JOURNAL OFFICE OF LEGISLATIVE COUNSEL WEDNESDAY - 21 JUNE 1967

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP69B00369R000100180102-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 2
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 18, 2004
• Sequence Number: 102
• Publication Date: June 21, 1967
• Content Type: NOTES

Approved For Release 2004/03/11 : CIA-RDP69B00369R000100180102-3
JOURNAL
OFFICE OF LEGISLATIVE COUNSEL
Wednesday - 21 June 1967
1. JSW) Mr. Howard Osborn alerted me that
Representative Albert Watson had been in touch with the FBI on the
WASHINGTON OBSERVER item of 15 May 1967. They had provided no
information and suggested that Mr. Watson be in touch with the Agency.
2? IJSW) Senator Peter H. Dominick called to
thank me for an item which had been sent to him. He also wished to
know how he could use this. I assured him he could use it in any way he
L
3. SW) Talked to Mr. Robert Michaels, House
Appropriations Committee staff, on the Craig Hosmer item in the CONGRESS-
IONAL RECORD of 19 June. I indicated that some of the dollar figures were
inaccurate as were some of the other statements. I also mentioned some of
the slight variations in the table of tests. This was enough for his purposes
in responding to the Chairman's questions.
4. I IJSW) Talked to Mr. Woodruff, Senate Appropriations
Committee stall, a5out 5. 1035 on which Senators Mundt and Milton Young are
co-sponsors. Woodruff agreed with our current strategy and also agreed we
should hold off requesting any action by Mundt and Young until Committee
action has been taken.
I
fE -_ ..
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8RESSIONAL RECORD - APPENDIX June 19, 1967
GOP Committee on NuRear Affairs State-
ment re Red China H-Bomb
EXTENSION OF REMARKS
OF
HON. CRAIG HOSMER
OF CALIFORNIA
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Monday, June 19, 1967
Mr. HOSMER. Mr. Speaker, for the
information of all Members of Congress,
the following is today's special report of
the chairman, GOP Committee on Nu-.
clear Affairs, regarding the Red China
H-bomb:
RED CHINA NUCLEAR PROGRESS
From: Rep. Craig Hosmer, Chairman,
Committee on Nuclear Affairs.
To: House GOP Conference.
Test
No.
Oct. 16, 19134
May 14,1965
May 9,1966
Oct. 27,1966
Dec. 27,1966
June 17,1967
20 kt-----
"Around 40 kt."_-__________
"Over 200 kt......... None announced -------_____
"A few hundred kilotons"--_-
2 to 7 mt.r
continue Mao Tse-tung's line that "atom
bombs are paper tigers" until its capabili-
ties enlarge.
4.-Red China's haste to develope nuclear
capability reflects its need for a "deterrent"
against the US and USSR as well as a desire
for greater influence in international affairs.
It also wants to make military developments
a springboard for general ildustrial and
technological development, as did the USSR.
It believes huge resources and sacrifices are
justified on both military and industrial
grounds. 0
5.-Red China's swiftly evolving nuclear
capability constitutes a major threat to other
nations. Many Kremlinologists believe it un-
derlies deployment of the USSR anti-missile
system to a greater extent than US power,
Despite Secretary McNamara's obstinacy, It
will dictate deployment of a US system. Al-
ready it Is causing India to think In terms
of a nuclear weapons arsenal and undoubedly
Japan soon must re-evaluate Its non-nuclear
defense posture.
6.-Some feel that, over the long term, Red
Chinese technological and industrial progress
stimulated by the nuclear effort may create
a need for expanded foreign trade and thus
a more relaxed attitude .toward the world at
large. However, the more likely result is that
the Chinese concept of the "Middle Kingdom
or Celestial Empire"-the Idea that China is
superior to any other nation and always is
right-will inspire an increasingly blatant
aggressiveness based on naked nuclear black-
mail.
7.-It Is clear that Red China alms at the
same "nuclear superpower" status enjoyed by
the US and USSR. It can be expected rather
quickly to overtake and surpass British and
French capabilities. Saturday's H-bomb dem-
onstration can be expected to cause nations
who "can be" nuclear powers to take a
dimmer view of signing any treaty which
would pledge them not to become so. On the
other hand, the "can't be" powers-those
without the scientific and other resources to
GOP go nuclear-may now regard such a treaty
more favorably if It is accompanied by US
guarantees against aggression.
Test tower______________
Air dro
U'35 rather than Pu indicated greater sophis-
tication than predicted.
p --_________
Signaled good yield-to-weight
small enough to be airborne)
ratio (device
Test tower______________
.
1st thermonuclear ingredients
bomb objective indi
t
d
detected (H-
400- to 500-mile missile__
ca
e
).
Excellent improvement in yield-to-weight ratio
in Ua55bomb
Test tower________
.
2d evidence of TM ingredients (probably proof
test of H-bomb "trigger")
-----do----------
,
H-bomb proof test.
I U.S. Minuteman warhead popularly tabbed at 1 mt. yield.
CONCLUSIONS
1.-Red China spends about ;y2 billion
annually on its nuclear weapons program and
possibly an equal amount on development of
delivery systems. This totals some 4 % of GNP.
The two efforts require at least 7i/2 % of avail-
able scientific and technical personnel and
seem not to have been interrupted or delayed
by current disturbances within the country.
2. Red China is anxious to achieve a flex-
able nuclear weapons capability, including
solid fuel rockets. It has tested aircraft and
intermediate range nuclear deliveries and is
known to be able to fire medium-range mis-
siles from submarines. Undoubtedly it will
test successfully an ICBM prior to 1975, the
date predicted by Defense Secretary McNa-
mara. It can be expected to launch a satel-
lite as soon as-possible to prove its missile
capabilities. This can be expected within 12-
113 months.
3.-Red China may have an existing arsenal
of around 30 A-bombs in yields of 200 KT
and below-still small compared to US and
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