THE SECRET SURRENDER BY ALLEN DULLES

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP70-00058R000300010059-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 13
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 13, 2000
• Sequence Number: 59
• Publication Date: July 1, 1966
• Content Type: MAGAZINE

 JULY 1966
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Harper's
The Secret Surrender
Part I: Opening the Intrigue with Hitler's Generals
By Allen W. Dulles
Since his retirement in 1961 from the Central Intelligence Agency, which he di-
rected for Presidents Eisenhower and Kennedy, Mr. Dulles has spent much of his
time writing a personal account of one of the great intelligence feats of World War
II. Here, for the first time, he tells how he conducted the hidden and perilous nego-
tiations which led to the collapse of the Nazi armies in North Italy.
Mr. Dulles' long, varied, and unstinting service to the United States began in
1916 and included four years as head of the OSS in Switzerland, the key intelligence
post in Europe during the war against Hitler. This narrative excerpt, and a con-
cluding one next month, are taken from his book, "The Secret Surrender," which
will be published by Harper & Row next October.
A few days before the end of World War II in
Europe, on the evening of May 2, 1945, Winston
Churchill made a surprise appearance in the
House of Commons. The atmosphere was charged
with expectation. Yet the Prime Minister did not
immediately intervene in the debate which was
then in progress. Whetting the appetites, as he was
wont to call it, he glanced through his notes before
asking the Speaker's indulgence to make a brief
statement. Then, without flourish or rhetoric, let-
ting the bold facts speak for themselves, he quietly
announced the first great German surrender to the
Allies of World War II. Close to a million men had
capitulated unconditionally in Northern Italy. The
war against Nazism and Fascism on that front
was over.
Behind this announcement lay a dramatic chain
of events. Since the end of February 1945, emis-
saries and messages had been passing secretly be-
tween the OSS mission in Switzerland, of which I
was in charge, and German generals in Italy. For
two crucial months the commanders of armies
locked in battle had maintained secret communica-
tions through my office in Bern, seeking the means
to end the fighting in Italy, hoping that a Nazi
surrender there would bring in its wake a general
surrender in Europe.
What prevented our early success was the stub-
born and insane policy of one man. Adolf Hitler.
Despite the hopeless position of his armies, he
would not countenance any surrender anywhere.
The generals on both sides, Allied and German,
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CP38RGH THE SECRET SURRENDER
had long known the war could have only one mili-
tary outcome. It was merely a question of time
and of how the end could be brought about, Could
there be an orderly German surrender, or. would
we be left with chaos and a vacuum of power in
those parts of Europe left by the retreating Nazi,
armies? From reports reaching us it was clear
that when the German military defenses finally
crumbled, Hitler hoped to drag all of Europe down
with him. The German Army leaders had orders
to "scorch the earth," to wreck what was left of the
industry and economy of the countries they had `
occupied, and even of Germany itself.
We learned from German sources,, however, that
our policy of unconditional surrender constituted
a deterrent, or at least an excuse, to German gen
erals who might otherwise have been willing to
act against Hitler. Several top generals whom the
conspirators in the July 20, 1944, attempt to kill
Hitler had approached had been unwilling to take
part in the plot and to assume the political respon-
sibility involved because the unconditional sur
render policy, as they understood it, meant that
Germany would be treated with the same harsh-
ness by the Allies whether .the surrender came
early through steps taken by Germans who dared
defy Hitler, or later through the actions of Hitler
himself or his henchmen..
In addition to the unconditional-surrender
slogan, there were other roadblocks to getting a
German surrender. The hopes entertained by the
Nazis that they could hold out in an Alpine fortress
bedeviled our progress. And so, did the myth of the
"stab in the back." This idea was originally gen-
erated after Ludendorff and other German gen-
erals in World War I claimed that they had been
lured into an armistice in November'1919 by the
promises of Woodrow Wilson and his Fourteen
Points. Weakness and even treachery were attrib-
uted to some of the German political leaders of that
day, who, the myth goes, had undermined the will
of the German people to resist and had forced the
German generals to surrender even when they
were still undefeated on the battlefield. Strangely
enough, this myth affected not only the attitude
weapon which would change the whole course of
the war. And this claim was not as foolish as
it may appear today. After all, we were not the
only ones working on the atom bomb, and the V-1
and V-2 weapons were already in production.
The final myth impeding progress toward a
surrender was that of coming Allied dissension.
Hitler unflaggingly nourished the illusion that the
Anglo-American Allies and Russia would quarrel
and that he could then make a deal with one or
the other of them. This myth grew apace at the
time of Franklin Delano Roosevelt's death on
April 12, 1945.
"Peace" Begins to Crop Up
.'Some of the main obstacles to peacemaking had
been created by Hitler much earlier. Of these, the
Nazi oath of loyalty taken by every soldier and
officer in the German Army was no doubt the most
potent. The oath read as follows :
I swear before God to give my unconditional
and of the German people, Supreme Commander
of the Wehrmacht, and I pledge my word as a
at the peril of my life.
The distinctive feature of this oath was that it
pledged the military to the person of Adolf Hitler,
as leader and commander, and not simply to coun-
try and flag. Today, far removed from the scene
in time and spirit, we find it difficult to form a
notion of the awesome power the Nazi oath had in
the minds of the German officers.
Once the July 20th plot had failed, the generals
-singly or as a group-were still less prone to try
to influence the course of the war, either by direct
.representation to Hitler or by action taken behind
his back. For Hitler's awareness of their treachery
had turned him fanatically against the military
caste. Even generals who had had no par`, in the
assassination attempt had to fear the slightest
appearance of treason.
After the 20th of July, aside from close personal
of many Germans. It also influenced the thinking advisers like Bormann and Goebbels, Hitler relied
of the Allied political leaders in Washington and . almost solely on the SS for the execution of his
London. The war against the Nazis and German policies and for his own protection. The SS was,
militarism, many of them said, must be fought to of course, precisely the faction which the Allies
the bitter end this time. They did not want the would be least disposed to recognize as spokesmen
Germans ever to be able to deny that Germany of a surrender and whose removal and punishment
had been thoroughly defeated on the field of battle. would be one of the prime considerations of Allied
Hitler used still another myth, one about new policy. Thus. the outlook for early peace was ex-
German miracle weapons, to discourage any move ' ceedingly bleak.
toward surA3 vLB f2 d 2 1'I ~ :CIA-~I I?6g 00'3~~13~ 5'~ 44-4G, how-
his troops that he had in reserve some kind of. new ever, we became aware of certain stirrings to the
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CPYRGHT
south of us, certain changes in the political
weather in North Italy. The word "peace" began
to crop up repeatedly. We were suspicious from the
start because the dreaded SS rather than the Army
most often seemed the interested party in these
peace feelers. Still, churchmen frequently ap-
peared as intermediaries or emissaries, and one of
the most dramatic reports we got stated that Field
Marshal Albert Kesselring, commander of the
German armies in Italy, was ready to quit if the
Allies would offer acceptable terms. A few weeks
after that, we heard from an Austrian agent who
had been sent by Ernest Kaltenbrunner himself,
the most powerful man in the SS Security Services
after Himmler. His message rang a new change
and, if it were true, gave some inkling of the con-
flict within the Nazi leadership. Kaltenbrunner
wanted us to know that he and Himmler were anx-
ious to end the war and were contemplating
liquidating the warmongers within the Nazi party.
They wanted contact with the British and Ameri-
cans.
By the end of February 1945, we had talked to
several churchmen and industrialists whom the SS
-not the Army-had sent to us as emissaries. Any
connections to the Army had been a result of our
own initiative-and were fruitless. Among the SS
feelers, it was still impossible to tell whether the
men who had allowed
their names to be used
were acting on their own
or on higher authority
and, more importantly,
whether any of them had
anything to deliver. It is
no wonder, then, that
when still another probe
bearing all the familiar
earmarks reached us, we
were not especially en-
thusiastic.
I heard about it first on
February 28, 1945, at a
meeting with Gero v. S.
Gaevernitz and Major
Max Waibel of Swiss
Military Intelligence.
Gaevernitz is a natural-
ized American, German
by birth, who had busi-
ness interests and family
holdings in Switzerland
and who remained there
after the outbreak of war
largely because he fore-
by Allen W. Dulles 39
himself useful in the anti-Hitler cause. He was
deeply motivated by the conviction that Germany
had never been so thoroughly permeated by
Nazism as the world was inclined to believe, and
that there were many people in Germany in high
positions both civilian and military who were
ready to join any workable undertaking that would
get rid of Hitler and the Nazis and put an end
to the war. Then in his early forties, Gaevernitz
was a tall, handsome man with a great capacity
for making friends. Indeed, on innumerable occa-
sions, I enlisted his aid, and we have collabo-
rated both in the writing of the book, The Secret
Surrender, and in preparing this article. For
many months he and I had been working closely
with Waibel, and a strong bond both of friendship
and of professional trust and understanding had
grown up among us. Naturally we shared the
desire to know what the Germans were planning.
This was almost as vital to the Swiss as it was to
the Americans.
That day Waibel had been contacted by an Ital-
ian and a Swiss. The Italian, a businessman whose
name meant nothing to us at the time, was Baron
Luigi Parilli. The Swiss was Professor Max Hus-
mann, who ran a well-known private school not
far from Lucerne. One of Baron Parilli's relatives
had attended Husmann's school, and this was the
saw that he m rimubd For Ref saVO0A11OSkM:(GtA-RG Z@tf30A&8R000300010059-3
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CPYRGHT
40 THE SECRET SURRENDER
slender link that had led Parilli to tell Husmann
his plan. Husmann, hearing what Parilli had to
say, had come to Waibel, whom he had known be-
fore, and Waibel had turned to us. It was a mat-
ter, Waibel explained, which could not be handled
by the Swiss, but only by the Allies. At the same
time, he assured us, the Swiss had a very deep and
natural interest in any project which would bring
an early peace and spare North Italy from destruc-
tion.
The Baron and the Professor
What did Parilli want? What was he. offering?
For the details Waibel suggested we talk directly
to the two men. I considered this for a moment and
decided it would be premature to entangle myself
personally with an unknown emissary who might
be acting on his own, or worse, be the agent in
a German attempt to penetrate our mission. Gaev-
ernitz was ideally suited for the task. He had been
working very closely with me for some time, knew
my views and methods, and was eminently capable
of forming an accurate opinion as to the genuine-
ness of peace probes of this kind.
Gaevernitz reported to me the next day. At
first the two men had struck him as unlikely con
tacts to the armed forces of Marshal Kesselring
and the black-booted SS in Italy. The Italian
Baron was a short, slight, bald gentleman with
ingratiating manners-as Gaevernitz put it, a bit
like the keeper of asmall Italian hotel who is try-.
ing to persuade you to take your dinner there. Hus-
mann was talkative, given to sweeping generalities,
and quite pompous in the delivery of them. During
the pauses in Parilli's account the Professor lec-
tured on peace and international understanding,
which were as dear to our hearts as to his, but to
which the session in progress did not seem to be
bringing us any closer. Parilli hedged when
pressed for the names of the people he was repre-
senting. He kept on the theme of the coming horror
of German vengeance in North Italy. He had had
an inspiration, he declared, that he had been
"chosen" to find the solution, to be the intervening
"angel" for North Italy.
At last Parilli began to elaborate on the idea
that the SS in Italy were somewhat different than
you might expect. It was the SS, not the German
Army, that might be capable of some independent
thought and action-certain people in the SS, any-
chief of counterespionage in the SS intelligence
office in Genoa. Zimmer, despite his membership in
the SS, was a devout Catholic, an aesthete, and
an intellectual. According to Parilli, he was moved
by a desire to save the art and religious treasures
as well as the industrial and power plants in
Northern Italy. The talks between them had
reached a point at which Zimmer. carefully
broached the whole problem to a top SS official
whom he knew, Colonel Eugen Dollmann. To
Zimmer's great relief Dollmann had listened to
him with apparent sympathy, and had said that he
would pass Zimmer's views to his chief, General
Karl Wolff, commander of all SS units in Italy.
Parilli did not know what had happened after that.
He and Zimmer, he said, had developed a plan of
trying to get to Switzerland, to search out a con-
nection with the Allies. On his own, Parilli had
applied to the Italian authorities for an exit per-
mit for "economic reasons." Somewhere in the
German SS command the word was given to let
Parilli take his trip.
Gaevernitz was not overly impressed by all this.
He thanked Parilli for informing him of his con-
tacts and his good intentions and said that a
talk with Dollmann or Wolff or preferably Marshal
Kesselring might be worthwhile. Beyond that one
could not go at the moment.
To our surprise,.a few days after these meetings
we had an urgent call from Waibel. Parilli had ,
returned. Not only that; with him were Colonel
Dollmann and Guido Zimmer. Their presence in
Switzerland would be kept secret, but they would
have to return to Italy shortly. It was up to us to
see what we could extract from them.
Wolff : The Prime Mover
t struck me as a good idea to try out another
intermediary on these emissaries, one who so far
had had nothing to do with this particular opera-
tion. The man I had.in mind was Paul Blum, a
trusted member of my Bern staff and an excellent
judge of people.
On March 3, Paul met in Lugano with Parilli,
l:'ollmann, Zimmer, and Husmann. Dollmann, with
his dark look, his long black hair combed back and
curling a little over his ears, struck Paul as a
slippery customer who knew much more than he
was telling. Captain Zimmer, good looking and
clean-cut, was obviously in a subordinate po-
way. Who? How did he know? Gaevernitz kept sition, and hardly opened his mouth. Paul quickly
pissing for proof. Finally the Baron mentioned learned that Dollmann would try to persuade Gen-
his doe APO# jjgWtI.ppw eag1@ngp ~r ?CIA_R}O MON688RUOogg~~ b5t?a3Switzerland to
certain Guido Zimmer, who until recently had been continue the talks if there were any hope of estab-
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by Allen W. Dulles
lishing contact with the Allies. No claims were
made that Dollmann spoke for Kesselring, nor did
anyone promise to produce him.
Before the meeting I had decided that it was
high time we had concrete evidence of the German
emissaries' seriousness and of their authority. I
had given Paul a slip of paper on which two names
were written: Ferruccio Parri and Antonio Usmi-
ani. Parri was one of the heads of the Italian
resistance. Usmiani had been doing military in-
telligence work for me in North Italy and had
rendered gallant services. Both had been caught by
the SS police and both were being held in prison.
I proposed, therefore, that General Wolff demon-
strate the seriousness of his intentions by releas-
ing these two hostages to me in Switzerland.
Parri was probably the most important Italian
prisoner the SS held.
Had we known at that time the anxiety of the
German chieftains in Italy about their military
situation, we would have been less surprised than
we were at what came next. We knew that many of
them were willing to pay a price to achieve a sure
line of communications with the Allies but they
knew they were risking their lives in giving to us
a hostage of Parri's stature. Furthermore, the
three representative components of German power
in North Italy-the Army, the diplomats, and the
SS-had little reason to like or trust one another.
And within the ranks of each of these three
groups, everyone knew that his closest associates
-out of fear or loyalty to Hitler, real or,feigned-
might betray to the Gestapo the least sign of wa-
vering from Hitler's order to fight to the finish.
Even with the historical records we now have,
it is difficult to reconstruct the way the idea of
a separate Italian surrender grew, and how the
various partners to it gradually approached each
other. No doubt something in the atmosphere of
Italy nurtured it. The people there were remote
from the main European fighting front and from
the German heartland. The Church was a mollify-
ing influence. And these factors, combined with
the particular type of men who happened to be on
the scene, must account for it. One thing at least is
certain. The prime mover in the end was SS Ober-
gruppenfflhrer Karl Wolff.
To supervise all SS activities, both police and
military, a position existed in most German-dom-
inated areas which was called the Higher SS and
Police Leader. Normally, this is what Wolff's title
should have been but Himmler wanted him to have
1 standing in the eyes oo{f both Mussolini and }Kes}se~l-
ring. Acco~f ~~tSg8 d
created for Pm. "I the other osses o an
police were Higher SS and Police Leaders, then
Wolff would have to be Highest SS and Police
Leader. He was responsible directly to Himmler
and of course to the Ft hrer. He was sent to Italy
as Himniler's personal representative to keep order
in an area which, at the time of his arrival in 1943,
stretched from north of Naples to the Brenner
Pass. He was to be Mussolini's adviser in police
matters, and no doubt he was to keep a close eye
on Mussolini and his Salo government for Himm-
ler's benefit as well. But Wolff was also to work
with Kesselring in coordinating the disposition of
his SS forces with those of the Army.
To do all this, Wolff was given still another
title: Plenipotentiary General of the Armed
Forces for the rear combat areas of Italy. As the
Nazi power dwindled, titles grew. This new title
meant, of course, that if any question of authority
between SS police and military forces should arise
in the North Italian area, Wolff could intervene to
coordinate matters.
Who was this Karl Wolff on whom Himmler
showered favors and in whom he had such trust?
The facts about him are briefly these. Before he
arrived in Italy in 1943, he had been the chief of
Himmler's personal staff and one of the liaison
officers between Himmler and Hitler-that is, be-
tween the SS top command and Hitler's headquar-
ters. At times, he was also liaison between Himm-
ler and Ribbentrop-i.e., between the SS and the
Foreign Office. Thus he was not primarily either
a commander of troops or a police official. Rather,
he was a kind of diplomat or political adviser to
the SS leaders. He had unobtrusively slipped into
very high places as a man who could manage other
men by dint of his personal qualities.
Shortly before coming to Italy, he had broken
one rule of the SS which Himmler could not lightly
forgive. He was married and had four children
but, early in 1943, he decided to marry another
woman. He went to Himmler with his request for
a divorce (every marriage and divorce in the up-
per ranks of the SS required Himmler's approval).
Himmler turned him down; his own Chief of Staff
could not be allowed to set such an example. With-
out a word to Himmler, Wolff then went to Hitler
and asked for his permission. Hitler gave it. Ac-
cording to many accounts, this incident, which
annoyed Himmler, was one of the reasons he
packed Wolff off to Italy. A top SS official was
needed there and while there were other more ex-
perienced SS administrators, Wolff had the rank,
and the personal qualifications for the job and
Hitler apparently still thought highly of him.
CIA- 0W8 VgK n May 1944
hat a`was rea y o comma rs own life to the
cause of peace." Few knew he had seen the Pope;
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42 THE SECRET SURRENDER
0710 of Mese few was e u iqui ous o mann, an
it was he who seems to have been Wolff's eyes and
ears in sounding out like-minded, potential sup-
porters in a conspiracy for peace.
Hitler's Promises Were Lies
When Dollmann, according to a report he wrote
after the war, was in Florence in July of 1944, he
received an invitation to visit the commander of
the German Air Force in Italy, General Max
Ritter von Pohl, at his headquarters outside Flor-
ence. To his surprise, Pohl opened up at once with
a hard-hitting statement on the absurdity of con-
tinuing the war and the hopelessness of convinc-
ing Hitler that it had to be stopped. The idea which
was really the key to the whole surrender in Italy
was clearly formulated by Pohl on this occasion,
almost a year before the event. Pohl told Dollmann
that an agreement would have to be made with
the Western powers without Hitler's knowledge.
The Army, with its cast-iron notions of loyalty to
the Fiihrer's oath, could not be called on to take
any action. The SS was the one organization left
in Germany with sufficient authority to carry out
negotiations to stop the war, yet Himmler would
be an unsuitable and unacceptable spokesman.
Therefore-and here Pohl turned to Dollmann with
a question-wasn't there an energetic and uncom-
promised leader in the SS who could approach the
Allies? Dollmann brought Wolff and Pohl together
that September.
As Wolff told us much later, he had believed in
the possibility of a compromise peace until the
beginning of 1945. He believed in it because he
thought that Hitler was really going to produce
the new weapons he had been boasting about.
After the failure of the Ardennes offensive (Battle
of the Bulge in December 1944 to January 1945),
Wolff heard that the Germans had almost no air
support. The long-awaited new jets had not ma-
terialized. For the first time, he realized that Hit-
ler's promises were lies. In mid-February he talked
to Hitler in front of Ribbentrop about the need for
Germany to find a way to stop the war. Hitler re-
mained unruffled by the proposal, didn't say no,
but didn't actually give Wolff permission to do
anything.
At the same time, one other man of highest rank
in the German establishment in Italy was think-
ing about surrender and was perhaps even readier
to act than Wolff. This was the German Ambassa-
dor, Rudolf Rahn, Hitler's personal emissary to
tary titles, he was closer to Kesselring and had
known him longer.
After Wolff moved up to quarters on the Lake
of Garda in the summer of 1944, he became a
neighbor of Rahn's and the two men carefully
sounded each other out. Both Rahn and Wolff
realized that only Kesselring could bring about an
armistice, and that he would have to be won over.
Rahn offered to talk to him, since he knew him
best.
Early in March, Kesselring dropped in to see
Rahn, who was sick in bed at the time. Rahn drew
him into a discussion of the hopeless military and
political outlook for Germany, and told him bluntly
that the final moment had come to save the rem-
nants of the German nation from total destruction.
As far as Rahn could see, only Kesselring, the
last undefeated German Field Marshal, could do
Field Marshal Albert Kesselring
something effective. He alone could really influence
his fellow generals to surrender. Rahn waited.
Kesselring didn't bat an eyelash. Outwardly he
was a cool and dispassionate man. He quietly re-
ferred to his oath as a soldier and added that he
thought the Fiihrer would still pull them all
through. To this Rahn said, "Field Marshal, this
is no time for either of us to resort to propaganda
Mussolini. Mp rXnledcFFmReiegLae t2961G$,i1 0 : Cad F a~-@ QrS~ QQQ3 Q0~j9y~u cannot
self, and had none of Wolff's police powers or mili-
make a decisive move now, I hope you will be ready
 Approved For Release 2001/08/20 : CIA-RDP70-00058R000300010059-3
ea .
Kesselring said nothing. He rose from Rahn's bed-
side to leave. Just before he went he said in an
unmistakably friendly manner, "I hope your polit-
ical plans succeed."
When Parilli had approached us, of course, we
knew nothing of all this and we were astounded
when, on the 8th of March-only four days after
he had started back to Italy with the report on
the Lugano meeting at which I had asked for "hos-
tages"-those hostages were delivered to me. Fur-
thermore, Wolff was hard on their heels. Wolff and
Parilli had crossed the border shortly after the
two released men, Parri and Osmiani. With Wolff
were three German officers, Colonel Dollmann,
Captain Zimmer, and his adjutant, Major Wenner.
All in civilian clothes, of course.
Wolff had acted with astonishing speed. How did
he do it? Did he regard himself as invulnerable?
Was his power so great that he had nothing to
fear? Was he perhaps foolhardy? How did he
cover up his tracks? Or did Himmler know, and
had he given his approval, and was there, there-
fore, nothing to hide?
I then decided that it was worth the gamble to
see Wolff myself, in full recognition of the fact
that considerable risk was involved. It would prob-
ably be the first meeting to discuss peace between
a commanding German officer and an Allied official
since the war began. If Wolff was trying to trick
me, and the news leaked, the consequences could be
unpleasant. I could see the headlines it would
make: "Envoy of Roosevelt Sees High SS Officer."
Wolff would learn nothing, but he could make po-
litical capital of the fact that I had talked to him.
At least I had an alibi: Through Wolff, I had se-
cured the release of two Italian hostages of im-
portance to the Allies, and I hoped to get valuable
intelligence also.
Before our meeting, Husmann handed me some
papers which he said General Wolff wanted me to
see. They were surprising documents, written in
German and with Wolff's official card attached.
The covering page, in translation, read as follows :
Karl Wolff
SS Obergruppenfuhrer and General of the
Military SS.
Highest SS and Police Leader.
Military Plenipotentiary of the German
Armed Forces in Italy.
Commander of Rear Military Area and of the
Military Administration.
Information about the above person can be
given by:
1. Th}~ j;4.1'.131@x A4HUlrv~#itlia.Piihtp~_irRmr~stf. ri ~?~~rl"ai~ rI'h~
2. The Present Pope: Visit in May 1944, re- ner, ran down the list of topics they discussed,
by Allen W. Dulles
lease of Professor Vasella at request of the
Pope, who stands by to intercede, if desired, at
any time.
3. Father Pankratius Pfeiffer, Superior of
the Salvatorian Order in Rome ...
There followed seven or eight more names of
churchmen, Italian aristocrats, and so on, with
details of how Wolff had been helpful to them, in
most cases by releasing them from prison. On the
next page were claims of a different sort. Here
Wolff set forth that on his orders several hundred
of the most precious paintings of the Uffizi Gallery
in Florence had been removed to safety in North
Italy when Florence was bombarded, along with
various sculptures and the famous coin collection
of the King of Italy, which was said to be worth
many millions of dollars.
He claimed also, to have been responsible, along
with Kesselring, for saving Rome from German
bombardment; to have settled without bloodshed
the general strike in Turin, Milan, and Genoa,
involving some 300,000 workers in 1944; and to
have negotiated with the partisans in November
of 1944, with the result that an amnesty had been
declared and the Italian population of North Italy
no longer needed to fear being drafted into Musso-
lini's armies or into German labor forces. There
were attachments in support of the claims made.
Wolff wanted to show us what kind of man he was,
in case I had the wrong idea about him.
Meeting by the Fireplace
I have always tried to have important meetings
around a live fireplace. There is some subtle influ-
ence in a wood fire which makes people feel at
ease and less inhibited in their conversation; and
if you are asked a question to which you are in no
hurry to reply, you can stir up the fire and study
the patterns the flames make until they help shape
your answer.
Shortly before ten o'clock Gaevernitz led Hus-
mann and General Wolff into my library. There
were no formal introductions. We nodded and took
seats around a fire I had built there. Wolff was a
handsome man and well aware of it, Nordic, with
graying, slightly receding blond hair, well-built
and looking no older than his age, which was about
forty-five. He sat rather stiffly and said very little
at first. Our conversation was in German. Hus-
mann asked my permission to summarize the dis-
cussion he had had with General Wolff during the
Rdb0b#glipn border. I
 Approved For Release 2001/08/20 : CIA-RDP70-00058R000300010059-3
CPYRGHT
44 THE SECRET SURRENDER
occasionany turning to Wolff, who nodded his
agreement. Wolff had conceded that the war was
irrevocably lost for Germany, and that the West.
ern Allies could not be divided. He also had as-
sured Husmann that he was acting without the
knowledge of Hitler and Himmler. When Husmann
had finished, he left us.
"I control the SS forces in Italy," Wolff told
me, "and I am willing to. place myself and my en-
tire organization at the disposal of the Allies to
terminate hostilities." However, he emphasized
that in order to end the war in Italy, it was impera-
tive to win over the commanders of the German
Armed Forces in Italy.
For a long time he had been on very good terms
with Field Marshal Kesselring, he said. If we
could assure Wolff that a secure line of communi-
cation reaching the top level of the Allied Com-
mand was available through his contact to us, he
would do his best to arrange that Kesselring or
his deputy come to Switzerland with him to sign a
surrender. I assured Wolff that we were in direct
contact with Allied Headquarters. He seemed im-
mensely relieved.
Neither at this meeting nor later did Wolff
suggest that his action would be contingent upon
any promise of immunity for himself. He did say
that he did not consider himself a war criminal
and was willing to stand on his record. In an hour
we had progressed as far as we could go at the
moment. Until we knew Kesselring's attitude we
could not safely plan our further course.
Late that night I sent a full report on the meet-
ing with Wolff to Washington and Allied Head-
quarters in Caserta. I had not sought prior
approval. This would have put too many people in
Washington on the spot. It was better to leave
them free to disavow me if they wished. Needless
to say I awaited the reaction with impatience.
To Caserta, I had suggested that, if Kesselring
or his deputy was prepared to come to Switzerland
with Wolff to surrender, it would be well for
AFHQ to be ready to send some high-ranking of-
ficers to meet them. I made it clear that we could
not yet judge how much weight could be placed on
Wolff's assurances.
This word of caution did not deter Field
Marshal Alexander. A man of action, he an-
swered my message with action, not with comment
of approval or disapproval. He radioed that two
senior staff officers were coming to Switzerland
at once. The OSS offices at Caserta and Bern, un-
der the orders of General William J. Donovan,
chief of OSS, were already making preparations
phernalia required for a complex operation which
must remain absolutely secret and secure. If all
went well, within a few days emissaries could be
converging on Switzerland who could speak for the
Allied commanders of the armies that had been
locked in battle with the Germans in Italy since
June of 1943.
But on the afternoon of March 11th, Waibel
phoned me that Parilli had just crossed the border
at Chiasso-alone. I met him for the first time that
day. Bundled in a large handsome overcoat with a
fur collar (it was bitter cold outside) which made
him look twice his size, he said a few words to me
in English when we were introduced; he spoke
Italian, French, and German with equal speed. He
liked to interlard whatever language he happened
to be speaking with phrases from another. One,
which he threw often in my direction, was, "You
are the boss." He had a sense of humor, as well as
a tendency to dramatize things a bit.
What he had to tell was dismaying. No sooner
had Wolff (after his talk with me on the 8th)
crossed into Italy and entered the Italian customs
office than a message from Kaltenbrunner was
handed to him by an SS official from Milan. Kal-
tenbrunner wanted Wolff to meet him in Inns-
bruck. During Wolff's absence Kaltenbrunner had
tried to get in touch with him, and had been told
that Wolff had gone to Switzerland. The fact that
Wolff had failed to inform Berlin of his trip im-
mediately aroused the most hostile suspicions.
Late that night Wolff sent a teletype message to
Kaltenbrunner begging off because of the pressure
of work. He had to assume that Kaltenbrunner
might try to arrest him if he left his own territory
and went into Austria.
Wolff knew now that he would have to straighten
everything out with Himmler soon. What he pro-
posed was that we, the Allies, should turn over
to him a German prisoner of high rank, equal in
importance to Parri, so that Wolff could say his
release of Parri was merely a prisoner exchange.
Wolff asked us to locate and deliver to him, if pos-
sible, Oberstummbannftihrer Wuensche, a per-
sonal friend and favorite adjutant of Hitler's who
had been taken prisoner in France. Hitler's birth-
day was coming up soon and Wolff could say he had
personally and quietly engaged in the Parri release
in order to give Hitler a birthday surprise.
What amazed me about this was the impulsive-
ness it revealed in Wolff. He had released Parri,
expecting no doubt that word would somehow leak
to Berlin, and he had done nothing at the time to
cover himself. Now that he was in trouble
he
,
was
to provicr]~pBeEt-s?/~rnCIA-~)7y0QA`~~~~Q{G~~~(~~Q`$r what he had
munications facilities, and the personnel and para. done, Either he considered himself even more
 Approved For Release 2001/08/20 CIA-RDP_70-000588440800010059-3---
werful than he was, or he thought his stock
with Himmier, or possibly Hitler, was so high that
e could do no wrong. Or, worst of all, he simply
idn't think ahead.
At about this time another unsettling event
ok place. Kesselring, we learned, had been trans-
erred from Italy and made Supreme Commander
of the hard-pressed West Front in Germany. We
oon found out that his replacement was to be
olonel General Heinrich von Vietinghoff.
And just at this juncture the two officers whom'
field Marshal Alexander was sending to me from
aserta arrived: the American Major General
yman L. Lemnitzer, then Deputy Chief of Staff
o Field Marshal Alexander, and the British Major
eneral Terence S. Airey, Alexander's chief in-
elligence officer. On March. 14 I met and briefed
hem at the French-Swiss frontier. No finer offe-
rs could have been chosen for this particular job.
,eneral Lemnitzer had already had experience in
secret operations, as he had participated promi?
nently in operation TORCH, the North African
landing of 1942. Terence Airey was a highly
trained and competent intelligence officer. Natu-
rally, the two men were disappointed to learn of
Wolff's problems due to Kesselring's transfer.
They had other news for me which filled me with
mixed emotions. A report of my March 8th talk
with Wolff had, they told me, been sent via the
Combined Chiefs of Staff, to Moscow and com-'.
municated to the Soviet government through our
military representatives there. From the begin-
ning I had felt that one of the risks which lay in
my meeting with Wolff was a German maneuver
to use it as a wedge between the Russians and our-
selves. Now that the Russians had been advised
this seemed less of a threat. However, though the
danger of a leak had been minimized, what would
the Russians do with the information that had
been given them? We were all too soon to find out.
Up to the Villas
On March 17 we received a message that Gen-
eral Wolff would arrive at the Swiss border on the
morning of the 19th. Thus, everything was set for
the meeting of the Allied generals and Wolff with
their respective advisers on that day. In agree-
ment with Headquarters, we had decided. on As-
by Allen W. Dulles 45
security and isolation, ana it was close tot e
Italian frontier.* The placid lake, among toweri g
mountains, created an atmosphere of serenity and
calm. It was hard to believe that not many mil s
north of us a war was being waged in those mou -
tains. All our surroundings breathed peace a d
mirrored beauty. It was no accident that Locar o,
only a few miles away, had once been selected r
a famous peace conference. For a secret meeti g
between Allied and German officers, here was te
perfect spot.
General Karl Wolff
This time Wolff was leaving Dollmann behi at
his headquarters to keep an eye on the situ ion
there. If any messages came from Himmle or
Kaltenbrunner relating to the business at nd,
Dolhnann would forward them on to us.
The Allied generals arrived at the villa o the
hill at Ascona during the morning of Marc 19.
Wolff and his party were already in Ascona
Gaevernitz and I settled down to a long pre imi-
nary talk with Wolff so that we could brief em-
nitzer and Airey of all the recent developme s.
First of all, I pressed Wolff to tell us all he new
about Vietinghoff. What sort of man was he? How
well did he know him? How would he react t our
particular enterprise? Vietinghoff, he replied, was
an old hand in the Italian campaign. Wolff's rela-
cona, on Lake Maggiore, as the place for the *In fact it was so close that Headquarters ad at
meeting, in part because Gaevernitz had the use of first objected to Ascona on the ground that the dver
two villas located there which were well suited for sary might pull off a coup and kidnap the AM gen-'
our purposes. One villa was directly on the lake and erals. As this would involve a serious violat on of
the other # i"Q aFn@9 e,l2MIDN2 : Cl Pr7?Qt020( 8f0OO3N 0( d3uarter that
We were well protected from the point of view of there was no danger. Anyway we were well gu rded.
 Approved For Release 2001/08/20 : CIA-RDP70-00058R000300010059-3
tions with him had been close and friendly.. ow-
ever, Vietinghoff was a stiff and proper aristocrat
of Baltic origin, as nonpolitical a German general
as one could find. He was not likely to take inde-
pendent action or to understand the political and
ethical implications of Germany's position at the
present stage of the war. He would not be easy to
win over unless he felt that he had the backing of
other senior officers in the Wehrmacht. Further-
more, Wolff-having had no way of foreseeing
Vietinghoff's assumption of the Italian command
-had never discussed the idea of surrender with
him. If he could be brought around to it at all,
Wolff feared convincing him wouldtake some time.
Kesselring had now been gone from North Italy
for ten days, and Wolff had not been in touch with,
him and could not risk talking with him over the
telephone because the Gestapo would be listening
in. Did this mean, I asked, that we would have to
dismiss Kesselring entirely from our surrender
plans? No, Wolff answered, not entirely. As he
saw it, there were three possible alternatives. If
there was practically no time available, he, Wolff,
could simply act with the forces under his own
command. This might not be very effective. Or he
could go directly to Vietinghoff and see if he could
enlist his aid. The third possibility, which he
strongly recommended, was for him to go im-
mediately to Kesselring's new headquarters in
Germany and try to get his support. Kesselring, he
thought, could bring his influence to bear on Viet-
inghoff.
In Wolff's mind, the controlling factor was time,
and that touched on a most delicate question. The
German command, he said, had information which
led them to believe that a big Allied offensive in
Italy would be staged by the end of March. I could
not help wondering whether Wolff was trying to
find out the date of the offensive for his own rea-
sons. Though I did not know it, the two generals
from Caserta most certainly did. His point was, of
course, that once the offensive began, the chance
of talking surrender with any success was mini-
mized-at least until the first clashes were over.
When we turned to the alternative of Wolff's,
acting alone, he described the mixed and motley
forces which the SS had assembled in North Italy:
Italians, Russians, Serbs, Croats, Czechs, et al.
They were widely scattered, armed only with light
weapons and a few rather ancient tanks. Besides
these units, which totaled just under 200,000 men,
Wolff had some 65,000 Germans assigned to him,
of whom only about 10,000 were in tactical units;
the rest made up supply and transportation corn-
ne ung was now very clear. in any s ,
General Wolff's principal contribution would have
to be primarily as the persuader, the man who
would talk the Army generals into realizing the
futility of further 'fighting. The question was,
therefore, whether Wolff should try to see Kessel-
ring or should just concentrate on Vietinghoff.
We then asked Wolff about Mussolini's position.:
Wolff said he was largely under the influence of
the women around him-his wife, Donna Rachele,;
and his mistress, Claretta Petacci, and her rela-
tives. He was, in any case, now of no consequence
in the matter of surrender. Kaltenbrunner?
Wolff showed signs of disgust. Kaltenbrunner was
merely trying to develop his own line through
Sweden or Switzerland for peace negotiations. He
did not want to encourage or permit any competi-
tion. What about the Alpine Redoubt, we asked?
"Madness," said Wolff. "It would only bring addi-
tional suffering to the German people. Everything
possible must be done to prevent such last-ditch
resistance.'."
"Produce Somebody"
That afternoon, after I had introduced Lemnit-
zer and Airey, giving them pseudonyms as "my
military advisers," I called on General Lemnitzer
to open the discussions with Wolff. He spoke in
English and Gaevernitz acted as interpreter. The
situation was unique and solemn. It was the first
occasion during the entire war when high-ranking'
Allied officers and-a German general had met on
neutral soil to discuss a German surrender and
talked peacefully while their respective armies
were fighting each other.
Lemnitzer, after an appropriate reference to the
purpose of the meeting, said that he thought he
had a good picture of the problems which Wolff
faced as a result of Kesselring's departure for the
West Front. The early defeat of Germany was in-
evitable, and it was understood that all concerned
accepted the fact. It was now up to Wolff, in col-
laboration with the appropriate military com-
manders, to produce specific plans to achieve
unconditional surrender. Technically it would be
necessary to arrange for qualified German mili-
tary representatives to meet with Allied military
representatives. If the Germans could be brought
to Switzerland, arrangements would be made to
take them from there to Allied Headquarters in
Southern Italy. Wolff replied that there should be
two representatives, one for the Wehrmacht and
panies. AppmvisclMoiaReleake 2ON4O81t20ot1CIA-RD OtOO058RO MSV9 -1 3nphasized that
cause from these troops seemed slight. once these men reached Switzerland, the Allies
 Approved For Release 2001/08/20 : CIA-RDP70-00058R000300010059-3
CPYRG-HT CPYRGHT
CPYRGHT
would protect the secrec
of their passage to and
from Allied Forces Head-
quarters and assure their
safe return to Switzer-
land. The Allies, Lem-
nitzer went on to say,
itiere interested only in
unconditional surrender,
and it would be pointless
for the Germans to come
to Caserta unless they
agreed to such terms.
Furthermore, he told
Wolff that conversations
at Allied Headquarters
would be limited to meth-
ods of military surren-
der, and would not in-
clude political issues.
At the end of the meet-
ing I explained to Wolff
that it was going to be
impossible to produce
Wuensche in exchange
or arri, as he had sug-
gested some time ago.
Wolff took this in good
grace but said his posi-
tion would be consider
duce somebody; it nee
lower one would do, as I
or two. I said I would
received our agreemen
ring, Wolff departed.
Ten days later, on M
the border and reporte
selring and Kesselring
n't be
)ng as
:eep t:
that
by Allen W. Dulles
The three intermediaries: Major Max Waibel, Professor Max Hus-
mann, and Baron Luigi Parilli.
a general officer; a
he had a decoration
ying. Then, having
he contact Kessel-
that
had cc
had t
t as e:
i Mor
nghof
ibasss
f Geri
Wolff's plan. Further, h
to Vietinghoff. If all we
would try to bring Viet
ter's staff officers, and A
The three components
would be represented.
On Monday, April 2,
Parilli, accompanied by
had met him at the bord
headquarters ever sinc
sent him to tell us what
Himmler had phoned
day morning. He had f
moved his family south
area which was under hi
olff had seen Kes-
ld Wolff to tell this
ected, Wolff would
day, April 2, and
or one of the lat-
or Rahn with him.
came but Baron
Vaibel
r. He
Frill
ad bee
rol ff 'r.
~Unf <
had said, "This wgs imm~udlept
*~,. th Aaor v~
ad been at Wolff's
taking place.
t that Wolff had
Brenner into an
wife and your children are now under my protec-
tion." It was a clear threat-the usual SS method.
He then added that he was warning Wolff not to
leave Italy, i.e., not to go to Switzerland. Wolff
was almost too depressed to talk. The best he saw
for himself was a funeral at state expense. He had
not dared came to see us that day.
We fell on Parilli with our questions. How did
Himmler get into the act? Who told him what
Wolff was doing? How much does he know? What
about Hitler? What about Kesselring and Vieting-
hoff? What about the surrender?
Then the Baron went back to the beginning.
Wolff, traveling by car, had finally reached Kessel-
ring's command post near Bad Nauheim on March
23. The Americans had already crossed the Rhine a
bare fifteen kilometers away and their continued
advance was about to cut Germany in two. All hell
had broken loose. While Kesselring was keeping a
handful of field telephones hot with orders to his
hard-pressed armies, Wolff was trying to tell him
what he had done. He asked Kesselring not only
if he would approve the surrender attempt in Italy
through Vietinghoff, but if he would join in by
surrendering in the West.
id !O8/20 ?~tA*DPYYO658ROOO80 O1OO59 as de-
e si uation. Your fan,Hncr f!nr? ;i -3 u,. , .
 r
Approved For Release 2001/08/20 : CIA-RDP70-00058R0003Q AT3
CPYRGHT
ER
even if he died himself in the fighting. He said he
personally owed everything to the Fuhrer. More-
over, he was sure the well-armed SS divisions be-
hind him would take action against him if he
disobeyed Hitler's orders. But he would counsel
. Vietinghoff to go ahead. "I regret that I myself
am not in Italy now," he said.
The phone call from Himmler threatening his
family had brought Wolff up sharply against the
fact he had been evading ever since he had made
his first moves in our direction. He could not
charm Himmler and the whole SS over to his side.
If he took a false step he could be liquidated and
then the whole surrender project would collapse.
He had to be most careful.
Certain "Points of Honor"
Although he could not meet with us on Easter
Sunday, Wolff did meet with General Vietinghoff,
and the two met again on the 5th and 7th of April.
Parilli was present at the meeting on the 7th,
along with Vietinghoff's (formerly Kesselring's)
Chief of Staff, General Hans Roettiger.
Both Vietinghoff and Roettiger were well aware
of what Wolff had been doing in Switzerland. And
they were in full agreement that the time had
come to put a stop to any further useless slaughter.
But Vietinghoff did not want to go down in history
as a traitor to his country or to the traditions of
his family and his caste. He was ready to sign an
"unconditional" surrender only if the Allies would
accept the "points of honor" he wished to have ob-
served. They were these: the Germans would stand
at attention when the Allies arrived to accept the
surrender; the Germans would not be interned in
England or America; they would be held in Italy
only temporarily, and.while there they would be
allowed to do useful work on reconstructing roads
and railways instead of being put behind barbed
wire; after the situation had stabilized they would
be returned to Germany in possession of their belts
and bayonets as evidence that they had made an
orderly surrender and had not merely been
rounded up as a beaten rabble. Vietinghoff also
requested "the maintenance of a modest contin-
gent Army. Group C [his command] as a future
instrument of order inside Germany." Things
were getting rather far away from the Casa-
blanca formula of unconditional surrender-so far
that Field Marshal Alexander could not accept the
heintr Cleariyp wo he~e~--^.e^+'"..?r':p go,,,n4 so vPrinnR
roadblock.
The coming days brought the sad news of Presi-
dent Ro&gc1Q'yef>?eaFt4>'; R$PM 2t0Q 2QhaGl
Himmler had been after Wolff again. On April 14,
Himmler had telephoned from Berlin ordering
Wolff to report there at once. After putting
Himmler off by claiming that his presence was
absolutely necessary in Italy, Wolff sat down and
wrote him a letter. Playing on an idea which he
had long since abandoned himself but which he
knew would appeal to the hallucinations of the top
Nazis in Berlin, he declared that he was pursuing
important negotiations with the Allies with a view
to separating the Anglo-Americans from the So-
viets.
At length, he pointed out to Himmler how
he, Wolff, had been right on previous occasions
when he had advised Himmler, and he begged him
to take his advice now. Germany's Western de-
fenses were failing, as Wolff had told Himmler
they would. Further fighting in the south would
only kill off more Germans to no advantage. Wolff
was seeking honorable terms with the Allies. He
closed his letter by inviting Himmler to come
down and join him in his attempt to make peace.
(If Himmler had accepted this invitation, Wolff
said he would have arrested him on arrival.)
Himmler telephoned Wolff immediately after read-
ing the letter. "I didn't ask for a report," he said.
"I want to talk to you personally." Wolff gave in;
he decided he would have to talk it out wit
Himmler and probably Hitler. He left by plan
for Berlin on March 16.
I did not learn until some time later that, be
fore he left, Wolff gave Parilli a kind of persona
testament addressed to me. These were its con
tents :
In case I should lose my command ... an
the action with which I have associated mysel
should not succeed, I request that the Germa
people and the German troops in Italy shoul
not suffer the consequences.
If, after my death, my honor be assailed,
request Mr. Dulles to rehabilitate my nam ,
publicizing my true, humane intentions;
make known that I acted not out of egotism
betrayal, but solely out of the conviction an
hope of saving, as far as possible, the Germs
people.
After my death, I ask Mr. Dulles, in fl e
name of the ideas for which I shall have false ,
to try to obtain for the German and Italia
troops honorable terms of surrender.
I request Mr. Dulles to protect, after
death, if this is possible, my two families, n
order that they not be destroyed.
[Next month Mr. Dulles will conclude his story-of
the negotiations that led to the last "Jawohl" and
-RD97JGiQ MR+0 'iWT 0GSq 3p in Europe.]