INSPECTOR GENERAL SURVEY OF CIA INTELLIGENCE PUBLICATIONS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP68B00969R000100040001-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 9
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 27, 2005
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: July 12, 1966
• Content Type: STUDY

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INSPECTOR GENERAL
SURVEY
OF
CIA INTELLIGENCE PUBLICATIONS
12 July 1966
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Dick Lehman (DDI)
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12 JUL 1966
MEMORANDUM FOR: Executive Director -Comptroller
SUBJECT : Survey of CIA Intelligence Publications
1. In accordance with your instructions I have had a survey made
of Agency intelligence publications. A detailed report of our findings
is attached at Tab C. The report is summarized in the paragraphs
that follow, and our-recommendations appear- in paragraph 17.
PURPOSE OF THE SURVEY
2. The purpose of this survey was to examine CIA intelligence
publications with a view toward providing answers to the following
questions posed by the Director:
a. Is there unnecessary and avoidable duplication among
Agency intelligence publications ?
b. Is there a demonstrated need for each publication and
is each put to profitable use by its recipients?
c. What means can be devised for readily informing the
Director of the distribution made of each publication?
d. What measures are taken to ensure the safekeeping of
CIA publications disseminated outside the Agency; how frequently
are the security systems tested; and how is this accomplished?
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SCOPE AND CONDUCT OF THE SURVEY
3. This survey was undertaken by a working group under the
chairmanship of the Chief, Inspection Staff, and with senior
representation from the Directorates for Plans, Intelligence, Support,
Science and Technology and the Office of National Estimates. The
working group included in its survey reviews of policies, procedures,
and actual intelligence publications produced by the Directorates
for Plans, Intelligence, Science and Technology and the Office of
National Estimates. Although the Deputy Director for Support was
represented on the working group, his Directorate does not originate
intelligence publications.
4. We required each of the producers of intelligence publica-
tions to furnish the following data concerning each publication:
"Brief description of the nature of the publication. Who
originated the request for it? What has been done to
determine if it is really needed and used by the recipients ?
To what extent is it duplicated in other Agency publications
or vice versa? Is this duplication justified: Can it be
merged with any other Agency publication or vice versa
without loss of value? Is its production under the
jurisdiction of a USIB committee?"
We reviewed current examples of DDI and DDS&T publications. All
finished intelligence publications disseminated outside of CIA during
the first three months of 1966 were examined by title, and these
titles were compared for evidences of possible duplication. We
found no instance of duplication. And, finally, the chairman drew
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heavily upon the professional experiences of each of the members
of his working group.
SUMMARY CONCLUSIONS
5. The principal. conclusions of this study are that each CIA
intelligence publication serves a useful purpose and that there are
no avoidable duplications among CIA publications resulting from CIA
research. There is some duplication of content among daily, weekly,
and special purpose studies, which we think unavoidable because of
the varying purposes these particular publications serve or because
of the differing security clearances held by the several groups of
recipients.
6. The survey group is convinced that there is a constant effort
in the Directorates to determine need, to limit distribution, and to
avoid duplication. We might note that current budgetary and manpower
limitations have reinforced these efforts. Immediately prior to the
beginning of this survey the DDI made an internal study of his
Directorate's publications and eliminated some, primarily by
consolidation. A directive implementing these findings was issued
during the course of this survey. The DDS&T completed a similar
study during our survey and with similar results. In the following
paragraphs we summarize our findings with regard to each of the
four questions to which we sought answers.
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Duplication
7. There is conspicuous overlap of content among certain current
intelligence periodicals, which is unavoidable, because each publication
.derives from the need to present essentially similar information keyed
to the security clearances or particular interests of separate categories
of recipients:
a. The sanitized editions of current intelligence
periodicals repeat much of the material that appears in their
respective codeword versions in order that noncodeword-cleared
readers may have the benefit of much of the usable intelligence.
b. Weekly codeword and sanitized current intelligence
publications, logically and by their very nature, repeat
information that has previously appeared in the daily versions.
c. Special purpose studies providing current intelligence
on particular situations, such as those on Vietnam, necessarily
repeat material that may have been printed in whole or in part
in daily or weekly publications. However, such repetition is
essential to the in-depth treatment of these special situations.
8. At Tab A is a chart illustrating duplication of content among
DDI publications.
9. With one exception, we found no significant duplication
among nonperiodical publications. The exception involves DDI
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 preparation of handbooks for DDP's. Special Operations Division.
Three independent studies have concluded that the duplication is
necessary.
10. Quite apart from the matter of duplication of content is
that of duplication of distribution. There appear to be cases in
which the same recipient is on the distributions of both the codeword
and the sanitized versions of daily and weekly current intelligence
periodicals. We have a recommendation in paragraph 17.
Need
11. We find that each of the present intelligence publications
has been produced to meet a specific need and usually has been
initiated by direction of higher authority. Each publication appears
well conceived to meet this previously established need. There have
been repeated efforts to verify that a particular need continues, that
distribution is sufficient but not excessive, and that contents continue
to meet the requirements of the customers. Unfortunately, the
continuing need for a particular publication is difficult to validate.
Recipients are ordinarily unresponsive to surveys initiated to
determine validity of need. There are several tests of validity that
may be and are applied. The directorates find that discussions on
the working level with their opposite numbers in other agencies are
quite productive. Resistance to proposals that distribution lists be
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reduced, on the one hand, or requests from customers that distribution
lists be expanded, on the other, are excellent measures of validity of
the need for a particular type of publication. Further, the analyst
in a particular field is often an excellent judge of what is worth
publishing and what is not, although it should be noted that an
individual analyst may not initiate a publication without authentication,
by higher authority. We believe that the combination of such tests
is an adequate measure of continuing worth.
Access to Distribution Data
12. One of the problems of concern to the Director is his
inability to discover readily who has been included on the distribution
of a particular publication. We believe we have a workable solution
for this problem. If the distribution list is too long to be printed in
the publication, and many of them are, we propose to have provided
to the Director a looseleaf notebook setting forth the distributions
for the massively disseminated publications. If the distribution list
can be printed on a single page, we propose that the list be included
in the publication. Often, however, the distribution that is to be
made of a particular publication cannot be determined until after it
has been printed and is ready for dissemination. In those cases, we
propose that the final distribution list be attached to the Director's
copy. The same system can be followed for the DDCI and the
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Executive Director-Comptroller if they so desire. We have a
recommendation in paragraph 17.
Security
13. Recipients of GOMINT and TALENT -KEYHOLE
reports must have approved, secure storage areas or vaults; otherwise,
such documents are not left with the recipients for storage.
14. There are inspection programs to enforce these regulations.
Each USIB member is responsible for the security of COMINT documents
it receives. The security control of COMINT material in the White
House, the Executive Offices of the President, and in certain departments
and agencies that are not members of USIB are assigned to designated
USIB members. These assignments are as specified in Tab B.
15. The Director of Central Intelligence is charged by Presidential
Directive with administering the security programs associated with over-
head reconnaissance. Under Chapter 2 of the TALENT manual, the
DCI reserves the right to inspect any TALENT facility within any
department, agency, or bureau of the government. In practice, this
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