STATEMENT OF JAMES E. WEBB ADMINISTRATOR NATIONAL AERONATICS AND SPACE ADMINISTRATION BEFORE THE COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE AND ASTRONAUTICS HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP69B00369R000200200028-2
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 24
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 25, 2010
• Sequence Number: 28
• Publication Date: January 1, 2000
• Content Type: STATEMENT

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HOLD FOR RELEASE UNTIL
PRESENTED BY WITNESS
James E. Webb
Administrator
NATIONAL AERONAUTICS AND SPACE ADMINISTRATION
before the
Committee on Science and Astronautics
House of Representatives
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee:
Thank you for permitting less than the normal 48-hour requirement for
advanced submission of prepared statements in the case of my statement
today and Dr..Seamans' tomorrow. This has given us an opportunity to have
these statements reflect the present status of the preliminary findings
and recommendations of the Board investigating the Apollo 204 accident.
We appreciate the consideration of the Committee on this and other matters
related to the accident. It is our understanding that when the Apollo 204
Board has made its findings, it is your purpose to have your Oversight
Committee examine in detail all matters related to its work and findings.
We will cooperate fully in that examination.
. A year ago, as we appeared before you to present President Johnson's
FY 1967 budget request, we pointed out that the estimates did not allow
for failures; that there were many difficulties ahead, and that the margins
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between success and failure were very thin. We also pointed out that cru-
cial decisions on the elements of the post-Apollo space program had been
deferred, but could not be delayed beyond the FY 1968 budget. Your actions
in support of the President's plan for FY 1967 permitted us to procure the
long lead-time items and to continue to plan the most effective uses for
post-Apollo funds.
During the past year we have finished the Gemini program in which we
sent into space and brought back safely 20 men in 20 months. Three success-
ful unmanned flights in the Apollo program demonstrated the performance of
the Uprated Saturn I launch vehicle, the Apollo heat shield, and the Apollo
propulsion and navigation systems.
Surveyor I made a successful soft landing on the moon and sent back
data of great importance.
We have obtained Apollo landing site pictures from each of our first
three Lunar Orbiters.
We have taken the first pictures of the earth from the moon and also
from synchronous earth orbit.
We have successfully tested the NERVA I nuclear rocket engine at full
power and had successful firings of the half-length 260-inch large solid
rocket motor.
We have played a major role in advancing aeronautical research and
development.
In manpower and expenditures, our program has passed its peak.
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Manpower peaked at about 420,000 during the third quarter of FY 1966, and
is now down to about 350,000. It is expected to drop to about 300,000 by
the end of FY 1968 under the President's Budget. Expenditures also peaked
rate
in the 3rd Quarter of FY 1966 at an annual/of about $6 billion dollars.
They have been declining at an annual rate of about $300 million during
FY 1967 and will continue at about this rate during FY 1968. We have
succeeded, I believe, in bringing together a first-class team, planning
and carrying out a very large and difficult undertaking, and then phasing
out each project as it approached completion. Our work force in FY 1968
will average 100,000 less than in FY 1966, and our expenditures $700 million
dollars less. At the same time, our work will be very much more complex.
Not all our efforts have been successful. We have had our difficulties
and failures -- most of them of the kind which it has proven almost
impossible to eliminate in very advanced developments in aviation and space.
We do all we can to avoid them, and when they happen, they bring home the
need for a large measure of technical and management strength, as well as
flexibility in our planning and use of resources to permit corrective
actions and find ways to work around the problems. For example:
-- We encountered unforeseen problems with extravehicular
activity (EVA) in the Gemini program. By making new plans
for Gemini XII, we were able to conduct experiments which
have given us know-how and consequent confidence that we can
move ahead to use EVA in future missions.
-- We have had problems with the large hydrogen-fueled S-II
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stages of the Saturn V launch vehicle. These have now been
largely overcome, we believe, but the first Saturn V launch
has been delayed about four months.
-- One S-IVB stage exploded while undergoing test with serious
damage to the test stand.
Our most serious setback has been the tragic Apollo 204 accident and
fire four weeks ago in which Astronauts Grissom, White, and Chaffee lost
their lives. We do not yet know the full effect this will have on Apollo,
but by the time you reach the testimony of Dr. George Mueller, I believe
he can give you the boundaries of the broad pattern of additional work
we will have to undertake.
All in all, during the past year, eventp have continued to show that
success in manned space flight involves a large capability to overcome.
very great difficulties, as we were able to demonstrate in Mercury and
Gemini. Faced as we are with even greater difficulties in Apollo, I have
complete confidence that we will also overcome all difficulties in the
way of success.
Since 1961 we have many times informed this Committee and stated to
public that the risks we were facing were large and that the thin margins
between success and failure in these flights justified more budgetary
flexibility and support. Some have regarded these statements as unduly
pessimistic, and some as merely a stratagem calculated to support our
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budget requests. The plain fact is that we are in a business that is both
hazardous and highly experimental. We have to do, and to the best of our
human, and therefore limited, ability are doing, everything we can to
reduce the hazards, particularly to human life. We have seen in Apollo 204
that even small accumulation of additional risk factors when added to the
basic and unavoidable risk base can produce catastrophe . But in a highly
experimental undertaking, where every step involves new equipment, new
conditions, new procedures, new skills, or new unknowns, we can never be
entirely sure in advance that we have anticipated all contingencies or
have eliminated all possibilities of error or failure. The concentration
of explosive power in our larger rockets, when fueled for launch, is
awesome to contemplate except in terms of a built-in capability to direct
it and control it.
Our whole method of operation is to develop fully integrated systems,
to test them thoroughly and to learn from experience. We carefully
consider the results of every test -- all the way from laboratory tests
of the tiniest components to full-scale flight of our largest and most
complex vehicles and spacecraft -- and assess with great care every
instance of both success and failure. Our constant effort is to determine
what changes in concept, design, or procedures should be made. The
process of investigation, assessment, corrective action, and program
adjustment we are now going through in the case of the Apollo 204
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accident is, in essence, an enlarged and expanded version of the same
process that we follow on a day-to-day basis in moving ahead with our work.
This brings me to the most important recent development in our space
program -- the fact that in his FY 1968 budget recommendations the
President urges that this Nation move forward in 1970 and beyond with a
strong program that will meet the Nation's needs in aeronautics and space,
that will take advantage of the large investments we have made and the
momentum we have gained, and that will continue to give us in increasing
measure the scientific advances, the new technologies, and the practical
applications that emerge from research and development in the air and
in space.
The President's recommendations, in brief, are:
1. To carry the Apollo program through to completion. We cannot
now state whether we will be able to meet the goal of a manned lunar
landing before 1970. But the decision in this budget -- and this is
not changed by the Apollo 204 accident -- is that we will press forward
with Apollo and achieve the capabilities for men to operate in space
which have been the goals of the Apollo program from the beginning.
2. To follow up the Apollo program, without loss of continuity,
with a program to apply and expand the knowledge gained through continued
use of the Saturn V, the Saturn I-B, and the Apollo spacecraft. This is
called Apollo Applications and its goal is to:
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-- Develop the capabilities for long duration manned space
flight which are fundamental to the effective use of manned
operational systems. With the further development, use and
reuse in orbit, of equipment developed in the Apollo program,
we believe that we can extend the useful life of some components
to achieve mission durations of up to one year or more.
-- Experiment with manned scientific observations from space
vehicles of the sun, the stars, and of the earth itself to
give us unique information of scientific and practical value.
-- Continue the exploration of the moon after our first Apollo
landings.
3. To press forward in the further development of practical
applications of our space know-how -- in meteorology, in communications,
and in other earth-oriented applications, using the capabilities of the
Apollo Applications Program as well as those of advanced unmanned
systems like the ATS-4.
4. To proceed with the next major step in the exploration of the
planets, through the Voyager program, with the first objective of
unmanned landings on Mars in 1973 and 1975.
5. To begin development of the NERVA II nuclear rocket engine
which offers the possibility of doubling the capabilities of the Saturn V
launch vehicle. This will insure that our future propulsion technology
and capabilities will be equal to our future needs.
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6. To increase our efforts in aeronautical research to deal effec-
tively with emerging problems of civil as well as military aviation.
A year ago we could only say that the FY 1967 budget would hold open
possibilities for the future, and that the program after 1970 would depend
on the decisions in the FY 1968 budget. This year the President's recom-
mendations show the way to our future goals.
This budget, in my opinion, represents a turning point in the
Nation's space program as important as the decision in 1958 to establish
NASA, and the decision in 1961 to seek pre-eminence in space with a broad
and expanded program including the goal of a manned lunar landing and
return by the end of the decade. In his FY 1968 budget, President
Johnson has placed before the Congress a program which says that this
Nation must go forward in space and not call it quits at the end of
this decade. The President says in this budget, that a continuing
vigorous space effort is essential to our national interest, and he
shows that the Nation can continue to develop and use its hard-won
space capability within the framework of total national needs and
resources.
I cannot say that this budget or this program will give us pre-
eminence in all major aspects of space and aeronautics. As I have
testified before, an annual budget level of at least $5.5 to $6.0
billion will be required for this. The FY 1968 budget before you leaves
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our margins thin for the work to be accomplished. It does not permit
us to move toward important goals as fast as we could or with as much
assurance as we would like. But it is a budget which clearly establishes
a forward-looking course for the future. It will enable us to do the
most important things, and will provide a strong base on which the
country can decide at some future time to build additional strength
should it be required.
The details of our programs and budget estimates will be presented
to the Committee over the next several days by Dr. Seamans, Dr. Mueller,
Dr. Newell, Dr. Adams, Mr. Buckley and others according to the plan
and schedules which the Committee has established. I believe it will
be most useful to you if I do not attempt to cover fully the points to
be made in the days to come by these men. Rather I would like to address
myself to the topics in which you have indicated a special interest,
including our plans to adjust the organization of NASA to the new
pattern of work, the treaty on the peaceful uses of space, and to cer-
tain other matters of policy.
First, as to NASA organization, my basic thought is that this
budget is intended to set the future course of our program. With
Apollo and other current programs moving toward completion, we are now
considering carefully how best to adapt our organization and management
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structure to best accomplish our work load in the new situation. We
do not have in mind any sweeping reorganization. We do plan a steady
evolution that will enable us to anticipate and meet the organizational
needs that arise as the character and content of our program change.
At present, our main job is to make sure the development of new
programs does not interfere with the effort required to carry Apollo
and our other current programs to successful completion. I believe our
present organization pattern is sound and have full confidence in the
system under which our government-industry-university teams are now
at work.
As we complete programs like Gemini, however, or as we advance
from the completion of a major technology program like NERVA I, to
the initiation of an even larger program like NERVA II, we will take
steps to evaluate the capabilities of successful project leaders,
engineers, and managers, and take advantage of their talents and
experience to strengthen our current programs and to organize new ones.
With this in mind, we have assigned Mr. Charles Mathews, who distin-
guished himself as the Project Manager for Gemini, to serve as Program
Director for the Apollo Applications Program.
From our experience with our lunar vehicles like Ranger, Surveyor
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and Orbiter; and our planetary and interplanetary vehicles like Pioneer
and Mariner, we have learned a great deal about how rocket-borne
scientific instruments can be used to yield large increments of new
knowledge about the earth and its place in the solar system. As we
make our plans to use the Apollo Applications missions to play a large
role in the further development of this effort, we need an organiza-
tional arrangement that facilitates the closest relationships between
those responsible for the development of an increasing base of manned-
flight technology and those responsible for increasing scientific
knowledge and its rapid use by engineers and others. Also, since
Voyager is a Space Science and Applications project, but will fly on
the Saturn V which was developed and tested by the Office of Manned
Space Flight, the same kind of close working arrangements between
various parts of NASA are very important.
A certain amount of organizational autonomy was undoubtedly
needed to get the Apollo project under way, but to continue too
much of it into the arrangements for the new programs would not be
wise.
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For this and other reasons we have assigned Mr. Harold Finger, who
has been responsible for the joint NASA-AEC work on nuclear propulsion
and nuclear power, to head a task force which is now examining in detail
the elements of NASA's present organization and analyzing possible
actions which would strengthen them. In the long run, the strength and
quality of an organization like NASA depends on advancing and broadening
the specialized knowledge and administrative experience of its best
people and assigning them to positions that will make the most of their
abilities. As we carry out our current programs and plan for those
recommended in the FY 1968 Budget, we are also creating a strong
reservoir of talent which appreciates and can deal with the total range
of problems on which the success of the agency depends, including those
related to science, technology, engineering, and management.
We also recognize the need for the introduction from time to time
at key management levels of a number of officials with broad experience
outside NASA. In this regard, I am glad to say that we have succeeded
in securing the services of a number of these, including Mr. Bernard
Dorman, who has had a distinguished career with the Aerojet General
Corporation. He has joined us as Assistant Administrator for Industry
Affairs. General Jacob E. Smart, USAF (Ret.), who has rendered out-
standing service in a long series of important assignments in the Air
Force, including that of Vice Chief of Staff, is serving as a Special
Assistant to the Administrator and, on a temporary basis, as Acting
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Assistant Administrator for Administration. Mr. William Rieke, who
rendered outstanding service in these positions, has left us to return to
private industry.
In organizing the effort required to carry out the new programs
proposed in the FY 1968 Budget, we recognize the need for some departures
from the pattern of the past. In our major programs we are in a period
when the primary emphasis is shifting from the development of capabilities
to that of using these capabilities to meet national needs. With the new
potentials of manned space flight coming into being, we will no longer
have as clear a requirement for the division between manned and un-
manned space programs as in the past. Further, in undertakings like
Apollo Applications and Voyager, and with the prospect of even larger
space scientific undertakings in the future, we have to consider care-
fully how the pattern of relationships between industry, universities,
government, and the scientific community which we have followed can be
adapted to best meet the new conditions.
The Apollo Applications Program will be headed by Mr. Charles
Matthews and will be under the direction of the Office of Manned Space
Flight, but new patterns of working relationships have been developed
under which he and Dr. Mueller will work very closely on a continuing,
almost day-to-day basis, with Dr. Newell, Mr. Cortright, Dr. Seamans,
and myself, in developing the administrative and science and applications
aspects of the program. This arrangement will make sure all phases of
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AAP are responsive to the needs of our total technology development and
science and applications program. In the applications area, including
the programs planned for AAP, we are devoting special attention to work-
ing relationships with other departments and agencies, including Commerce,
Interior, and Agriculture, who have important interests as current or
potential users of the new kinds of data that can be obtained from
instruments flown in space. At the field level, the work on the AAP
program will be handled primarily by the Manned Spacecraft Center at
Houston and the Marshall Space Flight Center at Huntsville.
For the Voyager program, we are establishing a new program manage-
ment office within the Office of Space Science and Applications at NASA
Headquarters. Mr. Oran W. Nicks will head this office and the program
will be carried out through three field organizations: the Jet
Propulsion Laboratory, which will be responsible for the surface labora-
tory and for tracking and data acquisition, the Marshall Space Flight
Center, which will be responsible for the Saturn V launch vehicle
and the spacecraft system; and the Langley Research Center, which will
be responsible for the landing capsule. The arrangements are designed
to make the best utilization of the'proven capabilities-of the Jet
Propulsion Laboratory and of our field centers and laboratories. A close
day-to-day relationship with the Saturn V program area in the Office
of Manned Space Flight will be maintained.
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On the new problems caused by the very large payloads required for
the scientific space projects we will be carrying out, we have been
considering with the National Academy of Sciences and other scientific
and university groups how we can best work with universities and the
many scientific researchers who must be involved. One of our first
steps is to establish a new Directorate of Science and Applications at
the Manned Spacecraft Center at Houston, which will be responsible for
the national program of experiments to be carried out by many university
scientists working in a number of laboratories in many states utilizing
the samples of lunar materials brought back by the astronauts. This new
office will also be responsible for the program through which we will
work with the many scientists all over the country who will want to
participate in the Apollo applications and other programs in the field
of surveying earth resources from space. We are endeavoring to work
out arrangements so that scientists from universities in various parts
of the country and some from abroad can supplement or augment the work
they do on their home campuses through periodic use of the facilities of
the Lunar Receiving Laboratory at the Manned Spacecraft Center.
Looking ahead to the likelihood that our experiments with the
Apollo Telescope Mount will lead to larger manned or manned-serviced
systems of astronomical viewing and measuring equipment in orbit, we are
considering with the Nation?s leading astronomers how best to organize
the long-term cooperative effort that will be necessary to derive the
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most benefit from such facilities and the data they can obtain.
In the field of international cooperation in space activity, we
have continued to make progress within the established pattern of our
joint activities with some 70 nations. In addition, we have initiated
efforts to extend the scope and character of that pattern to comprehend
the kind of larger projects and deeper involvement which will be necessary
if interested nations are to continue effective patterns of work with us
as we move into the new and more complex programs required to take the
next steps in space exploration.
For example, in 1966 we reached a new agreement with the French
National Space Commission for the launching of a satellite for balloon
tracking which can make a real contribution toward the concept of a
World Weather Watch. We also made new cooperative arrangements for
providing launching services to ESRO on a reimbursable basis for standby
tracking support for Japanese satellite launchings, and for testing
Argentine and Japanese meteorological sounding rockets at our Wallops
Station. The cooperative satellite projects we are carrying out with
the European Space Research Organization (ESRO), the United Kingdom,
the Federal Republic of Germany, and Italy continued toward their
launch dates in future years.
Our bilateral agreements with the Academy of Sciences of the
Soviet Union, negotiated in 1962 by Dr. Dryden, have finally produced
the first exchange of meteorological data from satellites over the
communications link between Washington and Moscow. This began in
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September and continued through most of October. We do not know when
the Soviets will be prepared to resume this exchange on an experimental
or operational basis. Some small progress was also made during the
year under our agreement for the preparation of a joint review of space
biology and medicine. Members of a Joint Editorial Board were selected
and a detailed outline of the contents of the work was agreed on.
In the calendar year 1967, four international satellites will be
launched. These include the Italian San Marco satellite, to be
launched from a platform in the Indian Ocean directly into the
equatorial plane, ESRO I, ESRO II, and UK III. Five individual
foreign experiments are scheduled for flight as parts of the payloads
in our own satellites during 1967. Thirteen new proposals for further
experiments of this type are under consideration, and we have given
tentative approval to 27 specific proposals received in response to
our invitation to scientists around the world to propose experiments
that would make the most out of our first lunar surface samples.
The task of extending the character and scope of international
cooperation in space is becoming one of opening new opportunities to
prospective partners. In the future many such opportunities will
involve cooperative work in the development and use of large payloads.
Whether such opportunities are in fact taken up by the other. countries
must be their decision. They will have to overcome many of the same
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kind of difficulties which will face us in finding ways and means to
get the greatest return from these large payloads.
As I reported last year, in December 1965 on the occasion of
Chancellor Erhard's visit to Washington, President Johnson made public
his strong interest in a major new opportunity for advanced cooperative
activity in space if the European nations were prepared to take it up.
The President invited European countries to pool their resources in
a major spacecraft project as an advanced technological undertaking
of significant scientific merit. Possible examples included both a
major solar probe and a Jupiter probe. We have explored this proposal
with the Germans and other nations, but the European nations have a
considerable distance to go in their decision-making processes before
they will be able to undertake the allocation of resources required to
develop and use the advanced technology which the kind of projects
President Johnson had in mind could yield.
It is important to recognize, however, that the President's
suggestion has been of great importance.. European participants in
space research have been stimulated to reassess their programs and
interests. It has served also to make clear the continued United
States' willingness to participate in major cooperative programs.
Perhaps most important of all, in view of European concern over
dropping behind us in advanced technology, it has made clear our
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readiness to work very closely with the nations of Europe in highly
advanced areas from which many benefits and. transfers will accrue to
them.
In the larger international sphere, following the President's
earlier initiative in the recent United Nations session, the United
States has completed the negotiation of a treaty on the peaceful uses
of outer space. As you know, the treaty is now before the Senate
for ratification.
In my view, the treaty places no obligations on the United States
which are inconsistent with our interests or which will pose special
problems for us in our efforts to explore space for peaceful purposes.
We are already more than meeting the treaty requirements for conducting
space programs and reporting on them. We, as well as all other
nations, will benefit from the treaty obligations to assist astronauts
in distress and return them to their home countries, and those relating
to responsibility for damage caused by space vehicles.
It is likely that one of the important factors that has led other
nations, including the USSR, to sign this treaty and accept the obliga-
tions it carries, has-been that our successes in space have made it
clear that space would not be permitted to fall under the dominion of
any single power and that space is a region of much interest and real
benefit to all. A prompt approval and execution of the programs
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recommended by the President in this 1968 Budget are one of the best
guarantees we can have that other nations will find it in their interest
to abide by this treaty. If we continue to pursue a strong and conti-
nuing national program on a scale and pace that will keep this country
at or near the forefront of space science and technology, the treaty
can be an important step in the direction that it is in our interest
and the interest of all mankind to go. What we continue to do in space
and what other nations see that we can do is the most effective means
we have to protect these interests.
We have no reason to believe that the Soviets have abandoned their
stated goals of preeminence in space or the strong views they have
expressed as to its importance in building Communist power. All avail-
able evidence continues to make it clear that the USSR has made a
major long-term commitment to large-scale operations in space, including
manned operations.
During 1966, the USSR carried out five unmanned lunar missions,
including the first soft landing on the moon, another soft landing
which tested the lunar surface, and the'first spacecraft in orbit
around the moon followed by two others. They launched two meteorological
satellites, and with their two new communications satellites, they are
in a position to provide world-wide communications. They announced
the launching of a total of 34 Cosmos satellites during the year.
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There were no Soviet manned flights in 1966, but a number of their
launchings were undoubtedly related to a continuing manned space flight
program. Two dogs were placed in a long eliptical orbit and were
recovered after 22 days. One Cosmos satellite tested spacecraft
maneuverability and another appears to have been an unmanned test of
a new space capsule for manned flight. The launching of Proton 3 with
a 27,000-pound payload shows that development work on large boosters
is continuing in a pattern that can lead to an early capability for the
use of large spacecraft for advanced manned missions. The fact that
there have been no manned Soviet flights since March of 1965 is what
might well be expected if the Soviets are, as I believe, in the process
of developing and introducing a new and larger manned spacecraft and
booster system for future missions.
In the fall of 1967, the Soviets will celebrate the 50th anniversary
of their Revolution as well as the 10th anniversary of their entry into
space with Sputnik 1. They may decide to make these important events
the occasion for a spectacular demonstration of national prowess in
many fields, and they have it well within their capability to include
in their total effort such a demonstration in space. Starting with
the first Sputniks in 1957, the Soviets have used their space program
as a principal vehicle for establishing a strong world-wide image of
national technological power, as well as for a rapid strengthening of
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their total educational, scientific and technological competence. Their
large investments, which have gone on for almost 20 years, and their
pronouncements show that they continue to regard their space effort as
a national endeavor of great importance to their future. There is no
reason for complacency on our part.
I should be very clear on the subject of risks. In moving ahead
to utilize the resources made available to us, we have had to take
technical risks in the development of our equipment and in establishing
our schedules. These have included risks that a particular design or
line of development would not succeed in meeting the specifications;
risks that schedules might not be met; and that we could not recover
from a serious setback because we did not have parallel or back-up
developments. But we have not knowingly accepted a higher level of
risks in order to meet our manned flight schedules. In our specifica-
tions, trade-off studies, test criteria, or mission plans, we have
taken no risks to the lives or safety of the astronauts that we could
find a way to avoid.
As this Committee knows, we have had a virtual moratorium on the
initiation of follow-on space projects for almost four years.. In
research and development for space systems there is a lead-time of many
years between the decision to start a project and the time that the
launchings occur. Unless decisions on the Voyager and Apollo Applications
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Program are made this year, we will find ourselves with a large gap in
our launch capability and our spacecraft development capability. The
dispersal of the know-how that we have built up in government, industry,
and universities that has already begun will accelerate.
It is my view that with the world situation what it is, and with
clear indications that the Soviets are going ahead with a large-scale
long-term program in space, it is important that the United States
let the world know that we can and will also go forward. Failure to
approve new programs this year will be a signal to the world that we
are not in space to stay.
In the case of Apollo Applications, we are faced in FY 1968 with
the decisions on whether we will continue production, beyond the Apollo
program, of the Uprated Saturn I, the Saturn V, and the Apollo space-
craft. Failure to proceed this year is equivalent to a decision to
stop production.
In the case of Voyager, the special need for starting this year
is to take maximum advantage of favorable opportunities for flights
to Mars in 1973 and 1975, and to avoid the technical risks and
increased costs of a schedule even tighter than the one we can
establish this year.
In the case of NERVA II, the special importance of starting this
year is that in doing so, we can take the best advantage of the gains
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from work on NERVA I, now being successfully completed, and that we
can have the development well under way by the early 1970's when we
will need a base of knowledge on which to make decisions on its use.
President Johnson has submitted a forward-looking, but austere
and limited aeronautical and space budget for FY 1968. We will do
our part, in the days to come, to establish a base of testimony that
will merit the kind of support this Committee has given the program
in the past.
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