections,
as we did not, to the publication in their
newspapers of our interpretations of
what happens in this world, as we per- .
mitted them to publish in our news-
papers their heavily slanted and almost
obscene observations. Furthermore, the
Russians should have no objections, as
we do not, to clarifications in their news-
papers of what we consider inaccuracies
in the reported news.
That is, if the Government of the
U.S.S.R. has mellowed?if communism
has changed?if we are near a detente,
or have one now?certainly, Russia
should be willing to accept this condition
precedent?this treaty reservation. If
Russia should prove unwilling to do so,
the one-sided nature of this treaty's
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benefits should be made evident to all.
We should know it now, if we are to rat-
ify the treaty, whether this is a one-way
street or not. Is this another case of
allowing the Communist side every ad-
vantage while we fail to press for what
is rightfully ours? For the life of me, I
cannot understand it. In this peril-
filled world, I can understand, but can-
not accept, "Nervous Nellies"; but I can
neither understand nor accept "Half-
way Hannahs," when they approve poli-
cies beneficial only to the Communist
half of the ideological strugggle now pre-
valing in this world.
But there is another and more impor-
tant reason for expecting and hoping for
"good faith" on the part of the Soviet
Union in allowing American representa-
tives of the press, freedom of access and
movement in their country?and that is
my undying faith in mankind to reach
agreements once they know each other.
To achieve this end, I have probably
been the leading exponent of people-to-
people exchanges of ideas with the long-
est record of support for such programs,
dating back more than two decades.
I believe that our Government should
encourage such activity. I backed this
belief with legislation; it is on the books,
known as the Smith-Mundt Act of the
80th Congress, sometimes identified as
Public Law 402 of the 80th Congress.
It remains on the books today. I still
think it is the most lasting foundation
for peace. I think that men have an
inclination not to like people they do
not know. I am also the author of the
legislation enacted by the 80th Con-
gress which led to the formation of
UNESCO?the United Nations Educa-
tional Scientific, and Cultural Organi-
zation.
I am likewise the author of legisla-
tion which gave a permanent status,
adequate appropriations, and continuing
power to the Voice of America, as well
as other legislation which established
libraries in foreign countries, mobile mo-
tion picture programs, and low-cost
books, as well as the exchange-of-people
programs. Under the terms of my leg-
islation, a great many Russians have
had the privilege of coming to the United
States as visitors to look around, and to
return to their homeland.
But, Mr. President, I am not an advo-
cate, and never will be, of making trea-
ties with the U.S.S.R. which work to their
advantage without providing an equal
advantage to my country and the citi-
zens of America. When we talk about
the press, when we talk about what a
consular officer is going to be permitted
to see and hear and do in Russia, and
examine the fine print of the treaty,
it will be seen that we are making a very
poor horse trade by failing to crank into
this treaty what should be put into it
concerning freedom of action of press,
of observation, and of speech.
This reservation will help us accom-
plish the needed and necessary goal. It
will help us improve relations with the
people?note that I say "the people,"
and not necessarily the government, be-
cause I still feel we should aim toward
the people in totalitarian states since
their rulers and commissars give them
only one side of the story?the Commu-
nist slant. It will also enable our own
citizens to better understand the com-
plexities of today's world.
To improve relations between cowl-
tries we must first increase the area of
agreement. To accomplish this we must
first dissipate any ill will and miscon-
ceptions that exist toward us today in
the Soviet Union and then build up a
realistic understanding of our country.
Under the present circumstances this is
impossible. The constant war by the
Soviet press which daily poisons Russian
minds against us is probably the biggest
stumbling block we encounter in our ef-
fort to prove our peaceful intentions.
Access to the Russian people through
their press could counteract and hope-,
fully someday overcome this.
I deplore the fact that this consular
treaty remains so completely and elo-
quently silent on these important mat-
ters. The reservation introduced by
Senators MUNDT, HRUSKA, and DOMINICK
would correct this deficiency, plug that
gap, and provide a test of the sincerity
which must be present if any portion of
the treaty is to work successfully and in
the interests of the United States.
Conversely, the American people must
have the truth as to what the Soviet
Union is really like. Not propaganda
furnished by their government or by ac-
quiescent or unrealistic journalists. We
need the good and the bad, just as they
need the facts.
We need an opportunity for American
representatives of the press to function
over there as responsible members of the
free press function anywhere in order
that they may be enabled to get the facts
on which to base their reports.
? To do this it is necessary that we open
up all lines of communication including
all shades of political opinion. No more
blackballing of certain publications in
Russia which dare truthfully to report
unpleasant or unpopular Russian facts.
No more denial of the right for any in-
terested and legitimate correspondent to
have a "permanent office" in Russia. No
more 30-day visas with quick cancella-,
tions to those who may be unflattering,
even though journalistically truthful, in
their analysis of the Soviet Government
and its leaders, its policies, and programs.
A free press and truthful representa-
tion on both sides of the Iron Curtain?
that is all we ask for in the proposed
reservation. This we already offer them
here. This, I repeat again, must be the
cornerstone of understanding and even-
tual brotherhood of man.
Under the proposed reservation, on
which we shall vote next Tuesday, we
would tell the Russians, our Government,
and the world whether we really believe
In opening up the bridges of understand-
ing or whether we are simply interested
in a Consular Treaty to build a material-.
istic bridge over which increase the ex-
portation of profitable goods to Russia,
so it can further expand its exportation
of arms to increase the casualty lists in
Vietnam. We will vote on that reserva-
tion Tuesday, and I think it is important
that we consider these facts carefully be-
fore the vote.
Under the proposed reservation our
consular officers?our diplomats?our
American press?radio and TV corre-
spondents?would no longer be subject
to the curious Russian description of
Pravda which says:
There is no news in the truth and no truth
in the news.
It would provide, for the first time in
history, that those liberties, freedom of
movement, and rights of expression en-
joyed now by Russian officials in the
United States would be enjoyed, after
ratification, by Americans in Russia.
What is wrong with such a procedure?
I wish the negotiators that we sent
there to write these treaties would have
brought back the intention to correct
the prevailing evils while yielding to the
Russian Communist demands that the
treaty should provide for complete im-
munity which they demand for their
consular officers in this country, when
American history records that never be-
fore in the history of this Republic have
we granted any such immunity to such
personnel of any country in the world.
I regret that the Senate rejected the
Talmadge amendment yesterday. It
would have corrected this curious con-
cession to the Communist demands.
Mr. President, are the Russians really
willing now to grant us reciprocal treat-
ment? We shall see. Are we willing to
demand it? That is the question of the
hour. That is the decision we shall make
when we vote on this reservation next
Tuesday afternoon.
Will Senators demand the reciprocity
that our State Department negotiators
failed to insist upon? Or, if they did
insist upon it, they did so with such a
lack of competent persuasion that they
brought home an empty sack.
Incidentally, this is not merely the
question for next Tuesday or the ques-
tion for today. This is the question
of the decades since the recognition of
Red Russia by Franklin Roosevelt in
1933. We never seem to demand any-
thing in exchange for our diplomatic
concession. Clothed with the power to
advise and consent, is it too much to ask
that the U.S. Senate demand such
a concession now? Or have we so
far slipped in our independent func-
tions as the Senate of the United States
that when treaties come down the trail,
all we do is to consent? As Senators,
we take an oath to defend the Constitu-
tion and to protect the Republic; and
In that connection, in treatymaking,
we should understand our function is to
advise and consent?not merely reck-
lessly and regularly to give our automa-
tic consent.
The very fact that the Senate is spend-
ing a week or 10 days to discuss this
treaty is a shocking but gratifying de-
parture from the usual procedure, be-
cause ordinarily we are so quick to con-
sent that we never even seem to consider
our function of advising, The Consti-
tution provides that the Senate shall
advise and consent on questions of for-
eign policy. So on Tuesday we shall
write some advice in a yea-and-nay vote.
Each Senator can offer his advice as his
conscience dictates; but, at least, it will
be a rare occasion because Senators will
be advising the State Dejiartment and
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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? SENATE March 10, 1967
the world of what they want to have
happen.
I submit that this is not too much to
ask. If we are to accept the major
premise of the Department of State that
this is the time for building bridges be-
cause we are in a detente with the So-
viet Union, here is an opportunity for
Russia to give evidence of its acceptance
of that concept.
If it be demanded that we tell the true
story of our country to our people, it
seems to me to be rather imperative that
we have the right of expression in Rus-
sia, and I believe that now is the time
to take our case and our cause to the peo-
ple of Russia as well as to the world.
If we muff the ball now, if we muffle
the American trumpet now, when we
have a chance to express ourselves
strictly within the terms, the philoso-
phies, and the policies of the people who
wrote the treaty and who now propa-
gandize us to accept it, then we are to
blame, because the restrictions will con-
tinue to be imposed, unless we exercise
our responsibilities to advise by the
adoption of this reservation.
Let me turn now to my second pro-
posed good-faith resolution?the one we
have agreed to vote on after 6 hours de-
bate on Wednesday next.
My second good-faith resolution is
jointly introduced by Senators MUNDT,
MILLER, MURPHY, TOWER, COTTON,
HRUSKA, and CURTIS. It reads ES follows:
Before the period at the end of the reso-
lution of ratification insert a comma and
the following: "subject to the reservation
that no exchange of instruments of ratifi-
cation of this Convention should be entered
lrto on behalf of the United States, and the
C3nvention shall not enter Into force, until
the President determines and reports to the
Congress that (1) it is no longer necessary
to assign members of the Armed Forces of
the United States to perform combat duties
In the defense of South Vietnam or i21 the
rEmoval of members of the Armed Forces of
the United States from South Vietnam is
not being prevented or delayed because of
military assistance furnished North Viet-
nim by the Soviet Union,"
Mr. President, in my opinion, this res-
olution, in the nature of a reservation
establishing as a condition precedent to
the activization and operation of this
treaty the simple but important fact that
the President of the United States must
first notify Congress in writing that the
sending of Soviet arms and military sup-
plies to their Communist comrades in
North Vietnam is not prolonging the war
and delaying or preventing the return to
the United States the members of the
American Armed Forces serving in Viet-
nam, is the most important and signifi-
cant reservation upon which we shall
vote, and I believe that students of his-
tory, looking backward from the van-
tage point of a distant tomorrow, will
say that this resolution of reservation
Is the most significant and far-reaching
one upon which the U.S. Senate has
ever in American history been permitted
to vote; and that in this rollcall, we will
be writing history, and will be setting
precedent; and when it is concluded, we
shall have taken a big step toward short-
ening or lengthening the war in Vietnam
by the manner in which we vote and
by which we express or withhold our
advice.
Our decision on that resolution, Mr.
President, so directly tied as it is to the
prospects for peace in Vietnam and the
size of our American casualty lists of
the future, will be voted upon in a Sen-
ate rolleall, as I say, late on Wednesday
afternoon, following 6 hours of debate,
so that Senators may have an oppor-
tunity to discuss it, to debate it, to speak
on it, and to give their reasons for oppos-
',rig or supporting the resolution.
I submit that this is in fact a good-
faith resolution, because it gives us in the
U.S. Senate a chance to demonstrate,
by our votes and our voices, our desire
to keep faith with 500,000 American boys
now fighting freedom's war in far-off
Vietnam.
Mr. President, taking every argument
of this administration, and every plea
Dy the State Department at face value,
this Consular Treaty, if ratified, is pre-
sumed to give some extra degree of com-
fort and convenience or safety to those
among the 18,000 Americans traveling
for pleasure or for profit in Russia ev-
ery year who get in difficulty with the
law.
The hard, demonstrable fact?not
contrived out of the imagination of the
senior Senator from South Dakota, but
as reported by the testimony of the State
Department?is that an average of nine
Americans out of the 18,000 each year
get in trouble with the police in Russia.
I would like to help those nine Amer-
icans, I think that if they have the fi-
nancial means to visit Russia, whether
they go there to gain information or
pleasure, or to seek profit?there is noth-
ing wrong with those motives?if they
get in trouble with the law, that it would
be a good idea if we could do something
to be helpful.
I must say I am disappointed at the
kind of assistance the State Depart-
ment would provide. All the proposed
treaty says is, if one of those nine gets
in trouble, he shall have a right to notify
the consular office that he is in jail. The
only other thing it says is that after the
consular officer learns he is in jail, he
shall have a right to visit with him in
his Russian jail, a chance to talk. It
may be through the screen of a prison
cage, it may be under the hot light of
one of those torturous inventions they
have over there for blazing out the
truth, that they may confer by them-
selves; but that is all. Nothing in the
treaty says they are going to get him
out of jail. Nothing in the treaty says
he shall have a fair trial. Nothing in
the treaty says he can present his case
to the public and the press, to try to
mobilize public opinion behind him. He
can talk with his consular officer. Only
that and nothing more.
Well, for what it is worth, there it is.
The treaty sponsors do not claim any-
thing more than that. That is all they
have written into these so-called safety
features.
It is on that flimsy evidence that they
build their case to adopt this unprece-
dented treaty, with unllmited immunity
extended to nationals of every country
establishing a consular office in the
United States.
I want, to help these nine troubled and
traveling American tourists, Mr. Presi-
dent, but I cannot escape the conviction
that somebody around here ought to be
paying a little more attention to the
problems and perils of 500,000 Ameri-
cans in uniform, risking their lives in
Vietnam. I think that is important, too;
and their problems are genuine. Their
problems are real. Theirs are problems
of survival.
Mr. President, the weapons supplied by
the Soviet Union to North Vietnam are
killing more than nine Americans every
week?probably every day?as against
the nine American tourists per year in
Russia for whom we would like to do
something. Because they have the
wherewithal to travel overseas, we would
fix it up so they can have a conversation
with their consular officer,
think we should get this thing into
proportion. I think we ought to look
behind the letters written to us by the
Assistant Secretary of State?which some
Senators are sending out to their con-
stituents and saying, "This is Biblical
truth."
I have read those letters, Mr. Presi-
dent. I would be ashamed to send them
to my constituents, because I think my
constituents are astute enough to see that
that letter itself evades the basic issues
and is an incomplete and inadequate re-
port. The evidence pounded into this
CONGRESSIONAL RECORD for the last week
and for the next week and perhaps long-
er will demonstrate the nature of the in-
adequacy and the deficiencies of these
State Department letters they send out
to defend the treaty.
Mr. President, the proposed consular
treaty, we should all keep in mind?and
an increasingly large number of private
citizens in this country, I am happy to
say, are learning to understand the issues
and to discuss than with their Senators?
is with the specific country, Communist
Russia, that today is supplying every
sophisticated weapon being used by our
enemy in Vietnam to do three things.
First. To prolong the war. I have
challenged the supporters of this treaty
since the beginning of the hearing to
point to any piece of evidence, however
small, no matter how illusory, which
would show that this treaty could shortcn
the war.
We can prove the opposite hypothesis
on the record. It is going to increase
the availability of Soviet arms to the
North Vietnamese; and I have not been
able to convince myself that, by increas-
ing the capacity of the enemy to fight,
we are ever going to be able to shorten
the war.
Second. Communist Russia is supply-
ing the North Vietnamese with every
sophisticated weapon and virtually all of
the petroleum used by our enemy in Viet-
nam?materiel without which they can-
nct fight a modern war. They are sup-
plying them with all of those supplies
needed to kill our brave American
boys who are fighting your battle and
m.ne over there, for whom I think we
should pay more consideration in our
zest to help nine traveling Americans in
Russia every year.
We take chances with their likelihood
of getting back alive and well and whole.
Third. It is expanding our rapidly in-
creasing casualty lists which already
have reached appalling or alarming fig-
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March 10, 1967 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? SENATE
ures of over 8,000 dead and total cas-
ualties of over 50,000 men and boys who
were sent there by the very Covernment
now pleading with the U.S. Senators to
embrace the Russians with this treaty.
Mr. President, this kind of kill and kiss
policy, it seems to me, is not compatible
with the Christian concepts of this Re-
public.
Mr. BYRD of Virginia. Mr. President,
will the Senator yield?
Mr. MUNDT. I yield.
Mr. BYRD of Virginia. Is the Sena-
tor aware of the new casualty figures
which were published this morning?
Mr. MUNDT. I am sorry to say that
I am not.
Mr. BYRD of Virginia. During the
past week the American casualties in
Vietnam totaled 1,617.
That would mean on that basis if the
war were to continue throughout this
year that the American casualties in
Vietnam would be double or more than
double the 35,000 casualties which this
Nation suffered last year.
Mr. MUNDT. I am certainly happy to
have the Senator provide the up-to-date
facts for the RECORD, because he serves
on a committee which has access to those
facts. It seems to me that it simply
underscores the severity of the problems
we confront.
Mr. BYRD of Virginia. Mr. President,
the Senator mentioned a moment ago
that a multitude of sophisticated weap-
ons which are being supplied by the
Russians to the North Vietnamese is
lengthening the war.
Mr. MUNDT. That is my sincere con-
viction.
Mr. BYRD of Virginia. Does the Sen-
ator concur with the view of the Senator
from Virginia that a long war is to the
distinct advantage of Russia?
Mr. MUNDT. Of course it is, because
they recognize that they have us in-
volved in a war which is not only expen-
sive and costly but is also a war concern-
ing which there is a growing division of
American support. As they listen to di-
visive debates about our part in this war,
as they watch the protests on the street,
and as they read about the meetings on
campuses, I am convinced that these
Communist warlords can delude them-
selves into the belief that if they con-
tinue the war for a long time, enough
American opinion in opposition to the
war will develop to convince the Presi-
dent that he must quit the war effort,
even by defeat.
I think this is their hope and their
expectation.
Mr. BYRD of Virginia. Is it not cor-
rect to say that while the Americans are
suffering casualties?as they did last
week to the extent of 1417 casualties?
the Soviet Union is not suffering one
single casualty in North Vietnam?
Mr. MUNDT. The Senator is pre-
cisely correct. They take the supplies
which we send them so freely now and
fabricate them into whatever their in-
dustrial economy requires. This re-
leases their big industrial complex to
manufacture the war goods which they
send to Vietnam.
They do not lose men, and they cer-
tainly do not lose prestige.
The United States must be losing
something prestigewise when, atter 5
long years of war, we stand before the
world unable to win a contest against
half a country?not a whole country, but
against divided Vietnam, against an
agrarian country, not an industrial coun-
try.
We stand as presumably the strongest
country in the world which, after 5 years,
has not been able to move forward to vic-
tory. in a country which lacks a single
industrial complex. They cannot build
a plane. They cannot build a tank.
They cannot build a modern antiaircraft
gun, and they cannot build a missile.
What must the rest of the world won-
der about the military power of this
great giant of freedom which, after 5
years, stands there frustrated in despair
and unable to defeat such a country?
I think I can answer the question of
the Senator, and give the reason why
this startling new casualty statistic has
been provided.
In the last 4 weeks, while the State
Department and the administration have
been trying to sell us the idea that we
should sit down and make love to the
Russians in this Consular Treaty, two
things have happened in Vietnam which
have increased these casualties.
First, the Communists have added to
the supplies that they are already ship-
ping to their Communist comrades in
Vietnam their most modern,- up-to-date,
effective helicopters. They had not sent
them there previously. They are send-
ing them there now because the heli-
copter activity that we have waged
against the North Vietnamese has been
among the most spectacular and effective
activities in our entire conduct of the
war.
The Russians therefore are now help-
ing them by providing helicopters, and
our casualty lists are beginning to show
the results.
Mr. President, another reason is that
within the same period of time the Rus-
sians, for the first time, have shipped out
from their industrial complex in Russia
to their Communist comrades in North
Vietnam their new 140-millimeter
ground-to-ground missiles which, within
the last 10 days or 2 weeks, were flung
at us by surprise and killed so many of
our boys in South Vietnam, and also
killed our allies among the South Viet-
namese civilians and soldiers. It is a
devastating new weapon employed by the
North Vietnamese for the first time.
They get it exclusively from Russia.
So, we should have the facts in the
record. We should not just be deluded
by the sweetness and light comments of
the State Department that tell us: "What
is wrong with the Consular Treaty?"
Mr. President, we could debate that.
It has its merits and its demerits in a
period of peace. We could debate that
dispassionately at a time when we are
not losing American lives every day in a
foreign country from weapons supplied
by a country with which we are expected
to make this consular concession. How-
ever, we must face up to the facts as they
are and consider this treaty in the world
In which we live and in relationship with
the war in which we are engaged.
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S 3537
Mr. HRUSKA. Mr. President, will the
Senator yield?
Mr. MUNDT. I yield.
Mr, HRUSKA. Mr, President, the
Senator has been making a splendid
statement. As I understand it, the idea
and the tenor of the reservation which
he is discussing now is that there should
be some reciprocity in this business of
ratifying, advising, and consenting to
this treaty.
Mr. MUNDT, The Senator is correct.
Mr. HRUSKA. It is thought by the
Senator from South Dakota, and also by
the Senator from Nebraska, who is a
cosponsor of that reservation, that if we
are doing something for the othgr side,
the other side ought to be doing some-
thing for us.
Mr. MUNDT. The Senator is correct.
Mr. HRUSKA. And it would not be at
all dishonorable to see to it that there
is some reciprocity.
Mr. MUNDT, The Senator is correct.
Mr. HRUSKA. I have listened with
interest to the latest statement of the
Senator. It is one of my indications that
it is not an open door, as was described
by the speaker at the Fulton, Mo., Col-
lege, Westminster College, on March 6,
when it was said:
It is my belief that we stand today upon
the threshold of a new era in our relations
with the people of Europe, a period of new
engagements, and I believe this period can
see the replacement of the Iron Curtain by
the open door.
But what the Senator from South
Dakota has said does not describe a
period of open door or any period of
transition.
The state of the Union message has
similar language relating to this mellow
business.
Our relations with the Soviet Union and
Eastern Europe are also in transition, Our
objective is not to continue the cold war
but to end it.
Those are the words of the Chief
Executive of this country. He also said:
We are shaping a new future of enlarged
partnership in nuclear affairs, in economic
and technical cooperation and treaty nego-
tiations and political consultations and in
working together with the governments and
peoples of Eastern Europe and the Soviet
Union.
In still another speech not too long
ago, before the Editorial Writers Asso-
ciation, the President said:
We do not intend to let our differences on
Vietnam or elsewhere prevent us from ex-
ploring all opportunities. We want the
Soviet Union and the nations of Eastern
Europe to know that we and our allies will
go step by step with them as far as they
are willing to advance.
Based on what the Senator from
South Dakota has said, there is no in-
dication that the Soviet Union wishes to
advance, nor has it advanced except in
a way to attempt to bring about our
military and psychological defeat in
Vietnam; and that certainly is true of
their beefing up of the military supplies,
the armament, and the materiel, and
more recently the helicopters.
I call the attention of the Senator
from South Dakota to language con-
tained in the New York Times on Octo-
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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD SENATE March 10, 1967
her 16, 1966, referring to the President's
speech, in New York, to the National
Conference of Editorial Writers, on Oc-
tober 7, 1966. Nine days later, the New
York Times reported, in a dispatch writ-
ten by Raymond H. Anderson, from
Moscow:
? Leonard S. Breshnev, the Soviet Com-
munist Party leader, rebuffed today, as a
strange and persistent delusion, the hope
expressed by President Johnson that closer
Soviet-United States cooperation was possi-
ble despite tensions over the war in Vietnam.
The United States must stop bombing North
Vietnam and end Its aggression before rela-
tions can be improved, this Soviet leader
declared.
Does language such as that, unquali-
fied in nature, lead the Senator from
South Dakota to waver many way from
his idea that there is no mellowing of the
Soviet Union?
Mr. MUNDT. Of course not. It is
difficult to make apparent to the Amer-
ican public the hard, blunt, bloody fact
that the Soviets, by their very utter-
ances, are telling us what they propose
to do to our Christian civilization, to
our freedoms, and to our soldiers in Viet-
nam with the same direct approach that
Hitler wrote in his "Mein Kampf."
We now have a new generation of
spokesmen on the other end of the Ave-
nue who are making the same mistake
that Chamberlain made with his um-
brella. Having read the book, they said,
"It sounds awful bad. He can't mean
it.,,
But take the words of the Communists
themselves. Just yesterday, Kosygin, in
his latest attack on our country so far
as I am aware?something else may have
come over the wires today?pointed out
that he believes that peace negotiations
are not making progress in Vietnam be-
cause of the U.S. bombing. He also
charged us with violating the truce pe-
riod by moving our equipment into place.
Mr. HRUS1CA. In his declaration
last October, Breshnev was not bashful
about saying what he would do by way
of quid pro quo.
The Senator from South Dakota is far
too modest in his original reservation,
when all he asks for is reciprocity in the
matter of representatives of the press.
Yet, a leader of the other great power in
the world says, ''Let's not fool ourselves
into thinking that our relationships can
improve until you do as we say?to wit,
get out of Vietnam, stop your bombing
in North Vietnam."
Mr. MUNDT. Precisely,
Mr. HRUSKA. It seems to me that
we should get it out of our heads. There
are many other evidences that the Rus-
sians have not mellowed?and I shall go
Into that matter in detail on Monday or
Tuesday next?that show they have, on
the contraiy, become more vicious, more
demanding, and more unyielding, rather
than having mellowed.
I thank the Senator for yielding.
Mr. MUNDT. I thank the Senator for
his contribution. As usual, he has util-
ized his precise capacity to point up the
facts which bear so vitally on this tre-
mendously important decision.
Mr. President, we must remember a
few aspects of this matter as we proceed
to the voting period, as we face up to the
moment of truth, which in my opinion
represents the most serious, far-reach-
ing vote that Senators will cast in any
Senate rollcall this year. I have been
in the Congress 28 years, and I cannot
think of very many more important
matters that have been considered in
that time compared with our votes on
the proposed resolutions of reservation
and on the treaty itself.
I wish to point out that this treaty
condones the qmplete and totally un-
precedented immunity provisions be-
cause the Communists insisted on put-
ting them in. Without the inclusion of
those immunity provisions, the Russians
would not sign the treaty.
But even then?and even now?Rus-
sia has not ratified this treaty. The
State Department came to our Commit-
tee on Foreign Relations and expressed
the hope that they could get the treaty
through the committee and through the
Senate in a single week. The chairman
stated. according to the newspapers, that
he believed it would pass In a few days.
This occurred last January. Those of
us who raised some question, those of us
who have some doubts, those of us who
really believe that the advice function
of our senatorial responsibilities in for-
eign relations is fully as significant as
the consent function, refused to be stam-
peded. So, from January we are mov-
ing to this period in March, when the
treaty is finally before the Senate. And
the facts are getting out to the public,
and that is what we wanted to have
happen.
Mr. MURPHY. Mr. President, will
the Senator yield for a question?
Mr. MUNDT. I am happy to yield to
the Senator from California.
Mr. MURPHY. I have heard refer-
ence made on many occasions in the last
few days to the immunity clause. Would
the Senator spell out for me exactly
what that means?
Mr. MUNDT. I shall be happy to do
that, because it has been a source of
great concern. It was the subject of a
brief debate?altogether too brief de-
bate?on the Senate floor yesterday,
when four or five Senators were seeking
to be heard on the subject, and we had
run out of the generous allocation of 30
minutes of time for discussing whether
or not, for the first time in American
history, we were going to grant diplo-
matic immunity to consular officers.
It would be bad enough and I would
find many things wrong with this im-
munity provision if we were talking
about such a provision with respect to
great friendly allies like England or
Canada or West Germany. I cannot
convince myself that consular officials
from any country should have a right to
come here and commit murder and rape
and espionage and sabotage, and be
Immune. Why should they have so
many more privileges and immunities
and protections than American citizens?
But it is worse when you single out for
this unprecedented gesture, this spec-
tacular concession, the Communists in
Russia, at the very time their efforts and
their supplies and their military support
in the direction of continuing the war in
Vietnam are the only things that keep
the war continuing there. It would also
mean the establishment'of a precedent
to be followed by others under the most
favored nations clause. How is the
world going to interpret the granting of
that concession to the Russian arsenal
for equipping our fighting enemy?
I sometimes wake up in the night
shuddering about what the ratification
of this treaty, without a reservation, will
do psychologically to our friends who
are fighting with us in this war?and
there are not very many of them. But
we applaud every nation which has sent
us a soldier or a nurse or a doctor.
I am thinking now, foe example, about
the little country of Thailand. We
think we are making a sacrifice in this
war?and we are. Thailand has, how-
ever, bet its all on an American victory
in Vietnam.
Have you ever stopped to think what
will happen to Thailand if we pull out?
If the doves in this country have their
was, and we come fluttering home and
permit the situation in South Vietnam to
develop in its own way, who will be the
first total and complete casualty?
Thtiland. Surrounded by Communist
enemies; weak but brave; but not big
enoigh to protect itself. What must the
people and the leaders of Thailand think
when they read about our signing a
treaty with a country, without any stipu-
lations or reservations at all, saying even
"Please, Russia, do not send so many
guns; do not send your best missiles; do
not send your best Mig's. Please, sir,
if we concede to you, will not you cut
down on the war supplies killing our
American troops?"
What is their reaction in Thailand
going to be, Mr. President, when thy
know if Russia succeeds and the Com-
munists succeed Thailand is gone. I
salote a country that bets its every-
thing on our capacity to win, on our
resolution of the fact that we mean busi-
ness when we say, as the President has
silk perhaps a hundred times. "We are
not going to permit armed aggressive
communism to drive us into retreat in
the world."
This means immunity for everything.
There is no crime that could be com-
mitted by man or anirr al from the top
consular official to the lowest which
woold be punishable once this treaty
is enacted.
Mr. President, the Communists place
our country now in a curious position
because, as I have pointed out, the Rus-
sians have not ratified I They have a
Preiidium that can sit at any time.
When Moscow says to ratify they ratify.
It is a body that does not consent and
advise. It acquiesces. We are getting
that way ourselves on this advising situa-
tion on foreign treaties, but I hope that
we never reach it on consent.
Did anybody ever ask why the Soviets
did not ratify? Why de they insist that
we ratify first? One does not have to
study communism very long or know
much about communism in this world, as
the distinguished Senator from Cali-
fornia [Mr. MURPHY] so well knows, be-
cause he learned about communism the
hard way, to understand why they take
this approach.
They want to place the United States
before the world as a supplicant on its
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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? SENATE
knees seeking to appease the mighty
Russian state by ratifying a treaty, with
the immunity provision upon which they
insist. Russia arrogantly insists that we
meekly ratify the treaty first as a
demonstration that once again their
commissars can outmaneuver and out-
wit the leaders of the free world.
That is why they want it to be ratified
by our country in the first instance.
Mr. MURPHY, Mr. President, will the
Senator yield?
Mr. MUNDT. I yield.
Mr. MURPHY. Is it not true that the
condition of the smaller countries in all
of southeast Asia was worsening consid-
erably because of fear of Russia and be-
cause of Russian propaganda that Amer-
ica was a paper tiger and would never ,
come to their aid and would never save
them if they got into trouble?
Mr. MUNDT. The Senator is correct,
because the Russians are the most skill-
ful and the best propagandists in the
world. They invented the Pavlov dog
experiment and have been using that
conditioning process ever since. They
use every little free debate that we have
in the Senate between those who believe
that we should support the policies of the
administration of standing firm and
those who are in favor of running out.
They make of it that a great, divisive
nation, America, is going to run out on
its international commitments because
of a divided nation and a breakdown of
support for the President and his han-
dling of the war.
Mr. MURPHY. Is it not true that
from the day President Kennedy sent
American troops into South Vietnam the
entire character of all nations involved
changed?
Mr. MUNDT. Of course; the Senator
is correct.
Mr. MURPHY. In other words, the
Pakistanians, who are our friends, who
were afraid that we would not come to
their assistance, suddenly said, "Maybe
we do not have to make a deal with Rus-
sia; maybe America will protect us."
Is it not true that in Indonesia, this
great chain of islands that stretches
within 14 miles of the Philippines, they
said, "We do not have to accept this
great show of force, this imposition of
will by an atheistic, communistic gov-
ernment, because our friends, the Ameri-
cans, will protect us"?
Is it not true that the President of the
Philippines came before a joint session
of Congress and told us how pleased, how
happy, how assured they were since they
knew that America was going to stand
firm on its stated policy to protect and
guarantee self-determination to smaller
nations?
Is it not true that he said that the
nations of Asia and southeast Asia
would be very, very happy if we Would
give that guarantee and they 'could work
out their salvation and properly and
prosperously, with our help, achieve the
kind of world we want?
Is it not true that the one thing that
,made this possible was the guarantee by
America that we would stand for no
further aggression in southeast Asia?
Mr. MUNDT. The Senator is correct.
I have no question in the world in my
mind that Sukarno would still be riding
high in Indonesia, perhaps with Chinese
Communist members in his ruling claque
by now, except for the fact that we did
indicate for a while to the world that we
were serious about stopping aggression
in Vietnam.
I have been one of those who has con-
sistently supported the President's film
position in this war. I have been one of
those who ran for reelection in the cam-
paign last year as a Republican in South
Dakota, supporting the President at a
time when the Democratic candidate was
attacking me on my support of the
President as being a warmonger, while
he joined the doves and wanted to flutter
out.
It is becoming increasingly difficult
for some of us who have supported the
President through this entire disgusting
debate between those who would stand
firm and those who would run out on
our war effort to rationalize in our con-
science supporting a war effort which
this country prolongs by its irrational
and contradictory policy of insisting
that we ship more and more supplies to
the Russians so that they can ship more
and more guns to the North Vietnamese
to kill more and more American boys
who are being drafted by a government
that says it wants to win the war.
Somebody owe S this country an ex-
planation of that, Mr. President, They
are going to get it soon or late. I will
guarantee they will get an explanation
during the course of the next political
campaign when the President comes up
for reelection, if he does not come back
to his good judgment of an earlier time
and provides a consistent and construc-
tive program which gives some chance
of victory to our American war effort and
discontinues aiding those who combine
to prolong the war.
America is getting tired of a war that
is 5 years old, which we have the ca-
pacity to win, and we can win it with-
out escalation, without bombing; we can
win it by shutting off the supplies of the
Russian arms that keep the Communist
warship afloat in Hanoi.
I believe that this war would have long
since been over if it had not been for our
self-defeating diplomatic and trade pol-
icies. Later an I am going to document
what I have said. I am going to place
in the RECORD a hair-raising list of ex-
ports we are shipping to Russia now by
Executive order issued by President
Johnson last October 12 in open defiance
of the recommendations of Congress.
Any President serving as a wartime
Commander in Chief who says we ought
to shorten the war and makes his coun-
trymen content when he moves in the
direction of sending supplies to the
enemy who is providing guns to prolong
the war, makes of himself a greater po-
litical Houdini than I ever believed him
to be?and I respect him very much for
his political dexterity.
Unhappily?and now we are getting
close to the meat of the coconut?the
illusory, euphoric atmosphere in which
the State Department and a few Senators
would like to discuss the merits and de-
merits of the consular treaty simply and
demonstrably does not exist today.
S 3539
Closing our eyes and our minds to the
fact that we are today at war in Viet-
nam, a war in which our enemy is sup-
ported by the Russians, does not make
the war go away. The casualty lists
printed in the hometowns of the States
of Senators serving here are getting a
little too long to persuade people to be-
lieve that a happy detente has come
about. This week's casualties in the war,
as pointed out this afternoon by the dis-
tinguished senior Senator from Virginia
[Mr. Byrn)] , are the heaviest of any like
period in the entire war?and the num-
ber will grow because we are giving to
the Russians the capacity to develop
their industrial complex and build their
strength so as to provide additional arms
to the North Vietnamese, to make cer-
tain that they too will grow in military
strength.
I wonder how many Senators have
asked themselves why it is, in the whole
course of the wonderful history of this
Republic, that no President has ever be-
fore authorized, to say nothing of en-
couraged, shipments of supplies to the
enemy with which to provide guns to
kill our boys?
Whatever other things historians write
about concerning this administration
and the era in which we live, they are
going to write about that, because it is
new, it is unprecedented. To me, it is
as incomprehensive as it is inadvisable;
but there are the blunt and awful facts.
I can remember as a young Member
of the House of Representatives going up
and down the highways and byways and
on the platforms of the country, and
even on the radio, because we did not
have much television then, and in my
humble manner joining those who were
debating the issue whether President
Roosevelt ought to stop American junk?
peddlers from selling scrap iron to Japan
in 1939, 1940, and 1941. We had some
interesting discussions then. We pointed
out that some of us believed that per-
haps the war lords of Japan would some
day shoot that scrap iron back and kill
American boys.
? What were we told? We were told
then what they say now?the editorial
writers, the commentators, the colum-
nists, and the State Department crowd:
"Oh, those people who talk about the
loss of American lives are using an emo-
tional approach." Mr. President, I plead
guilty to the charge. Death is an emo-
tional institution. Patriotism is an
emotional process. I think the time has
come for someone to show a little more
practical emotion for the boys who are
being killed in Vietnam.
I plead guilty to the charge of being
emotional, let me say to the liberal news-
paper writers of this country. I wish
some of them would show the same emo-
tion. I see nothing wrong with it.
The mothers and fathers who write
me about their boys who do not come
home from the war feel some emotion,
as well as those who write worrying
about their youngsters now in college
who, some day, will have to go out to
this bloody foreign battlefield the year
after next, the year after that, and no
one knows how many more years after
that, if we continue to feed and fight the
enemy at the same time.
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S 3540 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? SENATE
I was emotional in my desire to pro-
tect the lives of American fighting men
against the trade practices of war
profiteers in 1939, 1940, and 1941, and I
am emotional in that desire today. I
guess I am just an emotional country boy
from South Dakota.
At any rate, at that time, we pleaded
and we pleaded and we pleaded with
President Roosevelt to place an embargo
on scrap iron being sent to Japan, but
he did not do it. It made a lot of mil-
lionaires out of scrap iron peddlers in
this country exporting it to Japan. Some
of them got filthy rich in their traffic
in blood.
But on the morning of Pearl Harbor,
they picked out of the bodies of 3,000
American boys?for whom someone
should show some little emotion, if the
people pounding their typewriters from
the safety of their editorial sanctums
do not have any?the scrap iron which
our junk peddlers had sent to Japan.
While I never supported Franklin D.
Roosevelt?and the more I read Amer-
ican history the happier I am to reiterate
that fact?I do applaud him for one
thing:
Pearl Harbor came on a Sunday. We
declared war in Congress on Japan
shortly after noon the next day, on Mon-
day. I voted for the declaration. But
President Roosevelt issued an Executive
order, even earlier, prohibiting the fur-
ther sale of scrap iron to Japan, saying
the obvious thing, that since they were
using it to kill American boys we did not
think it was justified American business
practice to continue to sell scrap iron to
Japan.
That was great going F.D.R. on that
particular statement. That one was
right?but it was terribly late in coming.
I wish our present President, who ad-
mires F.D.R., and who supported him,
and still supports his policies, had emu-
lated the F.D.R. statement on embargo-
ing scrap iron to include today's ship-
ment of supplies to the enemy.
Because, on the record?and I am go-
ing to put It in the book today?on the
record, I want Senators to read it, I want
our constituents to read it, I want histo-
rians to read it, I want the whole world
to know the facts on the record-3
bloody years?more than that?after the
casualty lists started coming in and
Americans boys were being killed in
steadily expanding serious numbers, and
the war was really tough, an Executive
order was issued on October 12, 1966, by
President Lyndon Johnson which opened
up vast new floodgates of exports of sup-
plies, including iron, to Russia?the sole
supplier of the modern weapons being
shipped to the Communists in Vietnam
for use in prolonging the war and in ex-
panding our casualties.
The President did that despite the fact
that the Senate a number of years before
had voted overwhelmingly against such
a policy?and the House so expressed it-
self as recently as just last year.
The sophists in the State Department
induced the members of the House con-
ference committee to take all the teeth
out of that Senate amendment which I
sponsored then and weakened it to read,
providing that if the President finds It in
the national interest to ship them over,
he can ship over these supplies to Russia
in contradiction of the expressed policy
of the Senate as stated In a rollcall vote.
Then, last year, the Findley resolu-
tion came up In the closing days of Con-
gress, and that fine Representative came
up with a resolution against stopping
these kinds of sales to the Communist
enemy. The House this time overwhelm-
ingly approved it in a rollcall vote.
The same people now soliciting Sena-
tors in their offices, over the telephone,
and by letter, to support this treaty, who
broke down the support on the part of
the House for my anti-Communist trade
amendment a few years earlier, tried
again last year to break down the sup-
port of Senators for this House meas-
ure?the Findley resolution?and they
succeeded, to a large extent, in breaking
down support of enough Senators so they
again wrote in an escape hatch, and the
President blew the top off that escape
hatch by his Executive order of October
12, 1966. In effect that order said, "Let
American exporters profit. Let inter-
national bankers have their pound of
flesh. Let those who are making big
profits from selling to Russia sell at war-
inflated profits, even though the record
shows the weapons being made by the
Russians are being sent to Vietnam to
kill our boys."
Mr. President, we are at war. It is as
Impossible to divorce this Consular
Treaty from the facts of war as it is to
try to prove that the Communist Bear in
Russia has become a household pet.
Facts have a rude habit of intruding
themselves into the world of make-
believe.
Since we are at war, we should ask
ourselves occasionally, Who are we fight-
ing against? Who is on the other side?
Who is the enemy?
We are at war with communism. Does
anyone doubt that?
Does anyone question that 500,000
American boys in uniform are facing
death in the Vietnam war theater be-
cause we are at war with communism,
and more men are being drafted every
month for that same reason.
The bloody, ugly shooting aspects of
this major war have now been continu-
ing for at least 5 years. President John-
son told us yesterday in his televised
press interview that the end is not in
sight.
How could it be? Because the end
of the stream of war materiel from Com-
munist Russia to Communist North Viet-
nam being given our enemy is not in
sight and the end of our export pro-
grams and the profiteering peddlers of
war materiel to the enemy in Russia is
not in sight? So, of course, the war
drags on.
Mr. President. were this ugly war to
end tomorrow, I firmly believe it has
gone on many months?perhaps even
extra years?longer than necessary and
longer than it would had not Russia so
generously supplied the North Vietnam-
ese with every modern weapon and all
of the petroleum they have needed to
prolong the war. Surely at this date
in the war we should discourage rather
than encourage trade policies and prac-
tices which help the Russian war econ-
omy to continue and even to expand
March 10, 1967
these shipments of war supplies to
Hanoi.
There is nothing in sight to indicate
that the Russians will discontinue send-
ing North Vietnam, in increasing num-
bers, better and more modern war ma-
chines such as helicopters, as the days
go on unless we change our policies here
In the United States.
How many more years must this war
cor.tinue? It seems to me that these are
some of the demonstrable facts of life
that we should consider as we confront
our decision and our vctes on this Con-
sular Treaty, and on the reservation de-
feraing its operative date, until either
the war is over or until at least the hn-
mense war supplies and the modern and
effective killer-weapons being given to
our enemy each day by Communist Rus-
sia is discontinued.
I wonder, Mr. President, how many
Serators share my curiosity as to why
treaty negotiators these past 3 years
failed us so utterly in working into this
proposed treaty some :memorandum of
understanding or S01113 quid pro quo
agreement directed at stopping or cur-
tailing the Russians from supplying this
flood of modern weapons to Vietnam?
Did not our negotiators know a war
was going on? Did not they know that
Rit3Sill was the principal source of sup-
ply of warmaking weapons of modern
design being supplied to North Vietnam?
Could not they count on their fingers the
3 long years this war had by then been
underway?
I wonder, Mr. President, how many
Senators share my curiosity as to why
treaty negotiators theae past 3 years
failed so utterly in worksng into this pro-
posed treaty some memorandum of un-
derstanding or some quid pro quo agree-
ment directed at stopping the Russians
from supplying this flood of modern
weapons to Vietnam?a supply so large
and so effective that without.it, I for one
am convinced, we would have had peace
in Vietnam at least 6 months or perhaps
more than a year ago.
Does anyone deny the modern war
weapons being suppliee. to North Viet-
nam come from the Russians? Does any-
body deny that 95.6 percent of the pe-
troleum being supplied to North Vietnam
for use in the war comes from Russia?
Want to stop the war, Mr. President?
Turn off the gas. Shut down on the pe-
troleum. When you are in a war, try to
write a treaty or approve a treaty reser-
vation to protect 500,000 Americans in
uniform in Vietnam. rather than one try-
ing to alleviate the troubles of nine out
of 18.000 roving Americans visiting Rus-
sia in a year.
How many Senators, I wonder, agree
with the senior Senator from South Da-
kota that the major business of this Gov-
ernment and this Senate should not be
the torturous consideration of a treaty
which will enhance the capacity of the
mighty Russian industrial complex to
supply arms, petroleum, migs, ground-to-
ground missiles, trucks, ships, antiair-
craft weapons, SAM missiles, big artil-
lery, and a host of other death-dealing
devices to our enemy in North Vietnam,
but rather to concenti ate on steps to
shorten the war and to bring it to a
successful conclusion?
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I wonder if we will have a giddy opti-
mist among us who sometime will say
on the Senate floor, "Do we want to end
the war? Simple. Sign a consular
treaty expanding trade to the country
supplying arms to prolong to war in
Vietnam." I am eager to join in that
debate if, unexpectedly, one should
ensue.
By what curious line of reasoning can
any Senator or executive officer of this
great land convince either himself or
his constituents that any step making it
easier, and more acceptable, for Rus-
sia to utilize our American exports to her
industrial complex in the expansion of
her flood of war supplies to Vietnam will
either move in the direction of shorten-
ing or winning this tragic war? Can we
feed and fight communism at the same
time and look forward to anything re-
sembling a successful end of the war?
Mr. CURTIS. Mr. President, will the
Senator yield?
Mr. MUNDT. I am glad to yield to
the distinguished Senator from Nebraska,
who has been around here a long
time and who, I am sure, recalls the days
when another Democratic administra-
tion permitted war supplies to go to
Japan in order to make buckets of money
for a few, which resulted in our boys
being killed at Pearl Harbor later.
Mr. CURTIS. I commend the Senator
from South Dakota for his excellent
statement. He is a member of the com-
mittee that heard testimony which gives
timeliness to his statement, which is of
interest and concern to the entire Na-
tion. I commend him for it.
Can the Senator conceive of any rea-
son why this treaty, which has been lan-
guishing since the summer of 1964,
should be rushed to ratification at this
time? Is there any particular advantage
to the United States at this time?
Mr. MUNDT. I cannot think of any,
and I must say I have explored that
question very diligently. I spent over
two and a half hours one day last week
at a briefing in the CIA headquarters in
Virginia, trying to find out if, somewhere
along the line, something was known that
had not been brought to our attention.
I attended diligently the meetings of the
Foreign Relations Committee. I have
had pleasant and persuasive State De-
partment people come to my office talk-
ing to me about the treaty. I have asked
many questions. I can honestly say at
this late hour I know of no scintilla of
defensible reason why there should be
any cause for the rush, Oh, they have
given so-called reasons. They have
talked fast. But no one has given a rea-
son that makes realistic sense in the
war-torn world in which we live.
No wonder the treaty supporters have
become so desperate and, I regret to say,
devious in their efforts to divorce this
treaty ratification debate and considera-
tion?based upon letters that willing
Members send to their constituents, that
shoot all around the target and miss the
bull's eye?from the cruel American pol-
icy advocated by the Johnson admin-
istration favorable to an even greater
expansion of trade with Russia. But,
Mr. President, here again the facts on
the record demolish the rhetoric of those
who would have Senators close their eyes
to the basic issues involved in this Con-
sular Treaty.
Mr. President, I shall have much more
evidence to submit as the debate con-
tinues about the close tie-in, the demon-
strable relationship, the consequences in
terms of a longer and costlier war and
greater casualties which are irrevocably
related to this Consular Treaty, but let
me today point out just two facts from
the public record which completely prove
the point.
Let me point briefly, because I have al-
ready taken far more time than I had
intended, to two facts?I wonder some-
times if the President has had these
facts called to his attention?that every
Senator should want to reflect upon and
ponder over before he casts his vote.
Happily, Senators who earlier had an-
nounced their support of the treaty as
a result of the one-sided arguments pre-
sented by the State Department now
have an opportunity, by voting for reser-
vation 2, to vote for the treaty and still
prevent the treaty from becoming opera-
tive until the President himself can make
the statement that the Soviet Union is
no longer prolonging the war in Vietnam
and the treaty should not be effective
until Russia does stop prolonging the
war. That is fair enough. The Presi-
dent is the Commander in Chief. He can
pick the time. He can consider the evi-
dence. So Senators who want to vote
for ratification of the treaty have a
chance to vote for ratification of a treaty
with a reservation which provides a tool,
a bargaining device, a diplomatic weapon
to employ in winning a concession from
the Russians, rather than simply bow-
ing before the walls of the Kremlin and
saying, "So be it as you requested, Mr.
Commissar. Your war supplies to North
Vietnam continue."
The first fact is found in the Presi-
dent's state of the Union address at the
opening of Congress this year. This
Is what the President himself said in
simple, direct, and cogent terms:
Tonight I now ask and urge this Congress
to help our foreign and commercial trade
policies by passing an East-West trade bill
and by approving the consular convention
with the Soviet Union.
Those are the exact words of President
Johnson. You will find them in the tat
of his state of the Union address. They
are there for all to read. He tied these
objectives together with a Gordian knot
that Is so precise that not even a comma
or ,E1 break in the sentence can be found
to indicate that he did not mean what
the words themselves so tragically ex-
press. Do you still need additional
proof?
Are you still reluctant to accept the
facts? The President was not trying to
delude the country. He was not trying
to deceive the country. He put those
words together carefully to demonstrate
the close connection and the interrela-
tionship of this Consular Treaty and
stepped up exports to Russia in this time
of war.
I rather think the President would like
to have the Senate ratify this treaty as
another sort of Tonkin Gulf resolution.
That resolution, you will recall, passed
the Senate almost unanimously. We
were all upset and excited, and under-
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standably and properly so, about the
serious incidents in the Tonkin Gulf,
after which there was trumped up, hast-
ily, a resolution. All but one or two Sen-
ators voted for it. Since then, we have
heard five or six, eight or 12 Senators
stand up and say, "I did not quite under-
stand what was in it. I did not quite
understand its implications." The
chairman of the Committee on Foreign
Relations, who himself presented it to
us, said, "Looking back now, I think I
made a mistake, because it has been
changed, through its interpretation,
from what I thought it said."
Mr. President, this convention, when
we pass it, will be an economic Tonkin
Gulf resolution, because the President is
going to say when we have passed it, "I
told you in my state of the Union mes-
sage it was tied up with East-West trade.
You approved it when you voted, for this
economic Tonkin Gulf resolution, to
approve the Consular Treaty, tied in as
I tied it in, in my state of the Union ad-
dress, with expanded East-West trade,"
This time we are forewarned and those
seeking alibis for their actions will con-
front a much more difficult task.,
That is point No. 1. The other point,
Mr. President, is this: If further proof
is needed by those who might be inclined
to listen to the soothing words of the
State Department rather than to consult
the basic facts, Mr. President, I suggest
that, as a novel experiment, they try
reading the treaty itself, from beginning
to end.
It is long, involved, sometimes am-
biguous, and it includes 30 specific
articles of agreement, concession, or stip-
ulated purposes. Senators who are in-
clined to sign their names to the con-
tract, by voting to advise and consent to
its provisions, before doing so, should try
reading article 7 for example. It is
headed "Consular Functions." Let me
quote from the treaty itself that, in this
period of a tragic war, we are asked to
ratify without amendment, and without
needed reservations, and what in fact
could be and will be another Tonkin Gulf
type of wholesale approval of policies we
vaguely understand, which will be, in the
economic sense, what that one has proved
to be, to the embarrassment of some of
our fellow Senators, in the military sense.
I read you now a statement from
article 7, quoting exactly. The treaty
states, among other things:
A consular officer shall be entitled within
his consular district to perform the following
functions: To further the development of
commercial, economic, cultural and scien-
tific relations between the sending State and
the receiving State.
Mr. President, let each Senator answer
this question for himself and for his own
constituency. Does "To further the de-
velopment of commercial and economic
relations" mean expanded trade purpose
or does it not?
Since by his Executive order of October
12, 1966, President Lyndon B. Johnson
opened up for trade without license or
restriction the exportation of 400 addi-
tional items, products, raw materials,
machines, chemicals, iron and steel prod-
ucts, and like aids and items to assist the
Russian industrial war machine, it
stands as plain and clear as the path to
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S 3542 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? SENATE
the country schoolhouse that this treaty
by its very language and as properly and
purposefully defined by the President in
his state of the Union address is part of
the formula for expanding our exports to
Russia at the very tragic hour when she
has become the sole support of the enemy
we are fighting in providing her the
modern weapons and virtually all of the
petroleum she requires to prolong the
war and to increase our casualties.
Mr. President, I can only try to in-
fluence the decisions of other Senators.
I can only try to induce them all to be
sure that before they vote, they read the
treaty, and that they understand the
implications and the atmosphere in
which it is presented to us, with the
urgency to vote now and study what we
have done a few weeks later.
For myself, I shall never vote to make
less likely the return of the American
boys who have been drafted to fight
freedom's battles in Vietnam. Any act
which strengthens the power of the
enemy to continue the war and to ex-
pand the killing will not have my sup-
port. Basically, it is for this reason
I oppose this Consular Treaty so vigor-
ously.
Mr. President, for those still diligently
trying to make up their minds how to
vote on the treaty, and for those who
intend to vote for the treaty?and I
imagine there will be quite a number of
them?but who still believe that we ought
to put this reservation on the treaty, so
that it does not become operative until
they quit shooting at us, anyway, I wish
to call attention to another important
document, which is a little bit hard to
come by, but the international bankers
have it, the junk peddlers have it, the
big corporation presidents have it, and
those profiteering from traffic with Mos-
cow have it, so why should we not have
it in the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD? It Is
going to be put into public view right
now, Mr. President.
It is Current Export Bulletin No. 941,
dated October 12, 1966, published by the
U.S. Department of Commerce, John M.
Connor, Secretary, by his Bureau of In-
ternational Commerce, the Office of Ex-
port Control. Senators should send
down and get a copy of this astonishing
document, especially the original version
of bulletin No. 941.
Mr. President, I have here two ver-
sions of this bulletin. I am tempted to
put in the RECORD the one they first sent
me, before it was censored, changed, and
modified. But I wish to be fair. After
they sent it to me, and I had made a few
comments of shack and despair as to
what I found in it, they said, "There are
some little footnotes in here that indi-
cate some of these proposals for exports
to Communist countries have not yet
been completely finalized."
Well," I said, "I do not want anything
that has not been finalized; just send me
a new list, then." I said, "What you
send me, I intend to use." If other Sen-
ators wish to see the original copy, they
will have to send for it; I intend to keep
mine for future reference.
Some day I shall find out for sure
whether these things are finalized, but
for the moment, I will take their explana-
tions at face value. I give you now the
expurgated version, which has been sani-
tized, corrected, and approved. It has
three sets of exhibits. One is "Analysis
of the Decontrol Action for Exports to
Eastern European Communist Coun-
tries." For those who have not looked
at a geography book lately, Mr. Presi-
dent, that Includes Russia.
Second, "Commodities Decontrolled for
Exports to Eastern European Commu-
nist Countries Including East Germany."
And exhibit No. 3, "Commodities Decon-
trolled for Exports to Eastern European
Countries Excluding East Germany."
The only Communist country in East
Europe they exclude is East Germany.
It took a mighty intelligent bureaucrat
to figure that one out, Mr. President. It
Is certainly going to keep a lot of critical
machines and tools out of East Germany
if we ship them to Poland, Czechoslova-
kia, and Russia. This administration
surely has an airtight export control
there, has it not? Conceivably it might
take as long as an extra day to trans-
port these critical supplies from any
other Communist country directly into
East. Germany. We will not send certain
critical supplies to East Germany, but
we will ship and sell them all around
East Germany. Except for East Ger-
many we can sell these Communist gov-
ernments anything any American prof-
iteer desires, at any profitable price tag
he can put on his export items.
One reason we have shortages in this
country is because Americans like to sell
to the highest bidder; and any country
as desperate as Russia is today for ma-
terials of this kind will bid pretty high.
While reading on the subject, for Sen-
ators who might wish to go completely
into this question of East-West trade,
here is a document put out by the House
of Representatives Committee on Bank-
ing and Currency, issued in 1967. Sen-
ators and others can get it from that
House committee. It is entitled "The
Fiat Soviet Automobile Plant and Com-
munist Economic Reports," a report pur-
suant to House Resolution 1043, 89th
Congress, second session, by the Sub-
committee on International Trade, Com-
mittee on Banking and Currency, House
of Representatives, dated March 1,
1967?this month,
It is interesting, because it tells us
exactly why the parents of the boys who
are fighting in Vietnam are now subject
to higher taxes and greater inflationary
pressures, because we have guaranteed,
by executive action, $50 million worth
of credit to the Soviet Union to build in
Russia itself, not a library, not a hospi-
tal, not a school, but an automobile plant,
in conjunction with the Italians, the Fiat
Co., of Italy, together with machine tools
and all the other things they need to help
bolster and salvage a fumbling economy
in an area in which they are collapsing
so completely because they concentrate
so much on military hardware that in
the entire city of Moscow there are only
eight garages and eight filling stations
to handle the few automobiles available
in that vast city. We have that many on
almost any street in Washington.
That desperately begging Soviet econ-
omy needs these supplies, and you and I
and every other American stands a like-
lihood of paying higher taxes if the Rus-
March 10, 1967
slam do not repay the credit which we
are guaranteeing them by our American
Export-Import Bank to build an automo-
bile factory which will be complete in
1969
Are any of us so naive as to believe
an automobile factory in Russia cannot
be transformed into a weapons factory
almost overnight? We know the answer.
And--c4 course?any automobile com-
pany we help finance in Russia relieves
its consumer industry proportionately so
It can be utilized in building military
hardware for Vietnam.
We are living in a strange world. We
should debate an issue cf this kind for
6 months, instead of 2 weeks, so that the
facts get out to all our fellow citizens.
Mr. President, I commend this House
report to your careful study. This may
be expensive for the taxpayers, but I am
trying to find a way?and I may possibly
succeed?to give the Senate a chance to
vote on this before it is over. On the
Appropriations Committee we do have
ways of trying to turn off the gas, even
thou ;h this administration will not vol-
untarily reduce the exports to Russia.
At the moment, because there is an
American guarantee of Russian credits
by executive action, we have no oppor-
tunity at hand to stop it; but they will
come to us in due course for money to
help provide the credit.
I return to our sanitized report from
the Department of Commerce. The cur-
rent sanitized report?booklet No. 941?
carried over the signature of Mrs. Geral-
dine S. DePuy, Director of the Division,
who sent it to me.
If they thought the original 941 report
ought to be censored, it is up to them.
I am not giving up the original copy. I
am keeping it for future reference. But
I shall now make available for all to see,
their new and sanitized version of it.
I ask unanimous consent to have the
entire report printed at this point in the
RECCRD.
There being no objection, the report
was ordered to be printed in the RECORD,
as follows:
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE,
BUREATJ OF INTERNATIONAL COM-
MERCE, OFFICE OF EXPORT CON-
TROL,
Washington, D.C., Ootober 18, 1966.
To: All field offices; all customs offices.
From: Mrs. Geraldine S. DePuy, Director,
Operations Division.
Subject: Current Export Eulletin No. 941,
dated October 12.1966.
Ctrrent Export Bulletin No. 941 revised the
Commodity Control List in many different
respeIts, including the decontrol action for
exports to Eastern European communist
countries (Country Group 1-). However, the
Eastern European communist countries de-
control created a great deal of public interest
in view of its relationship to the President's
speech of October 7.
Attached Is the following information
which should be helpful in answering ques-
tions regarding the Eastern European com-
munist countries decontrol action:
Exhibit No. 1: Analysis of the Decontrol
Action for Exports to Easteni European Com-
munist Countries.
Exhibit No. 2: Commodilies Decontrolled
for Exports to Eastern European Commu-
nist Countries Including East Germany.
ibit No. 3: Commodities Decontrolled
for ENports to Eastern European Communist
Countries Excluding East Germany.
( Attachmen ts.)
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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE
EXHIBIT 1
ANALYSIS OF THE DECONTROL ACTION FOR EX-
PORTS TO EASTERN EUROPEAN COMMUNIST
COUNTRIES
Current Export Bulletin No, 941, dated
October 12, 1966, announced a decontrol ac-
tion for United States exports to Eastern
European Communist countries. This action
was taken to implement the President's
speech of October 7, in which he stated in
part: "We will reduce export controls on
East-West trade with respect to hundreds of
non-strategic items,"
A proper evaluation of the decontrol action
requires an examination into two aspects:
(1) What countries were affected by the
decontrol action
(2) What commodities were decontrolled
for each of the affected countries?
COUNTRIES AFFECTED
The form of the decontrol action an-
nounced decontrols for two country group-
ings:
(1) Exports to all Eastern European Com-
munist countries and
(2) Exports to all such countries except
East Germany.
As used in the announcement, the term
"Eastern European Communist countries"
comprises: Albania, Bulgaria, Czechoslova-
kia, East Germany (Soviet Zone of Germany
and the Soviet Sector of Berlin) , Estonia,
Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Outer Mongolia,
and Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. The
Export Regulations refer to these Eastern
European Communist countries as "Country
Group Y."
CLASSES OF COMMODITIES DECONTROLLED
As indicated below, only ten commodity
items spread over six commodity classes were
decontrolled for exports to East Germany.
The bulk of the decontrol action centered on
the decontrol of commodities for export to
Eastern European Communist countries
other than East Germany. The affected
commodity classes and the extent of decon-
trol for each commodity class is shown below,
Number of commodity items decontrolled by
commodity class and country grouping
Commodity class
Food:
Cereals and cereal prepara-
tions
Fruits and vegetables
Sugar and sugar prepara-
tions_
Feeding stuff for animals___
Miscellaneous food prepara-
tions
Crude materials, inedible:
Leather scrap
Crude rubber
Textile fibers
Metal scrap
Crude animal material
Mineral fuels, lihricants, and
related materials:
Petroleum and petroleum
products
Gas, natural and manu-
factured
Chemicals:
Chemical elements and
compounds
Crude chemicals from coal
and petroleum
Dyeing, tanning, and
coloring material
Medicinal and pharma-
ceutical products
Polishht and cleansing
preparations
Fertilizers
Nonmilitary pyrotechnical
articles
All Eastern
European
Communist
cowl tries
Eastern
European
Communist
countries
except East
Clermany
2
1
3.
2
1
1
2
1
1
2
20
4
1
S 3543
Number of commodity items decontrolled by
commodity class and country grouping?Con.
Commodity class
All Eastern
European
Communist
countries
Chemicals?Continued
Cellulose and artificial
? resins
Chemical materials and
Products, n.e.c
Manufactured goods:
Rubber manufactures_ '
Wood and cork manufac-
tures
Paper, paperboard, and
manufactures thereof__
Textile yarn fabrics
Nonmetallic mineral manu-
factures.
Nonferrous metals manufac-
tures
Manufactures of metals,
n.e.c
Heating and lighting fix-
tures
Furniture
Travel goods and hamlbags
Clothing and accessories.
Footwear._
Professional, scientific, and
controlling instruments;
photographic am] optical
goods, and watches and
clocks
Miscellaneous ?manufac-
23 turcd articles, n.e c
Coin, other than gold coin,
2 not being legal tender
Machinery and transport
7 equipment:
Machinery, other than
6 electric
Electrical apparatus and
3 appliances
1 Transport equipinent_.
1
1
EXHIBIT 2
Commodities decontrolled for exports to Eastern European Communist countries, including East Germany
Eastern
European
Communist
countries
except East
(lemony
Export
control
commodity
No.
Commodity description
04811
Breakfast cereals prepared for cooking.
04812
Breakfast cereals prepared for serving.
05420
Beans, peas and other leguminous vegetables, dried.
08110
Other vegetable products for animal feed, n.e.c.
08195
Other food wastes, n.e.c.
08199
Other prepared animal feed, including feather meal and alfalfa mai.
00100
Margarine; and shortening.
09910
Canned hominy; corn chips and similar chips and sticks; and other grain food preparations and dairy food preparations.
51206
Soil conditioners.
69524
Drill bits, core bits, and reamers, under 4 inches o.d., containing diamonds.
EXHIBIT 3
Commodities decontrolled ,for exports to Eastern European Communist countries, excluding East Germany
Export
control
commodity
No.
? Commodity description
04840
Other bakery products.
06130
Sugar, beet and cane, raw or refined.
06180
Sugar, invert,liquid, and powdered; lactose, crude and refined; malt sugar (maltose); maple sugar; refined milk sugar; and crude sugar of milk.
nal grades of malt sugar (maltose) in export control commodity No'. 51203.)
06201
Sugar-coated cereal foods and candied or sweetened popped corn.
09904
Mayonnaise; and other salad dressings. Crain food preparations and dairy food preparations.
21180
Leather scrap and chrome shavings for fertilizer manufacture.
23110
Compounds of natural rubber, balata, gutta parcha and other allied gums.
23120
Neoprene (polymers of chloroprene).
'26201
Recovered fibers, nob, and waste, n.e.c., wholly or in chief weigth wool.
26230
Mohair and other wool-like specialty hair.
26240
Sheep's and lamb's wool, not carded or combed.
26270
Wool or other animal hair, carded or combed, excluding tops.
26280
Tops of wool and other animal hair, except horsehair.
264
Jute, including jute cuttings and waste.
26500
Vegetable fibers and waste of sisal, henequcn, manila or abaca.
26621
Other manmade staple fibers, noncellulosic, not carded or combed.
26622
Other continuous filament tow, noncellulosic.
20623
Manmade fibers or waste, noneellulosic, carded or combed or otherwise processed but not spun:
26631
Acetate or rayon (viscose and cuprammonium) staple, not carded or combed.
26632
Acetate or rayon (viscose and cupraminonium) continuous filament tow.
26633
Other man made fibers or waste, cellulosic, carded or combed or otherwise processed but not spun.
Approved For Release 2005/11/21 : CIA-RDP70600338R000300050011-8
1
15
5
5
44
11
1.
27
3
2
1
23
13
18
41
14
5
(Report medici-
S3511
Approved For Release 2005/11/21 : CIA-RDP70600338R000300050011-8
CONGRESSIONAL RECORD-- SENATE March 10, 1967
:;
Commodities decontrolled for exports ID Eastern European Communist countries, excluding East Gerinany?ContilLued
,
cow rol I
commodity i
No.
drieriptioit
.2664o Via.ste of other manmade fibers, not carded OT
Lli;(10 tither used civilian clothing, used textile articles, met., ant new or used rags.
2-;4211 ! fron pyrites, unroasted.
.27621 Nitillite grains and pellets.
'27610 ' Ashestos. uninanufacluied.
Natural cryolite; and natural chlollte.
27tiaa Arsenic bisulfide. natural; arsenic sulfide. natural; calcium silicate: kieserite. natural: ma nesium chloride, naldral. anhydrous; magnesium sulphate, natural
sodium sulphate, natural; soil; strontitinite; strontium carbonate; and trona.
2MIN) Iron ore MISS.
'2?)290 T erne plated scrap; and tin-plated scrap which h is nut been +let hulled.
Other aluminum alloy WaSie and scrap.
.2s105 Other magnesium or magnesium alloy waste 111,1 er;11)
1.".1100 j biological supplies, animal origin; glands, crude, hoof meal, Wail meal; 311f] pancreas.
33262 I Paraffin was. crystalline.
:13291 Other noulubricating and mallet petroleum nib ,b1d. of 42 gal
33292 Pi tell of tar coke.
:es293 Piteh coke.
+ Petroleum bitumen awl other firtroltai in and shale oil rei?eliiiN.
:13'296 ; 1Sit =Mous mixtures, hoed on asphalt, pelroleo.n. etc+
:;11111 I Natural gas liquids. includiog liquefied petrojeu Li y.0 ,I, P (; I'M. of 42 gals.).
34120 i tias, mantifiwtured (artificial).
512(r2 Ortho-aininoitilrodlenzene; parashydroxy?chlurotier !rm.: awl par dolticuesulfonylehloride. (Pb 3 11
51202 I Paradow. (16)
51203 Methionine hydroxy analogue.
51204 6. ethoxy-1,2 dihydro-2,2,4-triniethybquinoline.
S1205 Methyl strarate; and triethyl phosphate.
512116 Sodium pentachlorophenol; aliiolearbaniate. and 2,3,3driclikiroallyldiisopropylthioltarhamate.
51.207 Nero! and phenyl acrid.
51207 Other chemicals for flavor and perfumery use, natural orient.
51207 Other enzymes.
51:ara Organic ehemiCZILS, the following only: A, lialibroinopropiraiie adenylic acid; camphoric acid; campho-sulfurie vitt: corn protein denattrant; crotolialdehy
de:t cyana-cetamitle; diacetone alcohol; diethyl inalomile: (toilet hyl glyoxiine; dlpeniterythrltol acetate; dwelll wrythritol hexaproprionatc; dipentaerytluitol
liexylbutyrate; ethyl alcohol; elliy Ibu(yrate; t iyi chloride, ethyl chloroacetate: ethyl chloro-carbonate; ethy formate; ethyl hydrogen sulfate; ethyl lactate;
ethyl inidonate; ethyl mercaptan; glittaronitrile: gl wryl monostearate; methyl glutamate; methyl hydroxy at (methyl glyeolater, methylinoylacetalde-
hyde: monoisopropanolamme: monopentarr )'tlintol diacetate dinutyrate; monopentacrythritol let rabutyrate; 1.etilatiellione 2-4 (acetylacetoue); and perpinyl-
acetate.
51209 liseelliinenus organic chemicals, excluding cyclic, OYA'? tlir hilt 'wing only: aluminum acetate; aluminum dihyd'oxyaminoacetate; aluminunt formate solutions;
aluminum isopropylate. aluminum lachtte. Minimum ?Lamle; ;Minimum oxIquInolate; ammonium acetate; a 11111011i= bitartrate; ammonium ferric oxalate;
ammonium oxalate; aninioninin thioglycollate; ant imolly lactate; cadmium acetate; cadmium oetoate; calcium acetate; calcium formate. calcium linoleate,
except paint and varnish dryers; calcium tertian"; clihnophyll, dry; chlorophyll solution (in oil); iron protoxaInt e: iron sodium oxalate; numnesium Oxypehnyl
arsenate; manganese acetate: patassium acetate. potassium 'Mannar; pohoium oxalate; potassium oxichinolin sulfonate; potassium salit ylate; sodium ally1
arsenate; sodittin halal-ate (acid Sodium tot trite), sodium fountite; sodium gluconate; sodium methylene sodium oxalate; sodium potassium tartrate: sodium
, salicylate; sodium steantle; tartar emetic; zinc let' lit'. ;111.I zific stellate.
'51320 Arsenic powder; pyrographite leposinal carbon.; and arbor 1 $. I'. I rcsubliili,11).
51333 Sulfuric acid; and oleunl.
5I331t ifydrochloric Or muriatic acid.
51350 Iron hydroxide; tine hydroxide: and zinc peruti(14'.
51361 Ammonia. anhydrous or In aqueous vilution.
51362 Sodium hydroxide (caustic soda). solid and limn,
51363 Potassium hydroxide; potassium peroxide; and ,-,ettufil
51366 'Pin oxides.
t440 Other inoreanic pigments, n.e.e.
5146u sodium compounds and potassium (ammonia's. the Milowirie only: potash-magnesia carbonate; potassium arseni e: potassium bicarbonate; pit ..1S5i111111118tilfale;
potassium meta-In-sulfite; potasdion phospliat 4. itionolceite: potassium silicate; potassium sulfate; potwinin sulfide; rochelle salts; sodium alnInOrlinill
phosphate; sodium arsenate. sodium hisullite; tatiutii chlorite; sodium orthosilicate; sodium sesquicarbonate, sodium silicate or water gli is; sodium sulfate;
and sodium thiosulfate.
it 470 Industrial cheinieals, cadmium sultat calcium carbide; calcium polysiallble; calcium silicate; carb c cake; carblc Carbide; cart) de powder, except
abrasive powders; chalk, preeipitattal: dicaleiiim phosphate, efisoni salts; ferrous carbonate; ferrous chloride; ferrous sulfate; iron chloride; iron phosphate;
iron sulfate; iron sulfite, artificial; haat orsenite. lime bisulfate; Iline phosphate; magnesium amen kle; magnesium plicsphate; magnesium silicate; magnesium
shicofilloride: immiesitim sui bit': Magnes111111 1r i4ilicale: monoculeitini phosphate; nionoodclum sulphate; palladium chloride: palladium salts and compounds;
met carbide; silver chlorides. silver cyanide, industrial; silver nitrate; silver sulfate; silver sulfide; sodium chltgite; sodium silico alumbute; zinc carbonate;
nor cyanide; zinc hydrosulate; rine nitrate; zinc phosphate; awl rine sulfate.
52130 Animoniacal gas liquors and spent oxide produced in coal gas purification.
52110 Creosote or dead oil; creosote oil distillates: and resinous oit X-1.
53101 Alizarin sulfonic; indigo. natural and synthetic; . plietiosalronine.
53230 Chromium tanning mixtures.
53290 Tannins; and tanning and dyeing extraets of vegetable ?,Iteport natural indigo in export control Commolity No. 53101.)
53310 Luminescent zinc pigments, not nail
mact.rHler.,
53320 Printing inks.
53331 Prepared ceramic colors, including liquid lusters
53332 Larquers, except illuotintim, gold, pearl, and silver. aiel pAperliacked gold stamping foil,
St 102 Beef glands. and inedible dried pancreas, bulk.
4162 Animal products used for medicinal purposea, hulk . the following only: beef brain powder; beef heart extract; Lone marrow; bone marrow concentrate; brain
substance powder; fibrin muscle; glycerine extract of brain and inusele; and glycerin extract, red bone marrow,
54163 I [fluids. other than yeast, except potato flume ferment.
51170 v
Piirimicentical preparationa for veterinary use, or parked for retail sale, except antibiotics, sulfonamide l, hormones, vitamins and n literal&
51191 Ilividages and surgical dressings, not impregnatol or coithat a till pharmaceutical products, put up fur retail sale.
51199 Dental rubber.
55300 Deadorants, non -personal.
55420 + Deterecids, the following only; Ktlionlid irr IS; Intramin WK and Y; and Perinalene A 1011, A-120, and A-10,
55430 Rifle cleaning compounds; abrasive pastes, compounds, awl cake, except chemical; and steel burnialling
51;100 Irea fertilizer.
57130 Nonmilitary pyrotechnical articles.
55132 Other regenerated cellulose and chemical derivattS if cellulose.
!A191 I I ardened proteins.
5s492 Modified natural resins (including ester gunt), aril chemical derivatives of natural rubber, all in tinifiiiished or senii-finislicd forum
5.slati Ammonium alginate.
59920 0,0-dimethyl 0-Psnitro phenyl phosphorothlabe 0.0-diethyl 0-P-iiitro phenyl phosphorothlate; 3,44lichlororo opionanilide; 3-amino-2,5-dichlorObenzole acid
2,chloro-4-elli y lamino-6-isopropy i nog- trial i ne: 34a. 3,4a I ich lorop holy 11 -I t boxy-I-met hylurea; 2-chloro- N-isopropy lace tan nide; alph
I ylacetaiiiitle; 1.a.a,-Itaillnoo-2,6alinitrosN.N.411Propyl-Ictoliddine; 2-chloroally1 diethyldithimarbamate;
tetrachloroteroplithalic acid: 2,34lichloroally1 dilsopropylthiolcarbainate: dllsopropylthiolcarhaMate; and 4-chloro-2-butylnyl-N-ehlor0-
e whanilate.
.V.41 Inulin.
59952 Gluten and gluten flour.
511)155 Casein hydrolysitte; casein lattalbuinin; lactallaimin. tart:dhow in hydrolysate; lactarene (casein); and inedibit soybean protein.
WAX Dextrins les., British gum).
50001 0 tlier tall oil.
rifitl3 Pine oil, except pine-needle oil: terrier-11c solvents. ne.e. gum turpentine: and wood turpentine,
594.15 Wood tar; wood tar oils; wood mason.; wood nalli t ha. awl acetone Olt.
59966 Wood pitch and products luso! thereon or on roam
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Approved For Release 2005/11/21 : CIA-RDP701300338R000300050011-8
March 10, 1967
CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE S 3545
EXHIBIT 3
Commodities decontrolled for exports to Eastern European Communist countries, excluding East. Germany?Continued
Expert
control
commodity
No.
Commodity description
_ 59973 Other animal black, except activated.
59977 Prepared culture media,
59978 Charges for lire extinguishers,
89994 Pickling preparations for metal surfaces; auxiliary preparations for soldering, brazing or welding (fluxes, powders, pastes), containing metal and other constitu-
ents,
59995 Composite solvents, paint removers, thinners, and other similar products,
09999 Water softeners, water purifiers, and boiler feed water compounds. .
61230 Rubber heels, soles, soling, top lifts, and top lift sheets.
62102 Other rubber cements.
62103 Rubber thread and cord, covered or bare.
62930 Other hygenie an.d pharmaceutical articles of unhardened rubber.
62988 Other articles of unhardened vulcanized rubber, n.e.c.
63120 Other plywood and wood panels, including wood-veneer and cellular panels.
63141 Improved wood (demigod and/or impregnated with resin of resiulike materials).
63142 Reconstituted wood (particle board).
63183 Hoopwood, chipwood, wood chips; and poles, piles, posts, pickets, stakes, and similar products which are split, pointed or both, but not sawn lengthwise.
63240 Windmill towers.
63289 Wood manufactures, the following only: bee hives; boat parts, small, machined to shape; bridges; Fibrisir laminates of melaminephenol formaldehyde resins,
sawdust, or ground wood and paper; hog troughs; patterns; propeller blades; propellers; and trestles.
64122 Fine paper.
64130 Kraft paper, in rolls or sheets, uncoated, as follows: abrasive base stock; acid proof; ammunition; antiacid manila; base wad stock; buffing; cable base stock;
cable filling, electrical; cartridge stock; coil winding; document manila, file folder; dynalnite; electrical insulating; emery, base stock; expanding envelope
'stock; flat wallet stock; flint backing; frisket; garnet; gasket; graphite; guide stock; insulating, electrical patch base stock; pattern stock, polishing; red foiling
(cartridge paper); red patch base stock; sandpaper backing; shell stock; silk wrap stock; tissue; tympan; voice coil stock; wallet stock; and washer stock,
64180 Machine-made paper and paperboard, simply finished, in rolls or sheets, n.e.c,, and hand mule paper, the following only: ammignition; guide stock; antiacid
manila stock; armature; beaming; cable base stock; calendar roll,stock; cartridge stock; coil winding; cone, yarn, designers pattern stock (except tissue); docu-
ment manila file folder; dynamite; electrical; expanding envelope stock; flat wallet stock; flint backing stock; frisket; gasket; graphite base stock; gum waddingd
insulating electrical; interleaving for film; jute tag stoek; patch base stock; polishing base stock; portmanteau; red foiling (cartridge paper); red patch basei
stock; rope, for sand paper backing; sandpaper backing; shell stock; shot shell stock; silk wrap stock; slot insulation; steaming; stencil (18 lbs and over);stencili
stock for oiling; tabulating-machine Card stock; tape, rope stock for electrical insulating; time card stock; tympan; voice coil stock; wad base stock; wallet
stock; washer stock; pattern stock; stencil blanks tabulating machine card stock; absorbent paper for matrix; interleaving; tissue paper under 18 pounds,
except sanitary; ground-wood base stock for carbonizing; fine paper (uncoated for printing, writing); bible; check paper; mimeotype stencil; body stock for
carbonizing, free from ground wood; box covering; carbonizing base stock; duplicating tissue; electrical insulating tissue; heat sealable tissue; imitation Jap-
anese, India, lens, matrix tissue., pencil carbon stock; pottery, tissue; press copy; rotograme tissue; stencil tissue; stereotype tissue; tea bags; fibrilise; tissue for
duplex decalcomania; transfer stamping; and book lining.
64191 Kleerview (lacquer-coated glassine paper).
64199 Asphalt and tar saturated paper, heavy construction type.
65126 Yarn of wool or of fine animal hair,
65130 Cotton yarn, gray (unbleached); and unfinished cotton thread.
65140 Cotton yarnicarded, combed, ?finished; sewing, crochet, darning, a ml embroidery cotton thread.
65172 Rayon or acetate monofil.
65177 Rayon or acetate spun yarn, including singles and plied.
65190 Other yarns of textile fibers, n.e.c., including yarns of vegetable fibers, n.e.c.
65211 Gauze, tobacco cloth, and cheese cloth, unbleached, wholly or in chief weight cotton.
65212 Terry woven fabrics, unbleached, wholly or in chief weight cotton.
65213 Broadwoven fabrics, unbleached, wholly or in eldef weight cotton. ?
65221 Gauze, tobacco cloth, and cheese cloth, bleached, dyed, colored, or otherwise finished, wholly or in chief weight cotton,
65222 Other torrywoven fabrics, bleached, dyed, colored, or otherwise finished, wholly or in chief weight cotton.
65223 Pile and chenille broad woven fabrics and corduroy, bleached, dyed, colored, or otherwise finished, wholly or in chief weight cotton.
65229 Other broad woven fabrics, bleached, dyed, colored, or otherwise finished, wholly or in chief weight cotton.
05230 Other broad woven remnants less than 10 yards in length, and fabrics, Mex., wholly or in chief weight cotton.
65301 Broad woven fabrics wholly or in chief weight flax (linen) or jute.
65321 Other broad woven fabrics, wholly or in chief weight of wool and/or One animal hair, excluding pile or chenille.
65322 Pile and chenille broad woven fabrics, wholly or in chief weight of wool and/or fine animal hair.
65370 Knit or crocheted fabrics, not elastic or rubberized, wholly or in chief weight cotton or wool.
65390 -Other broad woven fabrics, wholly or in chief weight jute or
65401 Narrow woven fabrics, nonelastic, wholly or in chief weight cotton, jute, flax, or wool.
65402 Woven labels, badges, emblems, and insignia, excluding embroidered, wholly or in chief weight cotton, jute, flax, or wools.
65403 Hat braid, allffibers, and other trimmings, nonelastic, wholly or in chief weight cotton, flax, wool, or metal.
65406 Embroideries, wholly or in chief weight cotton, flax, or wool.
65407 Lace machine fabrics, wholly or in chief weight cotton, flax, or wool.
65510 Other coated or impregnated felt fabrics; and felts and felt articles wholly or in chief weight cotton, jute, wool and/or v ool-like specialty hairs.
65541 Bonded fabrics and articles wholly or in chief weight cotton or wool, (1) 2
65542 Other textile fabrics coated with gum or amylaceous substances.
65543 Other textile fabrics, n.e.c., coated or impregnated with resin or other plastic materials.
65544 Other textile fabrics, n.e.c., coated or impregnated with oil,
65546 Other textile fabrics, n.e.c., coated or impregnated.
65550 Elastic fabrics and trimmings, woven or braided.
65560 Other cordage, cable, rope, and twine, and manufactures thereof, wholly or in chief weight other textile fibers, n.e.c.
65570 Other hat bodies,
65581 Wadding and articles of wadding (excluding cellulose wadding), mu., textile flock, and dust and mill neps, wholly or chief weight of other textile fibers.
65610 Bags, wholly or in chief weight of cotton, jute, or wool.
65620 Sails of canvas; and tarpaulins, tents, awnings, and other made-up canvas goods, wholly or In chief weight cotton.
65662 Blankets, wholly or in chief weight cotton. (Report electric blankets in export control commodity No. 65663.)
65663 Blankets, wholly or in eldef weight wool, except electric.
65691 Linens and other furnishing articles, wholly or in chief weight cotton or wool, excluding knit, bonded, felt, quilted or stuffed articles.
65692 Other made-up textile articles, n.e.e.
65730 Carpets and rugs, wholly or in chief weight cotton, wool, or jute.
65740 Vinyl asbestos tiles.
65770 Tapestries, hand woven or needle-worked, wholly or in chief weight cotton or wool.
65780 "Mats, matting, screens, and other items, n.e.c., of cotton or jute plaiting materials.
66181 Asphalt and tar roofing and siding.
66246 Nonrefractory ceramic hollow tubes.
66312 Hand polishing stories and similar stones of natural abrasives.
66320 Other abrasive paper and cloth, coated with natural abrasives, except dental abrasives,
66381 Packing, gaskets, textiles, yarns, and other manufactures of asbestos, other than friction materials, Met:
66391 Other laboratory and industrial ceramic wares, not refractory.
66420 Other optical glass and elements thereof, not optically worked.
66470 Other laminated glass or toughened safety glass.
66480 Mirrors for automotive vehicles.
66494 Other articles of glass fiber, n.e.c, (Report glass fiber yarn, roving, and strand in export control commodity No. 65180, and tape in No. 65380.)
66512 Glass inners for vacuum vessels.
66581 Laboratory, hygienic, or pharmaceutical glassware.
66585 Articles of glass, n.e.c., the following only; floaters, glass valves, and ballentini reflective material:
66700 Diamonds, rubies and sapphires, natural and synthetic, suitable for gem stories. (Report Industrial diamonds, natural, in export control Commodity NO.
27515; and report stories, mounted or unmounted, worked so as to be recognizable as parts of meters, measuring instruments, clocks, watches, et,o4 in the op-
propriato classification provided for parts of the specific item.)
68111 Silver, leaf.
69110 Finished structural parts and structures, iron or steel, as follows; architectural and ornamental work; anchors and fittings for reinforcing refractory walls;
bulkhead (water gates); gangways; sluice gates; guardrails; platforms; portholes not specially designed for military watercraft; prayer rails; loading ramPli
(nonmechanical); and turnstiles, not electric or coin operated. ?
Approved For Release 2005/11/21 : CIA-RDP70600338R000300050011-8
Approved For Release 2005/11/21 : CIA-RDP70600338R000300050011-8
S 3546 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE March 10, 1967
Exuma 3
Commodities decontrolled for exports to Eastern European Communist countries, excluding East Germany?Conti] ued
f 'onimodity description
a912o Alutninum structural parts as follows: fencing and rutting, ornamental; pingways; portholes; prayer rails; staffoleing equipment; tower sections; and twnstiles.
tsr211 t Septic tanks, trim or steel.
t5r213 Septic tanks, aluminum.
twit i Other shipping containeis, iron or steel, .
n9222 1 Other shipping contahatrs, aluminum, including turrets, boxes, chests and collapsible tubes.
ito510 Hand tools mainly used in agriculture or forestry, anti parts, n.e.c., as follows; cant hooks; digging burs; digging spuds; gardeners' trowels mattocks: picks:
pike poles; wheel-type cultivators; and wheel-type seeders.
ita521. Power saw bhales, woolworkine; and hand-operated saws, hall,1 MN frames, and saw blades, except hacksaw blades; and parts, me.e.
ita5a'2 , Metal-cutting shears ;old t lumen's snips, not pow eruperated: wrenches; pliers, pincers and other similar liond tools, and parts, and files, rasps, and file
areessories.
foram other hand tools, met., and parts.
0524 other cutting tools, dies, and pmts.
69525 Other machine knives and blades.
o96119 Knife blanks.
(44701 : Stec: wool, pot smurers, anti other polishing pada. don or steel.
I97114 Figures, flower racks, mirrors, trays, and photograph or pet are frames of base metals, n.e.c.
0.9511 Motor vehicle locks- ignition twits; and tire Melo.
(WI Window locks and Safety hasps, nonferrous metal; and key blanks, all metals.
69S12 !tantalite and parts of base metal, as follows: tratirportaticsi hardware, all metals; furniture beading,
stainless steel; builders' hardware, nonferrous metal, hand rails -It metals; mid other hardware, sta
itie130 Other chains and parts, iron and steel. n.e.c.
040840 Anchors, grapnels, and parts, iron or steel
atom Buckles with die-cut Inserts, and belt hooks, all metals; belt f
(OM Other wire springs, Iron or steed
titistai Commercial closures of metal,
G9891 Iron or steel cargo hooks; and malleable Ron manhole covers.
i6iS90 Other aluminum or aluminum allow castings aryl forgings.
WSW Articles of nonferrous metals. n.e.c., other than tamper or copper alloy, the following only: boat spikes, wire nails, wire staples, and wire spikes; bolts, screws,
rivets, washers and similar articles. except screw eyes and screw hooks; brackets fer mounting outboard motors; bulletin boards; cans, n.e.c. made or cut from
nonferrous base metals; caskets; clothes-11m (dryer) reels; log horns, nonelectric, for shirks; hinge chaplets; lids for boxes; link chains; mooring swivels; car locks;
pipe hangers; riget We; tool boxes and tool chests, empty; and utility boxes.
71189 Windmills and parts, n.e.c.
71711 Cotton gins.
1712 Looms other than cotton
1713 Parts, accessories, and attachments for: (a) cotton gins, and dd looms other than cotton looms.
71713 Other parts, memories and albichnietits for mac limes for extruding niammiade libels, and fur other machines for preparing and processing natural or man-made
titters into yarns, and for winding.
71714 Millinery dies (hat blocks), nonferrous metal.
71715 Silk screen printing equipment: pleating (foldingt machines: and parts and attachments, n.e.c.
Intl
Dolt
7is12
71821
',1s29
71S-31
71)+39
71)42
ickel-plite 1 steel; edgings, all metals; farniture hardware,
nlm steel, except hinges and butts,
.1 than buckles), clasps, grommets, altd similar articles of stainles- steel.
Laminators, electric, for restoring manuscripts and documents; and parts and attachments.
Other machinery for making or finishing cellulosic pulp, paper or piiperboard: and parts and attachments.
Other papercutting machines and machines, nisi., tor Ilw manufacture of articles of paper pulp, paper or paperboard; and parts and attachments, n.e.c.
Bookbinding machines, and parts.
Price marking machines, and plutit-oldate rotary shavers, anti parts,
Grain cleaning machines, and corn husking intwhints, and parts.
Chocolate homogenizers, and laids.
Snow plows, farm-type; and parts, arcessorws. and at taclunents.
71915 Other airconditioning and refrigerating equipmeet; and parts, met., including parts for scil-containt41 air conditioning machines, (Report compressors in
export control commodity No. 71922.)
1919 Other machines and equipment. other than domeitle, for treatment of material by a process involving 8 change in temperature; and parts, r et,
:1922 (.7ompressors, refrigeration and airconditioning type, 1,5 horsepower and under; and parts, n.e.c,
71923 Laboratory centrifuges, n.e.c., and parts, met.
Automobile lifts; jacks for automotive vehicles or &craft; and parts, n.e.c.
Other hand-operated, mechanical and hydraulic oaks; and parts, n.e.c.
Faris elevators; and parts,
Elevators and crying stair was s; and parts, it lu.
Butler churns, fano type; and ports.
71931
71931
71931
71931
71941
Coln tensors anti evaporators for innielectrie domestic refrigerators; and parts.
71951 Cutting machines for ceramics mid sinillitr nonmetallic materials, except quartz, crystal, masonry, or stone.
1951 Other machines, n.e.c., for working ashestosteenteitt, ceramics, concrete, quartz crystals, masonry, stone (includitig artificial, precious and senliprectous stones),
:old similar mineral materials. (Report parts iii export control commodity No. 71954.)
71952 Other machines, n .e.c., for working bone, ebonite, hard plastics, and other hard carving materials. (Report parts :el export control commodity No. 71954.)
?, tom Parts, accessories, and at laehmen ts for cutting machines for ceramics and similar nonmetallic materials, except glans, quartz crystal, masairy or stone.
719M Parts, accessories, and attachments for other nischines for working asbestos-cement, ceramics, concrete, quartz crystals, masonry, stone (including artificial'
precious, and semiprecious stones), iiiid similar mineral materials.
71954 Parts, accessories, and attachments for other machines fur working bone. ebonite, hard plastic, and other hard carving materials.
71961 Other calendering machines and shalhu rolling in :whines, ii.e.c.: and parts,
'.IMA Lead scale weights for weighing machines.
71064 I fydra-blast parts cleaners, and parts therefor; and windshield washer sets.
71964 Sprayers and dusters, agricultural and pesticidal, except lawn sprinklers; and parts, net., except nozzles.
71964 Other spray nozzles of metal; mut hand-operated spray gums; and parts, n.e.c.
71964 Oilier sprayers and spraying equipment, n.e.c.; aid parts, nee.
Atm Concrete and bituminous pavers, finishers, and spreaders; and parts and accessories, n.e.c.
'1980 Windshield wipers, nonelectric, and parts, met.
71980 Shock absorbers, mechanical or hydraulic.
719412 Other taps, cocks, valves and similar appliances, misc.. and parts.
71904 Other gaskets (Joints), biotin:dell metal and nonmetal material, or set of gaskets of two Or more materials.
72320 Other electrical insulators and fittings of insulating materials, ine.c.
72110 Color television broadcast receivers, whether or not combined with radio or phonograph; and unassembled color television kits.
-.2490 Automobile radio receiver antennas; and parts and accessories, me.c., specially designed for home-type radio and television receivers and automobile receivers,
mein communications receivers,
:2505 Galleys, buffet servers, ovens. and other equipment specially designed for aircraft; electric heaters for automotive vehicles; and parts.
1262n Other medical and dental X?ray and gamins ray (climatical; and medical and dental apparatus based on the us of radiations from radio-active substances; and
parts nee
7.2912 Bat tery separators and blanks, wood; and battery parts made of rubber.
71911 Spatk plugs, aircraft and automotive types, and parts. t Report Insulators in export control commodity No. MN.)
:-1911 Other electrical starting and ien akin equipment for other nacresl combustion engines; and parts.
:2942 Other motor vehicle liehting equipment, signaling equipment, horns, electrical windshield wtperi, and defroiters; and parts therefor.
?2951 Other electricity supply meters. (Report path in export control Lominodity No. 86199.)
1-1552 Test benches, electrical, for automotive engines, hnikes, pinups and specdometels.
-2960 Electromechanical Mind tools; and ports.
-2990 Other lighting carbons, brush stock, and carbon 1 rushes,
32s0 Heaters for nonmilitary vehicles; and parts.
73291 Other motorcycles, motor hikes, and motor scooters.
73292 Parts and accessories for other motortycles, motor bikes, anti motor scooters.
7339)I Logging wagons; and parts. (Report off-highway trucks anti trailers In export control commodity No. 73203.1
13593 Buoys, all metals; pontoons for pipe lines, iron or steel; and fiberglass swimming pools, flouting.
s1210 Central heating apparatus, n.e.e., and parts, !Lea,
S1241 Vapor-proof electric light fixtures.
14 142 Explosion-proof lighting fixtures: and vapor-proof lighting throw
saud alattresses, mattress supports, and SWIM' Siam furnishings, 11,e.c., cotton.
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EXHIBIT 3
Comm ditie4. decontrolled for exports to Eastern European Communist countries, excluding East Germany---Continued
S 3547
Export
control
commodity
No.
Commodity description
82108
83100
84111
84112
84113
84114
84121
84125
84126
84127
84129
84130
84141
84142
84143
84145
84146
84147
84148
84149
84154
84155
84160
84202
85100
86120
86134
86135
86171
86172
86182
86193
86193
86190
86243
86248
86401
86402
89111
89112
89300
89425
89442
89512
89711
89714
89715
89927
89927
89928
89934
89952
89955
89994
89995
89997
96100
Plastic furniture; and laboratory furniture, metal; and parts, n.e.c.
Travel goods, handbags, and other personal goods of cotton.
Men's and boys' outergarments (excludes shirts), not knit or crocheted; (a) wholly or in chief weight of cotton or wool, or (b) safety apparel and raincoats, all
materials.
Women's, misses', girls', children's and infants' outergarments, including blouses, waists, and blouse shirts, not knit or crocheted: (a) wholly or in chief weight
of cotton or wool, or (b) safety apparel and raincoats, all materials.
Men's and boys' undergarments, including outer shirts, not knit or crocheted, wholly or In chief weight of cotton or wool.
Women's, girls' and infants' undergarments (excludes blouse shirts), not knit or crocheted, wholly or in chief weight of cotton or wool.
Handkerchiefs, wholly or in chief weight of cotton.
Corsets, brassieres, and girdles of cotton or other textile fibers, met., except rubberized.
Gloves and mittens, not knit or crocheted, wholly or in chief weight cotton or wool.
Cuffs and collars, wholly or in chief weight of cotton or wool; and neckties, cravats, mufflers, and scarves, not knit or crocheted, all materials.
Clothing accessories, not knit or crocheted, wholly or chief weight of cotton or wool, n.e.c.
Safety apparel and clothing accessories of leather,
Gloves, knit or crocheted, wholly or in chief weight of cotton or wool,
Hosiery, not elastic or rubberized, wholly or in chief weight of cotton or wool.
Undergarments, including shirts, knit or crocheted, wholly or in chief weight of cotton or wom.
Knitted or crocheted elastic fabric and articles thereof, except ankle supports, knee-pads, and 'wristlets.
Men's and boys' outergarments (excludes shirts), knit or crocheted, not elastic or rubberized: (a) waterproof, all fibers, (b) neckties, cravats, mufflers, and scarves, -
all fibers, and (e) other outergarments, wholly or in chief weight of cotton or wool.
Women's and misses' outergarments, knit or crocheted, not elastic or rubberized: (a) waterproof, all fibers, (b) mufflers and scarves, all fibers, and (e) other
outergarments, wholly or in chief weight of cotton or wool,
Girls', children's, and infants' outergarments, knit or crocheted, not elastic or rubberized: (a) waterproof, all fibers, (b) mufflers and scarves, all fibers, and (e)
other outergarments, wholly or in chief weight of cotton or wool,
Other non-apparel articles, knit or crocheted, not elastic or rubberized.
IIat and cap materials, except hat bodies, wholly or in chief weight cotton, jute, wool or textile manufactures, n.e.c. (Report hat bodies in export control com-
modity No. 65570,)
Other Millinery, hats, caps, and other headgear, n.e.c., including helmets.
Other apparel and clothing accessories, including surgeons gloves, rubber or rubberized.
Artificial fur and articles thereof, wholly or in chief weight cotton or wool.
Nonmilitary spats, leggings, and gaiters, wholly or in chief weight cotton or wool.
Protective spectacles and goggles (safety equipment).
Other microscopes, excluding electron and proton; microprojectors; and photomicrographic equipment; and parts and accessories. .
Telescopes, including astronomical telescopes.
Dental hand instruments and tools for use with hand pieces, n.e.c., and parts.
Whirlpool baths.
Other revolution counters, production counters, and similar counting devices, n.e.c.
Optical measuring and checking instruments; and parts.
Other measuring and checking instruments, applicances and machines; and parls.
Laboratory type hyrirometeis and similar instruments; and thermometers, pyrometers, barometers, hygrometers, psychrometers, and any combination of these
Paper, paperboard and cloth, sensitized, not developed.
Exposed sensitized plates, and exposed and developed plates, except lantern slides.
Other clocks, electric and nonelectric; and time recording and time stamp machines.
Other clock parts.
Magnetic recording and/or reproducing equipment for voice and music only.
Parts and accessories for magnetic recording and/or reproducing equipment for voice and music only.
Other finished articles, n.e.c., of artificial plastic materials, except articles wholly or partially made of polyimides, polybenzimidazole, polylmidazo.pyrrolone,
aromatic polyamide, polyparaxylylene, polytotrafluorocthylene, or polychlorotrifluoroethy:lene; or items wholly made of other fluorocarbon polymers of
copolymers.
Artificial Christmas trees, metal; and tinsel of metal,
Base metal wire wickets; and safety apparel and equipment for recreational purposes.
Stapling wire (all metals) on spools; and nonferrous metal staples for hand-stapling devices.
Jewelry and related items of eaeat gold, platinum, and platinum group metals, except rosaries.
Other articles of other than precious metals, incorporating pearls or precious or semi-precious stones.
Hollow ware, solid or plated, of precious metals; and silver leaf,
Hand sieves and hand riddles, laboratory types.
Other wire cloth sieves.
Hat braids of natural or man-made fibers,
Cigarette and cigar lighters of precious metals.
Leatherette buttons.
Corset stays, and similar supports for apparel.
Wool-like specialty hair prepared for making wigs and similar articles,
Wigs, false beards, and other articles, n.e.c., of wool-like specialty hair.
Vacuum bottles, jugs, and chests, complete (assembled or unassembled), usable only for hot or cold food or drinks.
Coin, other than gold coin, not being legal tender. (Report numismatic and collectors coins in export control commodity No, 89600; coins mounted in objects
of personal adornment in Nos. 89711-89720; coins for legal tender in Nos. 68070 and 68080.)
Mr. MUNDT. Mr. President, I call at-
tention to a few items. I want to in-
trigue the curiosity, if I can, of Senators
and students, who will read it carefully
in its entirety, because some of the things
are extremely interesting.
One of the items we are exporting to
Russia is crude rubber. We are export-
ing crude rubber to a country that des-
perately needs it, I presume, for the
tanks and trucks they send to Vietnam.
They are not using it to build auto-
mobiles. They are borrowing money
with credits guaranteed by our Ameri-
can Government with which to build
automobiles so that they can have them
for somebody besides bureaucrats and
politicians. Whatever they are using It
for, the rubber is available.
Scrap metal is also available here.
If any junk dealer in the area wants
to make a profit, Russia will buy that
material from him. We will not restrict
it. We hope that they will not use it to
kill American boys, but I think it is a
futile hope. Clearly we guessed wrong
with the Japanese some 15 years ago.
Let us go to the next page. There we
find listed machinery and transport
equipment, machinery other than elec-
tric, electrical apparatus and appliances,
and transport equipment. Interspersed
here and there are some agricultural
commodities, a great many other prod-
ucts and raw materials, and a few medi-
cinal supplies,
I would not send them any of it, if I
had a right to say anything about it,
except the medicine and the things that
deal with humanitarian purposes.
I would not send them anything that
leads to inhumanity or anything which
can be fabricated into something that
will kill American boys now serving in
Vietnam.
I refer now to the items listed on ex-
hibit 3. They talked about iron back at
the time of Pearl Harbor. However, this
time we forget about that and open up
the floodgates. We kept them closed for
the first three years of this war until on
October 12, 1966, the President said it is
okay to sell it.
They list asbestos, aluminum, natural
gas, and other kinds of gas available for
exportation to Russia.
I suspect that they are running out of
gas. They are selling so much of their
petroleum to Vietnam to keep them
fighting, they now have to buy some of
it from us.
More than 100 different kinds of
chemicals are listed here for unlimited,
unlicensed export and sale to Russia.
I will let the list speak for itself, but
I want to point out that when they talk
about nonstrategic material, even in this
sanitized listing, we have to be more
gullible than I believe any Senator can
ever become and stay in these halls to
read that list of things we are exporting,
and believe that stuff is not being used
in the war and not being used to shore
up the industrial complex of Russia so
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S35,18 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? SENATE
that she can step up the war supplies
she ships to Vietnam.
Mr. President, If this were a cleaner
list, if they censored it again and sani-
tized it with greater degrees of purity,
I would still submit the argument then
that sending to the Russian industrial
complex and its economy today anything
beyond the requirements of humanity
for food, if starvation is involved, and
for medicine for people who are ill in
times of pestilence and serious disease
should be prevented so long as Russia
is the factory fortress prolonging the
capacity of the North Vienamese to con-
tinue this war.
One does not have to be a Harvard
professor to figure that if we were just
going to ship them bicycles and irons for
pressing clothes and washing machines
and the so-called consumer goods items
it would not make any substantial differ-
ence. We step up their war produc-
tive capacity that much every time we
relieve a Russian worker, machine, or
stock of raw materials from the essen-
tiality of manufacturing consumer goods
that they have to have in order to keep
the people from revolting and to meet
the people's creature comforts. Any
time we Americans take care of those
consumer items, we release men, mate-
rial, and machines for them to use in
making weapons and missiles, and there-
by make possible bigger shipments of
better weapons to Hanoi to be used in
building bigger American casualty lists
in that faroff battle area,
And where are the Russians sending
them, on the record from the State De-
partment, the Department of Defense,
the CIA, and the press? The military
stuff they fabricate is going in big volume
to Vietnam to kill American boys.
It is that atmosphere in which we
should think about the responsibility of
even those who intend to vote for the
treaty to put in it a reservation which
will prevent that kind of war shipment
from continuing. If that kind of ship-
ment does continue, we should defer the
treaty until such time as we can bring
about a cessation of this traffic in blood.
Mr, President, I yield the floor.
Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President,
will the Senator yield?
Mr, MUNDT, I yield.
Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, I
hope that every Senator will take the
occasion to read the magnificent address
delivered today by the distinguished Sen-
ator from South Dakota. This address
is illuminating and should be very con-
vincing to any man who is open minded
on this question of the Consular Treaty,
It seems to me, and I have been around
Washington for 12 years, now going on
the 13th year, that the moment the ad-
niinstration takes a position, approxi-
mately 40 to 50 percent of the Senate
goes right along with the administration.
It seems that in the minority party
there are a number of Senators who go
along.
Mr. President, I feel that America is
today really facing a crisis. I have felt
for a number of years that we have
helped to support communism by ad in
trade, as the distinguished Senator from
South Dakota has brought out today.
We furnished them wheat a few years
ago.
Mr. MUNDT. Yes; and the Senator
approved at that time my amendment to
prevent that type of aid to Communist
Rusiia,
Mr. THURMOND. The Senator is
correct,. We also guaranteed repayment
of the money to the bankers who loaned
the money to the Communists with
which to buy the wheat.
What are we up to? What obliga-
tion have we to a conspiracy that says:
"We are going to stab you in the back.
We are going to take over the world. We
are going to make slaves out of you and
your children."
Why should we furnish money to sup-
port the Communist governments? Why
do we now wish to enter into a treaty
with a Communist government that has
as its goal the domination and enslave-
ment of the world?
Why do we wish to help support and
to make friends with a government that
is today furnishing practically all of its
goods to be used in the war against
South Vietnam to kill American men?
Every vital machine and every weapon
In use in the war in Vietnam today is
furnished by Russia with the exception
of some rifles, ammunition, and a few
trucks.
Mr. MUNDT. Which in turn come
from Communist China,
Mr. THURMOND, That is correct,
they come from Communist China.
I read an article today by Henry J.
Taylor, in which he stated that we are
furnishing equipment to Czechoslovakia
which they use in turn to make war
equipment to send to Vietnam to kill our
men.
We sell material, as the distinguished
Senator from South Dakota has said,
to other countries. Rumania was men-
tioned, Poland was mentioned, and other
countries were mentioned. We furnish
the basic resource, the materials. We
furnish machine parts, and we furnish
ctemicals, and we furnish the things
they need. Because of that, they are able
to support the war effort in Vietnam to
a great extent.
The same situation prevailed when we
sold wheat to the Russians. They were
able to keep in their gun plants and their
missile plants the men they would have
had to take out of the plants and put on
the farms to grow more food.
Mr. President, the Senator from South
Dakota has rendered our country a great
service by his address. I hope that not
only Senators but also all the American
people will read this address. When the
American people get the truth, they will
rise and demand that Congress take the
right stand on this question.
We have gone along and played with
communism. We have compromised
with communism. We have accommo-
dated communism. We have done
everything to placate the Communists.
We did not win the war against the
Commuists in Korea when we could have
and should have won it. General Mac-
Arthur said that we could have won
the war at one point in 10 days, but
we did not do so. We did not win the
war in Korea, and as a consequence we
March 10, 1967
are having trouble in Viemam; and if
we do not win the war in Vietnam, we
will have to fight again--and possibly
closer to home the next tune.
I hope the people of this country will
awake before it is too late. I hope they
will rise up and demand that their rep-
resentatives in Congress?who are their
representatives and do represent them?
will take the right stand on this vital
issue before the American people. There
is no question in my mind that this is
the issue. It means the very survival of
this country. This communistic issue is
the important issue before America to-
day. No other question is more impor-
tant. Russia is part of an international
conspiracy whose purpose is to take over
the world.
Mr. MUNDT. Mr. President, will the
Senator yield for a question?
Mr. THURMOND. I yield.
Mr. MUNDT. The Senator from
Soutt Carolina is a longtime student
of American history, especially in its
militsry annals, because he was pro-
moted to the rank of general in the
Armed Forces of this country. He is
one of the few members of the Armed
Forces of such high rank in either body
of Congress. Does he believe that we
would be at war in Vietnam today, or
would have become involved at any stage
In the war in Vietnam, if it were not
for tae existence of aggressive interna-
tional communism, if it were just a
question of Ho Chi Minh possibly being
an irritable fellow or having some mali-
cious ideas. Does the Senator believe
that we would have been dragged into
the war or would have been kept in it
except for the demonstrable fact that
there we are at war with aggressive,
militaristic communism?
Mr. THURMOND. In reply to the
queszion of the Senator from South
Dakota, I will state, as I have stated
herr,ofore on numerous occasions, that
the war in Vietnam today is not a war
between the north and the south. It is
not a civil war, as some liberal news
med a in this country would lead the
people to believe. It does not involve a
difference of opinion between the peo-
ple of one part of the country and the
people of another. This is a war on the
part of the Communists to take over the
world. They just happened to use Viet-
nam this time in which to fight the war.
They chose to fight in Korea a few years
ago. They will choose some other place
in the future.
Tne war in Vietnam a simply another
battle by the Communists in their overall
goal and overall desire to take over the
world. I hope the American people will
realize that, and I hope they will realize
that what we are fightins for in Vietnam
is not simply to help the people of South
Vietnam maintain their freedom, as the
Preaident has said, because we would
have no justification for sending Ameri-
can soldiers there, much as we may sym-
pataesize with the people of South Viet-
nam, to maintain their freedom. The
only justification we have for sending
soldiers to South Vietnam is for the na-
tional interest of the United States. If
It is to our national interest, then we
have a right to send soldiers there, and
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March 10,1.967
CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE
should send them there, and we have
sent them there for that purpose?al-
though this Government has never ad-
mitted that in so many words, as I have
just attempted to state it.
Our national interest is at stake in
Vietnam today; and if we do not win this
war, I repeat that we will have to fight
again, and it appears that every genera-
ion will have to fight. Men who fought
in Korea are now fighting in Vietnam, or
their sons are fighting there. There
will be no end to this problem unless
we fight this war to win it.
This war would fold up tomorrow, so
far as the real practical effect of it is
concerned, if Soviet Russia withdrew the
support she is giving there?the anti-
aircraft artillery, the surface-to-air mis-
siles, the Mig planes, the furnishing of
25,000 metric tons of oil a month. The
complex radar equipment that is being
used in Vietnam and the trucks that are
sent there are mostly Soviet. Any facet
of the war one can think of is being pro-
vided by Soviet Russia. If Soviet Russia
were taken out of this war, the war
would fold up immediately.
Red China is furnishing some of the
ammunition and small arms, but that is
about all. Soviet Russia is furnishing
90 percent or more of the armaments and
equipment and ammunition and the
logistic support to fight this war.
Mr. MUNDT. I agree with the Sen-
ator from South Carolina. If we could
get the administration to realize the na-
ture of the enemy and the source of the
problem, I believe we could begin making
some headway in steps designed to
shorten the war and to bring it to a suc-
cessful end.
Certainly, if what the Senator has said
is true?and I believe it is?that the
thing that holds us in Vietnam and took
us there is a consideration of our na-
tional interests, that it would be detri-
mental to our national interests to be
defeated there and to be driven out, and
that if we were thereby demonstrated
to be a paper tiger, I believe it could lead
to nuclear war and set back the pos-
sibilities of an enduring peace by many
generations.
If our being in Vietnam is in our na-
tional interest, can the Senator conceiva-
bly find any reason why it is in our na-
tional interest at this time to ratify a
consular treaty, tied in by its major
exponents with expanded trade to Rus-
sia, to bolster a machine with which we
are at war? Could that conceivably be
in our national interest?
Mr. THURMOND. The Senator has
explained this matter so simply today,
that I do not see how any fifth grade
child could fail to understand the true
situation.
I should like to ask the Senator this
question: Is it not true that if we ratify
this Consular Treaty, the world will be
led to believe that we are now very
friendly with communism, and would it
not cause people behind the Iron Cur-
tain?the captive nations?to lose hope
in America and to lose their hope of
some day being liberated?
Mr. MUNDT. I can see no other pos-
sible reaction. And that is made in-
linking the Consular Treaty to East-
West trade. The State Department wit-
nesses did the same thing. Its major
newspaper support, the New York Times,
which either always echoes the ideas of
the State Department or thinks them up
for the State Department?I am never
sure which; but they are always together.
The New York Times advocates the two
together.
The people around the world can read
and hear. What will be the reaction to
a country which in the fifth year of a
war is taking steps to expand the ca-
pacity of the enemy to do us in? What
can be their reaction? They think as
human beings and react to the log:Lc of
events the same as we do.
Mr. THURMOND. Is it not true that
if we ratify the Consular Treaty, it will
tend to raise the prestige of the Soviet
Union, whose goal is to dominate the rest
of the world, because the United Si,ates
has recognized Russia in a treaty, indi-
cating that it can trust the Russians and
have faith in them and do business with
them?
Mr. MUNDT, Unless we enact one or
both of these reservations which we are
going to vote on next week, the Sena-
tor's statement is demonstrably true.
Add to that the fact that they have
seduced us into acting on the treaty first.
The Russians have not ratified it. They
may never ratify it, but they can wave it
around the capitals of the world, demon-
strating how they made Uncle Sam creep
and crawl, saying, "Please, Mother Rus-
sia, won't you please let us have a treaty
with you? We will forget about your
espionage, we will forget about your
sabotage, we will forget about your
propaganda, and we will forget about
the fact that you are supplying Hanoi
with the weapons which are killing our
boys and prolonging the war. Won't you
please ratify this treaty with us?"
What a propaganda tool to hand the
Communists. Why do we not have at
least the prudence to insist that if there
is going to be a treaty let them ratify it
first? Why hand them this great propa-
ganda document? It is beyond me to
comprehend.
I thank the Senator.
Mr. President, I yield the floor.
(At this point, Mr. KENNEDY Of New
York assumed the chair.)
Mr. CURTIS. Mr. President, when his-
tory records these years I have served
in this body I assume it will report the
period as that time in which our prime
effort has been to seek equality of treat-
ment for all our citizens,
At no other period of our history have
we been so dedicated to the achievement
of this equality. We are unstinting in
this total effort to afford all Americans
equality in education, in environment, in
the marketplace.
At no other time in this world's history
has a nation bestowed such a full mea-
sure of rights, of benefits, of full recog-
nition of individual dignity upon the
citizen as inheres in America today.
And we are generous in sharing our
gifts, blessings, and good fortunes with
those who come here from other nations
to visit, to trade, to learn and to witness
our artistic splendor or our scientific
S 3549
this great life in America. They also
stand equal to our own in the interpreta-
tion of laws by our tribunals.
We have acquitted ourselves by keep-
ing faith with those noble documents
written by our first citizens?we have
interpreted those documents in the spirit
and to the letter of their making.
But today the Senate is being asked
to approve another document setting
standards of human conduct. We are
being asked to ratify an agreement with
another large and powerful nation about
the treatment of our citizens when within
the jurisdiction of the other nation.
We are asked to ratify an agreement
signed more than 2 years ago because
a similar agreement, identical in pur-
pose, made 34 years ago, has not been
honored by our cosignatory. We are
asked to reaffirm a 34-year course of our
respectable conduct because that co-
signatory has, for 34 years, disregarded
its pledge of respectable conduct.
We must reaffirm our good treatment
of Russian nationals because we seek,
but have not yet achieved, good treat-
ment for American nationals.
We are now being asked to ratify an
agreement binding our citizens to in-
equality, to abuse, to degradation and to
a standard of conduct far below the
norms of this Nation.
We are exhorted to give faith where
experience and judgment fail to support
that faith.
We are asked to abandon that high
principle of equality of treatment for our
citizens in order to propitiate those who
recognize no such principle.
This I will not ask Americans to do. I
will demand for them as good as they
give. I will not accept less.
We have suffered this inequality for
34 years. We are told that "things have
changed" in Russia. We are told that
the Russian heart has warmed?that the
Russian smile is sincere, not sinister.
But I can make my case for demanding
equality of treatment on circumstances
of recent date. I can make my case on
the record which has been built since
this Consular Convention was formally
signed by representatives of the United
States and the U.S.S.R. a little more
than 21/2 years ago.
It was more than 21/2 years ago that
representatives of the United States and
the Soviet Union signed the Soviet-
American Consular Treaty in Moscow.
For reasons we need not go into now, the
administration first submitted the treaty
for ratification by the Senate but then
withdrew it before it came to the floor.
Mr. MUNDT. Mr, President, will the
Senator from Nebraska yield at that
point?
Mr, CURTIS. I am happy to yield to
the Senator from South Dakota,
Mr. MUNDT. I think I heard the Sen-
ator say earlier in his remarks that we
were now trying to revive or reconstitute
an agreement or treaty which was signed
34 years ago; is that what I heard the
Senator say?
Mr. CURTIS. I said that 34 years ago
we entered into a treaty with the Soviet
Union, wherein each country pledged
equal and fair treatment of the other.
skills or to contest our athletes.
creasingly true because of the deliberate Mr. MUNDT. In other words, a rec-
and purposeful policy of the President in Those who come share equally with_us ?ignition treat:0
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S 3550 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? SENATE
Mr. CURTIS. Yes, a recognition
treaty, one to the other. We have con-
sistently lived up to It but the Soviet
Union has not. Yet, we are being asked
to sign the same kind of agreement
again.
Mr. MUNDT. I am sure that the
Senator is also aware that as a condi-
tion precedent, and as an attendant and
associate circumstance of our signing
that treaty of recognition, there was an
exchange of letters between Litvinov and
President Roosevelt in which, Litvinov,
speaking for the head of state, stated
that Russia would, from that point on,
grant us virtually the same kind of con-
sular concessions which we are now talk-
ing about in the pending treaty, absent
only the complete immunity clause; is
that not correct?
Mr. CURTIS. I think that is correct.
Mr. MUNDT. We have had some deci-
sions recognized by both parties in that
communication, earlier in the days of
association between Russia and the
United States, which were disposed of in
conformity with that agreement. That
agreement was precise and definite.
Well, earlier in the hearings, there was
brought out, I believe by the Senator
from Iowa [Mr. HICHENLOOPER), that
this agreement did exist, As a distin-
guished lawyer, he said that it was still
operative. At that time, the State De-
partment said it had been abrogated, it
no longer holds, it no longer Is binding,
it no longer prevails.
This question kept cropping up in
meeting after meeting of the group con-
sidering it, so that finally, on February
25, Carl Marcy, the very able and dedi-
cated chief of staff of the Committee on
Foreign Relations, at my specific request,
which was incorporated in the printed
testimony, wrote a letter to the Secretary
of State, stating:
During the hearings of February 17 on the
proposed consular convention with the So-
viet Union, Senator Mundt stated that he
would like to know on what date the Rus-
sians abrogated the Lltvinov agreement, and
for the text of the communication by which
it was abrogated ...
Because I doubt very much that it was
done by long distance telephone.
. . Senator Sparkman, acting chairman
of the committee, replied, "We will make
that inquiry and get that Information for
the record."
We would appreciate having the informa-
tion Senator Mundt requests as soon as pos-
sible.
Sincerely yours, Carl Marcy.
On February 25, 1967, there was trans-
mitted to me, with a letter from Carl
Marcy, the answer which was received
to his letter to the Department of State,
and the letter is on the same date as the
one which he addressed to me, incorpo-
rating in that letter to Carl Marcy some
rather interesting statements.
The Senator may recall that In defin-
ing the kind of consular considerations
which would prevail as the result of the
Litvinov-Roosevelt agreement, the con-
dition precedent to the agreement on the
recognition treaty, Litvinov stated that:
W e will provide for you the same kind of
consular considerations which prevail in a
consular treaty which we have already
worked out with the German government.
That is on German-Russian relations.
He added one sentence, which can be
found in the documentary evidence from
the big book which contains the ex-
change of papers?
We think it would be well to try to negoti-
ate a specific consular convention between
the two countries, but once we are recog-
nized, we will extend immediately all the
considerations of the German-Soviet treaty
to the Americana.
As everyone knows, Russia has violated
that agreement time after time after
time. We had to withdraw our consular
offices in Vladivostok. We had trouble
with their consular offices on the west
coast. It got so bad that we took our
consular officers out of Russia and they
took theirs out of the United States in
protest against our protest against them,
The question is: Was it abrogated?
This is a question which the Senator is
raising in his remarks, as to the record
of good faith of the Communists in mak-
ing these treaties.
Is their record of adherence to these
agreements good enough so that we want
to sign another one with them?
Well, what is their performance rec-
ord?
It is very bad.
Thus, we wanted to know from the
State Department if the 1934 agreement
had been abrogated, because it certainly
took the action of someone to bring ab-
rogation about, either by letter or com-
munication of some kind, by some official
of the Russian government.
The letter of February 25. to Mr.
Marcy, is the result, and I ask unani-
mous consent to have it printed in the
RECORD.
There being no objection, the letter
was ordered to be printed in the RECORD,
as follows:
DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
Washington, D.C., February 25, 1967.
Hon. CARL MARCY.
Chin j of Staff, Foreign Relations Committee,
U S. Senate. Washington, D.C. t
DEAR MR. MARCY: Thank you for your let-
ter of February 23, 1967, in which you pass
on the Foreign Relations Committee's in-
quiry as to when and by what oonumunica-
Lion the "Litvinoff agreement.' of 1933 was
abrogated by the Soviet Union. Your refer-
ence presumably is to Foreign Minister Lit-
vinon letter to President Roosevelt of
November 16, 1933, In which the Soviet Union
promised unilaterally to extend to American
nationals the provisions for consular notifi-
cation and access contained in the Soviet-
German Agreement Concerning Conditions
of Residence and Business and Legal Protec-
tion of October 12, 1925. I am attaching a
copy of Mr. Litvinoff's letter which included
the pertinent extriacts from the Soviet-Ger-
man Agreement of 1925,
The Soviet-German Agreement was never,
to our knowledge, formally abrogated. It
ceased to have effect, however, upon the out-
break of armed hostilities between the two
countries during World War II, when each
country withdrew its diplomatic and consu-
lar personnel. After the war, and the occu-
pation and division of Germany, the pre-war
Soviet-German Agreement was not revived.
Instead the Soviet Union negotiated new
Gor.sular Treaties with both the Federal Re-
public of Germany and the so-called "Ger-
man Democratic Republic"?neither of
which contain any guarantees of consular
notification or access to arrested nationals.
I am attaching a copy of Article 17 of the
Soviet Agreement of 1958 with the Federal
Republic of Germany.
March 10, 1967
The post-war legal situation with respect
to consular protection of Ame lean citizens in
the So/let Union, prior to the 1964 signature
of the U.S.-U.S.S.R. Consular convention now
pending before the Senate, may thus be
summsrized as one in which there were no
Soviet treaties In force to which the Litivin-
off mart-favored-nation pledge could attach.
This was one of the reasons that persuaded
the Department to negotiate the 1964 Con-
vention, containing as it does clear and ex-
plicit guarantees of consular notification and
access.
The Litvinoff pledge itself, for what it was
worth. has also never been formally with-
drawn. However Mr. LitvincoVs letter linked
the Soviet pledge to the stued expectation
that the two countries would "immediately"
negotieite at consular convent on on the same
subject. As you know, this expectation was
not fulfiled since no convent on was negoti-
ated to agreement until mere than thirty
years later. The Soviets hale long been in
the position plausibly to ma ntain that the
Litvinoff pledge was merely in interim un-
dertak ng which lapsed upor the failure of
the patties "immediately" to negotiate a con-
sular convention.
The legal deficiencies of the "Lltinoff
agreen-ent" were among th2 reasons per-
suading the Department that the time had
come to conclude a treaty containing clear
and unequivocal provisions giving us the
rights of notification and access in cases of
Americans arrested in the Soviet Union.
These provisions are essential if American
citizens traveling in the S0v1,3t Union are to
be afforded the consular protection they de-
serve, The 1964 Consular Cor.veniton and its
Protocol achieve this purpose by making it
unamtiguously clear that notification and
access must be granted within four days from
the time of arrest or detention of an Ameri-
can national and on a continuing basis
therea 'ter.
If I an be of further assis.ance, please do
not heaitate to let me know.
Sincerely yours,
Doonas MACARTH JR
Assistant Secretary
for Congressional Relations.
Mr. MUNDT. Mr. President, it will be
noted that this letter states categorically
"this treaty has never, to our knowl-
edge, been formally abrogated. The
Litvinov pledge itself, for what it was
worth, has also never been formally
withdrawn." Thus, we now have it on
the record, from the Department of State
Itself, that there has been no abrogation
of the Litvinov agreement, that what we
have had is a series of violations of the
understanding and the treaty and, un-
happily for the relationshim between our
two countries, there have been violations
of like kind in so many treaties that the
Department of State itself has published
a report of treaty violations with the
Sovie-, Union containing all the treaties
and specific instances of Soviet
violations.
This report is available. They do not
like to circulate it very much these days,
but they are obliged to make it available
to anyone who asks for it From our State
Depvtment.
This is all rather basic as we start to
think about other treaties with the Soviet
Union. What I have stated, I believe,
will affirm what the Senator from
Nebraska has properly alluded to in the
understanding reached :34 years ago,
which has been violated and violated and
violated time and time again.
Mr. CURTIS. I than the Senator
from South Dakota,
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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE S 3551
I ask the Senate to delay action on it
until President Johnson and his Secre-
tary of State provide us with some solid
assurances that the United States will, in
fact, achieve equality in treatment for
its citizens once the treaty goes into ef-
fect.
I will not now go into the long history
of American disappointments with the
Soviet Union in its manner of carrying
out its treaty obligations.
It appears to be curious timing, how-
ever, for the United States to be ratify-
ing this Consular Treaty, long coveted by
the Soviet Union, at this particular time.
Let us look back over the past 21/2 years
since Ambassador Kohler and Foreign
Minister Gromyko signed the Consular
Treaty in Moscow on June 1, 1964.
Since that time the Soviet Union has
increased sharply its material support, in
warplanes, antiaircraft missiles, and
other arms, for the North Vietnamese na-
tion which this Senate has frequently
condemned for its aggression against
South Vietnam.
Would we not be rewarding the Soviet
Union for arming the aggressors in North
Vietnam, the forces waging war against
American boys in southeast Asia? How
does the consular treaty fit into the
broader context of overall Soviet-Ameri-
can relations?
The President, in his state of the
Union message, tells us that?
Our relations with the Soviet Union, East-
ern Europe are . . . in transition. We have
avoided both the acts and the rhetoric of
the cold war. When we have differed with
the Soviet Union, or other nations for that
matter, I tried to differ quietly with courtesy
and without venom. Our objective is not to
continue the cold war, but to end it.
Are we not entitled to learn from the
President how he expects to continue this
so-called transition out of the difficult
period of the cold war when at the same
time the United States is engaged in a
hot war against a nation whose prin-
cipal ally is the Soviet Union?
I am aware that I am raising broader
questions than those that deal with the
Consular Treaty alone. But this need
not make them any less valid. The Con-
sular Treaty does not come before us in a
vacuum, but in the real world of today.
Let us also consider the Consular
Treaty, however, in the narrower con-
text of treatment of American nationals
in the Soviet Union. The history of the
last 21/2 years, since Foreign Minister
Gromyko signed his name to the Con-
sular Treaty, is no less disconcerting.
We learned, only a few days ago, of the
diligent and commendable pressures ex-
erted by the administration to effect the
release of Vladimir Kazan-Komarek, the
American of Czech origin convicted of
treason by a Communist court in Prague
and sentenced to 8 years in jail.
Have we already forgotten how he fell
into the hands of the Czech authorities?
The Soviet Union is widely believed to
have taken the trouble to divert one of
its Moscow-to-Paris international flights
to set down in Prague, an unscheduled
stop, so that Kazan-Komarek could be
plucked out of the plane. Does this
Soviet apparent breach of normal inter-
national conduct reassure the President,
or any of us, enough to expect honest
compliance with the provisions of the
Consular Treaty? Will our nationals get
the same treatment Soviet citizens get
here?
Only a few months ago we learned of
the conviction of young Buel Wortham,
who was sentenced to 3 Years at hard
labor by a Leningrad court for having
participated with an American com-
panion in a small blackmarketing: deal
and for pilfering a statue of a bear.
Knowing the severity of life in Soviet
labor camps and aware of other nations'
less severe attitude toward such minor
offenses, does this episode bolster our
confidence that the Soviet Union can be
counted upon to observe faithfully the
provisions of the Consular Treaty to give
American citizens greater attention and
protection? Equality of treatment?
In this Wortham case we have a com-
ment from Secretary of State Rusk that
is far from reassuring. In December he
told newsmen at a press conference:
We did feel that, although these two young
men acknowledged the offenses . . with
which they were charged, the punishment
was more harsh than the violations them-
selves would seem to warrant . . .
I do not myself wish to condone these par-
ticular actions, but I think, as the Soviet
Union moves into a period in which they are
trying to encourage tourism and have maxi-
mum contacts with other countries, that
they might recognize that on occasion minor
incidents of this sort may occur and that it
will be in their interests to resolve them in
accordance with the general practice of most
governments when temporary foreign guests
pull pranks of this sort?or whatever you
want to call it?that would be a violation of
local law.
I would hope that the Soviet authorities
would take cognizance of this sort of thing
and take action to mitigate the punishment
that has been meted out to these two men.
Speaking, we must assume, for the ex-
ecutive branch, the Secretary of State
thus takes a dim view of this Soviet
action against an American etizen.
How can he be encouraged to hope for
better treatment of Americans once a
Consular Treaty is ratified? Foreign
Minister Gromyko's signature on the
Consular Treaty was long dry when the
Wortham sentence was pronounced.
And then there is the tragic, sordid
case of Newcomb Mott, the 27-year-old
textbook salesman convicted in Novem-
ber 1965, of illegally crossing the Nor-
wegian border into the Soviet Union. He
died on his way to a labor camp under
extremely suspicious circumstances. The
Soviet Union claimed he had committed
suicide. When his body was returned to
this country many competent authorities
concluded he had been murdered.
American Embassy officials were per-
mitted to see Mott while he was in cus-
tody, and before he was packed off on
a train bound for the Soviet labor camp
he did not reach alive. The effectiveness
of American Embassy officials in pro-
tecting an American citizen in this case
could hardly be described as impressive.
Three months after his death on Janu-
ary 20, 1966, the U.S. Embassy registered
complaints which must raise serious
questions about the worth of the provi-
sions in the Consular Treaty for access
to Americans arrested in the Soviet
Union. The American Embassy sent
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this message to the Soviet Ministry of
Foreign Affairs:
Certain physical evidence which would
have permitted an objective evaluation on
the Soviet report (of his alleged suicide)
was not made available, such as the instru-
ment with which Mr. Mott is said to have
accomplished his alleged suicide and the
clothing he wore when he died the report
was silent on the following key elements:
It does not tell why Mr. Mott was being
transported to the place where he was to
serve his sentence when, so far as the United
States Government is informed, his appeal
for clemency had not been decided on .
there is no description of his alleged act of
inflicting wounds on his arms, body and
neck prior to the discovery of the guards
that Mr. Mott had blood on his body . . .
the obscurities and omissions of the Soviet
report were called to the attention of the
Ministry with the request that the missing
items of information be supplied, along with
the photographs which were confiscated
from Captain James W. Bizzel, the Embassy
doctor at the time of the autopsy . . the
Soviet Government's refusal to provide those
vital elements of information .. is scarcely
responsive to the Ambassador's request.
A former New York City police com-
missioner, who examined Mott's body
when it was eventually returned, con-
cluded "beyond question" that Mott had
been murdered.
Certainly this dreary episode cannot
inspire confidence that the Soviet Union
intends to honor the commitment im-
plied in its signature on the Consular
Treaty to help American officials give
protections to their nationals in the
Soviet Union. Ought not the Soviet
Union be on its good behavior during the
period between signature and ratifica-
tion of the treaty?
What assurances can the President
and Secretary of State give the Senate
that the Soviet Union will report arrests
of American citizens at all, let alone
promptly? On the basis of past ex-
perience, how do we dare hope they will?
As for the increased dangers of Soviet
espionage in this country as a con-
sequence of opening an additional con-
sulate, it is perhaps supercautious to
contemplate opposing ratification of the
treaty on the grounds it will present the
Federal Bureau of Investigation and
other American authorities with extraor-
dinary surveillance chores. It appears
to be a little facile, on the other hand,
to suggest that since the present 452
Soviet diplomats and consular officials
will be augmented by only 15, the surveil-
lance problem is insignificant. If Presi-
dent Johnson intends to pursue his
"transition" toward an end of the cold
war, is it not reasonable to expect that
other consular offices will be quick to
follow? Besides several more Soviet
consulates, may we not expect to see
many more East Communist consulates
cropping up in other American cities?
Will the surveillance problem not have a
potential for rather spectacular growth?
If I read the various letters of Mr.
J. Edgar Hoover correctly, however, I do
not believe he has said his Bureau could
not handle the added security problem.
He has merely said what is obvious,
that the problem will be made more
difficult.
There has been so much emphasis on
the espionage potential of these pro-
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S 3552 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? SENATE March 10, 1967
posed consulates that many of us have
lost sight of the principal purpose of a
consulate: To increase trade. Why is it
that the administration proposes to set
up these focal points for increasing So-
viet-American trade before there is any
evidence that a significant increase in
trade is either possible or likely? Since
the passing of Stalin, and before, the
Soviet Union has sought to expand its
trade with the United States, but always
with the proviso that the United States
advance the Soviet Union substantial
loans with which to buy on the Ameri-
can market. It has been the American
position, in return, that the Soviet Union
must first settle its World War II lend-
lease debt, which started at $11 billion
and was cut subsequently by the United
States first to some $2 billion and later
to less than $1 billion.
Does the administration, perhaps, in-
tend to relent on this longstanding pol-
icy and begin financing Soviet purchases
in this country?
I have enumerated today only some of
the fundamental questions to which I
believe the Senate deserves clear an-
swers before it is asked to consent to the
Soviet consular treaty.
For the past 34 years, since we opened
diplomatic relations with the Soviet
Union in 1933, we have sought in vain to
achieve equality of treatment in our deal-
ings with the Soviet Union, Is it not
time now that we insist on clearcut, posi-
tive assurances that the United States
will get the same treatment which the
United States provides for the Soviet
Union?
Let me therefore propose that the Sen-
ate receive from the President a message
acknowledging the long history of dis-
parity of treatment and the methods
which will be used to receive equality
of treatment for American nationals
prior to consideration of this treaty with
the Soviet Union. We should not be sat-
isfied with a simple generality from the
President that the Soviet Union has
promised to provide the United States
equal treatment. The Senate deserves
to know, before it gives its consent to the
Consular Treaty, the specific earnests it
has received from the Soviet Union which
reasonable men can consider adequate
from a nation which has failed in the
past so frequently to measure up to the
norms of civilized behavior.
I would invite my colleagues to ponder
whether it befits the dignity of a great
power like the United States to accept
once again empty assurances of Soviet
good intentions without first obtaining
the most convincing evidence that the
Soviet Union intends to honor fully its
commitments. We have already waited
34 years for equality of treatment for
American nationals. The initial assur-
ances 34 years ago were just as clear
as those in this treaty.
For the Vie years since the signing of
this treaty the same course of inequity
and abuse has continued. Certainly we
can delay enough longer to assure our-
selves this consular treaty will achieve
equality. We must look forward with
confidence to an end of the Mott, Wor-
them and Kazan-Komarek types of epi-
sodes. We must not be beguiled by the
repeated cliche that 18,000 Americans
visited the Soviet Union last year. By
comparison, one million Americans vis-
ited Western Europe last year.
Should one American, let alone 18,000,
travel in the U.S.S.R. if we cannot assure
him treatment by the Soviets equal to the
treatment Soviet nationals receive in
these United States?
Should American students in our edu-
cational exchange be asked to study
under adverse limitations, under a denial
of promised access to scholars and ma-
terials, whereas we give Russian students
the fullest of opportunity, of freedom of
access, of comfort and of dignity?
Should American diplomats in the
U.S.S.R. continue to live in totally sup-
plied quarters under the harassment of
total:y supplied custodial and service em-
ployees whereas Russians select freely
their housing here and bring a total staff
of Russian personnel to the United
States?
I need not give answers. Rather, I
suggest a firm and formal action which,
in clear and unequivocal terms, will
achieve equality of treatment for Ameri-
can nationals, or will state apt and ample
remedies for incidents of inequality. I
am sure this can be accomplished by a
message from the President.
To do less than this, at this time, would
subscribe this body, so diligent in its pur-
suit of equality of treatment for our
citizens, to an agreement whereunder we
give that equality of treatment to na-
tionals of the U.S.S.R., and assign our
citizens to an inequality which is so pre-
dictably one of harassment, of abuse, of
degradation, even of risk of life itself.
The President desires ratification of
this treaty immediately. Many Mem-
bers on both sides of the aisle are in an
unseemly hurry to confirm, by action
here an agreement which was vested
34 years ago, which was reaffirmed by
signatories of the two nations almost 3
years ago, and which has been ignored all
these years by the other contracting
party.
Before we come to a vote cannot we
ask from the President, from the Secre-
tary of State, and from other officials
upon whom the responsibility rests an
absolute assurance in the form of a
message to this body that we take notice
of 34 years of inequality of treatment for
American nationals, that we will employ
apt measures to secure equality, and that
the President in this message state the
means whereby we will seek redress for
acts of inequality of treatment of Ameri-
cans within the actual or effective juris-
diction of the U.S.S.R.?
I yield the floor.
Mr. MUNI)T. Mr. President, I was
just called up to the press lobby, and in
passing through the Senator's private
lobby, looked at the teletype machines
which type out the news for the imme-
diate information of Senators each day.
I was pleased to note an Associated
Press dispatch coming off the ticker,
headed "Consular, Tops," I do not know
exactly what that "Tops" means. It may
be some Associated Press lingo indicating
that it is important news; but at least it
was gratifying news to me, and I think
important, and I shall read a part of
the statement, and ask unanimous con-
sent that the rest of it be printed in the
body of the RECORD. It says:
WASHINGTON (AP) .?Barry Goldwater, who
previously said he supports the U.S.-Soviet
consular treaty, came out today for an
amendment which the pact's upport,ers say
would kill it.
Goldwater, in a statement 1:sued through
Karl Hes, speech writer in the former Sen-
ator's unsuccessful 1964 campaign for the
Presidency, said he support:, a proposed
amendment by Senator Karl E. Mundt, R-SD.
The Mundt proposal would postpone effec-
tiveness of the treaty until the President is
able to notify Congress that U.S. troops are
no longer needed in Vietnam or until he
certifies that Soviet aid to North Vietnam is
not delaying the return of such troops
I interpolate at that point that I do
not lerow just where the Associated
Press gat its information that the pact's
supporters say that the acicption of this
amendment would kill the treaty, be-
cause it seems to me that would be a
comple-e confession of the fact that the
Soviets are prolonging the war in Viet-
nam, and delaying the retern of Amer-
ican troops to the United States. If it is
in fact a, confession of that situation,
which I believe to be a valid one, it would
seem to me that supporters of the pact
should welcome an opportunity to have
it ratified in such a way that it could not
be used for the purpose of prolonging
the war, but that the ratification, with
the resolution, could In fact be used as
a diplcmatic tool, to try to induce the
Soviets to discontinue this act of infamy,
which is so disastrous to our American
troops.
I read on from the Associated Press
news dispatch:
Backers of the pact, now bef ire the Senate,
contend Russia would accept no such
amendnent and the agreement on guide-
lines fcr the opening of new consulates in
each cc.untry would be torpeioed.
That distresses me, Mr. President, be-
cause the supporters of the pact are, in
the main, the ardent supporters of ad-
ministration policy. If?ac d I hope this
Is not the case they are speaking for
the administration, it seems to me that
to confess failure before we even try is to
indicate we are marking oue the working
formula for a war which may last, not
only another 5 years, but longer than
that; because there is no indication of
any ki od that important punishment is
being inflicted upon Hanoi today which
they cannot offset by the fact that they
get free oil, free guns, free food, free
clothing, and free supplies either from
their Communist partners in China, if
it is unsophisticated materai, or, if it is
important weaponry of the modern age,
they get it free of charge from Russia.
Continuing Mr. Goldwater's statement,
he says:
To oppose the amendment would be the
same as saying that Soviet taipport of the
killing of our soldiers is of no consequence
in the relations between America and the
Soviet Union.
He said:
I kncw that the American people feel that
It is of great consequence,
Mr. President, I ask unanimous con-
sent that the news Item be printed in
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March 10, 1967
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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? SENATE S 3553
full in the RECORD and that with it there
be printed again?although it is in the
RECORD previously, but it is brief and
gives the meaning and purport of the
Goldwater statement in the resolution
to which it is directed?the very brief
reservation I have proposed which is
scheduled for a vote late in the after-
noon of Wednesday next week, known as
Executive Reservation No. 2. It is to
that reservation that the Associated
Press story just off the wire alludes.
There being no objection, the material
was ordered to be printed in the RECORD,
as follows:
WASHINGTON (AP) =Barry Goldwater, who
previously said he supports the U.S.-Soviet
Consular Treaty, came out today for an
amendment which the pact's supporters say
would kill it,
Goldwater, in a statement issued through
Karl Hess, speechwriter in the former Sen-
ator's unsuccessful 1961 campaign for the
presidency, said he supports a proposed
amendment by Sen. Karl E. Mundt, R-S.D.
The Mundt proposal would postpone ef-
fectiveness of the treaty until the President
is able to notify Congress that U.S. troops
are no longer needed in Vietnam or until he
certifies that Soviet aid to North Vietnam is
not delaying the return of such troops.
Backers of the pact, now before the Sen-
ate, contend Russia would accept no such
amendment and the agreement on guidelines
for the opening of new consulates in each
country would be torpedoed.
"To oppose the amendment would be the
same as saying that Soviet support of the
killing of our soldiers is of no consequence
in the relations between America and the
Soviet Union," Goldwater said, "I know
that the American people feel that it is of
great consequence. They would, given the
opportunity to vote on it, support Sen.
Mundt's amendment enthusiastically, as I
do.
"Recently, I said that I would, if still in
the Senate, support Sen. (Everett M.) Dirk-
sen's position in over-all support of the con-
sular treaty, As I publicly explained, my
reasons for taking that position, after orig-
inally opposing the treaty, involve matters
of highest national security which I am not
free to disclose."
RESERVATION
Before the period at the end of the reso-
lution of ratification insert a comma and
the following: "Subject to the reservation
that no exchange of instruments of ratill-
cation of this Convention shall be entered
into on behalf of the United States, and the
Convention shall not enter into force, until
the President determines and reports to the
Congress that (1) it is no longer necessary
to assign members of the Armed Forces of
the United States to perform combat duties
in the defense of South Vietnam or (2) the
removal of members of the Armed Forces
of the United States from South Vietnam is
not being prevented or delayed because
of military assistance furnished North Viet-
nam by the Soviet Union."
ADJOURNMENT TO MONDAY
Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. Mr,
President, if there is no further business
to come before the Senate, I move, in
accordance with the previous order of
March 9, 1967, that the Senate, in execu-
tive session, stand in adjournment until
12 o'clock noon Monday,
The motion was agreed to; and (at
4 o'clock and 51 minutes p.m.) the Sen-
ate adjourned until Monday, March 13,
1967, at 12 o'clock meridian.
NOMINATIONS
Executive nominations received by the
Senate March 10, 1967:
INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION
George M. Stafford, of Kansas, to be an
Interstate Commerce Commissioner for the
term of 7 years expiring December 31, 1973,
vice Howard G. Freas, term expired.
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