WASHINGTON: VIETNAM AND THE PRESS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP70-00058R000300010060-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 1
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 13, 2000
• Sequence Number: 60
• Publication Date: June 29, 1966
• Content Type: NSPR

CPYRG~T ved For Release 2001/08/20 : CIA-RDP70-00058R0
0
CPYRGHT
NEW YORK TIMES
JUN -2 9 1966
Washington: Vietnam and the Press
By JAMES 1 ESTON
o ns n is reported
be furious about several rec,en
disclosures in the press about
his military plans in Vietnam,
and this time he has some rea-
son to complain.
In recent days the papers
have been full of speculation
that the bombing of the enemy's
oil refineries and power plants
Yin the Hanoi and Haiphong re-
I gions was imminent, and this
goes beyond the proper bounds
,,of public military information.
Public discussion of the wis-
ldom or stupidity of extending
E'the bombing to the populous
''+'Areas of these two cities is fair
'enough, but public disclosure of
tithe timing- of operational mili-
rta.ry plans is not,
Johnson's Tip
Inevitably, it puts the enemy]
on tactical alert for a militar
exercise that depends largely
for its success on tactical sue'
prise, and if the carrier-base'
pilots and bombardiers hav'.
protected this disclosure, they,
are well within their rights.
Most of the North Vietna-4
mese antiaircraft equipment,,
supplied by the Soviets, is moi
bile. With a few days' advancer
notice, it can be moved into'
position to defend the critical
targets around Hanoi and Hai-
phong, thus raising the risk to
the American planes, which
have had enough trouble with
the enemy's ground-to-air mis-
siles, and particularly its radar-
controlled antiaircraft guns, in
the past.
Ironically, President Johnson
himself started the speculation
in the, press by the statement in
his lst news conference that
"We must continue to raise the
cost of aggression." This could
mean only one thing-that the
long campaign by the joint
series and the power plants had
finally succeeded, and it was so
interpreted in most paper,
War always raises delicate
and even dangerous complica-
tions in the relations between
officials and reporters, but
Vietnam has raised more than
most. The normal restraints of
a declared war have not always
been present in this conflict,
The private conferences be
tween Gen, George C. Mar-
shall with the Washington
bureau chiefs in the last Worlri
War which did so much to keep
this problem under control, have
otbeen repeated as regularly
r effectively in this one.
Also, the Administration's re-
lation,a with reported,-; in the
Vietnam war have been poisoned
by a long-record of misleading
statements by generals in the
field and officials in Washing-
ton about. how well, . the war
was going, how well the vari-
ous Saigon Governments were
doing; etc. The result is that
there is now little faith here in
the press about the official pro-
nouncements on the war.
FOIAB3B
and space operations. The tech-
nical journals exerted them-
selves to give the American
public, and hence the Soviet
Union, the details of radar
screens and the like,. which for
geographic reasons, to be ef-
fective, had to be placed on the
territory of friendly countries
close to the Soviet Union.
No Need to Tinow
Finally, the policy of raising "These countries," Mr. Dulles
the'level of the bombing and ex- continued, "were quite willing,
tending it to targets around to cooperate as long as secrecy
Hanoi and Haiphong has been could be preserved. This whole
bitterly contested here and in vital operation was threatened-
other world capitals for,months, by public disclosure,... Except
and those who have been ad-- for a small number of techni-
vocating such a policy have not cally minded people, such dis-'
been able to conceal their satis- closures added little to the wel-
faction that the President has fare or happiness or even to the
apparently now agreed to take knowledge of the American peo-
the larger risk. ple. Certainly this type of in-
Aa,bits of the Past formation did not fall in the.
need to know' category for the,
The question of printing a American public."
good story has been a problem The same is undoubtedly true';
ever since the beginning of the of the actual battlefield plans of
cold. Z. Allen Dulles. former the Government in ,Vietnam.
hcacl-if the Cell tral7il eljipenGe Some of us think it is a tragic
P 0 .l Cy, iihusti alga it in .his book , blunder to extend the bombing
i~Graft of Intelligence." "I to Hanoi and Haiphong, but the
reca,.1," he wrote, "the days right of dissent does not extend.
when the` Intelligence commu-' to publishing operational plans
pity was perfecting plans for that help the enemy and in-:
various technical devices to crease .the risk to ?pur' own .1_
Approved For Release 2001/08/20 : CIA-RDP70-00058R000300010060-1