CONSULAR CONVENTION WITH THE SOVIET UNION

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP70B00338R000300050006-4
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 28
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 28, 2005
• Sequence Number: 6
• Publication Date: March 16, 1967
• Content Type: OPEN

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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE S 3905
CONSULAR CONVENTION WITH THE
SOVIET UNION
The Senate resumed the consideration
of the Consular Convention between the
United States of America and the Union
of Soviet Socialist Republics, together
with a protocol relating thereto, signed
at Moscow on June 1, 1964 (Ex. D, 88th
Cong., 2d sess.).
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I
wish to serve notice that of the remain-
ing 30 minutes on this side, 20 minutes,
at least, will be given to the distinguished
minority leader, 8 minutes will be given
to the ranking minority member of the
Foreign Relations Committee, the Sena-
tor from Iowa [Mr. HICKENLOOPER], and
perhaps the Senator from Montana will
use the remaining 2 minutes.
In the meantime, I yield 10 minutes,
on behalf of the other side, to the Sena-
tor from New Hampshire.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The
Senator from New Hampshire is recog-
nized.
Mr. McINTYRE. I thank the major-
ity leader.
Mr. President, I intend to vote to ratify
the Consular Convention. I have de-
cided to do this only after a long and
careful study of the issues raised by the
convention, and only after I had satisfied
myself that the advantages which would
accrue to the United States far out-
weighed the, claimed defects of the
proposal.
As I see it, this convention offers the
United States several substantial ad-
vantages. Some of these appear on the
face of the convention itself. It clearly
is in the national interest to be assured
that American citizens will not be ar-
rested without prompt notification to our
officials. It certainly is in the national
interest to allow our consular personnel
to consult with imprisoned Americans.
It certainly is in the national interest to
permit U.S. consular officials in the So-
viet Union to have greatly expanded im-
munity from the strange criminal laws
of that nation. It is a great coup for our
negotiators to have been able to persuade
their Russian counterparts to make these
special concessions to the United States,
concessions and privileges given by the
Russians to no other nation, and privi-
leges regarding consultation which are
not even enjoyed by Soviet citizens them-
selves.
These provisions are particularly ad-
vantageous when they are measured
against the historic Soviet pattern which
has resulted in the imprisonment of a
number of American citizens in past
years.
Mr. President, even more than these
substantive advantages which appear
from the provisions of the convention
itself, there is another, more important,
reason why the Senate should vote for
ratification today. For a generation
now, the United States and the Soviet
Union have held significant differences of
opinion regarding the world about us.
These differences have resulted in the
hostilities and the tensions of the cold
war, and the tragedies of the hot wars in
Korea and now in Vietnam. We won
our battle in Korea, I am convinced
that we shall win the struggle in Viet-
nam. But shall we win a convincing
victory in Vietnam only to be confronted
with more and more future wars, or shall
our eventual victory there mark a turn-
ing point toward a world at peace and
proud of itself, a world in which our
children can grow up to live to their :full
potential as human beinvs and in which
our winning battles are fought against
the enemies of disease, and poverty,
and illiteracy? We can help shape the
answer to that question, and we can be-
gin to shape that answer today.
I believe that we bear a strong re-
sponsibility to be willing to agree with
the Soviet Union in those areas where
agreement is possible, as well as being
willing to disagree where we must. I
am disheartened with those men who
are always willing to fight to resolve dis-
agreements, but who are never willing
to admit the possibility of having agree-
ments. I believe that it is only by mak-
ing a full and fair effort to seek areas
of agreement with our adversaries that
we can maintain the hope of future
peace.
How does this relate to the Consular
Convention? As Senators know, this will
be the first bilateral treaty to enter into
effect between the United States and
the Soviet Union. We are here con-
fronted with our first opportunity to put
into action our belief that a world at
peace is a possible goal. And I believe
that this is the most, substantial advan-
tage which accrues to our Nation by
ratification of this treaty; we shall go on
record as indicating our firm coninnit-
ment to the search for a key to a world
at peace and proud of itself.
Now, Mr. President, I have been in the
Senate long enough to have learned that
any issue which is important enough to
reach our floor has two sides. I have
discussed the advantages of this conven-
tion; I should like to turn to the dis-
advantages for a moment. And I would
like to differentiate between the phony
arguments which have been advanced by
the opposition, and the meaningful ones.
I have received a great deal of mail
opposing ratification. A few weeks ago
my mail was running at a rate of 200 to
1 against the treaty. Then I issued a
statement to the press explaining how
my mail was running, and who the or-
ganizations were that were stimulating
the mail. The result was amazing.
During the past 2 weeks the mail which
I have received in opposition to ratifica-
tion has dwindled, and the mail in sup-
port has multiplied.
The opposition mail, when it has not
been simply a carrier of senseless invec-
tive, has contained argument after argu-
ment against ratification. Every single
one of these arguments-with only one
exception-has turned out to be phony,
based upon misstatements of fact, dis-
tortions, and emotional appeals to preju-
dice.
These arguments have been ably re-
butted on the floor of the Senate during
the past week, I refer to such argu-
ments as those based on the experiences
of the refugee Kasenkina-who was not
a refugee-or the so-called Litv'lnov
agreement-which was ambiguous to be-
gin with and in any event has no rele-
vance today-or the dangers of Soviet
consulates-although ratification of this
convention is not needed to establish
Soviet consulates here now-or the ex-
tension of immunities to other Commu-
nist consular personnel under the most-
favored-nation clause-although this
does not in fact happen-and so on.
I believe that only one of the argu-
ments advanced by the opponents of this
convention has maintained any logical
or intellectual sense. This argument is
simply stated-how can we grant these
privileges to the Soviets at a time when
they are supplying equipment which is
being used, even now as I speak, in op-
position to our forces in Vietnam? This
is the fundamental basis of the opposi-
tion to ratification of the convention at
this time, and I would like to explain
why I consider this to be an insufficient
reason for voting no today.
I think that the answer to this argu-
ment must be based upon a full under-
standing of America's goals in the world,
and the steps which we must take to
achieve these goals.
Our goal should be to so conduct our-
selves as to maximize the possibilities
that the world of the future is one in
which we can partake of the Great So-
ciety of mankind, in which nations do
not make war any more, and we can
truly beat our swords into plowshares
and our spears into pruning hooks. To
do this, we must, as we are doing today
in Vietnam, be ready to meet aggression
with our might wherever it appears, so
that the aggressors of this world will
learn that their conduct will never be
successful as long as this Nation stands.
This is a major reason for my support
of our policies in Vietnam today.
But, for the same reasons and to
achieve the same goals,-I believe that we
must conduct ourselves in such a fashion
that even our most bitter enemies can
have no doubts about our willingness to
meet them on the fields of peace. And
for this purpose, I believe that the pres-
ent convention offers us an opportunity
to show that we will not spurn the hand
of constructive negotiations when it is
offered.
So, Mr. President, when the opponents
of ratification say that we cannot ratify
because we are at war, my answer is
that we must ratify for the same reason
that we are at war-because both war
and ratification are essential steps to-
ward our goal of a world at peace.
RECESS
Mr. BYRD of -West Virginia. Mr.
President, I move that the Senate stand
in recess subject to the call of the Chair.
The motion was agreed to, and (at 12
o'clock and 55 minutes p.m.) the Senate
took a recess subject to the call of the
Chair. .
The Senate reconvened at 1:15 p.m.
when called to order by the Presiding
Officer (Mr. MANSFIELD in the chair).
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The
Senator from South Carolina is recog-
nized. How much time does the Sen-
ator require?
Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, I
ask unanimous consent that I may pro-
ceed for 15 minutes.
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S 3906
The PRESIDING OFFICER.
out objection, it is so ordered.
CONGRESSIONAL RECORD --SENATE March 16, 1967
Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, be-
fore the Senate votes. on the resolution
of ratification on the Consular Treaty I
wish to emphasize a few points.
In carefully studying this treaty I have
not found a single valid reason for the
Senate to ratify it. There are many
valid reasons why it should not do so. I
have covered some of these reasons in
previous addresses I have made before
the Senate on this subject. I shall not
have time today to reiterate all of these
reasons.
I do wish to say that the record of
aggression, subversion, and expansion by
the Soviet Union is well known; and this
alone is sufficient for the Senate to vote
against ratification of the treaty.
Mr. President, it is clear that the So-
viets still have as their goal world domi-
nation and enslavement and it is crystal
clear that the Soviet Union has not
abandoned that goal. The single most
important step to bring peace to the
world today would be for the Soviet Un-
.
g
e
ion to renounce its goal of world doming- by the entire Soviet propaganda apparatus. December 1966 visit of Mr. Brown to
ii0i1, in January 1966 there took place in Ha- MOSCOW. The only thing Mr. Brown
be-
Mr. President, at this point in my re- ence ofhAfrican 1 Asian, and Latin American lated interview twith the British Consul"
marks I ask unanimous consent that peoples. The Soviets were the chief sponsors according to the British weekly, the
those instances beginning in 1956 and and financial backers of the Conference, and
ending in 1967, given by the distinguished the Soviet delegation was the largest- to Spectator, December 23, 1966. Further-
Further-
Senator from Connecticut [Mr. DODD] attend it. United States imperialism was more, the Spectator quoted Prof. Robert
in his address to the Senate on. March designated the chief enemy by the delegates Conquest as stating that the charge
8, 1967, be printed in the ate on. to the Conference. A continuing apparatus against Brooke-taking anti-Communist
The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr, of subversion was set up under Soviet material into the Soviet Union-was
KENNEDY of Massachusetts in the chair), control The 1 fact that the Soviet Union has "spec since Brov ded right to do si is
Without objection, it is so ordered. emerged as the principal architect of ;revolu- Nations ations ons c De provided for in the Uh Rights."
The excerpts ordered to be printed in tionary violence in the hemisphere was third inst on
e, Human Rights .o
the RECORD are as follows: recognized by the Special Consultativ Com- As a third West Berlin I should ur e s,
In 1956 there was the suppression of the mittee on Security of the Organization of refer to the West Berlin border murders,
Hungarian revolution. American States. Speaking about the Ha- in 1967.
In November 1958 there was Khrushchev's vana Conference, the report of the com- While Soviet diplomats ask whether we
Berlin ultimatum threatening us with all- mittee said-I quote: trust them, the East German Communist
out thermonuclear warfare if we failed to "The Committee recognized that the tre-
yield to his demands. mendous significance of the event, of major Soviet regime- Union regime-under an nose domination of the
In January 1959 Fidel Castro seized power seriousness inasmuch as it means a declara- d with Soviet soldiers
by fraud in Cuba, and then proceeded with tion of war against the democracies, lies in stationed throughout the country-Cn-
Soviet help to impose an open communist the fact that, it is no longer Cuba on its tinned in January 1967 to kill refugees
dictatorship on the Cuban people, own initiative that proposes to export its even after the refugees reached Western
In February 1960 there was the World 'revolution' to the other countries of the territory. The London Times, January
Conference of Communist Parties in Moscow, hemisphere, but Russia that makes common 29, 1967, reported that two East German
where all the talk was in terms of a final cause with the 'revolutionary movements' refugees were "on U.S. sector territory"
all-out assault on the bastions of imperial- and promises determined support to the when
ism, and where Khrushchev asked the dele- 'popular liberation movements' that follow border they troops were and killed
that at by Communist
gates to "synchronize their watches" in prep- the example of Cuba." a third refugee 41
aration for this assault. In 1966 and in this year of 1967 Soviet was seized and arrested by Communist
In the summer of 1960 the Soviets at. arms shipment to the leftist regimes of soldiers when he was already on the West
tempted to seize power in the Congo, work- Syria, Algeria, the U.A.R? Iraq and Somalia, Berlin bank of the canal." An American
ing through Patrice Lumumba. They were and Soviet political activities have posed a protest note was sent by U.S. Ambassa-
frustrated only when the Army rose against serious threat to the security cf every coun-
Lumumba and forced the 500 man Soviet try, all the way from Gibraltar to Aden. Gdor to hee, , to West Soviet Ambassador Amasto George East t G er-
mission out of the country. We have been warned by King Hussein of n but December 1960 the Soviets opened the Jordan, and by other Arab moderates, and many, b Pyotr
but it was
Laotian crisis by publicly mounting an air- even by prominent anti-communists in the refused by the Soviets.
the Soviets.
lift of weapons to the insurgent forces in UAR, that the current epidemic of unrest As a fourth instance, I refer to the
that country. in the Middle East must not be viewed as case of U.S. citizen Kazan-Komarek and
In April 1961 there was the Berlin Wall. a rash of unrelated incidents-that each of the U.S. agreement with Aeroflot.
In August 1961. the Kremlin, after many these sm a many Inc coordinated dents, in fact, is an integral Early in November 1966 the United
months of careful preparation, abrogated the part p:an designed to give
moratorium-on testing, and embarked on the Kremlin control of the whole of North States agreed to grant landing rights
their massive series of atmospheric tests, cul- Africa, and to give them control as well of to the official Soviet air service, Aero-
minating in the explosion of their 60 meg- Arabia's fabulous oil deposits, which are fiot, in New York. On October 31, 1966,
aton superbomb, estimated to contain Z/3 of the world's known the Aeroflot agency diverted a Soviet
In the summeor of 1962 the Soviets with reserves, airliner-on a direct Moscow-Paris
the greatest secrecy began building missile I challenge anyone to reconcile this cur- flight-to Prague, Czechoslovakia, so
sites in Cuba and shipping intermediate rent record of Soviet activity-in the Far that Czech secret police could seize Mr.
range ballistic missiles to equip them. East, in Africa, in the Middle East, _ and in Vladimir Kazan-Komarek, a naturalized
When the matter was first raised, the So- Latin America-with the assertion that we
viets gave us their solemn assurance that are today in a state of detente, U S Citizen. His arrest was kept secret
they lead no missiles in Cuba. and was not made known until November
In 1963, there was a bloody Communist Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, to 15. Having been held incommunicado
coup in Zanzibar carried out by Castro relate further instances indicating rea- from October 31 until January 30, 1967,
trained Africans, with the participation of sons for distrust of Soviet policy, I would Mr. Kazan-Komarek was secretly tried
Castro Cubans. As a result of the ill-advised mention first the suicide of Newcomb
federation of Zanzibar with Tanganyika to Mott. Soviet authorities alleged that
form the new country of Tanzania, the com-
munists have not achieved a position of near American citizen Newcomb Mott com-
dominance in the government of President mined suicide on January 20 1966 on a
,, Nyerere. It is a situation which is causing prison train while en route to ab Siberian
grave concern in all of East Africa, labor camp, Mr. Mott had been sen-
Beginning in 1963, the Soviets, through tented on November 24, 1965. When his
their massive shipments of arms to President body was returned to the United States,
Sukarno, made themselves primarily respon- an independent examination of the evi-
sible for Sukarno's so-called "confrontation"
with Malaysia, which virtually succeeded in dente by Dr. E. J. Felderman, Director of
bankrupting Indonesia and created a se-
rious danger of war in Southeast Asia. demonstrated beyond question that New-
1983 also witnessed Nasser's invasion of comb Mott was murdered and that his
Yemen, with arms supplied by the Soviet death could not have been suicide.
Union and with its open political encour- As a second reason I would refer to the
agement as well, The Soviets cannot escape case of Gerald Brooke, a British citizen,
moral responsibility for this cruel war and who
for tgrowing threat it now poses to the is currently serving 5 years in a
for the
o Aon peninsula. Soviet labor camp at Potyemlag, a labor
In October 1963 the Soviets further in- camp about 400 miles east of Moscow.
flamed the highly dangerous situation in The Soviet Union has contended that
North Africa by sending arms and equip- there are no longer any political prison-
ment to the Ben Bella government in large ers in the U.S.S.R. How much the Soviet
quantities and by openly inciting the Al- Union has changed since Stalinist days
gerians against the Moroccans. is indicated by the fact that Mr. George
In January 1964 there were the terrible Brown, the British Foreign Secretary,
Panama riots, organized and led by identified
Castro agitators and supported to the hilt intervened for Mr
Brooke durin
th
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March 16, 1967 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE S 3907
and on February 1, 1967, was sentenced newspapers in the U.S.S.R. are state- moil and war even there, in an attempt
to 8 years for "antistate activities." It is controlled, this would hardly appear to to reinstate their domination over Chi-
interesting to note that the Wall Street be an accident. nese policy.
Journal-February 2, 1967-reported One must ask: If the Soviet Union The major threat to world peace to-
that the U.S. State Department said the wants to gain U.S. confidence, is such a day, I repeat, as bad as Red China is,
"Russians deliberately diverted the plane campaign of abuse the way to do so? is not Red China, and it is not the other
"
to Prague.
For full details on the Kazan-Komarek
case see the Washington Evening Star, 15
and 19 November 1966, and the New York
Times, January 31 and February 2, 1967.
After "intensive secret diplomacy"-
including, apparently a warning that
trade could be affected-Mr. Kazan-Ko-
marek was expelled from Czechoslovakia
on February 4, 1967. It would now ap-
pear that the seizure and holding of this
,U.S. citizen was in retaliation for the U.S.
expulsion of Czech attache Jiri Opatrny.
See the New York Times for February 5,
1967.
As a fifth instance, I would refer to
the attempt by the Czech secret police to
"bug" the U.S. State Department, in
May and July 1966.
Related to the Kazan-Komarek case
was the attempt of the Czech secret
police to plant a listening device in the
office of Raymond Lisle, director of
State's Bureau of Eastern European
Affairs. The FBI apprehended Mr. Jiri
Opatrny, a Czech having diplomatic im-
munity, and he was expelled for his
subversive activity. See the Washington
Evening Star, November 15,1966. Czech
attempts had continued until July 1966.
For further details, see the "1966 FBI
Annual Report," pages 26-27.
As a sixth instance, I would refer to
the case of Volker Schaffhauser.
A citizen of the German Federal Re-
public, Mr. Volker Schaffhauser was ar-
rested in Leningrad on January 5, 1957,
by the Soviet secret police, but the Ger-
man embassy was not notified until much
later. The incident was finally reported
by Tass on January 26,1967.
As a seventh instance, I would refer
to Soviet attempts to subvert British
students.
The London Daily Telegraph revealed
on January 30, 1967, evidence of Russian
interfaranra in Thlt eh 4n+nY.nn1 - P,,;',
One must further ask: Are the Soviets countries behind the Iron Curtain who
so contemptuous of the U.S. Senate that are being held as captive nations,
they believe they can take such actions The major threat to the peace of the
in their press and that the Senate will world today is the Soviet Union. Every
ignore such abuse while considering a move they make, every word they utter,
solemn treaty obligation? is calculated for one purpose, and that
As a ninth instance, I refer to Soviet is to take over the world and commu-
violation of the United States-Soviet cul- nize it.
tural agreement of March 19, 1966. Mr. President, I ask unanimous con-
In early January 1967, a new Soviet sent that a summary of the arguments
propaganda magazine entitled Sputnik which I have made against the Consular
began appearing on newsstands in the Convention be printed in the RECORD at
United States. The magazine is dis- this point,
tributed by Eastern News Distributors, There being no objection, the summary
of 155 West 15th Street, New York City was ordered to be printed in the RECORD,
which is registered with the Department as follows:
of Justice as an agency of a Moscow state 1. No treaty necessary in order to establish
publishing exporting monopoly, accord- foreign consulates on U.S. soil. (We have
ing to the New York Times-January 13, had Soviet consulates in the past without a
1967. The Times stated that Jack treaty.)
Zucker, representative of the agency, 2? Roosevelt-Litvinoff Agreement of 1933
Provided similar protections to those
said. sought in this treaty. (See Thurmond Re-
and colleges and intellectuals.
Under present arrangements, the U.S.
Embassy in Moscow is allowed to distrib-
ute 2,000 copies of the Russian-lan-
guage Amerika of the U.S. Information
Agency. Another 60,000 copies are--at
least in theory-put on newsstands.
However, newsstands in the Soviet Un-
ion are a monopoly of the Soviet state.
In accordance with this arrangement,
the Soviet Embassy gives out 2,000 copies
of the English-language propaganda
monthly Soviet News and places the re-
maining 60,000 copies on sale at regular
commercial newsstands throughout the
United States where any U.S. citizen may
freely purchase a copy. There is, of
course, no police surveillance of U.S.
newsstands.
If the Soviet Union is employing this
method to get around the cultural agree-
ment, what methods will it employ to
get around the Consular Treaty?
?' '-' 1Gy "-LalL111, which I have referred, as cited by the establishment of Soviet consulates in Latin
president of the British National Union Senator from Connecticut [Mr. DODD] American countries, nations which might
of Students had protested Soviet sub- in his speech on March 8, 1967, and the well be less equipped to counter massive
version. The Telee?ranh nnnfnd him ne
.,.Y,.s. show clearly that the Soviet Union feels 7. If Soviet law is so capricious that U.S.
Two members of the Russian union, who it can commit these violations and yet consular employees need special immunity ent NUS gusts, went to seitain
the full time student get the U.S. Senate to ratify a treaty of yeti ripe to pormalie travel and thrade r lot
organizer of the British Communist Party, the nature being proposed here. Lions with the Soviets.
Fergus Nicholson, "after telling their hosts I would again remind the Senate that 8. Protection sought in the Baltic States-
they were making an important visit to the the goal of the Communist, based pri- Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania-by an ar-
Russian Embassy". It was later discovered marily in the Soviet Union, is to domi?. rested U.S. citizen would amount to de facto
that they discussed the future of the Na- nate and enslave the world. It cannot recognition of the forcible inclusion of these
tional Union of Students. At the meeting be overemphasized that the Soviet Union nations into the Soviet empire.
were two other British students "who are has within its grasp, the opportunity to The U.S, has never recognized these states
also involved with Mn Nicholson and the bring peace to the world if it wants to
Radical Student Alliance."
as of 9 a Under ae "sleeper" clause in the treaty,
do so. all Soviet diplomatic personnel (908) now in
As an eighth instance, I refer to the We hear alot about Red China. Of the U.S., including those without diplomatic
July 1966-February 1967 "vilification of course, Red China is a dangerous and immunity, could be given the heightened
America" campaign by cartoons in the violent nation, too; but Red China L8 immunities of consular status without the
Soviet press. torn from within. There is a fight going knowledge or consent of U.S. officials.
During the period July 1966-February on in that country now, apparently be- The PRESIDING OFFICER. The
1967, the Soviet Communist Party news- tween the Chinese who adhere to they Senator's 15 minutes have expired.
paper Pravda and the official govern- viewpoint of the Soviet Union on the one Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I
ment newspaper Izvestia-as well as side and Mao's group on the other. They yield 10 minutes to the Senator from
other newspapers-have fed their Rus- are fighting among themselves for ulti- Iowa [Mr. HICKENLOOPER] .
sian readers a steady diet of cartoons mate control of China today. The Soviet Mr. HICKENLOOPER. Mr. Presi-
vilifying the United States. Since all Union, though, is responsible for the tur- dent, my less than enthusiastic support
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1867-9)
~. Soviets have consistently violated Roose-
velt-Litvinoff Agreement of 1933.
Litvinoff agreed to offer consular protec-
tion to U.S. citizens even without negotiating
a consular treaty.
U.S. State Department used the 1933 agree-
ment as the basis for official protests against
violations of U.S. rights.
Secretary of State Cordell Hull held that
U.S. citizens had a right of access to U.S.
officials even without written agreements by
U.S.S.R.
4. Soviets have not honored the provisions
of the 1964 Treaty during the 30 months
since it was signed.
Secretary of State Dean Rusk has cited
20 cases since the signing where the stand-
ards of the treaty have not been met.
5. Soviets agreed to this treaty because it
provides immunity against prosecution for
consular personnel.
Soviets insisted upon this provision, be-
cause it allows only for the expulsion of
consular personnel, and not for prosecution
of criminal acts, including espionage. This
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S3908 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD -SENATE March 16, 1967
of the pending Consular Convention be- con,9ict with some Soviet law and we will The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who
tween the United States and the Soviet know very quickly whether the Soviet yields time?
Union is indicated by the fact that when Union will honor these commitments to Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr President, I
it was reported to the Senate in August notify our authorities of arrests and suggest the absence of a quorum.
1965, I was one of the members of the grant access to people who have been The PRESIDING OFFICER. Against
Committee on Foreign Relations who detained. whose time is the quorum call to be
signed the minority report. I did so Finally, Mr. President, article 30 pro- counted?
because I felt that It was not receiving vides that the convention may be Mr. MANSFIELD. The other side,
adequate public attention and there had terminated upon 6 months' notice, The PRESIDING OFFICER. The
not been opportunity for full considera- This is a most important provision, clerk will call the roll.
of the implications of the convention. because If we do not like the way they The assistant legislative clerk pro-
AfGer careful consideration. I have are performing, or if we feel they are cceded to call the roll.
now decided. somewhat reluctantly, to not carrying out their part of the bargain, Mr MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I
vote for its ratification, I do so, In we can cancel the convention in 6 ask unanimous consent that the order
brief, because I believe it may contribute months' time. So that is a vital part of for the quorum call be rescinded.
in some small way to a lessening of ten- the agreement. It Is not a long, indefi- The PRESIDING OFFICER. With-
sions between the United States and the nile term that is Involved. out objection, it Is so ordered.
Soviet Union. I hope, of course, that the convention Mr DAVITS. Mr. President, I ask
The treaty itself does not authorize will remain In force and prove a signifi- unanimous consent that the order for
the establishment of consulates in each cant step toward some lessening of ten- the quorum call be rescinded.
of the two countries. The President has sions between our countries. Neverthe- The PRESIDING OFFICER. With-
that power without action by the Con- less, should this not prove to be the case, out objection, it Is so ordered.
gress. In fact, some Soviet Consulates or should the Soviet Union not fully live Mr. MUNDT. Mr. President, I yield
were established in the United States up to the terms of the convention, the myse:I 25 minutes.
after President Franklin Roosevelt re- United States can be relieved of its re- Thy PRESIDING O['FICER. The
organized them in 1933. These were ciprocal obligations with only 6 Sena or from South Dakol a is recognized
later closed. The President might, there- months' notice. for 25 minutes.
fore, regardless of what the Senate does, In conclusion, Mr. President, when I Mr, MUNDT. Mr. President, as I con-
on his own initiative permit the Soviet seek to balance the advantages to the elude the debate on the part of the op-
Union to open consulates within the United States of this treaty-which are position to the ratification of the U.S.S.R.
United States, not very great-with the disadvantages constlar treaty on which we will be
Some of my concern about the con- which would flow from its rejection at voting in about 70 minutes, let me say
vent ion relates to the provision of article this time, I conclude that the treaty first of all that the treaty upon which
19, which for the first time will give should be approved. But we should keep we are to vote today is far more
consular officials and employees immu- our fingers crossed. A treaty such as this than a simple diplomatic expression of
nit.y from criminal felony prosecution. is only as good as the integrity of the undertakings between two sovereign
But we already have between 400 and parties. I view this as a small test of Statees.
500 Russians with such Immunity here the integrity of the Soviet Union-at It is, in fact, far more significant and
and the addition of 10 or 15 more will least the future integrity of the Soviet far reaching than the usual undertaking
not substantially increase the burden. Union-and I use the word "future" In- between two countries In the ordinary
I take with a grain of salt the argu- tegrity because certainly the record of exchange of diplomatic papers or agree-
ment that American consular officials the Soviet Union in keeping its word is menis, and certainly more important
going to the Soviet Union need to be not something to brag about. It has than an exchange between a Communist
immune from criminal jurisdiction in gone back on almost every agreement It and a non-Communist country which
that country, but it is of some comfort has made with any Western power. I might be considered in time of peace.
that trumped up charges cannot be en- think this convention may be the first The stern, hard fact Is that we are
forced. As a practical matter, we have test to see whether the Soviet Union is now about to decide whether as Senators
worked out a reciprocal device whereby willing to operate, to some degree, in we should approve this Consular Treaty
officials of either country accused of keeping with what we believe to be hon- not only in time of war but also at a time
criminal acts are declared persona non orable conduct among nations in the when the very country with whom we
grata. And, on a reciprocal basis, we keeping of their word. are making the treaty is sending an ex-
reject a Soviet diplomat every time they Again, I refer back to the important paneling amount of petroleum and all
take a similar action with respect to one provision that this treaty can be can- of the modern weapons required by our
of our officers in the Soviet Union, celed in 6 months' time It it becomes enemy In prolonging the war in Viet-
Therefore, I do not place a great deal necessary. nam and escalating our American casu-
of emphasis upon the Importance of So I do not think we are risking a alties.
article 19. And, furthermore, we have great deal, and it is entirely possible- To that should be added the fact that
been assured that Mr. Hoover can cope perhaps not probable: I do not know this Consular Treaty, as do all consular
with any problems this article may pre- whether, based on the Soviet Union's treaties, has a direct connection with the
sent to the security of the United States, past history, it is probable, but it Is baste American foreign policy question
and I have no doubt he can. possible-that this treaty will become now before this country which, after 5
I do attach some importance to the the basis for better relations between our hard years of war, must certainly be in-
provisions of article 12, which may pro- nations. I think as education Increases, corporated in the following question:
vide some protection to Americans visit- as the world gets smaller, as science and "Is It wise, Mr. President, and Is It
ing in the Soviet Union. It obliges the technology expand, it Is entirely possible proper for our Government in this coun-
receiving state to notify consular officers that such steps as this may make It try to take steps to expand even further
of a sending state of the arrest or de- possible for amiable, friendly associa- our own export of meteriel, supplies,
tention of a national within 1 to 3 days tions not only between our Nation and machines, and equipment to strengthen
from the date of arrest. Furthermore, the Soviet Union but between all the and relieve the pressur?s on the indus-
an American citizen arrested in the other nations of the world that are trial complex of Russia so that she can
Soviet Union will be able to claim a presently In conflict on Ideology and free more of her productive economy for
treaty right to be visited by a consular policy. the making of additional weapons of war
officer of the United States. This may For those reasons, I have concluded to be supplied In even greater numbers
prove of value to some Americans visit- that, on balance, at the moment, that to the North Vietnamese while we seek
ing. In the Soviet Union, including not there is more hope for the future in the futilely to bring about a successful end
ony students, scientists, American bust- adoption of the treaty with the safeguard to the fighting?
nessmen, but also to a number of casual provisions than without it. Therefore, That is the question with which we
tourists. Almost certainly some of these I shall vote for ratification of the treaty. wrestle in this debate, and I predict that
visitors to the Soviet Union will, at some I thank the majority leader for yield- that Is the question which Is going to be
time in the future, find themselves in Ing to me. resoundingly heard In this Chamber time
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after time during the remainder of the
session unless, in fact, this administra-
tion changes its program and policy for
exporting additional American materials,
equipment, and supplies to Russia in this
time of war,
On pages S3543, through S3547 of the
CONGRESSIONAL RECORD of March 10, I
have had printed the detailed list of the
supplies which American exporters are
now permitted to send free from restric-
tion and free from license to the Rus-
sian Government any time and in any
amount that it desires to buy them.
I think Senators and constituents
alike will want to review that astonish-
ing and disillusioning list in the weeks
ahead.
In brief, Mr. President, can a kiss and
kill relationship with Russia produce the
peace which we all implore? Can it, in
fact, be divorced from the growing
casualty list in southeast Asia?
Incidentally, a reporter just asked me
what I had in mind in labeling our effort
to expand American trade with Russia
in this time of war as a kiss and kill
formula. I suspect it is a fair question.
Let me say, therefore, that I think
those words are indeed descriptive of our
actions because, for example, we are
asked by ratification of this treaty to
kiss the hand of Russia diplomatically,
and by endorsing the administration
program for stepping up our wartime
exports to Russia we are asked to kiss
the Russian ruble economically through
making available to her in unrestricted
amounts exports of more than 400 items,
and therefore contributing to her ca-
pacity to supply weapons with which to
kill our troops in Vietnam.
If that is not in fact a kiss and kill
formula for dealing with the challenges
of our times, I submit that it will have
to stand as a descriptive term until
somebody evolves a better one.
At the very first public hearing on this
Consular Treaty addressed by Secretary
of State Rusk, on January 23, I gave my
initial reaction to it to the Secretary
when it came my turn around the table
to ask questions.
That reaction is reported beginning on
page 41 of the printed hearings now on
your desks. It summarized then, as it
summarizes now, my main concern about
the dangers involved in the ratification
of this treaty,in this time of war.
What I said on that occasion was said
after reviewing the step-by-step proce-
dures in which, through the cold war
and now-the hot one, the U.S.S.R. had
failed to evidence good intentions of
amity and was evidencing instead a ca-
pacity and a routine, for supply our
enemies so that they can continue the
war in Vietnam.
I said:
Senator MUNDT. Mr. Secretary, I wish that
I could, knowing you, share your feeling
we were discussing this treaty in an atmos-
phere of sweetness and light so far as
Russia Is concerned, but I think realistically
we should consider this treaty in terms of
the framework of world affairs as they exist
today.
If all we had was the cold war going on
with the USSR I think that would be one
set of circumstances.
But what we have actually is a war going
on today in Vietnam in which the Russians
are supplying virtually all, if not all, of the
sophisticated weapons which are killing
American boys every day of the year. Just
about the time that the agitation developed
again for the approval of this treaty we
read in the newspapers that the USSR has
supplied another hundred new Migs to be
used against our boys out of Hanoi.
So I think we have to recognize this
framework. The last two times you ap-
peared before this committee sitting where
you are now in this room, as I recall, was,
one, to make a very eloquent and persuasive
appeal for why the American policy was
correct in not recognizing Red China now
or admitting her to the U.N. now. The
other was to make an equally persuasive
appeal as to why it would be injurious to
the free world and to America if we would
lose the war to communism in Vietnam.
With those facts staring us in the face,
it would seem to me that the presentation
of this treaty now is at best a masterpiece
of bad timing, because I don't believe that
conditions have changed sufficiently so we
can go back and allude to this as just a
treaty with a country with which we are
establishing a detente, without any tangible
evidence as to what is invloved in that
detente.
Mr. President, I submit that, 60 Min-
utes before the hour that the Senate will
be called upon to vote on this ratiEca-
tion, there have been no outlines, there
have been no definitions, and there have
been no details of what this detente is
supposed to comprise.
Mr. President, I ask unanimous con-
sent that there be printed at this point
in the RECORD my individual views on
this consular treaty as contained in the
report of the Foreign Relations Com-
mittee published on March 3.
There being no objection, the individ-
ual views were ordered to be printed in
the RECORD, as follows:
INDIVIDUAL VIEWS OF MR. MUNDT
The undersigned does not agree with the
recommendation of the majority of the Com-
mittee on Foreign Relations that the Senate
should give its advice and consent to ratifi-
cation of the proposed consular convention
with the Soviet Union.
My reasons are as follows:
(1) I do not believe that this is a props.
tious time to ratify such an agreement with
the Soviet Union or that the treaty can be
considered as an isolated agreement unre-
lated to other measures concerning East-
West relations and the war in Vietnam.
(2) I do not believe that the proposed
convention would be respected any more
than previous treaties and agreements have
been respected by the Soviets.
(3). I believe that the convention would
be to the disadvantage of the United States,
principally because it would greatly increase
the danger of subversion.
(4) I do not believe that the benefits the
proposed convention provides are of suffi-
cient importance to outweigh the disadvant-
ages to the United States.
Each of these four reasons is explored at
greater length below.
1. This is not a propitious time to ratify
the convention and the convention must be
considered along with other East-West
measures.-I do not believe that the consular
convention with the Soviet Union can be
considered in isolation, for it is linked to
other measures in the field of East-West re-
lations. A New York Times editorial on Jan-
uary 23, 1967, put the case succinctly, say-
ing:
"Ratification means more than normal-
izing Soviet-American diplomatic relations
and providing badly needed additional pro-
tection to American citizens traveling in the
S 3909
Soviet Union a: * ". If the consular pact
cannot be ratified, then the East-West trade
bill is probably dead and the space treaty
may have been stillborn. The entire direc-
tion of American foreign policy toward the
Soviet Union at an extraordinarily critical
moment in world history is at stake."
In fact, President Johnson himself has
linked the Consular Convention to the East-
West trade bill in his state of the Union
message, in which he said:
"So tonight I now ask and urge this Con-
gress to help our foreign and our commer-
cial trade policies by passing an East-West
trade bill and by approving our Consular
Convention with the Soviet Union."
Is the Consular Convention the point of
an opening wedge designed to lead to ap-
proval of the East-West trade bill? It would
appear to be. If so, these measures relating
to our relations with the Communist world
should not be considered hastily and in-
dividually. They should be recognized as a
package, a package which contains the com-
ponent parts for building bridges to the So-
viet Union and other Communist countries.
We should examine this package carefully
and thoroughly. We can only do so before it
is delivered.
Not only can the Consular Convention not
be considered in isolation, it can also not be
considered in a political vacuum. We must
set the proposed convention in the context
of this particular point in history. It would
be one thing if we were considering the pro-
posed convention during a time of peace in
the world or of only a cold war. It is quite
another matter to consider such an agree-
ment during a hot war. We have in the
area of 500,000 men fighting in South Viet-
nam today. The weapons that are killing
these men on land and in the air, and sub-
stantially over 7,000 have died in the war
since 1961, are largely Soviet weapons. The
Soviets are declared allies of the North Viet-
namese. They are, therefore, accomplices in
the deaths of many thousands of Americans,
and have been largely responsible for the
more than 50,000 American casualties thus
far inflicted upon us by the enemy.
Consequently, I do not believe that this
is the time to give the appearance of being
in some sort of peaceful partnership with
the Soviet Union. The Soviets are certainly
not making.any concessions to better rela-
tions with the United States either in Viet-
nam or elsewhere. Concluding important
agreements with the Soviet Union at this
juncture will be interpreted not only by our
enemies but even by our allies, in the words
of one of the witnesses who appeared dur-
ing the hearings on the convention, as "a
sign of weakness, if not confusion." And
surely ratification of the convention will ap-
preciably affect the morale of American
soldiers in South Vietnam where the talk of
peaceful coexistence or detente is drowned
out by the sounds and dangers of war.
2. There is no reason to believe that the
Soviets would respect the convention.-The
record of Soviet behavior shows clearly that
the Soviet Government has not respected
the sanctity of international agreements or
treaties ever since it came to power. A re-
vised issue of a staff study for the Internal
Security Subcommittee of the Senate Com-
mittee on the Judiciary, issued in 1964 and
entitled "Soviet Political Agreements and
Results," devoted 103 pages to cataloging the
violations from 1917 through 1963. 'The
foreword to the study stated:
"The staff found that in the 38 short years
since the Soviet Union came into existence,
its Government had broken its word to vir-
tually every country to which it ever gave a
signed promise. It signed treaties of non-
aggression with neighboring states and then
absorbed those states. It signed promises
to refrain from revolutionary activity inside
the countries with which it sought 'friend-
ship,' and then cynically broke those prom-
ises. It was violating the first agreement it
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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE Marc! 16, 1967
ever signed with the United States at the
very moment the Soviet envoy, Idtvinov,
was putting his signature to that agreement,
and it is still violating the same agreement
in 19.55. It broke the promises it made to
the Western nations during previous meet-
mes at the summit' in Teheran and Yalta.
It broke lend-lease agreements offered to it
by the United States in order to keep Stalin
from surrendering to the Nazis. It violated
the charter of the United Nations."
']'.It(! Soviets have not lived up to past
agreements even on the matters with which
the proposed convention deals. When the
United States recognized the Soviet Govern-
ment in 1933, there was an exchange of let-
ters uetween President Franklin D. Roose-
velt and Foreign Minister Maksim I,ltvinov.
I.,t;inov stated, in a letter dated Novem-
ber 19, 1933, that the rights of legal protec-
tion (including notification and access
right;) then enjoyed by German nationals,
the rationals who were most favored In this
respect at that time, "will be granted to
American nationals immediately upon the
establishment of relations between our two
countries." It is a debatable point whether
this undertaking on the part of the Soviet
Government is still legally valid; I believe
that there are legal arguments on both sides,
But whether the agreement Is still in effect
or not, It was certainly at one point a legally
binding promise made by the Soviet Govern-
ment, a promise on which we relied on
several occasions. Yet it was a promise
that the Soviet Government ignored when-
ever it suited Soviet purposes. I do not be-
lieve that there is any reason to think that
the Soviets would scrupulously observe their
obligations under the proposed consular
convention, given their unscrupulous vio-
lations of previous agreements.
The Soviets have had ample time to dem-
onstrate that they do Intend to change their
behavior regarding the matters with which
this convention deals. They have not done
so. Secretary Rusk himself told the com-
mittee that in the 30 months since the con-
sular convention was signed by the Soviets
and the United States in Moscow, 20 Amer-
icans have been detained by Soviet police
and, in the Secretary's own words, "in none
of these cases did the Soviet authorities ad-
here to the standards of notification and
accea provided for by this convention."
3. The immunity provisions o/ the conven-
tion provide serious disadvantages to the
United States.-Article 19 of the proposed
convention contains immunity provisions
that have never before been included by the
United States in any consular agreement:
they grant to consular officers and employees
of the sending state unrestricted Immunity
from criminal prosecution in the receiving
state. Heretofore. we have restricted such
Immunity to misdemeanors. We have not
granted such unrestricted Immunity to the
consular officers or employees of any of our
trad.tional and proven allies. We have not
agreed to such unrestricted immunity in the
multilateral Vienna consular convention
(which we have not yet ratified). Yet we
extend this immunity for the first time in an
agreement with a country with which we
have had more difficulties than any other, a
country whose attitude toward us is one of
implacable hostility, a country which has
used its officials abroad for espionage pur-
poses to a greater degree than any other and
a country which is supplying the arms to kill
.and maim Americans fighting to preserve
freedom in the face of aggression.
The immunity provisions of the proposed
convention mean that a Soviet consular offi-
cer or employee cannot be prosecuted for any
crirr.e, including murder, sabotage, and
espionage. I do not believe that anyone
would deny that the Soviets have used their
embassies, consulates, and official missions
abroad for espionage purposes. In this coun-
try :done, since January 1, 1957, a period of
only 10 years. 28 Soviet officials have bean and Yugoslavia). Twenty-seven of these 35
arrested or expelled, according to J. Edgar countries have consular establishments in
Hoover, Director of the Federal Bureau of In-
vestigation.
Testifying before a subcommittee of the
Committee on Appropriations of the House
of Representatives on March 4, 1965, Mr.
Hoover said:
"Ifistorically the Soviet intelligence serv-
ices have appropriated the great bulk of offi-
cial positions abroad, primarily using their
official representatives and diplomatic es-
tablishments in other countries as bases from
which to carry on their espionage opera-
tions ' ? Long seeking greater official
representation in the United States which
would be more widely spread over the coun-
try, a cherished goal of the Soviet Intelligence
services was realized when the United States
signed an agreement with the Soviet Union
on June 1. 1964, providing for the reciprocal
establishment of consulates in our respective
cou-ntries."
On January 21. 1967, 1 wrote Mr. Hoover
and asked him whether he had "in any way"
changedhis views or changed his mind about
this testimony. He replied, in a letter dated
January 23, 1967:
"You specifically inquired whether I had
changed my views or whether any evidence
has developed to make me change my mind
about my testimony of March 4, 1965. The
answer is an unequivocal no."
In the same letter Mr. Hoover said:
"I can also state without equivocation that
Communist bloc diplomatic establishments
In ,his country serve as vital points for In-
telligence operations."
Mr. Hoover continued, making the point
that the problem of subversion on the part
of Soviet diplomats Is a problem of the
present-the imediate present--as well as
the past:
"You inquired whether, since March 5,
1965, there has been a cessation of attempts
by Communist diplomatic personnel in this
country to engage in acts of subversion or
attempted espionage. The answer again is
an unequivocal 'No.' "
Those who need proof to support Mr.
Hoover's statement need only read the testi-
mony of Mr. John Huminik before the com-
mit.tee, recounting the activities of six Soviet
diplomats during the past 5 years.
:.usequently, Mr. Hoover has been quoted
as saying that the additional number of
Sovietagents who would come to this coun-
try if a Soviet consulate were established
"would raise no problems which the FBI can-
not. effectively and efficiently deal with."
Nevertheless, the fact remains that there
Is a difference between saying that a serious
problem can be dealt with and arguing that a
serious problem would not arise. Additional
Soviet agents and increased Soviet intelli-
gence activity would certainly follow from
the establishment of a Soviet consulate in
the United States. I do not think that this
assertion can be challenged. It certainly has
nu, been to date.
There are additional dangers In the pro-
vision In the consular convention extending
unrestricted immunity from criminal pros-
ecution to consular officers and employees.
One complication is a result of the fact that
we have consular agreements with other
countries which contain a most-favored-na-
tion clause under which the country con-
cerned can request the same treatment for
its consular officers, and In some cases Its
employees as well, as the treatment which
we extend to the nation most favored in this
respect. Entry into force of the Consular
Convention with the Soviet Union would
mean that the consular officers and employees
of the Soviet Union would become the moat
favored in this respect.
What would be the practical effect? We
have agreements containing a most-favored-
nation clause with 35 countries Including
three Communist countries (Cuba, Rumania,
Communist country-Yugoslavia). In the
consular establishments of these 27 countries
there are presently 577 consular personnel
who would be entitled to immunity tinder a
most-Iavored-nation clause, The Depart-
ment of State has asked our embassies in
these 27 countries to estima":e how many of
these countries will request most-favored-na-
tion privileges regarding unrestricted im-
munity from criminal jurisdiction. The
Department has stated that on the basis of
replier received from our embassies only 11
of these 27 countries (Yugoslavia is not
among the 11) would take advantage of the
most-favored-nation clause and, thus, that
only 290 consular officers and employees
would be presently affected.
Making an additional 290 foreign officials
immune from criminal prosecution for viola-
tions of the law, including the laws against
espionage, is bad enough. Bit it seems clear
that 290 is only a starting point. The figure
of 290 represents only a guess by the Depart-
ment of State. We could well find that the
Department's guess was inaccurate and that
many more of the 27 countries with consular
establishments in the United States desire to
take r.dvantage of the Immunity provisions.
Furthermore, the figure of 290 is based on
the number of consular officers and em-
ployees now in the United States. But the
number of consulates is bound to increase in
time and the size of consulates is bound to
grow. That has been a fact of life and will
undoubtedly continue to be so.
Thus, 290 is a minimum figure. The maxi-
mum number of persons who might be af-
fected over the course of just the next decade
cannct be estimated. Nor can the number of
consular officials from other Communist
countries who would have such immunity
be estimated. Initially, we f.re told, only the
Soviets will have such imrr unity. But the
Department's guess as to the Intention of
the Yugoslav Government may be wrong or
the Yugoslavs may change their minds and
ask for unrestricted Immunity for their con-
sular personnel In New Yorl:, Chicago, Pitts-
burgh., and San Francisco. -Poland, with a
consulate In Chicago, could insist on similar
immtnity provisions in any consular con-
vention which might be negotiated in the
future. Rumania, which has the right to ask
for such immunity because there is a most-
favored-nation clause in its consular agree-
ment with the United States, has no con-
sulates here now. But it well may have con-
sulates In the future, as it has In the past,
and the personnel of that consulate would be
able to ask for such immunity.
In brief, in this Consular Convention we
are rot only granting a new immunity to
Soviet consular officers and employees. We
are, In effect, granting this immunity to hun-
dreds of other consular officers and employees
and leaving the way open for still hundreds
of others, Including those from other Com-
munist countries, to have he protection of
such immunity in the future.
One other factor should be noted. If the
proposed convention is ratified its Immunity
provisions will undoubtedly serve as a model
not only for the United States In future con-
sular conventions but also as a model for
other countries in their consular conventions.
Surely other countries negotiating a consular
agreement with the Soviet Union, or with
any other country, will feel that if the
United States can grant such immunity and
grant. It to the Soviet Union, so can they.
This will undoubtedly be true especially of
the developing countries. The result will be
a spread of Soviet subversion throughout the
developing world, including the Western
Hemisphere. As I observed during the hear-
ings on the convention: "I wonder if we are
not about to open a door which we will not
be able to close."
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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE S 3911
Indeed, the Soviets are already active in
this hemisphere, using Cuba as a base. At
the Tri-Continental Conference held in
Havana in January 1966, the head of the
Soviet delegation, Sharaf R. Rashidov, said:
"The Soviet delegation came to this Con-
ference to promote in every conceivable way
the unity of anti-imperialist forces of the
three continents so as to unfold on a still
greater scale our common struggle against
imperialism, colonialism, and neocolonialism
headed by the U.S. capitalists."
The final declaration of the Conference
read, in part:
"The Conference hereby proclaims that the
primary task of the peoples of Asia, Africa,
and Latin America is to intensify the struggle
against imperialism colonialism, neocolonial-
ism, and to win and consolidate national
independence especially against the exploi-
tation practiced by the Yankees. The merg-
ing of efforts will turn active solidarity on
our continent into a new historical force of
colossal dimensions.
The modest benefits which the United
States would obtain as a result of this con-
vention are discussed below, The principal
benefit is found in the notification and ac-
cess provisions in article 12 and the protocol
to the convention which involve an obliga-
tion on the part of the Soviets to notify an
American consular official within 1 to 3 days
when an American national is arrested and
to grant a consular officer access to that ar-
rested citizen within 2 to 4 days. These noti-
fication and access provisions were the bene-
fits we obtained which, it is claimed, balance
the concession we made in granting unre-
stricted immunity. But in the case of coun-
tries which have consular agreements with us
containing a most-favored-nation clause we
could be put in the position of making a con-
cession without obtaining such a benefit in
return. Under the most-favored-nation
clause any of these countries can request that
unrestricted immunity from criminal prose-
cution be extended to its consular personnel.
The most-favored-nation clause does not go
to the question of notification and access,
however, and from a legal point of view there
is nothing in these consular agreements that
gives us ground for demanding such a con-
cession in return.
4. The benefits obtained do not outweigh
the disadvantages.-The principal claimed
benefits for the convention are, as has been
stated above, the notification and access
provisions. It should be made clear, how-
ever, that notification and access are not
equivalent to freedom, They do not even
offer due process. They mean, purely and
simply, that we will be notified when a citi-
zen is arrested and that an American con-
sular officer will be able to visit the arrested
person in prison. There is no guarantee that
the arrested person will be given a fair trial.
There is no guarantee that he will be treat-
ed well during his imprisonment. There is
no guarantee that he will be given the right
to counsel:
Secretary Rusk, testifying before the com-
mittee on January 23, said:
"The rights of international due process
which this convention would provide would
be available without delay and without the
need -for continuous and insistent high-level
diplomacy * * *. That goal-the maximum
possible protection and assistance for Ameri-
can citizens on a regular and written basis
is out central purpose in this conven-
tion * * *."
I submit that the convention does not
provide "rights of international due process"
and does not obtain for American citizens
maximum protection and assistance. On
the contrary, the protection and assistance
for which it provides are minimal at best.
It has been argued by, some that the im-
munity provision is an advantage to the
United States because while it is admitted
that the Soviet officials who would come to
this country as officers and employees of any
consulate might well be espionage agents,
we in return could send intelligence officers
to any consulate we were to establish in the
Soviet Union. I believe, however, that in
any exchange of intelligence officers, there
would be a net disadvantage to the United
States, A Soviet intelligence officer, operat-
ing in an open society with easier access to
individuals and to information, would un-
doubtedly find his stay in the United States
most productive. An American intelligence
officer, operating in a closed society with
very limited access to individuals and in-
formation, would surely not be obtaining a
reciprocal benefit.
In sum, I believe that the modest benefits
provided by the treaty are far outweighted
by the disadvantages. These disadvan-
tages include improving the Soviet capacity
to spread propaganda and to conduct sub-
version, and jeopardizing our refusal to rec-
ognize the forcible incorporation into the
Soviet Union of Latvia, Lithuania, and
Estonia. I believe, furthermore, that the
treaty would enhance Soviet prestige at a
time when we are engaged in a war in which
the Soviet Union is participating, although
by proxy. The treaty would thus be re-
garded throughout the world-by our allies
and our enemies and by our men fighting
Communist aggression in Vietnam-as in-
consistent, irrational and foolish at best,
and as dangerous at worst.
Ratifying the consular convention is not
the way to improve relations between the
United States and the Soviet Union or to
reduce tensions in the world today The
first step toward that end is a fundamental
change in Soviet aims. These aims, con-
stantly reiterated, were summed up by
former Soviet Premier Khrushchev a few
years ago in the never-to-be-forgotten words,
words that the Soviets have never retracted:
"We will bury you." Khrushchev's prophecy
is being fulfilled daily in Vietnam, as the
stream of coffins crossing the Pacific attests.
This time of trouble for our country, a
trouble to which the Soviet Union has con-
tributed in large part, is no time to confuse
the realities of today with the hopes-the
still unfortunately unrealized hopes-of
tomorrow.
KARL E. MUNDT.
Mr. MUNDT. Mr. President, it is my
conviction that we are now being asked
today to ratify the wrong treaty on the
wrong subject at the wrong time and
with the wrong approach to the basic
problem of how best to end the fighting
In Vietnam and how to bring about a
better understanding and greater amity
between the Communist and non-Com-
munist areas of this globe.
The advocates of this treaty sum-
marize their primary objectives in just
five words: "We want to protect
Americans."
Surely, Mr. President, nobody can
quarrel with a noble objective of this
kind. We all want to protect Americans
wherever they are and for whatever
reason they are there. But when we are
called upon to protect one segment of
America-the fortunate 18,000 who are
able to travel for pleasure or profit in
Soviet Russia and of whom some nine
annually get in trouble with the law-it
seems completely clear to me that we
must not take action which, by giving
greater protection to these Americans,
places in greater jeopardy 500,000 far
less fortunate young Americans who are
now on the firing lines and the battle-
fields fighting for our freedoms in far-off
Vietnam.
Related as it is to expanded trade with
Russia and containing as it does psycho-
logical impacts, unprecedented conces-
sions of immunity to a great Communist
power, and no effective quid pro quo
guarantees in terms of making peace
either more prompt or more probable, I
'cannot believe that this treaty at this
time, in its present form, is either in our
national or our international interests.
Otherwise, I can assure Senators that I
would not have undertaken the long-
and at first the very lonesome-task, and
always the exceedingly difficult - uphill
battle, or trying to bring before the Sen-
ate and the country the basic issues and
the farflung ramifications which are
involved before we actually voted on
ratification. It has not been an easy
responsibility but starting as we did with
only four negative votes in our commit-
tee, I for one am greatly encouraged by
the number of Senators who have now
assured us of their determined opposi-
tion to the treaty.
In fact, compared with what might
and should have been written into this
treaty under today's wartime circum-
stances, I believe this is indeed another
shameful example of how anonymous
architects of America's destiny working
abroad in treaty conferences, which con-
ceal from the public both the discussions
and the minutes of the meetings leading
up to the final agreements, all too fre-
quently tend to fritter away America's
great opportunities for world leadership
through surrendering our international
strength by diplomatic obsequities.
This brings to mind, nostalgically,
other sad and irrevocable mistakes made
at other international conferences which
all of us can still remember, bearing
names like the conference at Cairo, the
Yalta Conference, and the ill-fated con-
ference at Potsdam.
I believe that this treaty with Russia
in this time of war, linked as it is with
both the desire and the program to ship
increasingly our American exports to the
Russian industrial complex-which, on
the record and substantiated by the testi-
mony of every knowledgeable witness be-
fore our congressional committee, is
today supporting not only all of the
petroleum required by Hanoi to continue
the fighting over there but also every
sophisticated weapon and many less so-
phisticated weapons needed by the North
Vietnamese to continue our fighting, to
expand our casualty list, and to prolong
tpe war-is a treaty which historians will
describe, if we cannot recognize that fact
today, as a treaty which is morally
wrong, psychologically bad, militarily
dangerous, and a setback in bringing
about successfully the early ending of
the war we all so devoutly desire to con-
clude.
The pros and cons of this Consular
Treaty have been discussed in the homes
and offices of America, up and down the
corridors of Congress, in speech after
speech recorded in the CONGRESSIONAL
RECORD, on the air waves, through the
press; and in one way or another there
have been placed before the Senate and
our constituents, since the Secretary's
first appearance before our committee
on January 23, the issues, the involve-
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S3912 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE March 16, 1967
ments, the repercussions, and the far- Hoover, has told Congress and the coun-
flung ramifications of the vote which we try that the FBI can cope with this ad-
are about to undertake. ditional espionge by increasing the num-
It is not my purpose and It would be ber of agents to meet the challenge. I
of no avail today to repeat the many too, believe that to be a fact.
reasons why, in the view of some of us in However, I think it far less likely that
the Senate at least, and in the view of the Latin American governments have
millions of Americans not privileged to the experienced and the security per-
express their convictions in the impend- sonnel to cope with the vast numbers of
ing Senate vote, this treaty is Inadvis- Communist agents officially entering
able and counterproductive at this par- their countries should they follow our
ticular juncture of our wartime history. example in this treaty, as I believe they
It has been pointed out by me and understandably and necessarily might.
many others that the advantages Only this week President Johnson has
claimed for the treaty are far less than asked us to support a new program of
those stipulated by the language of the $1,500 million to help stabilize and
treaty itself. Stripped to its bare es- strenthen our Latin American neighbors.
sentials, this treaty proposes to protect It is Inconceivable to me that we should
American travelers in Russia by giving take action which it appears to me, would
them the right to notify those most con- sabotage in advance the stabilizing meas-
cerned when they are in trouble and the ures and the money involved in his new
right to consult with our consulate of- requests for Latin America.
cers when they are placed In jail. Only Mr. President, we Americans can ill-
that and nothing more. afford to have any new Castro-like Cu-
The treaty does not even add in any ban governments In other Latin Amer-
way the right of an American tourist, scan countries In this time of test and
finding himself in a Russian jail, to have trial.
a fair and free trial, to make public Likewise, I also am greatly concerned
statements concerning his problem, to about the psychological impact of this
have representation by an atto;pey of treaty upon our allies who have joined
his choice, and to have his trouble re- us In the war effort in Vietnam. I am
solved by the due processes of legitimate sure that our allies, as have many Amer-
law. None of that is included in the icans, have read the President's state of
treaty and none of that has been the Union address linking together ex-
promised by the Russian Government, panded commercial trade with Russia In
Notification and consultation is the this time of war with the ratification of
sole benefit contained in the treaty pro- this Consular Treaty as a twin objective.
tecting traveling Americans in Russia. I am sure that they have read the edi-
And for that we provide, for the first torials in the New York Times which
time in American history, complete im- make the same connection and one of
munity to all Russian consulate employ- which I Inserted In the CONGRESSIONAL
ees in any and In every consulate they RECOR 3 only yesterday,
establish in the United States subse- I am sure many share my curiosity
quent to our action. Once having ex- and skepticism also about the effect on
tended this unprecedented action to the morale of our fighting men In Viet-
Russia, we must, of course, extend the nam and their parents of President
same inununity to all consulate offices of Johnson's Executive order of last October
other countries or bear the stigma of 12 in v hich he opened up the unrestricted
providing for the Communists of Russia exportation to Russia of 400 American
special and exclusive concessions denied products and supplies, a great many of
to other countries with which we main- which will have an Immediate benefit to
tain diplomatic relationships. the Russians in strengthening their war
To me, were there no other arguments munitions output by relieving many pres-
against the treaty, except for the impact sures on their faltering domestic econ-
of this unusual diplomatic concession to omy. That, consequently must make it
the Russians upon our friendly neigh- easier for the Russian Industrial complex
bors of Latin America, that would be to grind out additional weapons such as
sufficient for the Senate to vote against they are sending In Increasing numbers
ratification of the treaty at this time, to aid our enemy in Vietnam. I am sure
I call to mind that only 4 of the 20 non- these foreign friends of ours also read the
Communist Latin American countries language of the Consular Treaty itself
now even extend diplomatic recognition which specifically enmuerates as one of
to Communist Russia. the factors of this treaty the building of
However, should we ratify and an- additional economic ties and trade be-
nounce this unusual agreement before tween the U.S.S.R. and the United States
the world by providing a complete Im- of America.
munity to Russian consular offices and In this cruel time of war, Mr. Presi-
employees, the pressure would certainly dent, I think all these factors will have
be great upon all Latin American gov- a most unfortuate phychological impact
ernments for them at least to give diplo- upon both our friends and our foes in
matic recognition to Russia and for them other countries.
next to provide similar consular treaties Mr. President, I fear that the step that
with similar diplomatic immunities as the Senate Is about to take if It votes
those provided between the United for ratification of this treaty will come
States of America and the U.S.S.R. back to plague us some day much as the
Secretary of State Rusk, himself, has Tonkin Gulf resolution has come back to
said that he believes it to be probable plague some of my colleagues in this
that consular employees sent to the Chamber. Our failure to protest now,
United States will be selected from the this great economic war time aid to Rus-
KGB secret police personnel of the sia will be construed by many and I pre-
U.S.S.R. Director of the FBI, J, Edgar diet will be described by some in high
places ai Senate concurrence or approval
of this policy of providing wartime eco-
nomic aid to Russia at this time.
Some Senators have already com-
plained publicly on this floor about the
various interpretations being made in
high places about the impact and Intent
of the Tonkin Gulf resolution passed by
the Senate almost unanimously at the
time of ,he Tonkin Gulf incident. Hav-
Ing been forewarned by this fact of po-
litical 1i_'e they cannot now be surprised
by the :ype of interpretations which I
envision would follow sooner or later the
ratification action of today should we
ratify this treaty today and should it
come to be considered as an "economic
Tonkin Gulf resolution."
Incidentally, Mr. President, I suggest
that some reporter, or commentator, or
editor of our times make an analysis of
the groupings in the Senate of those who
vote for and those who vote against this
treaty since certainly some historian of
the future will make such a study. I be-
lieve the impending vote and the debate
of the past week will show that those
opposing ratification of this treaty now
have provided the greatest unity of sup-
port of President Johnson in his war
effort and that among those who support
this ratification, you will find the great
preponderance of Senators who have
been in the frontline of the President's
sharpest and most persistent critics in
his handling of the war in Vietnam.
I think that in the Senate, and in the
country generally, there will be found
supporting ratification of the treaty
most of those who feel that w re are in an
impossible and unjustifiable war over
there and so we should quit and come
home; or we should run and hide and
spend our lives in some bloody, endless
enclave, or that we should stay in South
Vietnam and be shot at while the enemy
is freed from attack by bombing or air
raids on his staging areas of the North.
Perhaps the President himself will
study tl-e ensuing rolicall as he looks
ahead to the wisdom of pressing for ad-
ditional expansion of our wartime trade
with Russia. This is at least an eventu-
ality for which I devoutly hope.
The PRESIDING OF'F`ICER. (Mr.
BYRD of Virginia in the chair). The
time of the Senator has expired.
Mr. MUNDT. Mr. President, I ask
unanimous consent that I Tray proceed
for 5 additional minutes.
The PRESIDING OFF`ICER.. Without
objectior., it is so ordered.
Let me say finally, Mr. President, that
enough Senators on one issue or another
on the rotes this week have expressed
their disenchantment and uncertainty
about the timing and the purport of this
treaty by the manner in which they have
voted on one or another of the several
reservations which have already been
before us. so that standing together,
those Senators who on one vote or an-
other conveyed their desire tc advise be-
fore consenting to this treaty can,
through sticking to their guns and vot-
ing "No" on ratification, today defeat or
delay this ratification.
I hope that those who, by their votes,
have earlier displayed their desire to ex-
ercise their constitutional right to advise
in treatymaking, and who are not con-
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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD --SENATE S 3913
tent merely to consent will not now re-
treat or recant or renounce their earlier
convictions and thereby on the impend-
ing vote now express approval of a treaty
which they earlier found undesirable in
one aspect or another.
I believe there are five questions we
should ask ourselves before we vote on
this treaty:
First. Can and will its ratification
shorten the war?
Second. Can, and will it help attain
success in our costly military effort?
Third. Can and will ratification of this
treaty reduce our fast growing list of
casualties in Vietnam?
Fourth. Can and will it improve the
morale of our fighting men in Vietnam?
Fifth. Can and will this treaty ratifica-
tion develop a greater and, in my opin-
ion, a much needed unity of purpose at
home among our fellow citizens in sup-
port of our war efforts overseas?
Mr. President, I hope and pray that
we can save President Johnson from the
awful but I am sure unintentional error
in which he is involved in pressing so
hard for ratification of this treaty in this
agonizing hour of war.
Otherwise, I sincerely believe that what
we do here today, if by our votes we
ratify this treaty, will help to prolong
the war, to discourage our allies, to bring
evil consequences and suspicion to our
friends, and to increase even faster the
growing list of military casualties in
Vietnam.
Mr. President, ordinarily, a Senator
engaging in debate devoutly hopes that
he is right. Let me, say, as I conclude,
that I devoutly hope that I am wrong in
my analysis of the question and in my
prediction of the results flowing from a
ratification of this treaty in this time of
war.
For me, however, every rule of reason
and of logic which I can bring to bear
and exercise brings me to the clear con-
viction that I believe, unfortunately, that
I am right.
Therefore, Mr. President, this treaty
will not be approved at this time by the
vote and consent of this Senator. I hope
that it will not be approved by the con-
sent and the vote of this Senate when it
answers the roilcall on this fateful ac-
tion.
Mr. President, I reserve the remainder
of my time.
Mr. KENNEDY of New York. Mr.
President, I rise in support of ratifica-
tion of the Consular Convention, I be-
lieve it is an important step in lessening
tensions between the United States and
the Soviet Union.
Ratification of the convention will
bring to a successful close an effort to
improve Soviet-American relations which
has been the subject of discussion and
negotiation since the late years of the
Eisenhower administration. It is on the
verge of ratification because of the strong
initiative taken by President Johnson in
seeking final approval this year. I know
we all applaud President Johnson's ac-
tion in making ratification a matter of
the highest priority.
The tangible benefits of the treaty to
the United States. are significant. Near-
ly 20,000 American citizens now travel
in the U.S.S.R. each year. The conven-
tion provides important new procedures
for their protection. It insures that
American officials will be notified should
one of these travelers be arrested, and it
insures that out representatives will
have access to the person detained.-
As a result, any new American consu-
lates which are opened after further
negotiations will be able to serve and
protect American travelers far better
than is possible at present.
The intangible benefits of the conven-
tion are even more important. The
monolithic communism which we con-
fronted with the foreign policy of the
cold war is no longer relevant. In these
circumstances, improving in relations
with the Soviet Union will further not
only our national interest, but the cause
of peace all over the world.
The Consular Convention represents a
significant symbolic step. toward im-
proving Soviet-American understanding.
Its ratification, therefore, serves the
highest cause of mankind-the cause of
peace.
Mr. President, I urge the ratification
of the Consular Convention.
Mr. JORDAN of North Carolina. The
Consular Treaty which we are now con-
sidering has caused me as much concern
as any issue which has come before us
during the time I have been a Member
of the Senate.
It concerns me, first of all, because it
comes up at a time when we are at war
with Communist forces in Vietnam.
It concerns me because I honestly feel
that a great deal of misinformation de-
signed to play on the emotions of people
has been deliberately spread about what
the treaty would and would not do. I
have received hundreds of letters from
sincere and honest people who fear the
treaty because of misinformation put
out through a massive letter-writing
campaign.
This treaty also causes me great con-
cern because we are at a point in our
history when we must not only use what-
ever military force is necessary to over-
come Communist aggression in Vietnam
or anywhere else, but we must also use
the very best wisdom we have in trying
to bring about peaceful relations among
men of all nations regardless of their
political persuasion.
I know we have the military might to
meet any challenge. We must also show
our adversaries that we have the pru-
dence and the judgment to promote
peace.
In deciding on the Consular Treaty we
need to think very carefully about where
it would fit into this picture.
First of all, the treaty itself does not
provide for any more or any less con-
sulates than could be established under
existing law.
What the treaty would do, and all it
would do, would be to spell out the rules
under which American consulates could
be opened and operated in Russia and
under which Russian consulates could be
opened and operated in the 'United
States.
These rules would be reciprocal in
every respect.
I think we must also consider very
carefully the fact that the treaty we are
seeking is not something that has Just
been suddenly thrust upon us. The exact
opposite is true. Our Government under
three Presidents has seen the need for
and sought such a treaty as a means of
encouraging peaceful relations for nearly
10 years. .
It is my sincere belief that if such a
treaty would help us in finding peace as
eatly as 1959 then it may help us even
more today, at a time when we are de-
voting our resources, our knowledge, and
our wisdom to ending the fighting in
Vietnam.
On many occasions I have stated that
any conflict between men or nations must
be settled ultimately by people sitting
down talking with each other. For ex-
ample, whatever understanding is finally
reached about Vietnam it will be reached
at the conference table, and I wish very
much that an understanding could have
been reached before the fighting instead
of the one which must be reached after
the fighting.
People, and nations, that talk to each
other are much less likely to fight than
those who sit in the corner, suck their
thumbs, and refuse to speak. On the
other hand, people, and nations, who
talk and communicate with each other,
more often than not trade and do busi-
ness with each other and become more
understanding and more peaceful.
If our Nation should decide that the
wisest course in dealing with Russia is
to maintain rigid silence and refuse to
communicate, then we should prohibit
the 18,000 Americans who visit Russia
each year from doing so. This same
course would also require us to prohibit-
any Russians from visiting and seeing
the United States.
On the other hand, if we think it is
wise, constructive, and helpful to ulti-
mate peace to exchange travelers, then
we have an obligation to give our citi-
zens who visit Russia the best possible
protection. That is one of the purposes
of this treaty.
It is my honest belief that it is wiser
for us to establish communications with
the people of Russia than it is to try to
convince ourselves that they do not
exist and ignore them. I may be old
fashioned, but I believe that once we
establish more peaceful communications
with them we can not only show them
the futility of war but we can also sell
them on democracy.
I am willing to try. I am not afraid
of democracy competing with com-
munism. I believe there is a way to
settle our differences without going to
war and I believe this treaty would help
us toward that end.
For these reasons I support the Con-
sular Treaty.
Mr. McGEE. Mr. President, let it not
be said that timidity, for the second time,
has caused this body to shrink from ap-
proving a very simple and desirous con-
vention on the exchange of consuls with
the Soviet Union because of fears en-
gendered by people who either misunder-
stand its nature or intentionally distort
the purposes of the treaty.
Every Senator in this Chamber has, as
I have, received countless letters-many
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of them identical form letters--opposing
this treaty and citing the Director of the
Federal Bureau of Investigation as the
source of their belief that it would lead
to the establishment of Soviet espionage
nests beyond the touch of U.S. laws in
virtually every important city of the land.
Many Senators in this Chamber know
this contention is pure, unadulterated
hogwash. It has been fostered by the
same coterie of individuals and organiza-
tions which attempts at every turn to
block every attempt at expanding the
contacts between the United States of
America and the Soviet Union, the
world's two major powers. The people
who fire the flames of opposition to this
treaty are, I submit, without substantial
faith in the attractiveness and power of
theAmerican system. Why else do they
make the Communists seem 10 feet tall?
Communism has always found it diffi-
cult, if not impossible, to stand compari-
son with the American way of life. Yet
we in the United States have been alto-
gether too shy, too reticent, or too afraid,
to use our best weapon--our heritage,
our traditions, our ideas, and our way of
life. The more we can expose foreigners,
especially Russians, to these, Mr. Presi-
dent, the greater our potential gains.
Indeed, as a politician I can state, very
frankly. that I am glad I am not a Rus-
sian in the Kremlin having to justify this
treaty. For, in fact, the United States
has more to gain from this treaty than
does the Soviet Union. As a bargain,
it is much in our favor.
It is an unfortunate circumstance that
this treaty, which the very able and as-
tute Committee on Foreign Relations has
twice considered and twice approved, has
been allowed to become an emotional Is-
sue. If we look at it unemotionally, Mr.
President, what do we find?
First, we find that it would not in itself
lead to the establishment of any Soviet
consulates in the United States. Such
exchanges would have to be worked out
between the two governments, although
the ground rules for their operations
would be laid down. Secondly, the con-
tention that any consulates subsequently
opened would be "covers" for -Russian
espionage and thus endanger the secu-
rity of the United States cannot be taken
too seriously if one has confidence in our
own counterespionage agencies, notably
the FBI. Indeed, one Russian consulate,
which is what we can look for in the
foreseeable future, would involve only
12 to 15 Russian nationals, all of whom
the FBI would presumably have no dif-
ficulty in identifying and in keeping un-
der surveillance.
Although these Soviet nationals would
be granted immunity, Mr. President, it
is likewise true that American consular
officers would have immunity from
prosecution under Soviet law. Consid-
ering the quality of justice in the re-
spective countries, I submit that this is,
indeed, an important protection for U.S.
personnel which might in the future be
sent to consular outposts in the Soviet
Union.
Each year, as we know, some 18,000
citizens of the United States visit the
Soviet Union for one reason or another.
A few get into trouble. This treaty, for
the first time, would guarantee our Gov-
ernment access to any American citizens
who may be apprehended and detained.
This, in view of the recurring arrest
of Americans in Russia, Is, I think, an
important argument in favor of the
treaty. It is a protection we do not have
now-but which every potential Ameri-
can tourist may need-perhaps sooner
than he realizes. The Russian traveler
in America, on the other hand, already
has this protection. Why cheat our-
selves?
I am under a firm impression, Mr.
President, that the elected leaders of our
Nation and the representatives of this
Government who participated in the
drafting of this treaty are honorable
men with the best intentions for the
United States of America always fore-
most :n their minds. In them, I say,
should repose much greater confidence
than in any fly-by-night operation on
the fringes of Capitol Hill operating with
a mailing- list and a printing press. I
would remind the Senate that this treaty
was first sought by President Eisenhow-
er, still sought under President Ken-
nedy, and finally signed 2 years ago
under President Johnson.
It lies in its own national interest for
the United States to be willing to meet
the challenge of easing tensions between
East and West. This treaty is but a
step, and a small step, in that direction.
It may develop that the Soviets might
not honor all provisions of the agree-
ment, in which case the United States
could declare it null and void.
It might well be argued, Mr. Presi-
dent, that now is the best time for an-
other step toward bettering East-West
relations, which are strained by the con-
flict in southeast Asia.
Mr. President, just as our objective
in Vietnam is not to make war, but to
end It., our objective with regard to
the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe
is, as President Johnson said in his most
recent state of the Union address, "not
to continue the cold war, but to end it."
The Consular Treaty will not end the
cold war, but it will help to ease it, per-
haps, and without lengthening the war in
Vietnam. It requires of us only that we
place trust in our own Government to act
wisely and in the best interests of the
United States and world peace in making
the treaty's provisions operative. That is
not, or should not be, asking much from
this body. We should vote to ratify
this treaty forthwith.
Mr. TOWER. Mr. President, ratifica-
tion of the consular pact would, in my
opinion, best be deferred pending care-
ful consideration of its relationship with
other important measures soon to come
before us. I refer, of course, to the
Treaty on Peaceful Uses of Outer Space,
as well as proposals to greatly increase
our trade with Communist nations.
The Space Treaty itself has what could
be termed broad ramifications. Certain-
ly, it deals with a subject matter that
could very well have a significant bear-
ing on our strategic posture, and on our
long-range national security interests.
Its provisions must be considered meticu-
lously, with careful analysis by this body
March 16, 1967
as well as by those possessing a high de-
gree of military and technical expertise.
It could very well be, Mr President,
space treaty ratification would have lit-
tle adverse effect on our overall defense
posture. If such were the case in my
opinion, then I would probably sup-
port it.
However, I feel my distinguished friend
from Nebraska has suggested the most
logical approach, and that ls, consider-
ation of the interrelationship of the
Consular and Space Treaties. along with
the more far-reaching, extremely sensi-
tive, and most important East-West trade
plans.
Some of those in support of the Con-
sular Pact advise, Mr. President, that to-
day the Communist world is a divided
one, and that this fact should be taken
into account in consideration of the rat-
ification of this treaty.
Specific Soviet-Chinese differences are
cited, but such differences have nothing
whatsoever to do with this proposed
treaty. And there has certainly been lit-
tle if any effect on the continued assist-
ance to North Vietnam by either nation.
It is difficult to find a single criteria
which would indicate to us that treaty
ratification would be followed by a cessa-
tion of Soviet ideological villiflcation, or
more importantly, an end to Soviet Rus-
sia's massive infusion of military aid into
North Vietnam.
The Consular Treaty and the Outer
Space Treaty, we are told, are merely two
preliminary agreemetns preceding what
could well prove the most controversial
issue to face the Congress in this session,
that is, the proposed expansion of trade
withCommunist nations.
Mr. President, it goes without saying
I strongly favor, as I am sure my col-
leagues do, sincere, mutual. paace efforts.
So have past administrations, both Re-
publican and Democrat. This Nation
and its official representatives, and some
not so official, I might add, have made
countless offers, countless times, to les-
sen tensions and to increase under-
standing with the Soviets and their
Commurist satellites. Just as often, our
moves and offers have been refuted. No
one can say this Nation has not dili-
gently pursued the quest for peace; sub-
stantial concessions have been made in
hopeful expectation that just a fraction
of our efforts would be successful. All,
Mr. President, to no avail, and I would
add, than, at the very time we were mak-
ing such proposals, the U.S.S.R. not only
mounted, but increased, its professed
ambition to impose, through any means,
its communization of the world.
The T:7-Continent Conference held in
Havana last year was attended by Com-
munist delegations from some 80 coun-
tries, there was vigorous participation by
the Soviets. The purpose of the con-
ference was described as one to consoli-
date the efforts of the Communists to
achieve their objectives in South Amer-
ica, Africa, and Asia.
The Soviet representative in attend-
ance stated:
The Soviet delegation came to this Con-
ference to promote in every conceivable way
the unit) of anti-imperialist forces of the
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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE
three continents so as to unfold on a still
greater scale our common struggle against
imperialism, colonialism, and neo-colonial-
ism headed by the United States capitalists.
The Tri-Continental Conference itself
called "for the use of every form of strug-
gle necessary including armed battle"
to achieve the objectives of the Com-
munists of the world.
And the final Conference declaration
stated:
The Conference hereby proclaims that the
primary task of the peoples of Asia, Africa,
and Latin America is to intensify the strug-
gle against imperialism, colonialism, neo-
colonialism and to win and consolidate na-
tional independence, especially against the
exploitation practiced by the Yankees. The
merging of efforts will turn active solidarity
on our continent into a new historical force
of colossal dimensions.
Mr. President, had this country's uni-
lateral efforts lessened tensions in any
way, or advanced the goal of peace, then
matters would be different. As I have
noted, not only have our peaceful ges-
tures been spurned, hostility toward us
by the U.S.S.R. has actually increased.
In January of this year, the President
of the Soviet Union said:
The Soviet Union is giving, and will con-
tinue to give North Vietnam ever growing
aid until the full triumph of the just cause
which the Vietnamese people are struggling.
Mr. President, in my opinion, the
prestige of this country can only be
harmed in the face of such overt repudi-
ation, such thwarting of our sincere
efforts toward peace, if we do not now
stand firm.
Two arguments presented in behalf of
the treaty are that better protection
would be afforded American citizens who
travel in Russia, and that this country
would be able to secure greater insight
into the Soviet thinking and way of life.
Certainly, the affording of better pro-
tection for American tourists would be
welcome, but nothing in the past has
deterred the Communists from detaining
and mistreating our citizens. I doubt
seriously if a new agreement would be
better honored, if in the Soviets' opinion
their best ends could be better served by
breaking or failing to honor such new
agreement.
As to the argument that our officials would
learn more of the Soviet way of life, I can
see little advantage. The Soviet society is
a closed one, with little access to informa-
tion, and very tight restrictions on travel.
Contrast this with relatively few restrictions
which will be placed on additional Soviet
personnel, and it can easily be seen which
Nation would gain the most.
Mr. President, I support in lieu of the
ratification of the Consular Treaty at
this time, and prior to the administra-
tion's presentation of the Space Treaty
and its presentation of East-West trade
proposals, the suggestion of several of
my distinguished colleagues that we un-
dertake a thorough examination and
review of our relations with the Soviet
Union and its Communist bloc nations.
This detailed inquiry into the relations
with the Soviet bloc will provide a
needed opportunity for clarification of
many important issues.
What we truly need, as my able friend
from Nebraska Senator IJRUSKA has
pointed out is a "painstaking analysis"
of the goals of the Communist world
today. We hear one thing, and, see
another, Mr. President. We hear there
is a softening of the Soviet position,
that no longer is world revolution the
Communist order of the day, that Rus-
sia at long last realizes that the achieve-
ment of peace is in its own best interests.
We are told increased trade, which will
be used to enhance the strategic power
of the Communist world, will not be
adverse to our interest.
I would just briefly point out to those
espousing this trade line that it is not
within our means to determine the ulti-
mate uses to which our exports will be
put. And certainly, such imports into
the. Soviet bloc would allow diversion by
them of at least some of their productive
resources into more militarily strategic
fields.
In any event, as has been noted, we
have just heard of this recent change of
Soviet heart, no evidence of it has been
seen. On the contrary, consider the of-
ficial Soviet declarations as to its pres-
ent and future commitments to North
Vietnam.
Mr. President, it is readily conceded
that this matter of a Consular Treaty
is only the first in a series of measures,
all of which, if adopted, would change
the entire complexion of our foreign pol-
icy structure. Therefore, while it is im-
portant we consider each such proposal
carefully, we must not lose sight of the
cumulative effect on our national inter-
ests.
Thus, I feel it would be wise indeed
to consider the administration's so-
called bridgebuilding measures in toto,
rather than piecemeal. By calling upon
the administration to submit all of its
"bridgebuilding" measures in one pack-
age, we may view the package in its en-
tirety, and thus better assess its ultimate
impact and long range effect upon the
United States.
Most certainly, Mr. President, consid-
eration of the Consular Treaty should
be deferred.
Mr. SPONG. Mr. President, after
considerable thought and careful study,
I have decided to vote in favor of the
pending Consular Treaty with the Soviet
Union.
In 1848 Viscount Palmerston of Great
Britain, speaking in defense of the for-
eign policy he had directed for his coun-
try, said :
We have no eternal allies, and we have no
perpetual enemies. Our interests are eternal
and perpetual, and those interests it is our
duty to follow.
More recently, Gen. Charles de Gaulle,
borrowing perhaps from Lord Palmers-
ton, stated that nations have no friends,
only interests. While these expressions
have not always been hallmarks of Amer-
ican foreign policy, they form the con-
text within which I chose to view our
posture with regard to Soviet Russia,
particularly with regard to the questions
of ratification of the Consular -Treaty
presently before the Senate for advice
and consent.
I am persuaded that it is in the inter-
est of the United States to ratify this
treaty at this time. The United States
S 3915
proposed the convention. The United
States toook the initiative in pressing
for negotiations leading to the document
now before the Senate.
The treaty merely provides the legal
framework for the operation of Soviet
consulates in this country and U.S. con-
sulates in Russia, if and when they are
established. The treaty itself does not
authorize the opening of consulates nor
does it specify the number of consulates
to be opened. The location and number
of consulates will be determined by nego-
tiation, should the treaty be ratified. If
negotiations are held as a result of rati-
fication, I have been assured that the
Congress will be kept fully advised.
Moreover, it has been stated that for the
foreseeable future only one consulate for
each nation is contemplated.
Should the treaty become operative,
protection will be afforded the more than
18,000 Americans who visit Russia an-
nually. Should an American national
be arrested in Russia, the treaty guar-
antees that consular offices will be noti-
fied within 1 to 3 days. There is guar-
anteed access by our officials to detained
Americans within 2 to 4 days of their
arrest and this right of access continues
as long as they are held.
Gary Powers, the U-2 pilot, was held
incommunicado by the Soviets for 21
months. In 1961, an American student,
Marvin Makinenwas detained from July
21, to September 4, before there was any
notification of his detention to the Amer-
ican Embassy. There are more recent
examples, one involving Newcomb Mott,
who died while imprisoned under cir-
cumstances still unexplained.
The provision in the treaty that ' has
given me concern is the immunity clause,
It is broad and contrary to any consular
agreement heretofore entered into by the
United States. Accordingly, I supported
an amendment to reduce the immunity
to that spelled out in previous con-
sulate agreements entered into through
the years by this Nation. This amend-
ment was defeated. It should be ob-
served, however, that the immunity given
to Russian officials in this country under
the treaty will also apply to American
officials in Russia. Undoubtedly addi-
tional security problems will be presented
by the treaty. But the proper authori-
ties have testified that no problem is
presented that cannot be handled.
Should the treaty prove unsatisfactory
because of the immunity clause or any
other article, it may be terminated by
either party upon 6 months' notice.
Other language has been offered dur-
ing the course of the debates as addenda
to the treaty. While I am in agreement
with the sentiments expressed in these
offerings, particularly those which rec-
ognize the present hostility of the Soviet
government to our efforts in Vietnam,
they are, for the most part, inapplicable
to the purpose of this treaty., Adoption
of any of these would have the effect of
saying that we do not desire the treaty
at this time.
Despite my reservations about the im-
munity clause, the compelling need for
the protection of American nationals in
Russia persuades me to support ratifica-
tion of this treaty. Moreover, with a
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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE March 16, 1967
decided change in Sino-Soviet relations
s o evident these past months, a limited
-esture in the direction of the Soviets
gems advisable.
I ask unanimous consent that recent
editorials from the Roanoke, Norfolk,
and Richmond newspapers which en-
dorse treaty ratification be printed In
the RECORD. These editorials see ratifi-
cation of this treaty for what it is: a
cautious, guarded step for the protec-
tion of American citizens abroad: hope-
fully, a step toward better understanding
in a troubled, shrinking world; and, in
the Alice-in-Wonderland atmosphere of
today's world stage, possibly a wise move
at a time when the Russians are con-
cerned with the growing tide of Chinese
nationalism and anti-Soviet sentiment in
Peking.
There being no objection, the editorials
were ordered to be printed In the RECORD,
as follows:
[From the Norfolk-Portsmouth Virginian-
Pilot, Feb. 4. 19671
HELP FROM MR. EISENHOWER
Former President Eisenhower's endorse-
ment of the proposed Consular Treaty with
the Soviet Union is a valuable service in
behalf of what ought to be a bipartisan
approach to improve Russo-American rela-
tions.
First of all. Mr. Eisenhower made clear
that the proposal was no scheme from Moe-
sow to increase Its espionage apparatus in
the United States. The idea originated from
the American side In his administration.
Vice President Nixon made the first official
move toward reciprocal consulates in July
1959. Secretary of State Herter renewed the
suggestion two months later. The major
objective was to protect American citizens
in Russia.
The Eisenhower statement also serves to
holster the efforts of an important group of
Republican moderates to overcome Senator
Dirksen's negative leadership on this Issue.
Without Republican support in the Senate,
where ratification requires a two-thirds vote,
the treaty is dead.
Two former chairmen of the Republican
National Committee-Senator Morton of
Kentucky and Senator Scott of Pennsyl-
vania-are among the moderate wing who
have spoken out on the Senate floor in
behalf of the agreement. Both took the
occasion to denounce the right-wing Liberty
Lobby, which is flooding the Senators with
letter of opposition. Senator Morton called
the postal avalanche a "carefully planned
and well financed 'big lie' operation designed
by the paranoids and fearmongers." Strong
language, if ever we heard it. Senator Mor-
ton also chided President Johnson for "ti-
midity" in not pressing more forcefully for
ratification.
Tae Senator asked on Tuesday for "force-
ful I,nd persuasive testimony" from the
White House. The answer came two days
later. Mr. Johnson, opening his Thursday
press conference, read a statement putting
himself "very strongly" on the side of rati-
fication. He may even have undone some of
the jinx put on the treaty by Mr. J. Edgar
Hoover's two-year-old testimony that Soviet
consulates in this country would make the
FBI's work more difficult. Mr. Johnson said
Mr. Hoover "has assured me" that no prob-
!^nts would be raised with which the FBI
...mid not deal. This attribution Is a shade
inure affirmative than Mr. Hoover's cryptic
r^sponse in the exchange of letters with
r-etary Rusk.
fr Eisenhower, agreeing with Mr. John-
ron that the treaty is "in our national In-
terest.," also helps to combat the espionage
argument against the treaty. As to whether
consulates would not also provide enlarged
spy opportunities for the United States, the
State Department has replied simply, "The
righta are reciprocal." Mr. Eisenhower adds:
The aeaty "should enlarge our opportunities
to learn more about the Soviet people."
1 From the Roanoke Times, Mar. 5,19871
Tndz To RATIFY CONSULAR TREATY
Now that the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee has approved the consular treaty
and some of the misconceptions about it have
been cleared up, the Senate should ratify it
as soon as possible.
The treaty, which has had a weird. In and
out, up and down existence since 1964, is a
small, guarded step In the direction of better
Faust-West relations.
It would work principally to the benefit of
the more than 18,000 American visitors and
tourists who travel In Russia (this figure will
prob.ibly leap with the direct air service
between the U.S. and the Soviet Union).
But more important. it is a way in which
two world powers can show their willing-
ness to try to case the worldwide tension
engendered by the war in Vietnam.
Sen. Everett Dirksen has broken with the
Senate's small but influential group of old
guard Republicans and has come out for
the consular treaty, a move that should help
speed ratification. The question of J. Edgar
Hoover's position on the treaty as an internal
security threat has been so muddied by Mr.
Hoover's propensity for letter-writing that
his shifting position Is no longer a consid-
eratlon.
The conservative GOP forces In the Senate,
realizing that the treaty has been blown up
Into a do-or-die battleground over President
Johnson's "bridge-building" campaign, may
be retreating and regrouping for an assault
on the East-West trade bill.
At that point Cold War rhetoric will prob-
ably ring out again. Until then, however,
ratification of the consular treaty would be
taneible evidence that the United States is
flexible enough to take advantage of growing
gaps In Russia's "closed society."
[From the Richmond Times-Dispatch, Mar.
15, 19671
RATIFY THE TREATY
Since the proposed consular treaty with
Rust.ia, unlike nearly every other treaty
which that country has wanted to sign with
us, :s as fair to the United States as it is
to the Soviet Union, it should be ratified.
Its ratification will bring no millennium-
we may be sure of that. The signing of such
a pact will represent only a minuscule step
In the direction of ultimate peace between
Moscow and Washington.
Yet, to repeat, the treaty embodies ad-
vantages to the United States as great as
those proposed for the USSR. For that rea-
son, one finds it hard to see that we are
taking a risk in ratifying It.
Ecch country is permitted, under the pact,
to open additional consulates within the
other. Since Russia can do that now In this
country, but we can't do likewise in the
Soviet Union, this is a distinct "plus" for us.
In addition, the 18,000 Americans who visit
Rusala as tourists annually will enjoy added
protection, under the treaty. In the event
of their arrest, they can communicate
promptly with U.B. offielals in Moscow or one
of ttte other Soviet cities where there will be
an American consul, Arrested Americans no
longer can be kept incommunicado, and for-
bidden access to U.S. consular representa-
ti vcss.
'1rue, it can be argued with absolute ac-
curacy that the USSR Is furnishing the back-
bone of the Viet Cong's war effort In Viet-
nam. The contention follows logically that
if Moscow wants to be friendly with Wash-
ington, It should first call off Its "dogs" In
Vietnam.
But Russia isn't going to do any such
thing n)w-everybody knows that. So either
we sign. the treaty without relationship to
what is happening in Vietnam, or there will
be no treaty.
Various types of reservations are being pro-
posed. However logical they may be, the fact
remainf that we must approve the treaty
without such reservations, or Russia will for-
get the whole thing.
Ratification by the U.S. Se. ate may turn
out to have no consequences whatever be-
yond providing the slight advantages with
respect to U.S. consulates and tourists al-
ready referred to. But it might have addi-
tional Important results, suet, as helping to
drive Moscow and Peking farther apart. If
so, It cculd be eminently worthwhile.
Mr. GRIFFIN. Mr. President, many
Michigan citizens trace their origins to
lands which are now under Soviet dom-
inatiort. At the time of the 1960 census,
over 27,000 first and second generation
Latvians, Lithuanians, and Estonians
were counted in Michigan. It is likely
that this number now exceeds 30,000.
I am receiving hundreds of letters from
these Michiganites because they are
keenly and sincerely concerned about
possible effects of ratification of the Con-
sular Convention upon the Baltic na-
tions and their peoples.
They are concerned that ratification
of the Consular Convention may prej-
udice and perhaps destroy the interna-
tional position of the Baltic States. Un-
til now, the United States has not recog-
nized the forcible annexation by the
Soviet Union of the Republics of Latvia,
Lithuania, and Estonia. Many well-
informed individuals are c)ncerned that
ratification will alter our ?resent policy
and may lead immediately, or ultimately,
to recognition of the Soviet, position with
respect to the Baltic State:,
These good Americans of Baltic de-
scent are also concerned that Soviet con-
sular personnel may be able to assert
representation rights with respect to
U.S.-situated decedents' estates belong-
ing to, or passing to, Baltic nationals.
Consulates representing the last free
governments of these Baltic Republics
have been recognized in the past by our
probate courts.
But there is concern that, if the con-
vention were ratified, the probate courts
of the various States would be required
to review our foreign policy and might
find the Soviet Union to be a proper
representative in probate matters.
Mr. President, I am c)nvinceci that
these are honest and substantial con-
cerns. Because I share t.iese concerns,
I have studied the record. and directed
several inquiries to the State Depart-
ment.
I believe that certain remarks of Sec-
retary of State Rusk delivered during
the 11,65 hearings of the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee, together with ex-
cerpt: from a State Department ques-
tion and answer statement, dated Feb-
ruary 2. 1967, as well as replies I have
received from the State Department
should be spread upon the RECORD and
made a part of the legislative history of
the Senate's deliberations on this treaty.
The State Department has declared
unegtlvocally that ratififJation of the
Considar Convention will not alter the
existing U.S. nonrecognition policy with
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March 16, 1967
CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE S 3917
respect to the forcible Soviet takeover
of Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia.
As appears in the record of the 1965
committee hearings, at pages 25-26, Sec-
retary Rusk was asked about the effect
of the treaty on recognition. Here are
the words of Secretary Rusk:
First of all, Sir, this convention does not
affect in any way the question of recogni-
tion of the absorption of those countries
into the Soviet Union, Recognition there
is similar to the general practice of recogni-
tion of states or of governments; that is,
everything turns upon the intent of the gov-
ernment concerned-in this case ourselves.
It would require us to make some formal
statement of an intent to recognize or an
act of recognition before that could come
about.
So, this convention itself does not affect
that.
Nor would it be affected by the establish-
ment of consular districts there for the pro-
tection of our own citizens. We do have a
bit of a dilemma there, Senator. If Ameri-
can citizens go into areas whose political
status we do not recognize, we still have the
responsibility of doing what we can to give
those citizens adequate protection, and as
you know, we have had some difficulties in
the courts and otherwise about the limita-
tions on the power of the U.S. Government
to inhibit the travel of its citizens into areas
where we cannot afford adequate protection.
So, our judgment and our position are
quite clear. This does not affect the ques-
tion of the recognition of the absorption of
those three states.
Earlier this year the State Department
issued a short statement entitled "United
States-U.S.S.R. Consular Convention,
Questions and Answers," dated Febru-
rary 2, 1967. Question 13, and the an-
swer thereto, relate to the issue of recog-
nition. The question:
Does the Convention prejudice the posi-
tion of subject peoples incorporated against
their will into the Soviet Union?
And the Department's answer:
No, it does not. The United States Gov-
ernment has never recognized the forcible
annexation of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania.
Ratification of this convention would in no
way change our policy in this respect, nor
would any subsequent opening of a consu-
late or demarcation of a consular district.
Recognition of incorporation of states into
the Soviet Union would require a positive
statement or act by the United States. The
convention contains no such statement and
provides for no such act. It is United States
policy to support the just aspirations of all
peoples of the world and to look forward to
the day when all will be able to express these
aspirations freely. The ratification of this
treaty will not change this policy-any more
than did the signing of more than 105 other
bilateral and multilteral agreements which
we have entered into with the U.S.S.R.
In addition, a letter dated February 6,
1967, which I received from the State
Department, signed by the then Assistant
Secretary of State Douglas MacArthur
II, includes the following statement:
The United States Government has con-
sistently ? refused to recognize the forcible
annexation of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania
into the Soviet Union. We continue to rec-
ognize the diplomatic and consular repre-
sentatives of the last free governments of
these countries. The ratification of this
Convention would in no way change our
policy in this respect. Neither would the
eventual opening of an American consulate
in the USSR and the demarcation of con-
sular districts, which, as you know, are not
required by this treaty. Recognition of the
incorporation of Estonia, Latvia and Lith-
uania into the USSR, like all cases of :recog-
nition, would require either a positive state-
ment to that effect, or a positive act clearly
manifesting an intention to recognize. This
Convention contains no such statement and
provides for not such act.
* * r e m
... It is United States policy to support
the just aspirations of all the peoples of the
world and to look forward to the day when
all will be able to express these aspirations
freely.
Mr. President, the State Department
has also declared that ratification of the
United States-U.S.S.R. Consular Con-
vention will not alter existing probate
practice as it relates to decendents'
estates passing to nationals of the :Baltic
States.
Recently, Mr. Algis Zaparackas, chair-
man of the Lithuanian World Youth
Congress, wrote to me expressing serious
concern on this point, and requesting
clarification.
This is a sober, intelligent inquiry ad-
dressed to a real issue of significance.
The legislative history of this debate
should contain a direct and satisfactory
response. Therefore, I addressed an in-
quiry to the State Department, and I
have received a reply dated March 15,
1967, signed by Assistant Secretary of
State William Macomber.
The reply reads in part as follows:
... Article 10(8) of the Convention , . .
preserves in full the competence of state law
and state courts to refuse or limit the au-
thority of consular officers to receive and dis-
tribute assets of an estate.
We believe that allowing this kind of flex-
ibility to the state courts, which after all
have primary jurisdiction and responsibility
for the administration of estates, will serve
the objectives sought by Mr. Zaparackas and
his organization.
It is believed by some that State De-
partment assurances, even if adequate
now, are inherently inadequate with re-
spect to the long-range problems this
convention may create for U.S, policies
in regard to the Baltic States. There is
the opinion that ratification will in-
evitably lead to de facto recognition of
the forcible annexation.
The course of international affairs is
too unpredictable to reject that concern
out of hand. However, we can minimize
that possibility by taking this oppor-
tunity to reiterate emphatically the con-
tinuance of our existing policy. In fact,
it would be my hope that the reassertion
of our present policy in this debate
should serve to reaffirm and strengthen
our support for the freedom aspirations
of the Baltic peoples.
Mr. President, I ask unanimous con-
sent that the full text of the two letters
from the State Department, to which I
have referred, be reprinted at this point
in the RECORD.
There 'being no objection, the letters
were ordered to be printed in the RECORD,
as follows:
ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE,
Washington, February 6, 1967.
Hon. ROBERT P. GRIFFIN,
U.S. Senate.
DEAR SENATOR GRIFFIN: During our recent
discussion of the US-Soviet Consular Con-
vention, you asked what communist coun-
tries maintain consular offices outside of
Washington. The only two that do so are
Poland and Yugoslavia. Poland has a con-
sulate in Chicago, and Yugoslavia has con-
sulates in San Francisco, Chicago, New York
and Pittsburgh.
Since we have no consular convention with
Poland, Polish consular personnel in Chicago
would not receive the immunities set forth
in the US-Soviet Consular Convention by
virtue of the most-favored-nation principle.
We do have a consular convention with Yugo-
slavia signed in 1881 which provides for most-
favored-nation treatment, conditional, how-
ever, upon reciprocity. The Yugoslav Gov-
ernment has evinced no interest in the im-
munities provisions of the US-Soviet Con-
sular Convention.
You also inquired as to what the effect of
the US-Soviet Consular Convention would
be on our position and policy concerning the
Baltic States and other peoples aspiring of
freedom. There has apparently been some
misunderstanding of these points and I
should like to make our position on them per-
fectly clear.
The United States Government has con-
sistently refused to recognize the forcible
annexation of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania
into the Soviet Union. We continue to rec-
ognize the diplomatic and consular repre-
sentatives of the last free governments of
these countries. The ratification of this
Convention would in no way change our
policy in this respect. Neither would the
eventual opening of an American consulate
in the USSR and the demarcation of con-
sular districts, which, as you know, are not
required by this treaty. Recognition of the
incorporation of Estonia, Latvia and Lithu-
ania into the USSR, like all cases of recogni-
tion, would require either a positive state-
ment to that effect, or a positive act clear-
ly manifesting an intention to recognize.
This Convention contains no such statement
and provides for no such act.
Whether or not this Convention is ap-
proved, if an American citizen should bear-
rested or detained in the Baltic States we
would have the inescapable obligation of try-
ing to make arrangements for his protec-
tion through the Ministry of Foreign Af-
fairs of the USSR, including access by an
American consular officer. While fortunate-
ly no Americans have been detained in the
Baltic States in the recent past, this has
been our policy over the years. It will con-
tinue to be our policy whether or not this
treaty is approved.
Some have argued that this treaty should
-be rejected because it would confirm or ap-
prove the Soviet Government's domination
over the non-Russian peoples of the USSR.
It is United States policy to support the just
aspirations of all the pepoles of the world
and to look forward to the day when all will
be able to express these aspirations freely,
The ratification of this treaty will not
change this policy-any more than did the
signing of the more than 105 other bilateral
and multilateral agreements which we have
entered into with the USSR.
I am enclosing several papers which deal
with various aspects of the US-Soviet Con-
sular Convention upon which we touched in
our talk on February 1. After you have had
a chance to look them over, I would be happy,
Indeed, to confer further with you on this
important subject if you so desire.
With all good wishes.
Sincerely,
DOUGLAS MACARTFLUR in,
Assistant Secretary for Congressional
Relations,
DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
Washington, March 15,1967.
Hon. ROBERT P. GRIFFIN,
U.S. Senate,
Washington, D.C.
DEAR SENATOR GRIFFIN: I have received
your letter of March 7, on the behalf of Mr.
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S 3918 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE
Algis Zaparackas, Chairman of the Lith-
uanian World Youth Congress, who suggests
ratification of the U.S.-U.S.S.R. Consular
Convention with a reservation preserving In
:orce certain treaties concluded in the
1930's between the United States and the Re-
public of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania.
The Department has taken a clear position
against the adoption of any reservations
which might and probably would open up
the Convention to counter-reservations or
rejecticn by the Soviet Union. Such a course
of action would jeopardize, among other
things, the rights of consular protection for
American citizens in the Soviet Union pro-
vided by the Convention, which we consider
very much in the national interest.
The Secretary of State and the Legal Ad-
viser to the Department have both made it
clear it their testimony to the Foreign Rela-
tions Committee that the Convention does
not in any way alter our policy of non-rec-
ognition of the forcible incorporation by the
Soviet Union of the Baltic Republics of Es-
tonla, Latvia, and Lithuania. Furthermore,
Article 10 (3) of the Convention, which I
have reproduced as an enclosure to this let-
ter, preserves in full the competence of state
law and state courts to refuse or limit the
authority of consular officers to receive and
distribute assets of an estate.
We believe that allowing this kind of flex-
ibility to the state courts, which after all
have primary jurisdiction and responsibility
for the administration of estates, will serve
the objectives sought by Mr. Zaparackas and
his organization.
Please let me know if I can be of any fur-
ther assistance.
sincerely yours,
WILLIAM B. MicOMBER. Jr.,
Assistant Secretary for Congressional
Relations.
CONSULAR CONVENTION WITH THE SOVIET
UNION-ARTICLE 10(3)
Unless prohibited by law, a consular offi-
cer may, within the discretion of the court,
agency, or person making distribution, re-
ceive for transmission to a national of the
sending state who is not a resident of the
receiving state any money or property to
which such national is entitled as a conse-
quence of the death of another person, in-
cluding shares in an estate, payments made
pursuant to workmen's compensation laws,
pension and social benefits systems in gen-
eral, and proceeds of insurance policies.
The court, agency, or person making dis-
iribution may require that a consular officer
comply with conditions laid down with re-
gard to: (a) presenting a power of attorney
or other authorization from such nonresi-
dent national, (b) furnishing reasonable
evidence of the receipt of such money or
property by such national, and (c) return-
ing the money or property In the event he
is unable to furnish such evidence.
Mr. SMATHERS. Mr. President, the
United States-U.S.S.R. Consular Con-
vention now before the Senate has
already been the subject of considerable
debate in the Foreign Relations Com-
mittee, on the Senate floor, and among
the general public.
I have carefully studied the arguments
for and against ratification and con-
cluded that I will support it-not as a
gesture of friendship to the Soviet Union
but as a measure to advance our own
self-interest.
I came to this decision only after con-
siderable thought and only because I
decided that this agreement meets one
essential criterion: it benefits the United
States more than it benefits the Soviet
Union.
We can perhaps afford to adopt less
stringent standards in judging treaties
with other countries, though these too
must result in a net gain for our national
interest If they are to merit approval.
But the Soviet Union is an adversary
with a very poor record of performance
on treaties and solemn undertakings to
which she has been a party in the past.
I believe experience shows us that we
must look long and hard at each new
proposal put before us. We must be
certain that any agreement with the
Soviets contains firm safeguards against
abuse or is self-enforcing, for while
many nations show an easy virtue In
fulfilling their treaty obligations the
Soviet Union's cynicism in this regard
flows from the well-springs of ideology.
The Consular Convention, I believe,
meets these exacting tests:
It was proposed by the United States,
not the Soviet Union.
Throughout the negotiations it was
the United States, not the U.S.S.R. which
pressed for conclusion of a treaty.
Today there is no evidence that the
Soviet Union attaches particular Im-
portance to the ratification of this treaty
except as an indication of the United
States' willingness to do business with
them.
The treaty gives the President no
power to open consulates which he does
not already have under the Constitution.
On the other hand, the treaty will
bring immediate benefits to Americans
arrested or detained in the Soviet Union,
whether or not consulates are ever
opened.
Its provisions on notification and ac-
cess give Americans rights which Soviet
citizens do not possess. While notifica-
tion and access are not equivalent to
guarantees of Immunity from Soviet law,
they do represent a major step forward
in our ability to assist Americans who
need help.
I know that if I were In a Soviet jail
I would feel that the right to Inform my
emba.isy of my plight and be visited by
American officials would be very im-
portant, and the testimony of those who
have been arrested in the Soviet Union
and other Communist states strongly
supports this view.
The minority views of the Foreign Re-
lations Committee's report contain four
compelling arguments against ratifica-
tion which must be carefully considered
and answered before arriving at any de-
cision.
These arguments were carefully de-
veloped in open hearings by seven wit-
nesses appearing in opposition to the
treaty.
One need only glance at the report of
these hearings to see that the opponents
of the convention were given full oppor-
tunity to express their views.
Let me briefly give my views on each
of the four arguments presented against
ratification:
First. The minority report holds that
this Is the wrong time to act on this
treaty because of Vietnam: in any case,
the entire package of bridge-building
proposals should be considered together.
I believe it would be folly to tell the
Soviet Government at the height of the
March 16, 1967
Sino-Soviet dispute that in effect we are
unwilling to do business with them on
any issue regardless of its merits.
Our limited alms in Vietnam will not
be served by full scale confrontation with
the Soviet Union in southeast Asia and
elsewhere.
Indeed such a policy might well force
Moscow and Peking into one another's
arms. We must carefully consider each
step toward more normal relations on
its own merits, not as part of some indi-
visible )ackage.
Second. The minority report stresses
that th? Soviets have a very poor record
in living up to treaty obligations, and
questions the usefulness of entering into
any sort of agreement with them.
I agree that history teaches us an im-
portant lesson about treaties with the
Communists. The lesson is that nothing
must be taken on faith-that specific
safeguards against abuse must be a cen-
tral part of any agreement.
The committee report on the Consular
Convention shows that it contains safe-
guards spelled out In unpre3edented de-
tail for an agreement of this sort.
Third. The minority report maintains
that this convention would greatly in-
crease the danger of subvers.on by grant-
ing immunities to any Soviet consular
officials who might be assigned to con-
sulates in this country.
I air. satisfied that Americans who
might serve in a consulate In the U.S.S.R.
need the protection of immunity, both
for their own safety and for the security
of this country.
I am satisfied also that our law en-
forcement agencies can control the ac-
tivities of the 10 or 15 Soviet nationals
with immunities who might staff a So-
viet corsulate in the United States.
As a matter of fact there are presently
452 Soy1et officials in the 'Cnited States
that have diplomatic imirunity. The
Director of the Federal Bureau of Inves-
tigation has assured the Congress that
10 or 15 more would raise no problems
which the FBI cannot effectively and ef-
ficiently deal with. The President of
the United States and the Secretary of
State are in agreement with the Director
of the Federal Bureau of Investigation.
There is one other point that I would
like to emphasize and that Is that under
the safeguards of the proposed Consular
Convention, if after ratification negotia-
tions are undertaken with respect to the
opening of a consulate it would be on an
equality basis. If the Soviet Union
agreed to permit us to open up one con-
sulate we in turn would al:ow them to
open one here. Should such an occasion
come about the question of where the
Soviet consulate might be eventually
established in this country would be
discussed not only with the Senate For-
eign Relations Committee, yut also the
State and local officials of the commu-
nity to be affected before concluding such
an agreement.
Fourth. Finally, the minority report
holds tt at, on balance, the disadvantages
of this treaty outweigh its advantages.
I disagree. First, I believe that the
convention's concrete provisions on pro-
tection for American citizens abroad
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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE S 3919
outweigh the hypothetical hazards cited
by opponents of ratification.
Second, I believe that we must show
our readiness to normalize relations with
the Soviet Union at this critical moment
of disarray in the Communist world.
In making the difficult decision to sup-
port this treaty I have tried to avoid
emotion and cliche. Examined on its
own merits the Consular Convention is a
modest step of little intrinsic importance.
While it well serve the U.S. interest it
will hardly open a new era of good feel-
ing in United States-Soviet relations.
One issue connected with ratification
is of overriding importance and justifies
the attention which has been devoted to
this seemingly minor question.
If we reject this minor step forward,
a step which if considered on its own
merits is clearly in our interest, we are
rejecting the central thesis of the Presi-
dent's policy towards the Soviet Union
and East Europe.
We are telling the Soviets that at this
critical moment in the Sino-Soviet dis-
pute we are unwilling or unable to take
any steps to limit areas of disagreement
between us and build a more stable rela-
tionship based on areas of mutual inter-
est. I believe this would be an historic
mistake.
For these reasons, I believe that ratifi-
cation of this treaty is in our own na-
tional interest and is not adverse to. our
national security.
Mr. LAUSCHE. Mr. President, I
would like to build bridges between the
East and the West, if it can be done con-
structively, that would lead toward peace
and better understanding. I have been
prepared to change my mind, feeling that
if what we have done in the past has not
succeeded probably we should take a dif-
ferent course and see what the end will
be,
My opinion is that while a consular
treaty is of some consequence, it is not
the major issue in what is going on. The
Consular Treaty contemplates giving the
right to Russia to open consular offices
in different places in the country, but
there will be other proposals coming be-
fore us, such as removing the restric-
tions against trade with Communist
countries. I would hope that we could
make a rapprochement with them, but
there is no indication on the part of Rus-
sia of any purpose to do so.
Certainly, to establish, let us say, one,
new consular office with 15 attaches
might not be dangerous, although if we
give Russia a consular office, we will have
to give one to Yugoslavia and to all the
other satellite nations as well.
The Consular Treaty is not what
bothers me. I think we can stomach
that, even though there may be some
dangers in it.
But, what is to follow?
How far are we to open the doors and
engage in normal intercourse with them,
commercially and socially, after the Con-
sular Treaty has been adapted?
Russia could help by ceasing its con-
demnation of the United States; cease
hurling epithets and labeling us as im-
perialists wanting to exploit the resources
and the human beings of other areas of
the world; cease issuing declarations
such as the one it made in Havana, in
its condemnation of the United States,
that they were going to fight us in South
America, Africa, and in the Far :East;
cease sending equipment to South Viet-
nam, equipment which is being used to
kill our boys.
They have done nothing to show any
gesture of friendliness toward us. All
their actions have been hostile, indi-
cating a continuation of the purpose
they announced in 1949, that they would
not rest content until all of imperialist
United States has been destroyed.
Mr. President, on February 17 a letter
was written to me by Mr. Wilbur L,
Dunbar, the editor of the Courier-Cres-
cent, of Orrville, Ohio. Orrville is a com-
munity of probably 2,000 people. Among
several questions, he put this question to
me :
What measures should be taken (Cr can
be taken) to improve international relations
between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R.? In this
respect, how do you evaluate the proposed
consular treaty?
The following was my answer:
The United States government has been
attempting in every way reasonable to bring
about a lessening of tensions between Soviet
Russia and the United States. I am dis-
tressed, however, to observe that there has
not been much effort on the part of Soviet
Russia to indicate in any way a desire to
lessen tensions. It is sending military equip-
ment to North Viet Nam now. It was a vigor-
ous participant in the Tri -Continental Con-
ference held in Havana, Cuba, in January of
1966, attended by Communist delegations
from about 86 countries and purposed to
consolidate the efforts of the Communists
to achieve their objectives in South America,
Africa, and Asia.
By way of interpolation, the Tri?.Con-
tinental Conference was concerned with
the continents of South America, Africa,
and Asia.
I read further from my answer:
A 34-man delegation went to the Confer-
ence from the Kremlin; it was headed by a
Sharaf R. Rashidov who quickly set the tone
by stating:
"The Soviet delegation came to this Con-
ference to promote in every conceivable way
the unity of anti-imperialist forces of the
three continents so as to unfold on a still
greater scale our common struggle against
imperialism, colonialism, and neo-colonial-
ism headed by the United States capitalists."
In the final declaration issued by the Con-
ference it called "for the use of every form
of struggle necessary including armed bat-
tle" to achieve the objectives of the Com-
munists of the world.
The declaration reads as follows:
"Imperialism will never voluntarily re-
nounce its policy of exploitation, plunder,
aggression and intervention.
"The people of Asia, Africa, and Latin
America know by their own experience that
Yankee imperialism, the implacable enemy
of all the peoples of the world, is the main
redoubt of colonial oppression and interna-
tional reaction.
"Yankee imperialism covers the map with
its capital, extracting millions of dollars
yearly for its monopolies. Yankee imperial-
ism commits all sorts of abominable crimes
against the people and actively prepares
attacks against socialist countries and
against world peace."
But, Mr. President, that is not the
end. They still go on.
The proclamation continues:
"The Conference hereby proclaims that
the primary task of the peoples of Asia,
Africa,. and Latin America is to intensify
the struggle against imperialism, colonial-
ism, neo-colonialism and to win and con-
solidate national independence especially
against the exploitation practiced by the
Yankees. The merging of efforts will turn
active solidarity on our continent into a
new historical force of colossal dimensions."
Mr. President, I shall repeat. This
declaration was issued in Havana, Cuba,
in January 1966, at the Tricontinental
Conference, with 83 countries repre-
sented by delegates of the Communist
peoples of the world. As I stated earlier,
34 of the delegates were from Russia.
Mr. President, I shall continue to quote
from my letter:
I cannot bring myself to the conclusion
that the people of the United States, or Con-
gress, should adopt the attitude that the
challenge to the security of our country has
come to an end.
Mr. President, we simply cannot do it
in the face of declarations that they are
constantly making.
About 5 weeks ago Premier Kosygin of
Russia had a 1-hour press conference in
London, which was televised to the
United States. I was at home and I
made up my mind that I would listen to
it thoroughly. The discussion was then
in progress about the prospects of going
to the negotiating table with Ho Chi
Minh, and it was sort of said that
Kosygin was going to say something that
would bring us to the negotiating table.
But what did Kosygiri say?
I listened to Kosygin hoping that he
would utter some words showing a pur-
pose on the part of Russia to relax the
tensions existing between his country
and ours. Not a word favorable to the
United States was uttered by him.
He was asked about our position in
Vietnam; he quickly and emphatically
declared that we were the aggressors;
that we were taking the lives and in-
juring the bodies of innocent men,
women, and children.
I continued to listen, hoping that he
would say some one word in behalf of our
country.
He uttered not one word against the
atrocities which have been clearly es-
tablished and are legion in number per-
petrated by the Communist North
Vietnamese.
Repeatedly Russian leaders are label-
ing our country as imperialist seeking to
exploit by neocolonialism various people
of undeveloped nations in Africa, South
America, and Asia.
We are trying to improve our rela-
tions with Russia, but the Communists
in Russia just as Ho Chi Minh, the Com-
munist in North Vietnam do not want
any relaxation in tensions nor the
achievement of peace.
In 1965 when the Consular Treaty was
before the Foreign Relations Committee,
I cast my vote against it. I would go
along with the President and approve the
treaty if I could conscientiously and
honestly bring myself to the belief that
Russia has any purpose actually-and by
deed-to cultivate a state of peaceful
coexistence but I see no evidence of such
a purpose on Russia's part.
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S 3920 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE
I will move into another subject or
field. Tito is supposed to be our best
friend of all the governments which
have a Communist basis. Being our best
friend, it would be well to look at what
he says as a Communist about our coun-
try.
I have aletter here from the Depart-
ment of'State answering a letter that I
addressed to it concerning statements
made by Tito about the United States.
Now then, this letter states that a plen-
ary meeting of the Central Committee
of the League of Communists of Yugo-
slavia was held in Belgrade on February
25 to 26 and March 11, 1966. In his
speech on February 25 opening the meet-
ing, Tito said the following:
Comrades, grave excesses are taking place
in the world today. The situation Is far
from good, it is troubled. You read what is
happening. The class enemy personified by
imperialists and the capitalist bourgeois class
is on the offensive all over. In some places,
he relies on money, or on coups, In others,
on gradual ideological Infiltration, etc. And
he is extremely active.
Then later in his speech concluding
this meeting, lie stated:
As you know, the international situation
has recently become extremely aggravated.
The atmosphere In the world is full of elec-
tricity, and various excesses may occur at
any moment. Capitalism and Imperialism
have undertaken their full offensive to re-
gain their positions. For this reason it is no
wonder that all this has an effect on our
country, which has numerous contacts with
other countries.
He then visited Rumania, and at a
luncheon in Rumania on April 18, he
said:
Unfortunately, this detente has not been
achieved in other parts of the world. On
the contrary, the situation is steadily worsen-
ing and new dangerous hotbeds of conflict
spelling a serious threat to world peace and
security have appeared of late, especially in
Asia and Africa. By their unscrupulous in-
tervention in the internal affairs of inde-
pendent countries, the imperialist and neo-
colonialist forces try to halt progressive de-
velopment In the world and to stifle the
people's aspirations for liberty, independence,
and equal rights. The most telling example
in this respect is the war in Vietnam where,
by a most brutal use of foreign armed forces
an attempt is being made to prevent the Viet-
namese people from deciding their own des-
tinies and ways of development.
If the above statements of Tito show
an absence of purpose of establishing
amity. what can we expect of Russia?
Mr. President, I ask unanimous con-
sent that the minority views on the Con-
sular Convention with the Soviet Union
which I wrote, published August 10, 1965,
constituting the minority views of the
Committee on Foreign Relations, be
printed in the RECORD at this point.
There being no objection, the minority
views were ordered to be printed in the
RECORD. as follows:
MINOSrrY VIEws
We do not concur with the recommenda-
tion of the Committee on Foreign Relations
that the Senate give Its advice and consent
to ratification of the Consular Convention
With the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.
We believe that the disadvantages of the con-
vention for the United States are sufficiently
grave to outweigh the advantages which are
claimed for it.
Our concern relates principally to the pro-
visions In the convention under which con-
sular officers and employees of the sending
state are given immunity from the criminal
jurisdiction of the receiving state. This con-
vention is the first to which the United States
has been a party which provides for unlimit-
ed exemption from criminal jurisdiction for
consular personnel. Previous consular con-
ventions have provided for immunity from
criminal jurisdiction for consular personnel
with respect only to misdemeanors but not
to felonies. We believe that if the provisions
regarding Immunity had not been Included
In the convention, the Soviet Union would
not have agreed to it and that, in fact, these
provisions were a principal Soviet objective.
The testimony of witnesses from the Depart-
ment of State has been contradictory on the
que?tion of whether the Soviet Union or the
United States first proposed including these
immunity provisions In the convention.
In tiny case, we believe that the extension
of Immunity to Include felonies would open
the way to espionage and other forms of
subversion on the part of Soviet consular
personnel. If this convention is ratified,
and If the Soviet Union then establishes a
consulate or consulates in the United States,
the officers and employees of these consulates
would be able to engage in espionage and
subversion knowing that they will not be
liable to prosecution but only to expulsion.
It to true that the establishment of a So-
viet consulate or consulates would mean
only a small increase in the number of Soviet
officials with immunity from criminal juris-
diction (as of July 1, 1965, there were 249
Soviet officials and 150 dependents who en-
joyed diplomatic Immunity). We are con-
vinced, however, that there Is a predisposi-
tion on the part of Soviet officials to engage
in espionage and subversive activities, a pre-
dlspos:Lion which is an Important considera-
tion regardless of the numbers involved. In
this connection, it is Important to recall the
testimony of J. Edgar Hoover, Director of the
Federal Bureau of Investigation, before a
subcommittee of the Committee on Appro-
priaticns of the House of Representatives on
March 4, 1965. In a statement Inserted in
the record justifying the appropriations be-
ing requested for the Federal Bureau of
Investigation, Mr. Hoover said:
"In regard to the Communist-bloc espio-
nage attack against this country, there has
been no letup whatsoever. Historically, the
Soviet Intelligence services have appropri-
ated the great bulk of official representation
and diplomatic establishments in other
countries as bases from which to carry on
their espionage operations. Over the years,
the number of such official personnel as-
signed to the United States has steadily
increased."
In testimony relating to this statement
during the March 4 hearing Mr. Hoover
stated that "our Government is about to
allow them [the Soviet Union] to establish
consulates in many part of the country
which, of course, will make our work more
difficult." Mr. Hoover then inserted in the
record of the hearing several other brief
statements. The first read, in part, as
follows:
"The methods used to collect the data
sought by the Communist-bloc intelligence
services are almost as varied as the types
of data which they endeavor to collect. One
of their mainstays Is the collection of
information-classifled and otherwise-
through espionage operations Involving per-
sonnel legally assigned to official Soviet and
satellite establishments In the United
States. The focal points of these operations
continue to be the United Nations and the
Communist embassies, legations, consulates,
and news or commercial agencies In our
country. Such gathering of Information is
conducted by the Communist representa-
tives using the legal cover of their diplomatic
March 16, 1967
or other official status to cloak their spying
activities.
"Historically, the Soviet intelligence serv-
ices have appropriated the great bulk of
official positions abroad, primarily using
their official representatives aid diplomatic
establishments in other countries as bases
from which to carry on their espionage
operations."
A second statement related specifically to
the question of new Soviet consulates. It
read as follows:
"Long seeking greater official representa-
tion In the United States which would be
more widely spread over the country, a cher-
ished goal of the Soviet intelligence services
was realized when the United States signed
an agreement with the Soviet Union on June
1, 1964, providing for the reciprocal estab-
lishment of consulates in cur respective
countries.
"One Soviet Intelligence officer in com-
menting on the agreement spoke of the won-
derful opportunity this presented his service
and that It would enable the Soviets to en-
hance their intelligence opera-tons.
"In in solving the great bulk of their official
personnel in intelligence activity In one way
or another, the Soviets utilize to the fullest
extent possible any and all official means such
as the United Nations, trade delegations, and
the like,. as transmission belts to carry ad-
ditional Intelligence personnel into this
country.'
More recently, on July 14, 1965, Mr, Hoover,
reviewing the major phases of the operations
of the Federal Bureau of Investigation during
the past fiscal year, stated:
"The great majority of the 800 Communist-
bloc official personnel stationed in the United
States, protected by the privilege of diplo-
matic immunity, have engaged in Intelligence
assignments and are a dangerous threat to
the security of the United States."
We believe that these statements of the
chief Investigative officer of the United States
should be given serious consideration. It is
also worth looking at the record of the ac-
tivities ,f Soviet officials in the United
States. According to information supplied
by the Department of State, since 1946, 27
Soviet Embassy and consular officers and
personnel in the United States have been
arrested or expelled for intelligence activity.
These 27 included personae: assigned to
the Soviet Embassy in Washington, the
Soviet consulate general In New York (which
was closed in 1948), the Soviet mission to
the United Nations, and the United Nations
Secretariat. In the same period, 13 diplo-
matic, consular, and international organiza?
tion officials from Czechoslovakia, Hungary,
and Rumania were expelled from the United
States for intelligence activities.
There is another grave aspect to these
Immunity provisions and that is the chain
reaction that will be set off if this conven-
tion is ratified. The provisions regarding
immunity will then apply not only to Soviet
consular personnel but may also apply to
consular personnel of the 27 other countries
with which the United States has consular
conventions or agreements which contain a
most-favored-nation clause. These 27 coun-
tries include 2 other Communist countries:
Rumania and Yugoslavia. As a practical
matter, a3 there are no Rumanian consulates
in the United States at present. there would
not be any immediate increase in the num-
ber of Rumanian official personnel enjoying
complete Immunity from criminal prosecu-
tion. If any Rumanian consulates were
established in the United States in the
future, however, their consular personnel
would enjoy such Immunity.
We are thus opposed to the convention be-
cause we consider the provisions granting
unrestricted Immunity from criminal Juris-
diction to Soviet consular personnel to be
unwise. We believe that the:;e immunity
provisions will encourage Soviet subversion
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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE S 3921
by placing Soviet consular personnel outside
the criminal jurisdiction of the United
States. We also believe that it is not in the
interests of the United States to extend this
immunity to several hundred, perhaps as
many as 400, persons which would be the
case given the fact that most-favored-nation
clauses are found in consular conventions
and agreements the United States has with
27 other countries.
FRANK J. LAUSCHE.
BOURKE B. HICKENLOOPER.
JOHN J. WILLIAMS.
KARL E. MUNDT.
INDIVIDUAL VIEWS OF SENATOR THOMAS J.
DODD (DEMOCRAT, CONNECTICUT) ON THE
PROPOSED RATIFICATION OF THE CONSULAR
CONVENTION WITH THE SOVIET UNION
I wish to express my opposition to the rati-
fication of the Consular Convention With
the Soviet Union.
I am opposed to it not because this clause
or that clause has been poorly drawn, but
on grounds of basic principle.
The signing of the consular convention
will in no way serve to improve communica-
tions between the Soviet Government and
the Government of the United States, be-
cause it is not the function of consulates to
communicate or to participate in diplomatic
conversations.
Nor is there any reason to believe that the
opening of several American consulates in
the Soviet Union and several Soviet con-
sulates in the United States will encourage
the development of friendlier relations be-
tween the Soviet and American peoples, or
that it will persuade the Soviet leaders to
call off the cold war.
On the contrary, it is my conviction that
the establishment of Soviet consulates in
this country will only serve to provide the
Kremlin with an enhanced cold war capa-
bility and that it will, in the long run, only
fan popular hostility toward the Soviet Un-
ion because of the incurable addiction for
espionage of all Soviet diplomats.
The record of Soviet diplomatic espionage
is so massive and consistent that I think it
can properly be taken for granted that every
Soviet diplomat and diplomatic employee
must be considered a member of the Soviet
espionage apparatus and a recruiter for this
apparatus.
Mr. J. Edgar Hoover, Director of the Fed-
eral Bureau of Investigation, has under-
scored the seriousness of this problem in
repeated statements over the years.
In a speech which I made on the floor
of the Senate in October of 1962, I listed 17
Soviet nationals who had used their posi-
tions at the United Nations for purposes of
espionage and who had been obliged to leave
the United States when their activities had
been exposed. Since that time the number
of such cases has grown to 21. In addition
to these Soviet nationals who had used their
diplomatic status at the United Nations as
a cover for espionage against the United
States, a total of 12 Soviet nationals at-
tached to the Soviet Embassy in Washington
have similarly been obliged to leave the
country when their espionage activities were
exposed.
I am appending to this statement a sum-
mary list of Soviet nationals at the United
Nations and Soviet nationals attached to the
U.S.S.R. Embassy who have engaged in es-
pionage against the United States.
It has been argued that the Consular Con-
vention With the Soviet Union is in no sense
exceptional because it is similar in substance
to our consular conventions with other
nations.
This statement is not entirely accurate be-
cause the provision in the convention which
gives consular officers and employees immu-
nity from criminal jurisdiction makes this
the first convention which grants such un-
limited exemptions to all consular personnel.
Senators Lausche, Williams of Delaware,
Hickenlooper, and Mundt in the minority
views which they jointly presented, have
dealt with this matter in considerable detail.
But even if it were true that the conven-
tion with the Soviet Union is similar in sub-
stance to our consular conventions with other
nations, this argument would still ignore the
fact that the other nations with whom we
have consular conventions are not com-
mitted to our destruction, are not seeking to
subvert friendly governments all over the
world, and are not waging cold war against
us.
More than one administration spokesman
has made the point that those who oppose
our policy in Vietnam for some strange rea-
son fail to comprehend the fundamental na-
ture of Communist tyranny and the nature
of Communist aggression.
I, too, feel that the anti-Vietnam demon-
strations that have taken place on our
campuses reveal an appalling lack of com-
prehension of the basic facts about com-
munism.
But the fault for this does not lie entirely
with our educational system or with the in-
difference of our citizens to the facts of his-
tory.
To a very large degree, I believe that the
lack of comprehension displayed by the many
honest critics of our Vietnam policy stems
from the persistent efforts, under both
Democratic and Republican administrations,
to gloss over the tyranny of communism, to
ignore the Kremlin's persistent anti-Ameri-
can tirades, to minimize its subversive ac-
tivity in other countries, to grant the Soviet
regime respectability, and to encourage the
illusory belief that the Soviet regime is just
another civilized government whose philos-
ophy happens to be different from ours.
To a large degree, this lack of comprehen-
sion has been encouraged by things like
Khrushchev's invitation to visit this country,
by our willingness to sweep the issue of Hun-
gary under the rug at the United Nations, by
muting the criticism of communism on Voice
of America programs.
The consular convention which we are now
being called upon to ratify is, in my opinion,
an error of the same order-an error that
blurs the differences between freedom and
communism and that makes it easier for the
Communist cadres on our campuses to in-
cite the academic community against our
policy in Vietnam.
I believe that we have nothing to gain
from this consular convention, that it will
not, by any stretch of the imagination, serve
to bring about a true abatement of tensions
between the Soviet Union and the United
States, and that it will contribute sgnifi-
cantly to the spread of popular befuddle-
ment on the issue of Vietnam and on the cold
war in general.
I am loath to oppose the administration on
an issue such as this at so critical a period
in history. But I would be untrue 1;o my,
conscience and undeserving of any popular
confidence if I were to mute my criticism
on this issue in deference to the admir.dstra-
tion's attitude.
I, therefore, wish to go on record against
the ratification of the consular convention
and I would urge my colleagues to examine
the record closely before they cast their final
vote.
LIST OF U.S.S.R. EMBASSY PERSONNEL WHO HAVE
BEEN DECLARED PERSONA NON GRATA BECAUSE
OF ESPIONAGE ACTIVITY
Yuri Vasilycvich Novikov
Novikov entered the United States April
24, 1948, as an attache of the Soviet Em-
bassy, Washington, D.C. He subsequently
held the position of second secretary and
from 1950 through July 1952 acted as editor
of the official publication of the Soviet Em-
bassy, the Information Bulletin.
In April 12, 1951, Novikov, by meeting a
source in Washington, D.C., was identified
as the new Soviet principal in an espionage
operation which had its origin in Austria in
1949, Novikov, on April 12, 1951, appeared
at the designated place on the proper date,
at the designated time, and gave the pass-
woxd previously agreed upon between the
source and his Soviet espionage superiors in
Austria.
The original principals in this operation
in Austria were two naturalized citizens,. Otto
Verber and Kurt L. Ponger, who were brought
back to the United States and upon entering
guilty pleas, were, on June 8, 1953, sentenced
for violation of the espionage statute.
Novikov operated the controlled source in
the United States until April 22, 1952, and
on 10 occasions sought classified material.
On January 14, 1953; Novikov was declared
persona non grata by the Department of
State in connection with his espionage ac-
tivity. He departed the United States on
January 19, 1953.
Igor Aleksandrovich Amosov
Amosov entered the United States Febru-
ary 17, 1952, as assistant Soviet naval attache.
Amosov was the third Soviet principal in
an intelligence operation directed by the
Soviets from their naval attache's office. He
served in this capacity from. June 7, 1952,
until his departure in February 1954. Targ-
ets assigned by Amosov to the controlled
source included radar developments, details
of the latest cargo ships, manuals reflecting
details of the latest electronic developments,
and bombsight data. He paid the source a
total of $2,000 for his services.
While the operation functioned under
Amosov's control, he did not accept any ma-
terial directly from the source. Amosov fur-
nished instructions to the source in Wash-
ington, D.C., and the material was passed
in the New York City area with the source
following a set procedure of obtaining ac-
knowledgment signals and, thereafter, de-
livering the material to a designated drop
area. Amosov was declared persona non
grata by the State Department on February
3, 1954, as a result of his activities in this
case and he left the United States on Feb-
ruary 7, 1954.
Aleksandr. Petrovich Kovalev
Kovalev arrived in the United States Octo-
ber 8, 1950, as a second secretary of the So-
viet delegation to the United Nations.
For approximately 2 years as assistant
Soviet naval attache in Washington, D.C., he
had been operating a controlled source, ob-
taining from him material of intelligence
significance. On April 19, 1952, the assistant
Soviet naval attache told the source that in
the future, material obtained was to be
microfilmed and the undeveloped film was
to be delivered to the Soviets by means of a
dead drop located in the New York area
rather than through direct delivery to the
assistant naval attache. The source was told
to park his car in a designated area in New
York City at a designated time and to place
a package wrapped in red paper therein so
that it could be seen through the rear win-
dow in the event material was to be passed.
An additional signal by way of marking a
telephone directory in a New York restau-
rant was perfected to indicate to the source
that the material delivered to the dead drop
was picked up.
A trial run of this arrangement occurred
in New York City on April 23, 1952, on which
date Kovalev was observed in the immediate
vicinity of source's car, which was parked
in the designated area and in which was
placed a package wrapped in red paper.
Thereafter, the source deposited material in
the dead drop and on April 24, 1952, Kovalev
was observed making the predesignated mark
in the telephone directory in the New York
restaurant.
Material of intelligence significance was
left by the controlled source in the New
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S 3922
York dead drop area on October i and De-
cember 3, 1952, which material was retrieved
by the Soviets. On June 7, 1952, the source
was given by his Soviet principal in Wash-
ington $500 to purchase an electronic device
for delivery to the Soviets and an additional
$500 in payment for delivery of a microfilm
reproduction of portions of a manual deal-
ing with an automatic steering device for
ships. The controlled source last heard from
his Soviet principal on April 1, 1963, on which
date he was told that a meeting scheduled
for April 3, 1953, would not be held.
Kovalev was declared persons non grata
by the Department of State for his actions
in this case on February 3, 1954, and be de-
parted the United States February 10, 1954.
Leonid Igorovich Plvnev
Plvnev entered the United States on March
17. 1950, as assistant Soviet air attach*.
On November 2 and 3, 1953, while on a
tour throughout the Southwest, Plvnev pur-
chased aerial maps of Tulsa, Okla., and
vicinity and Dallas, Tex., and vicinity. Plv-
nev slid not identify himself as a Soviet of-
ficial when purchasing these maps.
In the spring of 1953, through a Washing-
ton businessman, he endeavored to utilize
the businessman's address as a mail drop.
He explained to the businessman that he
would have mail delivered to him at the busi-
nessman's address, which mail was to be
addressed to a fictitious person and which,
upon receipt, was to be delivered by the
businessman to him.
On March 24, 1954, he inquired at a Vir-
ginia aerial photographic concern as to the
possibility of purchasing aerial maps of Chi-
cago, Ill. He Instructed the firm to seek such
maps and agreed to pay approximately $8,000
for them. On that date he purchased 33
aerial photographs of Washington, D.C., and
vicinity. Plvnev, in contacting this firm,
Identified himself as one "George." He did
not indicate his official connection with the
Soviet Embassy.
On May 3, 1954, he contacted a Washing-
ton, D.C., photographer, introducing him-
self as a Mr. George Tinney, a representative
of a private firm desirous of purchasing
aerial photographs of New York City at a
scale of 1:20,000 to 1:40,000 feet. Photo-
graphs of this type were not commercially
available. On May 13, 1954, be agreed to pay
the photographer $700 to obtain the photo-
graphs. He advanced on that date the sum
of $400 as partial payment.
On May 20, 1954, when meeting with the
photographer for the purpose of obtaining
the photographs, he was accosted by special
agents of the Federal Bureau of Investiga-
tion on which occasion he Identified himself.
On May 29, 1964, the Department of State
declared Pivnev persona non grata for his
action, and he departed June 6. 1954.
Ivan AIekrandrovich Bubchikov
Bubchikov entered the United States De-
cember 1, 1954, as an assistant Soviet mili-
tary attache.
From July 1965 through May 1966, Bubchi-
kov maintained contact with a naturalized
American citizen of Russian origin who was
employed as a sales engineer. In July 1955
he appeared at the sales engineer's residence
late in the evening and sought his coopera-
tion in securing data concerning jet fuel,
atomic submarines, and aeronautical devel-
opments. Bubchikov promised the engineer
large sums of money; however, even though
seemingly important Information was furn-
ished to him, he did not fulfill his promise
of large payments. During the course of
this operation it was featured by clandestine
meetings, complex recognition signals, and
a variety of "drop areas" In which the source
deposited material for the Soviet.
In view of his activities in connection with
the engineer, the Department of State, on
June 14, 1956, declared Bubchikov persona
CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE March 16, 1967
non grata for engaging "in espionage activi- diplomatic status. He departed from the
ties incompatible with his continued pres- United States on June 11, 1958,
ence in this country." He departed the Evgent Alekscevich Zao -trovtsev
United States J
n
24
1958
u
e
,
.
Yuri Pavlovich Krylov
Krylov entered the United States May 4,
1955, as assistant Soviet military attache,
Washington, D.C.
In April 1958, Krylov was introduced to
the manager of a Washington electronics
supp?y house. Through the Washingtonian,
who cooperated with the Federal Bureau of
Investigation Krylov purchased hard-to-get
electronic equipment.
In, August of 1955, Krylov contacted an
employee of the Atomic Energy Commission
and attempted to obtain from him informa-
tion concerning the technical aspects of
nuclear power. In December 1955, he con-
tacted a former commissioner of the Atomic
Energy Commission In an effort to develop
Information concerning atomic energy for
space heating. In February 1956, he at-
tempted to purchase 26 unclassified films
on peacetime atomic energy.
In February 1956, he endeavored to join
the Society of American Military Engineers
and to subscribe to the publication "The
Military Engineer." which contained infor-
maticn concerning U.S. fortifications.
On January 14, 1967, the Department of
State declared Krylov persona non grata as
a res'.alt of his activities. He departed the
United States January 28, 1957.
Gennadi Fedorovich Mashkantsev
Mashkantsev served as an employee of the
consulate division of the Soviet Embassy,
Washington, D.C., handling repatriation
matters. He arrived In the United States
Octet or 25, 1956..
On March 12, 1957, he appeared at the
home of Petr Pirogov, Russian flyer who,
with Anatoll Barsov, defected to the United
States In Austria in 1948. Barsov redefected
to Russia in 1949 and, according to Vladimir
Petrov, the former Soviet intelligence officer
who defected In Australia, after lengthy
interrogation was executed.
Upon visiting Pirogov, Mashkantsev de-
livered to him a lengthy handwritten letter
purportedly from Barsov. The letter peti-
tioned Plrogov to return to the U.S.S.R.
Examination of the letter established that
it w:u not in the handwriting of Barsov
but was a carefully prepared simulation. As
a result, on April 17, 1957, Mashkantsev was
declared persona non grata for "improper
activities directed toward inducing return to
the Soviet Union of persons who have sought
asylum in the United States." Mashkantsev
departed April 25, 1957.
Nikolat fvanovich Kurochkin
Kurochkin entered the United States,
April 4, 1966, as a third secretary of the
Soviet Embassy, Washington, D.C.
In the fall of 1958, Charles T. Beaumet,
a professional writer, contacted the Soviet
Embassy seeking statistics as to hosiery pro-
duction In the Soviet Union. He met
Kurochkin, who supplied the desired statis-
tical data and, after a series of meetings,
informed Beaumet that If he would obtain
military information to be incorporated in
articles Kurochkin was writing for Russian
military journals, he would share with him
his proceeds from the articles. Thereafter,
Beauniet, ultilizing the entree he enjoyed as
a reporter, obtained training and field man-
uals of the U.S. Army which he turned over
to Kurochkin. For the various manuals
delivered to Kurochkin, Beaumet was paid
approximately $450. Included among the
manuals sought by Kurochkin were two
which were classified. The classified manuals
were not delivered to the Soviet.
On June 8, 1958, Kurochkin was declared
Zaostrovtsev entered the United States
August 2, 1957, as a second secretary of the
Soviet Embassy, Washington, D.C.
On February 23, 1958, Zaostrovtsev met a
State Department Foreign Service officer in
training, at a social function. There fol-
lowed Intensive efforts on the part of
Zaostrovtsev to cultivate the State Depart-
ment employee for Intelligence purposes.
Between February, 1958, and February 6,
1959, ho met with the State Department em-
ployee on 15 occasions. He obtained from
the Stai;e Department employee material con-
cerning the training program of Foreign
Service officers and endeavored, without suc-
cess, to obtain classified documents from
State Department files concerning the politi-
cal and economic affairs In the area of the
Government employee's future foreign as-
signment. He paid the Government em-
ployee 4150 for information furnished to him.
As a result of his dealings with the State
Department employee, the I)epartment of
State on May 13, 1959, made an informal
request of the Soviet Embassy for Zaostrovt-
sev's recall. Zaostrovtsev departed the
United States on May 16, 1959.
Gennadiy G. Sevastyanov
Gennldly Sevastyanov arrived In the
United States in March 1959 to serve as an
attache In the cultural division of the Soviet
Embassy in Washington, D.C On April 6,
1963, an Individual whom the Russians
Identified as "Vladimir Gridney" arrived in
the United States as a temporary employee
of the Soviet Embassy. Actually "Gridnev"
was not the man's true name. He had been
brought to the United State-s under this
pseudonym to assist in the attempted re-
cruitment of his brother, a soviet defector
now employed by the Federal Government,
as a Russian spy.
Under the eye of Sevastyanov, "Gridnev"
approached his brother outside his brother's
home In a suburb of Washington on the night
of April 28, 1963. Sevastyanov also stood by
while meetings were held between the
brothers on April 30 and May 2, 1963; and he
attempted to obtain details of the work
which ' Grldnev's" brother wis performing
for the 'Federal Government as well as to re-
cruit him as an espionage agent.
"Grid:Iev" left the United States early in
May 1963. His brother head one other
meeting with Sevastyanov-or. the night of
June 13, 1963. "Gridnev's" brother coop-
erated fully with the FBI following his
Initial contact by the Soviets on April 28,
and FBI agents made motion pictures, as
well as still photographs, of the meetings be-
tween the three men on April 30 and May 2,
Sevastynanov was declared persona non
grata by the U.S. State Department on July
1, 1963.
Boris V. Karpovick
On January 7, 1965. Boris V. Karpovich was
declared persona non grata by the U.S. Gov-
ernment for conduct incompatible with his
diplomatic duties and he leparted the
United States on January 12, 1965. (See p.
72 of Mr. Hoover's testimony, March 4, 1985,
copy attached.)
Ste/an M. Kirsanor
On Ji ne 2, 1965, Kirsanov was declared
persona non grata by the U.S. Department of
State for "activities incompatible with his
diplomatic status." Kirsanov and his wife
departed the United States June 10, 1965, for
Russia.
LIST OF SOVIET U.N. REPRESENTATIVES AND
SOVIET U.N. EMPLOYEES WHO HAVE ENGAGED
IN ESPIONAGE AGAINST THE UNITED STATES
Vassili Molev
persona non grata for engaging in highly While attached tothe Soviet delegation to
improper activities incompatible with his the United Nations, in 1953 (handling main-
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March 16, 1967 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE S 3923
tenance, purchase of supplies and similar
matters) Vassili Molev met Boris Morros on
a date and at a time and place previously
designated by Morros' Soviet intelligence
superiors in Austria, Molev accepted from
Morros a report prepared in New York by
Jack Soble and given by Soble to Morros in
accordance with instructions from their So-
viet superiors. Photographs, both still shots
and motion pictures, of this meeting were
taken by FBI personnel. Immediately fol-
lowing the arrest of Jack Soble on espionage
charges on January 25, 1957, the U.S. De-
partment of State declared Molev persona non
grata. Molev at that time was employed (in
a similar capacity) by the Soviet Embassy.
He left the United States on January 28, 1957,
en route to Russia.
Mikhail Nikolaevich Svirin
Mikhail Nikolaevich Svirin, a Soviet as-
signed to the Soviet U.N. delegation from
August 1952 to April 1954, was identified by
Yuri A. Rastvorov, a former Soviet intelli-
gence officer, as a member of the Ministry
of Internal Affairs and a very experienced
intelligence officer. Svirin was also identified
by Reino Hayhanen -a former Soviet intelli-
gence agent. On two occasions in January
and February 1953, Svirin was observed in
the area where Boris Morros was scheduled
to meet with his Soviet superior. Morros
subsequently met Vassill Molev on March 3,
1953, at the scheduled meeting place.
Maksim Grigorievich Martynov
Maksim Grigorievich Martynov last entered
the United States on November 3, 1954, as a
member of the Soviet representation to the
U.N. Military Staff Committee. In August
1954 a highly placed Army officer in Germany
was introduced to a Soviet under clandestine
circumstances in the Soviet sector of Berlin.
The officer did not discourage the Soviet's
approach and meetings in New York were
arranged. A code phrase was established for
recognition purposes. The New York con-
tact turned out to be Martynov. On two
occasions, a special agent of the FBI, made
up to resemble the Army officer, met with
Martynov. On the second occasion January
15, 1955, 1'BI agents, with State Depart-
ment permission, accosted Martynov, who
identified himself, but claimed diplomatic
immunity. On February 21, 1955, the De-
partment of State declared Martynov per-
sona non grata for the above activity and he
departed the United States February 26, 1955.
Alelsandr Konstantinovich Guryanov
Aleksandr Konstantinovich Guryanov en-
tered the United States March 26, 1955, as
an employee of the Soviet delegation to the
U.N. On April 25, 1956, he was declared per-
sona non grata by the U.S. Department of
State as a result of his implication in the
improper repatriation to the U.S.S.R. of five
Soviet seamen who left the United States on
April 7, 1956. The seamen were members of
the crew of the Soviet tanker Tuapse who
previously defected to the United States.
The Department of State informed the So-
viet Government that Guryanov's activities
made his presence in the United States no
longer desirable and he departed May 9, 1956.
Boris Fedorovich Gladkov
Boris Fedorovich Gladkov entered the
United States December 15, 1953, as naval
adviser to the Soviet representation in the
Military Staff Committee of the UN. In Jan-
uary 1955, Gladkov, at a cocktail party, met
a sales engineer for a New York marine engi-
neering firm. He cultivated the sales engi-
neer and held a number of clandestine meet-
ings with him. Through the engineer, on
June 14, 1955, he received two unclassified
publications dealing with marine boilers.
During his meetings with the sales engineer
which continued on a regular basis through
June 1956, Gladkov furnished the engineer
$1,550 for services rendered. On June 22,
1956, the Department of State declared Glad-
kov persona non grata. He departed July
12, 1956.
Rostislav E. Shapovalov
Rostislav E. Shapovalov entered the United
States September 27, 1955, as a second sec-
retary of the Soviet delegation to the U.N.
On May 7, 14, 17, and 21, 1956, he contacted
a Russian emigree in New York and urged
him to return to Russia. The eraigree,
Michael Schatoff, a former officer in the
Russian Army, was a classmate of Shapovalov
at a New York university. On August 20,
1956, the Department of State declared Shap-
ovalov persona non grata for his activities in
attempting to induce Schatoff to return to
the Soviet Union. Shapovalov departed the
United States September 12, 1956.
Viktor Ivanovich Petrov
Viktor Ivanovich Petrov arrived in the
United States February 17, 1953, as a trans-
lator employed at the U.N. Secretariat. Ac-
cording to the FBI, Petrov, during 1955-56,
established contact with an aviation drafts-
man for the purpose of seeking classified in-
formation concerning U.S. military aircraft
development. On August 20, 1956, the U.S.
representative to the U.N, brought the matter
to the attention of the Secretary General,
who agreed to dismiss Petrov. Petrov de-
parted the United States on August 23, 1956.
Konstantin Pavlovich Ekimov
Konstantin Pavlovich Ekimov entered the
United States October 17, 1955, as second
secretary of the Soviet delegation to the U.N.
Ekimov was accused before the Senate In-
ternal Security Subcommittee of participat-
ing in the abduction of Tanya Chwastov,
aged 2, and American-born daughter of a
Russian refugee. He took part in dockside
arrangements which enabled Alexei Chwas-
tov to leave the United States with his infant
daughter. This move was against the wishes
of the child's mother who remained in the
United States. Ekimov was declared persona
non grata by the Department of State on
October 29, 1956, and he departed the United
States on November 30, 1956.
Vladimir Arsenevich Grusha
Vladimir Arsenevich Grusha was formerly
assigned as first secretary of the Societ dele-
gation to the U.N. On March 5, 1957, Grusha
had a rendezvous with a Ceylonese employee
of the U.N. Secretariat, Mr. Dhanapalo
Samarasekara, in the latter's automobile,
after Mr. Samarasekara had been observed
entering the offices of the Ceylonese delega-
tion and extracting certain papers from a file
cabinet. Based on information developed by
the FBI, the Department of State declared
Grusha persona non grata on March 25, 1957,
and he departed from the United States on
April 10, 1957.
Kirill Sergeevich Doronkin
Kirill Sergeevich Doronkin arrived in the
United States March 12, 1956, to serve as film
editor, radio and visual division of the De-
partment of Public Information, U.N. Secre-
tariat. In October 1958 special agents of the
FBI observed a clandestine meeting between
Doronkin and a source that had been re-
cruited for the specific purpose of obtaining
aerial photographs of the Chicago area. The
source reported to the FBI that the package
which he turned over to Doronkin at this
meeting contained the requested aerial
photographs. The U.S. mission to the U.N.
delivered a note to the Secretary General of
the U.N. on January 15, 1959, requesting
Doronkin's dismissal from the U.N. ])oron-
kin's contracted term of employment termi-
nated March 3, 1959, and he was not reem-
ployed by the U.N. He departed from the
United States March 11, 1959.
Vadim Aleksandrovich Kirilyuk
Vadim Aleksandrovich Kirilyuk arrived in
the United States September 11, 1958, as a
political affairs officer employed by the De-
partment of Trusteeship and Information for
Non-Self-Governing Territories, U.N. Sec-
retariat. During the period from June
through September 1959, Kirilyuk met with
an American citizen in a clandestine man-
ner on five occasions. On these occasions he
requested data concerning cryptographic ma-
chines and instructed the American to seek
employment with a vital U.S. Government
agency. Kirilyuk's meetings with the source
on August 28, 1959, and on September 18,
1959, were observed by special agents of the
FBI. The Secretary General of the U.N. was
informed of Kirilyuk's espionage activity on
December 17, 1959. On January 7, 1960, the
Soviet delegation to the U.N. was advised of
Kirilyuk's activities, whereupon Kirilyuk and
his family left the United States on January
10, 1960.
Igor Y. Melekh
Igor Y. Melekh, a Soviet national was as-
signed to the U.N. Secretariat in October
1958. According to the FBI, Melekh asked
a New York freelance medical illustrator,
Willie Hirsch, to provide intelligence data
such as a map of Chicago showing military
installations. Melekh and Hirsch were in-
dicted by the Federal grand jury in Chicago
on October 27, 1960, and both were placed
under arrest by the FBI on the same day.
They were charged with three counts includ-
ing espionage and conspiracy. Melekh
claimed diplomatic immunity; however, this
was denied by the courts and he was released
under $50,000 bond. On March 24, 1961, a
U.S. district court ruled that, if Melekh de-
parted from the United States by April 17
and if the Attorney General moved for dis-
missal of the indictment, the court would
dismiss as to both defendants. Melekh left
the United States for the Soviet Union on
April 8, and the indictments against both
Melekh and Hirsch were dismissed on April
11, 1961.
Yuri A. Mishukov and Yuri V. Zaitsev
Yuri A. Mishukov was employed as a trans-
lator by the U.N, on November 11, 1957.
Yuri V. Zaitsev was employed on August 9,
1961, as a U.N. political and security coun-
cil affairs officer. On September 15, 1962, the
FBI disclosed that Mishukov and Zaitsev had
established an espionage arrangement with
an American citizen and between June and
August of this year had paid him $3,000.
Two days after the Justice Department made
its announcement, the U.N. announced that
Mishukov had left for Moscow last July 5
and Zaitsev had done so August 7.
Eugeni M. Prokhorov and Ivan Y. Vyrodov
Both Eugeni M. Prokhorov and Ivan Y.
Vyrodov were members of the permanent mis-
sion of the U.S.S.R. to the U.N. On Septem-
ber 28, Prokhorov and Vyrodov were appre-
hended by FBI agents in the act of receiving
classified information concerning the U.S.
Navy from Ylc Nelson Cornelius Drummond.
They were released after establishing their
identity. On September 29 the U.S. delega-
tion to the U.N. demanded that the Soviet
delegation expel Prokhorov and Vyrodov.
Ivan D. Egorov
On July 2, 1963, FBI agents arrested two
persons in New York City and two persons
in Washington, D.C., on charges of conspir.
ing to spy for Russia. The pair arrested in
New York City were Ivan D. Egorov, an em-
ployee of the Office of Personnel, United
Nations Secretariat, and his wife, Aleksandra
I. Egorova. Charges against these two were
dismissed on October 11, 1963, contingent
upon their immediate departure from the
United States. At the same time, the Soviets
released the Reverend Walter Ciszek, a Cath-
olic priest, and Marvin Makinen, a college
student, both of whom had been in prison
In Russia.
The pair arrested in Washington, D.C., on
July 2, 1963, were identified as Robert K.
Baltch and Joy Ann Baitch. Actually, these
were not their true names.
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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE March 16. 1967
the moment someone asks just how such a
course would advance the best Interests of
the U.S. Certainly It would not s`op the
flow of Soviet arms or yield any other bene-
fit we can think of,
The treaty is part of President Johnson's
campaign to normalize relations with the
European Communist nations. Ultimately,
the U.S. must seek to live as normally as
possible with these nations despite their
alien ideology and the Soviet record of
treachery; the alternative is to prepare for
a nuclear showdown. Steps toward more
normal relations might also have some slight
tender.cy to aggravate splits in the Com-
munes; camp.
This "bridge-building" contains manifest
dangers. Each part of it must be carefully
examined on its merits. The Senate would
serve a real purpose In scrutinizing, say, the
outer space treaty for any evidence of booby
traps.
On she consular treaty, though, the Ad-
ministration seems to be on solid footing
while the pact's foes have their heads In
the cicuds. It hardly serves the U.S. Interest
to sabotage a deal in Its own advantage.
Mr. HANSEN, Mr. President, I have
made two brief comments on the Consu-
lar Convention before us and I hesitate
to again inflict my views on the Senate.
However, there are several points raised
in my letters which I feel should be an-
swered on the Senate floor. I wish also
to place myself on record as to the rea-
sons for the position I shall take on this
convention.
I want to make clear at the outset that
as a very junior Member of the U.S. Sen-
ate, I am certainly not an expert on
foreign policy. This, indeed, is my first
involvement in treaty legislation.
I shall express opinions based on the
best information obtainable. They will
be opinions based on correspondence I
have exchanged with the Department of
State, numerous telephone conversations
with that Department, personal conver-
sations I have had with Secretary Rusk,
and certainly on the views of my constit-
uents contained in correspondence de-
livered by the pound to my Senate office.
My views and opinions are based also
on the very excellent speeches which
Senators on both sides of the aisle and
on bosh sides of this issue have delivered
during the more than 2 years the Con-
sular Convention has been pending be-
fore the Senate.
One's attitude toward the Consular
Convention must, of necessity, be predi-
cated on certain major premises and as-
sessments. It sems apparent that while
the Soviet Union can be expected to con-
tinue supporting forces In Its ideological
corner, Russian leaders are carefully
avoiding a major confrontation with the
United States.
In a no-holds-barred contest with Red
China for leadership of the Communist
world, no one should expect Russia to
transform her social order for the sake of
a Consular Treaty. To predicate all con-
tracts between our two countries entirely
on the basis that Russia must first cease
being Communist is to close the door on
any hope for even limited agreements of
mutual benefit.
CHANGING COMMUMSM
Communism violates too dramatically
the aspirations of man, the realities of
economics and the existence of a Su-
preme Being, to survive as a system. I
believe that we are seeing today in Eu-
rope the beginning of the end of Com-
munism, as anything more than a de-
funct ideology of revolution. The end
of the process is many years away, but
commurdsm is losing its grip on the mil-
lions it once held so tightly in its fist.
I have no doubt that with the passage
of time, the Soviet system itself will be-
come ie;s militant and more responsive
to the reeds of its own people. I think
history indicates and contemporary
events ,.ubstantiate the fact that Rus-
sian communism will draw inward to
save itself. The Soviet Union will come
to think. of itself as a nation of people
and consumers, rather than as the faunt
of a rapacious philosophy of interna-
tional conquest. But that time if far in
the future.
As we deliberate this consular conven-
tion, we must consider today's world and
today's priorities-priorities dictated by
the war in Vietnam, the threat of war
elsewhere, and the general hostility of
communism. These are facts at hand-
not theories or inevitabilities in the dis-
tance. We must judge effects on the
present before we commit ourselves en-
tirely to the hopes of the future.
Gleb Pavlov, Yuri Romashin, and Vladimir
Olene1
On the night of October 29, 1963, John W.
Butenko, an American engineer, was arrested
by FBI agents in New Jersey after delivery
to Gleb Pavlov of an attaches's case contain-
ing detailed documents of military interest.
Also arrested was Igor A. Ivanov, an employee
of Amwrg Trading Corp., who was accom-
panying Pavlov.
Yuri Iomashin had served in countersur-
veillanco capacity during the clandestine
meeting between Pavlov and Butenko on the
night of October 29, 1963. Vladimir Olenev
had previously accompanied Pavlov during
meetings with Butenko. These three men
were members of the Soviet mission to the
United Nations and were declared persona
non gra,a by the U.S. State Department on
October 30, 1963. They departed from the
United States on November 1. 1963.
Butenko and Ivanov were convicted on
December 2, 1964, on charges stemming from
this espionage plot.
Mr. LAUSCHE. Mr. President, in con-
clusion, we want peaceful coexistence.
This Congress has tried to achieve it. We
have shown a charitable and eleemosy-
nary attitude toward people all over the
world.
It is argued that Russia has let up on
its perpetuation of the tensions. Can
anyone point out tangible evidence where
that lessening has occurred? I would
like to hear it. I have tried to find it.
I have searched for it. But instead of
finding it, every word that comes to me
indicates an avowed, unrelenting, eternal
purpose to destroy our country.
Mr. President, I wanted to vote for
this Consular Convention, but neither
my reasoning, nor my intuition, nor the
promptings of my soul would permit me
to do so. I will vote against the conven-
tion.
Mr. SCOTI'. Mr. President, I ask
unanimous consent that an editorial of
the Wall Street Journal, which puts the
Soviet-American Consular Convention in
proper perspective, be printed in the
RECORD.
There being no objection, the editorial
was ordered to be printed in the RECORD,
as follows:
[From the Wall Street Journal, Mar. 14,
1987]
THz WRONG TARGrr
The Senate was wise, we think, to reject
an amendment Intended to cripple the Soviet
consular treaty, and It will also be wise to
reject further proposed Impediments.
The treaty would allow each nation to
open consular offices In the other's chief
cities, supplementing the embassies in capi-
tals. This would give Americans traveling
in the Soviet Union better access to the
protections U.S. officials can offer, which is
clearly a gain for U.S. citizens.
There has been complaint that Russian
consulates in the U.B. would facilitate Soviet
espiona e. But since we would be trading
listening-posts in our open society for listen-
ing-pos:s in their closed one, the balance
would again -seem to favor our side,
In other words, here is one treaty which
shows a profit for the U.B. Yet some mem-
bers of the Senate have offered amendments
,.nd reservations designed to scuttle the
pact. The most notable is a proposal which
would bar the treaty's Implementation while
the Soviets continue to supply arms used
against U.S. troops In Vietnam.
It's an approach with a nice patriotic
sound, and at first hearing It even has a
logical ring. The ring goes off key, however,
TFE WAR AND RUSSIA'S INTEREST
Some Senators speak of the possibility
of talks involving the United States, Mos-
cow, Hanoi, and possibly Peking, as a
means of bringing peace to Vietnam.
What evidence is there from any re-
liable source that the Communist world
is less than delighted to have the United
States bogged down in a bloody and
costly land war in Asia?
Despise its clear reluctance to risk an
Armageddon with the United States,
there is no question that to most of the
Communist world, the United States is
the "main enemy," the largest single
obstacle between the Communist world
and its massive expansion.
Why, then, would the Soviet Union
take pity, on the United States and hon-
estly seek an end to the war? What
would Russia possibly gain by pulling
America's chestnuts out of the fires of
southeast Asia?
Unless we were to cave in at the con-
ference table and hand South Vietnam
over to Hanoi, no future peace would
serve communism's interests so well as
the present war.
The Soviet Union may be i,i the process
of changing, but today as we discuss this
treaty she is still an enemy who has
sworn to bury us. Change is far in the
future although, as I have said, I think
it Is Coating.
From Russia's standpoint, nothing so
good as Vietnam has existed since Korea.
No Russians, if we may believe reports,
have died in Vietnam.
With a contribution that is but a frac-
tion of America's commitment of men,
money, and machines, the Soviet Union
is keeping a half-million American
troops pinned down in Asia.
With a modest logistics commitment,
she is driving a second-rate Asian dic-
tator to naked aggression across the
boundaries of a nation that has had
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March 16, 1967 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE
S 3925
might be attempt arrested
sovereignty longer than 43 of the mem- ingress to grant to others the same cour- we would wish to who continue
Americans
bers of the United Nations. tesies, civilities and standards of humane protect
ote; as we ri a now through the bevies Min-
The Soviet Union is fighting a war conduct which Soviet nationals can en- istry of Foreign Affairs. In any case, this or
istry
by proxy against the United States and joy in almost every Western country. any other arrangement we might contem-
South Vietnam. In an earlier age, we I might add parenthetically that this plate, would have no bearing on our policy
would have responded in kind. Today comes as a rather interesting commen- of nonrecognition of the forcible annexation
we make treaty talk. We ought to re- tary on the often-discussed question of of the Baltic States by the Soviet Govern-
member the admonition of Carl Schurz: legislating morality. ment. We have no plans to establish any
consulates in the Baltic States.
Nothing that is wrong in principle can be As the State Department pointed out
h 9
f M
h
,
arc
right in practice. in a letter to me under date o
The preamble to the consular con-
vention speaks of the signators as seek-
ave g
we
ing to strengthen friendly relations. It can who has been held more than a few days.
to presume that
is a denial of reality
this treaty will strengthen friendly re- This small, but significant concession
lations while American boys are being by the Soviet Union comes, I might point
killed with Russian weapons in a war out, prior to ratification and the effectua-
that Russia could stop. tion of the Convention which we here
None of us believes that the Soviet discuss.
Union will stop being Communist for It has been alleged that a new treaty is
the sake of a treaty with the United not necessary because of covenants
States. But there are different brands agreed to in 1933 by President Roosevelt
of communism, not all of which seek ac- and Soviet Foreign Minister Litvinov. I
tively to control other nations or active- believe that this assertion is at variance
ly underwrite wars of aggression. with facts, which make the premise tenu-
If the people of the Soviet Union wish ous on at least two points.
to live in a Communist society, that is As I understand the issue, Soviet For-
their business. But when they seek to eign Minister Litvinov, in a letter dated
export communism through the use of November 16, told President Roose-
terror, subversion, sabotage, and open velt that the Soviet Union was prepared
war, then it becomes the legitimate con- to negotiate a consular convention con-
cern of all nations. taming provisions for access to American
CHARGES PRO AND CON citizens detained in Russia. The consu-
Mr. President, a number of statements lar convention of that era was to come
and allegations with respect to specific immediately after establishment of diplo-
provisions of the treaty have been made matic relations between the two coun-
on the Senate floor and in the letters tries and was to contain provisions anal-
that have come to ' my office. These, I ogous to a German-Russia treaty in force
feel, compel a reply. at that time. This was fine as far as it
In my own research on the convention, went, except that the consular treaty
I have turned to the public record, the was never negotiated in accord with the
Library of Congress, various diplomatic Roosevelt-Litvinov agreement.
histories of the United States and the But even had the agreement of 1933
Department of State. Despite what re- been consumated, it would have been a
search I have done, I am not attempting moot point. In the German-Russian
to represent myself as a foreign policy treaty the access provisions became ef-
expert. I am far from it. But I have fective upon the termination of the in-
made a sincere effort to develop a few vestigation. According to the State De-
points which I think are pertinent to our partment, both the Soviet Union and
debate. Some of these points would Germany accepted this interpretation
seem to militate for, others against, rati- of the agreement. The Germans saw
fication of the Consular Convention. their people after they had been investi-
It has been alleged on the Senate floor gated, which could take up to 9 months,
that we are attempting establishment of The treaty before us specifies that U.S.
consulates and the attendant protective officials will be notified immediately; that
covenants for our citizens by treaty is, within 1 to 3 days, when an Amneri-
rather than by Executive order because can citizen is arrested or detained by
the Soviets would need the weight of the U.S.S.R. It stipulates that these of-
treaty law in changing their domestic ficials will have rights of visitation
law to allow for early access to incarcer- without delay, within 2 to 4 days, and
ated Americans. on a continuing basis thereafter.
This allegation, I believe, is at variance It has been alleged that this conven-
with the facts. tion will, or could, compromise the fight=
I cite as reference both the State De- ful position of the United States in op-
position to recognition of the forced in-
which and the Library of Congress, corporation of the Baltic States into the
which say, in essence, that Soviet crimi- Soviet Union. Much as I sympathize
er oral assur-
I have been given ot
ances that the U.S. Government has ab-
solutely no intention of altering its po-
sition of nonrecognition of the enslave-
met Of the Baltic States. Nothing in
the consular convention would change
this policy, although as a practical mat-
ter, the American Government might
make efforts to represent American citi-
zens incarcerated by Soviet authorities
in the Baltic States.
It has been alleged that provisions of
the treaty favor the Soviet Union over
the United States, particularly with re-
spect to immunity from arrest, which
would be enjoyed by consular officials.
This again, as I am sure no Senator
would disagree, is at variance with the
facts. All provisions of the treaty are
reciprocal. As a practical matter, how-
ever, the United States will stand to gain
more than the Soviet Union through the
provisions of access to its citizens.
It has been alleged that the United
States would be. in a position of having to
grant immunity upon request to consular
officials from any country having a most
favored nation clause in a treaty with
the United States. Again, I quote the
Department of State:
Countries having most favored nations
clauses in treaties with the United States
would be able to request immunities with
consular offices only if they are willing to
grant us reciprocal rights. Therefore, any
step in this direction would be on the basis
of mutual agreement. Further, if for some
reason, we were unwilling to grant these im-
munities, we would insist on renegotiation of
the treaty with the country concerned or if
necessary we could abbrogate the most fa-
vored nations clause in this treaty.
The letter from which I quoted goes on
to, make the point that Yugoslavia is the
only communist country which has con-
sulates here and with which we have a
treaty containing the most favored na-
tion clause. Yugoslavia has 13 consular
officials in the United States and there is
no indication that the Yugoslavs would
be at all interested in entering into a mu-
tual immunity arrangement. But even
if they did, their consular people are
known and identified by the FBI. They
would be only a part of nearly 10,000 dip-
lomatic people in the United States al-
ready enjoying full immunity.
For the record, Mr. President, I ask
in this context that
unanimous consent
nal law, as spelled out In the Basic Prln- ciples of Criminal Procedure, allows for with the plight of the brave people of there be printed at the conclusion of my
Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia, I do not remarks, a paper listing the nations with
up to 9 months' isolation of persons un- believe that their fears in this area are which we have most-favored-nation
der investigation. This is an allowable justified. agreements, their total consular person-
maximum. It is designed to give Soviet The Department of State has assured nel, and other data.
authorities maximum latitude in isot me in a letter, which I shall ask to have The PRESIDING OFFICER. With-
all of the investigated tg But not printed in its entirety, that- out objection, it is so ordered.
may, be consumed, - As a practical matter, if the Soviet Union (See exhibit 1.)
The of Soviet authorities need need party.
The Sovie, at their dis- were divided into two or more consulate
cretion, grant access at any time, to any districts, the Soviets would regard the Baltic Mr. HANSEN. Mr. President, it has
person being held in pretrial custody. States as belonging in one of the districts. been alleged, particularly in a cleverly
Access to detained foreigners is less a We would not wish to try to exclude the executed, but misleading comic strip dis-
matter of Soviet law than of Soviet Will- Baltic States from a consular district, for tributed by Liberty Lobby, that the con-
1967:
Since this convention was signed in 1964,
ri-
ranted access to each Ame
been
h
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S 3926 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE March 16, 1967
sular convention "clearly provides for It also disregards the obvious fact that
the opening of consulates." The article overt espionage is a double-edged sword,
cited as the authority for this statement I think it fair to assume that our con-
is article II, but If the gentlemen of sular officials could learn much about
Liberty Lobby would again read the life In that broad expanse of Russia be-
treaty they would find that this article yond the environs of Moscow. They are
contains no such provision. Nor does a full match for the Russians.
any other in the treaty. To quote the Consider that our open society, believ-
State Department again: Ing that truth and information is our
The convention does not authorize, pro- best protection, prints more of its vital
pose. suggest, provide for or require the open- information than most nations secure
ing of a single consulate in the USSR or a under lock and key,
single Soviet Consulate in the US. It does I am informed by those who have had
not
ermit th
S
i
t
t
d
i
l
p
e
ov
e
s
o sen
a s
ng
e extra
person to this country, nor does it let us
send anyone to the USSR.
Consulates, if and when there are any,
will be the subject of separate negotia-
tion.
It has been alleged, particularly In cor-
respondence, that there is something im-
moral about American citizens wishing
to travel to the Soviet Union. Implicit
in this allegation is that the travelers
are either less patriotic than those who
stay at home, that they are Insipid
enough to be seduced by the Soviet sys-
tem, or that they are pink enough to
defect. This is unvarnished nonsense.
I have lived in the pleasant company
of American citizens for 54 years, and I
have a high regard for their patriotism,
their motivation, and above all, their in-
tellectual curiosity. I also regard them
as the finest sales people in the world,
not only in the context of the economic
system which is emulated In every free
country, but as salesmen of their Ideas
and their beliefs; in selling their God
and their ideals; and In selling Amer-
icanism.
I do not fear the effects that will flow
from American travel to the Soviet
Union, in terms of ideas or exposure.
And, conversely, Mr. President, I do
not fear the effect travel in the United
States will have on the Soviet tourist. I
have confidence in America's ability to
proselytize "by osmosis"-and by that, I
mean to Impress positively and construc-
tively those from other lands who visit
her shores.
Americans cannot fully appreciate the
spiritual experience of an Eastern Euro-
ipean who stands for the first time on
American soil. To be able, for the first
time in his life, to say that he thinks,
without fear of imprisonment; to be able
to take any job he Is capable of per-
forming and to leave that job at his op-
tion; to enjoy the right of privacy in
thought and opinion.
This is what freedom-by American
definition-means. I am not fearful in
the least of its wondrous effect upon the
traveler who first experiences It on
some experience In the intelligence busi-
ness that deep agents, which Russia cer-
tainly has here, and which I hope we
have over there, do not work out of em-
bassies or consulates.
The point has been made In Senate
discussion that the immuity from arrest
provisions of the consular treaty go too
far. First, if we were to accept the pre-
mise--which I do not-that ratification
at this time is in our national interest, it
would follow that we do not wish to sub-
ject those staffing our consulates to the
threat of unwarranted seizure, or Incar-
creation. I would want them to have
all possible protection.
Second, as has been pointed out also,
both the British and Japanese Govern-
ment3 have negotiated consular conven-
tions with the Soviet Union, with im-
munity provisions going beyond those in
the United States-U.S.S.R. Consular Con-
vention. The provisions of the United
State;-U,S.S.R. agreement are no longer
entirely unique.
HAD HOPED TO SUPPORT TREATY
At one point, Mr. President, I had
hopes to be able to support this conven-
tion. There are strong and convincing
arguments for it. But for the war in
Vietnam, I believe I would have sup-
ported it.
I find little in the language or provi-
sions of this convention to which I can
object. But to bring this convention be-
fore the Senate and the American people
at what must be the most inopportune
time In our history defies logic and rea-
son. Beyond the unfortunate choice of
timing, my objections to this treaty stem
from the effect that it could have on trade
between our two countries, and the effect
that this trade could have on Russia's
ability to wage war in Vietnam.
In this context. I have written Secre-
tary of State Rusk to ask that he reject
the proposed loan of American dollars for
construction of an automobile plant in
the Soviet Union. This loan for some
$50 million would provide sophisticated
machine tools that could be used in mak-
ing cars-or military vehicle components.
American soil. I intend to have more to say on this mat-
It has been alleged on the Senate Hoar ter at a later date. But for the time be-
that the convention is a license to spy, ing. I ask unanimous consent that my
favoring the Soviet Union. I think this letter to Secretary Rusk and his reply be
hyperbole is certainly unfair to our own printed in the RECORD at the conclusion
Intelligence people. It casts doubt upon of my remarks.
the loyalty and integrity of those in gov- The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without
ernment who, rightly or wrongly, as his- objection, it is so ordered.
tory may determine, see in this treaty an (See exhibits 2 and 3.)
effort toward giving us a world In which Mr. HANSEN. Mr. President, It Is also
we may live in peace and freedom worth considering that coming in war-
time, this convention will deal a powerful
psycho:ogical blow to our fighting men
and allies in Vietnam. It will indicate to
the so-called third world, whose leaders
have not shown the capacity for sophis-
ticated comprehension of fig power di-
plomacy, that the United States regards
Itself as being at peace and at war with
the same power at the same time. This
Is an a~lomoly the delicacy of which will
be understood in few capitals.
Were our confrontation with the cur-
rent pact-setter of international commu-
nists confined to the rhetorical, commer-
cial, and theoretical arena. I could see
definite advantages to the consular con-
vention. But the area today is neither
theoretical nor tranquil. It is bloody,
costly war, and Russia has ,he ability to
stop the war-if she genu.nely desired
the friendly relations alluded to in the
preamble to this convention.
As I asserted on the Senate floor on
March 13:
I appreciate the importance of better un-
derstanc'.ing among the nation., of the world.
I think that were it not for the fact that we
are today involved in this conflict, there is
every argument and every reason, and there
should he every desire on our part, to enter
into this sort of arrangement; but this is not
the time. The priorities are set by the sit-
uation in Southeast Asia.
Mr. President, the great international
question is not one of "better under-
standing" between ourselves and Russia.
They understand us only too well.
The questions which divide the Soviet
Union e.nd the United States are crucial
as any in history. The issues are not just
aid and trade; or economic competition;
they are the most fundamental questions
of peace and war; of aggression and con-
tainment. They are questions of the im-
portance of the human being; of the
relationship of the government to the
governed; of freedom and cr:ptivity; and
of the existence of a Supreme Being in
our uniierse.
These differences have built an un-
bridgeable chasm of action and philos-
ophy between international communism
and American democracy. No consular
convention can, or should be able to,
erase these differences to bridge this
chasm,
EXHIBIT I
List of States having Most-Favored-Nation
Provisions in Agreements wit!, the United
States:
Argentina Latvia
Austria Liberia
Belgium Mexico
Bolivia Morocco
Colombia Nepal
Costa Rica Norway
Cuba Paraguay
Denmark Philippines
Estonia Rumania
Ethiopia Saudi Arabia
Finland Spain
France Sweden
Germany Switzerlaid
Greece Thailand
Honduras Yemen
Iraq Yugoslavia
Ireland Zanzibar
Italy
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March 16, 1967 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE
Possible most-favored-nation coverage of ity to supply the communist regime of North
States with consular establishments in the ViItnam.
not opposed to the concept of build-
United States W t lon
o g
s
t
Argentina----------------
Austria- - - - ---------------
Belgium------------------
Bolivia--------------------
Colombia- ----------------
Costa Rica ----------------
I)ennlark-----------------
Fthiopia-------- ---------
Finland-------------------
France--------------------
Germany- - -- -------------
Greece--------------------
1Ionduras-----------------
Iran ---------------------
Ireland____________________
Italy----------------------
Liberia-_------------------
Mexico--------------------
Norway---- ---------------
Paraguay-----------------
Philippines_______________
Ru mania----- ------------
Spain---------------------
Sweden ---------- --------
Switzerland ------ --------
Thailand__________________
Yugoslavia________________
Total
consular
personnel
o111ca11y lviulua uuuuu w a., a .. J,--
until the conclusion of the preliminary in-
vestigation or whether Soviet authorities
have discretion in this matter. Soviet crim-
inal law does not deal with the question of
access to arrested persons in general terms.
There are no guarantees that arrested per-
sons can see or talk to anyone while the pre-
liminary investigation of the alleged crime
is in course, and in practice Soviet citizens
are held incommunicado during this period
which may extend as long as nine months.
Under Article 47 of the Code of Criminal Pro-
cedure of the Russian Soviet Federated So-
cialist Republic, which is the model proce-
dural code for the other republics of the
USSR, defense counsel is permitted to par-
ticipate in a case "from the moment the ac-
cused is informed of the completion of the
preliminary investigation."
Soviet practice in dealing with American
citizens has varied. We were never per-
mitted access to Professor Barghoorn prior
to his expulsion from the Soviet Union.
Likewise we were never granted access to
Gary Powers in the 21 months he was held
in jail or to Lieutenants McKone and Olm-
stead after their RB-47 was shot down over
international waters. On the other hand,
since this Convention was signed in 1964 we
have been granted access to each American
who has been held more than a few days.
Thus Soviet practice appears to have im-
proved since the Consular Convention was
negotiated, but in none of these cases has
the notification or access been as prompt and
as frequent as the treaty provides.
As you point out in your letter the Pres-
ident has the power to exchange consulates
with the USSR without a treaty. But simple
establishment of consulates would not have
any effect on our rights to notification and
access to American citizens in the Soviet
Union. For this reason we believe that a
consular treaty is required. The existence
of such a bilateral undertaking, containing
specific assurances on access and notification,
would prevent the Soviets from saying to us,
as they have in the past, that their own law
or procedure prevents their granting prompt
notification and access rights
Possible
most-favored
nation
coverage
based upon
American
Embassy
estimates
, s
and e
ing bridges between Eas
as those bridges are built in a time of peace
for purposes of. peace, and are not bridges
across which the materiel of war flows from
the warehouse of our enemy to his battle-
field.
I urge the proposed loan through the Ex-
port-Import Bank be reconsidered so that
the United States will not be put in the un-
conscionable position of subsidizing the
economy of a nation which is contributing
directly to the continuation of a terribly
costly war in Southeast Asia.
Sincerely yours,
CLIFFORD P. HANSEN,
U.S. Senator.
EXHIBIT 3
DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
Washington, March 9,1;167.
Hon. CLIFFORD P. HANSEN,
--------------
U.S. Senate,
Washington, D.C.
DEAR SENATOR HANSEN: Thank..you for your
letter of February 28, 1967, to Ambassador
MacArthur concerning the US-USSR Con-
sular Convention. The questions which you
raise go to the heart of several important is-
sues.
Hon. DEAN RUSK,
Secretary of State,
Washington, D.C.
DEAR MR. SECRETARY: The purpose of this
letter is to request that you review, recon-
sider and reject the proposed U.S. govern-
ment loan to the Institute Mobilaire Itali-
ano, which would underwrite, through the
Export-Import Bank, the sale of some $50
million in machine tools to the Soviet Union.
I appreciate that the Administration wish-
es to aid Communist countries in moving
their economies away from the military
sphere and toward a more consumer-oriented
and peaceful emphasis; however, I think the
United States is picking a rather poor time
in history in which to strengthen the econ-
omy of a nation that is the chief supplier of
another Communist nation with which we
are at war.
In view of the massive Soviet aid being
poured into North Vietnam-aid which is
the backbone of Hanoi's ability to continue a
bloody and costly war-I find it impossible
to justify, politically or otherwise, the com-
mitment of American tax dollars to helping
the Soviet Union; particularly when one
cause of the USSR's inability to produce
motor vehicles for its own use is the large
numbers of trucks it is manufacturing and
shipping to North Vietnam. As you know,
the Soviet Union is supplying the trucks and
troop carriers which our airmen are being
called upon daily to destroy, often at great
personal risk. How, in a time of war, can
aid to an enemy be justified or rationalized?
I think I speak not only for myself, but for
a good many Americans when I venture the
opinion that American subsidization of a na-
tion which we are fighting by proxy in Viet-
nam is somewhat analogous to aiding Nazi
Germany during World War II-the main
difference being that Hitler fought the
United States openly and directly. The So-
viet Union today has others engaged in com-
bat in her, behalf.
Even assuming that the automobile plant The second question you ask concerns the
to be built in the Soviet Union by the Fiat
Company of Italy would be primarily for
the production of peaceful goods, it is true
that by strengthening the Soviet economy,
we would still be contributing to her capac-
amount of money spent per capita by the
18,000 Americans who travel to the Soviet
Union each year and the 900 Soviet citizens
who visit this country. We have no reliable
figures for either category of traveler. I
S 3927
would estimate ? that the typical American
traveler to the Soviet Union would spend 4
to 5 days in Moscow and Leningrad and about
$300 exclusive of transportation to and from
the USSR. Most Soviet citizens going abroad
are permitted by the Soviet Government to
obtain only about $100 in foreign exchange.
Therefore, no Soviet visitor to this country
could legally bring more than $100 here.
The rest of their expenses would presumably
be paid by relatives in the US. Arrange-
ments for covering the expenses of Soviet
exchange visitors' in the US vary. In some
cases their living expenses here are paid
by American sponsors and the living ex-
penses of corresponding American exchange
visitors in the Soviet Union are handled by
Soviet sponsors. In other cases, the sending
state covers all the expenses of its exchange
visitors, which of course are usually consid-
erably in excess of $100.
Third, you ask what our position is regard-
ing the reciprocal establishment of consul-
ates with the USSR while the war in Vietnam
continues. There are no formal proposals
or plans pending for the opening of a US
consulate in the USSR or a Soviet consulate
in the US. The ratification of this treaty
would not automatically lead to the separate
negotiations for the reciprocal opening of
consulates. Secretary Rusk has undertaken
to consult the Senate Foreign Relations Com-
mittee and other interested Senators before
proposing any such- negotiations to the So-
viet Government. Obviously, one or the.ma-
jor factors which Secretary Rusk--and, pre-
sumably, the Senators consulted-would take
into account in considering the exchange of
consulates would be the international en-
vironment, including the. situation in Viet-
nam.
Fourth, you ask whether the US would ac-
cept the demarcation of a consular district
which include any or all the Baltic states
and whether we plan to establish American
consulates in these countries. As a practical
matter if the Soviet Union were divided into
two or more consular districts, the Soviets
would regard the Baltic states as belonging
in one of the districts. We would not wish
to try to exclude the Baltic states from a
consular district for we would wish to con-
tinue to attempt to protect Americans who
might be arrested there, as we do now
through the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Af-
fairs. In any case, this or any other arrange-
ment we might contemplate would have no
bearing on our policy of non-recognition of
the forcible annexation of the Baltic states
by the Soviet Government. As for the ques-
tion of establishing consulates, the most
which we can foresee would be the establish-
ment of one American consulate, probably
in Leningrad. We have no plans to estab-
lish any consulates in the Baltic states,
Fifth, you asked whether the United States
would have to grant immunity unilaterally
to consular officers from countries having
most favored nation clauses in consular
treaties with the US on their request. Spe-
cifically you ask about the case of Yugoslavia.
Countries having most favored nation
clauses in treaties with the United States
would be able to request immunities for their
consular officers only if they are willing to
grant us reciprocal rights. Therefore any
step in this direction would be on the basis
of mutual agreement. Further, if for some
reason we were unwilling to grant these im-
munities we could insist on renegotiation of
the treaty with the country concerned, or if
necessary we could abrogate the most favored
nation clause in this treaty. As a practical
matter we would not contemplate such ac-
tion.
Yugoslavia Is the only communist country
which has consulates in this country and
with which we have a consular treaty con-
taining a most favored nation clause. We
have asked our Embassy in Belgrade whether
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S 39 8 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE
or not they believe that the Yugoslavs would
be interested In seeking immunities for their
consular officers through the operations of the
most favored nation clauses. The Embassy
estimates that Yugoslavia would not be in-
terested in such action as they would be un-
willing to grant similar provisions to em-
ployee:, of our consulate In Yugoslavia. The
Yugoslav Government has not been con-
sulted on this matter.
Finally, you ask about the Department's
policy with respect to the punishment of na-
tionals of communist countries who do not
possess diplomatic Immunity. Such cases, of
course, are within the jurisdiction of State
or Federal law enforcement agencies, depend-
ing upon the nature of the crime In ques-
tion. In the relatively few cases which have
involved some aspect of foreign policy or in-
ternational relations, the Department of
State customarily consults with the other
agencies involved and we have sought to pro-
vide advice which would advance the na-
tional Interest. This has been true whether
the foreign national Involved comes from a
communist country or a non-communist
country.
Please let me know if I can provide you
with further Information on any of these
points. I hope you will be able to support
this important treaty.
sincerely,
WILLIAM B. MACOMBER, Jr.,
As.;istant Secretary for Congressional
.aerations.
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I
suggest the absence of a quorum, with
the time to be taken out on this side.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. With-
out objection, it is so ordered; and the
clerk will call the roll.
The legislative clerk proceeded to call
the roll.
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I
ask unanimous consent that the order
for the quorum call be rescinded.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. With-
out objection, it is so ordered.
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I
yield 20 minutes to the distinguished
minority leader, the Senator frown Illi-
nois I Mr. DIaxsera 1.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The
Senator from Illinois Is recognized for
20 minutes.
Mr. DIRKSEN. Mr. President, from
the day I reached Washington, 34 years
ago this month, I have manifested an in-
terest in Soviet affairs and activities.
It was in November of that year that
Franklin D. Roosevelt brought about the
recognition of the Soviet Union and a
resumption of diplomatic relations with
that country.
The ink on that document was scarcely
dry before infiltration and subversion be-
gan. Nor have my suspicions or doubts
concerning Soviet purposes and objec-
tives been appreciably allayed.
Through the years, I have done my
full share in assailing Soviet efforts to
undermine and weaken our free enter-
prise system.
However, in a third of a century, there
have been changes and developments.
Both nations have grown toward a pop-
ulation of 200 million. Both nations
have moved forward In science, in tech-
nology, in military strength, in modern
weaponry, in diplomatic skill, In the use
of nuclear power, and in industrial
might.
Both nations are members of the
United Nations. Both nations hold per-
manent membership on the Security
Council.
One has pioneered the North Atlantic
Treaty Organization and the other the
Warsaw Pact.
Both participated In World War U.
Both sat at the peace table when the
peace treaties with Austria and Germany
were signed.
Since that time, there have been 21
years of friction, suspicion, and retalia-
tion.
Suppose that in this nuclear age, fric-
tion generates fire and conflict ensues?
Both would be armed with missiles, high-
speed fighters and bombers, and the most
lethal weapons their scientists and tech-
nicians could devise.
The end result would be ghastly.
Neither would win. Neither could win.
Only the Four Horsemen of the Apoca-
lypse can win--especially the Horseman
on the pale horse, for he is the Horseman
of D??ath.
What, then, is the most sacred of the
two most powerful nations on earth?
What is their reciprocal duty-theirs
and ours? Surely, we have a duty, when
an opportunity presents itself, to do
what can be honorably done to dissipate
the frictions which have plagued the re-
lations of these two nations and to pur-
sue a viable pattern of conduct which
may prove, not only mutually benefi-
cial to both, but to the peoples of the
entire world.
Before committing myself to advise
and consent to the pending treaty with-
out amendment or reservation, I went
back to examine the documents of 1933
which became the basis for our recogni-
tion of the Soviet Union.
I reexamined the reports of the House
Committee on Un-American Activities,
even to the days when it was best known
as the Dies committee, and when Martin
Dies of Texas fashioned for himself a
national reputation as Its chairman.
I reexamined the testimony of J. Ed-
gar Hoover before the House Appropri-
ations Committee.
I reexamined all of the Hoover letters,
including the last one, of February 8,
1967.
I carried on a steady flow of corre-
spondence with the State Department
to secure clarification on a number of
matters.
I had the Senate Legislative Counsel
prepare an extensive memorandum on
amendments and reservations and their
effect.
I reread the House report Issued In the
82d Congress, second session, Report
No. 1229, released on December 30, 1951,
and styled "The Shameful Years-30
Years of Soviet Espionage In the United
Stater," a 70-page summation of what
happened in that period.
I went back to reread J. Edgar
Hoover's book, "Masters of Deceit."
I reexamined the staff study made by
the Internal Security Subcommittee of
the Senate Committee on the Judiciary
In the second session of the 88th Con-
gress, at a time when I was a member
of the Internal Security Subcommittee,
and I am still a member of that sub-
committee.
And, finally, I endeavored to read
March 16, 1967
every current article or column on the
Consular Treaty which Caine to my at-
tention.
In all this, I was not uraware of the
campaign being carried on to defeat the
treaty. It recalled earlier haptisms of
fire which showered the Congress, The
first was in the days prior to our entry
into World War II, when the beleaguered
Allies sought weapons and : hips from us.
The cry went up, "Cash and carry"-
"Cash on the barrelhead." One counted
those frost cards and letters not in the
thousands, but in the hundreds of thou-
sands.
I remember when, under the foreign
aid program, we earmarked 375 training
planes for Tito. On that issue I was
excoriated, hanged, drawn, and quar-
tered because I took up th' cudgels for
President Eisenhower.
These misguided baptisms are not
new; they are a test of one's perspective.
One of the tragic things about this
treaty LS the misconceptions that have
developed.
It was alleged that the Soviet Union
was pushing for this treaty. If any-
thing, we were, and we are, the pushers.
In 1959, Vice President Nixon suggested
It to Deputy Prime Minister Koslov in
Moscow, and the Secretary of State, the
late, lamented Christian Herter, was
urging It on Gromyko.
It was, and is, alleged that it can be
done without a treaty. That is only
partially true. The President, without
resort to Congress, can negotiate con-
sular conventions, but not when they
contain an Immunity clause.
It is alleged that the Soviet Union
will scatter consulates all over the
United States. It cannot do so without
our permission. The treaty does not
even authorize consulates. It only pro-
vides the ground rules under which con-
sulates can be established, and they
have to be negotiated later.
It Is said that It will floo?l the United
States with spies. In his letter to the
President on February 8, J. Edgar
Hoover anticipates no difficulty in keep-
ing them under surveillance, and then
adds, "even without additional appro-
priations."
And somehow it is forgotten that we
can denounce the treaty in 6 months if
there should be violations and abuses.
It is said also that similar immunities
must b? extended to 33 nations under
the most-favored-nation clause. That is
true, and it is also true that these na-
tions have already been canvassed.
Eleven of the thirty-three expressed
some interest. Nine of them are in Latin
America. Only two are Iron Curtain
countries.
Mr. President, I ask, if consulates were
so effective as spy nests, a by did the
Soviet Union abandon its consulates
prior to 1948--one in San Francisco, one
in Los Angeles, and one in New York
City?
It is said that American nationals, if
arrested in the Soviet Union, already
have access to an Embassy, and that a
consulate established by Presidential
order would suffice. On November 16,
1933, Maxim Litvinov did, unilaterally,
offer this protection, since it was con-
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 March 16, 1967 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE
S 3929
tained in a treaty with Germany nego- A Journey of 1,000 miles begins with a The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without
tiated on October 12,1925. When World single step. objection, it is so ordered.
War II came, diplomatic relations were Speaking for myself, I would want to Who yields time?
severed. New treaties were negotiated leave some little step on the record. to Mr. MUNDT. Mr. President, I yield
with Germany in 1958, which contained show that my vision was not entirely myself 2 minutes. I do not believe there
no provision for access to our nationals. obscured by the sins, excesses, and out. will be any further requests for time on
Nor are there any U.S.S.R.-U.S. treaties rages of the past. I prefer to face a fu- this side. If not, at the end of 2 minutes
now in effect to which the so-called ac- ture where an iridescent sun is just ris- I shall be happy to yield back the re-
cess provision could attach. ing, not setting, and where there is a mainder of my time.
While the Litvinov offer has never been hope of better understanding. The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Sen-
formally abrogated, the offer, according I remember always, Mr, President, ator from South Dakota is recognized,
to Litvinov's letter, was linked to the ex- Solomon's entreaty to the Lord. He Mr. MUNDT. Mr. President, the time
pectation that the United States and the asked for only one thing. He said: for debating the issues of this monu-
U.S.S.R. would "immediately" negotiate Give thy servant an understanding heart, mental decision is now over, and each of
a consular convention on this subject. us must face up to his responsibilities
Frankly, this was never done. One of Fifty years ago, I was marching up according to the dictates of his own con-
the purposes of this treaty is to establish time's slope, only to be whisked to a science. All I ask and hope is that each
ground rules for just such a negotiation foreign land in uniform, on the western Senator, after prayerful consideration,
when American nationals are arrested front in World War I. Twenty-five, or will vote his convictions; not on the basis
or imprisoned in the Soviet Union. In nearly 25 years ago, a son-in-law, who of any pressures or coercions, but rather
the absence of such a provision, Ameri- is a Member of this body today, came up on the basis of the dictates of his in-
can nationals get the same treatment that same slope, to journey to the un- dividual conscience. I certainly respect
which is accorded to Soviet citizens. stilled waters of the Pacific in a PT the right and the judgment of any Sena-
Much is made of the espionage issue. squadron. Five years hence, Mr. Pxesi- tor to vote in any way on an issue upon
Is there any major nation on earth, be it dent, a grandson who is now marching which we are called to legislate.
the U.S.S.R., the United States, Great up the slope will be registering under the I hope, too, that our vote will be cast
Britain, France, Japan, Germany, or new concept of selective service. If I in each case after a serious analysis of
China, which does not carry on intelli- am still here, what can I say I actually all the available information, of all the
gence activities of some kind? I state did to dissipate the ferment, to dispel facts in this lengthy Record; and of all
parenthetically that after World War I the friction, and to promote better un- the attendant wartime 'circumstances,
came to an end, I found myself suddenly derstanding? and that it will be based on the result
assigned to the second division of the This treaty, Mr. President, may never of that analysis, and not on any second-
General Staff of the U.S. Army. It was materialize our hopes, but it could be a hand secrets or vague promises which
formally known as G2-B, and its work first step in the right direction; and for Senators may have heard during the
was intelligence. I did that intelligence that reason, when the roll is intoned, 1 course of the discussion,
duty in Germany, sometimes in uniform propose to advise and consent to this Mr. President, those of us opposed to
and sometimes in plain clothes. I have treaty. the ratification of this treaty are pre-
some concept of what intelligence activi- The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who pared to rest our case in the hope that
ties are, not only as they pertain to our yields time? whatever verdict the Senate now writes
country, but to other countries, as well. Mr. MUNDT. Mr. President, I do not into the pages of history will be in the
These are but some of the misconceptions see on the floor at the moment either of best interests of the United States.
which have victimized the thinking of two Senators who indicated that they Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I
many people. might or might not want some time in yield- myself 2 minutes,
But, Mr. President, there is one more the concluding minutes of this debate. The PRESIDING OFFICER. The
aspect of the whole matter to be consid- I suppose the best that I can do is to sug- Senator from Montana is recognized
ered, and I deem it to be quite overrid- gest the absence of a quorum temporar- for 2 minutes.
ing, Every 365 days, about 2 million ily, and take it out of my time; and then, Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President,
young Americans march up the slope of if we have any time remaining, if they there is very little that could be added
time and become 18 years of age, wish to say something, it can be done. to what the distinguished minority
Under the proposed changes in the Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, does leader has had to say in his analysis of
Draft Act, they must register. Farther the Senator wish to make further com- the convention now pending before this
down on that slope are other millions of ments himself? body.
American youths who are also marching Mr. MUNDT. Not if any other Senator Relative to the debate, while emotions
to the crest of the hill, to become the wishes to speak, have been aroused from time to time, I
custodians of this land in their time. Mr. MANSFIELD. If he does, I would would say that the debate ',-as been held
But they first march through that period like to proceed for 2 minutes, and then on a good level. Side issues have been
of military vulnerability, if qualified, to yield the lost 2 minutes to him, and then brought in, and great amounts of mail
become our security protection. proceed to a vote. have been received by those for and
Suppose the frictions between the two Mr, MUNDT. All right; we can check, against the convention.
great world powers continue and end in if the Senator cares to do that. The Sen- All of the letters from the Secretary
confrontation. What can we say that ator is entitled to finish the debate, but of State have been read to the Senate,
we really did to diminish this danger? if he wishes to do that, I can rr.;ake a All of the arguments pro and con have
What little thing can we say we ac- telephone call while he is speaking, I do been made in this body. All of the
complished to promote better under- feel obligated to check with the offices of .amendments, reservations, and under-
standing? the two Senators who have indicated they standings have been considered, voted on,
Every year, more and more Americans may wish to speak. and a decision has been reached,
will journey to the Soviet Union. Last Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, how Now, in the Idiom of our time, the
year the number reached about 18,000. many minutes do I have remaining? "crunch" has come, and each Senator
Whenever one is arrested and held for The PRESIDING OFFICER, There must, as we say in my part of the coup-
an unreasonable period without benefit are 7 minutes remaining on each side, try, "Call them as he sees them."
of the counsel of his own countrymen, Mr. MANSFIELD, Mr. President, I Now it is up to us to vote as our con-
there develops an emotional binge suggest the absence of a quorun, the science dictates, to use our own best
which can only widen the chasm of time to come out of both sides. judgment, and to exercise our responsi-
misunderstanding, and generate malice The PRESIDING OFFICER, The bilities as Senators of the United States.
and hate. How long does this fractious clerk will call the roll, I will vote for this treaty because it is
ferment continue? To be sure, a con- The legislative clerk proceeded to call an aboveboard proposal made initially by
sular treaty is such a small step toward the roll. a great President and carried forward by
ameliorating this condition, but it is at Mr. MANSFIELD, Mr. President, I his successors.
least a step. An ancient Japanese ask unanimous consent that the order I will vote for this treaty because it is,
proverb says: for the quorum call be rescinded. I repeat, in the best interests of the
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S3 )930
CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE
United States, and it is in the best in- quirement of the Constitution is a two-
terest of the U.S. citizens who travel in thirds majority of those present and
the Saviet Union. voting, the pair in the affirmative must
Our country and our people are en- have two votes, compared with one for
titled to this consideration In this day the negative.
and these times. Mr. SMATHERS. In that ease, I vote
1 urge the Senate to do this by ratify- "Yea."
tog the convention now before us. The VICE PRESIDENT. The Sen-
Mr. DIRKSEN. Mr. President, before aLor votes "yea,"
we proceed to vote, I would like to di- The assistant legislative clerk con-
rect the attention of the Senate to the cluded the call of the roll.
fact that today is the natal anniversary Mr. BYRD of West Virginia, I an-
of the distinguished majority leader. nounce that the Senator from Idaho
Or, the Old Sod on this day they would 1 Mr. CHURCH] Is absent on official
say: "Up the O'Mansfields." [Ap- business.
plause.I I also announce that the Senator from
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr_ President, I Maryland [Mr. BREWSTER], the Senator
yield back the remainder of my time, from Nevada [Mr. CANNoNl, and the
and I ask for the yeas and nays. Senator from Louisiana [Mr. LONG] are
The yeas and nays were ordered. necessarily absent.
Mr. MUNDT. Mr. President, I yield I further announce that, if present
back the remainder of my time. and voting, the Senator from Nevada
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The [Mr. CANNONI and the Senator from
question is, will the Senate advise and Louisiana [Mr. LONG] would each vote
consent to the resolution of ratification? "nay."
On this question the yeas and nays have IN4r. KUCHEL. I announce that the
been ordered, and the clerk will call the Senator from Massachusetts [Mr.
roll. BROOKE] is absent on official business
The assistant legislative clerk proceded and, if present and voting, would vote
to call the roll. "yea."
Mr SMATHERS (when his name was The yeas and nays resulted-yeas 66,
called). On this vote I have a pair with nay,; 28, as follows:
the distinguished junior Senator from [No. 64 Ex.[
Louisiana [Mr. LONG1. If he were pres-
,,
,,.. ," rf `AS-661
a
A ..
t-- ...-1
en
an
oti g
d vote
n
I were peemitted to vote, I would vote
"yea." I therefore withhold my vote.
Mr. BYRD of West Virginia (when his
name was called). On this vote I have
a live pair with the Senator from Idaho
I Mr. CHURCH I and the Senator from
Maryland [Mr. BREWSTER 1. If they were
present and voting, they would vote
"yea." Were I permitted to vote, I
would vote "nay." I therefore withhold
my vote.
Mr. MUNDT. Mr. President, a par-
liamentary inquiry.
The VICE PRESIDENT. The Senator
will state it.
Mr. MUNDT. I did not hear the
names of the two Senators who paired
with the Senator from Florida.
The VICE PRESIDENT. Will the
Senator restate his inquiry?
Mr. MUNDT. Because of the con-
fusion in the Chamber, I did not hear the
names of the two Senators involved in
the pair with the Senator from Florida.
It takes two on one side and one on the
other to effectuate pair in a treatymak-
ing process. I am sure that both Sen-
ators were mentioned, but I did not hear
their rames mentioned for the Record.
The VICE PRESIDENT. The Sena-
tor from South Dakota has raised a valid
point.
Under the precedent of the Senate, in
a vote on a treaty, a pair requires two
Senators for to one against. In that
instance, the pair of the Senator from
Florida with the Senator from Louisiana
would not be valid.
Mr. SMATHERS. I did not under-
stand the ruling of the Vice President.
The VICE PRESIDENT. The state-
nient of the Vice President Is not in the
nature of a ruling, but a recitation of a
precedent with respect to treaties, that
where there are pairs, because the re-
Aiken
Allot,
Anderson
Baker
Bartlett
Bayh
Bennett
Bogs
Burdick
Carbon
Case
Clark
Cooper
Dtrksen
Dominick
Ellender
Fong
Fulbright
Gore
Gritiln
Harris
Hart
Bible
Byrd, Va.
Cotton
Curtis
Dodd
Eastland
Ervin
Fenni i
Gruelling
Hansen
Brewster
Brooke
Hartke Morton
Hatfield Moss
Hayden Muskie
Hickenlooper Nelson
Inouye Pastore
Jackson Pearson
Javita Pell
Jordan, H.C. Percy
Kennedy, Mass. Prouty
Kennedy, N.Y. Proxmire
Kuchel Randolph
Long. Mo. Ribicoti
Magnuson Scott
Mansfield Smathers
McCarthy Smith
McGee Sparkman
McGovern Spong
McIntyre Symington
Metcalf Tydings
Mondale Williams, N.J.
Monroney Yarborough
Morse Young, Ohio
NAYS-28
Hill Murphy
Holland Russell
Hollings Stennis
Hruska Talmadge
Jordan. Idaho Thurmond
Lau.cche Tower
McClellan Williams, Del.
Miner Young, N. Dak,
Montoya
Mundt
NOT VOTING--e
Byrd, W. Va. Church
Cannon Long, La.
March 16, 1967
fication may differ in particular reasons
for so voting, the fact remains that the
Senate, by its vote, has said unequivo-
cally that the benefits obtained in this
treaty warrant its adoption, that the 18,-
000 or more Americans who visit the So-
viet Union each year deserve the protec-
tions embodied in its pros isions. I per-
sonally believe this is an outstanding
achievement-an achievement that rep-
resents another step in the journey of a
thousand miles-an achievement which
distinguishes this entire body. Clearly,
this was not a partisan issue. It never
has been. Its acceptance by more than
two-thirds of the Senate demonstrates
beyond question its nonpartisan nature,
its bit artisan appeal.
Many Members, however, should be
singled out for particularly strong and
effective efforts, although it is difficult-
perhaps impossible-to list everyone de-
serving credit for an accomplishment of
this magnitude. First and foremost, the
chairman of the Committee on Foreign
Relations, the Senator from Arkansas
[Mr. 1'ULBRICIITI, certainly deserves the
highest credit, praise, and distinction for
his efforts in shepherding this conven-
tion from its very beginning-over 2 years
ago tc' its final ratification today; his
fairness of attitude permitted the fullest
and fairest presentation of view and
viewpoint. The ranking member, the
distinguished senior Senator from Iowa
[Mr. HICKENLOOPER], similarly is to be
commf nded for joining to assure full and
swift action both in committee and on
the floor. And the other members of
the committee, on both sides of the aisle,
demonstrated a spirit of outstanding co-
operation, assuring, first, that the views
of all )n various aspects of the treaty
were presented and then, joining to see
that the measure was reported swiftly.
But particularly, I wish also to thank
the distinguished Senator from Alabama
[Mr. S?ARKMAN] for his highly able and
astute talents in assuring the fullest pres-
entation of argument in favor of ratifi-
cation here on the floor.
The Senator from Kentucky [Mr.
MORTON] deserves a great deal of credit
for his tireless efforts-his indispensable
efforts--to muster the support necessary
for ratification. His role in defining the
issues involved, in articulating the merits
of the convention, were vital to its adop-
tion. Equally strong and articulate was
his colleague from Kentucky [Mr.
COOPER to whom we similarly are in-
debted for adding his immense wisdom
and good judgment to assure ratification.
The vigorous endorsement by the
senior Senator from Louisiana [Mr.
ELLENDERI. the carefully reasoned state-
ment of the senior Senator from Col-
orado [Mr. ALLOTT], and the wise and
ar?ticula ,e support of the senior Senator
from Vermont [Mr. AIKEN] -the rank-
ing Republican-all served to make rati-
fication a certainty.
The entire Senate is indebted also to
the splendid cooperative efforts of the
senior Senator from Maine [Mrs.
SMITH]. Her charm and gt?ace during
the consideration of this measure were
combined with her typically generous
and completely selfless cooperation.
The distinguished minority leader,
the senior Senator from Illinois [Mr.
The VICE PRESIDENT. On this vote
there are 66 yeas and 28 nays. Two-
thirds of the Senators present and voting
having,; voted in the affirmative the reso-
lution of ratification is agreed to.
Mr. FULBRIGHT. I ask unanimous
consent that the President be immedi-
ately notified of the action of the Senate.
The VICE PRESIDENT. Without ob-
jection, the President will be so notified.
Mr. MANSFIELD, Mr. President, in
ratifying the Consular Convention with
the Soviet Union, I believe the Senate has
wisely discharged its constitutional duty
both to "advise" and to "consent."
While each of us who have voted for ratt-
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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE S 3931
DIRKSEN], has demonstrated again the
statesmanship so characteristic of his
public life. History will speak his praise
better than I could attempt at this time.
To be singled out also are the distin-
guished senior Senator from Pennsyl-
vania [Mr. SCOTT], who with the senior
Senator from Kentucky [Mr. MORTON],
rallied the early support for this meas-
ure; the distinguished Senator from New
York [Mr, JAVITS], and the distinguished
senior Senator from Tennessee [Mr.
GORE] added their articulate and elo-
quent support which is not only always
welcome but wise and helpful.
The vote was not unanimous but the
views of those opposing the convention
were just as strong and just as sincere
as those favoring the convention. In
leading the opposition, the senior Sena-
tor from South Dakota [Mr. MUNDT],
employed the same high degree of cour-
tesy and cooperation that has charac-
terized his many years of service in this
body. Joining him, first to voice their
own sincere positions and to cooperate
fully in assuring efficient action, were
the senior Senator from Nebraska [Mr.
HRUSKA], and the senior Senator from
New Hampshire [Mr. COTTON].
To the distinguished Senator from
Nebraska [Mr, CURTIS], and the distin-
guished senior Senator from South Caro-
lina [Mr. THURMOND], we owe our thanks
for cooperating fully to dispose of the
measure in orderly and efficient fashion.
Finally, to the Senate I say again, that
the ratification of the consular conven-
tion has not only distinguished this body,
it has demonstrated that the national
interest is always a bipartisan business.
LEGISLATIVE SESSION
Mr, MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I
ask unanimous consent that the Senate
turn to the consideration of Calendar
No. 73, House Joint Resolution 627, which
I understand will take a very short time.
Mr. HICKENLOOPER. Mr. President,
I object to any unanimous consent until
we can have order in the Chamber, so
that we can hear what is being asked.
The VICE PRESIDENT, The Senate
will be in order.
Without objection, the Senate will re-
sume consideration of legislative busi-
ness.
Mr. HICKENLOOPER. Mr. Presi-
dent, I do not wish to be understood as
continuing an objection to the unani-
mous-consent request, but I could not
hear what was being said. Until we can
understand what is being said, I object.
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, the
Senator is correct. We should have
order.
The VICE PRESIDENT. The Senate
will be in order. Attaches will please
leave the Chamber so that the Senate
can conduct its business.
Mr. HICKENLOOPER. Mr. Presi-
dent, I cannot hear what is going on.
There is too much confusion in the
Chamber. I object to further unani-
mous-consent proceedings until we have
order.
The VICE PRESIDENT. The Chair
will attempt to get order. The Senate
will be in order.
AMENDMENT TO SENATE JO]'NT
RESOLUTION 53
AMENDMENT NO. 130
Mr. MORSE. Mr. President, I wish to
report a comedy of errors. Two days
ago I introduced on behalf of the White
House, Senate Joint Resolution 53, which
is the resolution that sets forth the
President's recommendation to the Con-
gress for a policy to which he would
have us give our advice and consent re-
lating to the expansion of the Alliance
for Progress program.
As the RECORD of March 13 will show, I
arrived on the floor of the Senate fol-
lowing a speech that the majority leader
had made commenting on the President's
message on Latin America. I thought
the majority leader had introduced a
resolution supporting that message. I
then made a speech.
Mr. HICKENLOOPER. Mr. Presi-
dent, I am interested in what the Sena-
tor is talking about. I cannot hear. I
am not going to move over and sit beside
him in order to hear him and I do not
expect him to roar until the rafters ring.
I wish we could have order.
The VICE PRESIDENT. The Chair
will once again attempt to have order in
the Chamber. I would appreciate the
cooperation of Senators and those in the
galleries.
Mr. MORSE. Mr. President, then, as
the RECORD will show, I proceeded to
make a speech joining the Senator from
Montana in support of the President's
message. I then left the Chamber.
I was thereafter phoned by Ambassa-
dor Linowitz, who said he understood
that I had not introduced the resolution.
I advised the Ambassador that it was
not my understanding that I was to in-
troduce the resolution; I thought the
majority leader would introduce the res-
olution. However, I told the Ambassa-
dor that I would proceed immediately to
the floor of the Senate and introduce the
resolution.
I spoke with the majority leader about
the matter and he said he had not in-
troduced the resolution and that he
wanted me to introduce it, and so, I
stood near the majority leader and in-
troduced the resolution, Then, I said,
"Where is it?" He said, "On top of your
desk."
I came over to my desk. Mr, Presi-
dent, I am telling this story because I
think, it is an interesting bit of history.
I found a resolution on the top of my
desk. It was a Xerox copy. I thought
the fact that it was Xerox copy would
be of particular importance to the Am-
bassador. I took the Xerox resolution to
the desk and handed it In. It seems,
however, that during my absence some-
one had made some changes on the
Xerox copy of the administration reso-
lution. They apparently thought some
modifications would be appropriate and
they planned to discuss them with me
before the resolution was Introduced, I
did not know about this offer of advice,
and since I did not know about it the
resolution was introduced with some
modifications written in and certain
language stricken.
Mr. President, I now make the follow-
Ing offer to the Senate: I submit an
amendment to Senate Joint Resolution
53, which strikes all after the resolving
clause and insert the original language
sent to me by the White House.
The VICE PRESIDENT. Without ob-
jection, the amendment will be received,
appropriately referred, and printed In
the RECORD.
The amendment (No. 130) was referred
to the Committee on Foreign Relations,
as follows:
Strike out all after the resolving clause and
insert the following:
"That the Congress recommends, in sup-
port of the concept of a Latin American
Common Market and after appropriate steps
have been taken toward progressive estab-
lishment of such a market, that the United
States furnish through the Inter-American
Development Bank standby resources to be
matched by Latin American countries to pro-
vide integration adjustment assistance to
facilitate the transition to a fully functioning
Latin American Common Market.
"The Congress further recommends that
the United States join with the other mem-
bers of the Inter-American Development
Bank, in the provision of resources to that
institution to be used for financing multi-
national projects which promote Latin Amer-
ican economic integration.
"That the Congress support individual and
joint efforts of the member states of the
Organization of American States to expand
trade within the region and with other areas
of the world and to mobilize public and pri-
vate resources inside and outside the hemi-
sphere to. further the economic development
of Latin America.
"Further, the Congress recommends that
the United States provide an increase in as-
sistance under the Alliance for Progress for
programs of educational and agricultural
modernization and improvement of health.
The nature and amount of such assistance
is to be dependent on demonstrated need
and adequate self-help within the recipient
countries.
"The Congress recommends that the United
States be prepared to make available sig-
nificant additional resources over a period
of five years in support of the foregoing
objectives and in relation to progress by the
Latin American countries toward the goals
of economic integration and in the mobiliza-
tion of domestic efforts and resources to
advance the purposes of the Alliance for
,Progress."
Mr. HICKENLOOPER. Mr. President,
I wish to address a question to the Sena-
tor from Oregon. Is my name on that
resolution?
Mr. MORSE. The name of the Sena-
tor from Iowa is on both of them.
Mr. President, I want the record to be
perfectly clear that this substitute is in-
troduced on behalf of the Senator from
Iowa [Mr. HICKENLOOPERI, the Senator
from Montana [Mr. MANSFIELD], the Sen-
ator from New York [Mr. JAVITSI, and
the Senator from Florida [Mr, SMATH-
ERSI.
ADDRESS BY SENATOR PERCY BE-
FORE THE AMERICAN ASSOCIA-
TION OF SCHOOL ADMINISTRA-
TORS IN ATLANTIC CITY, N.J.
Mr. PROUTY. Mr. President, my
good friend, the junior Senator from Illi-
nois [Mr. PERCY] recently made some
interesting observations in an address
before a convention of the American As-
sociation of School Administrators in
Atlantic City, N.J.
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S 3932 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE
This speech is a timely dissertation
concerning the progress which Project
IIeacistart has made in the field of edu-
cation. I believe it important that this
speech be brought to the attention of my
colleagues, however, because it also dis-
cussed the future possibilities of the
Headstart Program and suggests certain
lines along which this program may be
further developed.
TI-,is address, Mr. President, reflects
the distinguished Senator's grave con-
cern and deep compassion for the terrible
disadvantages faced by the children of
poverty in the field of education.
As the Senator so aptly points out,
Headstart has already made a lasting
contribution to American education in
that it has dramatically cast the spot-
light on the significance of early educa-
tion and on the untapped potention of
the early years.
Mr. President, it gives me great pleas-
ure to request unanimous consent that
this line statement by the junior Senator
from Illinois be printed in its entirety at
this point in the RECORD.
There being no objection, the state-
ment was ordered to be printed in the
RECORD, as follows:
ADDRESS BY SENATOR CHARLES H. PERCY TO THE
AMERICAN ASSOCIATION OF SCHOOL ADM1N-
ISTLATORS, ATLANTIC CITY, N.J., FEB. 12,
1967
As a nation, we have committed much to
education, but we have not yet committed
enough..
There is one area of education In which we
have made important progress in the recent
past, but in which we must move far more
boldly in the near future.
I speak of early education.
The nation has lately embarked on a
great experiment to prepare children from
severely disadvantaged families for school.
And It Is evident already that this experi-
ment--Project Head Start-is a success In
terms of its limited scope. Certainly, it has
been by far the most successful of all the war
on poverty programs.
For a long time, It had been obvious that
children of poverty came to school initially
less well prepared than middle-class children,
and fell further behind each year. They
were thus subect to a vicious cycle of in-
adequate education, low occupationl skill,
low income, and renewed poverty.
Pro ect Head Start was designed to help
break this cycle at perhaps its most critical
point. during a child's formative years. One
of its chief aims is to meet what one expert
calls "the chronic-failure syndrome-the
giving up before you start." It is an effort
to give children from severely limited home
environments something of what other chil-
dren take for granted.
A child who has never see a b(x)k. never
used a pencil, a child who confuses a teddy
bear with a rat because a rat is the only
animpl he knows, a child who may not even
know his own name-and there have been
many such children In Head Start-a child
who is a stranger to the simple words and
conceits that are a part of his contempora-
ries' environment, such a child starts out at
terrible disadvantage. And we can make our
ideas of equal opportunity meaningful only
if we do in fact equalize opportunity at this
nios: !ritical of formative stages.
We court disaster when we neglect these
children, for neglect will result In lives filled
with resentment and frustration. By ne-
^lect, we invite another round, another lost
generation, in that cycle of poverty and
alienation.
But. given a little assist at this critical
time, they can be well started toward lives
as 'iseful and productive citizens.
I t will be some years before we know pre-
cisely how successful Head Start will be In
achieving this long-range goal. But already
we know that Head Start children have a
jump on other disadvantaged children in
significant ways:
A Head Start child's health has been at-
tended to; he is used to a good deal of per-
sonal attention when he needs help: he re-
ceives more support for his school activities
at home because of the direct parent-teacher
con^.act that Head Start encourages. The
Head Start child Is better prepared for school,
and frequently his readiness can be seen
in terms of subsequent academic achieve-
ment.
Dramatic gains on standardised intelli-
gence tests and in language ability have been
found in several follow-up studies. These
have been coupled with Indirect evidence of
greater motivation and Interest in school.
These, then, have been some of the ac-
complishments of Head Start. Unfortu-
nately. the coin has another side which is
not so bright. Perhaps the words of one
Head Start teacher can best describe part of
the problem.
"It's not that the regular teachers push
then back down," she says, "but, unless
the teachers are better than average, they
do cut off the gay, conquering spirit that
these kids have been taught. In fact, there
were teachers last year who complained that
they had to have the Head Start kids be
quiet while they brought the rest of the
children up to their level."
What emerges here is the fact that most
children have to adjust when they switch
from Head Start to school because in many
cases they are taking a step backwards. The
result is that much too often, the educa-
tional head start is washed away for lack of
an adequate followthrough.
For example. Baltimore's Head Start pro-
gram was considered one of the nation's best,
but follow-up studies showed that the chil-
dren's gains declined as their first full year
of school progressed.
The fact Is that an eight-week summer
program cannot fully compensate for four
or n?re years of lost ground. And unless Head
Start is followed through in the classroom,
It can be next to meaningless.
In Chicago, I've been Involved personally
for ,hp past two years in our own private
Head Start-type program. This has been
year-round. Sponsored jointly by the New
Illinois Committee and the Cook County Re-
publican Central Committee. we've been see-
Ing what can be done by giving Head Start-
type help to children on a continuing basis.
The results have been highly promising.
Unless we find ways to fund more Head
Stare classes on it year-round basis, those
earls first steps will lead to nowhere.
In this regard. I was gratified to heir the
President affirm in his State of the Union
message that the Administration wished to
strengthen the Head Start program. The
following week again, In his Economic Mes-
sage, he promised "an expanded Head Start
program."
However. when I sat down one night to
examine the budget, I discovered that Head
Start is not being expanded. The same
number of children will be served In the
new fiscal year as in the last fiscal year. Last
year there were 550.000 children In the sum-
nmer program and 187.000 in the full academic
year program or a total of 737,000 children.
This year's budget calls for the same number,
737,(00. Not only are we standing still as
far as the number of children are concerned,
but less money has been requested by the
Administration to fund this year's program.
President Johnson has actually requested 15
March 16, 1.967
million dollars less this year than last to
pay for the Head Start program.
I fall to understand hove this is either
"strengthening" or "expanc.ing" the Head
Start program; I only hope that the Con-
gress will do better by Head Btart than allow
it to s'.and still.
Head Start must be broadened and im-
proved, but already it has made one lasting
contribution to American education: as
nothirg before it or since, it has dramatically
cast the spotlight on the significance of early
education and on the untapped potential of
the early years. In only twc years, this one
new Federal program increased preschool en-
rollment by 17 per cent. Last summer,
nearly one-half of the nation's more than
3000 counties had at least one Head Start
center Already. Head Start has touched the
lives of over a million underprivileged
American children.
The impact of this has been great. For
the nation is becoming increasingly aware of
all that can be gained In a child's early
years--and of all that is lost if we ignore
those "ears.
The evidence offered in this area by such
men as Chicago's Benjamin Bloom and J.
McV. Hunt of the University of Illinois is
persuasive: the evidence that an individual's
achievement in life depends to a great extent
on what he has been helped to learn before
the age of four; the evidence that children's
intellectual and emotional development is
capable of greater strides during the years
before age 6 than at any time thereafter;
the evidence that these ar> the years of
greatest susceptibility to environmental in-
fluenceg-the years when the roots of intel-
lectual curiosity are laid.
Cons ersely, it Is in the early years that
deprivi.tion is most disastrocs in its effects.
Many experts believe that millions of chil-
dren are being Irreparably dt.maged because
they do not learn enough during this crucial
period.
The lack of any planned ini ellectual train-
ing in the early years all too often results
in precrdained failure In schcol and In adult
life. Ilead Start is trying to cope with this
problem in our poverty communities.
But oven for children who cannot be called
disadvantaged, the lack of early intellectual
training may result in a loss of natural gifts,
a less interesting life, a diminished intel-
lectual curiosity, a smaller contribution to
society.
Pre-t,chool education has long been avail-
able to the rich, who could afford private
nursery schools and kindergarten; now we
are making it available to the poor through
Head Start. But what about the great num-
bers in the middle?
I think we must be careful lest middle
America becomes the newly disadvantaged
educationally. And that it why I was
enormously excited last May when the Edu-
cational Policies Commission of the N.E.A.
and the A.A.S.A. recommended that free pub-
lic schooling at the age of four be made
available to all children. I want you to
know that you have a new vcIce in the Sen-
ate who will champion your cause there.
Five million children in he 4-to-5 age
bracket. are not now in schoo. We must do
much better than that. We can't afford not
to.
Does this mean an earlier start on the
regular course curriculum? Not at all. It
means that the program for 6-year olds
would be altered to take into account the
earlier schooling, not vice versa. It means a
special environment tailored to the special
needs of early childhood. It means staffing
by early childhood specialists with the pro-
fessional skills and personal I.bilities needed
to prevent future school failure on the one
hand, iEnd to help pave the way toward fu-
ture excellence on the other. It means en-
couraging the child to develop his innate
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