WOODROW WILSON: PROPHECY AND PERSPECTIVE FOR THE PRESENT BY ALLEN W. DULLES DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIENCE AT YALE UNIVERSITY NOVEMBER 27, 1956

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP70-00058R000200050054-5
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 21
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 23, 1999
• Sequence Number: 54
• Publication Date: November 27, 1956
• Content Type: SPEECH

Approved For Release 2001/03/02 : CIA-RDP70-00058R000200050054-5
WOODROW WILSON: PROPHECY AND PERSPECTIVE
FOR THE PRESENT
By
Allen W. Dulles
Director of Central Intelligence
at
Yale University
November 27, 1956
It is an honor to have been designated as Lamont lecturer and to speak
to you of some phases of the work of Woodrow Wilson.
I feel particularly gratified that you should have chosen a Princeton
man for this task, but possibly after what tool-, place a week ago Saturday,
you can afford to be magnanimous.
In the presence of Charles Seymour, your distinguished President
Emeritus, I speak of Woodrow Nilson with a great deal of humility. He is,
after all, the real expert on the subject, and I shall draw liberally from ideas
he has expressed.
A. few weeks ago I returned from 3. 35, 000 mile trip around the world,
visiting particularly the countries of the Middle East, Southeast Asia, and the
Far East. I had rather planned to work out, during this trip, what I would
say to you today. But although I did some thinking, I found little time for
writing, while visiting some twenty countries. As I talked, however, with the
leaders of these countries, many of which had newly found or fought out their
freedom, I could not help but ponder how fiercely had burned the fire of
self-determination which Woodrow Wilson had helped to kindle some 40 years
Approved For Release 2001/03/02 : CIA-RDP70-00058R000200050054-5
 Approved For Release 2001/03/02 : CIA-RDP70-00058R000200050054-5
Before taking up the main subject of my talk I would like to say a word
about Yale and my chosen field of intelligence. The co:nn,-.ection between Yale
and national intelligence is an old one. Two members of your class of 177 ,
Nathan Hale and Benjamin Tallrnadge were, as many of you may know,
pioneers in the field of intelligence. The story of Hale's martyrdom while
gathering information from the enemy is well known,
Hale s friend, Ben Tallmad e, was an almost equally fabulous character.
n ingenious system of information collection on British troop
He devised a
during g the Revolutionary War, used primitive codes and invisible ink, a.p
played an important role in the apprehension and conviction of Benedict
Arnold's accomplice,
.Andre, After the war, he became a businessman,
a land speculator, a member of Congress, and a lay preacher in the
Congregational Church. As you can see, a career in intelligence preparos
you for almost any occupation.
Your university today is contributing able men to American
intelligence, and I am one of the chief beneficiaries. Among them, none is
more outstanding than a former Yale Professor, Dr. Sherman Kent, who as
Chairman of the Board of National Estimates in the Central Intelligence .gency,
plays a major role in our work.
We have, of course, come -i long ~Na.y in our national life since the
days of Hale and Tallmadge and with our growth to manhood as -a nation, our
responsibilities have increased well beyond the dreams of our forefathers.
Approved For Release 2001/03/02 : CIA-RDP70-00058R00020005.0054-5
 Approved For Release 2001/03/02 : CIA-RDP70-00058R000200050054-5
Since I finished my academic studies in 1916, I have divided my time
evenly between government service and the practice of the law. During these
years I have served, in one capacity or another, under every President ofi the
United States; the first was Woodrow Wilson. He was my college president
during the early months of my freshman year at Princeton before he beca.#ne
Governor of New Jersey. He was also my first chief as I entered the Foreign
Service in 1916.
IIi
In what I am going to say about President Wilson today, I am drauting
very largely on my recollections of the man, I may say that despite the
passage of time, these recollections are clear. My association with Wilton,
modest as it was, has had a definite impact upon my own thinking and my ap-
proach to the international problems with which I have been engaged fro r4
Universities in the Nation's Service
It is appropriate for us here t to start where Wilson himself
began, by stressing the important role that must be played by the university
communities in the service of the nation.
Wilson said prophetically to his own university some 60 years aglo
that "when all is said, it is not learning but the spirit of service that will
give a college -jti.._place in the public annals of the nation . . . There is laid
upon us the compulsion of the national life.. We dare not keep aloof and closet
ourselves while a nation comes to its maturity. The days of glad expansion
are gone, our life grows tense and difficult; our resource for the future] lies
Approved For Release 2001/03/02 : CIA-RDP70-00058R000200050054-5
 Approved For Release 2001/03/02 : CIA-RDP70-00058R0002000~0054-5
in careful thought, providence , and a wise economy; and the school must !be of
Little did Wilson suspect when he tour office how great his own role
would be in America's coming of age -- despite the fact that he well appr I
ciated America's growing leadership in international affairs.
X'ou will recall that Wilson was elected to the Presidency on a platform
that dealt almost exclusively with domestic problems and reforms -- such a.s
lowering tariffs and overhauling the ban?-in; system. Wilson wrote to a friend
just before assuming office that "it would be the irony of fate if my adminstra-
tion had to dal chiefly with foreign affairs," In his first inaugural addre s
in the seemingly peaceful days of 1913, he scarcely mentioned foreign p l)cy,
i'+'S.;.Then his first term was half over we were in the thick of it; and before his
second term had finished, a series of fateful decisions were taken which
affected world history.
In the years between those events there was a vast growth in our
world responsibilities which 37.Tilson understood wit'-L a foresight that manly in
this country were slow to appreciate.
Wilson and. Responsible Government
From the time he was an undergraduate in college, Wilson had been
fascinat.d with problems of brinning government up to meet the challengas
and problems of the times, He viewed .f: merica's mowing-up with excitement
and hope., .!\.t his inaugural address as President of Princeton in 1902, A e had must lead the:
spoken of AOpr~ovd&ForkeieaserlOO1I03/02 :CIA RDP76-00058R000200050054-5
world.
 Approved For Release 2001/03/02 : CIA-RDP70-00058R00020005.0054-5
And in the same year he wrote that: have come to full maturity
with this new century of our national existence and to full self -consciousness
as a nation. And the day of our isolation is past. We shall learn much
ourselves now that we stand closer to other nations and compare ourselves
first with one and again with another, . ."
Several years later at Columbia he concluded one of his many
speeches on government with the prophetic remark that, can never
hide our president again as a more domestic officer." There could 15~ no
more eloquent proof of these words than Viilson's own tour of service in
that high office,
Some 215 years ago I came into the possession of the original of one
of the rare documents of 'i' oodrow 1t' ilson's career -- a personal letter to
Secretary 'Lansing -- which illustrates his convictions as to the high
responsibility of the presidency in the conduct of foreign relations.
bile the letter was published in ?ay Stannard Bake-'s "Life and
Letters ?-,f 7foodr-)w Wilson," it has never received the attention which it
deserves.
Before the end of the campai^.n of '.x,'161 the President became fully
aware that the election was to be a close one, that it was more or less of a
toss-up whether he or iv r. Hughes would win. That election, as was the case
of the election the other day, was fought out during a period of great ntor-
national crisis. America then faced hard decisions and as the letter indicates
'Wilson was deeply disturbed about the consequences to the country of the situ-
ation which would arise if he were defeated and yet remained on as the
President
Approved For Release 2001/03/62: CIA-RDP70-00058R000200050054-5
 Approved For Release 2001/03/02 : CIA-RDP70-00058R000200050054-5
VO.:
from early November until the coming March. It is fortunate that Wilson
set forth his ideas in a latter which he wrote Mr. L^.nsing, then Secretary
of State, who had left R"Tashington to vote in his home of Watertown, New 'Fork.
~
The main source of concern was, in Wilson's words, that: "The
direction of the foreign policy of the government would in effect have been
taken out of my hands and yet its new definition would be impossible until
He added this: "I feel that it would be my duty to relieve the country
of the peril of such a. situation at once. The course I have in mind is dependent
upon the consent and cooperation of the Vice President; but, if I could ga.'n his
to invite Mr. Hurlhes to
as c your n
consent to the plan, I would permission
become Secretary of State and would then join the Vice President in resigning,
and thus open to Mr. Hughes the immediate Succession to the P'resi:.lenc .
my life long, 11 l%7ilson continued, '. "I have advocated some sl.~ch
responsible government for the United States as other constitutional sYste'rnl7i
afford as a matter of course, and as such action on my part would inau r4rate,
at least by example. Responsible government means government by those
whom the people trust, and trust at the time of decision and action. Tle
whole country has long perceiv cl., without '.knowing how to remedy, the extreme
disadvantage of f having to live for four month after an election under a party
e polls. Hare is the remedy, ata.ny
whose guidance earl been tai-;clad at th
rata as far as the Executive is c one erneed. "
''+e car igi?na~. letter was given to me by my.Aunt, Mrs. T-,7.nsing,
T~..
.
who found it among my Uncles papers after his death. It was marked to be
Approved For Release 2001/03/0: CIA-RDP70-00058R000200050054-5
 Approved For Release 2001/03/02 : CIA-RDP70-00058R000200050054-5
destroyed, but I disobeyed this injunction, -is I have done frequently since
The problem which President Wilson poses in this letter has bee.
in part solved by the 20th '?.mendment, moving; the date of inauguration from
March 4 to January 2Q. The possibility of the solution ha suggested has been
eliminated by legislation which changes the line of succession, after the
Vice President, from an appointed officer (the Secretary of State) to an
elected officer (the ?peakar of the k-I? use of : presentatives).
It seems to me questionable, however, whether the 2Oth.AmendmIent
has adequately solved the problem. True it h s reduced the I-Ime duck-.
period from about four months to a little over two and a half me nths, But in
,: the present state of the world, in the atomic age, "" days is a very lk,ng
period, For example, if Eby chance we were today in a "lame duck" period
I can hardly conceive how adequate machinery could be set up to reach t1e
decisions that are required daily if not hourly, with one roan holding 0:13 1
titular authority and another enjoying the popular mandate.
In the lame duck period of 1933 an attempt was made by '?resident
Hoover to solve the problem by collaboration between the outg'o,in(-f and tide
incoming administration. This proved unrewarding. I imagine that any
incoming administration will be .reluctant to share the responsibility witl`iout
3-v ving the real power of decision. It would, it seems to me, be easier o got
the willing cooperation of outgoing -fficials who have turned over their offices
to the newly elected or appointe-.1 officials than to try again what failed in
1933.. Most European constitutional governments, including the British,; manage
in one waa4pprovediFor Reielasel-2O?eU83/00n f A REDKO A6 NO240050054-5
T
 Approved For Release 2001/03/02 : CIA-RDP70-00058R000200050054-5
There are other curious anomalies in the present lame duck system
of 75 days. The outgoing administration in early January must put in a
State of the Union message, an economic report, and a budget message;
Except for the actual work done on the budg;t, this trilogy of swan songs
serves very little useful purpose.
Cf course the real log jam comes from the Electoral College procedures,
which the 20th - mendment did little to sat right. The Amendment rightly
ruled that electoral votes should be counted only by the newly elected Congress
so that a, possible tie could not be bro'cen by a lame duc*~' Congress. but,
since the new Congress does not meet until January 3rd according to tho
., ..mendment, the long period of waiting for a change in administration s'tiems
destined to be with us until some better way is found to solve this problem
which '.:rilson first tried to meet.
Wilson was President when two great revolutions swept through
Russia in 10,17; first the Keren.s'.=y revolution of March, then the Bclsh; vi'~
revolution of Lenin-Trotsky in November, He had great sympathy for fho
democratic revolution in March of 10/17 a.nd made every effort to extend
support to it,
You may remember that he sent a distinguished mission under
:,lilau Zoot to review the prospects of the Provisional Government and ,o
ascertain what steps we could twee to help it. The Mission brought a very
dissenter was Charles R. Crane vihn
optimistic report from which the only
Approved For Release 2001/03/02: CIA-RDP70-00058R000200050054-5
 Approved For Release 2001/03/02 : CIA-RDP70-00058R000200050054-5
possessed that most valuable of all qualifications: first-hand '..mnowledge
of an area he hal visited many times,
Even after the hopes for democracy and freedom in Russia were
dispelled by the November revolution, Wilson sought to make clear that
our policy was one of deep friendship for the Russian peoples despite their
form of government, "Whether their pr sent leaders believe it or not,
he said, "it is our heartfelt desire and hope that soma way may be opened
whereby we may be privileged to assist the people of Russia to obtain their
utmost hope of liberty and ordered peace .
Today, almost 40 years after the nussia.n revolutions we are stillI
thwarted in our quest to convince the Russian people of our desire for peflce
and friendship with them. The tight dictatorship in tale gremlin b.- Is pted,
with a large measure of success, to l.reep the truth and the facts fr.^m th
people of the Soviet Union. For example, they have never published the text
of ?hhrushchev's speech denouncing Stalin and Stalinism, which has been
printed elsewhere throughout the civilized world. The people in Russia
have never been told the truth about events in gland. They Have been t. i.d
hardly anything, and certainly none of the truth, about what has transpir d
this past month in Hungary.
It seems t?:' me, however, that th.. Soviet lv^-ad ers have made two flatal
errors if they propos ; to retain the hard dictatorship which the t achings.
of Lenin and Stalin envisage.
Approved For Release 2001/03/02 : CIA-RDP70-00058R000200050054-5
 Approved For Release 2001/03/02 : CIA-RDP70-00058R000200050054-5
First, the new leaders of the USSR admitted to respectability
the Tito experiment in Yugoslavia. I do not pose its -.t prophet, but in an
address which I made l?3 months ago at the Columbia University Commencement,
I put this question: If the Tito form of heresy, denounced a few yearn ago
more vigorously even than capitalism, is now to be forgiven and appro'red,
how can the Soviet deny the ''Europoan satellites the right to a similar }heresy
if they so desire?"
I only wish that this question had been a prophecy because it is
proving to be true. Poland has already made moves in this dir, ection,
In Hungary the people were unwilling to accept -1 halfway station towarrd
liberty and have electrified the world by their struggle For complete
independence. In doing o o they have tended to disprove the theory go long
held that revolt against a tyranny equipped with the modern weapons of war
was foredoomed to failure,
Approved For Release 2001/03/02 : CIA-RDP70-00058R000200050054-5
 Approved For Release 2001/03/02 : CIA-RDP70-00058R000200050054-5
Whatever the final Outcome in Hun.ary, those wh~. have sacrificed'
themselves will not have failed. They have alerted the world once more
to the meaning of Soviet despotism, and have struck. a blow for freedom
which will rank in history with the American and French revolutions.
The second fatal error the Kremlin has made was in calculating
that it could safely introduce mass education into the Soviet Union and
that those who were educated in science and technology would not come to
think in political terms as well. Education has made it difficult, if not
impossible, for the Soviet leaders to continue to close off their people
from access to the realities of the outside world.
An interesting report that has recently been received indicates that
irr` the men in the Kremlin understand the danger and are trying by artificial
means to meet it. They are apparently now proposing that advanced deg i roes
will not be given to those who have completed their educational work until
they have had four additional years of a compulsory work assignment on'
top of their educational career. 'Perhaps the Soviets believe this time
would serve as an adequate antidote to independent thinking, But artificial
means such as these and the resuscitation of Molotov to lecture to the
writers and artists will do little to solve the problem. You can brainwash
a few for a period of time, you could never brainwash a whole nation.
In each of these problems the Soviet Union' s difficulties stem from
indifference to beliefs :Nilson held most deeply: the rights of any nation
to determine its own destiny, and the necessity of bringing intellectual
enquiry into the life of the nation at large. I daresay that Nilson would'
Approved For Release 2001101/62 : CIA-RDP70-00058R000200050054-5
 Approved For Release 2001/03/02 : CIA-RDP70-00058R000200050054-5
not have been surprised to see the proud peoples of Eastern Europe led in
their latest struggle for self-determination by students and writers as well
as workers and peasants.
We are now going through dramatic days in our relations with the'
Soviet Union and it seems that some inexorable laws are at last catching
up with the Soviet system, In the industrial and educational progress which
has been made they have gone far towards turning serfs into thinking human
bThey have seen satellites move dramatically toward freedom, and
beings.
it is not too much to predict that the Soviet Union can never be the same,
as it was in the days of Stalin, In the n.Qt too distant future we may find
new means of evidencing to the -ussian people the basic friendship whic'.
the American people have always had toward them and which 'V.rilson tried
to show in the early days of the Russian revolution.
Wilson and the Search for Facts,
In his development of our foreign policy, Tdilson was an avid
searcher for the facts. In preparation for the work at the Paris Peace
Conference in ic'18-1 he gathered together, in a committee aptly called
The Inquiry", the ablest experts, in and out of government, to prepare:
the position papers on many of the intricate subjects to come before the
Conference.
As a young Foreign Service Cfficer in Paris, I worked closely with
this group. I was not officially a member of it as was Charles Seymour,
-
12
Approved For Release 2001/03/02 : CIA-RDP70-00058R000200050054-5
 Approved For Release 2001/03/02 : CIA-RDP70-00058R000200060054-5
but I can state that to the surprise and amazement of the European
negotiators, the American delegation to the Paris Peace Conference
arrived there better documented, even on most of the intricate European
I recall a particular instance at the Conference
problems, than the representatives of the European
states themselves.:
in 10, 11/1 when WVd odrow
Pail son had an exceptionally difficult problem to solve, and one which w as
fraught with deep international significance. It related to the allocation
of the port of Fiume between the conflicting claims of Italy and Yugoslavia.
Here the President's advisors were not in accord, and he was faced with
detailed memoranda presenting both sides of the case. Few of the inter:-
national issues presented at the Conference illustrated so well Vilson'w
determination to get at the facts and then to decide without fear or favor.
In this case, after considering the issues,-particularly that to take
Fiume from Yugoslavia would leave that country without any readily
accessible port on the Adriatic, while Italy had a plethora of ports in fl "L
area, including Venice and Trieste, - the decision went to the Yugoslavs.
It resulted in the temporary withdrawal of Italy from the Peace Conference,
led to the Greek invasion of sia Minor, and stirred a deep wave of
indignation against the United States throughout Italy. Jilson who had
been the idol :,f the Italian people 'became overnight an enemy in their eyes.
With all the political changes in the area, this issue has long since
become academic, The incident, however, has helped to reconcile mq to
the fact that if this country is to follow the right course, we cannot al-Ways
Approved For Release 2001/03/02 : CIA-RDP70-00058R000200050054-5
 Approved For Release 2001/03/02 : CIA-RDP70-00058R000200050054-5
hope for popularity or the love of other peoples. I find this a somewhat;
consoling thought these days, In the long run if our conduct follows the
course of justice and fair dealing, even though unpopular at the time, w~
will eventually gain and hold respect.
,,7,rilson wanted not only the facts, but a solid conclusion from them.
President :1meritus Seymour in his article in Foreign Affairs
1956, recounts that on his way to the Paris Peace Conference
'nlashington, he called together his expert analysts in "The
for January
on the Gegrge
Inquiry" and
said this, "Tell me what is right and Itll fight for it. Give me a guaranteed
position. "
More than any of his predecessors he sent special envoys and special
missions to various foreign countries to bring him reports on particular,
situations. I have mentioned the Root mission to -?%ussia, He sent a se ies
of missions to Mexico when ethers were urging him to take action without
worrying about petty details. Likewise in the early days of the World "War
he sought information on the attitudes of the great powers through his riving
Ambassador, Colonel House.
I sometimes wonder why Vilson was not the originator of the plan
which led to the creation of the Central Intelligence Agency. After all, its
task is to do on a worldwide and systematic basis what Wilson was endeI avoring
to do with special missions as emergencies occurred.
What we are trying to do day by day in the Central Intelligence Agency
is to pull together the facts of those situations abroad which affect Dur
-14-
Approved For Release 2001/03/02 : CIA-RDP70-00058R000200050054-5
 Approved For Release 2001/03/02 : CIA-RDP70-00058R000200050054-5
national security. These facts range from the military and ec:nomic power
of a given country, which we call the "1 ardware", to the plans and intentions
of the leaders of that country.
As coordinator of foreign intelligence, we have also set up machinery
ix government today which greatly reduces the danger of being caught un>
prepared, as we were at Pearl Harbor. There the essential facts, to a
large extent, were available; but at that time there was no central machinery
to pull them together and bring the conclusions to the attention of those v ho
had the responsibility for action,
Today there is a Z4-hour "watch" machinery established to bring.
important factors to the attention of competent officers as soon as they
are received.
Of course, after each crisis you will find allegations in the press
that our intelligence has failed and that we have been caught flat-footed in
situations such as in the Middle East, Poland, Hungary, and the like. Such
criticisms have to be left unanswered -- not because they are justified, but
because the information available to us cannot be advertised before the
event, Sometimes it cannot be mentioned even after the event without
risking disclosure of intelligence sources and methods which, under the
law constituting the Central Intelligence Z.gency, are not to be divulged.
Those who bring this criticism arc generally not in a position to know what
facts are in the government's possession, but they do not hesitate to accuse
-15-
Approved For Release 2001/03/02 : CIA-RDP70-00058R000200050054-5
 Approved For Release 2001/03/02 : CIA-RDP70-00058R000200050054-5
the government of being taken by surprise.
Cf course, the fact-finding mechanisms are as fallible as the hurxan
beings whz, do the collecting and the assessing of information. On several
occasions oodrow Wilson discovered this, His missions to Mexico were
often hampered by the partisan interests of his reporting officers; and his
mission to :Russia in 1917 was handicapped by the unfamiliarity of most cpf
the delegation with Russia's traditions and problems.
In our own day, even if one were to know all the hard facts, the
problem of determining how a given country will act is no easy task. Th! is
is particularly true in dictatorships, where action depends upon the decisions
of a small group of men, taken in secret, with no control by responsible
legislation and with only a modicum of attention to the possible reaction of
public opinion. Even at times the actions of democracies are not easily
predictable.
Wilson in the 'Contest for Men's Minds.
One of the great tests we face in the contest with international
communism is the battle for men's minds, In our search for effective:
instruments of political persuasion, we can perhaps take a lesson fron~
Woodrow 'irilson. The First " Vorld War was won not only on the battlefield.
The victory was mightily aided by a convincing program of struggle for the
allegiance of men,
Approved For Release 2001/03/02 : CIA-RDP70-00058R000200050054-5
 Approved For Release 2001/03/02 : CIA-RDP70-00058R000200050054-5
Even before the military tide turned in favor of the allied powers$
Wilson succeeded in creating almost on a world-wide basis the picture of
himself as a man who stood for a just settlement of the war issues.
Just
as today President Eisenhower's great influence in the world is based orx
i
the realization that our war time leader is a man who places peace abovo
all other aims.
v ilson's feat was all the more remarkable because it was carried
out before the days of radio and television, and before we had all the modern
means of mass communication. He did have some advantages, however!,
which we do not now have in our dealings with the Communist countries,
The press in Germany during i orld `.Wear I was relatively free except in!the
military field. Also, Wilson was addressing himself to a people whose;
education and sophistication made them particularly susceptible to his
messages.
The Wilsonian phrase "peace without victory", proclaimed before
we entered the war and not very warmly received by either of the warring
groups, was still well remembered in Germany when, during the latter:, days
of the war, he enunciated his 14-Point program.
This statement of war aims aided in undermining the German power
to resist because he persuaded great segments of the German people that an
end to the war would not mean their humiliation or annihilation, and that there
was an honorable way to bring the hostilities to an end. Viithout seeming to
do so `Wilson was able to carry out that most difficult and generally dangerous
Approved For Release 2001/03/02 : CIA-RDP70-00058R000200050054-5
 Approved For Release 2001/03/02 : CIA-RDP70-00058R000200050054-5
operation of appealing to the people over the heads of their own governments,
and of giving them statements of ideals, aims, and objectives which made
the statements of their own leaders seem hollow and unrewarding. In ob
doing he was following exactly the opposite course from that adopted in 'World
War II when the unfortunate unconditional surrender slogan contributed so
mightily in aiding Hitler and the Nazis to wage war to the bitter end.
When Prince Max of Baden, the German Chancellor, put out very
tentative peace feelers in the autumn of 1918, allied leaders abroad, anti
prominent figures in the United States, called upon ?iTilson to reject theoe
approaches unconditionally. But Wilson continued the correspondence .nd
slowly brought the German people over to his side -- much to the constprna-
tion of German military leaders. Ludendorff, in particular, saw that lie
Noe
was losing the war because the home front was failing at a time when his
armies remained largely undefeated in the field.
In stressing the right of self determination, Wilson also broke the
will to resist of great areas of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, and in the
view of our Minister to Switzerland at that time completed the demoralization
of that country. So appealing was :Tilson's idea of a "peace of impartial ,
justice" that the Chancellor of Germany himself eventually justified surrender
with the reasoning that; if we comprehend that the significance of this
frightful war is above all a victory for the idea of Justice, and if we d not
resist this idea, but submit with all good faith, then we shall find in it a
18-
Approved For Release 2001/03/02 : CIA-RDP70-00058R000200050054-5
 Approved For Release 2001/03/02 : CIA-RDP70-00058R000200050054-5
awl cure for our present wounds and a reservoir of future strength,"
In a sense, tTilson proved one of our first and most effective
psychological warriors. His success was attributable not only to the
inherent appeal of his ideals, but to his own deep and genuine belief in the
importance of the intangibles in human affairs.
Wilson and World Grganization.
There may be a kind of justice in the fact that this centennial
anniversary of V:rilsonrs birth falls at . moment when vitally important
roles are being assumed by the United Nations in the Middle Eastern, the
Hungarian and other crises. The great dream of Wilson was of nations
united in a covenant of peace, which would hold guarantees against armed
aggression. In Wilson's view the deterrent was primarily, but not exclu-
sively, in the moral forces of nations united for peace.
"Armed force/ is in the background in this program," he said,
"but it is in the background, and if the moral force of the -%riiorld will not
suffice, the physical force of the world shall," "But that is the last resort,"
he added, "because this is intended as a constitution of peace, not as a
league of war."
It is also well to remember that Wilson's idea of a League of Nations
was not merely a passive organization to keep the peace in a negative Dense,
"It is a League," he explained, "which can be used for cooperation in any
international matter." ''ihen we look at the work being done by the various
Approved For Release 2001/03/02 : CIA-RDP70-00058R000200050054-5
 Approved For Release 2001/03/02 : CIA-RDP70-00058R000200050054-5
..% humanitarian, cultural and economic organs of the U.N., we see again
acceptance of 'i)ilson's injunction that more and more men in all walks o
life must be "drawn into the field of international consultation."
It is, of course, too soon to be carried away by optimism about the
potential of the United Nations for realizing our goal of a world at peaces
le can have hope, however, that its role in the current Middle Eastern
I
and Hungarian situations -- like its moral and material force in meeting:
the challenge of Korea _, will give it .such stature that no would-be aggressor
will dare to risk directly opposing it.
Is
It is, I feel, a vindication of iJilson's vision that the United State!
is not only an active participant in the U. N. and the site of its permanent
headquarters, but that America has taken a position of leadership in
bringing together the moral force of a great majority of the U. N. members
on all of these three challenges to the rules laid down in the charter.
Certainly the world is now awakened to the realities of the present
era, `:7'fars in the days of the bow and arrow had limited repercussions,
and even after gun powder was discovered they dick not quite succeed in
destroying our civilization. But today with nuclear weapons, long range
bombers and guided missiles, there is no answer to our survival unless; we
have an effective instrument to guard the peace. The laws of the junglecan
no longer prevail.
Approved For Release 2001/03/02 : CIA-RDP70-00058R000200050054-5
 Approved For Release 2001/03/02 : CIA-RDP70-00058R000200050054-5
Some historians have criticized ':Tilson for being too inflexible
in his beliefs, too quick to act on slogans, too sure that he had a guaranteed
position. There is no doubt some justice in these criticisms. Basically,
however, 7;,7ilson was right in his major beliefs -- and, indeed, these have
been largely accepted as American policy: a deep concern for the freedom
and independence of peoples everywhere;, and, at the same time, commit-
ment to an international body as the best hope for peace in troubled times.
From the depth of his spiritual c--evictions, .Nilson realized in his own
day -- and reminds us in ours -- that n4tienaal policy like life itself needs
a sense of direction and high purpose
Approved For Release 2001/03/02 : CIA-RDP70-00058R000200050054-5