THE CHANGING STRATEGIC MILITARY BALANCE U.S.A. VS. U.S.S.R.

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP69B00369R000100230119-9
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 95
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 8, 2004
• Sequence Number: 119
• Publication Date: July 1, 1967
• Content Type: REPORT

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FILE ?
THE CHANGING STRATEGIC MILITARY
BALANCE
U.S.A. vs. U.S.S.R.
Prepared at the Request of the
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
NINETIETH CONGRESS
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
80-7850 WASHINGTON : 1967
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HOUSE COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
FIRST SESSION, NINETIETH CONGRESS
L. MENDEL RIVERS, South Carolina, Chairman
PHILIP J. PHILBIN, Massachusetts
F. EDWARD HkBERT, Louisiana
MELVIN PRICE, Illinois
O. C. FISHER, Texas
PORTER HARDY JR., Virginia
CHARLES E. BENNETT, Florida
JAMES A. BYRNE, Pennsylvania
SAMUEL S. STRATTON, New York
OTIS G. PIKE, New York
RICHARD H. ICHORD, Missouri
LUCIEN N. NEDZI, Michigan
ALTON LENNON, North Carolina
WILLIAM J. RANDALL, Missouri
G. ELLIOTT HAGAN, Georgia
CHARLES II. WILSON, California
ROBERT L. LEGGETT, California
DONALD J. IRWIN, Connecticut
FRANK E. EVANS, Colorado
FLOYD V. HICKS, Washington
IIERVEY G. MACHEN, Maryland
SPEEDY O. LONG, Louisiana
E. S. JOHNNY WALKER, New Mexico
SANTIAGO POLANCO-ABREU, Puerto Rico
Resident Commissioner
WILLIAM if. BATES, Massachusetts
LESLIE C. ARENDS, Illinois
ALVIN E. O'KONSKI, Wisconsin
WILLIAM G. BRAY, Indiana
BOB WILSON, California
CHARLES S. GUBSER, California
CHARLES E. CHAMBERLAIN, Michigan
ALEXANDER PIRNIE, New York
DURWOOD G. HALL, Missouri
DONALD D. CLANCY, Ohio
ROBERT T. STAFFORD, Vermont
RICHARD S. SCHWEIKER, Pennsylvania
CHARLES A. HALLECK, Indiana
CARLETON J. KING, New York
WILLIAM L. DICKINSON, Alabama
CHARLES W. WHALEN, JR., Ohio
JAMES V. SMITH, Oklahoma
Joux It. BLANDFORD, Chief Counsel
PHILIP W. KELLEHER, Counsel
FRANK M. SLATINSHEE, Counsel
EARL J. MORGAN, Professional Staff Member
WILLIAM H. COOK, Counsel
RALPH MARSHALL, Professional Staff Member
JOHN J. FORD, Professional Staff Member
GEORGE NORRIS, Counsel
ONETA L. STOCESTILL, Executive Secretary
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MEMBERS, HOUSE COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
To THE MEMBERS : The problem of whether the United States has
sufficient nuclear weapons to meet the Soviet threats underlies our
entire defense posture.
In order to better understand the situation I requested the Amer-
ican Security Council to examine the situation on the basis of un-
classified statements in the open literature. The report "The Changing
Strategic Military Balance" is the result of that study. This report
is being presented as a Committee Print in order to be available for
all so that they may see what is involved in our present situation.
I must express my appreciation for the work involved in preparing
this study to John Fisher, President of the American Security Council,
and to General Bernard A. Schriever, USAF (Ret.), who chaired the
special subcommittee responsible for this particular study. I would
hike also to express my appreciation to the Aerospace Technology
Division of the Legislative Reference Service in the Library of Con-
gress for its part in the research on which the report is based.
While the Committee on Armed Services does not take any position
as to the accuracy of the statements contained in the report and can
neither affirm nor deny the whole or any portion, I believe, nevertheless,
that the report deserves careful analysis. The views expressed in this
study do not necessarily represent the views, however, of myself, this
Committee, individual members, .or the staff.
L. MENDEL RIVERS,
Chairman.
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I. Soviet Union versus United States Strategic Objectives:
Trends in the Strategic Military Balance . . . . . . 9
II. The Strategic Military Balance . . . . . . . . . 45
A. Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBM) . . . 46
B. Intermediate/Medium Range Ballistic Missiles
(IRBM/MRBM) . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
C. Anti-Ballistic Missiles (ABM) . . . . . . . . 60
D. Submarine-Launched Missiles (SLM) . . . . . 71
Anti-Submarine Warfare Forces (ASW) . . . . . 74
E. Strategic Bombers . . . . . . . . . . . . 79
F. Space Weapons . . . . . . . . . . . . . 86
Annex: Chronology of Weapons-Grade Requirements for
Nuclear Materials . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 92
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Paige
Soviet Space Firsts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
Strategic Balance Trend . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
ICBM Balance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 6
IRBM/MRBM Balance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
ABM Balance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58
SLM Balance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69
Strategic Bomber Balance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77
Space Weapons Balance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84
Nuclear Material Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . 91
Page
Strategic Balance Trend . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
ICBM . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
IR/MRBM . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
ABM . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
SLM . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70
Strategic Bombers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 78
Space Weapons . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85
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FOREWORD
This study has been prepared for the House Armed. Services Com-
mittee at the request of Committee Chairman L. Mendel Rivers. He
asked that we prepare an assessment of the strategic military balance
between the U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R. based on unclassified sources only.
To insure availability of the full range of public source material,
Chairman Rivers asked the Library of Congress to assist in this study.
This assistance was provided by the Aerospace Technology Division of
the Library of Congress. We gratefully acknowledge this help which in-
cluded reviewing a great volume of material for pertinent references,
compiling the results of this review, and providing office space and other
facilities for American Security Council staff personnel.
It is fully realized that in using unclassified sources of information
only, much of the data used could be inaccurate. However, the same can
be said for the most carefully gathered secret intelligence. Opportuni-
ties for factual verification of intelligence information concerning the
U.S.S.R. do not come very often. Informational "raw material" must be
evaluated and interpreted before it becomes functionally meaningful.
The element of human judgment is predominant in these processes and
a wide range of fallibility inevitably results.
Some of the figures used so freely in classified quantifications fail
to receive a unanimous vote by the principal intelligence officers in-
volved, but a decision must be made and so the majority prevails. One
must ever keep in mind that a belief by a majority that something is so
does not make it a fact, and factual verification is often difficult, if not
impossible.
Thus the Soviet installation of missiles in Cuba came as a complete
surprise to official Washington despite the massive preparations which
had extended over several months. Similarly, there are current differ-
ences within the Department of Defense as to whether the primary
purpose of the great Soviet TALLINN defense system is to defend
against bombers or against missiles.
This study is based on analysis and evaluation of hundreds of un-
classified sources published from January 1960 through April 1967.
The types of sources used ranged from military, nuclear-strategic, and
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and technical journals and magazines, and publications of general and
popular circulation, news magazines and newspapers.
Some of the more productive sources for strategic balance specifics
included testimony before Congressional Committees by Secretary of
Defense McNamara and other Department of Defense officials, The
Military Balance by London's Institute for Strategic Studies, Jane's
All The World's Aircraft, Jane's Fighting Ships, Technology Week, Air
Force Magazine/Space Digest, Aviation Week and Space Technology.
Certain of the articles reviewed were "landmarks" or "break-
throughs" in their contribution to the unclassified literature bearing
upon the strategic military balance. The following six articles are in
that category:
"Is Russia Winning the Arms Race?" U.S. News & World Re-
port, February 6, 1967.
"The Russians Mean to Win the Space Race," by William Shel-
ton, Fortune, February 1966.
"Countdown For Nike-X," by George A. W. Boehm, Fortune,
November 1965.
"Slow-Down in the Pentagon," by Hanson W. Baldwin, Foreign
Affairs, January 1965.
"The Atomic Arsenal," (Cover Story) -Time, August 23, 1963
(Reprinted in Readers Digest, November 23, 1963, p. 67 under
title "Our Awesome Atomic Arsenal").
"Now the President Must Decide on His Own," by Charles
J. V. Murphy, Life, February 16, 1962.
We believe that sources such as those noted are responsible although
it should be understood that their resources do not compare with those
available to the United States intelligence community. We do believe
that the "ball park" figures from these unclassified sources are adequate
to support thoughtful evaluation, and that they will indicate trends and
strategic postures which could not otherwise be revealed.
In reporting specifics which have come from a variety of sources,
we have listed the source or sources most readily available to the gen-
eral public.
For purposes of this study, strategic weapon systems are considered
to be forces designed to carry out long-range strategic missions and to
carry the main burden of battle in a general nuclear war.
In this study we have used the same ground rules throughout for
comparison of weapon systems. We have compared like kinds of wea-
pons, i.e., ICBMs with ICBMs, IRBMs/MRBMs with their like, stra-
tegic bombers with strategic bombers, and submarine-launched missiles
with submarine-launched missiles. Not only are numbers compared, but
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information may readily make the necessary data substitutions should
this be desired.
In assessing the strategic military balance we have considered both
the number and yield of each strategic weapon system. Each of these is
an important measure, but we fully agree with Secretary McNamara
when he says, ". . . We should bear in mind that it is not the number
of missiles which is important, but rather the character of the payloads
they carry; the missile is simply the delivery vehicle."1 For this reason,
we use the payload as the best single measure of the strategic military
balance. After all, weapons-yield as expressed in megatonnage is the
measure of firepower in the nuclear age.
In this connection, it should be noted that in our classification of
strategic weapon systems we have paralleled the scholarly Institute for
Strategic Studies classification system. There are material differences
between this approach and that used currently by the Office of the
Secretary of Defense (OSD).
For example, in his January 23, 1967 Posture Statement, Secretary
McNamara did not consider the 900-odd Soviet BADGERs in the stra-
tegic balance. Yet, the BADGERs have intercontinental range with in-
flight refueling and are so classified by the Russians. The BADGER is
comparable to the phased-out B-47, which was previously included in
the strategic forces by the Office of the Secretary of Defense. Their
range is as long as the FB-111 which the OSD plans to use as a "stra-
tegic bomber."
Secretary McNamara does not consider the 750 intermediate-range
ballistic missiles based in western Russia as a part of the strategic
force even though they could eliminate the major defenses and cities
of our NATO allies. These IRBMs are supposed to be countered by the
United States submarine-launched IRBMs (POLARIS), but when com-
paring opposing forces, the OSD groups the POLARIS missiles with
ICBMs.
Both the BADGERs and the IRBMs in Western Russia are classi-
fied as "strategic" by the Institute for Strategic Studies. We concur with
this judgment.
It would be short-sighted, however, not to take into account the in-
tentions of the Soviet leaders, for certainly it takes more than weapons
to start a war. But history has revealed that the criterion of "intentions"
1. Posture Statement of Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara before a Joint
Session of the Senate Armed Services Committee and the Senate Subcommittee
on Department of Defense Appropriations on the 1968-72 Defense Program and
1968 Defense Budget, January 23, 1967, p. 41. (Hereafter referred to as Posture
Statement; January 23, 1967.)
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fences, for one might be deceived by intentions but never by capabilities
provided his intelligence of the enemy is accurate.
If one is to examine an opponent's intentions, it is likewise important
that he examine his own. The intentions of one side certainly influence
the intentions of the other, not to mention the strategic stance each
side takes with its weaponry. This criterion of intentions, or strategic
objectives, has seemed to weigh heavily in the design of America's
strategic military posture. For this reason, the strategic objectives of
both sides are examined in the following section.
It should be emphasized that the purpose of this study is limited
to a factual assessment and interpretation of the strategic military bal-
ance without arguing for, or against, the overall policies which have
brought each side to its present strategic military posture.
signed/ General .3ernard A. Schriever, USAF (Ret.),
Chairman
General Paul D. Adams, USA (Ret.)
Lt. General Edward M. Almond, USA (Ret.)
Prof. James D. Atkinson
Admiral Robert L. Dennison, USN (Ret.)
Vice Admiral Elton Watters Grenfell,
USN (Ret.)
General Curtis E. Le May, USAF (Ret.)
Admiral Ben Moreell, CEC, USN (Ret.)
Prof. Stefan T. Possony
General Thomas S. Power, USAF (Ret.)
Vice Admiral W. A. Schoech, USN (Ret.)
Major General Dale 0. Smith, USAF (Ret.)
Admiral Felix B. Stump, USN (Ret.)
Dr. Edward Teller
Rear Admiral Chester C. Ward, USN (Ret.)
General Albert C. Wedemeyer, USA. (Ret.)
Major General W. A. Worton, USMC (Ret.)
as special subcommittee of the
National Strategy Committee of the
American Security Council.
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1. SOVIET UNION VERSUS
UNITED STATES
STRATEGIC OBJECTIVES
Trends in the Strategic Military Balance
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STRATEGIC OBJECTIVES
Trends in the Strategic Military Balance
The basic frame of reference for comparing the strategic strength of
the Soviet Union and the United States is an examination of their
national objectives, both military and political. It is not our task here
to explore Soviet political objectives in extenso, although it must be kept
in mind that these cannot be separated from the U.S.S.R.'s military
goals. For a half-century, Soviet leaders have time and again repeated
that Communism's ultimate objective is world domination. But many
in the Free World simply refuse to believe that the Soviet leaders mean
what they say.
In the realm of strategic military weapons, the United States has,,
in recent years, demonstrated much the same inclination to disbelieve `,.
or to discount Soviet achievements and advances. This is particularly
so with respect to the new ballistic missile defenses of the Soviet Union
and to Soviet boasts of an orbital bomb capability.
Yet, the available evidence indicates that the Soviet Union has a
goal of strategic superiority designed to win a nuclear war rather than
merely deter one. Once in a war-winning posture, the U.S.S.R. would
be ideally situated to practice nuclear blackmail and would not even
have to fight a nuclear war. Some strategic analysts assert that this is
the ultimate goal of the Soviet Union, and that it depends upon a de-
fense against nuclear retaliation.
The United States has exchanged its goal of a war-winning stra-
tegic superiority for a strategy of mutual deterrence. The United States
strategy of mutual deterrence is said to increase "stability" and reduce
international tensions. Hence, American officials are striving to convince
Soviet leaders that a race to build anti-ballistic missile (ABM) systems
would be pointless.
Not only has the Soviet Union already deployed an ABM system,
but much evidence indicates that it is driving hard toward a goal of
overwhelming superiority in the decisive field of nuclear weaponry.
Contrast Between U. S. and Soviet Political Objectives
The thoughtful words of President John F. Kennedy clearly illustrate
the contrast between U. S. and Soviet political objectives.
Regarding U. S. objectives, President Kennedy said:
"Yet our basic goal remains the same: a peaceful world com-
munity of free and independent states-free to choose their own
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freedom of others."2
Regarding Soviet objectives, President Kennedy said:
"Where we feel the difficulty comes is the effort by the Soviet
Union to communize, in a sense, the entire world. If the Soviet
Union were merely seeking to protect its own national interest,
to protect its own national security and would permit other
countries to live as they wish-to live in peace, then I believe
the problems which now cause us much tension would fade
away."3
In the speech prepared by President Kennedy and intended for de-
livery in Dallas, Texas on November 22, 1963, were these prophetic
words :
,,Our adversaries have not abandoned their ambitions, our dan-
gers have not diminished, our vigil cannot be relaxed."4
In the year 1967, the Soviet Communists are celebrating the 50th
anniversary of the Bolshevik Revolution in Russia. During all of that
time, Soviet leaders, both political and military, have continuously re-
peated declarations that Communism's ultimate objective is world
domination.
Our own experience and current research fully confirms that the
Communist objective is still that of world conquest. We affirm the cur-
rent validity of the following statements by J. Edgar Hoover and
Robert S. McNamara:
"Since the time of Lenin, atheistic communism has surged forth
from Russia to enslave nearly one-fourth of the earth's surface
and a third of her peoples. Nowhere are its advance battalions
more active than in our own Western Hemisphere, where agents
trained by the Kremlin continue to burrow deeply into countries
of the Caribbean and Central and South America. Their deadly
objective is to undermine legitimate governments, foment revo-
lution and create a Soviet Union of Latin American Republics.
"I have said this before and I would like to repeat it here: We
are at war with communism and the sooner every red-blooded
American realizes this the safer we will be."5
2. State of the Union Message, January 11, 1962.
3. The New York Times (Interview with editor of Izuestiya) November 29, 1961,
pp. 1, 18, 19.
4. Public Papers of the Presidents, John F. Kennedy 1963, U. S. Government Print-
ing Office, p. 894.
5. J. Edgar Hoover, Address to Brotherhood of the Washington Hebrew Congrega-
tion, December 4, 1963.
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o no ieve a we can reasons y assume ese
manifestations of a change in policy reflect a change in the
ultimate objective of the Soviet leadership, which is to extend
the sway of Communism over the rest of the world. Their dis-
pute with the leadership of Communist China is not over the
ultimate objective but how it is to be achieved and who is to
control the world-wide Communist movement. Expansionism is
so deeply engrained in Communist doctrine that it would be
naive for us to expect any Communist leadership to repudiate
it."6
In January 1967, General Earle G. Wheeler, Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff, was asked in a series of questions if, in his opinion, the
Soviets have abandoned their goal of world domination and were mel-
lowing. He expressed his belief that they had not abandoned their goal
of world domination. On the question of mellowing, he said:
"I don't believe they are mellowing at all. I believe they have
adopted new tactics and are seeking new routes to the same
objective."7
As Leonid I. Brezhnev, first Secretary of the Communist Party of
the Soviet Union, said in his March 29, 1966 report to the 23rd Con-
gress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union:
"Ever harder times lie ahead for capitalism. The fact that it is
doomed is becoming increasingly clear. But the capitalists will
never surrender their rule voluntarily. The working class and
the laboring masses will achieve victory only in the course of
stubborn class battles.... At our Congress today we once more
repeat the appeal: close ranks more solidly for the struggle
against the common enemy! "8
Soviet Strategic Objectives
From our analysis, it is clear that the overall Soviet military ob-
jective is to achieve absolute strategic superiority.
The main thrust of the authoritative book, Military Strategy, edited
by Marshal Sokolovsky, was toward achieving superiority. In a dis-
cussion of strategic missile forces, attainment of qualitative and quan-
titative superiority was set as one of the "most important problems in
6. Robert S. McNamara, Secretary of Defense, Statement before Joint Session of
Senate Armed Services Committee and the Senate Subcommittee on Department
of Defense Appropriations, January 1964, p. 4.
7. Hearings on S. 666 before Joint Session of the Senate Armed Services Committee
and the Senate DOD Subcommittee on Appropriations, January 25, 26, 27, 30,
31, February 1 and 2, 1967, p. 407.
8. Pravda, March 30, 1966, pp. 2-9.
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establishing superiority over the enemy in modem weaponry was the
material prerequisite for victory.9
Recently-deceased Soviet Defense Minister Marshal Malinovsky
made a clear-cut statement concerning strategic superiority. In a pam-
phlet published in late 1962 by the Soviet Ministry of Defense he wrote:
"The most characteristic feature of the present stage of development
in Soviet military doctrine is the fact that it rests on the superiority
of the Armed Forces of the U.S.S.R. over the armies of the most power-
ful countries of capitalism, both in military-technical resources, and
from the morale and battle standpoint. This superiority and the just
goals of our Armed Forces give us a firm confidence that in a future
war ... the victory will be won by us."10
Malinovsky's pronouncement takes on added significance in the light
of a 1966 statement in the authoritative Soviet journal, Communist of
the Armed Forces, that "military-technical superiority along with moral-
political superiority is one of the most important factors in our time
for the reliable defense of the country ... (T)he significance of military
factors themselves, in particular military-technical superiority over the
enemy, has grown in contemporary circumstances as never before." The
article goes on to stress that achieving military-technological superiority
is a constant process and that "the stern dialectics of development are
that the struggle for superiority must be waged continually ..."11
How do the Soviet leaders define superiority? Communist of the
Armed Forces is quite clear: ". . . Military-technical superiority is such
a correlation of quantity of military equipment and weapons, of the
degree of troop training in using them and also of the effectiveness of
the organizational structure of the army, that the given side has the
advantage before a real or potential enemy and can defeat him ..."1"
This same 1966 article noted that Soviet superiority is derived from
mobile Soviet intercontinental ballistic missiles and from Soviet ad-
vances in space technology. Soviet science, it continued, has created
weapons new in principle "secretly nurtured in scientific, research bu-
reaus and construction collectives."
Additional evidence of the Soviet drive to attain strategic superiority
is supplied by a January 1967 statement of the late Defense Minister
9. Military Strategy, V. D. Sokolovsky (ed.) Moscow, Voyenizd-vo, 1963, (In
Russian) p. 237.
10. Vigilantly Stand Guard Over the Peace, U.S.S.R., Ministry of Defense, 1962.
11. "Military-Technical Superiority is the Most Important Factor in a Reliable
Defense of the Country," V. Bondarenko, Kommunist Vooruzhennykh sil, No.
_ 17, September 1966 (In Russian).
12. Ibid. (Emphasis added.)
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Missiles (ICBM) emplacements and at a burgeoning Anti-Ballistic Mis-
sile (ABM) program.13
What would they do with strategic superiority? Here's the basic
doctrine :
"The essence of Soviet military doctrine is this: if a future war
is unleashed by the imperialists, then it will be the decisive
collision between the two opposing social orders, and nuclear
rocket weapons will inevitably be used. All this pre-supposes
an extremely violent and dynamic character of the conflict, high
maneuverability of combat operations, the absence of continuous
fronts and well-marked boundaries between front and rear, the
appearance of possibilities for striking sudden blows of great
force, both against the troops and the homelands of the warring
nations. In connection with this, very great attention is devoted
to the initial period of the war."14
In other words, if general war comes, the Soviets will try for a knock-
out nuclear first strike in the initial period of the war.
Official Communist policy statements, however, emphasize their in-
tention of winning world domination without a general nuclear war.
This was expressively stated by Nikita Khrushchev in a speech in July
1963 as follows:
"Today the imperialists pretend to be brave--but only in words;
in reality they tremble before the socialist world which is grow-
ing and gaining in strength. And let them tremble! So much the
better for us!
"A fight is in progress between these two systems, a life and
death combat. But we communists want to win this struggle with
the least losses, and there is no doubt whatsoever that we shall
win. This is why we are striving for victory, for the triumph of
communism, without unleashing a world thermonuclear war."15
Official statements of Soviet policy since that time differ only in their
choice of language.
However; we can draw little comfort from such statements because,
as shown hereinafter, the principal Soviet military thrust has been to
develop a massive and superior capability for nuclear war.
13. Washington Post, January 18, 1967.
14. "Increased Organizational and Directive Influences of the Party in the Armed
Forces," L. P. Prusanov, Problems of the History of the CPSU, Moscow,
February 1965.
15. Soviet News, July 22, 1963, pp. 51, 52 and 53.
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The latest and most authoritative unclassified statements of United
States objectives are to be found in the 1967 Senate testimony of Secre-
tary of Defense Robert S. McNamara and his principal assistants.16
The testimony of all the principal witnesses relating to U. S. grand
strategy in these Senate Hearings is the most definitive in the last six
years. Much of it borders on the sensational, and the divergence of the
views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and of the Secretary of Defense is
stated and explained far more frankly and specifically than in previous
official testimony. The focus of much of the most significant testimony
is on the strategic effects of the Soviet deployment of anti missile de-
fense systems, whether and when the U. S. should deploy such a sys-
tem, and the level of total U. S. strategic power required to maintain
sufficient security on the U. S. side of the strategic balance.
The Secretary of Defense left no doubt that the military strategy
of the United States is based on the concept of deterrence through a
second strike in retaliation against a Soviet first strike. Thus he ex-
plained that:
"Our general nuclear war forces should have two basic capa-
bilities:
1. To deter deliberate nuclear attack upon the United States
and its allies by maintaining, continuously, a highly reliable
ability to inflict an unacceptable degree of damage upon any
single aggressor, or combination of aggressors, at any time dur-
ing the course of a strategic nuclear exchange, even after ab-
sorbing a surprise first strike.
2. In the event such a war nevertheless occurred, to limit dam-
age to our population and industrial capacity.
The first capability we call `Assured Destruction' and the sec-
ond `Damage Limitation.' "17
In determining what this policy contemplates in relation to the
strategic military balance, it is helpful to examine Mr. McNamara's
testimony on the anti-ballistic missile. The principal reason given for
16. Hearings before the Senate Committee on Armed Services and the Subcommit-
tee on Department of Defense Appropriations, on S.666, Military Authoriza-
tions, Defense Appropriations, 1968, January 25-February 2, 1967. Included
in the printed Hearings at the front of the report is Secretary McNamara's
prepared statement on Military Posture and the 1968-72 Defense Program,
which was released to the public on January 23, 1967. Both the prepared state-
ment and the actual testimony of the witness have been subject to deletions
stated to be for purposes of national security.
17. Ibid, p. 44.
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e o en a a t
consion a we s ou rio im is an
W lus
time" is that "the Soviet Union would be forced to react to a U. S. ABM
deployment by increasing its offensive nuclear force still further ..."
In explaining why he did not actually plan to deploy a damage limit-
ing system, he said, "If the general nuclear policy of the Soviet Union
also has as its objective the deterrence of a U. S. first strike (which I
believe to be the case), then we must assume that any attempt on our
part to reduce damage to ourselves (to what they would estimate we
might consider an `acceptable level') would put pressure on them to
strive for an offsetting improvement in their deterrent (offensive}
forces." (Emphasis added.)
This is consistent with McNamara's February 1963 testimony
that we were about to enter a new era in strategic balance between the
United States and the Soviet Union, which he called an era of "mutual
deterrence." At that time, McNamara said, "More armaments, whether
offensive or defensive cannot solve the nuclear war dilemma. We're
approaching an era when it will become increasingly improbable
that either side could destroy a sufficiently large portion of the other's
strategic nuclear force, either by surprise or otherwise, to preclude a
devastating retaliatory load. This may result in future betterment ...
1967 was the year mentioned by McNamara as the most likely be-
ginning of the new era.
Under questioning by Senator Margaret Chase Smith of Maine, fol-
lowing the above testimony, McNamara denied that his anticipa-
tion of "mutual deterrence" could properly be equated with nuclear
"parity" or "stalemate," and said he had repeatedly stated that it is his
intention to "maintain nuclear superiority in terms of numbers of war-
heads versus the Communist bloc."
1967 testimony of Secretary of the Air Force Harold Brown, how-
ever, indicates that the United States policy may be to accept "parity":
"Militarily the Soviets have a very formidable missiles force.
They are building missiles very fast.... You see, we have
leveled out our missile forces. We announced how big our mis-
sile force was going to be. Our plans are that 5 years from now
we will have just as many missiles as we have right now. They
have known that. They have known that for a couple of years,
and they keep on building.
"Now we can afford to let them build for a while, if they feel
they want to `catch up.' But there is evidence that if we stop,
they don't necessarily stop. They haven't stopped. I think that
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out over responding."19
In the final analysis, the best way to determine actual differences
between the U. S. and the U.S.S.R. strategic military objectives is to
compare their performances. For this purpose we will examine herein-
after such key areas as development of space weapons, production of
nuclear materials, strategic military budgets, attitude toward research
and development and the changing strategic military balance.
Development of Space Weapons
The United States policy on space weapons was first announced in
1961 by the then Deputy Secretary of Defense, Roswell L. Gilpatric:
"An arms race in space will not contribute to our security. I
can think of no greater stimulus for Soviet thermonuclear arms
effort in space than a U.S. commitment to such an effort. This
we will not do."
This policy was confirmed in October 1963, when the United States
announced its adherence to the United Nations General Assembly reso-
lution banning the "Placing in orbit around the earth any objects
carrying nuclear weapons or any other kinds of weapons of mass de-
struction, installing such weapons on celestial bodies, or stationing such
weapons in outer space in any other manner."20
This resolution, however, contains no provision for inspection and
no penalties for violation.
Although the Soviet Union has announced its compliance with the
U. N. resolution, its official publication, Izvestiya, noted that while the
U. N. had banned the orbiting of rockets that constitute weapons of
mass extermination, it by no means banned "the manufacture of such
missiles."
On July 4, 1965, Communist Party Chief Leonid Brezhnev declared
that the Soviet's possess "orbital rockets."21
Brezhnev's claim was supported by the display of a three-stage mis-
sile in the Bolshevik Revolution Day parade on November 7, 1965. On
November 8, 1965, both TASS and Izvestiya described it as an orbital
missile. This weapon has since been code named SCRAG.
Subsequently, the Department of State announced that it had
asked Moscow whether, in the light of the Soviet display of an orbital
19. Senate Hearings, January 25, 26, 27, 30, 31 and February 1 and 2, 1967, p. 876.
20. Report of the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate on Execu-
tive M, 88th Congress, 1st Session (Exec. Report No. 3) Government Printing
Office, 1963.
21. Izvestiya, July 4, 1965, p. 2.
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roc et in t e evo u ion ay parade, the remhn still planned to abide
by its pledges not to put such weapons into orbit.22 The Soviet answer
was that the agreement did not bar development of such weapons.
While waiting for an official answer from the Kremlin, the Depart-
ment saw fit to keep our country on record (as reported by UPI) :
"The State Department reiterated the U. S. position that al-
though either the United States or Russia could put such a
weapon into orbit, there would be no military sense in doing so."
The Soviet attitude should have been no surprise to anyone. After
an examination of the long history of broken Soviet treaties and agree-
ments, a Senate Internal Security Subcommittee report concluded that:
"It keeps no international agreements at all unless doing so is
clearly advantageous to the Soviet Union."23
On March 12, 1964, at hearings before the House Appropriations
Subcommittee, Dr. Harold Brown, then Director of Defense Research
and Engineering, now Secretary of the Air Force, was asked how much
money was being spent on studies of orbital bombardment vehicles.
This is his official answer:
"My recollection is that we have no more than three or four
people working in one of the contract organizations studying
this question. We are not doing any hardware work. So that I
would be surprised if more than a couple of hundred thousand
dollars in fiscal 1964 is being spent on this, and certainly no
more than that is planned for 1965.
"There are two reasons: First, it is not a very good idea....
Second, there is now a U. N. resolution which we subscribe to
and the Soviets have subscribed to, not to put bombs in orbit.
This does not prevent people from doing the development on it,
but apparently neither the Russians nor we believe it is a very
important strategic weapon. . . ." (Emphasis added.)
Late in 1966, President Johnson announced that the United States,
the Soviet Union and more than 100 nations on the United Nations
Political Committee had agreed upon the language of a formal treaty
outlawing nuclear weapons in space. It has now been passed by the U. S.
Senate. Again, no provision for inspection was included in the treaty.
The only known effective ways to assure the world that none of the
nuclear-rocket powers are orbiting nuclear weapons are to inspect space
rockets before launch, or to rendezvous with the orbiting rockets and
22. United Press International dispatch dated Washington, November 19, 1965.
23. Soviet Political Agreements and Results, Internal Security Subcommittee, Sen-
ate Committee on the Judiciary, Third Revision, Volume I, U. S. Government
Printing Office, 1964, Foreword, p. VIII.
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as one AEC authority put it).
General Earle G. Wheeler's statement on the Treaty on Outer Space
includes the following comment on verification:
"The Joint Chiefs of Staff remain concerned about the assured
verification capability with regard to `weapons in orbit.' The
deployment of prohibited orbital vehicles could have serious
implications, especially if it enabled an enemy to achieve effec-
tive surprise attack against our command and control facilities
and military forces. Weapons in orbit could become a matter
of grave consequence, particularly when utilized in conjunction
with other strategic systems. The focus of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff concern is upon the capability which the United States
would have to define and respond to such a threat....
"This threat can be answered only through intensified U. S.
efforts to develop capabilities to detect and verify the orbiting
of nuclear weapons or those threatening mass destruction. We
must develop the capability of dealing with that threat should
it materialize, with or without a treaty."24
Production of Nuclear Materials
Another area to examine the implementation of the respective poli-
cies may be found in the requirements and the production of weapons-
grade nuclear materials.
President Johnson announced in January 1964, the partial shut-
down of American plants producing weapons-grade nuclear materials.
On January 24, 1967, it was reported that the fifth such plant was
deactivated.25 The Soviet Union has made no comparable moves in this
direction. The Atomic Energy Commission reported in November 1965,
that there is "no evidence" that the Soviet Union had carried out nu-
clear materials cutbacks announced on April 26, 1964. Actually, accord-
ing to Hanson W. Baldwin, military editor of The New York Times, the
Soviet Union had doubled its production of weapons-grade nuclear ma-
terials during 1965.26
Without access to classified material it is difficult to deal in quan-
titative terms with the comparative positions of the Soviet Union and
the United States in the matter of nuclear stockpiles and production
capacities. A generalized way of indicating Soviet interests in maximum
24. Hearings before the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate on
the Treaty on Outer Space, March 7, 13 and April 12, 1967, p. 84.
25. The New York Times, January 25, 1967, p. 9 (See Annex "Chronology of Wea-
pons-Grade Nuclear Material Cutbacks.")
26. The New York Times, July 14, 1966, p. 14.
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pro uction o nuc ear a is examine the expansion o ovie gross
requirements of fuel by function, and compare this in some crude way
with United States requirements.
By 1960, the Soviet Union had expanded its list of uses for nuclear
materials to include bombs, civilian uses, surface ships, submarines and
missiles. Up to then, the gross requirements of both countries, by func-
tion, grew in parallel, with the United States slightly ahead because of
its presumed lead in overall nuclear development.
Beginning in 1961, the United States' testing program was notably
less active than the Soviet Union's. The Soviet Union broke the un-
declared moratorium in September 1961, with a massive series which
was impressive in many ways, one of them in the amount of weapons-
grade nuclear material expended.
It was in this test series which extended from September 1961 into
early 1962 that the Soviet Union was rumored to display an unusual
interest in the anti-ballistic missile. That interest was sustained over
the years and Secretary of Defense McNamara announced in December
1966, that the Soviet Union was deploying an operational ABM system.
Hanson W. Baldwin has reported that the Soviet nuclear tests were
conducted in 1961 in such a way as to destroy two incoming missiles.27
U. S. News and World Report reported a Soviet breakthrough in anti-
ballistic missile defense that "produces the so-called `X-ray effect' in
intense proportions."28 This effect is said to neutralize ICBM guidance
equipment and fissionable material at great distance from the actual
ABM explosion. Soviet ABM tests in 1961 and 1962 provided the knowl-
edge which has permitted the U.S.S.R. to rush ahead with its ABM
development and outstrip the United States. The atmospheric nuclear
test ban has denied the United States the opportunity of ever catching
up.
Anti-ballistic missiles, in order to be effective against many attack-
ing ICBMs, must be widely deployed. The U.S.S.R.'s TALLINN system
covers a vast area.29 Although remarkable advances in anti-ballistic mis-
sile accuracy are claimed, it must still be assumed that, as in the air
defense weapon systems, many defending weapons must be launched
againsteach incoming warhead in order to achieve a high probability of
destruction. In this respect, it would seem that the ABM's task will be
similar to that of conventional anti-aircraft, setting up a radioactive
27. The New York Times, February 5, 1967, p. 1.
28. U. S. News and World Report, February 6, 1967, p. 36.
29. The New York Times, February 5, 1967, p. 1.
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an ABM system will require a prodigious amount of fissionable material.
It can be assumed, therefore, that the Soviet Union has foreseen, at
least since 1961, this tremendous requirement for weapons-grade nuclear
material to counter American ICBMs. In this connection it would also
appear that the United States had rejected the idea of producing an
extensive ABM system as long ago as January 1964, when President
Johnson announced cut-backs in manufacture of fissionable materials.
(See Annex.)
Strategic Military Budgets
The increases of the U.S.S.R.'s military budget for 1967 to 14.5-
billion rubles, up 1.1-billion rubles or 8.2 percent over the 1966 figure,
is another reflection of the Soviet drive for military superiority when
it is analyzed. In 1964 and 1965, when the Soviet Union announced
budget cuts, actual spending continued to rise. Much other defense
spending is filed under such headings as "science" and "financing the
national economy." From such evidence it is estimated that Soviet
military spending in 1967 may approach 20-billion rubles, or 30 per-
cent above the announced figure.
Also,
". . . While the Russians have a much larger standing army,
the United States spends a lot more to pay, clothe and equip
each of its soldiers. And Soviet tanks, a basic item of ground
equipment, are hard to price accurately since they are made
with heavily-subsidized coal and steel.
"Because of this `warped' pricing structure, it would be useless
to multiply the Soviet defense budget by the $1.10 official ex-
change rate and use the resultant dollar figure to compare with
America's defense effort, it is said.
"Officials estimate that if the Russians had to enter the Amer-
ican market place to buy the military goods and services that
go into their defense establishment, they would have to pay
from $50-billion to $60-billion a year."30
According to U. S. News and World Report, "Russia ... is found to
be investing almost 70 percent of the budget in strategic offensive and
defensive systems."31
Other experts on the Soviet budget estimate that "substantial" por-
tions of the Soviet defense effort will be devoted to three principal
30. The New York Times, William Beecher, December 25, 1966, p. 27.
31. U. S. News and World Report, February 6, 1967, p. 34.
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~a~n l ~si 9
defense forces, on a coequal basis.32
Using Mr. Beecher's estimates, the Soviet strategic military budget
is the equivalent of $331/3-billion to $40-billion a year. Even at the
official exchange rate, the Soviet strategic budget would be $14.7-billion.
In his January 23, 1967 Posture Statement, Secretary McNamara
reported that the total United States 1967 military budget would be
$68-billion. The budget for strategic forces was $7.1-billion or 14 per-
cent of the total military budget.
The above budget figures show a clear difference between the U. S.
and Soviet strategic military intentions.
Soviet Research and Development Objectives
"First of all, we are facing today a formidable Soviet aero-
space threat and a concerted Communist effort to achieve critical
scientific breakthroughs, both of which factors pose a serious
challenge to the continued strategic superiority of the U. S.
Armed Forces."
General John P. McConnel133
Chief of Staff Air Force
It should be more widely understood that science and technology
provide the vital impulse in the Soviet society. The Soviet leadership
views each new level of technology, each new medium for political or
military operations, as offering opportunities for furthering its objec-
tives. Unanticipated technological breakthroughs may be realized for
leapfrogging America's means of deterrence. Thus, the Soviets are
aggressively moving forward on the frontiers of strategic weapon tech-
nology.
Space is one of the first arenas of major public interest in which
Soviet industry, technology, and science gained-in fact, not in words
-a leading international position. This is so despite the not incon-
siderable United States achievements in space. In the public mind, ap-
parent technological advantage in space has been readily translated in-
to an image of military advantage.
One of the primary strengths of Soviet research and development
and production programs is the use of scientific planning with cyber-
netics. This new technique is noted throughout U.S.S.R. weapons pro-
grams. Scientific planning, theory of games, optimum solution of coin-
32. Beecher, op. cit.
33. Hearings on S. 666 before Joint Session of the Senate Armed Service Commit-
tee and the Senate DOD Subcommittee on Appropriations, January 24, 26, 27,
30, 31, February 1 and 2, 1967, p. 874.
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SOVIET
lin
SPACE FIRSTS
ISM,
EARTH SATELLITE'
4 OCT. 1957
? BIOLOGICAL SATELLITE
3 NOV. 1957
? SOLAR ORBIT
2 JAN. 1959
? LUNAR IMPACT
12 SEP. 1959
? LUNAR SATELLITE PHOTOS
4 OCT. 1959
? MAN IN SPACE (GAGARIN)
12 APR. 1961
? "TANDEM" MANNED FLIGHT
11-12 AUG. 1962
? MARS PROBE
1 NOV. 1962
? 3 MAN SPACE FLIGHT
12 OCT. 1964
? EXTRA-VEHICULAR OPN (LEONOV)
18 MAR. 1965
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automatic contro , an hundreds of similar subjects, all
pertinent to the modern techniques of scientific planning and develop-
ment of aerospace weapon systems, are featured in Soviet cybernetic
literature.34
An analysis of overall Soviet power must now take into account the
integrated cybernetic systems optimized for Soviet military and na-
tional security purposes.
United States Research and Development Objectives
U. S. Defense Department policy toward advanced research has been
perceptively and most cogently stated and explained by a scientist who
is in a commanding position to know the actual facts. Dr. Harold Ag-
new, Director of the Weapons Division of the Atomic Energy Com-
mission's Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory, spoke at a recent Air
Force Association symposium in San Francisco, on "The Technological
Threat."
According to Technology Week:35
"AEC's Dr. Harold Agnew declared that there appears to be
a new concept of the balance of power.
"Agnew, whose comments drew the largest ovation at the sym-
posium, said the present philosophy seems to be based on a
concept that assumes that balance or equality is the optimum
state for one nation to have vis-a-vis another state in order to
have stability.... `from my experience stability is gained and
maintained only through superiority. Yet more and more today,
we see decisions being made which have as their long range
objective equality between the U. S. and other powers rather
than superiority of the U. S. over other powers.'
* * *
"'The apparent drift in national policy on the concept of bal-
ance of power and stability is resulting in a stifling of innova-
tion. We find ourselves being authorized to build or to consider
only those systems which respond to a clearly defined threat.
As a result, we are continuously reacting on the defensive .. .
since we react only to those systems or threats which have been
proven to exist, and it takes several years to react, we are con-
tinually in danger of coming up with answers to threats which
have changed, if indeed we come up with answers in a time frame
which is relevant at all.'
34. Text of the Resolution Passed at the Third All-Union Conference on Auto-
matic Control, translated by L. A. Zadeh. (Odessa: 1965), p. 1.
35. "AEC Weapons Expert Blasts DOD Technology," Technology Week, March
27, 1967, pp. 15, 16.
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which we have not heard about, but which all of a sudden
appear.'
"Agnew said it is clear that the Soviet Union recognizes the in-
creased importance of technological breakthroughs. He quoted
a recent Soviet Defense ministry document which said that Rus-
sia 'is not limiting itself to those military means which the ad-
versary already has.' He said this contrasted with the position
of some U. S. committees, such as the one on arms control
headed by Jerome Wiesner and Roswell Gilpatric, that the U. S.
should not innovate new weapons because this would be de-
stabilizing.
"A specific example of this, he said, is the recommendation that
we avoid an effective anti-missile system because it would upset
what Wiesner and Gilpatric called the `delicate balance of
terror.'
"One of the greatest faults of U. S. policy makers, Agnew de-
clared, 'is that they seem not to understand that technology
will never be stagnant. It will not stand still.' '
This thesis of the U. S. policy-planned stagnation of innovation in
U. S. advanced research was also comprehensively stated and exten-
sively documented by Hanson W. Baldwin, in a "landmark" article,36
under a title which states his theme: "Slow-down in the Pentagon."
He reports that research, development, and innovation have sunk in-
to stagnation in the Pentagon because of three major policies or
attitudes: (1) "the technological revolution is over"; (2) disarmament
or arms limitation "is the only way to political salvation and that there-
fore continued technological military development worsens the situa-
tion"; and (3) "the requirements merry-go-round"-mandate from the
Secretary of Defense that every new project has to be justified on the
basis of demonstrated military requirements, that is, that there must
exist in advance a clear-cut military mission for a new weapons devel-
opment.
Mr. Baldwin further points out that:
"Many promising developments-particularly in space-could
never be pushed, or even demonstrated, if developments had to
wait for the establishment of requirements.
"Invention has never followed this path; the machine gun and
the tank would still remain blueprint dreams if their develop-
ment had awaited the specification of clear-cut military require-
ments. One cannot state a requirement for an inventor's hopes.
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"As Dr. Edward C. Welsh (acting Chairman of the National
Aeronautics Space Council) pointed out, `If we had required
a clear-cut prior mission, we would probably have developed
no airplanes, no spacecraft, or, in fact, no wheel."'
Both Dr. Agnew and Mr. Baldwin have done an outstanding job of
explaining why the strategic military balance is changing.
To analyze the present strategic military balance, the following sec-
tions of this study compare the numbers of delivery vehicles and the
total megatonnage delivery capabilities of the various strategic weapon
systems. In addition, the figure on page 29, and the table on page.13W
also show the general trend in total megatonnage delivery capability
from 1962 to 1971 as delineated by the range of estimates derived from
unclassified sources. These performance figures are the key to determin-
ing the real strategic military intentions of the U. S. and the U.S.S.R.
The general trend was established by plotting all available respon-
sible unclassified estimates on a graph.
The preponderance of evidence points to the conclusion that the
Soviet Union is succeeding in its massive drive toward strategic military
superiority and that the United States is cooperating in this effort by
slowing down its side of the arms race.
In 1962, the United States had a total megatonnage delivery capa-
bility ranging between 25,000 megatons and 50,000 megatons. The
corresponding figures for the Soviet Union ranged between 6,000 mega-
tons and 12,000 megatons.
The year 1967 falls in a crossover period with the U.S.S.R. estimates
ranging between 16,000 and 37,000 megatons, to equal or exceed the
U. S. estimated range of between 8,000 and 29,000 megatons.
It should be noted that the "nuclear capable" U. S. aircraft carriers
are not included in the strategic balance either here or by Secretary
McNamara.
For 1971, it appears that a massive megatonnage gap will have
developed. U. S. delivery capability is estimated to range between 6,000
megatons and 15,000 megatons, whereas the estimated high for the
Soviet delivery capability is 50,000 megatons, and the projection of the
established Soviet range-curve indicates a low figure for the Soviets of
approximately 30,000 megatons.
On the basis of this projection, the U. S. and. the U.S.S.R. will have
reversed their roles in a ten-year period.
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proximately equal in strength at the present time. However, measure-
ment of the strategic balance requires consideration of many additional
factors including the following:
1. The above figures are based on peacetime inventory. Since
the U. S. is committed to a second strike-policy, we should
count only those U. S. strategic weapons which would remain
after a Soviet first strike. There is no solid basis for estimating
the remaining U. S. strategic weapons because the U. S. has
not tested very high-yield warheads and therefore does not
know the weapons effect of Soviet super-yield weapons of 50
megatons and over.
2. Some of the remaining U. S. missiles would be destroyed
by the Soviet anti-ballistic missile defense. This important fac-
tor was not included in the above figures because of the lack of
adequate unclassified data on the numbers and yield of Soviet
ABMs.
3. Also, "a lesser amount of nuclear explosive does much greater
damage to the United States than to the Soviet Union because
of America's geography, urbanization and weather patterns."37
The Soviet Union has three times as many square miles as the
United States and its industries and cities are better dispersed.
4. Unclassified sources for the Soviet missile count appear to
be based on the number of operational missile sites without con-
sideration of refire capability. Thus, the actual Soviet missile
count may be substantially larger than the unclassified estimates.
5. Many of the unclassified estimates as to Soviet strategic
weapons yield are low because the sources have not given the
Soviets credit for their great improvement in warhead yield/
weight ratio in their 1961 nuclear tests. (See ICBM section for
detail.)
Behind-the-iron-curtain unclassified sources report that the strategic
military balance has changed in their favor. For example, in a compre-
37. Arthur T. Hadley, The Nation's Safety and Arms Control (New York: The
Viking Press, 1961), p. 34. Hadley's study is based upon the findings of a Sum-
mer Study Seminar held in Dedham, Mass., in 1960 under the auspices of the
American Academy of Arts and Sciences and the Twentieth Century Fund. The
participants included physicists, psychologists, lawyers, economists, mathemati-
cians, political scientists and weapons specialists. Among those who took part
were Donald T. Brennan, Hans A. Bethe, Morton H. Halperin, Herman Kahn,
Thomas C. Schelling, Louis B. Sohn, Leo Szilard, Victor F. Weisskopf and
Jerome B. Wiesner.
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 ApproK"FvpraptR!pMA9n4hOt iest'ra egicRmiPlita squat equation I00230 e bred
on unclassified sources, Lt. General Khristo Dobrev concludes:
"The deciding power in the world today is the socialist states.
They have at their disposal everything necessary for taming
the imperialist aggressors. The bare fact that it is not Moscow
but Washington which is putting forward the question of reach-
ing an agreement on `freezing' the anti-missile defense system
speaks sufficiently clear on which side lies the military su-
periority."38
The United States does not appear to have a superior position in
deliverable strategic weapons. There is still time to regain superiority
but time is on the side of the one which uses it. Because of long lead
times for weapon development and production, however, the decision to
do so must be made in the year 1967.
38. Lt. General Khristo Dobrev, "On Military-Political Subjects: Anti-missile-De-
fense, A New Nightmare for U. S. Imperialists," Rabotnichesko Delo, (Sofia,
Bulgaria: April 10, 1967).
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 App l ' 1 t@V@6/O ACW QORt?ft1 10230119-9
BALANCE OF STRATEGIC WEAPONS IN
TIME PERIODS 1962, 1967, 1971
The "Range of Estimates From Unclassified Sources, Trends of
Total Megatonnage Delivery Capability-All Strategic Weapon Sys-
tems-" as depicted in the graph, supra, was based upon analysis and
evaluation of hundreds of unclassified sources published during the en-
tire time period of 1960 through April 1967. Sources studied included
military and scientific books, treatises, journals and limited distribu-
tion studies. Also employed were trade and technical journals, news
magazines, newspapers and publications of general and popular circu-
lation.
To provide a ready reference for spot-checks and parameter con-
firmation, however, a summary is presented here of extracts from cer-
tain of those unclassified sources which relate directly to the initial,
median, and terminal years covered by the graph which depicts the
trend of the strategic balance in the decade from 1962-1971. The selec-
tion includes sources documenting the derivation of the "highs" and
"lows" of deliverable megatonnage presented in the table which di-
rectly follows the Strategic Balance Graph, referred to above.
Thus the sources summarized support the upper and lower edges
of the U. S. and U.S.S.R. curves representing trends of total megaton-
nage delivery capability. They include also, however, samplings from
sources which fall within the areas delineated by the edges of the respec-
tive curves, providing thereby the basis for an appraisal as to the
existence or absence of a consensus. The selection of sources for sum-
marization emphasized publications more likely to be generally avail-
able to segments of the public not likely to have convenient access to
scientific, technological, or strategic libraries.
1962-BOMBERS
U. S. News & World Report-August 13, 1962
U. S. U.S.S.R.
700 Heavy Bombers X 50
= 35,000 MT
1,000 Medium Bombers X 5
= 5,000 MT
TOTAL 40,000 MT
150 Intercontinental
Bombers X 20
= 3,000 MT
600 Medium Range
Bombers X 10
= 6,000 MT
TOTAL 9,000 MT
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 b91Ba03R9p/0100230119-9
Approved For RpI ejie(iq^o2De6
U. S. U.S.S.R.
1,700 Bombers - 49,000 MT
(Estimate: 50,000 MT for all stra-
tegic systems; bomber megaton-
nage estimated at 49,000 megatons
by subtracting from total an esti-
mated 1,000 assigned to 200 AT-
LAS, TITAN and MINUTEMAN
missiles and 100 POLARIS mis-
siles.)
210 Long Range
Newsweek-November 19, 1962 (ISS cited)
U. S. U.S.S.R.
Long Range Bombers
630
Long Range Bombers
200
Medium Range Bombers
1,000
Medium Range Bombers
1,300
1,630
1,500
Readers Digest-March, 1963
"While America Slept," by James Daniel and John G. Hubble
U. S. U.S.S.R.
30,000 MT (all strategic weapon
systems) p. 267.
The Military Balance-1961-62, Institute for Strategic Studies
U. S. U.S.S.R.
630 B-52's, 850 B-47's, 90 B-58's
Total Strategic bombers 1,570
70 BEARS, 120 BISONS,
1,000 BADGERS
Estimated :megatonnage 1,190
The Nation's Safety and Arms Control
by Arthur T. Hadley, Viking Press, 1961
U. S. U.S.S.R.
2,500 bombers 24,470 MT
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 Approved For Release 2004~~J5~05 jCBMsRDP69B00369R000100230119-9
U. S. News & World Report-August 13, 1962
U. S. U.S.S.R.
100 X 10 MT = 1,000 MT; or
75 X 10 MT = 750 MT
U. S. News & World Report-February 6, 1967
U. S. U.S.S.R.
200 ATLAS, TITAN and
MINUTEMAN missiles
Newsweek-November 19, 1962 (ISS cited)
U. S. U.S.S.R.
The Military Balance-1961-62, Institute for Strategic Studies
U. S. U.S.S.R.
90 ATLAS 36 TITAN
= 126 Total
3 MT 5 MT
270 + 180
Readers Digest-March 1963
"While America Slept," by James Daniel and John G. Hubble
U. S. U.S.S.R.
102 ATLAS
54 TITAN
U. S. News & World Report-August 13, 1962
U. S. U.S.S.R.
300 T-2 & T-4
(1 MT assumed) = 300 MT
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 Approved For Release 2004/05/05 : CIA-RDP69B00369R000100230119-9
1962-IR-MRBMs (Cont.)
Newsweek-November 19,1962 (ISS cited)
U. S. U.S.S.R.
250 J700
The Military Balance-1961-62, Institute for Strategic Studies
U. S. U.S.S.R.
30 JUPITERS-Italy 1700 X 1 MT = 700 MT
15 JUPITERS-Turkey
Readers Digest-March 1963
"While America Slept," by James Daniel and John G. Hubble
U. S. U.S.S.R.
105 THOR and JUPITER 142 (in Cuba)
1962-SLMs
U. S. News & World Report-August 13, 1962
U. S. U.S.S.R.
POLARIS 144 X 1/2 MT
50 X 1 MT (assumed)
U. S. News & World Report-February 6, 1967
U. S. U.S.S.R.
POLARIS 100
Newsweek-November 19, 1962 (ISS cited)
U. S. U.S.S.R.
POLARIS 96 X .7 MT
(assumed) = 67.2
The Military Balance-1961-62, Institute for Strategic Studies
U. S. U.S.S.R.
'POLARIS 144 X .7 MT = 100.8
Readers Digest-March 1963
"While America Slept," by James Daniel and John G. Hubble
U. S. U.S.S.R.
128 POLARIS T50 GOLEMS
Approved For Release 2004/05/05 : CIA-RDP69B00369R000100230119-9
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 Approved For Release 200M#NO%()M P69B00369R000100230119-9
Statement of Secretary of Defense-Senate Armed Services Committee
Hearings on S. 666-Military Authorizations-Defense Appropriations,
1968; January 25, p. 47
680 (no estimate of megatonnage)
155 (strategic medium-range Sovi-
et bombers not counted in Mc-
Namara's statement despite
refueling capability)
U. S. News & World Report-February 6, 1967
U. S. U.S.S.R.
The Military Balance-1966-67, Institute for Strategic Studies
600 B-52's
80 B-58's
100 BEARS
110 BISONS
900 BADGERS and BLINDERS
Space/Aeronautics-September 1966
"Strategic Missiles and Air Defense," by Leon H. Dulberger
U. S. U.S.S.R.
125 with round-trip ability
25 supersonic-non-round-trip
Washington Post-April 8, 1967
"Johnson Building Case for Reduction of Nuclear Margin"
by George C. Wilson
U. S. U.S.S.R.
680
"U. S. Nuclear Bombers carry
about 4 bombs each."
See 1962 listing and Military Balance summary supra,
for bomb loading examples.
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 Approved For Release 2004/0Q: C ?QP69B00369R000100230119-9
Statement of Secretary of Defense-Senate Armed Services Committee
Hearings on S. 666-Military Authorizations-Defense Appropriations,
1968; January 25, p. 47
U. S. U.S.S.R.
:1,000 MINUTEMAN
54 TITAN II
340 (although listed under the
date October 1, 1966, a foot-
note states the figures are for
"mid-1966" which would be
June-July 1966)
U. S. News & World Report-February 6, 1967
U. S. U.S.S.R.
:1,054
500 (now 400-end of year 600)
The Military Balance-1966-67, Institute for Strategic Studies
U. S. U.S.S.R.
54 TITAN II
X 5 MT = 270 MT
:1,000 MINUTEMAN
800 MINUTEMAN I
X 1 MT = 800 MT
200 MINUTEMAN II
X 2 MT = 400 MT
Total 1,470 MT
300-500
(Assumed) 400 X 10 MT
4,000 MT
New York Times-November 13, 1966
"Soviet Increases Build-Up of Missiles," by William Beecher
U. S. U.S.S.R. --
800 MINUTEMAN I 400-450 (as of October)
:130 MINUTEMAN II
with 70 more MINUTEMAN
II for 1967 and 54 TITAN II
Associated Press-December 7, 1966
Dispatch dated Washington, by Bob Horton
U. S. U.S.S.R.
U. S. maintains 3- or 4-to-1
advantage
:1,600 ICBMs (Presumably
including POLARIS)
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 Approved For ReleasejiV,4Lf&:{PP69B00369R000100230119-9
Space/Aeronautics-September 1966
"Strategic Missiles and Air Defense," by Leon H. Dulberger
U. S. U.S.S.R.
Washington Post-April 8, 1967
"Johnson Building Case for Reduction of Nuclear Margin"
by George C. Wilson
1,446 (including SLBM)
470 (including SLBM)
The New York Times-November 13, 1966
"Soviet Increases Build-Up of Missiles,"-by William Beecher
U. S. U.S.S.R.
800 MINUTEMAN I
130 MINUTEMAN II
70 MINUTEMAN II in early
1967
54 TITAN II
400-450
A 3-stage liquid-fueled missile
"may carry a warhead ranging
from 30 to 60 MT"
"Soviet Missile Power"-a `Credible Threat Now,' by Xenophon, Tri-
umph Magazine, February 1967; Reprinted U.S. News & World Report,
February 20, 1967 under title "The Danger is Very Grave"-Russia's
Growing Arms Threat
U. S. U.S.S.R.
"Few of the Soviet ICBMs have a
lift capability of less than 7 mega-
tons and most are 10 MT or more."
The Soviets "may be on the brink
of deploying an ICBM capable of
lifting the weight of their 100 meg-
aton warhead."
"The U.S.S.R. with as few as 20
such missiles equipped with mul-
tiple warheads of 1 megaton each
-could acquire the capability of
striking 2,000 targets, more than
the entire existing U. S. strategic
missile arsenal can now cover."
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 Approved For Release 2004/9?hL D0Rpp0369R000100230119-9
Space/Aeronautics-September 1966
"Strategic Missiles and Air Defense," by Leon H. Dulberger
Of the several classes of land-based
strategic missiles in the Soviet in-
ventory, the most powerful, most
sophisticated ICBM's are SAV-
AGE.. . SCRAG ... and the so-
called PROTON booster, with a
thrust of over 2-million pounds
and easily able to loft a 100 MT
warhead."
Technology Week-March 27, 1967
"Soviets Narrowing ICBM Gap," p. 33
"Brown told the committee that the
United States `does not have a 3-1
superiority in ICBM payload over the
Soviet Union, because their missiles
carry somewhat more than our own
do. `But,' he added, `I think that as of
this moment we probably have more
total missiles. I think that ratio won't
be true in another year or two.' "
"Air Force Secretary Harold Brown
has told the Senate Armed Services
Committee that the Soviet Union is
rapidly closing the missile gap and
may equal the U. S. in numbers of
ICBMs in a year or two.
"Brown, questioned at length on the
Soviet ICBM threat by the commit-
tee, said that the Soviets have a very
formidable missile force and that they
are building new missiles `very fast.'
"In explaining what amounts to a
Soviet attempt to close the missile
gap, Brown said `we leveled out our
missile forces. We announced how
big our missile force was going to be.
Our plans are that five years from now
we will have just about as many mis-
siles as we have right now. They have
known that. They have known it for a
couple of years, and they just keep
on building.'
"Now we can afford to let them build
for a while, if they feel they want to
`catch up.' But there is evidence that
if we stop, they won't necessarily
stop. They haven't stopped.'
:'(I think, `Brown told the committee,
`that in our position we can afford to
let this go on for a while without over-
responding.' "
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 Approved For Release 200411$05 Mj &W f 69B00369R000100230119-9
The Military Balance-1966-67, Institute for Strategic Studies
U. S. U.S.S.R.
700-750
SKEAN = 1-2 MT
SANDAL = 1 MT
Assume 1/3 SKEAN:
500 SANDAL X 1 MT
250 SKEAN X 1.5 MT
500 + 375 MT = 875 MT
Washington Post-April 8, 1967
"Johnson Building Case for Reduction of Nuclear Margin"
by George C. Wilson
U. S. U.S.S.R.
Statement of Secretary of Defense-Senate Armed Services Committee
Hearings on S. 666-Military Authorizations-Defense Appropriations,
1968; January 25, p. 47
U. S. News & World Report-February 6, 1967
U. S. U.S.S.R.
The Military Balance-1966-67, Institute for Strategic Studies
U. S. U.S.S.R.
120 SLBM X 1 MT
= 120 MT
160 SLCM X.5 MT
80 MT (. 5 MT est.)
200 MT
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 Approved For Release 2004/05/05 : CIA-RDP69B00369R000100230119-9
1967-SLMs (Cont.)
The New York Times-July 14, 1966
"U. S. Lead in ICBMs is Said to be Reduced," by Hanson Baldwin
U. S. U.S.S.R.
250 (including 100 "winged"
cruise missiles)
The New York Times-November 13, 1966
"Soviet Increases Build-Up of Missiles," by William Beecher
U. S. U.S.S.R.
608 POLARIS X 1 MT
= 608 MT
"Slightly less than 1 MT"
Space/Aeronautics-September 1966
"Strategic Missiles and Air Defense," by Leon H. Dulberger
U. S. U.S.S.R.
150 SLBMs
100 SLCMs
Department of Defense Testimony-Senate Committee on Armed Serv-
ices, Hearings on S. 666, Military Appropriations, Defense Appropria-
tions, 1968; January 25-February 2, 1967, p. 248.
U. S. U.S.S.R.
Secretary of Defense McNamara
testified before Senate Armed
Services Committee that there
would be 255' B-52G-Hs through
fiscal year 1972 and 210 FB-111s
Space/Aeronautics-September 1966
"Strategic Missiles and Air Defense," by Leon H. Dulberger
U. S. U.S.S.R.
125 with round-trip capability
25 supersonic non-round-trip
Soviet Mach 2.35 supersonic trans-,
port now in development could be-,
come supersonic intercontinental
bomber.
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 Approved For Release 2004/0 0' z-QCB iW69B00369R000100230119-9
Department of Defense Testimony-Senate Committee on Armed Serv-
ices, Hearings on S. 666, Military Appropriations, Defense Appropria-
tions, 1968; January 25-February 2, 1967-(all MINUTEMAN are re-
placed by Its or Ills) pp. 64, 240.
U. S. U.S.S.R.
1,054
U. S. News & World Report-February 6, 1967
U. S. U.S.S.R.
1,054 MINUTEMAN and
TITAN II
5,000 MT (all weapons)
1,000 + missiles
50,000 MT (all weapons)
The New York Times-July 14, 1966
"U. S. Lead in ICBMs Said to be Reduced," by Hanson Baldwin
U. S. U.S.S.R.
1,054
U. S. News & World Report-December 19, 1966
U. S. U.S.S.R.
1,600 (including SLM)
Now 400, + 300 to 400 a year ad-
ditional through 1970-est. 400 +
300 a year for 4 years = 1,600
Washington Post-April 8, 1967
"Johnson Building Case for Reduction of Nuclear Margin"
by George C. Wilson
1,000 MINUTEMAN X 1 MT
= 1,000 MT
650-1,000
Some missiles of 1 MT but "hun-
dreds of missiles with warheads
between 7 and 25 MT." "Some
military leaders say privately that
the U. S., not Russia, is faced with
a `megatonnage gap.' "
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 Approved For Release 2q%fP /(& J 19B00369R000100230119-9
The New York Times-November 13, 1966
"Soviet Increases Build-Up of Missiles," by William Beecher
Rate of increase of numbers
"roughly 100 or more a year over
the last 2 years." (est.) 450 + 100
a year for 4 years = 850.
U. S.
None
All sources quoted for 1967 statis-
tics tend to indicate same num-
bers maintained through the years
-consensus is 700 to 750 in num-
bers and 700 to 875 MT in ex-
plosive power.
Secretary of Defense Testimony is
that there will be no increase in
the present number 41 of Fleet
Ballistic Missile Submarines-but
that in the 1970 period the present
POLARIS submarines will be re-
constructed to carry the POSEI-
DON missile at a cost of 60 per-
cent of new submarine construc-
tion. Senate Hearings on S. 666
Military Authorizations-Defense
Appropriations, 1968, January 25-
February 6, 1967, p. 62. This "re-
trofit" program is to be spread over
a period of years on a schedule
tied to the regular overhaul cycle.
Note: If 7 were converted at a
time, and the process required 2
years for each group of 7, some 12
years would be required, and the
deployable force would be propor-
tionately reduced for that period.
The Military Balance 1966.67, In-
stitute for Strategic Studies, does
not project any figures for 1971,
but says that present production
of nuclear submarines is "at the
rate of at least five a year."
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 Approved For Release 2004/05/05 : CIA-RDP69B00369R000100230119-9
II. THE STRATEGIC
MILITARY BALANCE
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INTERCONTINENTAL BALLISTIC MISSILES
'950 MINUTEMAN I,1 MT
50 MINUTEMAN II,1 MT
54 TITAN 11,5-18 MT
WEAPON-10 MT EST.
YIELD OF EACH
300-500--AVERAGE
Note: Although the U.S. has more weapons, the U.S.S.R. has heavier war-
heads. Effects of high-yield explosions on our ICBM systems are largely
unknown because of the inability to make atmospheric tests. U.S. has
reached a numbers plateau. USSR force continues to grow. Mr. McNamara
has said he believes Soviets continue to increase ICBM deployment.
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 Approy
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 Apffye li~~l I1~i A5~ ACI,~'I G6~~~O1(~ )0119-9
The 1,000th American MINUTEMAN intercontinental ballistic mis-
sile will be deployed in a site that has just been activated near Malm-
strom Air Force Base, Montana. This site will contain 50 new MIN-
UTEMAN II missiles, a considerable improvement over MINUTE-
MAN I, which comprise the remaining MINUTEMAN force. Warheads
of MINUTEMAN I are reputed by unclassified sources to yield one
megaton. MINUTEMAN II may have somewhat higher yield, or a
trade-off with penetration aids.
The United States has also deployed 54 TITAN II missiles with a
warhead yield of over 5 megatons.39 There are no plans to increase this
ICBM force. In fact, on February 12, 1967 the Department of Defense
let; it be known that the TITAN II would be phased-out beginning in
197040 and Secretary of Defense McNamara revealed in his 1967 Posture
Statement that he had ended procurement of new TITAN boosters
"with the FY (Fiscal Year) 1966 buy." In other words, the TITAN II
phase-out has already begun.
The Soviet Union has between 300 and 500 ICBMs, all of which
are reputed to have a warhead yield of at least ten megatons.4' This
estimated yield is probably low for some Soviet missiles, such as the
new SCRAG which mounts a 30-to-50 megaton warhead and can be
used either as an ICBM or as an orbital space weapon.42 Some sources
attribute 500 missiles to the Soviets.43
In his Posture Statement of January 23, 1967, Secretary McNamara
credited the United States with 934 ICBMs and the Soviet Union with
340 as of mid-1966.
The total yield of the United States ICBM force is estimated at
1,650 megatons, while Soviet missiles can yield at least 4,000 megatons.
However, these unclassified estimates are probably low for Soviet
missiles. Few unclassified sources have revised their Soviet warhead
39. The Military Balance 1966-67, (London: Institute for Strategic Studies, 1966),
p. 25.
40. The New York Times, February 13, 1967, p. 1.
41. The Military Balance, op. cit. p. 44.
42. Ogonock, No. 20, May 1965.
43. Business Week, January 14, 1967, p. 88.
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 P YtdegrtR a W41'f ffMit CgslRW6yQ8O53 6$I04QQ7h0h 119-9
the 1961 Soviet nuclear tests. Typically, the Institute for Strategic
Studies still shows Soviet missile warheads at the same yield as they
did in 1961-10 megatons.
In their 1963 paper submitted to the Senate Committee on Foreign
Relations during the debate on the Test Ban Treaty, the Joint Chiefs
of Staff said that as a result of the 1961 tests:
"The U.S.S.R. is ahead of the United States in the high-yield-
tens of megatons-technology ... and in the yield/ weight ratios
of high-yield devices ... if the Treaty goes into effect ... the
U. S. would not be able to overtake the present advantage ..."44
An authoritative appraisal of U. S./U.S.S.R. position as to high-
yield weapons after the 1961 Soviet tests gains was made by Charles
J. V. Murphy, a long-established expert in the area of nuclear weapons.
His article was published in Life, February 16, 1962, and its accuracy
has never been challenged. Although Mr. Murphy carefully refrains
from stating exact yield/weight ratios, he does say that the Soviet gain
was "several fold" and makes the following comparison:
"The (Soviet) 100 megaton warhead, according to some nuclear
scientists, probably does not weigh more than 15 tons and may
even weigh less than 10 tons.... By comparison, the warhead
of our largest rocket, the TITAN, weighs nearly half as much as
the lowest estimate for the Soviet warhead while its yield is
probably less than 1/10 as high."
Thus it would appear that since 1961, the Soviets have had a 5-to-1
advantage over the U. S. in yield/weight ratio in contrast to their pre-
1961 inferiority.
It seems reasonable to assume that this improved capability has by
now been used in upgrading missile warhead yield.
Some American planners believe that the numerically larger Amer-
ican force is superior on the premise that a one megaton warhead is
powerful enough to destroy any city and accurate enough to take out
a hardened Soviet launching site.
They also believe that most Soviet launching sites are "soft" and
extremely vulnerable to a MINUTEMAN warhead. However, the -soft-
ness or hardness of Soviet launching sites has little relevance unless
America strikes first, something present U. S. policy would never permit.
44. Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, Hearings, Committee on Foreign Relations, 88th
Congress, 1st Session, (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1963), p. 273.
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 ApprovfteE* fANmF&&jQ4jg J : r i09. 9f W ~;fi-9
has already expended its first missiles unless the site has a reload capa-
bility. It is argued that for logical deterrence, which is the U. S. strategy,
the city-busting potential of the MINUTEMAN force, backed with
a few heavy TITAN II missiles, appears to be adequate at the present
time.
Even if numbers were to be considered as more important than
power, Secretary McNamara in his January 23, 1967 Posture State-
ment estimated that in a future nuclear war about half of our missiles
would be knocked out if the Soviets strike first.
Even if our remaining ICBMs were to function perfectly, it is diffi-
cult to estimate how many might be destroyed by Soviet anti-ballistic
missile defense. (See ABM section of this study.)
The high yield of Soviet ICBMs leads one to question the invulner-
ability of our own hardened ICBM sites. None of the American sites
has been tested against such great explosive power as the Soviets
demonstrated in their 1961-62 nuclear tests, although various smaller-
scale tests have been conducted. The Department of Defense is con-
fident that scaling up of the smaller underground explosions can lead
to accurate prediction of the effects of massive multi-megaton explo-
sions. However, some scientists question this concept. They assert that
when an explosion is scaled up beyond a factor of ten, entirely new
effects can be expected.
It is conceivable, therefore, that the electro-magnetic pulse or some
unexpected effect of a high-yield Soviet warhead might knock out an
entire MINUTEMAN complex regardless of the hardening and shield-
ing attempted. Many scientists express concern that very high-yield ex-
plosions may cause a total communications blackout and thus prevent
the transmission of a presidential order to retaliate. The Soviet Union
has tested very high-yield warheads. The United States has not. Under
the restrictions of the atmospheric Test Ban Treaty, the United States
can only guess at what unique effects might occur when very high-yield
weapons are exploded. But the Soviets know.
Considering the above, Soviet missiles might well be able to deal a
first-strike knockout blow to our hardened ICBMs-if not today, some
time in the future as the Kremlin leaders continue to upgrade their
force in quality and numbers. Should the Soviet Union be convinced of
this capability and should it have determined a way to nullify the
United States POLARIS missiles (see SLM section of this study), the
U.S.S.R. would be in a position to exercise nuclear blackmail. War
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 ~v~ ,% PAIM% 695N&tC1i FI]~i H6 i %q9A i 119-9
only an anti-ballistic missile defense or surrender could save American
lives.
Some questions have even been raised concerning the credibility of
a strategic deterrence based solely on "second-strike" retaliation. For
example, Paul Nitze, presently Secretary of the Navy and Assistant
Secretary of Defense until he was appointed to the Navy, presented a
paper at the National Strategy Seminar at Asilomar, California in
April 1960 in which he said:
"The principal problem ... with this alternative, (an invulner-
able second-strike, purely retaliatory capability) is that it pro-
vides us with no rational military strategy if deterrence fails ...
If deterrence fails, the only reaction open to us is retaliation in
support of a purpose that no longer exists-the purpose of deter-
ring the enemy from taking the action they have already taken."45
Suppose the Soviets use this as the basis for estimating the credi-
bility of our stated intention of retaliating? Might they not reason
somewhat as follows:
Secretary McNamara has testified that a Soviet first strike against
the United States could result in 120 million U. S. fatalities.4 After
this has happened, Secretary McNamara says that the United States
would strike back at the Soviets, and that enough of our strategic wea-
pons would have survived the Soviet strike to enable us to strike back
and kill 120 million people in the U.S.S.R.
The target of our retaliation would be people. Secretary McNamara
revealed this expressly for the first time in his 1967 testimony before
the Senate Committee on Armed Services, as follows:
"If we were to strike after they struck us, the question is, what
would we launch our missiles against? I think all would agree
that we would launch against their cities. They have already
launched all their missiles against us."
With most of the American population dead, would it then be ra-
tional to launch a retaliatory strike with their surviving strategic forces?
If the 70 million survivors prefer to remain as survivors, they might
forego a retaliatory strike, so as not to invite a Soviet mop-up attack
by their follow-on bombers and missiles from sites with refire capability.
A retaliatory strike certainly would not help the 120 million Americans
45. Proceedings, Asilomar National Strategy Seminar, p. 6 (Emphasis added.)
46. Posture Statement, January 23, 1967, p. 53.
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 Appalrea Fcaeaa sre araiin/0%05fact ttnaathe9 OQ3 s , 9R0001 023119-9
g g ovie upon aun t mg
their first attack would have evacuated their cities, and assuming that
Secretary McNamara's figures are correct, namely, that the American
retaliatory strike could kill 120 million Russian people, why should the
remaining Americans launch such a futile attack? The people whom
they would kill had no say in their government's decision to strike.
We are confident that the remaining Americans would retaliate, but
the key question is whether the Soviets believe this.
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 APIM)IMRM/
RALAVEB00369RO00100230119-9
INTERMEDIATE/MEDIUM RANGE BALLISTIC MISSILES
NONE
750 EACH, 1 MT
SANDAL, SKEAN &
SCAMP
Note: Soviets have missiles deployed in western U.S.S.R., threatening
NATO cities and military installations. This is a stategic deployment
and must be considered in context with ICBM balance and SLBM bal-
ance. NATO has neither adequate warning nor retaliatory system. Also,
many Soviet MRBM/ICBMs are mobile and will be difficult to target.
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 Approved For ele seQ20P4/05/0,5 ? CIA RDP69B00369R000100230119-9
eA
W r. .5
F Z
0
In -F. r~ m
C- IM4 04 .1
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 Approved For Release 2004/05/05 : CIA-RDP69B00369R000100230119-9
II-B. INTERMEDIATE/MEDIUM RANGE MISSILES
(IRBM/MRBM)
The Soviet Union has at least 750 intermediate and medium-range
ballistic missiles (1500-to-2500-mile range), mainly in western Russia.
These are code-named SANDAL, SKEAN and SCAMP. The latter was
first shown in May 1965 and is a mobile version, which indicates that
the Soviet Union continues to upgrade IRBM/MRBMs. The United
States has no comparable missiles nor is it developing any.
NATO assumes that the 750 Russian missiles are targeted at the
major military installations and population centers in Western Europe,
including London, Paris, Frankfurt, the Ruhr, Hamburg, Munich, and
the NATO headquarters and bases. Because they presented a major
threat to NATO, the United States provided IRBMs, THORs and
JUPITERs in England, Italy and Turkey. These missiles became oper-
ational just before the Cuban missile crisis in 1962. After the crisis,
the United States dismantled its entire NATO IRBM operation.
Nothing is now left of the extremely expensive U. S. complex of
THORs and JUPITERs which were capable of countering Soviet
IRBMs. The reason given for removing them at the time was that the
IRBMs were obsolete and were being replaced by POLARIS missiles.
(See SLM section.) The fact is, however, that U.S. IRBMs in Europe
had hardly been installed when they were removed. Many strategists
do not accept the explanation that the missiles had become obsolete so
quickly.
The principal counters to the Soviet IRBMs at this time are the
POLARIS submarines operating in the Mediterranean and other waters
within range of the Soviet Union, and NATO fighter-bombers capable
of carrying nuclear weapons. Secretary of Defense McNamara has an-
nounced that we have 7,000 tactical nuclear weapons in Western Eu-
rope47, many of them no doubt capable of being carried by fighter-bomb-
ers but most of them tactical weapons which would be used only in the
event the Soviets attacked with ground forces.
Since the western powers have no intention of launching a first
strike, fighter-bombers can be considered reaction weapons. How many
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 Appi lgqsFd?Gt I f&t WM ?l:aq&Vgg 2t3R U99A89 1 i21jj9-9
missiles? Airfields certainly would be a prime target for the 750 Soviet
IRBM/MRBMs.
The American nuclear-capable PERSHING, a tactical missile with
a range of perhaps 400 miles, is available in Europe but could not be
considered as a counter to the Soviet IRBM/MRBMs because of its
Short range. PERSHING cannot reach into the Soviet Union from
European bases, no matter how close it is placed to the Iron Curtain.
Europe's confidence in the United States' pledge to defend it against
Soviet nuclear attack has understandably been shaken by our failure
to maintain a counter-force to the Soviet IRBMs. After the U. S. re-
moved its THOR and JUPITER missiles, there followed the long, abor-
tive give-and-take debate about providing NATO with sea-based inter-
mediate range ballistic missiles. But many NATO powers believe that
the United States is no longer certain it would use its POLARIS mis-
sile and ICBMs if the Soviet Union launched its IRBM/MRBMs
against Europe.
The pull-out of THORs and JUPITERs, the failure of discussions
on the multilateral nuclear force to bear fruit, the quibbling by Amer-
ican officials in NATO discussions of strategic nuclear retaliation have
combined to raise doubts, (first in France, and more recently, in Ger-
mnany) about the reliability of the American deterrent against Soviet
attack in Europe.48
Soviet military writers and Soviet publications have indicated
repeatedly that Moscow policymakers consider Western Europe to be
the Soviet Union's hostage because of the intermediate and medium-
range ballistic missiles poised in western Russia. For this reason, in
weighing the strategic balance, one must consider Russian IRBM/
MRBMs as strategic weapons in the same context with United States
POLARIS and ICBMs.
As Red China moves into a position where it has an intermediate.-
range or medium-range ballistic missile capability of its own, Peking
may similarly view Japan, Korea, Formosa, Southeast Asia, the Philip-
pines, Indonesia, Pakistan and India, as its hostages. If these nations
find themselves virtually defenseless against Peking's nuclear forces,
they will inevitably drift-or be driven-into Communist China's power
orbit. Thus, the sacrifices of American men-at-arms in Korea and Viet-
nam may ultimately prove to have been made for naught.
48. General Johannes Steinhoff, "NATO Crisis: A Military View," Survival, No-
vember 1966, p. 8.
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LARIS submarines to the Western Pacific area. Presumably this is in-
tended to counter the present Chinese Communist nuclear threat. How-
ever, this raises the interesting question as to whether Red China and
the other Asian Communist countries consider the POLARIS submar-
ines a real threat. In two wars in Asia since the United States obtained
nuclear weapons, they have not been used. Indeed, American policy-
makers have made it abundantly clear that the U. S. would never use
nuclear weapons against Communist aggressors in Asia. Although this
policy might change if Red China develops a serious nuclear threat
of its own, the United States' credibility with its Asian allies, at least
so far as our will to use strategic weapons is concerned, has already been
seriously damaged.
It is perhaps crucial to the future of the Free World in Asia that
the Communist powers respect U. S. nuclear strength in the Pacific.
For the time being, however, it is obvious that Soviet IRBM/
MRBMs constitute the greater threat to the Free World's security and,
particularly, the security of Western Europe. Our NATO allies need
positive reassurance that the United States still firmly intends to pro-
vide them with a nuclear umbrella against a possible Soviet attack.
NATO has already been severely hurt, if not crippled, by the with-
drawal of France from the military alliance. And there is strong evi-
dence that President DeGaulle took this drastic step, at least in part,
because of France's withering confidence in the credibility of our nu-
clear deterrent. Certainly, DeGaulle was not unmindful of the Soviet
missiles aimed at his country when he ordered NATO forces from
French soil.
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ANTI-BALLISTIC MISSILE
U.S.A.
NONE
NIKE-X NOT DEPLOYED
(ZEUS & SPRINT)
GALOSH, GRIFFON,
TALLINN SYSTEM
Chairman Khrushchev announced U.S.S.R. ABM capability in 1962. Long
suspected by unofficial sources, the existence of a Soviet ABM System
was confirmed by Secretary of Defense McNamara in November 1966.
The extent of this system and its capabilities are unknown although Mr.
McNamara asserts that offensive penetration aids would nullify it. What
assurances does the Secretary have of this?
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w (V
z 0 z
C-
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 Approved Fore 11_C. sNTI-B4 lL iS IdT MISSILESOO(A69BM~ 0100230119-9
Although both the United States Army and Air Force began studies
for missile defense as early as 1955, the Office of the Secretary of De-
fense (OSD) did not authorize the NIKE-ZEUS program before 1957.49
Preliminary tests on Kwajalein Island of Army's NIKE-ZEUS system
against ATLAS ICBMs launched from the mainland proved successful
in 1962. OSD, however, noted that NIKE-ZEUS could not discriminate
between warheads and decoys where interception took place above the
atmosphere from 50-to-200 miles out, and that decoys and other pene-
tration aids were within the state of the art for engineers of the U.S.S.R.
Thus NIKE-ZEUS was not put into production even though the Soviet
Union did not have penetration aids at that stage. In other words,
ZEUS would have been effective for a limited time until the U.S.S.R.
had developed penetration aids but OSD believed a short effectiveness
period would be impractical.
In 1963, the Army designed the NIKE-X system. This was to include
the ZEUS and another missile, SPRINT, which would fire rapidly and
intercept at close range (20-to-30 miles) those incoming warheads
missed by ZEUS. It was conceived that lighter decoys would fall be-
hind or burn up in the atmosphere and a new Multifunction Array Radar
(MAR) system would be able to discriminate and handle many targets
simultaneously.50 This NIKE-X system has proved out in what tests
could be run without actually exploding nuclear warheads in the at-
mosphere. Tests of SPRINT are still being made at White Sands. Still,
NIKE-X has not been put into production, although about $400-mi1.-
liion each year ($421-million in FY '68) for ten years has been invested
in ballistic-missile defense, or $4-billion.51 An advanced version of ZEUS,
now called SPARTAN, with a 400-mile range, is now under develop.-
ment.52
The U.S.S.R. displayed the GALOSH ABM in its case at a Moscow
parade in November 1964.53 It is believed to compare with NIKE.-
ZEUS. In October 1961, at the 22nd Party Congress, Marshal Malinov--
49. Inquiry into Satellite and Missile Programs, Hearings, Senate Preparedness
Committee, 1958, Part I, p. 381.
50. DOD Appropriations for 1965, Hearings, Part 4, pp. 186-188.
51. Posture Statement, January 23, 1967, p. 47.
52. Business Week, January 14, 1967, p. 79.
53. Ibid.
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 AwftmW 19-9
been solved by Soviet scientists. In 1963, the GRIFFON, a short-range
ABM was unveiled which has been said to compare with the United
States SPRINT. Unofficial reports were frequent in 1963 of Soviet ABM
deployment. By 1966, the reports were corroborated when Secretary
of Defense McNamara announced on November 10, 1966, that the
United States had "considerable evidence" that the Soviet Union had
indeed deployed at least a limited ABM system.
In his annual Posture Statement to the Congress, the Secretary took
cognizance only of "a deployment of an anti-ballistic missile defense
system around Moscow."54 In the published version of his statement, at
least, he did not refer to what Hanson W. Baldwin, calls "the far more
widespread (ABM) installations in other parts of the Soviet Union
known as the TALLINN system."55
According to Mr. Baldwin, "launching sites and radars of this sys-
tem extend in a wide arc across the northwestern part of the Soviet
Union covering the missile window, or angle or arc, through which
United States missiles, launched from land bases, would have to ap-
proach their targets." In addition, he said, "installations of the TAL-
LINN type have been discovered east of the Ural Mountains." He
added that there were reports of more such installations "in the south-
ern part of the Soviet Union in position to defend against attacks from
the Mediterranean area."
Although there is a difference of opinion within the U. S. intelligence
community on the type of missiles employed in these TALLINN-type
systems, some experts believe the Soviets are probably deploying ABM
weapons capable of producing "X-ray effects." Let loose by ultra-high
energy nuclear explosions, pulsed X-rays cause "violent reactions with-
in materials" that can destroy or neutralize attacking nuclear warheads.
According to the publication, Technology Week, the shielding materials
currently used to protect U. S. warheads would fail to offset the X-ray
effect.5?
The policy of the United States, at this writing, is" to defer deploy-
ment of an ABM system pending an appeal to Moscow by Ambassador
Llewellyn E. Thompson for an agreement on a mutual moratorium on
ABM deployment.57
54. Posture Statement, January 23, 1967, p. 40.
55. The New York Times, February 5, 1967, p. 1.
56. Technology Week, January 2, 1967, pp. 10-12.
57. The New York Times, January 18, 1967, p. 3.
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ere is isagreemen in a in a igence community over the ex en
and effectiveness of the Soviet ABM system. But there is no disagree-
ment over the fact that the Russians have something and the United
States has nothing.58 Under these conditions the Soviet leaders will find
themselves in a favorable bargaining position as they did during the
Cuban missile crisis. That side with most negotiating capital is likely
to come out ahead.
Even if deployment is finally ordered,. the Administration in Wash-
iington is talking about a limited system costing from $4-to-$5-billion
over a period of four or five years. This system would be specifically de-
signed to defend against missiles aimed at the American long-range
offensive system and would probably have little effect on saving lives.rrO
ABM Deployment: Arguments Pro and Con
Some of the central arguments concerning the deployment of an
anti-ballistic missile system are:
1. Against ABM
A principal argument used by the Office of Secretary of Defense
(OSD) against a U. S. commitment to production and deployment of
an ABM system is summed up in an ancient military rule, i.e., that the
best defense is a good offense.
The OSD contends that offensive systems are cheaper and more
effective in modern warfare than countervailing defensive systems. Mis-
sile penetration aids are far less expensive than an ABM. ABMs cannot
defend everywhere because of the prohibitive cost and the terrible de-
structive capability of nuclear warheads but ICBMs can be targeted
anywhere. Thus, the Secretary of Defense argues, the U. S. should de-
vote its efforts and resources to improving offensive systems to deter
potential enemies from attacking.
In his 1967 Posture Statement, Defense Secretary McNamara
spelled out his position clearly: "It is our ability to destroy an attacker
as a viable 20th Century nation that provides the deterrent, not our
ability to partially limit damage to ourselves.... Once sufficient forces
have been procured to give us high confidence of achieving our Assured
]Destruction Objective, we can then consider the kinds and amounts of
forces which might be added to reduce damage to our population and
industry in the event deterrence fails." (Emphasis added.)
58. Washington Star, Richard Fryklund, January 11, 1967, p. A-20.
59. Baltimore Sun, January 25, 1967, p. 1.
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Obviously, if deterrence fails it is then too late to build an ABM-
too late for the 120 million Americans whom the Secretary estimates
would be killed in such an attack.
The only deterrent value in our offensive weapons is the credibility
an enemy places in our will to use them in defense, not merely of the
United States, but of our Allies and our global interests generally. There
is a serious question, which probably cannot be answered, unless and
until, the Soviets conclude they are ready for an all-out attack or a final
face-down, as to whether U. S. credibility has not already been seriously
undermined by America's adherence to a "second-strike" policy. (See
ICBM section for further discussion on this point.)
Despite our total strategic reliance on offensive weapons, the "sec-
ond-strike" policy casts United States military posture in a fundamen-
tally defensive mold. In the absence of an ABM, and with our offensive
weapons restricted to a wholly defensive role, the danger of a general
nuclear war is greatly increased. An enemy who knows he is guaran-
teed the advantage of a first strike that would, according to Secretary
McNamara, kill 120 million Americans-and who has himself deployed
an effective ABM that might cut his own losses to an acceptable level-
might in the future be sorely tempted to attack America in the hope of
winning "the final victory" with one massive blow.
In short, the argument that the best defense is a good offense is
not applicable here because the U. S. has elected to take the defense.
We have given the Soviet Union the first strike in the event of nuclear
war. Yet we have no defense other than our threat to strike back. (See
ICBM section for further discussion.)
2. Against ABM
The expense of the ABM is prohibitive, and at the very least, would
place a tremendous strain upon the U. S. economy.
Stretched over a ten-year period, the $40-billion which OSD now
estimates is required for a comprehensive ABM system would be only
$4-billion per year and could be readily borne by the American economy.
Our total defense budget in 1967 will top $75-billion with supplemental
requests for the Vietnam War and the economy has still proved viable.
Vietnam costs alone came to more than $25-billion in 1966 and the
stakes there do not begin to compare with the stakes in an intercon-
tinental nuclear war which would kill tens of millions of our people.
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Secretary McNamara has estimated that even a $20-billion expendi-
ture for deployment of NIKE-X, supplemented by a fallout shelter pro-
gram, would save 70-to-90 million American lives and hundreds of bil-
lions of dollars in property.
It should be noted, however, that OSD's $40-billion figure represents
the "maximum feasible protection" in a total defensive system that in-
cludes $5-billion for a fallout shelter program and a $15-billion for beefing
up the aging air defense system. It is argued that there is no point in
guarding against one kind of attack if another kind of attack can get
through. Nevertheless, these other expenses are not part of the ABM
system any more than is a necessary ICBM system. The remaining $20-
billion would be for the ABM.
If $20-billion over a period of ten years can protect 70-to-9() million
lives, then the "insurance" cost for each year per individual protected
would amount to $67 per year, or about $5 per month. Should one
choose the $40-billion figure, even $10 per month seems cheap insurance
for such protection.
It must also be noted here what several recent offensive weapons
systems have cost. Building these was a burden which the United
States bore without complaint: ICBM system: $20-billion; POLARIS
system: $11.8-billion; B-52 system: $8-billion.
3. Against ABM
An American commitment to build an ABM would accelerate the
arms race, thereby reducing our security.
The Soviets have already opted for acceleration, not only with their
current deployment of an extensive ABM system but by increasing their
:ICBM force, and in the development and deployment of many other
military components, including a nuclear submarine strike force capable
of delivering missiles on American cities.
In this connection, it is interesting to note that on January 15, 1966,
Charles M. Herzfeld, Director of Advanced Research Projects Agency
in the DOD, told a European Study Commission conference in London
that the U.S.argument against deployment of ABMs, (i.e., that it would
accelerate the arms race) was "put to the Russians at least three Pug-
wash Conferences ago. On the first two occasions the Russians did not
even understand the argument that there might be an advantage in not
having a defense; the third time they said it was too late."
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 App ecretaryrMeNamara0adm ts0 tha I~two signiifican 9ch0anges a0e 19-9
occurred during the last year in our projections of Soviet strategic
forces. The first is a faster-than-expected rate of construction of hard
ICBM silos; the second is more positive evidence of a deployment of
an anti-ballistic missile defense system around Moscow."so
The concomitant argument that an arms buildup would reduce U. S.
security is difficult to understand. Every Soviet arms development which
is not at least matched by a U. S. effort reduces our nation's security.
Since we have made it abundantly clear that the U. S. will maintain a
second-strike policy, there is no need for the present Soviet buildup-
unless they intend to use their new strategic weapons for nuclear black-
mail or a first strike.
4. Against ABM
U. S. deployment of an ABM would be a provocative measure which
would heighten world tensions.
For ABM
It should by now be clearly understood that an ABM is a purely
defensive system, particularly in the hands of a nation which religiously
adheres to a second-strike posture. However, if a nation was indeed
preparing for all-out war, it would naturally place a high priority on an
effective ABM so that it could protect itself after delivering a first strike.
An ABM itself cannot logically be provocative. But, coupled with
an offensive buildup such as the Soviet Union is now pushing, it could
indeed increase world tensions, whereas a U. S. ABM effort would now
tend to stabilize the strategic balance and ultimately reduce tensions.
During his February 1967 visit to Great Britain, Soviet Premier
Kosygin openly defended the U.S.S.R.'s action in deploying an ABM
on the grounds that a country has the right to provide for its own de-
fense. If this argument were used by the United States, a non-aggressive
nation, the logic of this view would be difficult to dispute. Used by a
leader of a nation firmly committed to world domination, it certainly
appears provocative.
Although an effective defense system strengthens any military pos-
ture by protecting the base from which offensive forays can be made,
defensive systems that cannot threaten a potential enemy will not pro-
voke an attack unless the adversary already has designs for conquest.
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Throughout history, defensive works and fortifications have tended to
stabilize the political environment because they lend a sense of security
to those behind the fortifications which makes it less demanding for
them to destroy their enemies.
Today, America's continued emphasis on offensive strategic weapons
does much more to strain world tensions than deployment of an ABM.
As Soviet Major General Nikolai Talenski puts it, "only the side which
intends to use its means of attack for aggressive purposes can wish to
slow down the creation and improvement of anti-ballistic defense sys-
tems. For the peace-loving states, anti-missile systems are really a
means of building up their security."61
By placing our sole reliance for deterrence on ICBMs, POLARIS
and POSEIDON missiles, and the remaining manned bomber force, the
United States places itself in the dangerous position of having only one
option left if it is faced with a Soviet ultimatum to surrender. It must
either fire its offensive nuclear weapons or give up its sovereignty. An
ABM would at least strengthen the hand of the President if he were
confronted with such a fateful decision, and it might well stay the hand
of an enemy at a critical moment in history.
5. Against ABM
An ABM would be of little use without a concurrent fallout shelter
program, which would also greatly burden the economy and frighten
the American public.
In his 1967 Posture Statement, Secretary McNamara says: "A sig-
nificant amount of fallout protection exists today. By the end of the
current fiscal year, we expect that this effort will have identified about
160 million shelter spaces. . . ." Although Secretary McNamara con-
cedes that a "substantial portion of our population would still be left
without adequate fallout protection," he adds that "much of the short-
fall, we believe, could be met by making, at little or no cost, relatively
minor changes in the design of new buildings."62 (Emphasis added.)
This "significant" present protection has been achieved with a rela-
tively low expenditure for Civil Defense, an expenditure which the
Secretary estimates at $111-million for Fiscal 1968. However, to pro-
vide a really effective fallout shelter program the DOD previously esti-
61. Technology Week, March 27, 1967, p. 16.
62. Posture Statement, January 23, 1967, p. 63.
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mated the cost at $5-billion. Spread over the ten years needed to deploy
the concomitant ABM system this would average out to about $500-
million per year. Certainly, this is a modest price tag to put upon a pro-
gram that even without an ABM could save many millions of American
lives, particularly when the U. S. is spending 50 times that amount an-
nually on the Vietnam War.
As for the argument that an accelerated shelter program would
frighten the public, it would seem that Americans would be far better
off knowing the facts if ultimately their lives could be forfeited through
ignorance and lack of preparation. For many years, the U.S.S.R. has re-
quired every Soviet citizen over 18 years of age to take intensive courses
in Civil Defense. In comparison, the American effort is indeed puny.
In 1966, General Wheeler, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff,
testified before the House Appropriations Committee that the Joint
Chiefs favored both an ABM and a fallout shelter program. General
Wheeler believed that a low-key approach, coupled with intelligent pub-
lic education, would overcome the fears that might be associated with a
shelter program.63
6. Against ABM
We are not certain how far the U.S.S.R. has gone with its own ABM,
which may only be intended as a defense against Communist China.
The major U.S.S.R. ABM deployment is known to be along its north-
western borders, anchored on the Baltic city of Tallinn. This is in the
path of the known route most American ICBMs would take in a re-
taliatory attack on the Soviet Union-not in the path of any present
or likely future strike from China.
Secretary McNamara says that it "appears unlikely that the Chinese
could deploy a significant number of operational ICBMs before the
mid-1970's, or that those ICBMs would have great reliability, speed of
response, or substantial protection against attack."64 Is it possible that
the Soviets view Communist China's strategic threat with greater alarm
than does our own Secretary of Defense? If so, America had better look
to its own defenses and build an ABM system to intercept a possible
attack from China.
63. House Appropriations Committee Hearings for Fiscal Year 1967, Part I, pp.
88-89.
64. Posture Statement, January 23, 1967, p. 42.
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As to the extent of Soviet ABM deployment, the U a pro-
gressed well beyond the deployment of ABMs around a major city or
several cities; it had developed a comprehensive, advanced and expen-
sive system. Even more important, the Soviet system is evidently not
a `point' defense system, but an `area' defense system. It is geared, that
is to say, not only to defend cities and concentrations of weaponry, but
to protect military installations that have already been widely dis-
persed . . . . "65
Moreover, Soviet leaders have repeatedly stated in public that their
nation has an effective ABM. On April 23, 1966 United Press Interna-
tional reported from Budapest that Soviet Defense Minister Malinov-
sky claimed the U.S.S.R. had already "introduced" a defense system ca-
pable of intercepting whole squadrons of attacking bombers and knock-
ing out incoming missiles.
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111IIISUBMARINE-LAUNCHED MISSILES
149 BALLISTIC MISSILES
(1 MT)
98 CRUISE MISSILES
(0.5 MT)
208 POLARIS 2 (.7 MT)
448 POLARIS 3 (.7 MT)
Note: The U.S. SLBM System is more sophisticated than the U.S.S.R. Sys-
tem. However, the U.S. System is a counter to the 750 Soviet IRBMs. Con-
sidering that about 50% of the U.S. Force is kept on station, this amounts
to 352 Polaris missilies, only 22 of which might be fired at one time.
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D. SUBMARINE-LAUNCHED MISSILES (SLM) AND
ANTI-SUBMARINE WARFARE FORCES (ASW)
U.S.S.R. SLM Capability
A move to the sea is in progress for the Soviet Union's rocket forces
as a part of the U.S.S.R.'s determination to gain domination in hydro-
space, precisely as it seeks supremacy in aerospace.
From an examination of Jane's Fighting Ships 1966-1967, it is
clear that the U.S.S.R. plans to use submarines as launching platforms
for a substantial portion of its missile arsenal. Indeed, as Captain H. B.
Sweitzer, USN, has pointed out in the Proceedings of the U. S. Naval
Institute (September 1966), "Seventy-seven Soviet (missile-firing) sub-
marines, both conventional and nuclear-powered, are in operation, includ-
ing 10 "E" class, 13 "H" class, two "J" class, 30 "G" class, 10 "Z" class,
and 12 "W" class; each carries from two-to-six guided or ballistic mis-
siles." Jane's Fighting Ships 1966-1967, also reports that an additional
30 submarines are under construction in Soviet dockyards."66
The "H" type submarine for example, is a nuclear-powered ballistic
missile type, with a displacement of 3,500 tons. Armament consists of
three ballistic missile tubes for missiles with a reported range of 600-
to-3,000 miles.
Space/Aeronautics concludes: "For the present, with all its various
limitations, the U. S. Navy's attack submarine force is in generally
better overall shape than the U.S.S.R.'s, as nearly anyone this side of
Moscow can figure. Yet the intentions of the Soviet Union are clear:
to wipe out our present lead in submarine technology; to threaten the
POLARIS-POSEIDON strategic deterrent; to interdict both our com-
merce and our naval power by its submarine force should it come to
war."67
This journal also pointed out, that while what the U. S. knows about
the Soviets' nuclear submarines "is very sparse," it is possible to project
certain characteristics from knowledge of submarine technology. If the
Soviet submarines aren't as good as U. S. craft yet, the journal said,
"they certainly can become that good."
66. Jane's Fighting Ships 1966-1967, pp. 433, 434.
67. Space/Aeronautics, July 1966.
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&
in appraising a oviet seaborne missi a rea , e ov
effort at sea should be taken into consideration. Paralleling the Soviet
rocket effort of the 1950's and 1960's has been an enormous oceano-
graphic program. To conduct successful submarine missile attacks, Soviet
naval commanders require detailed information of the sea bottom in
critical areas. Indeed, it long has been believed, and frequently reported,
that the Soviets have marked the sea bottom in certain places as possi-
ble firing points. While the under-ice operations of certain American
submarines, notably the SKATE, have received widespread attention,
it should be appreciated that the Soviets have been studying Arctic
navigation for decades. One danger is that Soviet submarines, intent
on making missile attacks against the North American continent, would
enter Hudson's Bay which would enable them to make a deep penetra-
tion of the continental land mass.
Any appraisal of the Soviet submarine missile threat should not
downgrade the menace because of the limited range of the U.S.S.R.'s sub-
marine-launched missiles. On the west, the Soviet Union can only be
approached through narrow or arctic waters. Thus it is necessary that
U. S. missiles have a greater stand-off capability, whereas the Soviets,
could be expected to employ their missiles in a first strike, and could
deploy their submarines close to the shores of the United States.
It should be borne in mind that the military applications of hydro-
space are only beginning to be made. Even as satellites in space offer a
potential for military action, the seabed offers opportunities for launch-
ing platforms of the future. The advanced nations currently are develop-
iing deep submergence technology which will enable men to live and
work at great depths. This will lead, initially, to undersea mining and
oil drilling beyond the continental shelf-on submerged lands which
have no sovereign claims at present. It also will lead, one can be sure,
to the development of missile-firing bases on the seabed.
The United States needs to look ahead, both in terms of submarine
technology and the law of the sea, to undersea defense zones from
which Soviet submarine forces would be excluded.
Space/Aeronautics has observed that "looking toward the future of
submarine warfare, submariners feel that the force in being in the late
1970's may include small reconnaissance craft, and `bomber' types even
larger than the 425-foot LAFAYETTE class of FBM boat. Armament
may include more sophisticated missiles and torpedoes; the `bomber'
types may operate with drone escorts. Ocean-bottom armories and fuel-
ing stations, and fixed-site (or crawler-mounted) launch platforms, may
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States cannot permit the Soviet Union to have superiority in such under-
sea strategic weapon systems. This is all the more true in that, at this
time-as The Institute for Strategic Studies has noted-missile-bear-
ing submarines have an increasingly important role in Soviet strategy.
Many Russian submarines and surface ships, it should be noted,
carry air-breathing missiles with a range of about 300-to-500 miles.
The Soviet Union has 46 submarines which carry 149 ballistic mis-
siles and 17 submarines which carry a total of 98 CRUISE missiles.6"9
The United States, of course, is precluded from destroying Soviet
submarines in peacetime. During the Cuban missile crisis we were made
aware of Soviet submarines cruising near United States shores. If they
had been firing missiles, their mode of attack would probably have been
to surface at night, fire their missiles, and quickly submerge. In a peace-
time environment they would not have been subject to attack until
they had taken the act of war by firing their missiles.
We can take little comfort in the fact that Soviet SLMs are of shorter
range than our POLARIS missiles. Ours must be long-ranged to reach
Russian targets, while Soviet vessels can approach well within range of
the principal coastal cities of the United States. Also, the new Soviet
submarine-launched ballistic missiles have a range comparable to our
POLARIS.
United States SLBM Capability
When the last of the 41 POLARIS submarines is operational in the
early fall of 1967, the United States will be in a position, theoretically,
to deploy a total of 656 POLARIS missiles at sea-or 16 per submarine.
Due to overhaul and refit, however, only 22 POLARIS submarines will
be on station at any one time, or, an actual figure of 352 POLARIS
missiles available for launch. Seven of the 41 boats will be assigned to
the Pacific, according to latest reports, and the rest will be on duty in
the Atlantic and Mediterranean. Thirteen submarines are equipped with
the A-2 missiles, and the remainder with the A-3 missiles. The latter is a
rocket with a range of 2,500 miles, and will have superior accuracy.
L. Edgar Prina, editor of NAVY Magazine, reports that the A-3 "is
believed capable of carrying a warhead of one megaton or an equivalent
of one million tons of TNT."
68. Space/Aeronautics, July 1966.
69. Jane's Fighting Ships 1966-1967, pp. 433, 434.
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The Secretary of Defense has announced that $5- Ilion wi be
devoted to the POSEIDON submarine-launched missile. This will cover
development of the missiles and fitting them in some of the nuclear-
powered FBM boats.
With only 22 POLARIS submarines actually on station at any one
time, the United States which has, after all, a four-ocean defense re-
sponsibility can hardly be said to have a fully adequate at-sea missile
force. A reasonable number of POSEIDON submarines on station in
the Indian Ocean would, for example, not only enhance U. S. deterrence
of a nuclear war but would create an additional heavy burden to the
Soviet ASW effort and might force them to withdraw ASW units now
deployed in the Atlantic and Pacific and thus move them further away
from U. S. shores.
ANTI-SUBMARINE WARFARE FORCES
Even as advocates of aerospace preparedness insist on prompt de-
ployment of an American ABM defense and development of a military
capability in space, so do students of seapower emphasize the need for
swiftly augmenting U. S. anti-submarine warfare forces to deal with
the growing Soviet undersea threat.
The Soviet position with respect to sea warfare was first enunciated
at the Communist Party Congress of 1956 when Marshal G. Zhukov
stated: "In a future war the struggle at sea will be of even greater
importance than it was in the land war." In the decade since that state-
ment was made, the Soviet Union (a land power by tradition) has em-
barked on massive programs aimed at upgrading all aspects of its sea
power. These programs have massive merchant ship construction, full
utilization of fisheries vessels, combination of the former separated Black
Sea, Baltic and Northern fleets into a single high seas fleet, establish-
ment of a powerful task force in the Mediterranean, and-most sig-
nificantly-the crash drive for a missile-firing nuclear submarine force.
Not only has the Soviet Union pushed ahead with missile subma-
rines, but it has developed nuclear attack submarines for anti-submarine
warfare purposes. Typical of these new boats is the "N" class sub--
:LENINSKY KOMSOMOL 270. This is a fast (30 knot) nuclear-
;powered fleet submarine designed as a hunter-killer. It is armed with
21-inch torpedoes which are launched through six bow tubes. Such
craft undoubtedly would be employed against American missile-firing
submarines, if the latter could be detected.70
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priority concern of the United States. To this end, the U. S. in the
1950's stepped up its oceanographic research and refined the techniques
of searching for submarines by helicopter-lifted sonar and by airborne
sensors. In both the 1950's and 1960's, the U. S. Navy also emphasized
development of stand-off weapons as well as detection devices. The
ASROC anti-submarine rocket is now in general use, and gives surface
ships a nuclear punch-if the enemy submarine can be located. How-
ever, its effectiveness today lies in the fact that it uses a non-nuclear
MARK 46 torpedo, which has been shown to be effective against sub-
marine targets. Other advanced detection devices and weapons include
the SQS-26 Sonar and a Variable Depth Sonar, plus new torpedoes and
drone helicopters. Destroyers are specifically configured for ASW, and
the Navy continues to build special anti-submarine escort ships.
The devices available for detection of conventional diesel boats in-
clude sonobuoys dropped from carrier-based aircraft and magnetic
anomaly detectors. But ASW commanders generally admit that these
devices are, at present, grossly inadequate against fast, deep-diving,
nuclear-powered submarines.
In rough weather, the "nukes" are well able to run away from sur-
face attackers. Airborne detection systems now in operation cannot pin-
point a nuclear submarine. It is now agreed, therefore, that the most
effective means of dealing with Soviet nuclear submarines is another
submarine, though the U. S. has a valuable aid in fixed long-range sub-
marine detection systems in the Atlantic.
At present, however, the Navy's force of attack submarines-sub-
marines designed to fight other submarines-is a mixed diesel nuclear
force of only 105 boats. Seventy of these boats are of basic World War
II design, with improvements. They provide excellent submerged lis-
tening platforms, but cannot deal with nuclear subs on a competitive
basis. By fiscal 1969 there will be 64 effective SSNs authorized. Even
more significant, however, is the fact that the projected 64 SSN force
would be thin indeed in view of the multitude of Soviet missile-carrying
surface ships and the large and growing Soviet merchant fleet ships
all of which would constitute targets in the event of war. And these
would necessarily be targets for a submarine force operating in Soviet-
controlled waters where our submarines would be able to operate only
in a war situation.
This force is meager, especially in view of the need to divide the
force between the Atlantic and the Pacific. The SKIPJACK class boats
are the fastest in the world, with an estimated top speed of close to 40
knots; but these and other attack boats are few in number.
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he limite size o the presently programme attac submarine force
is all the more disturbing in that changes in surveillance of the oceans
almost certainly will produce the need for boats which can operate at
vastly greater depths. New passive sensors which can observe radiation
in all portions of the electromagnetic spectrum may, in the future, en-
able reconnaissance satellites to "see" submarines operating at current
depths. The deep submergence of submarine forces is desirable because
of the problems it raises in the enemy's ASW effort. With the need for
true deep-diving submarine forces will come a parallel need for missile
weapons capable of being fired from the depths. The U. S. Navy has
pioneered SUBROC, a nuclear rocket for use against sub-surface tar-
gets. But naval commanders would like to see SUBROC equipped with
an airburst-nuclear warhead.
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BOMBER BALANCE
BISON 10 TONS 110
BEAR 20 TONS 100
BADGER 10 TONS 900
BLINDER 6 TONS ?
B-52 37.5 TONS 600
B-58 6 TONS 80
Note: Bomb load of each type is noted in tons of conventional bombs
normally carried by that type of bomber. The total tonnage is that which
all strategic bombers in the national inventory could carry at one time.
Converted to nuclear yield, the figure would be higher by a factor of
1,000,000 or more. The Soviet conversion factor-that is, their nuclear
explosive yield/weight ratio-is higher than that of the U.S.
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The Soviet Union has the numerically largest strategic bomber force
in the world today. This is because the U.S.S.R. has retained its air-
refuelable medium bombers (900 BADGERs and BLINDERs) while
the United States has scrapped a large force of over 1,000 B-47's. Thus
the Soviets now have 1,110 strategic bombers versus 680 United States
strategic bombers.
This change in the balance of U.S.-U.S.S.R. strategic bomber forces
represents a reversal of the United States' former numerical preponder-
ance in manned bombers, and poses a threat to the United States which
is largely overlooked because the spotlight has been focused on the
ICBM threat.71
The Soviet strategic bomber forces are composed of the following
types and numbers of aircraft: 7 2
About nine hundred Soviet Air Force BADGERs (TU-16). Oper-
ational since 1955, the BADGER is a twin-turbojet subsonic medium
bomber similar to the former U.S. B-47 and equipped for in-flight re-
fueling. The BADGER has a bomb load capacity of 20,000 pounds and
some versions carry the KIPPER standoff nuclear missile, with a range
of 450 miles. The BADGERs are expected to be replaced by the
BLINDER (TU-22) which has supersonic capability and a bomb load
capacity of 12,000 pounds. The BLINDER was operational in 1962
and carries a KITCHEN air-to-surface missile. A few BLINDERs are
included in the above estimate of the BADGER force.
One hundred and ten BISONs (M-4's). Operational since 1956, this
four-engine turbojet bomber is comparable to our long-range B-52. It
has a bomb load capacity of 20,000 pounds.
One hundred BEARs (TU-95). This is a huge four-engine turbo-
prop bomber with a range of 7,800 miles. Its commercial version, the
TU-114, is the largest aircraft in the world. A BEAR-type aircraft flies
71. Major Arthur J. Ruppert, USAF, "The Soviet Long-Range Bomber Force,"
a thesis submitted to the Air Command and Staff College, June 1965, Space/
Aeronautics, November 1966, p. 63.
72. The Military Balance Institute for Strategic Studies, 1966, pp. 3, 44.
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 Ap p r~v~ld~~ rrier~~1~6i?4di@~1101SvIb~'ehGk*Rb~ R'.9031&~ffi8~2~fl-9
gers and freight. First operational in 1956, the BEAR has a bomb load
capacity of over 40,000 pounds and carries a KANGAROO standoff
missile.
Despite pronouncements of Soviet officials that the bomber is ob-
solete, it appears that bombers still play a major role in Soviet stra-
tegic planning. Marshal of the Soviet Union, V. D. Sokolvsky has written
that the long-range bomber force would "deliver blows" after a first
strike by Soviet ICBMs. Air-to-surface missiles would be used first in
the attack, launched from a point beyond the range of anti-aircraft fire.
The United States has phased out all of its medium B-47 bombers
and retains an aging force of 600 B-52's and 80 B-58's. 3 Air Force
planners had expected to replace obsolete strategic bombers with more
modern counterparts such as the supersonic B-58's and the XB-70, but
these plans were discarded as the result of unfavorable OSD cost-effec-
tiveness studies. The requirements for an Advanced Manned Strategic
Aircraft (AMSA) continues to be advanced by the United States Air
Force to provide strategic flexibility and optimum options for deter-
rence or retaliation. 7 4
Current Department of Defense philosophy considers the manned
strategic bomber to be "provocative" for two main reasons: First, it is
thought vulnerable to surprise missile attack when sitting on an air-
base. In order to use it at all, it must be launched before the enemy
missile strikes. Thus, it hints of a "first strike" strategy. Second it
is believed that the bomber is subject to less positive control. than are
missiles and may attack without authority through accident or madness
of its crew.
These two philosophical objections to bombers by modern defense
strategists have probably affected the objectivity of cost-effectiveness
studies. Few military planners accept the "provocative" argument and
the Joint Chiefs of Staff have always approved of a follow-on bomber,
the AMSA. Some point out that strip and air alerts will reduce vul-
nerability probably to the degree available for hardened sites or P0-
LARIS missiles, and that the "accident" or "madness" arguments, if
73. Hearings on 5.666 before Joint Session of the Senate Armed Services Committee
and the Senate DOD Subcommittee on Appropriations, January 24, 26, 27, 30,
31, February 1 and 2, 1967, pp. 835, 836.
74. House Appropriations Committee Hearings on the Department of Defense,
1967; Part I, pp. 518, 525-528.
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 aa`ffrAvAY, t0b@Yeff"N/R%1 ivfdci l i ~Q~i i Ql0~a 2 0119-9
on POLARIS submarines.
Other arguments used against the AMSA are:
1. Their relatively long time of flight as compared to the ICBM.
Rebuttal: This is being cut down with advances in hypersonic flight
and could be made comparable to ICBMs with SKYBOLT-type, stand-
off missiles. With a long-range standoff missile, the AMSA would be-
come as invulnerable an IRBM launcher as the POLARIS submarines.
2. Vulnerability to SAM missile defenses.
Rebuttal: Experience over North Vietnam has indicated that SAM
missiles have been highly over-rated in past cost-effectiveness studies.
Against low-flying aircraft using evasive tactics and others countermea-
sures, SAM-2 missiles have had less than a 6 percent effectiveness. SAM-
3 missiles now guarding Russia, but not yet in North Vietnam, may be
more effective. New countermeasures carried on an AMSA could reduce
SAM accuracy still more.
Arguments for the AMSA include:
1. The AMSA's broader operational flexibility will provide a spec-
trum of strategic options. It can attack on an infinite number of un-
predictable flight patterns, high and low, thus making enemy air defense
extremely costly. It would outflank any Soviet anti-ballistic missile
system and penetrate where missiles might be stopped.
2. Over friendly territory, aircraft are the least vulnerable of any
strategic vehicle and can only be attacked by long-range interceptors
which do not now appear in the Soviet inventory.
3. AMSA would provide a reaction to crisis, short of an actual nu-
clear attack. AMSA can be launched on alert and recalled; ICBMs
must proceed to the target once they have been launched or be de-
stroyed in flight. AMSA thus provides a strong psychological tour de
force in crisis management.
4. AMSA can deliver nuclear weapons with greater discrimination
and more last minute corrections than can ICBMs thus reducing the
probability of unnecessary population destruction and permitting
tighter, more effective crisis management.
5. AMSA can carry exotic sensors and collect invaluable recon-
naissance information for relaying to command posts. The best of these
sensors is the human eye backed by human intelligence and utilizing
electronic and optical aids. Human faculties are not found in ICBMs
or reconnaissance satellites.
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api intelligence ee ack is possib a wit an n moving nuclear war neither side will know who is winning without
AMSA. The manned strategic vehicle is protected at all times by the
infinite capabilities of human judgment which can perceive and react
instantly to unprogrammed enemy deceptions or other unforseeable
events where a spot decision may mean the success of the mission. The
acknowledged value of a man-in-space program for overcoming mechan-
ical malfunctions is illustrative of the validity of maintaining human
control over strategic weapon systems.
With the continued thinning-out of continental radar systems and
air defense aircraft, the United States is being exposed to attack by
Russian airbreather weapon systems as a follow-on to a first-strike
missile attack. The only Improved Manned Interceptors (IMI) under
development, but not scheduled fcr procurement, are F-12's built around
a larger SR-71 airframe.75 Present flying and radar equipment is be-
coming obsolete and is wearing out.
The Soviet Union, on the other hand, is modernizing its strategic
bomber force with supersonic, medium-range BLINDERs and continues
to deploy an extensive air defense system. The possibility of replacing
B-52's with the 210 FB-111's, as proposed by Secretary McNamara (a
modification of the TFX variable-wing fighter built by General Dy-
namics) in the 1970's, will be a stop-gap measure because of the in-
ability of such a small bomber to carry adequate sensing devices, navi-
gation equipment and penetration aids-not to mention its light bomb
load and relatively short range without refueling. In any event, the
Soviets would still retain their numerical superiority after the full de-
ployment of the FB-111.
Secretary McNamara neglects to consider Soviet medium bombers
in the number of 155 Soviet intercontinental bombers listed. in his Pos-
ture Statement of January 23, 1967. Yet, 900 BADGERs are assigned
to the Soviet strategic air command and with in-flight refueling, they
have an intercontinental range. It is reasonable that they be considered
in this strategic category as were the United States' B-47's before their
phase-out.
It might be noted that perhaps all the BADGERs do not carry
bombs and that some would be used for in-flight refueling. This would
reduce the overall bomb payload capability of the total force. But it
still leaves the BADGER as a formidable force to be reckoned with
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 A-allrojaedtEW 8 fi l o W 1 e y 2 ffl : qAR 0 Wfl2&119-9
strategic balance.
The explosive power carried by the respective bomber forces is a
more accurate measure of their respective strengths. On the basis of
bomb loadings measured by weight of bombs carried, the United States
has nearly a 2-to-1 advantage with 22,980 tons for the U. S. and 12,100
tons for the U.S.S.R. However, the Soviet advantage in yield/weight
ratio for nuclear bombs (see ICBM section) would give them parity
in delivery capacity as measured in megatonnage.
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 ApprsP ElewEXPONIWEXRE0001 00230119-9
NONE
SCRAG - 30 MT
a
Note: Soviet leaders have publicly noted that the U.N. Resolution against
space weapons does not deny the development of such weapons and the
Soviets have frequently boasted of their capability to employ orbital
nuclear weapons, the Scrag, specifically. Nonetheless, the U.S. has riot
developed a military capability in space though the Gemini series clearly
shows it could do so.
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SCRAG Shown in Moscow 1965
Capable of delivering a 30 MT war-
head from fractional orbital or or-
bital trajectory.
Sources:
The Military Balance 1966-1967, ISS, 1966, p. 2.
Military Review, November 1966, p. 106.
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F. SPACE WEAPONS*
The United States Program
The United States has conscientiously avoided the development of
space weapons and has been the leader in resolutions and agreements
to ban weapons of mass destruction in space. It is generally held that
ICBMs which enter space on a ballistic curve are not space weapons,
but rather that orbital weapons alone apply to the space category. The
Soviet Union's designation of "global" rockets which follow Keplerian
elliptical trajectories the long way around the earth, (but short of a full
orbit) have not been designated as space weapons, yet would logically
appear to be so.
When the successful rendezvous of GEMINI 6 and 7 demonstrated,
in small part, the great military potential of space, the Department of
Defense officially ruled out any idea of a strategic weapons system in-
volving satellites with nuclear warheads.
"There are two reasons for this, the Pentagon stated: U. S. defense
experts insist that better accuracy, reliability, and warhead load can be
obtained with long-range ballistic missiles; and there is agreement be-
tween the major nuclear powers not to use satellites as weapons."76
The American space effort is one of civilian exploration in the in-
terest of science under the National Aeronautics and Space Administra-
tion (NASA). The United States, to date, has spent some $30-billion
on its space effort. Of this total, some $9-billion has gone into military
space programs. This does not include any space weapons systems or
even their development. NASA's ultimate goal is to land men on the
moon rather than to exploit the region near earth for military purposes.
The DOD's position is that there is "no requirement" to put military
men in space.77 In fact, the United States halted its promising DYNA-
SOAR development in December 1963. The military Manned Orbital
Laboratory (MOL) will not be launched before 1968. American military
satellites are for reconnaissance, for missile-launch warning, for com-
munications, for precise navigation, and for weather reconnaissance.
Thus, as far as United States satellites are concerned, they are all de-
fensive; none are offensive.
* See also the Space part of the Strategic Objectives section of this study.
76. Associated Press dispatch dated Washington, December 17, 1965.
77. U. S. News and World Report, June 21,1965, p. 42.
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In the Soviet Union, space programs are run entirely by military
men with military goals foremost in mind. Several official Soviet sources
claimed explicitly in connection with the display of a 3-stage missile in
the Bolshevik Revolution Day parade on November 7, 1965, that they
now possessed a "monstrous new terrible weapon." Both TASS and
Izvestiya78 described it substantially as an "orbital missile [whose]
warheads can deliver their surprise blow on the first or any other orbit
around the earth." This weapon has since been code-named SCRAG.
Stress was laid on the capability of the new weapon "delivering its blow
unexpectedly." The May 1965 issue of Ogonock80 contained an article
describing the perfection of an orbital missile capable of carrying a 100-
megaton warhead. Unclassified sources give the orbital version of
SCRAG a 30-megaton warhead.81 The Chief of the Soviet Air Force,
Konstantin Vershinin, said in 1964, that the Soviet Union is developing
space craft that could take-off and land at any airfield and "could knock
out any foe."82 This sounds much like the cancelled U. S. DYNA-SOAR,
and if true, points the Soviet Union far ahead in the military man-in-
space program.
What are the advantages and disadvantages of orbital nuclear wea-
pons compared with ICBMs or other delivery vehicles of nuclear war-
heads? First, delivery time for weapons in orbit, assuming the weapon
is over the intended target area, is much less. Consequently, under cer-
tain controlled conditions, the reaction time available to the defending
power may be cut significantly from about 15 minutes for an ICBM to
from four-to-six minutes for an orbital missile.
The ground-based ICBM, on the other hand, is considered to have
three advantages over orbital bombs: (1) numbers available for firing,
(2) accuracy, (3) positive control. A large number of orbiting space-
craft might bring on a war that home-based ICBMs would not. Many
officials also point out that the orbiting weapon is at a disadvantage
because it must be near the target area to be a faster-firing weapon
78. Izuestiya, November 8, 1965, p. 2.
79. United Press International dispatches, dateline Moscow, November 8, 1965 and
November 11, 1965.
80. Ogonock, No. 20, May 1965, pp. 6-7.
81. The Military Balance 1966-1967, (London: Institute for Strategic Studies,
1966), p. 44.
82. The New York Times, August 18, 1964, p. 17.
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 Apprq fic r f CeAMp% ;%qAffil $it J%
.JZWMBO
weapon might be half way around the world or 45 minutes plus de-
orbiting time from its target when ordered to fire. An ICBM, on the
other hand, although it may take longer to travel (32 minutes to strike
a target 10,000 Km. away) is always the same distance away and hence
more predictable.
Those who counsel against development of an orbital bomb by the
United States also say it is less accurate than ICBMs. This is illustrated
by the de-orbiting of astronauts in their re-entry capsules. It should be
pointed out that the accuracy of de-orbiting American astronauts has
been increasing in each of the GEMINI flights and can be expected
to continue to improve. Little has been stated publicly about the ac-
curacy of de-orbiting Soviet launches, but it is generally conceded that
the Soviet Union has a sophistication comparable to that of the United
States.
Orbital nuclear weapons systems can be used in other ways. A nu-
clear bomb of high enough yield, detonated in space while still in or-
bit over a target area, could be a devastating prelude to an ICBM at-
tack. A possible effect of such a very high-yield weapon exploded in
space would be the searing of a large area of the earth beneath. Amer-
ican scientists have stated that the Soviet Union is, in fact, capable of
producing 1.00-megaton weapons, as she claims. There can be little
doubt that its boosters have the capacity to orbit a bomb of this size
or even larger. The Soviet BIG BROTHER booster demonstrated its
ability in 1965 to put a 13.5 ton payload in orbit.83
The heaviest object orbited by the United States was a 21,000
pound satellite launched by a TITAN III-C rocket. The non-military
SATURN V, due to become operational in 1967, will have a thrust; of
7.5-million pounds-over three times as powerful as the TITAN III-C.
An orbital high-yield detonation would certainly impair communica-
tions to some degree and possibly damage the United States' offensive
missile system over a wide area. It has been publicly acknowledged that
the space tests by the United States from Johnston Island in 1957 and
1958 blacked out most communications in the Pacific for an hour or
more.84
Thus, if the Soviet Union chose to use orbital nuclear weapons in
conjunction with a first strike with ICBMs, the orbital weapons could
83. U. S. News and World Report, August 30, 1965, p. 25.
84. William E. Howard and James Barr, Spacecraft and Missiles of the World-
1966, (New York: Harcourt, Brace, and World, Inc., 1966), p. 41.
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 00rupy1211g0119-9
weu criipp e t ie "unI ieteaebtates Q s/e ena-strike 6apacity6b9Ry
communications necessary to retaliate, or by other phenomena such as
heat, blast and various electromagnetic effects.
If the Soviet Union is developing the option of orbital nuclear attack,
it is unlikely that launching of orbital weapons would be announced as
such. Orbital rockets could be launched under various covers, as scien-
tific satellites, space explorations, or manned satellites if the planned
attack were imminent.
If the United States were to discover that the Soviet Union had
been indeed launching nuclear weapons into space orbit, there would be
two experimental weapons designed to knock them out: a THOR modi-
fication and a NIKE-ZEUS based on Johnston Island and Kwajalein
in the Pacific. Yet, there are some possible orbits from Soviet Union
launch sites which would be out of range for these two weapons. In 1964,
it was reported that the Soviet Union launched two satellites in orbits
which would take each over Johnston Island and Kwajalein. This oc-
curred shortly after the Presidential announcement of the United States'
anti-space weapons.85
A prerequisite to attacking a Soviet satellite in space, of course,
would be verification that it was actually carrying a nuclear weapon.
Shooting down a peaceful manned or scientific satellite would probably
be considered a provocative act of war unless it occurred over friendly
territory. If, however, it were widely believed that a nuclear payload
was truly in orbit, the country which destroyed it would be applauded
by all the other countries over which the orbital bomb had traveled.
That the Soviet Union would dare to risk the deployment of orbital
bombs is at least credible in view of experience during the Cuban missile
crisis. Surprise would be complete since the United States has no way
of determining if an orbital vehicle is bearing a nuclear weapon. Sur-
prise is also possible with the so-called global Soviet rockets which
could attack from over the South Polar regions and completely out-
flank America's continental Ballistic Missile Early Warning System
(BMEWS).
The Soviet Union could hint that certain orbiting craft were capable
of immobilizing our ICBM system. Combined with a means of counter-
ing the American POLARIS missile force, this might be the ultimate
nuclear blackmail.
In the United States we argue variously that space offensive nu-
clear delivery forces are less efficient, less accurate, and less credible,
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than ICBMs. But if the Soviet Union is dedicated to offensive world
objectives, the special effects of space-military offensive forces may ap-
pear very useful. Such effects are, for example, prestige, terror, pursua-
sion, coercion, pressure, psychological warfare, and demoralization. The
sight and electronic signals coming from Soviet military-orbital forces
in the free skies of the world day and night, with communist satellite
TV and propaganda tuned into Western sets around the world, would
not be attractive to contemplate in view of the Soviet goals of world-
wide communist domination.
Speaking at the annual meeting of the American Institute of Aero-
nautics and Astronautics at San Francisco on July 29, 1965, Dr. Albert
C. Hall, Deputy Director for Space, Office of the Director of Defense
Research and Engineering of the OSD, said, "We could no more go un-
protected against the masters of space than we could dare go unarmed
on land, sea or in the air."
Nevertheless, we are doing just that-going unprotected. The ex-
ceptional accomplishments of the GEMINI program and those ex-
pected of the APOLLO will not assure much military protection.
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a
w
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Chronology of Weapons-Grade Nuclear Materials Cutbacks
December 1962 President Kennedy on the "overkill" thesis in the course
of a radio-TV program, "There is just a limit to how much
we need, as well as how much we can afford, to have a
successful deterrent ... I would say when we start to talk
about the megatonnage we could bring into a nuclear war,
we are talking about annihilation. How many times do you
have to hit a target with nuclear weapons?" (The New
York Times, January 5, 1962, p. 14.)
November 1963 Oak Ridge Laboratory graphite reactor to be shut down
in November after 20 years' operation. Dr. Linus Pauling
puts U. S. nuclear arsenal at 240,000 megatons, U.S.S.R.'s
at 80,000; says U. S. has 12 times stockpile needed to wipe
out U.S.S.R. (The New York Times, September 29, 1963,
p. 51.)
January 1964 President Johnson, ordering cutbacks in manufacture of
fissionable materials and manufacture of arms, urges
U.S.S.R. do likewise as step toward "eventual abolition of
arms," State of Union Message; suggests move is possible
because building of arsenal is at point where it is becoming
excessive; administration officials note arsenal has in-
creased 50 percent in last 3 years, now includes tens of
thousands of weapons; AEC sees cutback saving $50-mil-
lion in fiscal '65, $70-million in next year. (The New York
Times, January 9, 1964, p. 1.)
January 1964 Two uranium-processing plants to close; operations at two
others cut. (The New York Times, January 12, 1964, p.
33.)
February 1964 U.S.S.R. Marshal Krylov holds U. S. stockpile exceeds
needs. (The New York Times, February 23, 1964, p. 21.)
June 1964 AEC stresses stockpile increases but at reduced rate, com-
ment of President Johnson statement on cut. (The New
York Times, August 21, 1964, p. 1.)
December 1964 Seaborg reports AEC will cut outlays for production of
fissionable material, news conference after conference with
President Johnson. (The New York Times, December 31,
1964, p. 1.)
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 N
aa-ryvuooor RpAlsspartt ot?the/./~5planl forRcDurrbin Bt03e sp9Rg0 atomic 0119-9
weapons, William C. Foster, Director of the Arms Con-
trol and Disarmament Agency, said in February 1964, that
the U. S. was "prepared to permit international inspec-
tion" of one of the four plutonium production reactors
scheduled to be shut down by the U. S. Since then, two of
the reactors have been shut down, one at Savannah River,
S. C., summer of 1964, and one at Hanford, Wash., on
January 2, 1965. The two remaining at Hanford were
scheduled to be shut down in May and June of 1965, leav-
ing the AEC with 10 reactors producing plutonium for
atomic weapons. (The New York Times, January 11, 1965,
p. 13.)
February 1965 Excerpt from AEC Authorizing Legislation-1966, p. 1919.
(Summary of operating programs Fiscal Year 1966) ".. .
Production of special nuclear materials will decline some-
what in 1966 as a result of reduced cascade power and the
first full year of operations after the shutdown of four pro-
duction reactors during 1964 and 1965. Work will continue
on process improvements to assure continuity and safety
of operation and more economical methods of production
Weapons program.-Operating costs for the weapons pro-
gram are estimated at $705.4-million in 1966 compared
with 1965 estimated costs of $753.3-million and 1964 actual
costs of $754.9-million. The weapons program encompasses
the production of atomic weapons; the maintenance of
stockpiled weapons in a state of constant readiness; the
design, development, and underground testing of new
weapons types; preparation for and maintenance of a
readiness capability to resume atmospheric testing; and
participating with the Department of Defense in the de-
velopment of test detection methods."
April 1965 President Johnson's comments on AEC program, April
17, 1965, letter to Chairman Seaborg, "The orderly cut-
back in the production of fissionable materials is a signi-
ficant example of this realism .. ." (AEC Authorizing
Legislation-1966, p. 1886.)
November 1965 AEC reports "no evidence" U.S.S.R. has carried out nu-
clear materials cutbacks announced April 20, 1964. This
question has been raised by Senator Jackson. (The New
York Times, November 25, 1965, p. 15.)
January 1966 President Johnson's Budget Message puts AEC appropria-
tions and estimated expenditures below Fiscal 1966 level;
expenditures down $90-million. (The New York Times,
January 25, 1966, pp. 18, 22.)
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January 1967 The Administration, in a budget-motivated gesture toward
slowing the atomic arms race, announced today (January
24, 1967) a further cut-back in the production of fission-
able materials for nuclear weapons. On July 1, 1967, AEC
will shut down the plutonium production reactor at Han-
ford, Washington. This will be the fifth reactor closed since
1964. Senator Henry M. Jackson expressed concern over
the decision "particularly in light of the substantial re-
quirements that could develop if a decision is made to pro-
duce and deploy an anti missile system." Senator Jackson
observed that the Soviet Union has been "expanding its
output" of fissionable materials. (The New York Times,
January 25, 1967, p. 9.)
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