WHY DID MIDEAST SURPRISE U.S.?
Document Type:
Collection:
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST):
CIA-RDP69B00369R000200290015-7
Release Decision:
RIFPUB
Original Classification:
K
Document Page Count:
1
Document Creation Date:
December 12, 2016
Document Release Date:
October 7, 2001
Sequence Number:
15
Case Number:
Publication Date:
July 12, 1967
Content Type:
NSPR
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CLAYTON FRITCHEY.
Washington, D.C.-In her annual New Year's Dayi+ I'of aritime nations to break the Gulf of Aqaba blockade);
j~ ~ ka J .prediction Mrs Jeans Dixon' Washington's famed' ~ V-Yas!+a' Failure '
, a .a+ I +i i hTumeraus foreign diplomats and foreign corscspon- i
tr seeress, took a des look into her crystal ball and re rfed
p p? is htx'' foresaw.' the trend of events long ago, as did our i
that the U.S. was headed for a major crisis in the Middld~yc bhi age d'affaires -in Cairo, David G. Nef, who reportedly
Y nEast. So President Johnson, she .prophesied, will shortly! ant Washington "clear warning months in advance," but i'
t; face "the most. momentous decision
of his life."
w:. Mrs. Dixon might have been a
0: i little more specific, but compared
gazing she was right on target. This~is'
'? made secretary of state, but it does
suggest that the department, with all
of its immense resources, might be
expected to match her assessments of,
wa's regarded as an "alarmist" by State.
It also comes out that in the three critical 'months i,
preceding the crisis, there was no U.S. ambassador to the ;
United Arab Republic. It apptars' that. no U.S. official.
spoke with. Nasser during that time, nor since- for that F ?
matter. A new but inexperienced envoy; Richard Nolte,
finally did arrive at Cairo on May 21 after Nasser had.-`
started mobilizing. When' asked about the, crisis, he is 4^
reported to have said, "What crisis?"
Now that Congress has returned from its'recess, it will .1
be interesting to see what if anything comes of talk of a
Now 10, t the mnediate crisis ante, as proposed by Sen=Qh rtes I-1. Percy (R?Ill.. In Kist,
a i OJsees "teeey ?-~ 2
. has' subsided, it -'may be a good opinion, the emergency left grace questions about the
moment to do a little stock-taking, for our future policy in quality of our advanced?planning.
that troubled area will no' doubt be. influenced to an Rju.. Wayne Havs (D-Ohio), chairman of a House' ?
-important degree by the same officials who were so slow . lioreign Affairs subcommittee, has already held a closed' } ;?
,
and hesitant in anticipating and coping with the Arab? session with Nef. Hays charges State with "contributory
Israeli explosion.' negligence" in failing to heed the warning from Cairo. Ile
It is always easy game to second-guess the State De- , says the subcommittee feels there has to be an improve-
partment, but considering that the taxpayers are spending ment in "the way messages from crisis areas are handled at
about $1 billion, a year to provide it with every form of the department.'
intelligence, it.is hard to understand why the performance It is significant that the complaints on the Hill come
r .;was not better. State has hundreds of Middle East experts, from spokesmen from both parties. Lkqn. Gerald R. f'otd
it has its own bureau'of intelligence and research, it has a (B.Wch.), the House Republican leader, says the adminis-
large policy planning staff, and it also has all the reports tration "got caught napping." Sep Milt- Mansfield (b?
of the y \ . Mont.), the Democratic majority ea er, sai tie same.
Yetzt is clear that (1) State' underestimated the danger ' The President earned some good marks for -his
1 of a war in the_area, (2) it had nb acceptable contingenc : personal diplomacy during the crisis, but it was obvious be
.plan ,ready for, the President :when war 'did break out, (3), was improvising and playing it by ear, rather than depend.
it was not even .certain what:Amer" 's pbligat(ons were ing on a carefully planned. strategy devised in advance b7 and (4) the plan it belatedly 4id settle' on (a corisottium the pirofessionals
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Approved For Release`2001/11/01 : CIA-RDP69B00369R000200290015-7