Congressional Record Excerpts March 15, 1967

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• Publication Date: March 15, 1967
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March 15, 1967 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? SENATE
great respect for the distinguished ma-
jority leader, who read the letter. I
want to say for one Senator, the Senator
from Florida, that he does not agree at
all with the statement in that letter that
the assurances given in prior letters are
now stronger than the expression of the
hope contained in the understanding of
the distinguished Senator from Maine,
because there is nothing in the former
letters, there is nothing in the ex-
pressions made to the Senator from
Florida?and he has conferred with the
representatives of the Department of
State?or by any manner or means, that
they do not intend to open consulate
establishments with the Soviet people
until after the cessation of the Vietnam
conflict. They say they do not have any
present proposal. They say they will
take up subsequent proposals with the
committee headed by the distinguished
Senator from Arkansas [Mr. FULBRIGHT].
But they make no statement at all?of
a hope or anticipation or commitment?
that they will not open negotiations with
the Soviet Union for the purpose of
establishing consulates until the Viet-
nam conflict comes to an end.
I see no reason in the world why a
Member of the Senate should not have
the right to express a hope, an intention,
an understanding, just as much as the
Secretary of State or anyone else. Cer-
tainly this Senator claims the right and
he thinks every other Senator should
have that right.
The Senator from Florida agrees fully
with the hope expressed in this under-
standing?and it is not a binding ex-
pression at all, but with the hope ex-
pressed?that there will be no commit-
ment made, no negotiations opened look-
ing to the opening of consulates in this
country by the Soviet Union and in their
country by us until the conflict between
the free world and a large part of the
Communist world comes to an end. That
is the least we can say.
I voted against the reservations which
went further, but I hope, in view of the
popular feeling of the people in this mat-
ter, and in view of what I think is in
the heart of every Senator, there will be
no move toward further opening of con-
sulates until the Vietnam conflict comes
to an end. That is what the Senator
from Maine says in her understanding,
which I shall certainly support.
I thank the Senator from Maine for
yielding to me.
Mr. FULBRIGHT. I yield 3 minutes
to the Senator from Kentucky.
Mr. COOPER. Mr. President, it is
always difficult to be in opposition to
the distinguished Senator from Maine.
I share with everyone else in this body
great respect for her patriotism, her
ability, and her integrity. But her pro-
posed understanding, like the proposed
reservations that were offered by the dis-
tinguished Senator from South Dakota
[Mr. MUNDT] and the distinguished Sen-
ator from Nebraska [Mr. CuRns] , place
a heavy burden on all of us. All of us
are deeply concerned about the war in
Vietnam. But the proposals place us
somewhat in the light of public opinion,
as if we were not concerned, and as if in
some way, by our opposition, we were
actually encouraging conditions which
would continue the war longer. If their
adoption would shorten the war, I
would support them, but we know their
adoption would not shorten the war.
But I address my opposition to the
understanding for two reasons: one is
that the Senate, by voting down the
reservation offered by the Senator from
South Dakota, similar in its purpose to
the understanding, has expressed its con-
viction that this convention offers bene-
fit to the United States, even though the
war in Vietnam is in progress. It is
logical to say that if we had believed
otherwise, we should have voted for the
reservation of the Senator from South
Dakota.
A legal question arises. Legal ques-
tions are not always interesting, but the
effect of this understanding must be con-
sidered. It may be thought that only
a proposed labeled reservation affects the
operation of a convention.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The
Senator's 3 minutes have expired.
Mr. COOPER. I ask for 2 additional
minutes.
Mr. FULBRIGHT. I yield the Senator
from Kentucky 3 more minutes.
Mr. COOPER. But under interna-
tional law this is not correct. A mem-
orandum of the Committee on Foreign
Relations prepared at the time the nu-
clear test ban treaty was adopted, pointed
out that the use of the terms "reserva-
tion" or "understanding" is not definitive
and controlling; that the real question
is whether or not the proposal changes
the contractual obligations of the parties,
or changes, inhibits or limits the applica-
tion of the convention.
Mr. President, I ask unanimous con-
sent that a memorandum prepared
by the staff of the Foreign Relations
Committee on the treatymaking process
be inserted in the RECORD at the conclu-
sion of my remarks.
(See exhibit 1.)
The PRESIDING OFFICER. There
being no objection, it was so ordered.
Mr. COOPER. Mr. President, the pur-
pose of entering into the convention is
to make it operative. I do not say that
the President could not ignore the un-
derstanding but in effect I think it would
inhibit him from doing so until the end
of the war in Vietnam. It would be a
limitation upon the convention itself.
So I return to my original statement,
that if we believe that there is something
wrong about ratifying this convention,
then we should vote it down. If, with
our concern about the Vietnamese war?
and we are concerned about it, as we all
know?we believe that this convention
stands in the way of a resolution of that
conflict, we should have voted for the
Mundt reservation.
But if we believe that this conven-
tion offers benefit to the United States
and would have no adverse effect on the
war, then we should vote down these
reservations and understandings.
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS STAFF
MEMORANDUM ON THE ROLE OF THE SENATE
IN THE TREATYMAKING PROCESS
Article II, section 2, clause 2, of the U.S.
Constitution states that the President
"shall have power, by and with the advice
and consent of the Senate, to make treaties,
S 3863
Provided two-thirds of the Senators present
concur."
In performing this function, the Senate
has several options. Normally, the procedure
for unconditional approval of a treaty is by
adoption of a resolution of advice and con-
sent to ratification which, in the case of the
Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, would read as
follows:
"Be it resolved (two-thirds of the Sen-
ators present concurring therein), That the
Senate advise and consent to the ratification
of the treaty banning nuclear weapon tests
In the atmosphere, in outer space, and un-
derwater, which was signed at Moscow on
August 5, 1903, on behalf of the United
States of America, the United Kingdom of
Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and the
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics."
The Senate may, however, reject a treaty
in toto, or stipulate conditions in the form
of amendments, reservations, understand-
ings, declarations, statements, interpreta-
tions, or statements in committee reports.
For example, the Statute of the International
Atomic Energy Agency was approved subject
to an "interpretation and understanding."
In that case, so that no uncertainty would
exist as to whether the United States might
be obligated by some future amendment that
the Senate saw fit to reject, the resolution
of ratification was approved "subject to the
interpretation and understanding, which is
hereby made a part and condition of the res-
olution of ratification, that (1) any amend-
ment to the statute shall be submitted to
the Senate for its advice and consent, as in
the case of the statute itself, and (2) the
United States will not remain a member of
the Agency in the event of an amendment to
the statute being adopted to which the Sen-
ate by a formal vote shall refuse its advice
and consent."
This "interpretation and understanding"
in no way affected the international obliga-
tion of the United States. It was, however,
made a part of the operating instrument of
ratification and Presidential proclamation
and circulated to the other parties to the
treaty with the following statement: "The
Government of the United States of America
considers that?the above statement and un-
derstanding pertains solely to U.S. constitu-
tional procedures and is of purely domestic
character."
The Senate also approved the NATO
Status-of-Forces Agreement subject to an
"understanding," Article III of that agree-
ment provided that under certain conditions
members of a military force were to be ex-
empt from passport and visa regulations,
from immigration inspection, and from reg-
ulations on the registration and control of
aliens. The effect of article III on U.S. im-
migration laws was not entirely clear, and in
order to remove all doubt about the matter
and to make sure that the United States
could take appropriate measures to protect
Its security, the following language was made
part of the resolution of ratification:
"It is the understanding of the Senate,
which understanding inheres in its advice
and consent to the ratification of the agree-
ment, that nothing in the agreement dimin-
ishes, abridges, or alters the right of the
United States of America to safeguard its
own security by excluding or removing per-
sons whose presence in the United States is
deemed prejudicial to its safety or security
and that no person whose presence in the
United States is deemed prejudicial to its
safety or security shall be permitted to enter
or remain in the United States."
This "understanding" was also included in
the instrument of ratification and the Pres-
idential proclamation which was circulated
to the other parties to the agreement. Here
again, however, it had no effect on the inter-
national obligation of the United States.
Another, and perhaps better known case
Involves the so-called Connally reservation
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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD --SENATE March
o the compulsory jurisdiction clause of the treaty. As a general rule, it is considered
the
case tatitte ?54 t4e International Conrt of Jus- necessa7 in
-Clop. In..?thnt-Ingt 11,Pe! $pate gave its
idyl. e ad - -t
1.
, _ concerned
e of any instrument Of
its ratification, adherence or acceptance em-
advice peonase e AO, e. deposit by the bodying any Of t,4 -above-Mentioned types
c rat on _under para- of statement, that the other state Or states
p 2 of article 6 of the statute--the so-
lae notified thereof and be given
Called optional clause. By accepting the an opportunity to comment. If the state-
optional clause, the United *States agreed ' xnent is designated a 'reservation' but is not
that in certain types of legal disputes it a true reservation the notification to the
would recognize the compulsory jurisdiction other state- or s4tes may be accompanied
, ,
of the International C t ,7 t' II *
,bur of
ever, in accepting that jurisdiction, the en-- - emphasize fact tPiateli*litdesigodill to
o actualm i ca-
)oy anexptlahneatr
ate stated that it did not apply to matter's Mon or 11411tatiol; of the treaty provisions is
essentially 'within the domestic furisdictio i
Oie 116 4 a:.---s t 11 - intended.
f C
-. e tates as determi ned by th '
ITnited *ate's. `Vor technical reasons the ? , "The U.S. Government as depositary does
ally reservation is not viewed by all in- not, as a rule, consider it appropriate for
erP4tional lawyers as a true reservation; in reservations to be set forth merely in a let-
fact, it was SoininlanleSted to other parties ter or note accOmpanying an instrument of
anti the obligatiOli of other Parties with re- ratification, acceptance, adherence, or ac-
peel to the rilited-States is no greater than ' cession. If the instrument is to be quail-
atasstned by the 'United States. fled by a reservation, it is considered that
taetisaaprrea5cetricvaaltiornnattotertis-ifr'eraentStoennaotet ad
-- thheetrrheseerhvattioitne J:fhoulAd be embodiedhinhdtehr_e
lice And cOnsent the inference i that 11 1
: standing, or other statement not consti-
contractual relationship is being changed. * tuting an actual reservation may, of course,
However, if the Senate uses language of be set forth in an accompanying letter or
inid storKling,, the 'huplication (but not -
I note, the text thereof then being notified
neck Sot the fact) is that the Contractual
arra, ge lit is not being changed: areto interestednotifi e regardingsta tes at the e sdaempeostime 1 they
e
Irr_ esapeeetive..00f what term is .,n,se,d *iCa.?, Cie- . formal instrument."
eicrioe (main n I posed on a treaty, now-
'One of the most authoritative state-
.ever: the view o; the U.S. Government is . ments on reservations appears in Charles
thot:the,:content or effect of the statement ,is .- Cheney Hyde's book, "International Law."
trilfatpt.9rihm, e1,intp;reteatnticiev.e. hIfr,,.:hdeehspihteeqtehveeide.i
8,Lig...: , Hyde states (vol. II, p. 1435) : "A reservation
'the on c114,94 Ilg tlii .o4lal '1?1:ktctii? That
prospective party for the purpose of creating
'' to a treaty is a formal statement made by a
of II ,..1:ee efi',A, ,on,, .It WQ,D1
4 be so treated
a different relationship between that party
WcallAq.nen the treaty' to further , .and. the other parties or prospective parties
e a ons. 7n. thie. 'conneetion, the folL *
?Whig extracts fromof State * *
athozttvoitilfixie. reasittrisgi::rxnuelndtthwe trtefisoeurvtinflasvt;
proxnitotoiereallttingfteloailiotline,tosixtbjeeseetil:Oaftro"bnseplfitatcrfiy made such a statement A more interpre-
,, tative declaration made by a prospective
was -sUbmitted, to the TTRed X' ' ti '''`' party without such a design, and with a
L year are relevant: view merely to accentuate a common under-
ili, Is 'understOoil by 'thes' tri;.o. Govern- ' s? tanding, is not regarded as a reservation,
e that the terin 'reservation' means Sc- ' ess another party or prospective party
Tig to general international' usage a deems it to be productive of a different rela-
fOrrna. 1 deCiaratIon by a `state, when-sign- tionshi between the state issuing the decla-
ing,l'atifying, or adhering to a treaty, Which - ration P d the other_ parties or prospective
modifies or lirnits the subitantiVe effect_ made
e- tion not Of _ parties than would result Were the declara-
one twe tile rer more of the treaty provisions as be-
state and each of the terpretati:ye-sta. In a word, whether an in-
statement is to be regarded as a
t;
otherstates parties to the treaty. A true' reservation and dealt Wlth*as such depends
rege7
atiOn is a statement asserting specific in pra.ctie:e upon' the Place 'which the states
Pon itions of a clvac ei tr
-which '(if the re- to which it is addressed
are disposed
re to aa-
Serving state becomeS a party to the treaty) sign to it." "
_
effectively qualify or modify the application "
ree ing, 'state and other states parties to ,
AMENDMENTS
of e treaty "in the rela.tiOns between the ' '' ' IS WEUDD should be made between an
arliendment and ,a reservation. The differ-
the ?treaty. If the statement does not ef- ence between, the' two is that an amendment,
fectnally change in some way, either by ex-if it is accepted by the Preaident and the
pancting or diminishing the treaty provisions, - other party or parties to the treaty, changes
the Application of the treaty between the ` it for all ?parties, whereas a reservation lim-
regetvint gtate and other staes ' parties its only the obligation of the United States
thereto,. then It is questionable whether -
mi. Ader?tbe treaty, although a reservation may,
It 4 a tine i'egerfatibn eyen though it terms
itmay 1 ',In ?il4c,t, Pe qf such significance as to lead
be e.signated a 'reservation.' , ptner p to ,parties file similar reservations, to
'tinct rstanding,"declaration ' t, ' t t seek renegotiation of the treaty, or, indeed,
may be used to designate a statement which to refu.?.e:to proceed with r,atification.
mar or Play not be a true reservation.- More To putit another way, the distinctions be-
pro -
perly,' 'understanding' is used to desig " tweet). the two "are not in the essential Lab-
nIl, a statement when it Is not Ultended:Jects sought, but in the form taken by the
to odifi Or rinalt any of the provisions Of qualified ?assent and in the notice or action
the treaty in its international operation, but: 'called for,. from VIP Other party to the agree-
i I4tended merely to clarify or explain or ment 4 the cnntrast is ordiXlarilY drawn,
I- Igith, some Matter incidental to the an arnendment to a treaty is a textual change
tion of the treaty inta ina,nner other : an
.,? the instrument itself by way of an addi-
a substantive reseria 1Qn. outethries' tion alteration, 'or excision- it makes a,part
an linderstanding is no more than a 'state- o? f the '
e identical contract to which the two
men of policies or principles or perhaps an- are to give their assent in the
indication, Of internpl procedures for carry-* exchange of ratifications. A reservation, on
ing Out provisions` o the treat The terms, ,the other., hand, is an interpretation or con-
'dec/aration' and 'statement' wyhen used as struction. placed, upon some portion of the
the 'descriptive terms are used Most 'often ' 'initriimeot by the Senate, to indicat the
when it Is considered essential or desirable- wiclerstakicring with Which the united States
to Kive notice of certain matters of policy` "tt enters Into the agreement as to the obliga-
or grinciPle, but withOut any intention f ' ons which this country is to assume."
der.sating fn any way from th la t ? ?I) '
? y rom e su s antive (Haynes "The Senate of the 'United States,".
righ.s or obligations as Stipulated in the' vol. II, p.p. 617-I8.)
'At
15 1967
SUMMARY
In summary, therefore, and in order of im-
portance so far as the effect on other parties
Is concerned, the Senate might take the fol-
lowing steps to make its views known or to
qualify its consent to ratification of a
treaty:
1. The Senate may advise and consent to
ratificatio.11, but make its views known in the
committee report. This would have no more
legal effect on the treaty than other nego-
tiating background or than legislative his-
tory has on public laws.
The Senate may include in its resolu-
tion language expressing its understanding
or interpretation. So long as this language
does not substantively affect the terms or in-
ternational obligations of the treaty, or re-
lates solely to domestic matters, there would
be no legal effect on the treaty. Under ex-
isting practice, however, the Executive would
communicate such understandings or inter-
pretations to the other parties for such re-
action as they may take.
3. The Senate may include in its resolu-
tion language expressing its reservation.
Normally reservation language would in-
volve some change in the international obli-
gations of the treaty and might affect its
terms in such a significant manner as to re-
quire the Executive to communicate the
terms of the reservation to other parties to
the treaty, thus enabling them to take such
action as they felt appropriate, including
reservations of their own or even refusal to
proceed with the treaty.
4. Finally, the Senate may amend the terms
of the treaty itself. In this instance, there
would be no question but that the treaty
would need to be renegotiated.
Committee procedure
The Committee on Foreign Relations trans-
acts business by a majority vote of a legal
quorum (currently nine members). Once a
legal quorum is established, It is presumed
to be present, and thereafter oral or written
proxies are valid for the purposes of voting.
This procedure applies with respect to any
treaty reservations or amendments consid-
ered by the committee. However, on the
final question as to whether the committee
shall-agree to report favorably a particular
resolution of ratification, an actual Physical
quorum of nine members must be present.
Senate procedure
The act of ratification for the United States
Is a Presidential act, but it may not be forth-
coming unless the Senate has consented to it
by the required two-thirds of the Senators
present (which signifies two-thirds of a
quorum), otherwise the consent rendered
would not be that of the Senate as organized
under the Constitution to do business (art.
I, sec. 5, clause 1).
Insofar as Senate procedure is concerned.
rule XXXVII states that when a treaty is
reported from the Committee on Foreign
Relations it shall, unless the Senate unani-
mously otherwise directs, lie 1 day for con-,,..
sideration. Amendments or reservations are
subject to approval by a majority vote.
An amendment or reservation may be
modified before any action is taken on it.
They are not, however, subject to modifica-
tion after adoption by the Senate. More-
over, an amendment or reservation which is
substantially the same as one previously of-
fered and rejected is not in order.
The decisions made must be reduced to the
form of a resolution of ratification, with or
without amendments or reservations, as the
case may be, which must be proposed on a
subsequent day, unless by unanimous con-
sent the Senate determines otherwise. After
the resolution of ratification is offered,
amendments to the text of the treaty or the
resolution of ratification are not in order.
On the final question to advise and consent
to the ratification in the form agreed to, the
concurrence of two-thirds Of the Senators
-
ApprovecrPor elease . - 1570tsur 7-3
Illaivh 15, 1967 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? SENATE
present and voting shall be necessary to de-
termine it in the affirmative; but all other
motions and questions upon a treaty shall be
decided by a majority vote, except a motion
to postpone indefinitely, which shall be de-
cided by a vote of two-thirds.
Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, the fol-
lowing statement has been prepared by the
Parliementarlan for guidance of the Senate
during consideration of the Nuclear Test San
Treaty:
"NUCLEAR TEST BAN TREATY
" (Procedure Under the Rule)
"The treaty is in the Committee of the
Whole and shall be proceeded with by arti-
cles. This provision, however, may be
waived by unanimous consent, and thus per-
mit an amendment to be offered to any part
of the treaty,
"A majority vote is required for adoption
of an amendment.
"A motion to table an amendment would be
in order.
"Where there is no further debate or action
to be taken In the Committee of the Whole,
the proceedings are reported by the Pre-
siding officer to the Senate. If any amend-
ment has been made, the Senate vo,tes on
concurrence therein. Further amendments
are then in order.
"Reservations are not in order while the
treaty is being considered in the Conunittee
of the Whole or in the Senate. They should
be offered to 'the' resolution of ratification.
"When there is no further debate or
amendment to be proposed, the next step
would be the proposal of the resolution of
ratification. It cannot, however, be proposed
an that clay except by unanimous consent.
If any amendment has been made to the text
of the treaty, it Must be incorporated in the
resolution of ratification. .
"After the resolution of ratification has
been proposed, no amendment is in order
except by unanimous consent, Reserva-
tions, however, are in order at that stage, and
not before, ?
"The vote on the question of agreeing to
the resolution of ratification or on a motion
to postpone indefinitely requires a two-thirds
vote for adoption. All other motions and
questions upon a treaty shall be decided by
a majority vote."
Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, will
the Senator yield, on the question of the
meaning of the word "understanding"?
Mr. COOPER. I yield.
Mr. FULBRIGHT. A committee print
entitled "Background Information on the
Committee on Foreign Relations," pre-
pared by the committee staff, contained
a paragraph which I think may have
some bearing on the subject. It is found
on page 21 of the document and reads
as follows:
The Senate may include in its resolution
language expressing its "understanding" or
"Interpretation." So long as this language
does not substantively affect the terms or in-
ternational obligations of the treaty, or re-
lates solely to domestic matters, there would
be no legal effect on the treaty. Under exist-
ing practice, however,. the executive would
communicate such understandings or inter-
pretations to the other parties.
Concerning reservations, It says;
Irrespective of what term is used to de-
serape a condition imposed on a treaty, how-
ever, the view of the U.S. Government when
it serves as a depositary is that the content or
effect of the statement is of prime impor-
tance. If, despite the.designation, the execu-
tive bra.och believes that the condition has
the actual character and effect of a reserva-
tion, it would be so treated and thus would
open the treaty to further negotiation.
I think this means--and it is some-
what vague, that an understanding would
be communicated to the other party one
way or another. In this case, we would
confront the Russians with the decision
of whether to accept the implication con-
tained in the language of this under-
standing,
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The
Senator's time has expired.
Mr. FULBRIGHT. r yield myself 2
additional minutes.
I believe, of course, that the Russians
do have an influence in Vietnam, but
Vietnam is not directly involved here;
and I think the effect of this understand-
ing would be not that it would require
renegotiation but that it would give the
Soviets an excuse to fail to ratify the
treaty.
So I come back to the Question asked
also by the Senator from Kentucky, do
we want the treaty or do we not?
I think it would be very confusing to
accept the understanding and then ap-
prove the treaty. It would be much
more clearcut simply to say, "Table the
treaty; this is no time to act on it; wait
until the war is over." But the admini-
stration believes, and I believe, that this
treaty is timely.
It happens that the last case of signifi-
cance involving a man detained in Rus-
sia was that of an Arkansas citizen, a
man whose name all Senators have
heard, Mr. Wortham. I shall not dwell
on the background of the matter; but
Just last week, I believe, In an unprec-
edented action, the Soviet Union reduced
a sentence of 3 years' imprisonment on
appeal and imposed instead a fine of
5,000 rubles.
There is a feeling that the fact that,
on appeal, they reduced a sentence of
3 years' imprisonment to a fine of 6,000
rubles, indicated that they are will-
ing, in the midst of a war to make some
gesture toward reconciliation. I do not
say it is related to this matter, but I
would say it indicates a form of mutual,
passive, deoscalation of the heat in our
cold war. I do not think the incident is
unworthy of some thought.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who
yields time?
Mrs. SMITH. Mr. President, how
much time do I have remaining?
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The
Senator has 15 minutes remaining.
Mrs. SMITH. I thank the Chair. I
yield myself such time as I may require
for my few concluding words.
Mr. President, at the outset of my
closing remarks, I acknowledge the 'very
unique distinction I have?both the State
Department and the Liberty Lobby are
against me. No other Senator can make
that statement. [Laughter.]
The opposition to this understanding
seems to be based on expressions in let-
ters of the Secretary and Assistant Sec-
retary of State. Tho two letters of
Assistant Secretary Macomber to the
majority leader speak only with respect
to the proposed reservations to the
treaty. Consequently, they do not apply
to the understanding amendment to the
resolution of ratification.
However, the March 8, 1967, letter of
the Secretary of State to the chairman of
S 3865
the Committee on Foreign Relations
groups amendments, reservations, and
understandings together and makes no
distinction between them. In that letter
the Secretary of State charges that even
an understanding could result in first,
either the Soviet Government refusing to
ratify the treaty; or seeond, the Soviet
Government retaliating with its own
qualifications or interpretations. His
letter to the majority leader merely re-
peats this theme of opposition.
I fail to see how his charges are ap-
plicable to the understanding that I have
offered. In the first place, the under-
standing has no effect whatsoever on the
treaty or any of its provisions.
In the second place, the understanding
merely expresses a hope of the Senate
that peace will have been achieved in
Vietnam before a Soviet consulate is
opened in the United States.
Why would the Soviet Union find an
expression of hope for peace in Vietnam
to be offensive when the Soviet Union
repeatedly professes its desire for peace
in Vietnam and in that expression of
desire for peace condemns the United
States for not suspending bombing of
North Vietnam?
Why would such an expression by the
Senate be so offensive to the Soviet
Union that it would refuse to ratify the
treaty? If there is such a danger as
this, then surely, this treaty stands on
very shaky ground and on a very frail
reed.
For if the Soviet Union would use this
understanding as a flimsy excuse to re-
fuse to ratify the treaty, then I can only
conclude that it is looking for an oppor-
tunity to refuse to ratify the treaty. It
could just as easily take the excuse that
a single Senator spoke or voted against
the treaty, much less than that several
Senators spoke against and voted against
the treaty,
In fact, the Soviet Union could manu-
facture any excuse that it wanted to
fabricate for refusing to ratify this
treaty.
Are we to act in this body in such
fear of the Soviet 'Union? Are we to
tiptoe so softly that we do not even ap-
prove an understanding expressing a
hope for peace?a hope that does not
even have any effect on the treaty?lost
we somehow, however slightly, do some-
thing the Soviet Union does not like?
even a call for peace?
In the third place, in his letter of
March 8, 1967, to the chairman of the
Committee on Foreign Relations, the
Secretary of State observes that:
lls soon as this treaty is ratified and enters
Into force, the benefits conferred by it will
come into operation whether or net any con-
sulates are opened in the Soviet Union or
the United States, The Convention does not
provide for the opening of consulates. De-
cisions on any such action are separate from
the Convention; . . . there has been no
agreement with the Soviet Government in
the negotiations on the Consular Convention
or otherwise, for the opening of any con-
sulates in either country, We have no pres-
ent plans for taking such action.
In view of these observations that this
treaty does not provide for the opening
of consulates, that no agreement exists
for the opening of any consulates in
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S 3866 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? SENATE
either country, and that there are no
present plans for opening any consul-
ates?the understanding that I have of-
fered all the more clearly does not affect
the treaty?and negates any argument
against the adoption of the understand-
ing I have offered.
As to the second fear that the Secre-
tary of State has raised?that the Soviet
Government would be given an opportu-
nity by any adopted understanding to
retaliate with its own qualifications or
interpretations?I simply do not see how
such an argument applies to my proposed
understanding which would not be at-
tached to the treaty but only to the reso-
lution of ratification and which would
not have any effect on the treaty itself.
The plain truth is that we have no
assurance that the Soviet Government
will not make its own qualifications or
interpretations even if this treaty is
ratified.
If the Soviet Government finds this
understanding that I have offered to be
offensive because it expresses a hope for
an end of the fighting in Vietnam before
any Russian consulate is established in
this country, then I can only conclude
that it will be because the Soviet Govern-
ment finds the plain truth to be of-
fensive?for the plain truth is that it is
the Soviet Government that provides the
backbone of the materiel and equipment
with which the aggressor in Vietnam
wages the war and opposes a peaceful
end to it.
My only comment on this is, that God
forbid, that fear of the Soviet Union in
the U.S. Senate has reached the point
where we do not have the courage to
recognize and proclaim the plain truth
and adopt an expression of hope for
peace on the basis of the recognition of
that plain truth.
Mr. AIKEN. Mr. President, does the
Senator from Maine interpret her pro-
posal in any way to be another version
of the reservation proposed by the senior
Senator from South Dakota?
Mrs. SMITH. Mr. President, the Sen-
ator from Maine is very pleased to say
that she has no reference to the reserva-
tions at all.
It is simply a means for the U.S, Sen-
ators to express their own feelings. I am
not asking for any reservations. I am
not asking for anything to be attached to
the treaty.
I simply want to have the world know
that we still hope for peace.
Mr AIKEN. And it is an expression of
hope that the war in South Vietnam may
come to an end.
MN. SMITH. The Senator is correct.
Mr. FLTLBRIGHT, Mr. President, will
the Senator yield?
Mrs. SMITH. I yield.
Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, I
would join the Senator in accepting a
resolution expressing that hope.
I do not think there is any question of
interference or of fear here. But the ef-
fect of the understanding could well be
the same as that of the reservations pro-
posed by the Senator from South Da-
kota?the effect of killing the treaty.
The question is not interfering with
the Soviet Union or fearing the Soviet
Union. The question is simply: "Do we
want a treaty?"
I do not think we are trying to threaten
anybody. I think that if the understand-
ing is designed to prevent ratification, or
if it might have the effect of preventing
ratification of the treaty, It would mean
that the treaty would not come into
being and none of its benefits would
naturally become effective.
I certainly would join with the Sen-
ator in a resolution expressing our hope
for an end of the war, but I do not wish
to put it in the form of an understand-
ing on this particular treaty because I
think the treaty is in our interest. They
would both be in our interest, but they
ought to be handled separately.
Mrs. SMITH. I can only reply to the
distinguished chairman of the Commit-
tee on Foreign Relations that it seems
to me I have been hearing a great deal
for the past few days about any reserva-
tion, any amendment, or any under-
standing affecting the treaty to the ex-
tent that the Soviet Union would not
sign it.
This is only an expression of hope. It
does not require renegotiation of the
treaty. It has nothing to do with the
treaty.
It simply says to the world: "We are
ready for peace. We are trying our best
to work with the Soviet Union, but we
do not want the world to think that we
have given up the hope for peace."
Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, I
yield back the remainder of my time.
Mrs. SMITH. Mr. President, I yield
back the remainder of my time.
The PRESIDING OrteiCER. All time
having expired, the question is on the
adoption or rejection of the understand-
ing proposed by the Senator from Maine
I Mrs. SMITH I.
On this question, the yeas and nays
have been ordered, and the clerk will call
the roll.
The legislative clerk called the roll.
Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. I an-
nounce that the Senator from Maryland
I Mr. BREWSTER] and the Senator from
Connecticut (Mr. Dona) are absent on
official business.
I also announce that the Senator from
Nevada I Mr. CANNON], the Senator from
Idaho I Mr. CHuacitl, and the Senator
from Louisiana [Mr. Lon] are neces-
sarily absent.
On this vote, the Senator from Con-
necticut [Mr. Dotio] is paired with the
Senator from Louisiana (Mr. Lon).
If present and voting, the Senator
from Connecticut would vote "yea" and
the Senator from Louisiana would vote
I further announce that, if present
and voting. the Senator from Maryland
I Mr. BREWSTER I and the Senator from
Nevada (Mr. CANNON] would each vote
"nay."
Mr. KUCHEL. I announce that the
Senator from Massachusetts I Mr.
BROOKE I and the Senator from Pennsyl-
vania Mr. Seoul are absent on official
business.
Tlw Senator from Illinois [Mr. DIRK-
SEN I is absent because of illness.
The Senator from Iowa I.Mr. HICKEN-
LOOPER I, the Senator from New York
I Mr. JAVIT5 I and the Senator from
South Carolina Mr. THURMOND] are de-
tained on official business.
March 15, 1967
If present and voting, the Senator from
Massachusetts I Mr. BROOKE I, the Sena-
tor fron.. Illinois [Mr. DIRKSEN], and the
Senator from Pennsylvania I Mr. SCOTT]
would each vote "nay."
On this vote, the Senator from South
Carolina [Mr. TstuamoNal is paired with
the Senator from New York I Mr. JAVITS I.
If present and voting, the Senator from
South Carolina would vote "yea" and the
Senator from New York would vote
"nay."
The result was announced?yeas 38,
nays 51. as follows:
I No. 63 Ex.I
YEAS-38
Aiken Fannin Mundt
Allott Gruening Murphy
Andersor. Hansen Pearson
Baker Hartke Fussell
Bennett Hill Smathers
Byrd, Vs Holland Smith
Byrd. W. Va. Hollings Stennis
Carlson Hruska Talmadge
Cotton Jordan. N.C. Tower
Curtis Jordan. Idaho Williams, Del.
DominicIt McClellan Yarborough
Eastland Miller Young, N. Oak.
Ervin Montoya
NAYS-51
Inouye Morton
Jackson Moss
Kennedy, Mass. Muskie
Kennedy, N.Y, Nelson
Kuchel I'astore
Lausche l'ell
Long, Mo. l'ercy
Magnuson Prouty
Mansfield Proxmire
McCarthy Randolph
McGee Itibicoff
McGovern Sparkman
McIntyre Spong
Metcalf Symington
Mondale 'Cydings
Monroney Williams, N.J.
Morse Young, Ohio
NOT VOTING-11
Ihrksen hong. La.
Dodd Scott
Hickenlooper Thurmond
Javits
Bartlett
Bayh
Bible
Boggs
Burdick
Case
Clark
Cooper
Ellender
Fong
Fulbright
Gore
Griffin
Harris
Hart
Hatfield
Hayden
Brewster
Brooke
Cannon
Church
So Mrs. SMITH'S executive understand-
ing was rejected.
Mr. McGOVERN. Mr. Pi esident, after
considerable thought and careful study,
I have decided to vote in favor of the
Pending Consular Treaty w:th the Soviet
Union.
I am firmly convinced that ratification
of this treaty is in the best interests of
the United States. Were I not so con-
vinced I would of course, rot vote for it.
In spite of all the scare talk and the con-
fusion, the treaty is basically designed
to provide more legal protection for the
18,000 American citizens v siting Russia
annually. I have no doubt but that the
treaty will be of more benefit to the U.S.
than to Russia. But both countries will
benefit from this document which de-
fines the legal ground rules under which
their citizens shall be protected when
visitinl the other country.
The proposed treaty enjoys the strong
bipartisan support of the leaders of both
major political parties. It has been
strongly endorsed by President Johnson
and the majority leader cf the Senate,
Senator MANSFIELD. Preiident Eisen-
hower, who first proposed the treaty to
Soviet officials in 1959, said as recently
as February 2, 1967,
I have not changed my belief that such
a con,?ention is in our national interest;
that it will not impair our nstional security;
that It should enlarge our cpportunities to
learn more about the Soviet people, and
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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? SENATE
that it is necessary to assure better protection
for the many thousands of Americans who
visit the Soviet Union each year.
The treaty now. before us was reported
favorably by the Foreign Relations Com-
mittee by a vote of 15 to 4. It is sup-
ported by the able and distinguished
minority leader, Senator DIRKSEN, by
the chairman of the Republican policy
committee, Senator HICKENLOOPER, and
by the former Republican national
chairman, Senator MORTON. In addition,
the 1964 Republican presidential candi-
date, Mr. Goldwater, has said that he
supports the convention.
Since the various amendments or res-
ervations would have the affect of killing
or confusing the treaty, I have opposed
these amendments.
Because of the great amount of pub-
lic misunderstanding concerning exactly
what this treaty contains, I ask unani-
mous consent that a clear description of
Its terms, which appears on pages 4 and
5 of the Foreign Relations Committee
report, may be printed at this point in
my remarks.
There being no objection, the excerpt
was ordered to be printed in the RECORD,
as follows:
PROVISIONS OF THE CONVENTION
A. GENERAL PURPOSES
The convention regulates the consular af-
fairs of each country in the territory of the
other and the treatment to be accorded con-
sular officials and employees. The conven-
tion covers such matters as the status of a
consular establishment, thn duties and func-
tions of consular officers, and the rights,
privileges, and immunities of the consular
personnel of each country stationed in the
territory of the other country.
The convention does not itself authorize
the opening of consulates or specify the num-
be of consulates which may be opened, but
merely provides the legal framework for the
activity of accredited constlar officers
whether attached to an Embassy or to con-
sulates which might be? opened as a result
of separate negotiations.
B. NOTIFICATION AND ACCESS
The convention follows the pattern of
other bilateral consular conventions to which
the United States is a party except that the
convention (which includes the protocol)
contains two distinctive provisions relating
to the protection of American citizens:
1. It obliges a receiving state to notify
consular officers of a sending state of the
arrest or detention of a national of the send-
ing state within 1 to 3 days from the time
of arrest or detention depending on condi-
tions of communication.
2. It provides that consular officers of the
sending state may visit and communicate
with a national of the sending state who is
under arrest or detained in custody by the
receiving state within 2 to 4 days of the ar-
rest or detention depending on his location
and on a continuing basis thereafter.
C. UNRESTRICTED IMMUNITY FROM CRIMINAL
PROSECUTION
The convention also states, for the first
time in any consular agreement to which the
United States is a party, that consular officers
and employees of the sending state will be
immune from the criminal jurisdiction of
the receiving state.
This provision extends to consular officers
and personnel the same unrestricted immu-
nity from criminal prosecution that Embassy
officers and employees now enjoy. In other
consular conventions to which the United
States is a party, the immunity granted con-
sular officers aiid employees has generally
been restricted to misdemeanors. The pro-
posed convention extends the immunity to
felonies.
. D. SAFEGUARDS
The proposed convention contains certain
provisions designed to afford protection
against abuse of the measures regarding im-
munity from criminal prosecution. These
provisions specify the right of the receiving
state to declare consular officers persona non
grata and consular employees unacceptable.
The convention also states that all persons
.enjoying immunity from criminal jurisdic-
tion are obliged to respect the laws and reg-
ulations of the receiving state, including
traffic regulations.
The convetntion also contains a number
of measures designed as safeguards against
the danger of subversion, If, after ratifica-
tion Of the convention, the United States
agrees to the opening of a Soviet consulate
in the United States, the officers and employ-
ees of the consulate will be subject to the
same visa screening and entry controls as
officers and employees of the Soviet Embassy
in Washington. They will also be subject to
the same travel restrictions as those which
apply to diplomatic personnel. As has al-
ready been noted, the convention also pro-
vides that consular officers and employees
may be expelled.
E. TERMINATION
The convention may be terminated on
6-month notice by either party.
Mr. McGOVERN. Mr. President, I
also ask unanimous consent that certain
carefully prepared materials wh:Lch I
received from Mr. Douglas MacArthur
II, of the U.S. Department of State, ex-
plaining the proposed convention, may
be printed at this point in the RECORD.
There being no objection, the letters
were ordered to be printed in the REC-
ORD, as follows:
DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
Washington, January 27, 1967,
DEAR SENATOR: There has been a good deal
of misunderstanding about the US-Soviet
Consular Convention which is now pending
before the Senate Foreign Relations Com-
mittee. To clear up such Misunderstand-
ings, we have issued a statement which I
am enclosing in view of the general interest
in this important matter.
The statement makes clear that the Con-
sular Convention does not authorize, pro-
pose, suggest, provide for, or require the
opening of a single United States Consulate
in the Soviet Union, or a single Soviet Con-
sulate in the United States. It does not
permit the Soviets to send a single extra
person to this country, nor does it l.et us
send anyone to the Soviet Union.
What it does do is to provide that we will
be notified of arrests of American citizens
within one to three days, and allowed to
see them within two to four days. As mat-
ters now stand, arrested persons can be held
incommunicado until the investigation by
the Soviet authorities is completed and this
can take up to nine months or more. Last
year we had 18,000 U.S. citizens visiting the
Soviet Union and the number will increase.
The Soviets, on the other hand, had only
about 900 of their citizens visiting our coun-
try. We earnestly believe, therefore, that
the balance of advantage in this Conven-
tion lies heavily with us and that it will
give us the tools we need to protect Ameri-
can citizens traveling in the Soviet Union,
I also attach a more comprehensive but
still brief statement on the purposes and
effects of the Convention which I hope you
will find useful. If you have any further
questions about the Consular Convention,
please don't hesitate to let me know as I
S 3867
would be glad to arrange a briefing on this
matter for you.
Sincerely,
DOUGLAS MACARTHTJR
Assistant Secretary for
Congressional Relations.
[Excerpt from State Department press brief-
ing, Jan. 25, 1967]
STATEMENT ON THE UNITED STATES-U.S.S.R.
CONSULAR CONVENTION
Following up on Secretary Rusk's testi-
mony on the US-USSR Consular Convention
before the Senate Foreign Relations Com-
mittee on January 23, I would like to try to
clear up a persistent misunderstanding about
this agreement, And I might add that this
misunderstanding is common among both
opponents and supporters of ratification,
The Consular Convention does not au-
thorize, propose, suggest, provide for, or re-
quire the opening of a single United States
Consulate in the Soviet Union, or a single
Soviet Consulate in the United States. It
does not permit the Soviets to send a single
extra person to this country, nor does it let
us send anyone to the Soviet Union.
What it does do is to provide ground rules
for the protection of American citizens in the
Soviet Union, and Soviet citizens in the
United States.
These ground rules, which represent major
concessions by the Soviet Government,
specify that we will be notified of the arrest
of an American citizen within one to three
days, and allowed to see him within two to
four days. As a matter of routine, we grant
these rights not only to Americans, but to all
foreigners arrested in the United States.
But, in the Soviet Union, even the Soviet citi-
zens enjoy no such rights. They are held
incommunicado until the investigation of
the crime is completed; and this investiga-
tion can take nine months, or more.
These ground rules go into effect the min-
ute the Treaty is ratified, without regard to
the separate question of opening consulates.
The officers attached to the Consular Section
of our Embassy in Moscow will enjoy notifi-
cation and access rights under this Treaty
the moment both parties ratify it. Thus,
tying the idea of opening consulates to the
idea of approving this Convention confuses
the issue. The issue is do we need better
tools to help us protect Americans who get
into trouble in the USSR. The answer is
clearly yes.
THE UNITED STATES-SOVIET CONSULAR
CONVENTION
We believe that ratification of the US-
USSR Consular Convention is clearly in
the national interest and, on balance, more
valuable to the United States than to the
Soviet Union. This Convention is part of
our balanced strategy for peace, aimed at
limiting the areas of disagreement in our
relations with the USSR while we are re-
sisting communist aggression wherever it
occurs.
During the Eisenhower Administration,
Secretary of State Christian Herter suggested
to Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko that a
bilateral Consular Convention be negotiated
and first drafts were exchanged. Negotia-
tions were completed in 1964. President
Johnson called for prompt Senate approval
of this agreement in both his October 7, 1966
speech in New York and his January 10, 1967
State of the Union message.
This Convention will permit this Govern-
ment to assist and protect more effectively
the 18,000 or more American citizens who
annually travel in the USSR. If a citizen
of either country is detained or arrested, the
Convention requires that the embassy or
consulate of that citizen's country be notified
within three days and that access to the
prisoner by a consular official be granted
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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE
within four days. These provisions will come
into force when the treaty Ls ratified.
Without the protection of such an agree-
ment. Americans have frequently been iso-
lated in Soviet prisons for long periods and
kept from contact with American Embassy
consular officers, One, Newcomb Mott. died
in Soviet hands under these circumstances.
The treaty does not provide for the opening
of consulates. Approval of the Convention
has no bearing on this question, since under
the Ccnstitution the President can agree to
reciprocal opening of consulates in the U.S.
and the USSR at any time.
There are no formal proposals or plans
pendir g for the opening of separate consular
offices of either country in the other. If at
a later date it was decided to be appropriate
to open one outside the respective capitals,
it would be the subject of careful negotiation
on a ssrict quid-pro-quo basis. Such an of-
fice would probably involve 10 to 15 Ameri-
cans in the Soviet Union, with the Soviets
permitted to send the same number here.
In accordance with Secretary Rusk's state-
ment before the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee, we would plan to consult that
body snd the state and local officials of the
community to be affected, before concluding
such an agreement. While, as noted, such an
arrangement would be reciprocal, the fact
that toe Soviet Society is a closed one while
the United States is open, and that the U.S.
citizers needing service and protection while
travelling in the Soviet Union far outnum-
ber Soviet citizens with like needs in the US.,
indicate that the balance of advantage would
be on 3ur side.
This Convention gives full immunity from
criminal jurisdiction to consular officers and
employees of both countries. We would not
send American officials or clerical employees
to serve in the USSR without this protection.
Since 1946, 31 Americans at our Embassy
in Mcscow have been expelled by the So-
viets, most often on allegations of espionage.
Without immunity consular employees could
be jaUed or suffer even harsher punishment
on similar trumped-up charges. Further-
more, action against American consular per.
sonnel serving in the Soviet Union without
diplomatic immunity could be a temptation
to So let authorities whenever a Soviet citi-
zen was arrested in this country for espio-
nage. Other governments similarly protect
their officials and clerical employees in the
USSR the British and the Japanese re-
cently negotiated consular conventions with
the Soviet Union containing immunity
provisions modeled after those in the US-
USSR agreement.
The opening of one Soviet consulate in the
U.S. would not materially affect our internal
security. The number of Soviet citizens
now enjoying immunity, 452, would be in-
creased by only 10 or 15 persons. We have
the right under the treaty to screen the
personnel of such an office before agreeing
to their assignment. We are also authorized
by the treaty to prevent them from travel-
ling to sensitive areas in the country and
to expel them if they prove to be undesir-
able. We could close a Soviet consulate in
the U.S. whenever we wished, and we could
cancel the Consular Convention on six
month's notice.
-
UNIrLD STATES-U.S.S.R. CONSULAR CONVEN-
TION?QUESTIONS AND ANswzas
1. What was the historical origin of the
Convention?
When we first established relations with
the USSR in 1933 an exchange of letters be-
tween President Roosevelt and Soviet For-
eign Minister Litvinov stated that it had
been agreed that a consular convention
would be negotiated "immediately following
the establishment of relations between our
two countries." Other problems intervened,
however, and negotiations were never begun.
It was President Eisenhower's proposal at
the 1955 Geneva Summit Conference for
"concrete steps" to lower "the barriers which
now impede the opportunities of people to
travel anywhere in the world" and subse-
quells relaxation by the Bulganin-Khru-
shchev regime of tight Stalinist controls
which led to greatly increased American
travel to the USSR and to the realization
that we needed to protect U. S. citizens by
negotiating an explicit consular convention
with the Soviet Union. At the Camp David
talks in 1959, Secretary of State Christian
Herter proposed such a treaty to Soviet For-
eign Minister Gromyko. Drafts were ex-
changed in early 1960 but there was little
further activity because of subsequent strains
in US-Soviet relations until September 1963
when formal negotiations began in Moscow.
After 8 months of hard negotiations, the
Convention was signed on June 1, 1964 and
submitted to the Senate by President John-
son on June 12. 1964.
2. What is the basic purpose of the Con-
vention?
We need this treaty to secure rights for
Ameficans in the Soviet Union that they
do not now have. Under present Soviet law
Soviet, citizens and foreigners alike can be
held incommunicado for nine months or
more during investigation of a criminal
charge. The Consular Convention contains
major concessions by the USSR. It specifies
that U.S. officials will be notified immedi-
ately [within 1-3 days) when an American
citizen is arrested or detained in the USSR
and stipulates that these officials will have
rights of visitation without delay (within
2-4 daysi and on a continuing basis there-
after.
3. W hu do we need additional protection
for American citizens?
Because increasing numbers of them travel
to the Soviet Union and the number which
encounters difficulties rises proportionally.
Between 1902 and 1966 the number of Amer-
icans travelling to the USSR rose by 50';
to 18.000, while the number of Soviet tfavel-
ers remained static at about 900 per year.
Since the Convention was signed in 1904,
more than 20 arrests or detentions of Amer-
ican citizens in the USSR have come to our
attention. In none of these cases have we
been notified of the incident or allowed to
visit the American within a reasonable period
and certainly not within the time limits
specified in this treaty. Meanwhile, our own
Constitutional system and democratic society
automatically provide Soviet travelers here
with protections similar to those our travel-
ers would obtain from the convention.
Without the protection of such an agree-
ment, Americans have frequently been iso-
lated in Soviet prisons for long periods and
kept from contact with American Embassy
consular officers. One, Newcomb Mott, died
in Soviet hands under these circumstances,
During periods of strained US-USSR rela-
tions such as the present Soviet treatment
of Americans accused of violating their law
Es likely to be harsher than usual.
4. Does the Convention provide for the
opening of new Soviet consulates in the US?
No. It does not authorize, propose, sug-
gest, provide for or require the opening of a
single US consulate in the USSR or a single
Soviet consulate in the US. It does not
permit the Soviets to send asingle extra
person to this country nor does it let us
send anyone to the USSR. What it does do
is to provide ground rules for the protection
of American citizens in the USSR?ground
rules which we badly need.
Under the Constitution, the President's
approval is all that is needed to permit
foreign governments to establish consulates
in the US. Between 1934 and 1948 there
were three Soviet consulates In the US and
an American consulate in the USSR, though
theer was no US-USSR consular agreement
In force.
March 15, 1967
5. Why do we grant Soviet consular offi-
cers immunity from our criminal jurisdic-
tion?
Because we believe it is vital to hase the
same protection for American consular offi-
cers and clerical employees in the USSR.
Since 1946, 31 Americans at our Embassy in
Moscow have been expelled ty the Soviets,
most cften on allegations of espionage.
Without immunity our consular employees
could be jailed or suffer even harsher pun-
lshmens on similar trumped-up charges.
Furthermore, action against American con-
sular personnel serving in the USSR without
immunity could be a temptation to Soviet
authoriaes whenever a Soviet citizen is ar-
rested in this country for espionage. Other
governments similarly protecs their officials
and clerical employees in the USSR; the
British and the Japanese recently negotiated
consular conventions with the Soviet Union
containing immunity provisions modeled
after those in the US-USSR agreement.
6. Is it right to extend this immunity to
clerical employees as well?
We believe that the American secretaries,
file clet its and communications and admin-
istrative personnel whom we might send to
a consulate in the USSR need and deserve
the protection of immunity ES much if not
more than the consular officers. Clerical em-
ployees we would send to a consulate in the
Soviet Union would often be young women
and it would be both unfa r and from a
security point of view unwise to give them
less protection than we give our experienced
officers.
Of course, the Soviets would not be allowed
to station a staff of Soviet nationals at a
consulate in the US larger th in the number
of Americans we send to the USSR. If we
send a staff of 10 to the USSR the Soviets
may have a total of ten here.
7. Waat is the prospect lot the rec7procal
open in a o/ consular offices?
There are no formai proposals or plans
pending for the opening of separate consular
offices af either country in the other, If at
a later date it was decided to be appropriate
to opea one outside the respective capitals, it
would be the subject of careful negotiation
on a strict quid-pro-quo Mists. Such an
office would probably involve 10 to 15 Ameri-
cans in the Soviet Union, with the Soviets
permitted to send the same number here.
In acc3rdance with Secretary Rusk's state-
ment before the Senate Foseign Relations
Comm ttee, we would plan o consult that
body and the state and local officials of the
community to be affected, before concluding
such an agreement. While, as noted, such
an arrangement would be rec:procal, the fact
that the Soviet society is a closed one while
the Ur Red States is open, and that the U.S.
citizens needing service and protection while
travelling in the Soviet Union far outnumber
Soviet citizens with like needs in the U.S.,
indicate that the balance of advantage would
be on 3ur side.
8. IJ a Soviet consulate were eventually
opened would it represent a threat to the
security of the US?
The opening of one Soviet consulate in the
US would not materially affect our internal
security. The number of Soviet citizens now
enjoying immunity, 452, wen Id be increased
by only 10 or 15 persons. We have the right
under the treaty to screen the personnel of
such an office before agreeing to their assign-
ment. We are also authorized by the treaty
to prevent them from traveling to sensitive
areas in the country and to expel them if
they prove to be undesirable. We-could close
a Basset consulate in the US whenever we
wished, and we could cancel the Consular
Convention on six month's notice. Both
Acting Attorney General Ramsey Clark and
FBI Director Hoover have stated that 10 to 15
additimal Soviet officials in this country
would not place an undue burden on their
organizations.
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March 15, 1967 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? SENATE
IA
OCAM
9. What effect will the immunity provisions of international agreements and treaties. A Ing of machinery for the regular handling
have on our agreements with other countries? careful study of serious violations can be of matters affecting American citizens in the
Would immunities received by the Soviets be found in "Background Information on the Soviet Union, with adequate protection for
automatically extended under MFN clauses Soviet Union in International Relations" pre- the American officials involved, appears to us
to other countries? pared by the Department of State in 1981. a forward-looking step which follows natu-
We have 35 agreements in force with other Despite its earlier record of repeated vio- rally from the many efforts, public and pri-
countries which require us, on the basis of lations of international obligations, the So- vate, for wider cultural and personal con-
reciprocity, to extend most favored nation viet Union is party to a number of multi- tact between Americans and Russians. Such
treatment to consular officers and oecasion- lateral and bilateral agreements which it has efforts, particularly at a time of ideological
ally consular employees. A recent survey not been accused of violating. There may disunity among communist nations, are im-
shows that 27 of these countries have con- have been infractions of some of these agree- portant in breaking barriers to understand-
sular offices here with about 577 personnel, ments, but the Soviet Government can be ing.
Should these countries agree to grant im- said to have generally found it to be in its The possible adverse effects to American
munity from criminal jurisdiction to the 424 interest to live up to them. Among the most interests which might be caused by the pres-
American consular officers and employees important of these agreements are the Aus- ence of Soviet consular officers in the United
stationed there, we would have to extend the trian State Treaty (1955), the Antarctic States or by an expansion in the number of
same treatment to their people here. All Treaty (1959) and the Liniited Nuclear Test Soviet visitors appear well within the ca-
Ban Treaty (1963).
twenty-seven of these countries can be de- pacity of American law enforcement author-
scribed as either friendly or neutral. Treaties between sovereign governments ities to contain and should not deter prompt
Our Embassies in these 27 countries were are negotiated on the basis of mutual self- ratification.
asked to estimate whether their host country interest, not as rewards for good behavior or The years have shown that coexistence
would ask for most favored nation treat-
as evidences of good faith. We believe there with the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
ment?and give it to us in return, The re-
are areas where the US and Soviet interests is not only possible, but is also a necessity, if
plies indicated that at most 11 might make
coincide, though these areas must be care- the world is to remain at peace. This must
such requests, with 290 officers and em-
fully delineated and explored before arriving be our modus vivendi for the foreseeable
ployees. Assuming that we eventually de-
at any agreement. The Limited Test Ban future. Every step should be taken to en-
cide to open a consulate in the USSR with Treaty, the Treaty on Outer Space which we hance, improve, and expand the spheres of
15 people, we would permit the opening of a
have just signed, and the treaty on the non- coexistence whether by more frequent cul-
Soviet consulate with 15 people here. In this proliferation of nuclear weapons which is now tural exchanges, increased travel by the
case a total of 305 foreign consular officers under discussion are examples of agreements United States citizens to the Soviet Union
and employees would be affected, This corn-
covering such areas. Each of these agree- and the satellite countries, expanded trade
pares with the estimate of 9400 foreign diplo-
ments either has built-in safeguards or is beyond the Iron Curtain, or others. If we
matte officers, members of their families and
self-enforcing. The consular treaty is no ex- follow this policy and practice, we shall find
employees who now enjoy full diplomatic ception?it is carefully drafted to provide the areas of agreement becoming wider and
full protection against abuse,
immunity in the US, the differences, narrower. The inevitable
10. What do other countries do about their Should the Soviet Union violate the terms result, where people meet people, is that
'
consular relations with the USSR? of this agreement we could suspend it or, the government of the Soviet Union will no
Prior to the negotiation of the US-USSR with six months notice, terminate it. Should longer be able to insulate the Russians from
convention the Federal Republic of Germany a Soviet consulate be opened in this country the ways of the free world and disregard the
and Austria were the only non-communist and should its personnel violate our laws or yearnings of the Russian citizenry?which we
countries which had consular treaties with the standards of behavior we would expect, believe to be the same as ours?for a world
the USSR. Neither of these treaties con-
we could expel them or close the consulate, at peace and for good will to other peoples of
tamed firm guarantees on notification and
13. Does the Convention prejudice the po- the earth.
access similar to those in the US-USSR sition of subject peoples incorporated against Respectfully submitted.
treaty. their will into the Soviet Union? ANDREW K RICE,
Since 1964 the French, Finns, British, Jap- No, it does not. The United States Gov- Chairman, International Affairs Com-
anese and Italians have negotiated consular ernment has never recognized the forcible mission, American Veterans Committee
conventions with the USSR. The -British annexation of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania. (AVC, Inc.).
and Japanese conventions are modeled after Ratification of this convention would in no
the US treaty both in the guarantees on way change our policy in this respect, nor Mr. McGOVERN. I believe that these
notification and access and in the immunities would any subsequent opening of a consu- materials indicate accurately and fairly
provision. Of the non-communist countries, late or demarcation of a consular district, why the Consular Convention ought to
India and Turkey have consulates in the Recognition of incorporation of states into be ratified. Not only that, they dem-
USSR. Italy, Japan and Finland hope to the Soviet Union would require a positive onstrate clearly that the balance of ad-
open consulates soon. statement or act by the United States The vantage in this treaty lies not with the
11. What effect does the Convention have convention contains no such statement and
on estate and tax matters in the US? provides for no such act. It is United States Soviet,Union, but with the United States.
The estate and tax provisions of this con_ policy to support the just aspirations of all Mr. President, I would like to stress
vention are the same as those in other con- peoples of the world and to look forward to several points.
sular conventions which the US has nego- the day when all will be able to express First, this treaty does not provide for
tiated recently. The United States made no these aspirations freely. The ratification of the opening of consulates. Whether or
concessions about estates in this Convention, this treaty will not change this policy?any not the convention is approved, the
In the negotiations the Soviet Government more than did the signing of more than 105 President still has the constitutional au-
attempted to obtain wide powers for its con- other bilateral and multilateral agreements thority to agree to a reciprocal opening
sular officials in the settlement of estates of which we have entered into with the U.S.S.R.
American citizens where a Soviet citizen is of consulates at any time.
Mr. McGOVERN. Finally, Mr. Presi- Second, this convention will be of
a beneficiary, or in the settlement of estates
of Soviet citizens who die in the United dent, I ask unanimous consent that a great value to the more than 18,000
States, The Soviet Government did not ob- fine statement in support of the treaty Americans citizens who visit the Soviet
lain these powers. by the American Veterans' Committee, Union annually. In this regard, I ask
The Convention provides that consuls can which appears on page 261 of the Senate unanimous consent to include at this
play a role in the settlement of estates only hearings, may be printed at this pcint in point in my remarks an excellent article
if permissible under the existing applicable the RECORD. by Richard Reston which recently ap-
local law. If the Convention is ratified,
therefore, the laws of the individual states There being no objection, the state- peared in the Washington Post.
would continue, as they do now, to govern ment was ordered to be printed in the There being no objection, the article
the extent to which a Soviet consul can play RECORD, as follows: was ordered to be printed in the RECORD,
a part in the settlement of an estate. STATEMENT ON EXECUTIVE D, 88TH CONGRESS, as follows:
This convention, like many others to Which CONSULAR CONVENTION WITH THE SOVIET A CONSULAR TREATY FOR SAFER TRAVEL
the US is a party, exempts the consular per- UNION BY THE AMERICAN VETERANS COM. (By Richard Reston)
sonnel of the sending state from Federal and MITTEE
State taxes with certain exceptions. Also, The American Veterans Committ, an or- Moscow.?On Oct. al, 1963, a professor
ee
from Yale University disappeared while
property used for a consulate or as residences ganization of veterans of World War I, II, the
for consular and diplomatic personnel would traveling in the Soviet Union, American
Korean Conflict, and the Vietnam Conflict, diplomats in Moscow soon suspected some-
be exempt from real estate taxes, This is favors the ratification of the consular con- thing had gone wrong, but they could not
normal international practice. vention between the United States and the be sure of the whereabouts of Prof. Frederick
12. In view of the Soviet record 0/ treaty Soviet Union and urges that the Senate give C. Barghoorn.
violations, how can you make them observe its consent. Later, the Embassy confirmed its worst
this one? And what can be done if they We believe that the security of the United suspicions, notably that Barghoorn was in
don't? States will be enhanced by a normalization the hands of Soviet authorities for alleged
It is true that, particularly in the Stalin of relations in the Soviet Union such as is espionage activity. But, still there was no
years, the Soviet Union violated. a- nurabet envisazact hv this convention_
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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE
istry of any such detention or arrest. In fact.
Barghoorn was held incommunicado for 13
days.
In response to heavy pressure from Wash-
ington, the professor was finally released and
expeed from the Soviet Union on Nov. 14
of that same year.
The Barghoorn case might have been quite
another story if a formal consular treaty be-
tween the United States and the Soviet
Union had existed at the time. Indeed the
events surrounding the Barghoorn Incident
deal with the heart of the Soviet-American
consular convention now under discussion in
Washington. That treaty, signed in June.
1964, but never ratified by the U.S. Senate.
provides for official notification by either the
Soviet Union or the United States within
three days of the arrest or detention of one
of its nationals.
It further specifies that official diplomatic
representatives be given the right to visit
and communicate with a detained citizen
within four days of detention.
In short, the consular treaty that has
stirred such controversy in Washington
would provide for a far greater degree of
protenion for Americans traveling in the
Sovia; Union. The two countries have not
had normal consular relations since 1948.
Proper consular relations are becoming in-
creasingly important as the number of
Amencans coming to this country continues
to rise.
For example, it is estimated that some
18,000 U.S. tourists now visit the Soviet
Union annually. Most of this travel, averag-
ing between three and five days, comes be-
tween May and September. and the American
tourist figure may go higher in 1967 as the
Sovie, Union celebrates the 50th anniversary
of the 1917 Bolshevik revolution.
All of these American citizens could need
U.S. consular assistance at one time or
another. A final consular treaty between
the Soviet Union and the United States
would spell out the rights, duties and opera-
tion procedures of consuls, who look after
non-Mplomatic transactions of their citizens.
It would extend not only general assistance
and protection to Americans in the Soviet
Unior, but would also cover such other areas
as notary rights, birth and marriage certifi-
cates. wills and travel documents. Proper
consular service could provide American na-
tionals with translation help, advice about
domestic laws and assistance in personal and
professional dealings with the Soviet
government.
What is perhaps more important is that a
new consular treaty might produce a more
business like approach to some lesser Soviet-
American transactions.
But the heart of the matter is more ex-
tensive protection for Americans in the
Soviet. Union. Similar conditions would of
course apply to a smaller number of Soviet
citizens traveling to the United States.
Since the Barghoorn case?perhaps be-
cause the consular treaty has been hanging
fire since 1964--the Soviet government gen-
erally has been better on the question, at
least, of official notification in the event of
detenjon or arrest of American citizens, It
is not to suggest that the situation is now
perfect.
Only last month, two Americana. Ray Buel
Wortham, 25, and Craddock Gilmore. 24,
were tried in Leningrad for-seemingly-minor
currency violations and the theft of a bronze
bear.
The American Embassy in Moscow was able
to assist these two almost from the begin-
ning. Gilmore was fined one thousand dol-
lars and released. Wortham, who was
sentenced to three years in a labor camp,
Is now out on hail while his case is appealed
to the Supreme Court of the Russian
Federation.
II Wortham is finally convicted, there is
no amurance that U.S. diplomats will be
allowed further contact with him. With a
consular treaty in existence, Wortham would
have the right of contact with U.S. officials
on a "continuing basis."
Toe point about such a treaty is that it
may, ii only slightly, diminish the politics
of the cold war and, at the same time, pro-
vide Americans with a wider legal backdrop
for travel in the Soviet Union.
Mr. McGOVERN. Third, the proposed
Consular Convention is not a threat to
our national security. Assurances have
been given on this point by both Secre-
tary of State Rusk and the Director of
the Federal Bureau of Investigation, Mr.
J. Edgar Hoover. In a press conference
on February 2, 1967, President Johnson
said:
There are presently 452 Soviet officials in
the United States that have diplomatic im-
munity. So if an additional consulate were
opened, and if another 10 were added to the
452, Mr. Hoover has assured me that this
salad increment would raise no problems
which the FBI cannot effectively and
effic.ently deal with.
Fourth, under the terms of the treaty,
we have the right to carefully screen
consular personnel before agreeing to
their assignment in our country. We
can prevent them from traveling to
sensitive areas within the United States.
and can expel them if they prove un-
desirable. We can close a Soviet consul-
ate in the United States whenever we
wish, and we can cancel the Consular
Convention on 6 months' notice. All of
these safeguards are built into the treaty.
Fifth, this convehtion presents the
United States with an opportunity to
further widen the growing gap which ex-
ists between the Soviet Union and Com-
munist China, at no real cost to our-
selves. It approval will mark one more
step toward the destruction of what used
to be a Communist monolith.
Mr. President, for all of these reasons
I shall vote to ratify the United States-
U.S.S.R. Consular Convention.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. What is
the will of the Senate?
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, it
was my understanding, in view of the
question raised prior to the presentation
of the understanding by the distin-
guished Senator from Maine [Mrs.
Sul-rill, that there would be no further
reservations, understandings, proposals,
or 1; hatnots, to cover every possible con-
tingency, before the distinguished Sen-
ator from Maine submitted her proposal.
No affirmative answer was made?no an-
swer of any kind?when this question
was raised before the Senate, so I would
assume that the action just finished com-
pletes the consideration of the amend-
ments. reservations, and understandings
to the convention.
March 15, 1967
Mr. President, do I correctly under-
stand that under the agreement entered
into, ;he Senate will convene at 9 o'clock
tomorrow morning and that the vote on
the convention will take place not later
than 3 o'clock tomorrow a.lernoon?
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The
Senator is correct.
Mr. MANSFIELD. I would hope that
Senators who wish to speak tomorrow
would get in touch with either the ma-
jority leader or the minority leader, so
that we can make certain that every
Senator who desires to spelik will be given
an opportunity to have as much time as
he desires.
Mr. KUCHEL. Mr. President, will the
Senator yield?
Mr. MANSFIELD. I yield.
Mr. KUCHEL. If there are no Sen-
ators who desire to consume the entire
time from 9 o'clock in the morning un-
til 3 o'clock in the afternoon, am I cor-
rect in understanding that the vote may
come earlier than 3 o'clock tomorrow?
Mr. MANSFIELD. Yes there is that
distinct possibility. It is the intention
of the leadership to adjourn from tomor-
row at the conclusion of business until
noon on Monday.
It is my understanding, in talking with
the distinguished chair= a of the Com-
mittee on Armed Services and the dis-
tinguished ranking minority member of
that committee, the Senator from Maine,
that it is anticipated that tomorrow the
$12.2 billion Vietnam supplemental bill
will be reported and brought up on Mon-
day next.
Mr. MUNDT. Mr. PresAent, will the
Senator yield?
Mr. MANSFIELD. I yield.
Mr. MUNDT. Mr. President, inas-
much as the Senator from South Da-
kota has been charged with parceling
out time to those who oppose the treaty,
if there are those in opposition who have
not contacted me and who wish to
speak, both Republican and Democratic
Senators, we shall try to pircel the time
equitably. Unless I know who wants to
speak it will be difficult to make ar-
rangements prior to the time that we
shall vote.
Mr. MANSFIELD. I suggested that
the time be allocated to the majority
leader and the minority leader. I should
have said that the time be allocated to
the tr. ajority leader and the minority
leader, or whomever they designate.
The tam on the majority side will be
under the control of the chairman of
the ccmmittee, the distimmished Sena-
tor from Arkansas I Mr. FLTLBRIGHT].
Mr. CURTIS. Mr. President, will the
Senator yield?
Mr. MANSFIELD. I yield.
Mr. CURTIS. I understand that the
vote may come before 3 o'clock tomor-
row afternoon.
Mr. MANSFIELD. It is a possibility;
and I hope a good one.
Mr. CURTIS. Is there any likelihood
that the vote would be before 12 o'clock
noon tomorrow?
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March 15, 1967 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? SENATE
Mr. MANSFIELD. No.
Mr. CURTLS. I think it would be
helpful to Senators to know that.
,Mr. MANSFIELD. I give the Senator
my assurance that the vote will not oc-
cur before noon.
Mr. CURTIS. I thank the Senator.
COMMITTEE MEETINGS DURING
SENATE SESSION TOMORROW
On request of Mr. MANSFIELD, and by
unanimous consent, all committees were
permitted to meet during the session of
the Senate tomorrow.
ADJOURNMENT UNTIL 9 A.M.
TOMORROW
Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. Mr.
President, if there is no further business
to come before the Senate, I move, in
accordance with the previous order, that
the Senate, in executive session, stand
in adjournment until 9 o'clock am, to-
morrow.
The motion was agreed to; and (at
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6 o'clock and 15 minutes p.m,) the Sen-
ate adjourned until Thursday, March
16, 1967, at 9 o'clock a.m.
NOMINATIONS
Executive nominations received by the
Senate March 15, 1967:
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA REDEVELOPMENT
LAND AGENCY
John Joseph Gunther, of the District of
Columbia, to be a member of the District
of Columbia Redevelopment Land Agency
for the term expiring March 3, 1972 (reap-
pointment).
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