DANGER! SPIES AT WORK IN PITILESS STRUGGLE ETHICS, MORALS DON'T MIX WITH ESPIONAGE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP70-00058R000100120030-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 7
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 6, 2000
• Sequence Number: 30
• Publication Date: May 23, 1956
• Content Type: NSPR

GARDEN CITY (LONG SLAND)) NE1gSDAY
Approved for Release 2001 /0]: 1- P70-00
MAY 24 1956
MAY 25 1956
Ethic
fond of Tlaree-?art Series EYyes in theDk on a
'" ," gc4 I ?1Gj
Worais
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CPYRGHT
Part one---Soldiers of the 'old War
While talk continues of disarm am en?t and peace,
the major nations of the world continue to wage a
silent, secret, life-and-death war of secret agents,
espionage and counter-espionage. To the men in-
volved, it is war. The penalty for mistakes is death,
or long.prison terms and, sometimes, denunciation by
the very nation they serve.
y Bob Rhodes
1'
wary of a spy.
1a spy, peace is war-a deadly war which
surro nds him 24 hours a day. It's a war without
bulle s, a war which knows no truce, a war which
leave no margin for error.
E en today, with the world quietly balanced on a
tightr pe of cautious peace, the spies go stealthily about
their usiness. They're the invisible men used as pieces
in tile gigantic chess game they call espionage.
Iu ?isible they are because they look like the guy
in thelplant. The only way they can succeed is if nobody
they 4on't always succeed. Two, and probably most iua-
In the past month the Russians discovered one of
the wiliest post-war pieces of espionage when they un-
covered a tunnel between East and West Berlin. The
tunnel' apparently was being used for wiretapping pur-
poses against the Russians.
Then, there was the- celebrated frogman case in
Portsmouth Harbor during the visit to England of
Russia's Premier Nikolai Bulganin and Party Leader
Nikita Khrushchev. All anyone can do is guess what
the British skin-diver,_was doing in the water underneath
the cruiser which brought B. and K. to England. The
skin-diver can't tell-he hasn't been found iet and is
"presumed" to be dead.
. Those are two of the cases which failed, B+at the
failures run a poor second to the successes, Intelligence
agencies of practically every country have their spies
(AP Photo)
RUSSIANS examine elaborate wire-tapping equipment dis-
covered in a secret tunnel which had been built under their
sector in Berlin front the nearby AmPTira77 ..c rtnr
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spreal i 1 a -e wor , searc aulg out secrets ae
other side has and protecting the secrets their own side
owns.
Pulling the strings in t1iis cloak-and-dagger world are
the top-level intelligence authorities from each country.
They manipulate their spies as deftly as generals de-
ploying their troops in wartime. They have to be careful.
The safety of their nation depends on their success.
In the Cold War strategy, everybody knows tilt
spies are there-someplace. In the military, in govern-
ment, in manufacturing plants. ';Wherever they are
they're picking up the things their country wants to
know, and they're sending that information back to be
added to the files.
Only Hear the Failisrec
Although everybody knows the spies are there, no..
body knows who or how effective they are. The only
time a country can find out is when one of the- es-
pionage agents is caught, or a spy ring is broken up, or
somebody gets fed up and decides to spill what's going
on to the authorities,
Those are the intangibles. Espionage circles work
on a policy of perfection. When there's one slip-up,
that part of the game is over. `I he spy has lost his use-
fulness, indeed perhaps lie has lost his life or been put
in prison, and the country for which he was working
has sonic explaining to-do.
'l'ake the frogman case, for instance. Bulganin and
Klunslichcv were on a "good will" mission to Great
Britain. They arrived aboard the Soviet cruiser Ordzhoni-
kidze, which pulled into it pier in Portsmouth harbor.
A retired British naval diver, Lionel Cribb, twice-
decorated for his exploits in i'irarld \V-ar If, and a mys-
1.crious "Mr. Smith" registered in it small Portsmouth
Harbor hotel the day before B. and K. arrived. The
early morning after the two Soviets arrived Crabb and
Smith left their hotel. This was April 19.
Later that morning, according to the Russian em-
bassy, a . frogman was spotted diving and surfacing in
tilt vicinity of the Soviet cruiser, one of the newest in
flit Russian fleet. The next day Smith returned to the-
}, FPl l n. ; 1 Fl,- 1,:71 for 1 t - _ _nd l_t~ N ___ _
Newsday
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tiUS any of then lies turned dolyn as a poor risk:
Those are only, some. of the qu a1ities. If, a :candidate`,
owng r a discreet, Agile, Tugged;daring, have
.-
r be. spying world isn't made up only of the profes-
sion ils-:_'1'he amateurs do a devastating job besides
dream up his own variations., No two. spies work exactly
Once the spy gets to work lie's on his own and can
Y. use o ;,,
nortey-=-if the price is right some people of it tilted
1 cknrdil a worker into divulging secrets Sex perverts
re considered easy targets. Often it's tzerel 'a c f
There are nary reasons why they"tuur,.to. conuirit
had no formal spy training. But they know how tc# get
their information. They work on the iiside,.r~vhere hey;.
iese are t1ie ones who display the tendencies luiiiped
under the overall title of "security risks."
The amateurs are amateurs only because the h
I Jiese are the shills put to work by the professionals.
Tl
a
vho holds a position where the information to which
e his access is desired by the enemy. Some of the most
anions :cases in spy history, :center around just such
niateui s. '
`There are other reasons-and the professional spy
sows. all the weak points. Any employe is vulner
bl
Photography, however, is all- 'essential. Agents "bor-
ow" secret papers, photograph them, then return the
.per s. If the papers were found` to be stolen, their
alue then would be lessened. The object is to 'get the
rformation. without anyone knowing it has been.
gotten.
Photographic negatives can be reduced to the size of
pin, pasted on a postcard in; a pre-arranged spo, car-
d& in the sole of a shoe, hidden almost anyplace. Any
ractieal, device is used .to get the information from its
urce? back to headquarters.
he Second Largest
he- U.S. spy system is considered to be the second'
l? rgest in the world. First' is Russia. Allen W. Dulles,
C rief of: the Central Intelligence Agency, credited Russia
'th the largest last Oct. 10, but he said the Soviets
ti't always use their information wisely.
14edid say, however, that despite the expanded U.S.
- s stem.which has grown up since 1940, the Soviet bar-
r rs make it "almost more difficult" to get intelligence
it formation front, the Communists than it was to get
d ta on ,the Gcrrnalist dtiring World War II.
Just last February a Russian intelligence officer
ttstified the Reds have two spy networks operating in
t] e U.S., one working out of Washington, . the other,
o it, of the United Nations. And he said that- 85-,90 per
c. t of the 'l'ass news agency reporters around the world
w,-re Soviet espionage agents.
When. Sen. William E.Culler (R-hid.) was chairman
o 'the Senate Internal Subcommittee, his committee
is tied a report charging that thousands. of diplomatic,
,p litical, military, scientific and economic. secrets of the
S have been stolen by Soviet agents in our govern-
n t. `
"Policies and programs laid down by members of the
?iet conspiracy are still in effect within our government
Ian constitute a continuing hazard to our national se-
ru ity,". the report said. .
The report said Soviet agents work themselves into
ant ortant posts within the U.S. government. Once they
ge a foothold they make. it easier for other agents to
sli .through.. They use each others names for references,
hi each other, promote each other? raise the pay of
ea r: other, transfer each other from bureau to bureau
an department to department.
Once inside, the Communist agents. help to guide
.tth research on which American policies are set, write
sp dies for Cabinet officers, influence Congressional
ri stigations, help draft laws and manipulate admin-
iS.t Live reorganizations.
e, ,Do Get Caught
Every once in a while, fortunately
somebody gets
,
. ca ))t-, Six years ago one of the biggest cases of espion-
age was uncovered and two of the Soviet agents. involved
we executed-Julius and Ethel Rosenberg. It. was
tJie r crime against the U.S. government which was
call d "worse than murder" by Judge. Irving. Kaufman.
r The Rosenberg case was filled with now-familiar
-ran es. Dr. Klaus Fuchs, the physicist; Harry Gold, the
28- ear-old bio-chemistry student who had worked 10
yea as a Soviet spy in the U.S.; David Greenglass, the
19-- car-old brother of Ethel Rosenberg who testified
agai ist his sister, and her husband.
hey .were all in- ittogether. - Greenglass was in the
Arn y and had been sent first to Oak Ridge, Tenn.,
tliet to. Los Alamos, N.M., as an assistant foreman
He
.
testified at the Rosenberg trial that "
Friday, May 25. 1956
DEATH was the price Ethel and Julius Rosenberg,
above, paid for their part in a Red spy ring aimed
at the Los Alamos atomic center. Breaking the ring
was considered a major victory for U.S. counter-
espionage dforces.
.
elaborate security regulations at the Los Alamos
proving, ground': spying was no trouble at all., for one on
the inside "with the run of the area" as lie had. He
said he simply walked around, observed, asked questions
and. remembered.
. Greenglass got his orders from Julius Rosenberg
while the 19-year-old was home on furlough in 1945.
Rosenberg 'told him what to look for at Los Alamos
so he would know what information to bring back.
Later that year Greenglass gave Julius 12 pages of atom
description. Ethel typed it into form.
Gold, . meanwhile, was sent to Los Alamos to see
Fuchs and Greenglass. Greenglass turned over informa-
tion to both Gold and Fuchs. When Gold submitted the
information to the Soviet vice counsel, the vice consul
is supposed to, have commented: "Excellent."
Both Rosenbergs denied everything when they went
on trial after their arrests in 1950. But Greenglass turned
state's. evidence and brought out the whole story. For
doing.. so, Grenglass got of with. a 15-year sentence.
The Rosenbergs were.given the death sentence and died
in the. electric chair on June. 19, 1953. -
Gold is now serving a -i0-year prison term while
Fuchs, arrested, and tried in Great Britain, got off with
only 14 years.
The Rosenberg case was a major victory for the U.S.
counterspy program. But what could have turned into
another major victory ended up in a jangle of frustration
for U.S. officials when the convictions of two spies
were thrown out of court.
That was in, the case of Judith Coplon and her
fellow conspirator, Valentine A. Gubitchev. Tlicy were
convicted twice on two separate indictments-one for
the deliberate theft of government secrets and the other
for conspiracy to commit espionage.
On the first charge they were sentenced to 40'nionths
to 10 years and on the second they were sentenced to a
flat 15 years. And although the U.S. Court. of Appeals
called both convictions just, the convictions were thrown
out of court because of technicalities. The theft con-
victions were thrown out because the government had
used : wiretaps in obtaining evidence and wiretaps at
that time -were illegal. The conspiracy conviction Was
thrown out because the 1131 had failed to get an arrest
warrant before seizing the two convicted spies.
Cubitchev was permitted to accept deportation to
escape his `prison term-this was before the convictions
were thrown out. But Miss Coplon has since gone free,
gotten married and had a baby. The Justice Depart-
ment said there probably will be no further attempts to
bring the convictions-against Miss Coplon back in-it
would be too 'hard to make them ? stick, ofTicia1s figure.
'Alger Hiss instance m \which he w:fs convicted in 1950.
'
But the government didnt get him on a treason charge.
Ile was convicted of perjury in denying lie passed govern-
meritnfriatior t Whik C
ioniottaerhambers, a Soviet
espionage agent.
And the case of Harry Dextcr White, former assistant
secretary of the treasury Cvho played a major role in the
1944 Bretton Woods Conference. ITC was named as the
one who gave information to a Communist, spy ring
during World. War 11. But three clays after he testi-
fied before the House Un-American Activities Com-
mittee that he was not and never had been it Com-
munist he died of a heart'attack.
Then there was Vladimir Petrov, the Soviet dip-
loniat in Australia, who denounced Communism and
sought political asylum .in:; Australia. Ile brought'papers
with 1iint'wh'ich were said to expose a Soviet' spy -ring.
The Russians' broke' off diplomatic relations with Aus-
tralia over the incident.
The methods of espionage and spying and spies have
come a long way from sex-baiting as employed by per-
haps the 'most. famous spy of all time-Matti Hari. A
dancer-they'd call her an exotic today-she sold her-
self for war secrets during World War I and was. paid
off by the Germans for her efforts.
Her biggest coup` was when slj'e was able to find out
about the British tanks-7--a highly-kept secret at that
time. The Englishman who told her about them took
the easy way out when he found what she bad done-
he committed suicide.
No Raving Beauty
The legend that she was a raving beauty while she
was doing her cloak and dagger work is strictly legend.
She was well past.40, and those who remember her say
she looked almost, common.
The stories about her death arc as fascinating as her
exploits as a spy. One story, has. it that she was told
there would be nothing but blanks in the guns on the
firing squad. The volley would lie fired, then she would
be whisked away. But her execution went off without
incident.
Another story, equally as unfounded, credits her with
standing in front of the firing squad in a heavy fur coat.
Just as the men on the firing line raised -their guns,
the story goes, Math Hari stripped off her coat to let
the soldiers fire at her naked body.
The stories are typical, mainly because the workings
of espionage, spying, cloak - and - dagger- call it what
you will-never fully are.b'rought to the surface. They're
kept in the shadows, just like the people who make their
living in the business keep. in the shadows.
It's part of the game. They play to win. In espionage,
it's too expensive tQose.
Klaus Fuclis, B r i i is it Judith Coplon, twice con- Alger Hiss, a former lop Whittaker Chambers, an
atomic sciciatist involved vicied of stealing U.S. U.S. official, was convict- . admitted former C011113111.
in the Rosenberg spy secrets was freed on tech- ed of lying when . lie
nr st spy, is the magi who
i s .2nd denied ever. passing gov
ring, drew a 14-year prison: . riicalitc
Probably erinnent information to a said lie received U.S. se
sentence for- his- actions.:aievez will be tried again: Red agent, cress from Alger hiss.
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Director of the FBI, through his forcefulness, initiative
and managerial ability, to have developed his agency
into a model organization of its kind," the report said.
"We are confident that in the FBI we have a most
effective counter-intelligence service."
The espionage system, as set up in the U.S., has
been dealing effectively with intelligence and counter-
intelligence matters. But, as the commission pointed
out in its report, there still remains more to be done
to bring intelligence and espionage activities in this
country up to "an acceptable level."
For instance, the commission mentioned the secur-
ity setup on employment within the intelligence agen-
cies themselves: "One flaw in the present system seems
to be the absence of a general plan for a periodic review
of the security status of every person after employment
in intelligence activities to guard against the possibility
that some employe who was completely dependable and
honorable when starting work might have changed
character, fallen from grace, or succumbed to alien
blandishments or some personal weakness such as strong
drink or sexual perversion."
Daily Contact Enough
In other employment, the commission said a com-
mon practice is to remove security risks from classified
jobs and put them on jobs-in the same plant-which
aren't of a secret nature.
"Because he has, daily personal contact with em-
ployes engaged in sensitive production and enjoys free-
dom of movement within the plant, such an employe,
still would have access to material and information of
great value to a potential enemy of this country."
In both intelligence and counter-intelligence work,
the basic factor is that those people involved must be
of the highest character. But who knows when you can
trust whom, and for how long? A supposed loyal
government employe can be transferring all top secrets
with which he is entrusted to agents of the enemy;
an intelligence agent himself can decide to sell himself
out to the enemy. The espionage system is only as
efficient. as the stability of those who operate it.
Take the fascinating Burgess-Maclean story, for
instance. Here were two British foreign officers, Guy
Burgess and Donald Maclean, who were veterans of
diplomatic assignments in Washington. Burgess; who
had been with the British Secret Service, was second
secretary of the British Embassy in Washington and
Maclean had been head of the American department
of the British Foreign Office.
Yet in May, 1951, these two diplomats, apparently
above the slightest tinge of suspicion, slipped across the,
English channel on a small steamer and disappeared.
For five years it was only a guess where they could have
gone-the guess was Moscow. And with then, the
guess continued, went the secrets they knew. .
Last February the pair turned up again-in Mos-
cow. In Red Square-there, they talked for a few brief
moments with newspapermen, handed them a prepared
statement, then returned to their retreat behind the
Iron Curtain.
In their prepared statement they said they had been
Communists for years and had fled to Russia "to make
our contribution to a policy aimed at achieving greater
mutual understanding between the Soviet Union and
the West." They criticized U.S. foreign policy, denied
they were secret agents but would give no hint as to
what they were doing now.
Nonetheless, they had defected, as the phrase goes,
to the Communists. Trusted enough by the British
government which sent them into important jobs in
the U.S., they had become turncoats-and carried their
classified information with them.
But Burgess and Maclean were only diplomats. Their
case is far overshadowed by...O,ttq.. Joim, the man whose
job as chief of German Internal Security piade him the
J. Edgar Hoover of Western Germany. Ills main job
was to safeguard Western Germany from Communist
infiltration.
'Gone for a Quick Beer'
The world was shocked when, on July 20, 1954,
the news came out: John had climbed in his car after
announcing he was just "going down for a quick beer"
and had driven quickly across the East-West boundary.
in Berlin to join forces with the Soviets. Shortly after,
he began a series of Communistic broadcasts to his
former countrymen.
John's previous exploits had earned him the plaudits
and respect of many top authorities in the West. Ile
had been a vigorous anti-Nazi during World War IT,
had even been involved in a bomb plot against Ilitler
in 1944, had helped to prepare evidence for the war
trials of German generals. His anti-Nazi record helped
him get his security job in West Germany-indeed,
the U.S. even backed his appointment.
The noted columnist, Victor Riesel, who was blinded
several weeks ago when an assailant fliww grid in lric
Thursday, May 24, 1956
"Security measures adopted by. the Communists
have been provokingly conceived and boldly employed,"
the report stated. "They have been quite effective in
comparison with our security measures, which have per-
rimitted the collection of vital secrets in this country
with relative ease.
"The information we need, particularly for our
Armed Forces, is potentially available. Through con-
centration on the prime target we must exert every
conceivable and practicable effort to get it.
"Success in this field depends on greater boldness
at the policy level, a willingness to accept certain cal-
culated political and diplomatic risks, and full use of
technological capabilities."
That's the case for espionage.
Tomorrow: The Glamor Is Gone.
(AP Photos)
WHAT SECRETS British
Diplomat Donald MacLean,
shown above with his wife, Linda,
took with him when he deserted
to Russia can only be guessed.
daughter, ?Melinda.
DIPLOMAT Guy Fnrncis Bur-
gess, left, also deserted to the
Reds with MacLean. Both were
key men in British foreign service.
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DR. OTTO JOHN, left, was West Germany's
security chief until he defected to the Commu-
nisis. fie and a friend were stopped at Sandkrug
Bridge, below, and warned by guard they were
entering the Red sector but laughed and told the
guard they were going to hospital at right, rear.
eyes, called John "a man to whom the people of all free
nations owe a vote of gratitude." In that column, which
appeared in September, 1953, Riesel said John "made
it possible for the German chancellor to roll up a power-
ful pro-American yictory" and added that John had
virtually wiped out both the Communist and Nazi
undergrounds in Germany.
Ten months later John had done the turncoat act.
And since then he has worked to undermine public con-
fidence in the West Germany government. Only five
weeks before lie fled to the Russian zone, John had been
to the United States where he had conferences with
J. Edgar Hoover and Allan Dulles, head of the Central
Intelligence Agency.
Just as surprising as his disappearance into the Soviet
zone was his appearance last. December. He surren-
dered himself to West German authorities, said he had
been drugged and carried off to East Berlin.
But the court did not believe him. "There is strong
suspicion that John not only had treasonable relations
with the Communists but also actually betrayed state
secrets," the court said as it ordered John to jail to
await trial. He will face charges of treason.
That's what the U.S., and the other Western
countries, are up against. That's why the espionage
system of today has to'be of the highest calibre. The
commission, in its.report last year to the government,
made note of that:
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.Last. of a Series: The
lg Ga nbld,
The stakes are high, both for the spy and tbei:
nations involved. But there's no set pattern o
operation. Some are chosen because they're
strong. Others are forced to cry because' they're
weak. They inay be suer high in go . er.innrut,
your next-door neighbor or a fellow-
worker in your plant or office.
By Bob Rhos es
What kind of spy would .you "make?
Supposing you were put into a bedroom and
were told the room had been used 'several days
ago by a man your government wanted to find.
articles of clothing, newspaper clippings; a timetable,
several other objects. You're told to examine those
objects carefully. Then you've got four minutes to tell
what kind of a man. your target is.
If that sounds like an obscure test, it's rncant to.
That's only one of the many examinations a candidate
must take if he wants to. be a spy for the U;S. govern-
ment. At. the end of tree days of such. tests in the
special espionage school, the government: has a pretty
sound idea as to. how the candidate' would react to thr
conditions he would meet as' a spy.
MAT A ITArtl, the legendary
ZC'cirld War I spy wlio sold ]ter-
self to get British secrets was one
of the few "glamorous-type" spies.
RELATIONS between
Russia and Australia were
broken off after Vladimir
Petrov, a Red diplomat,
exposed a Communisl
spy ring.
isliment of 'cover on the spot-making local contacts,
itting into the target area without suspicion.,
(6) Surreptitious acquisition of information-actually
ctting the information the spy is after. (7) Meetings
vitli informants and couriers-lining up the people who
ill carry the information hack to headquarters. -(8) Com-
nunications-ways of keeping in touch with the office
o receive assignments and relay information back. (9)
afety and security-making sure the spy doesn't' get
aught.
Its no hit or miss proposition. All nine points' have
cen carefully studied, boiled down to where there is the
cast possible chance for error. If any one of the points
ras the most importance, it must be the first one-
ccruiting and selection, Because the spy represents the
unman element and no mathematical formula can cover
lnat. If the spy is unreliable, if lie's unstable, if there's
chance that he can't.follow through, the whole system
s put out of order.
Here are some of the qualities a spy must have, ac
ording to Author Farago: His morale must be high,
e must be interested in the job ahead, lie must be
nergetic, zealous, enterprising, resourceful; a good drinker
motionally stable, calm. uiet bealtliv- be able, 'to Pef
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the efficiency of its espionage system, it is easy to under-
stand why spies and the way they operate have to be
handled with slide-rule precision on a mathematical
formula.
The fundamental operating procedure of an espion-
ages}stem was dramatically pointed out by a former
"
intelligence worker,
Laclislas Farago, in an absorbing book
called "WVar of Wits." In the book Farago breaks the
spying technique down into 9 basic stages. They are:
(1) Recruiting and selection-how to find good spy
personnel. (2) Training and indoctrination-how to make
him a good spy. (3) Establishment of cover and authen-
tication-the spy gives up his formet`identity~ becomes
an entirely new person. (4) Routing =Getting him to
the area where lie will do his espionage work. (5) Estab-
 CPYRGHT
Part Two: A Necessary, Dirty Business
The goal is preparedness, knowing a poten
tial enemy's eapa b i l i t i e s and plans in the
CPYRGHT
hopes of preventing another Pearl Harbor.
..The spy-operates with the idea that the end
justifies the means. Lying, cheating, stealing,
double crossing, killing if necessary are 'all
some of his tools. lie has no room for ethics or morals.
CPYRGHT
By Bob Rhodes
Espionage is a dirty vicious business founded
on the double-cross and nourished by squealers.
Yet a country which has no espionage system
-or has only an inefficient one at best-might
just as well haul down its flag and hand over its
keys to the enemy.
Because no matter how dirty or how vicious espionage
is, it's as vital to a world power as taxes.
Without espionage the United States would have
little idea of,what the Communists are doing, what war
plans they have and what weapons they have to do it
with.
Without espionage the.U.S. would leave itself open
to another Pearl Harbor.
Without espionage the U.S. would be unarmed
against its most dangerous foe in the Cold War: The
Soviet espionage system.
The importance of espionage in the present battle
of nerves was pointed out in a simple warning by a special
government commission. In a report on intelligence
activities made last year, the commission said:
"The aggressiveness of the Soviet bloc, as well as
the difficulty of penetration of their security harriers,
point up the fact that our intelligence effort must be
the best in our history.
"This, added to the advent of nuclear weapons
has made adequate and timely intelligence imperative
to our national security. It would be false economy to
stint on some phase of the intelligence operation and
thereby run the risk of another costly and tragic. surprise
like Pearl Harbor."
How extensive the U.S. espionage system is must
remain guesswork. There is no way of determining how
much is spent per year. how many arr rnllnn+?~ N,?;.
] 0 c
vital information, what kind of data is trickling back
into our security coffers.
It is by necessity a top secret operation. The only
time the average citizen knows such a system even exists
is on those few occasions when one of the U.S. spies
gets caught at it. Even then, because of the immoral
nature of the whole spying idea and also because govern-
ments don't like to tip their hand, authorities will
deny that the apprehended spies belong to them. Or,
they'll cover up in some way.
A Complex System
. But the system fortunately does exist. There are at
least 12 major departments and agencies in the govern-
ment which are engaged in some form of intelligence
work. In addition to these, there are at least 10 minor
agencies or activities which are given public funds to
work with in their intelligence operations.
Overseeing everything is the National Security Coun-
cil, made up of President Eisenhower, Vice-President
Nixon, Secretary of State Dulles, Secretary of Defense
Wilson and a small handful of other top governmental
executives.
The council is the clearing house for everything in
regards to national security, whether it be domestic,
foreign or military. Its object is to get the military
services and the other departments of the government
to cooperate more effectively in matters involving
national security.
Right below the National Security Council is an
organization which owes its present existence to Pearl
Harbor. Congress had recognized that information
necessary to anticipate the sneak Pearl Harbor attack
actually was available to the U.S. But at that time
tbci -- ' l I..tclllgence Agency ro get the
information, evaluate it, and bring it to the attention
of the president for action. -
So in 1947, the Central Intelligence Agency was
formed. It is the focal point for intelligence data affect
National Security Council. But the CIA handles only
are handled by the departments themselves.
For instance, the Army has its own intelligence
corp, dealing with information pertaining to the. war
potential, military forces and activities and even topog-
raphv of foreign nations. The Navy and the Air For
ce
]so have their intelligence departments, all of whom
efort directly to the Secretary of Defense and the joint
liicfs of Staff.
Standing stalwartly in the background is -perhaps
he finest organization of its kind in. the world-the
'edcral Bureau of Investigation. Headed by J. Edgar
Ioover, the FBI deals primarily with counter-intelligence
utters. Such things as espionage, sabotage, treason
mid other acts against the U.S. fall under the FBI's
lomain. It also gets loyalty reports on persons employed
w the government.
The commission which made the report last year
n intelligence activities made the expected remarks
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has heard from him since-or even has acknowledged
who he might be.
Crabb's fate? The British admiralty announced lie
was "missing and presumed dead." He had been testing
"certain underwater apparatus," the admiralty announced.
Finally the admiralty said Crabb was "in all probability"
the diver seen by the Russian sailors. His presence, the
admiralty added, "was without any permission whatso-
ever."
A formal protest was lodged with Britain by the
-Russian government less than two weeks ago. Britain
apologized, red-facedly. Prink Minister Edcn was ques-
tioned about it by his own House of Commons, but he
refused to go into details. It would not be in the best
public interest to say more, lie said. Some observers felt
that, meant an American espionage agent might have
been working with the frogman, but there has been no
substantiation of this, and U.S. officials have denied it.
It was common knowledge, however, that the British
were interested in the underwater design of the new
Sovict cruiser. The ship has great speed, it has under-
water equipment for detecting submarines and mines -
a diver might be able to learn many secrets.
't'hat Britain had been caught in a most embarrassing position was quickly apparent. The Russians, while
certainly not naive enough to believe their ship wouldn't
be looked over carefully while in the British port, at
least had concrete evidence- tat spying had been done.
And done during a supposed good-will visit to Great
Britain. The fizzling of the mission put the Britains'
back to, the wall.
FROGRMAN AND CRUISER. One of the
most recent cases of supposed espionage in-
volved British Cmdr. Lionel Crabb, shown
shove getting his equipment checked before a
dive, and the Russian Cruiser Ordzhonikidze,
right. Crabb "disappeared" while mysteriously
diving near the Rcd Ship.
Wednesday, May 23, 1956
The newsmen were, taken to a spot about 500 yards
from the radar. station. There they saw a "huge hole
dug 10 feet in the ground and at the bottom of the
hole a cast-iron tube. The tube was about six feet in
diameter and nearly 600 yards in length. A hole had
been cut in the top of the tube by the Russians. The
story was inside the tube.
It was loaded with cables, tape recorders, electronic
equipment-an elaborate wiretapping setup. There was
ventilating apparatus made by 'both American and Brit-
ish companies. The cables were traced to the point
where they tied in with cables used by the Russians
in East Germany.
At the borderline of East and West Germany the
huge underground tube was sandbagged, blocked off.
A sign, in both English and German, read simply: "You
are now entering the American sector,"
The. Reds let out a loud scream and said the tunnel
had been laid by the Americans so they could listen in
on important Russian telephone calls. The United States
would say nothing. And still hasn't. But the .tunnel,
built to last for years, has now outlived its usefulness.
Diplomatically, it was an embarrassing month for the
Western world. The compensating factor is that the
Communists have been caught in the past and are
known 'currently to have their unseen fingers in many
a free world confidential pie.
. It's part of the. game to- get caught once in awhile.
With espionage at its highest point since the start of
World War II there have to. be some slipups. The spies
know that security forces are checking more closely now
than ever before. Their jobs are harder, the penalties
more severe.
For them the war goes on.
To,narrow: Espionage Is a Dirty Business
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Eden himself pointed out the ramifications of the
incident. In, announcing to- the House .of Commons
that he would comment no further on it, the prime
minister declared:
"In this business I do-not rest only on the national
interest. There is also a very important international
interest." He said it was his hope that the discussions
with the Russian leaders would prove to be the "be-
ginning of the beginning" and added:
"I intend to safeguard that possibility at all costs.
It is for that reason that I deplore this debate and will
say no more."
Caaz Affect Diplomacy
Whether the incident tended to chill the British-
Soviet relations was not immediately apparent. But it
was a lesson in how espionage can backfire to produce
harmful. diplomatic results. .
The frogman' incident was small potatoes compared
to the straight-from-Hollywood type of tunnel which was
burrowed between East and West Germany. How long
it had been there, what secrets had been. intercepted
through it, even who dug it were questions nobody knew
but everybody guessed at.
At one edge of the U.S. zone a radar post had been
set up, right near the border separating the U.S. and
Russian zones. Russians, who keep a good eye on all
things they can see in the American zone, finally
put their figures together and realized there was some-
thing out of order in the activities going on at the radar
post.
At the beginning of this month they knew what it
was. They called a press conference to announce it and
offered newsmen from West Germany to see for them-
telves.