THE DEVELOPMENT OF US STRATEGIC INTELLIGENCE BY COL. F. SERGEYEV

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP70-00058R000300010054-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 14
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 13, 2000
• Sequence Number: 54
• Publication Date: July 8, 1966
• Content Type: MISC

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ME DEVELOPMENT OF US STRATEGIC INTELLIGENCE
by Col F. SERGEYEV
The following is a translation of an article published in Voyenno-
istoricheskiv Zhurnal (Military History Journal), No 5, May 1966, pages
In American literature dealing with the history of intelligence in
the, US thc1-3 is a legend that spying activity is not in keeping with the
national character of Americans. Many authors have referred to the fact
that when the US entered World War I the opinion was widely entertained
that "America never had any spiee," In almost all or at least in marve
research works there is related with unconcealed satisfaction the story of
now Henry Stinson, US Secretary of State in 1929, abruptly cut off the
official who was reporting to hill about, the measures being taken in the
State Department to break the codes of ether:countries. He declared: -
"Gentlemen do not read other peoples mail," and he pushed away a pile of
telegrams which had been decoded. It seamed in this way that the "black
cabinet" ha been disbanded. By citing.:such:examples, apologistS for US
intelligenee try to divest American "gentlemen? of their predilection for
"dirty" operations.
At the same time an analysis of histerioal facts shows convincingly
that as early as the end of the 19th century, US intelligence was developin
into C,-.1ie of the most important elements, in the US imperialist government
apparatus.- it is another matter that.incomparison with British and French
intelligence services, it came into being much later. In his book, The
Craft of Intellip.once, vhich was published in Now York at the end of 1963,
the former director of CIA, Allen Dulles, describes the development of a
prcn:essional, peacetime; military intelligence service in the US in the
a..-ellowing way: "The dirst permanent army and navy peacetime intelligence
organizations were created in the 1).,5 in e 1530g5. (As far as US _Air Forc
intolliganco is concerned, American authors claim that its history datos
back to 1907, when in the-Office of the Army Chief of Signal Communications
a section for "air force" research was formed. However, in view Of the
fact that military air forces at that time and for a long time after that,
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i.e., up to September 1947, did not constitute an independent service in
the armed forces but remained u2:do..,7 the Army General Staff, air force
Intelligence was subordinate to G-2 (Armj intelligence section)) The Army
organization was known as the Xildtary Information Division and was included
in the Adjutant Goneralgs Offici, The .:ntelligence office of the Navy was
included in the Bureau of Porsornol and Navigation. During the same
decade, military and naval attache.; were introduced for the first time in
our embassies and diplomatic missions abroad where they were to act as
observers and intelligence officers. In 1903, with the creation of the
Army General Staff, the Military information Division was incorporated in
it as the gSecond Division.g Since then, intelligence sections in the
American Army have traditionally boon designated as G:.2."' (A. Dulles, The
Craft of Intelligence, Now York, 1963, pages 40-41)
Naturally, Americans did not remain satisfied with military intelli-
gence alone. In the US, as in other countries which had entered the
imperialist phase of development, "intelligence shifted to the political
sphere -- espionage became entrenched in the secret cabinets of diplomats
and secret intelligence became an integral part of politics." (W. Nicolai,
Geheime Machto, Leipzig, 1924, page 10)
As is known, the United States did not enter World War I until
1917. However, -2.01.1 before this, US intelligence was able to plant its
agents in the general staff of the Kaisers Germany, the staffs of several
large military units, in certain ministries, in the Krupp plants, and in
other places. The main US intelligence forces which were operating at
that time against Germany were concentrated in neutral countries -. Holland,
Denmark, Sweden, and primarily Switzerland. At the outbreak of war the US
had at its disposal an extremely far-flung apparatus. An American intelli-
gence officer, Thomas Johnson, stated in his book about World War 1:
"There are still some who think that the Americans did not have a Isecret
servicel in Europe but they are mistaken -- or at least they give the
impression of being mistaken." (LvIntelliR:ence Service americain pendant
is. guerre, Paris, 1933,, page 17) He presents evidence showing that by the
end of the- war "espionage was more widespread and complex than during all
previous wars." The US intelligence apparatus made wide use of the
experience. borrowed from the secret services of the US/5 political allies --
England and Yrance. Americans attended special schools for training
British and 2rench agents. Densey, a colonel in the British Army, was
sent from England to Washington to instruct the supervisors of US intelli-
gence. The influence of methods used by the British Secret Service can be -
found in many of the intelligence methods practiced'by the Americans.
17,6VCJ: fren the very beginning US intelligence differed from the
;L".77..ca's of England and France by the extent of the material
CYa2C:G3 available. According to Hans Holm, a German author, the huge
amounts of available US funds were just as vital for the intelligence of
tho Entente as the new military equipment and masses of fresh manpower,
not exhausted by the war, were for the military command. (H. Helm, USA in
z
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Teeekeit, Dresden, o. D., page 85) A fOrmer chief of British intelligence,
-a6i1 Thempson, remarked with unconcealed envy: "The Americans could be
guided by the fellowing principle: Silence is golden but silence can be
broken by gold which opens all doors. The US government was so generous
that US intelligence could afford a luxury not available to any other
intelligence service, i.e., that of paying for information about its own
allies just as easily as for information about the enemy." (T. Johnson,
op. cit., page 10.)
Luring the course of World War I, US military intelligence con-
tinued to grow. According to Walter Sweeney, a lieutenant colonel in the
US Army, hundredeeof officers and soldiers were transferred from combat
units into the intelligence service and sent to Various geographic areas.
Many hundreds of others carried out missions for the intelligence service
right in combat units. (W. Sweeney, Military intellieence, USA, 1924,
page 1.) After completing in a short time the education given them by
their British teachers, the Americans joined the "secret struggle" of the
Entente against Germany.
The development of international economic relations was the reason
for the close union between the intelligence apparatus and monopolistic
organizations. Many agents wore recruited from among the employees of
large American firms who took regular trips "on business" to the countries
of Western Europe, especially to Germany. The Americans managed to pene-
trate the government apparatus of other imperialist powers. In the books
written by American authors about the history of US intelligence (R. Rowan,
T. Johnson, and others), there are many references to the fact that "if
the names of people who worked forth? US secret service were disclosed at
this time, the amazement in many official circles would be great.? It
will never be possible to reveal the complete truth. This would result in
bringing down on our country, and many others,a storm of anger, hate,
suspicion, and indignation." (T. Johnson, op. cit., page 57.)
As early as World War I, a chaeacteristiefeature of US intelligence
was noted that of reliance on the most reactionary elements in forming
an .agent network. Thus, literally on the day following the victory of the
Great October Socialist Revolution a refuge was created in the United States
for many Tsarist intelligence officers whom the Americans then used in
their own interests for conducting subversive activities against the young
Soviet republic. There was another distinguishing feature of US intelli.
gence -. along with a broad network of agents who were planted in other
countries, a massive network of informers was organized among American
Expeditionary Forces in the European theater of ware This network was
designed to keep watch over the political attitudes of American soldiers
and to determine their "reliability." Richard Rowan, an author of well-
known books about intelligence, stated: "It is curious to note that the
most successful branch of US counterintelligence in Prance was the
surveillance of Americans, In every company, battalion, and division sent
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overseas there was an observer, who was reeponsible not to his own commander
but to another officer charged with observing the morale and loyalty of
soldiers." (R. Rowan, The Story of the Secret Service, New 'York, 1938
page 658.) The total number of such "silent observers" in the US Armed
Forces amounted, in Thompsongs sicj estimation, to about 50,000 mon. -
(T. Johnson, op. cit., page 10.
After World War I, the activity of US military intelligence naturally
subsided to the limits befitting a time of peace and, in the opinion of many
authors, was considerably reduced. Of course, there is nothing surprising '
about this, A certain lag of the US behind other imperialist powers in the
sphere of intelligence was associated with the particular disposition of
political forces at that "ime in the imperialist camp and with the "isola-
tionist" foreign policy ee the US government. However, this did not mean
that intelligence ceased to serve the needs of US monopolistic capital,
which was carrying out a policy of economic and political expansion in
Europe, Asia, and Latin America.
Here is just one of numerous explos. At the initiative of the US
a naval conference was held in Washington in 1921, attended by nine countries,
during which the Americans managed to split the British-Japanese alliance,
achieve acceptance of the "open deer" pninciploein China, conclude. a treaty
? limiting naval armament, and win equal rights with England with respect to
. , total tonnage of battleships and aircraft eam'iers. This success was
'facilitated by the fact that, prior to thebee:inning of the conference, US
intelligence broke the Japaneseece4o.and nble to read exchanges between ?-
n. the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japarnend its ambassador in Washington, ?
and also between Tokyo and London.
, During the period between the two '.Tars , the US watched the course of
events on the European continent very closely. As before, the principal
organ of US intelligence was the Office of Army Intelligence, which bene-
fited from experience acquired in World War I. This office managed to send
agents to many European. countries. One of the covers used in the major
capitals of the world was law firms which -provided favorable conditions
for making contacts with broad circles of. people from all classes of society.
? Many American agents posing as members of phiiantropic missions, and later
as employees of embassies and consulates, were sent by US military and
political intelligence organs to carry eut subversive activities in the
Soviet Union. During the prewar years, a number of US Intelligence centers .
were operating near the northern and western borders, of the USSR. One of
these centers in Riga, the capital of bourgeois Latvla, was particularly
active.
The new conditions confronted ruling circles of the country with the
need to select a definite type of intelligence organization. Since it was
required to carry out aggressive plans aimed at forming an American "world
empire" it became necessary to create an appropriate intelligence structure.
1
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It is generally considered that the historical development of the
intelligence systems of imperialist governments resulted in the formation
of two basic types of intelligence services. The first one of these found
expression in the older intelligence services of England and France Which
'strove to plan their work with lone-eenge goals in mind, trying to achieve
their purposes, so to speak, not by eeentity but by skill and by concentrating.
compact intelligence forces in te moot important directions. For this
typo of intelligence organization, not a mass approach but a "selective"
approach to planting agents is characteristic.
The two young imporialiet predatory powers -- Germany and Japan
had a different typo of intelligence system than .England and France. It
was distinguished first of all by the anount of resources used and the size
of the agent network. They relied mainly on mass recruitment of spies and
based their activity on the doctrine of "total espionage." The most
characteristic features of this doctrine are maximum territorial scope of
intelligence activities, an effort to create the broadest possible agent
network abroad, and surveillance "by all over all" inside the country to
ensure stability in their own rear areas. The implementation of a doctrine
of "total espionage" under conditions such as .existed in Germany, meant that?
espionage must become -- and did in fact become.-- a common cause of the
government and the fascist party, and that all departments and or estab.
lishments in the country wore adapted to conducting espionage. But that.
,is not all.
The doctrine of "total esnienage".reshaped the very nature of actual
intelligence operations. In maklng plans for espionage and sabotage
activities in the USSR, Admiral-lheim Canaris, chief of the German
"AbWahr," formulated his principle as follows: "The more Shots are fired,
the more chances there are of hitting the target." It is not surprising,
?therefore, that during the war Cheka organs 'encountered many instances where
the "Abweehr" sent two or even three groupe of agents with one and the same
.mission against the same target in our country.
The birth of the doctrine of large-scale, "total espionage" and the
rapid grou'eh of "all-encompassing" and "all-penetrating" intelligence
services in Germany and Japan were determined entirely by the needs of
impoeialistic expansion and theeinterests of the struggle for world hegemony.:
In the beginning of World War I..:US President Franklin Roosevelt,
requested the formation of an intelligence:service Which would conform to
the needs of modern war and the new course in US foreign policy. In the
opinion of American exports, the experience acquired by US intelligence in
the period between the wars was not sufficiently incorporated in the now
organizational forms. The question arose: -.What typo of intelligence
organization should be sot up? It seamed that .an intelligence system of .
the Eeitish type would be more appropriate for the United States, the more
so since the intelligence services of the US and England had cooperated
closely as far back as World War I. According to Johnson, "the ideas and
experience of the English and French helped us to a great extent in setting
up American intelligence system which .satisfied the needs of a large-scale
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(T. Johnson, op. cit., pace 76.) In many ways, the Americans depended
on tea Englieh in matters of intelligenee during the early part of World
T.'ae II, In 1940-41 Roosevelt twice sent the chief of the future Office of
Strategic Services, Colonel (later General) Willie m Donovan, on secret
mieelons to 'Europe and the Middle eet. In carrying out his missions,
Donovan was able to become thoroughly familiar with the British system of
organizing espionage and sabotage.
Nevertheless, in selecting its typo of intelligence organization, ?
the monopolistic ruling clique in the US did not follow the example of
theie allies but were more inclined to the German-Japanose variation.
1L-nerfeee World *War II, US military intelligence adopted as a model many of
the structural peculiarities of the intelligence apparatus of the Wehrmacht.
FO2 e:cample, the Americans did not creLte a single military intelligence
organization but copied the fascist German System of three intelligence
services, one for each branch of the armed forces. Furthermore, they showed
preference for the Gorman system of combining organs of intelligence and
counterintelligence. Finally, the Office of Strategic Services (OSS)
which was created during the.war, obviously resembled Admiral Canarisl
"Abwehr."
US intelligence entered World War II with wellestablished Army and
Navy intelligeree services. At that tia.e the State Department was an
,important organ for collecting economic and. political intelligence. More-
Hover, with the formation in.1942 ot' a joint coP-mittee of the chiefs of
staff, there was attached to it .a?j;eint L)t,c0...1dgence Committee (JIC).
?? The (TIC included representatives of intelligence organs of the Army, Navy,
and ?State Department, as well as the Office of Strategic Services and the
Commission for Studying the Economy of.Foreigle Countries. ,The JIC was to
be a coordinating center forsintelligence actvities, i.e., for concentrating? -
'army and navy intelligence sources and .combining all government
intelli-
gence services. In the opinion of American authors, the JIC played an
? important role in expanding the intelligence activity of the US. With its
participation, many government measures were conceived and implemented
which made it possible to improve the system for collecting strategic
.intelligence and coordinating intelligence work. In the military theaters.
there were combined intelligence groups made up of personnel from the Army
and tao Navy and a large number of civilians who were experts in various
fields. Their tasks included the coordination of collection and processing
of intelligence information and the maintenance of contacts with the JIC
center in Washington. Such groups wore active in the Mediterranean,
African, Middle East, Indo-Burmese, and Chinese theaters ofmilitary
operations.
Unquestionably, World War II gave great impetus to the development
of US military intelligence, although it was not marked by any great .
success. When operations began in North Africa, intelligence support for
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thees oporatiens was provided ye'LJ by Eeitish military intelligence.
'aenever the Lmericans were rece2s. -;() act more or less independently,
they often peoved to be helpieeen This wee the case, for example, during
the German counteroffeneive in the S:edennes in theewinter of 1944-45.
This offensive took US troops by surpeise. The same thing happened
several times in the Far East. This is, how American authors evaluate the
oversights of the (TIC: The JIC coesuitted many serious errors. Less than,.
ten days had passed after the committee expressed its final conviction that
Japan would not carry out landings in the Aleutians, when in the summer of
1944 the Japanese seized Kiska and Attu, two of the most important islands
in the Aleutians... Many other such errors could be cited." (W. McGovern,
Stratesie intellia.ence and the Shape of Tomorrow. Chicago,. 1961, page .7.) '
Tho conduct of strategic intelligence in the real sense of the word
was concentrated in 1942 in a government organ sot up at that time --- the .
Office of Strategic Services (OSS). As regards its functions, it.closely .
resembled a Central intelligence Service of the country. At the head of
OSS, as .mentioned above, was one of the most prominent US intelligence
experts, Donovan ("Wild Bill"). His assistants were drawn from New York
legal firms, financial establishments, and the so-called group of 100
professors. All during 1943 OSS units operated in all parte of the world
pith the exception of Latin America, which was covered- by the FBI, and also
several areas of the Far East Command which was covered brintelligence
directly subordinate to General MacArthur. As pointed out by H. Ransom,
"by creating the OSS, the United States for the first time undertook an
intensive study of strategic intelligence, wide-scale intelligence
operations, and political activities on a world-wide scale." (H. Ransom.
Central intelligence and National Security.- Cambridge, 1958, page 6)-i..)
The OSS was involved in many problems -- from the collection,
evaluation, and dissemination of information concerning the capabilities
and vulnerabilities of foreign governments and dispatching agents and
carrying out sabotage in enemy countries, to planning and carrying out
special operations having far-reaching consequences. "It seems there was
nothing," 'a-ites A. Dulles, "that the OSSdid not attempt to do at one time
or another during the period between 1942 and the end of the war." (A. '
Dulles, op. cit., page 46.) During the war years the OSS employed the
services of about 227000 workers. (L. Farago, Burn after Reading, New '
York, 19627 page 219.) The scale of OSS activities can easily be estimated
if it is borne in mind that the 1945 budget for this agency amounted to
*57,000,000.
What was characteristic of US military intelligence during this
period? Even at that time there was obviously extensive dispersion among
different agencies. Parallel with the OSS there was army, air force, and
naval intelligence as well as State Department intelligence. The War-
Depa.rtment, Navy Department, and State Department competed openly with the.
OSS. Departmental intelligence agencies competed With the OSS Ana teco.s
?
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constantly in conflict among themselves. This was an indirect reflection ?
of the struggle which was characteristic for the US Armed Forces between
separate monopolistic groups advocating one type of armed forces or
another.
Immediately after the war strategic intelligence was taken away
from the jurisdiction of military agencies and transferred to the State
Department. This caused objections from government exports. The process
of dispersing organs for strategic intelligence was practically stopped
when General George Marshall came to the post of Secretary of State. What
was loft of the old OSS was combined in a separate organ in the State
Department, and OSS units engaged in intelligence, work were transferred to
Army G-2, which was headed by General Donovan. Some of his closest
associates went there with him. G-2 also absorbed a large part of the OSS
agent network.
In 1947 the entire grovernmcnt apparatus of the US was reorganized.
Tho military departments were subjected to complete overhaul. There was
set ue a Department of Defense to which were subordinated the departments
of the three branches of the armed forces -- Army, Navy, and Air Force.
The fairly well knownhfames Forrestal became Secretary of Defense. At the
same time the highest military-political organ of the United States was
created -- the National Security Council (NSC) which included the
President, Vice President, Secretary of Stete, Secretary of.Defense, and
the chief of the Office for Defense Mobili,Lation.. Tho now, highly central-
:: ized organization was to advise the President concerning important political
problems. "The purpose of the council,"-trote Robert .Cutler, ? special
assistant to the President for national security, owas to combine the
:numerous aspects of national secerity (feign policy, military, economic,
financial, psychological, and inteznal.seeurit so that the policy finally
-reconded to the President would be alLencompassing and 'unified."
(ForeiFn Affairs, 1956, No 2.) :?
In the plans for reorganizing US military and political leadership
prishc importance was attached to the intelligence system, Which was also to
be reorganized and strengthened.- The openly declared course toward
eetablishing world hegemony was accompanied by the creation of a global ?
intelligence organization on a scale unprecedented in the history of the
country. In accordance with the 1947 National Seourity_Act there was set
up a permanently operating government agency of combined "political and
strategic intelligence" -- the Central Intelligence Agency --which was
suberdinated directly to the NSC. (C. Merriam and R. Marriam. The American
Government. Boston, 1954, page 777.) As Harry Truman,. former US President,
stated in his.memoirs, the creation of this centralized government
f_ntelligence service was a result of almost two years of study by US intelli.
tNnoo exports of the best possible organization for espionage and subversive
activities.) (The Memoirs of Harry S. Truman, Vol. 1, page 98.)
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mus, tno estaelisnment ci no C:A 'an'nd a new stage in the develop.
mont of US intelligence. In r?iric.:, tho -?ect of National Security Act,
one finds that Paragraph 102, Chapten 1 of this law defines the functions
of CIA as follows:
"d) To coordinate the intellinencnr: activities of various govern-
ment departments and agencies the CIA, under the direction of the National
Secueity Council, must carry out the following functions:
1. To adviso the National Security Council concerning such aspects
of intelligence activities of government departments and agencies as
relate to national security; .
2. To make recommendations to the Council for the coordination of
such intelligence activities of government departments and agencies as
relate te national security;
3. To correlate and evaluate intelligence information relating to
the national security, and provide for the appropriate dissemination of
such intelligence among government agencies, using for this purpose, if
necessary, existing.agencios.and facilities...;
4. To perform, for the benefit of existing intelligence agencies,
.
such functions of a general nature :hich a central organ is able to carry
out More effectively and which are determined by the National Security
.Council;
S. To perform such other intelligence functions related to National
Security as may be assigned from time to tine by the National Security
Council." (National Security Act of 19L7, Congressional Record, July 24,
1947, pages. 10072710078.)
Thus, the Central intelliicenee Agency acquired groat power, primarily
of a coordinating naare.- In a nenegrnph concerning the CIA the well-known
cnentator, Joachim joesten, wrote that this agency has "a unique quality
which is a result of the large-scale capitalistic nature of the American
Tile CIA is a huge business?. Many CIA leaders come from the
business world. The methods used are completely in keeping with the
methods employed by a business concern.v, (j..Joesten. CIA, Munieh, 1958,
page 20.) Blending the intelligence apparatus with monopolistic capital
imparted great weight to the new intelligence -agency.
The creation of. CIA did not involve the abolishment of military
strategic intelligence as such. The CIA was able, for example, to advise.
the National 'Security Council hownto divide responsibility among various
intelligence .agencies, although 'illis'problemwas to be finally decided
only by the Council itself. IncudocfninHthe composition of the Council
were the directors of agencies affpotedfoY.CIArecommondations. At the
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ea= time CIA did not acaniro the eight to interfere in the internal
affairs of other intelligence agencies.
In examining the situation of military intelligence in this complex
.system it should be noted that during this whole period it was making
desperate attempts to come out in first place. For A. Dulles, who for
many years was chief of the CIA and who came from OSS, it was characteristic
that he tried to "politicize" all steategic intelligence and make the CIA
not simply an organfor coordinating intelligence but for 'quaking major ?
policy." Officials in the Pentagon voiced dissatisfaction with such a
course. They were afraid that "a passion for political intrigue" would
make it difficult to solve militaey problems, diminish the importance of
military intelligence, and deprive intelligence information of the needed
accuracy and objectivity.
For some time the internal struggle among various agencies of. US
intelligence was concealed and conducted in the depths of the "intelligence
jungles." But it soon came to the surface. The military circles, which
strove for greater influence of Pentagon intelligence, once more gained
the upper hand. The victory won by those circles was expressed and con-
solidated by the establishment in August 1961 of the Defense Intelligence
Agency (DIA), headed by Lt Gen Joseph Carroll, formerly a responsible
official in the Federal Bureau of Investigation and later Inspector General
_of the Air Force.
The creation of DIA, according to American authors, was not simply
a matter of merging the intelligence offorts-of the throe branches of the
Armed Forces into. one organization. Tho main purpose of the new agency,
which is subordinate to the Secretary of 'Defense and constitutes the key
organization in military intelligence at trio highest. level -- its "brain
trust" -- was an attempt to achieve ma-ximum coordination and greatest
possible Ltfactiveness in the intelligence activities carried out by the
Army, Air Force, and Navy. According to information from US sources, DIA
is obliged: 1. To determine what intelligence information is needed at
any given moment; 2. To establish priority of information; 3. To distribute
among the three branches of the Armed :Forces tasks involving the collection
of intelligence information; and. 4. To analyze and evaluate the informa-
tion presented by various service intelligence branches. The creation of.
DIA has shed light on one of the problems Which traditionally proved to be
a stumbling block for the US intelligence apparatus. The nature of this,
oblem is the constant bohnd-theaseenes struggle among various intelligence
agencies. The government was inevitably faced with the fact that each
military department gave its own evaluation of the potential capabilities
of an enemy a:certain slant which would enable it to obtain funds, moral
eupport for its otn needs and interests. The Department of the Air Force
and air force intelligen:ce have been particularly noted for this in recent
years in their efforts to acquire greater appropriations to help them in
their race for increased air armament.
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The creation of DIA was an -effort to concentrate in the Pentagon
the derection of allfoees of waefeee, beeinning with military action
itsef and ending with the organization on foreign territory of subversion
in the broadest moaning of this term. - It Was produced, as A. Dulles later,
weote, by the need to expand the activities of armed forces intelligence
to the point are it would be able to deal successfully with the over-
growing and ever more complicated tasks. (A. Dulles, op. cit., page 46.)
It is comnonly known that the tasks assigned to DIA and service intelligence
beanches include mainly the collection of information about the military
--
economic potential and the armed forces of the Soviet Union and other .
socialist countries.
The interests of DIA go far beyond the limits of strictly military
problene and also relate to Military-political, economic, and scientific
aspects of life in various countries -. the potential targets of US
aggression and expansion. For the purpese of justifying expansion of the
sphere of interests of military intelligence and its right to "crowd" CIA,
a large nember of noted specialists was called upon. They stated that. the
time has passed when it was possible to view the military aspects of
intelligence operations apart feen overall national problems. In their
ceieion, political or economic feetoee sometimes have a determining
influence on the position of counteiee; in other cases, they are influenced
by scientific inventions and tec'enological- improvements, or also by
psychological advantages. On thie bais, the conclusion has now been
expressed in bourgeois military literature that "military intelligence must
be -viewed and evaluated only as pa::'t of the overall system of government
and political intelligence and in no case must it be considered apart from?
these broader aspects of intelligence activity." (E. Kingston-McClory.
-Military Policy end Stratoey. Meseaa, Voyenizdat, 1963, page 85.)
In i attempts to learn the military, political, economic, and
scientific-teChnical 'secrets of the USSR and other secialist countries, US
.military intelligence is not restricted in its scope of activities or in the
selection of means. Ameng these means, agent intelligence activities are
of ?eine importance. "The clandestine collection of intelligence (espionage),"
accoeding to In Dulles, "must remain an essential andbasic.type of
intelligence activity." (A. Dell es, op. cit., page 58.) Great importance
is also assigned to the legal apparatus for military intelligence abroad
the system of military 'attaches who are 'accredited as US diplomatic reprc.
sentatives abroad.
As has long been known, US military intelligence which is a component'
part of the government machine, is responsible fpr protecting the army and.
the country against possible internal dioorders. From a territorial view-
point, function is broadly interpreted, i.e., it includes not only the
-United States itself (which, incidentally,- explains the close ites existing
between military intelligence and the 'AI), but also the territory of other
countries whc1.0 the interestsof,anmonerelies are represented. The .-
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. counterintelligence functions of IAIitary intelligence in the US Armed
:Forces have a direct connection wioh this 'r%policemanls role."
An idea of present-day US lalitary ontelligence would be incomplete
if it did not include consideratTh.a of an 'TaapOrtant and super-secret
,intelligence organization as the National ,7;ocurity Agency (NSA) which has o-
been growing in importance from coar to T.T:Ar. Under the supervision of the
-:Pentagon; NSA collects information by radio intorcept and by decoding.
secret communications of foreign gevernmente. Although the principal .
efforts of this agency are directed toward penetrating the secrets of
cipher systems and codes of socialist co%Intries, the immediate allies of
the US in its military-political blocs ac no i.xception. The following
data give an idea of the scope of I2A activity. The number of employees
in the agency exceeds 10,000 people. In the building of its central
officeo, which is surpassed in size only by the Pentagon but which is
larger than the CIA headouarters in Langley, there aro many computers and
special apparatuses. The operation of the central offices of the agency
alone costs $100,000,000 per year. NSA has at its disposal a far-flung
network of outlying radio intercept stations which operate round-the-clock,
Through the use of these stations, which inclode more than 2,000 special
:posts manned by 8,000 military operators, NSA intercepts both coded and
open-text messages. Nest of the intercept activity is done by US military
radios located at US bases abroad. Zoreover, monitoring is also done on
aircraft and ships equipped with special devices. The expenses of operating
the outlying intercept stations al:.oea-it. to about $380,000,000 annually.
If we add to this the cost of maite,ining the central offices of the
agency we find that. the US government spends for communications intelli-
gence alone almost Half a billion dollars per year. The NSA is also
charged with protooting the ciphers and codes of US government establish- '
ments. In addition, NSA ?superviees and coordinates the activities of the.
. US Army Security Agency and corresponding communication intelligence ?
groupo in the US Navy and Air Fore?. Ranson, op. cit., page 117.)
The recent changes in the eupervision of US intelligence have also.,
affected the NSA. Army Lt GOA Marshall Carter,- who for the last three
years was deputy director of CIA, was put in:charge of NSA. ? (Herald
Ty.ibune, Nay 16, 1965.)
Directly connected with the inorease0. importance of military
intelligence in the US is the appointment to the pest of CIA director, in
replacement of MeCone, of William Raborn,- a fellow-Texan and active
supporter of President Johnson. (Rayborn was born in Texas 1n190.5.
After completing the Naval Academy he was assigned to duty on a Navy ship.
In 1934 he qualified as a-Navy pilot and served inair units. From 1940
to 1942 he headed the air artillery :school of 'Pearl Harbor. He took part
in military action in the Far East. After the war, ho occupied many
command posts in the Navy, including those of. commander of a battleship and
:
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Assi3tallt On1-2 of Staff of the Fleet. In 1956 he was promoted
to roar adairal and in 1960 to vice admiral. He retired in 1963.
The military career of Raborn was not onlyspocifically naval.
? Doing an artilleryman, he specialised after the war in the missile field. -
In 1952.he worked in the missile section of the Navy staff and after 1955
he headed the program for the dGvolopme::It of Polaris type missiles. Prior.
to retiring, he was Deputy Chief of Staff of the Navy for Ociontific
Research. As indicated in the n3 -yress, IUDorn played a considerable role
in pushing the production of Poris mdssiles.which have boon assigned an.
important place in US military 6.oetrine. - In the person of Raborn a repro-
,: sentative of the most aggressive circles of the Pentagon was assigned to .-?
- the post of CIA director. His z--,gnment to that post was a very important.
? victory for the "Military-indust.rL11 complex" and further evidence of the .
'increase in the role played by those forces in planning US foreign policy.
Tho assignment of Raborn was indicative in another respect -- in a way it
sunned up the behind-the-scenes, interdepartmental squabbles which had boon
waged over the past few years between two members of the "intelligence
community" -- the CIA and military intelligence The miserable failures
of CIA over the past few years, and especially the part it played in the
intervention in Cuba, seriously undermined public confidence and forced the
US government to remove A. Dulles from the post of directing intelligence
activities. This all indicates that the scales have tipped in favor of
the Pentagon.
The new director of CIAis not onlya.military man but like his
predecessor, john McCone, an inr:ortant business man (upon retirement he
beca.:f.e vice president of the Aerojet.General?Corporation of California
which, being an important pro un of missile equipment, occupies a special
place in US military industry).- .Tho tits between monopolies and intelli-
gence are effected in many ways andthe -"personal union" of generals in
intelligence with generals in big business, as personified earlier by
Alien Lulles and John 1.1cCone and at the present time by Maliam Raborn, is
only one of these way's'. It is much more convenient for powerful monopolists
to operate through intelligence than through other organs in the US govern-
Tho fact of the matter is :11at the ties with intelligence guarantee
a maximum of secrecy and a minimtm of publicity. (It is well known what
furor the US press, which represents the interests of monopolies, raises
in those rare instances when information about the dirty collaboration
botween business and the government apparatus becomes known to the public.)
Secondly, the largo monopolies always considered it necessary .to have their
C;;;":1 intelligence system in order to be abreast of. the affairs of their
economic competitors and to guarantee for themselves superprofits for many
years to come. In this sease'CIA is a trusted instrument for monopolists.
Thirdly, by acting through inteiligonce, the most reactionary monopolistic
circles can engage in transactions which the goverment itself cannot ? .
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conduct openly because of so-called prestige considerations. In the fourth
place; among professional US intellie;ence agents, monopolies can most
easily find people who are ready Co do anything for the sake of carrying
out well-paid orders,.
The increase in the role of military intelligence is a symptomatic
phenomenon reflecting, the efforts of US military loaders and in keeping with
their aims. In all stages of their strategib planning they have consideren
intelligence to be ono of the most important OIL. ants. "During the present
crisis," says L. Farago, author of the book Wcr of Wits, which caused a
sensation at one time in the US, "we shall be able co survive only under
the definite condition that we have accurate and timely knowledge of, that
is 'going on in the werld, anywhere in the world, and especially behind the
walls of the Kremlin... We must know the secret intentions of the enemy, -
his vulnerable or weak spots, and those vitally important regions where .he
has concentrated his physical and spiritual resources." (L. Farago, War of
Wits, Now York, 1954, page 3.)
Information collected by US :,trategic intelligence serves as a basis
for planning and carrying out military measures in peacetime as well as in
time of war. In this connection intelligence agencies direct their main
efforts toward defining and studying the potential capabilities and weak
points of foreign countries. A prominent US intelligence expert, Professor
Sherman Kent, wrote on this subject: "Our political leaders need a large
amount of information concerning foreign. governments. They need informa-
tion which must be complete, aceurate, and timely and can serve as a basis
.for action... For example, they must know: a. the physical-geographical
conditions of these countries, i.e., their natural topography ? and environ.
menu and also the many different permanent installations added to the
terrain (cities, agricultural and industrial enterprises, transport routes,
etc.); b. their population including total number, density in various
regions, typos of occupation; c. state of the arts, science and technology
in these countries (1 would also edd.the condition of their armed forces);
d. the nature, of their .political system, economy, social groups, moral
principles, and the relationship among all these phenomena." (S. Kent,
Strteic Intallir4ence for Amoico.n World Policy, Princeton, 1949, pages
5_6.) _es. we see, Kent tried to provide a theoretical foundation for the
broad activities of strategic intelligence and to reinforce the practices
of the US government and monopolies with reliable arguments which were
intended to convince public opinion in the US of the need to strengthen the
role of military intelligence and, eonsecuently, of the inevitability of
the huge expenditures associated with the intelligence program. ? The image
of US military intelligence makes it altogether clear that it is an
experienced and dangerous enemy which has great resources at its disposal, ?
which does not hesitate to tse any method whatsoever, and which is carrying
out extensive intelligence and subversive activities- against the socialist
camp. .
pro e e e eas