A CONGRESSMAN LOOKS INSIDE THE STATE DEPARTMENT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP70-00058R000100120001-6
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 4
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 6, 2000
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: June 15, 1956
• Content Type: MAGAZINE

U. S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT +HMt .15 5 19 r _~, -//
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A CONGRESSMAN LOOKS INSIDE
THE STATE DEPARTMENT
Who really makes policy ?for U., S. in the
foreign field? Is the Department; of State al-
ways zealous in .watching out: for the interests
of America?
Representative ;Walter H., Judd, Republican,
of Minnesota, gives answers to those and other
questions in testimony ,ghat follows,
His conclusion: U S. foreign policy, in prac-
tice, often is made not atthe 'top, but among
officials down the Iine =-frequentlywith mo-
tives that are obscure and with effects not in
the U. S. interest:
Following are excerpts from the transcript of testimony
by Representative Walter H. Judd before the Senate Sub-
committee on Internal Security, May 31, 1956:
Mr. Morris [Robert Morris, chief counsel of the Subcom-
mittee]: Mr. Judd, do you remember making a visit to China
in October, 1945?
Mr. Judd: Yes, sir.
Mr. Morris: I wonder if you
at that time?
would relate what happened
Mr. Judd:... I talked, of course, to our officials there....
The thing that disturbed me was the conversations I had with
some of the junior members of our Embassy and some of the
colonels-that general level in our military staff-because a
surprising number of them were just following one line, that
we must ditch the Generalissimo [Chiang Kai-shek], his Gov-
ernment was hopeless, and we must back the Communists,
because they were (1) democratic, (2) they were interested
in the well-being of the people, (3) they would be more co-
operative with us than the Generalissimo because the Gener-
alissimo had been unwilling to-he had opposed General
Stilwell's proposal to ship Lend-Lease material up to the
Communists, and so on. [Maj. Gen. Joseph W. Stilwell was
Chief of Staff to Chiang Kai-shek.]
These people were all for arming the Communists, and all
-these Americans-all for sort of making the Communists the
main agency that we would back in China. I was sure that
would be disastrous. I could not figure out why so many of
our Americans would be just chanting what, to me, was the
Communist Party line, and which later proved to be the
Communist Party line.
Mr. Morris: Many of those are still in the United States
Government today, are they not?
Walter Judd long has been recognized as
an authority on the Far East and on workings
of the Department of State. He is serving his
seventh term in Congress. Previously, Repre-
sentative Judd spent many years in China as
a medical missionary.
On May 31 of this year, the Minnesota Con-
gressman was called to testify before the Sen-
ate Subcommittee on Internal Security. Under
questioning, he recounted many of his obser-
vations of the State Department in action at
home and abroad.
Mr. Morris: Generally, what were they doing?
Mr. Judd: . . . There was a universal line that America
should ditch our ally, the Nationalist Government of China,
and put our chips on the Communists. That disturbed me
tremendously....
C C G
Another thing-the leaks that come to the press. Here
is one recently. All of you have seen in the press for six
months repeated stories, especially from certain columnists,
that the United States is going to recognize Communist China,
and, after the next election, the United Nations Assembly will
meet and admit Communist China to the United Nations. I
asked about it two or three tines down at the State Depart-
ment, if this is true. It has been denied completely by every-
body at the top.
Finally, one came out a few weeks ago in a Kiplinger Letter.
It said that at one of these conferences it was tentatively
agreed that this should be done. It would be denied officially,
the Letter said, but the fact is the United States is going to
recognize Communist China and not veto its entrance into
the United Nations.
I called up key men and said, "Has there been a change?"
They said, "No; we saw it, too. There is not a word of
truth in it."
Now, the newspapers didn't think that up. Somebody in
the Department told them that. This is the thing that goes on
again and again. Leaks go out from underlings that this is
what our policy is going to be. Now, we are going to recog-
nize Communist China.
That is not the President's policy. That is not Mr.
Dulles's policy. That is not the policy of the Far East Di-
vision. Yet, somewhere down in the State Department or
in the Pentagon, or the National Security Council, or some-
where, there are people who passed this out. You go to
the press people and they won't reveal their sources. I don't
blame them.
who took pApunpe positio nd st of th s : QA kuubtj
bi~j,lyar t ~Iy~s ~elss out to
American rOVeC Or eleaseeb6i/ 3ti 2 1 , Vprsr. ttFr ~j ~lti}~lJ ft~{he think-
Mr. Judd: Some of them are, and some of them are not.
Then there were, from the military, colonels and majors
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"Too much emphasis on cloak and dagger work" of Reds
ing of the people toward further appeasement of the Com-
munists.
Mr. Morris: Are there other things the Committee should
look for in trying to determine whether or not there are Com-
munists or Communist sympathizers working in our midst?
Mr. Judd: Let me say this: I, myself, think in our country
there has been a little too much emphasis on the cloak and
dagger work of the Communists. We have to get somebody
who stole documents or wrote something in code to the Soviet
Union. I don't think those are the dangerous ones. Those are
the little fellows.
The really dangerous ones are the ones nobody ever sus-
pected. I remember John Peurifoy, when he was chairman of
security, or head of security, in the Department in 1947 and
1948, and we had a subcommittee of the Committee on
Government Operations in the House that investigated the
Department and we got rid of 131 unsuitable people, about
half of whom were Communists or Communist suspects. We
didn't have a headline. But he said to me one day:
"Walter, what worries me is how many there are like Hiss,
whom I never suspected. I used to lunch with Hiss, once in a
while. It makes me wonder if the fellow I have lunched with
now is one."
If you go down through their history and watch what
they recommend over the years, it turns out to be favorable
to the Soviet Union. I am sure they will never be found to
be carrying Communist cards. They would be fools to have
meetings in the back end of an alley or a restaurant some-
where. They are clever, and their real danger is their ability
to, at the lower echelons, write policy papers, position papers,
which come up to their superiors and become policy papers.
Then those policy papers go to the action agencies, like
the State Department, the Pentagon and the National Secu-
rity Council. If you allow me to write the papers on which
my superiors make their decisions, I think I could have a
good deal to say about what my superiors will think.
For example, if the top man comes in and he has the
choice between two memoranda on his desk, and those
both are written by a fellow who is pro-Communist, the
man's freedom of decision is not too wide. He has to decide
between two positions, both of which are in various degrees
pro-Communist, which means, in my book, inimical to the
interests of the United States.
Mr. Morris: Do you think, then, that committees such as
the Internal Security Subcommittee should look into who has
been writing for years the directives that make the policies?
Mr. Judd: I think that is where pay dirt is to be found, sir.
4 R *
Now, here is a story that you can confirm: On the morning
of April 13 [1945], when President Truman, the new Presi-
dent, came to his office in the White House for the first time
as President of the United States, naturally the press was
there from a great many papers and so on, and the picture
taken of the new President, the first morning in his office, the
first piece of business, shows a memorandum on the Presi-
dent's desk, written right on there. A man who has that picture
now, who was in intelligence and was sensitive to intelligence,
saw it and the minute he saw it, he said to his friends, Presi-
dent Truman, "You must not have a picture like that around,
showing for all to read a memorandum on the President's
desk, no matter whether it is innocuous or not."
What does the memorandum tab say? The first piece of
business: "See John Carter Vincent about China."
Who is high enough in the Administration-within two
UNDER SCRUTINY: THE STATE DEPARTMENT
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. . . "I can't understand how the experts can be so misguided"
weeks after Roosevelt had reconfirmed the policy support-
ing the Government of China, helping the Generalissimo win,
re-establish order in his country, build up and overcome the
great difficulties which had existed-who is high enough to
get the first piece of business for a new President, "See
John Carter Vincent about China"? John Carter Vincent,
whose policy, as he himself avowed, says, "I worked at
nothing for years, except to get the coalition between the
Communists and the National Government."
Well, Mr. Truman didn't have that background. Obvious-
ly, Mr. Vincent and the others got to him-I am not accus-
ing them of Communism or anything of the sort. They, how-
ever, for whatever reason, believed we should back the
MR. JUDD TO COUNSEL MORRIS: "The
damage is done in preparing directives"
Communists and try to get a coalition. I can't understand
their ignorance, if that is what it was, because the documents
are so replete.
In a report to my own Committee on Nov. 14, 1947, after I
had been out on another trip to China and examined this
thing, I discussed this here. Talking about the threefold plan
that the Communists had, it is (1) to destroy the Generalis-
simo at home by tearing up the railroads, wrecking the econ-
omy, making it impossible to restore his economic processes,
and so on; (2) to destroy him abroad by saying-they had six
words for him: inept, incompetent, inefficient, undemocratic,
corrupt, reactionary. By saying these six things, inept, in-
competent, inefficient, undemocratic, corrupt, and reaction-
ary, you can close off all mental processes.
The third thing was to build up the Communists them-
selves as democratic. I said, "The propaganda, as you know,
was largely led by about 20 or 30 writers and lecturers and
commentators in America, and by some men who became Far
East advisers to our State Department or experts on the
staffs of organizations s xi}p osed~y, d dicated
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"There were some of the group in what has become wide-
ly known as the `Red cell' in the State Department-the Far
Eastern office. It has been openly said that some of these
experts, both in and out of the Government, are members of
the Communist Party, although I have no personal knowledge
of that. But certainly, they have consistently followed the
party line with respect to the Chinese Communists.
"One of them openly boasted that, while they had not
succeeded in all they wanted, at least they had gotten rid
of Grew, Hurley and Hornbeck, who were the three in State
Department who knew the facts about the Communists' wiles,
and who tried to carry out Roosevelt's policy of supporting
the Central Government of China."
In the next page I said:
"I do not know when, if ever before in history, some 30 or
40 persons in and out of the Government have been able to
lose a great victory so almost completely as this hitndful of
Communists, fellow travelers and misguided liberals in
America has succeeded in doing with respect to the victory
over Japan which 4 million brave Americans won at such a
cost in blood and sacrifice. I do not like to make so strong a
statement, but I do not see how anyone can look at the facts
and come to any other conclusion."
Impending Loss of China Was Clear
It was plain as day in the fall of 1947 that we were going
to lose it [China] if we didn't change. But we didn't succeeu
in changing.
Mr. Morris: You mention that report. When did you make
that report?
Mr. Judd: Nov. 14, 1947... .
0 4 x
I am just an ordinary workingman Congressmen. I could
find out what the Communists were up to. I can't under-
stand how the great experts can be so misguided and mis-
lead. I cannot believe it is wholly ignorance.
Mr. Morris: You think we have the problem with us today?
Mr. Judd: Well, you see it on every hand. Look, here is
last night's David Lawrence article. He is quoting from a
speech by Allen Dulles of the CFA' [Central Intelligence
Agency], in which Mr. Dulles is warning about the dangers of
some of our allies' going into coalition with Communists:
"Today the danger of parliamentary compromises with the
Communists, even in Europe, is not to be ignored. In Asia,
this threat is even greater, because it is generally less well
understood."
Here is the head of our CIA warning us against coalitions
with the Communists. Yet the State Department, with the ex-
ception of a few at the top, was insisting on coalition with the
Communists then. There are some not only advocating, now,
parliamentary coalition with the Communists, but executive
branch-War Department compromises, if you will.
c < D
Mr. Morris: I think in executive session you went through
four points we should look for....
Mr. Judd: I said you ought to watch where Government
officials put out false information, or, second, where they leak to
the press information posed to be the inside dope on American
policy, which is contrary to the announced and official policies
of the responsible heads of our agencies in Government.
Third is their delay in carrying out directives-that is,
policies established by the Congress, and, if they don't approve
of it, feet are dragged and the goods don't get out or the ac-
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orld
... Pro-Communists still in Government? "Why, yes"
Chairman Eastland [Senator James O. Eastland (Dem.),
of Mississippi]: Mr. Judd, where are those leaks coming from?
Mr. Judd: I don't know, sir. I have tried to find out from
some of my newspaper friends. They come from State and
from the Pentagon. Those are the two common sources.
Chairman Eastland: Then you think some of these people
that are pro-Communist are still in the State Department,
and still in the Pentagon?
Mr. Judd: Why, yes. I don't mean pro-Communists in the
sense that they are still in the party, but they advocate pol-
icies that work out to the good of the party. On the law of
averages, a moron once in a while would make a decision that
would be favorable to the United States. When policies
[that] are given or advocated to a group consistently work
out to [Communist] advantage, that couldn't be happen-
stance.
been. Then, if he has been consistently advocating over the
years a policy which events have proven wrong, he ought to
be fired, not as a Communist, but as a fellow who is wrong.
If I have a doctor who takes care of my father and he dies,
who takes care of my mother and she dies, who takes care of
my wife and she dies, and then I get sick, I am going to fire him,
not as a Communist, but because he is just not a good doctor.
I don't think we have to call them subversive. I think a
lot of them are not subversive. They are intellectuals, and
Communism appeals to the theoretical mind-one leads to
two, two leads to three.
Chairman Eastland: But you do think they are pro-Com-
munist?
Mr. Judd: I think the things they advocate consistently
w
k
h
oi out to t
e interest of the Communists.
Mr. Morris: Have you finished the four points?
Mr. Judd: The fourth one was in writin their
g
Who Really Shapes Policy
Chairman Eastland: Do I understand that you think that
the recommendations of these individuals have influence
with the real policy makers in the State Department and in
the Pentagon?
Mr. Judd: Oh, there is no slightest doubt of it. For exam-
ple, if I may use an illustration, I amn told, because I have
asked all kinds of questions down there, that here is the Assist-
ant Secretary for a given area, Europe or the Middle East
or the Far East. He is strongly anti-Communist, and in every
instance he takes a position to build up the interests of the
United States. He is the man who carried out policies and so
on. But we are inclined to assume that because he is the
Assistant Secretary he is the man who advises the Secretary
on what the policies should be. But, when you investigate,
you find that isn't the way it happened. It is the planning
council-whatever you call it.
Mr. Morris: Policy Planning Board, isn't it?
Mr. Judd: Policy Planning Board. They have on their Pol-
icy Planning Board a man, for example, for the Far East, one
for Latin America, one for the Middle East, and so on. They
prepare the "position" papers. Those are the ones that go
up to the higher levels, where the policy is determined. The
men we look to, the men you confirm as Assistant Secre-
taries, carry out the policies. But I find they are not the in-
fluential ones in making the policies. It is these position pa-
pers that come up from the Policy Planning Board.
Chairman Eastland: You think today that those officials
are subject to pro-Communist influence?
Mr. Judd: You mean the higher officials?
Chairman Eastland: Yes.
Mr. Judd: Yes, I do. I don't see how they can come to the
conclusions they do if that weren't the case.
Mr Morris: You think, Congressman, that influencing our
policy to our disadvantage would come from the bottom and
not from the top?
Mr. Judd: Oh, I am sure it is not from the top. You talk to
some of those people and they are distressed themselves at
They start out with a big
, smashing, strong statement, and
then, in the third or fourth paragraph, it is hedged around
with howevers and buts until it is watered down. Then it
goes up, say, to the National Security Council or other boards
who have to take this policy paper and work out a policy.
They don't go by the big, strong statement. They go by the
small print when it is spelled out in the later paragraphs.
So, the policy that is ultimately carried out is not the one
that is foreshadowed, apparently, in the strong, anti-Com-
munist, firm policy in the first paragraph. It is the one down
in the modified paragraphs or in the rewriting of the direc-
tive, based on the policy which can be watered down.
. I think it is in the preparing of these papers and direc-
tives that the damage is done, and in the influencing of minds
of the people above.
Chairman Eastland: Let me ask you this question. Do you
believe that any government ever had a weaker department
than our present State Department?
Mr. Judd: No, I think the State Department is a good deal
better than it was. But I still think it has a long way to go. I
will probably get in trouble, but I have said this to him per-
sonally.
A man down in the Department said to me just about in-
auguration day in 1953:
"Well, we were kind of worried when there was a change
down here, but we have things under control."
I said, "What do you mean?"
"Well, we are going to give Mr. Dulles the Jimmy Byrnes
treatment."
"What is that?" I asked.
"Keep the Secretary of State out of the country."
Ile said, "Look at Jimmy Byrnes: He came in and we
took Byrnes and [Senator Tom] Connally and [Senator Ar-
thur] Vandenberg and sent them to Paris for six months. They
were over there while the postwar pattern of appeasement
was being established. They kept them out of the country."
This man was not one of them.
the miscarriage of the orders that are supposed to be against Appeasement: Still a Problem
the Communists and it doesn't work out. Chairman Eastland: We still have that policy of appease-
As John Peurifoy said, some of these people are not on our went, don't we?
side. Who are the people? Mr. Judd: I be
g your pardon?
.
Chairman Eastland: What is the trouble? Can't they fire Chairman Eastland: As I understand your testimony, we
them? still do have that pattern of appeas.
Mr. Judd: Well, it seems to me they could. It seems they Mr. Judd: In the lower echelons. Notlat the top.
could, if there was the will to be really tough in policing an Chairman Eastland: But you say they influence the men
organization and tightening it up. They could go back to the at the top. They are being influenced by'pro-Communists.
papers and find out wh tForaRelease 6bsTJ 3/b1 : CIA btbdU58R000100120001-6
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U. S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, June 15, 1956