U-2R PURCHASE

Document Type: 
Collection: 
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
CIA-RDP68B00724R000200190111-7
Release Decision: 
RIPPUB
Original Classification: 
T
Document Page Count: 
4
Document Creation Date: 
December 15, 2016
Document Release Date: 
October 6, 2003
Sequence Number: 
111
Case Number: 
Publication Date: 
May 27, 1966
Content Type: 
MF
File: 
AttachmentSize
PDF icon CIA-RDP68B00724R000200190111-7.pdf173.37 KB
Body: 
. Approver Release 2003/11/ IDEA 3177 Copy 7 of 8 2? May 1966 MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy for Technology, OSA ATTENTION: (U-2R Development Phase SUBJECT: U-2R Purchase REFERENCE: Memorandum from Director of Reconnaissance, CIA, to D/NRO, dated 16 Ma 1966, subject: U-2R Purchase 1. The Deputy for Material, OSA, and I have read the reference letter. Both of us agree that certain items should be brought to your attention at this time. 25X1 ~~ ~ 2. Specifically, and for the record, the following are problem areas that we feel should be identified at this time: a. Per paragraph 1. of the reference memorandum: The statement on the loss rate in this paragraph is felt to be unrealistic for cansideration as a future planning factor. This rate, taken from the total losses over the past history of the U-2 project, is a straight line rate. It does not consider the various factors needed for future planning purposes, such as the rate of loss for training, R&D and combat. It says, in effect, that because we have lost so many aircraft over a period of so many years, then we will lose aircraft at a given rate each following year. This statement does not consider the peaks and valleys in a nominal loss rate such as extensive training of inexperienced pilots, or periods where experienced pilots are performing mast of the flights. LAC, in their special report,"U-2 Accident Analysis", dated 29 March 1966, (IDEA 3102) has considered all of these factors in detail; and it is therefore suggested that this document be used for future planning factors. b. Per paragraph 1. of reference memorandum: The statement alluding to an unknown factor of metal fatigue in the nine to eleven year old U-2's is felt to be a myth. The possibility of these aircraft being affected in this manner was completely disproves in the recent loss of article 342. This aircraft's structure was submitted Approved For Release 2003/11/2~PCI~F1T8B00724R000200190111-7 Eacludcd cram actama;~< downgradiA'g aad 5X1 ' _ Approvetlw6br Release 2003/11/25: CIA-RDP68BQ,8,724R000200190111-7 T E RE T IDEA 3177 Page 2 to exhausting examinations and the metals were found to be well above its designed strength criteria. It is therefore suggested that in future papers, no men- tion be made of possible metal fatigue in present U-2's. c. Per paragraph 8. of reference memorandum: There is no mention of provision made for any two seat U-2R trainers. It is our understanding that there has been some discussion on this matter with T~AC, and that the cost of trainer models will be slightly mare than standard U-2R's. This office wishes, at this time, to firmly establish an operational requirement for at least two of the first 25 U-2R's to be configured as two-seat trainers. These two aircraft should have sufficient con- trols for an instructor pilot to perform his duties from either cockpit. Justification for this requirement would be that the training received in these two-seat models would most likely decrease the aircraft loss rate during '' the initial training of new pilots and will certainly be of great benefit as an instrument for the contingency measurement of the pilot's proficiency. d. Per paragraph 13. of reference memorandum: The proposal to test prototype appears to be unrealistic because it is the understanding of this office that all space is essentially used up. Further, the personne o CIA and LAC) are com- completely involved in the OXCART program, and a division of their time in the proposed manner would certainly detract from their performance of duties on either program. Instead, the undersigned believes that the testing phase of U-2R prototypes could be easily assimilated by the Edwards North Base Detachment with minimal increase in personnel, support equipment, and additional expense. Deputy for Field Activities, OSA 25X1 25X1 Approved Far Release 2003/11/25: CIA-RDP68B00724R000200190111-7 Approv~or Release 2003/11/25: CIA-RDP68~724R000200190111-7 IDEA 3177 Page 3 Chief, Materiel Division SAS/OSA bm-let (27 May 66)?~ Distrib . 1 - D/TECH/OSA 2 - MD/OSA 3 - PS/OSA 4 - D/FA/OSA 5 - SAS/OSA 6 - D/SA 7 - RB/OSA ? $ - Chrono 25X1 25X1 Approved For Release 2003/11/25: CIA-RDP68B00724R000200190111-7 A Approved For Release 2003/11/25 :CIA-RDP68B00724R00~0200190111-7 25X1 AEA-3l~'T-~8 Copy~t~3 ~% 3 lEsty 18E~6 ~EAi+~U#d Fit Director l~JECr s i~-~~t Special ~cti~r~tties 1. ~u~gest a dec~.t~ia> bre made +~nd announced tv clear ~r~y area St tlao ffio~nt re].atia~ to +~h+~, i~ 4~fiee of Bpe~cia~. ~tivlties, has primary ses~asibllitg ~Cwr the D- program, i . e . ,~ Deputy ~'ar Ip~i.ntenauc~a Qr Dep~ttty ~?~r $!J~$itrC~3 iiid DeWelflpme~xt. Traditionally product improv@-- ~ata relating to a vehicle de+c2.ared operational bare been the r+~sponsibility of Deputy far Materiel to persue. Derv ~ta~ox vehiclo systeae normally .have been the res~-neibi2ity of Deputy #Qr 'hechaolog~r . ~. Ji~at Gunningham's announced res,pons~.b~.itq ra-- latin;~ tt~ p~tl Iing together facts on t3-^ ea~ports is dear . ~S / P~.~'' Dsp~ttp ftlr RlfiAar#~3h and D+~tvelt~poteAt ~~tC~a~. ~Att~.Vf.t~.e8 ~. Paraagos~ky :i~lBh~/~tA :~ t3 ~.p ~~) Distribution; ! - D/~IA ~ - DID/#~A w 1?lt~peratioasft~B,& 4 - ~1f l~aintence,/f~A 8 - ~.eting Cc~ptrv3lerlEk~A - D/g&D 7 - D/D (Cbroaa) /~11 25X1 Exc)pded B oro au tOwagTadlag ant dam? e~s~tica?-aa