THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE PAYS TRIBUTE TO HIS FORMER BOSS.

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP70-00058R000100220035-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 37
• Document Creation Date: November 11, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 13, 1998
• Sequence Number: 35
• Content Type: SPEECH

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WILLIAM J * DONOVAN AND NATIONAL MOR
Allen W. Dulles
It was agr privilege to be associated with William J. Donovan both
as a lawyer between the wars and then during World War II, when I served
under his command in the Office of Strategic Services. His courage and
leadership made a profound impression on me. I gould like to conveV to
you something of that impression, and acme idea of what his pioneering
has meant to all of us.
His interest in our national defense and security started early.
In 1912, as the war clouds gathered In the Balkans, he helped organize
Troop I of the New York National Huard. In 1915 he went to Poland as a
member of a Rockefeller conmisston charged with relieving the great
shortage of food there, and particular3y of milk for the children. When
the National Guard was mobilized in 1916, he cams home to join his Troop I
on the Mexican Border.
Then awe his fabulous career in World War I with the 165th Infantry
of the 42nd Division - the renowned "Fighting 69th" of the Rainbow
Division. Sere he got his nielmam "Wild Bill.* The legend goes that
after the regiment landed in Prance he ran them five miles with full
packs to limber then up. As the men were grumbling with exhaustion,
anted out that he was ten year. older and carrying the same
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50-pound Eck. One of the men rep,.ied, "But we ainit as wild
Billiw Another story has it that the honorary title was transferred to
him from a professional baseball pitcher of the same name whose control
left something to be desired. Whatever its origin, the title stuck.
The citations Colonel Donovan received in France tell the military
story: On July 28, 1918, a Distinguished Service Cross: se
advance of the division for four We, all the while under shell and
machine gun fire from the ansaty, who were ? n three sides of him, and
he was repeatedly and persistently counterattacked, being wounded twice."
Three days later the Distinguished Service Models "He displayed con-
spicuous anergy and most efficient leadership in the advance of his
battalion across the Ourcq River and the capture of strong enee
positions* .*His devotion to duty,, heroism, and pronounced qualities of
a Commander enabled him to successfully accomplish all missions assigned
to him in this important operation."
And then, for action in combat in the Meuse-Argonne on October 14,
the highest of all awards, the Congressional Modal of Honors "...Colonel
Donovan pwa:onnally led the assaulting wave in an attack upon a very
strongly organized position, and when our troops were suffering heavy
casualties he encouraged all near him by his ele, wing among his
in exposed positions, reorganising decimated platoons and accompanying
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them forward in attacks. When he use wounded in the leg by a
d to be evacuated and continued with his unit urrt
withdrew to a lase expos
sition." *No man err deserved it more,"
said General Douglas MacArthur, who had seen this action.
Three aids were killed at Dcno ane' a side in the course of these
actions. Reverend Francis P. 't , the ehaplaxin Of the 69th, said,
"His men would have cheerfully gone to hell with him, and as a priest,
I mean what T. say'." Several years ago General Fftnk McCoy,, describing
his close association with Bill Donovan during World War 1, said he was
one of the finest soldiers he ever saw in his lifer-lDng service in the
A; pr, that he had the qualities of the ideal soldier, judgment and
ourage and the respect and affection of his men.
~dmgm
reorganized the Department of Justice and called Hill to
he entered a new phase of his career. In 1924 President
man was appointed U.S. Attorney in Buffalo,, and shortly
Washington to be assistant to the Attorney General, heading
Division. Here he showed both his fearlessness in law
enforcement and his intense Interest in asking law a practical vehicle
to promte the economic welfare.
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of free enterprise, He attacked restraints and monopoly
convinced that individual freedom is vitally linked
ive wthusiae . In the fre iton Potteries case he won
t that price fixing among dominant competitors is
of itself illegal.. He brought under legal attack such diverse industries
as oil, sugar, harvesting machinery,, motion pictures, water transportation,
and labor unions. Yet he recognised that the uncertainties of our
antitrust laws pose serious business problems, and accordi ;3y instituted
Jae of giving advance opinion on the legality of proposed
merry and other business activities that might be questioned under the
of the Philippdnes when Preside
ever entered the White House in 1929, 1#111 turned it down and went
ice in New York City. He as short3y appointed counsel to
of the Now York bar aseocUt ions
a general
overhauling of the bankruptcy laws. During this period he also served
as counsel to a coemittee for review of the laws governing the Staten's
Public Service G ,ssion. In. 193 he unjuccessfully ran for Governor
f the State.
As a corporation attorney he won in 1935 the i portant Humphrey
case, in which the I3.8* supreme Court held that the President cou 4 not
ve a chairman of the ]Federal Trade Commission. He also
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fairs* He took time off to visit Bthiopia during
important decision in the Appalachian coal ease, upholding the
of coal producers to or inise a joint sing ag*ic3r in econOMlc
self-def . Ihie "may is still in emistence.
the 1935 Italian invasion. He was
careful observing the Axis
President Roosevelt,
of corporate law practice, Bill never lost his
CiI
of World War II Evan was called into so
Q he was stint on a fact-finding mission to
Ragland and in 1941 to the Balkans and the Middle last. An
esion had been moat helpful to the
From
first trip, the one
not long after
had brought back to Washington a very important report. You will recall
am at that time In some quarters as to whether
British could effectively carry out Churchill** thri3ling promise, "We
defend our island, -hatch the cost may be, we shall fi&t on the
beaches, we shall fig' t an the landing-grounds, we shall fi&t in the
fields and in the street,, we diall fight in the hills; we shhall never
der." Donovan reported to Roosevelt that the British could and
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This had a direct effect on American policy. He
Hopkins that the ins might strike toward Suez
prophecy that soon became a reality*
ded to the President that the United States
immediately for a global tear. He particularly stressed
the need of a service to wage unorthodox teaarfare and to gather Information
available. He discussed this idea at length with
;o Washington to head it. In original concept this Office was
e Information and inte igence a ograms with pgrchological
This proved to be too big a package for one
The seeds uhi:ch Sill planted blare fruit. y 1941 the President
Ohabliehed the Office of the Coordinator of Information and called
his close friends in the Cabinet, Secretaries X= and Stimeon, and with
Attorney General Jackeons
Bill.? s greatest interest lay, was put trader an Office of Stra
Lie information services became the Office of War
1942 the organization was split. That portion of it
Information, and the intelligence and unorthodox warfare work, here
coordinw
al 9*3,*Ajk
Truly one of the reark able asoo> liaehments in World War 11 was the
organization and activity of the O iS.S. `??- feats *ich would never have
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theorthod*c, the
1941, he built
ill Donovanf a leadership and his vast interest in
vel and the de4ngsrous. Starting from scratch in
of about 25,0)O people that made a real
ontrib tion to the victory. V WW of the deeds of 0.3.3* will have to
the 0.34. as a world Bide Intelligence OrgudwtiOn
with the passage of time man have been disclosed.
d collect the facts ne aessary to develop Our policy and war
He convinoed that Axis secrete were to be found
in Berlin, Rote, and Tokyo, but in other capitals and outposts around
the world, So he im sdiate4 set about dispatching officers to k4
spots in ape:, Asia,, and liter All iaa. The psi-off justified the
He was able to obtain infarmaticm of great value from
established agents with contacts in Berlin, in the German High Cm=and,,
and in the Abwehr, the Gerwo military Intelligence
of these agents gave us advance intormatian about the development of
about Guman work with heavy meter in the effort to
about the V 4.1ts and Y'-2e., and about the
ere
to his orgenisatiec for the collection of strategic
a to help gather tactical. information
igence, he
forming teems of parachutists -- Americans as wezll
drop behind ert*y limes. But not content with passive
action. He knee that well-org.z grirril.las
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tries occupied by the Nazis, Fascists, and
perating behind snug lines In stage %hers the lei p+r lation was
fr i!a dly could wre k havoc on snag limes of eation and tie
are be used in ca nt. Working with our
up tam of leaders and ceaa .cators to tae
Japanese* there were also air dre of supplies and equipment d
behind the Axis lines in francs and Italy, in Burma and elsewhere.
These action teen. were well supported by a headquarters tedmical
group, i dh under t van's guiding hand was iemginativ Ar dare
now ways to sabotage the enwW war effort and now gadgets either to
harass the eneev or help our am *=so
ieationa si-atams to a rep.l2
soft associates, in a recent tribute to the Cen,eral-a
terra Not all
e. Ambassador David Bruce, one of
qualities of leadership, vividly described his arsnite n t over idea.
Anbaa$ador Bruce wrote, and I subscribe to ewe word of its
.l.s imagination was unlimited. Ideas were his playth
tement made him snort like a rays horse, Woo to the officer
who turned dean a project, because, on its faces, it seemed
ridiculous, or at least usual. For painful weds under his
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e mo bility of "Ing bats then fre0
in western cam to destroy 'ice"
actic* Incendiary b j+ The General, backed
, was
would not sure v, a t ee-P&oifie fli t at him altitudes.
is, fil
;ppearo probable that the cave bats,
Zany Ingenious ideas to work the nerves of the snasrv were born in
G6neera1
rt and getting the facts and firms,
revo :rs of
of vital
;deea .oiaine, and tourists, and also that held bt foreign CCP4rt5 residing
War Information was telling the energy about the magnitude
Perehological warfare branch of the mar effort. 'While
of the 0.8.8 - the ) ale motions tsnch.. This use
dedicated to OOntaging the ess and. breaking
was convinced that there were great untapped
ormation in this country about foreign areas which had
erect in the oar effort -- data in the archives of
business orpn aatians, ;Lnforeatiem aired abroad by American scientists,
here. He asst about to
ph gmvhs of foreign areas.
this info ation and data and a ease of
As the war reached more and more areas of
came to have great imprtaace.
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He also ruralised the i rtaanee of analyzing and presenting
of Intelligence. N. established in the 0.8.5. ,-
e policy makers in rowdily usable form - one of the
best academic and analytic brains he eould
Lvereitise, laboratories,
of go
political and soonamic aspects of the war,, asses
to occupied lands. Th
a and
taaai of estimating kd.s naz'abiljty and war poteertial and the staying
o even than told us almost nothing about
d the qualities a great intelligence offic
He took nothi for granted and at the same time was insatiably
He had a good nose et'ths naves a taint tiff of thing
speed his mind into a dozen possible aearp anations,
s as the wiles of the mmW* Her asnted to see things
or hie's?elf. He was constantly on the move and
drove his staff wild trying to keep him tram places thser thought too
He a put than into a state of near exhaustion trying to
keep up with the pace he set himself. One of his great gulf ties was
to the man who served under him, and his ever-readiness
to give than his
afte ctim. 1 vividly recall a personal instance.
He, in tu, had their ado
In Washington the
ow, or steal from
Ld,
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working for o"n in Mtzeer lend, then nth erns Aro3.ed by the
Nazi-Fascist fo reee* In September 1944 the American Seventh fir,
a*, brae three to the $wise border near
in the Mee Yell y
wai=t a clandestine flight to take me to
landan, As
there man * kno* on the d o
ores he di.e
ides, toning
hideout in
e airstrip
4 been
ving, I weU r , on
2waimbed the first of their
It descended near the center
ig+ht of nesr3y two hundred milea. Both the
on,
we waiting for me at the
3 a
des where I -.s hidd a.. After weather had held up nV
Le I, Generai Donmen ins in ' shingtm and had not
which had just been evacuated
ckto
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s and strategists tailed to see earlier
of the success of the r--2, as 2 believe the Soviet did,
in the Sim that the combimtiof of the b4313aati.c
missile with the a
an about to be =voile d, could
mange the MUM of mar and the security positin of this country.
Few maw of his time mere more alert than Dmxmu to the new threats
that milt develop, In late 1%4
is
the effect that the
aeti:
is ddlo ga
Gomm threat reoe ding. The
I
the peace. H. foresaw the n
OMHAg a men to cairn
he awl istructia ns to
for intelligence operations should now
in the Balkans rather than Comman
paa even more
Import.mt" to
ay mekere gent pensive and
oonwlidated analyses to Buda their decisions as to our course of acts ceas
Limmy
to the whole gait irxtel3gesace
faU of 1944 Donovan presented to the Frost
a paper
;ce organization operating net a wor iedde
were to be adjusted
be put into Official
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neibi.lity to the President. While it we not to
take upon itself the responsibilities of the departmental intelligence
de of agencies concerned for co me at on it. These c reants,
The paper stressed that the proposed organization would have no police or
powers and would not operate in the United States. President
expressed considerable intent in this peoposal, and
before his death in April. 1945 asked Donovan to poll the Cabinet and
act as a coordinating mechanism for all Intelligence.
pinion that there use no need for such a peacetime organ--
to the belief that it was vital to national security, stake
g reading todAy.
Donovan received an trek Leaf 0luster to his Distinguished Service
Medal for his wirtime work,, but his plan to develop the O,8.S. Into a
peacetime intelligence organization was beset with conflicting vie s.
Some would have the new organization, like the 0.5.8.
Joint Chiefs of Staff, exile others preferred that it be put under the
Department of State. And there was controversy as to whether one
individual could or should be responsible for presenting a consolidated.
view of the intelligence picture to the policy makers, rather than leave
this th
,ve responsibility of the chiefs of all the intelligence
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.. 15 .0
Abet 1945, and the O?8.1* bas
A PPWMI for a central nt 1ig a or,
tion such as Donovan
led in the first draft of the 80-called Unification
erstaeit to rotary P'erreBtAl In October 1945
And in
to reserve assets 'e s the issue we being
e arder 1 1'I at the Central Ute llUe nce pup,
f
....,.... exa.ecse activities:
arcs not Y'st c e ,r rammed.. leas still
had to
peed up some of the activities
AM r
went test
Act of 1947, 'AiCh created
JAY 1947 liter. executive and legimUtiv a endorsement mm ,
have
Lon to pilace~ the O.I.A. Banter the President
kdvise the President and oversee
the provisione for a Central Jtelligee a Agency
and
the via m %h cat Donovan had bom striving to have ***ept
ow 14e009MU70
ess enerjV hard turned eta hers with the
of 0.3.5,, alttu gh he rang AV* up his interest in the or zation
or stepped - ing h
a ne eitV for providing
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to the pol.ia r n kea's of the ,get t
a aaurit:
es. His 1;
the urg
: iresti to the
The
eoncerned he we,
co-authored an article '
the Amerio*n people to the dwgers. He
JourrAl for 3ul7 1949 resenting
Attack to Cowwnifft Penetration of
e said a
I&I grievance* 1 iae'
ope r ioe are asada up of ti ned and a
and imta .ige nce
spreading rumors*
. He went to Orew* to
Polk, a
of the
ctivitiee in
sax of the Soviets In action the
er fiction is an
wM find it as eaw for a edaorit r to operate a
or a pacifist league, or as y* other each movement#
"Out
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17 ..
the al'holders take no
large corporation in most of
t*e
great in the varig
In 1950 President Eisenhower? then President of Co ttbie Univer*j
occasion of the award to Hi.l1 Dm*vokn of the Alexander
Alummi Association for distlxWdshed
a of the Sr
him Am asadcr to
his years
for
At this time the
reeear able men of 70 thr.w himself
eer their defaises against the
keersto a of anti o ee tsn In Southeast Asia
.teed States one might have ester, him
National Chairman of the
et further from his mind. He became
ie Refugee Camittee and the
diroator of that group's fight groat the Soviet pmgvm
Comeuniam to return hem. At the time of the
eed his energies to aiding the. refugees of
this
an CoMmItteeee an United ape, from its
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in 1949, and
t o
%jor area in We
Cc m i t danger,
he continued to further the effort
0 achieve a greater m ty In the
ed his inter In the
the deve3.+ er t of our inteUigmee k
of his role in
ones field, Presider*t Atethoe in 1957 aid hint the
*ft-o hie foreei tt, id.
during the sour" of World tar 11
-.d
efftahlimhe t of
left his rftor4 with the
Ge
d the smwV to to his ideas into
vet, he foreeawt
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the heritage c,
#swran is written in the national security.
e to the need of a permeneut peacetime
stirred Wsab into creating a mechanism
goveri ?nt ccamponeopts whit receive nfor'nstl t an *a
-d! work together a e one umined estimate of what
the world psl their lenm .edge, stare their
He holped place 9ntellig lice in its propw perspective snd
its role In determining
Rd, He was one of the architect, of an or tion
d keep our government the heat info d of aqr in the world.
Hietor a epitaph for W414em J. Donavan will bee
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.95.
The ealustias of the
rination process u
Gs c t by the Wei" Gepsrtus , with its
has rented in stt.mpts to qtMeaise current
popular a esprt of ""brai a irate hes booms so well setabl fished, not
san in the street but with whose aeomdation % 4th
iate' Zige c
w more aophistIated or at least better info
the Prouan off isttiag a bet
C i W.W.
ecounts si oeaeit art of braisuashing, but in its
viewpoint is
d out the picture t r pointing to
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1959
1 Witten in
better orals nmg enlisted am it
of the Code of
kid of inte r'o t
officers, for
face as
b1e and to xable fore. Bat an oversimplified and
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geisral boc*s rams from the o mmly waU
an the lndactrimation
is ywt to be writ
and in the
an ncyelopedia of the history of ,
s aeeasrr!" of the criminal courts
literary allusions to the confess on process. It dum not have
intic poli* of Tenter or 11*md or the s ti *iaelin of rloo. The
e m of a pae t aed lamer has beerm applied to p tae *at is in effect
as seers tram his esp.riace and Wig.
a growing liters
dictated tgr pethologic al motives; his
lid and scteerti f c. is far as c be
i
It trsts the
+ , he has bra both eatbo3l-c and thorough In
thoui fault can be found with lessee o
his work is vetr mss as a
It is ap"amwt
8oggee is sore at basses with historieml and
seelvrct sci ifIc artial.e. Ex erpt
citing the 8e iatae testimarr of soma and the 4searlptive (rather than
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Hie ratke h+esvrj emIgHasia raa
ears
aasd histori
if he had
etteetivt
bs
Cees."
4 of 11"0 getOofs asr the
saw amf6adams
iia iR the
sisal force W du
no 14, A. T sand 42 ie s1 3a sit*rs. ftt
tras es tk eb sh the ~mmt ~ of tksae
tors had in $ the is s-it easl a~stsm. (p. 1")
Mr, logger nsa his UUWGIOVOS
AU reads led to tks seas
five it
W Mltk the paNr
teed, eke it necemrp- is abandm
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inW s thesis
Of that is be
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T. (NOW York: i7st,'ubleed -y. 1959-
Practically everyone in and out of goverrent is fall at ideas for
practical steps to make U. S. representatives abroad more effective'.
Dr. Bull's book seeks to lay a theoretical basis for these practical
efforts, to the ant that they are &treected tamrd sinimis
reaction that takes place when a mows into the area of a foreign culture.
Some people have chosen to call this ('culture shock". $e-il+e+ ie '4 it as
"'removal or distortion of many of the familiar cues one encounters at
c substitution for them of other cues which are st ange."
proposition the
ee ple's difficulties with each
other can be traced to distortions in commmnicsttcn,," The Silent Ica e
"treats cultvwe in its entirety as a fora of cc tunicsti " as it seeks
of culture and a theory of how culture came into
present "the tecbmical tools for probing the secrets Of
culture."
The author should know what he is writing about. He is an
anthropologist who but travelled and worked abroad to develop principles
and concepts for teaching U. S. reps entatives boy to be more effective.
Re has done such teaching in the Sta
Strategic Inel-
lige a School, and elsewhere- Be ncW makes this subject his business.
The study points out basic differences in langus and zys
speaking, but hasizes the actions which speak louder than words? and
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particularly the kind of t icatic a that takes place "out of awareness".
on,
there at significant portions of the
everyone else to see mwy ee+sa frightesing. The point, however, is a
crucial one and will. grow in importsm as men begin to grasp it*
implicotions".
personality tbgt
differently, "
conceptual c
kes another point of oajc ' significance for anyone who
et abroad when he says: "What compliestee matters,
people reared in different cultures LgMn to learn
a fay not be persuaded of the validity of the author's
uses a great many v
fwrden variety of meaning would sea
But dissatisfactions such as these only serve to po:
that there is much m *k to be done in this field. The
understanding of foreign cultures is critical to intelligenee operations
and to intelligence analysis; and such a considerable contribution of now
3, ,ate make can but stimulate more progress
;ding.
and order an ec mi tiona media
His "mar, of culture" may be over-billed as
Iii elat sification of behavior patterns as
al is ea effort toward unettainable preeisien.
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RC NM BUFT KAIRM. (Rowel Calling Cairo) $t John W. Upler.
(Guetersloh: C. Bertelsmann Verlag. 1959. Pp- 300-)
Operation Condor was a bold, Oven desperate stroke aimed at placing
a German resident agent in the -heart of the British North African com-
mand center, who could provide R mel with vitally seeded order of
battle information. It failtd, partly because of bad luck, but mainly
because of the almost incredibly i.asecure, brash "cowboy" operational
methods used by the agent.
published just on the heels of a British account of the same
eventsl, gppler's tale of his espionage activities in Cairo for Field
Marshal Ervin Rowel during the struggle for North Africa reveals
little new substantive information. Mosley's report, reviewed in the
previous number of St~s2, will be of more interest to the professional
intelligence officer.
gppler has told an adventure story in a romantic, intensely per-
sonal style characteristic of much of the recent spate of German war
reminiscences. The fact that a lotion picture is being made In Germany
based on Operation Condor is perhaps indicative of the nature of the
book.
We learn nothing from Eppler about how he was spotted and
recruited by the Abvehr; the story opens with his posting to Rowel in
North Africa, and the first 130 pages deal with the problems and
1Leonard Mosley, The Cat and the Mice. (London: Arthur Barker Limited,
1958. 160 pp.)
Vol. 3, No. 2, Spring 1959.
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 Sanitized - Approved For Release : CIA-RDP70-00058R000100220035-8
experiences of his 4,000 kilaseter trip across the Sahara to reach the
target area. Passing mention is given to technical intelligence prepa-
rations for the mission, such as documentation, oasmmunicatians equip-
ment, clothing, etc. Inasmuch as he is arrested by British security
forces on page 216, and from then on deals with his treatment by his
interrogators, it will be seen that he gives relatively little space to
his actual work in Cairo. Details on the recruiting of sub-agents are
almost completely lacking, as well as a useful account of what
anything, was accomplished. One incident, that of the separation of
the British courier from his pouch of battle plans by the belly-dancer
Nekaath Fathmy, is given; a satisfactory account of this is available
from Mosley.
Eppler never again made radio contact with Abvehr base stations
after his initial report upon arrival because the two special Abvehr
radicuen assigned to service him had been posted too close to the front
by order of Rommel and had been captured with their codes during a
raid by the Long Flange Desert Patrol. Zppler was cut off (e1 ge auert)
after this in order to prevent a play-back. Zppler's radioman tried
night after night without success to make contact with base station;
the title of the book, in view of this, would more logically read
Cairo Calli 1.
Mosley deals at some length with the tracking down of Bppler by
British security forces. tippler's own account adds nothing of signifi-
cance to this.
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This book can be safely passed by, especially by those who have
The Cat and The Nice.
25X1A9a
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 Sanitized - Approved For Release : CIA-RDP70-00058R000100220035-8
This scholarly and
social scientists is of
pa
ga.ficance because it evaluates
ve book bV one of Rand Corporation's
auLlysis tee ques actua liy used In an operratiot ,l situation
and has therefore had to consider the d namios of politics, rather than
s h-ej,rc s
presented to illustrate, the broad range of intelligace
scholarly study in political
science is devoted* Mrs Gorge's gained pig is the analysis of German
e 1 the CCs Foreig* Broadcast teel?tigonce Service
1. H. ev mines it in the light of informaticnt obtained
war documents and German officials, which provides a
unique opportunity to validate the Inferences drs from propaganda bearing
igence problems and questins critical to Allied policy. Some
80 percent of the FCC inferences that could be soared proved to be accurate.
The reader who does not make a specially of p nda anilysis will
"Nothodelagy and Applications," in which 20
problems app t+ ed by the FCC. The a=0ysts'' real Ling is
and their inferences matched against the available historical record on
Russia in
as the question of a Gen offensive against
46w Ce roan expectation. in. 1942 of an Allied second front
attitude toward the Mai information
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 Sanitized - Approved For Release : CIA-RDP70-00058R000100220035-8
policy, and a
seetba*e on the Rusriasn
The first cease etu4-, on the
presentation of military
do as well as their British
:peas propa~eys nda, is cited
s Apr be known to am* readws*
tasted hypothesis that Garen prepagend
dsliberatel?y mislead the German people about an Increase of Ge=m power,
it concluded that the Ge Bans actuae?.ly had we* sort of new weapon and were
It accurately described the Garman leaders' a .uaticn
of the new weapon and made the tentative ost#aste, Used an ruebtle shifts in
.da, that in November 1,943 the Oartesne
,ve it reaOr
and mid-April 1944. This erstis*te vedaaes
Hr.
As4Geeorge writes:
The deduction concerning the Owran to der.' private estimate
of the t ing of the 7-wapon ms based upon Ingenious use of a
gasm'al oWervetian about Basi proop-pada practice. The British
ana3yaet reasoned that Goebbele would be cara# l not to give the
le: a promise of r+ tslisti too far ahead of the date
could be fulfil ed, ,.9.?e3ring a number of
factors into account, the British analyst ree*oned that Ooobbels
would give himself about three mks as the ss period ,..to
to forthcoming retaliation in advance,
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 Sanitized - Approved For Release : CIA-RDP70-00058R000100220035-8
Arse of the reasons advanced for the
to
of eaordimtio may also
not aced to coordinate their
six were
ity
'ed to look for deals of Nod conei
rice, and so ca t1maed to seem far
possible ssasnd front across the 71 %g3-1& Ounnel
The- sesomssd.
ita+c5 t then were not
re rah with
of iichthe ana3ysi.s
aa' # = r e' r.~' f rwra rrr'~
predicting a major action, are not regarded ash, r
author recc es and discusses at some I gth the possibility that
leaders may decide to forego wW
he points out
The value to the police maker of infarenoees assessing the
nature and Objectives of the major action apse it is tak
ted; in mar- cases thA r
ion before it occurred.
and aacpe s, Kr. George has mot himself a
eeeeting these Interesting *as* studies. He
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 Sanitized - Approved For Release : CIA-RDP70-00058R000100220035-8
f Inference made about conditions
to determine the awsmication content (for maWle propaganda
test "situational fae rs," and elite estimates, expectations
2) to idantit r other possible determinants about which the
stem of behavi
inferences, and than to depict the relationeiip
and indirect
conclusion:
d (3) t
wore use. Out of this thorough
It same that prvpaganda analysis can booms a rsaoccaw7
objective dia aoe-tic tool for caking certain kivids of info-one"
and that its to aique s are capable of refine nt and 3mp~ ant.
The book is not saaV to read, in pert because or both un efined and
`/"''-