ADDENDUM TO 5-10-15 YEAR PROJECTION FOR AIRBORNE RECONNAISSANCE SYSTEMS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP68B00724R000100090006-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 4
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 3, 2002
• Sequence Number: 6
• Publication Date: October 26, 1966
• Content Type: MFR

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26 October 66
MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD
SUBJECT : Addendum to 5-10-15 Year Projection
for Airborne Reconnaissance ystems.
25X1A REFERENCE 5-10-15 Year Projection for Airborne
connaissance Systems, 15 September 1966 .
25X1A
Transmittal of 5-15 Year Papers
Relating-
. ng o ick Reaction Systems and Security
Contracting Policies, 7 June 1965
25X1A
This memorandum contains some further considerations
on the pls a of aircraft systems in the National Reconnaissance
Program. (Details on aircraft systems which might be available
in the time frame considered are given in the references.) Thus,
this is an addendum to the fifteen year plan of the references
and serCes as a rationale for the continuation of aircraft
systems as a part of the NRP.
2. The F Role 2f A SysteM&
A
Aircraft systems rightly have been relegated to a
secondary role in the collection of photographic and electronic
intelligence. Nonetheless, this secondary role is significant
and must be supported. Development and maintenance of this
secondary class of systems is necessary because:
a. Aircraft can be defended more easily against
attack than satellites and have a high probability of
mission success. The merit of this will become apparent
only at such time as the existing acquiescence to satellite
reconnaissance disappears, either when the posture of the
Soviet Union changes or when some other power (such as
Conist China) achieves and uses the capability of
denial of satellite reconnaissance. (Current, moderately-
sophisticated U.S. and Soviet missile systems have this
capability now.) The denial of satellite reconnaissance
of China b China would be, concurrently, dantAl of All
including reconnaissance
of t. Soviet Union. The same satellite overflies the
Soviet Union as overflies China; China cannot deny
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satellite reconnaissance of China without also denyin
satellite reconnaissance of the Soviet Union. A similar
potential blockage exists regarding other powers, having
sophisticated missile capability, if and when the
relationships between the U. S. and such powers leads to
their denial of U. S. satellite over-flight. The aircraft
system is not subject to this restriction,, as it can be
selectively programmed regarding nations overflown.
Advanced aircraft systems could provide a true back-up
capability, as
well as gainst postulated future capabilities of other,
nations (presently either friend ors foe).
b. Aircraft systems provide a capability of frequent
reconnaissance of local areas, a situation app oaching
the tactical reconnaissance mission of the military;
this reconnaissance can be obtained at any part of the
world without direct impact on or over-f light of other
areas, and the information can be made available to
responsible parties in the immediate area. The cost per
flight of aircraft systems for such missions is small
compared to the cost per flight of the satellite systems,
although the original cost of the aircraft system runs
much higgher than the satellite system. Satellite systems
are most economic in the reconnaissance of large areas
at reasonably predictable intervals.
c. Flexibility of basing of aircraft systems, and
lack of definability of the nation t1ming the systems
allows a plausible denial by the U.S. The greatest defect
in the plausibility of denial is the sophistication of the
aircraft. The characteristics (radar and other) of
sophisticated aircraft are such that a firm assignment
to the nation of manufacture may be made; theassig
to the nation of operation cannot be so easily made.
d. In many cases, the aircraft systems can provide
a more timely flow of information than can the current
satellite systems.
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e. It appears from technical considerations that
the aircraft systems, working at a more favorable photo-
raphic scale factor, can achieve adequate resolution
over a wide swath without overtaxing the optical industry
of this country.
f. The continuation of the development of high
performance reconnaissance vehicles has important
technological offshoots. The developments in the OXCART
vehicle have had a significant impact on the development
of the supersonic transport; similarly, the development
of the next generation systems will have an impact on
the development of hypersonic military vehicles, (possibly
hypersonic civilian vehicles). As the projected advanced
aircraft is only a stop away from a space vehicle, the
technology is of use in the fields of recoverable boosters
and space rescue craft. Space rescue craft have received
onlyy~ __llp service from the government to date; the first
"THRESHER" of space will see the same impact on space
rescue that the THRESHER of the ocean gave to deep sub-
mersibles and deep ocean rescue. In actuality, the
psychological impact of a slow, lingering death in space
would be manyfold greater than that from the quick loss
in THRESHER.
These six points constitute the rationale for considering
the development of advanced aircraft systems warranted, and
for maintaining existing aircraft capabilities. A reasonable
portion of the national photographic and electronic intelligence
collection systems budget must be devoted to the development
and operation of aircraft systems. This requirement for air-
craft systems is valid even though our most advanced existing
aircraft system (OXCART) is not actively employed, even for
missions wherein it is the (technologically) best system for
the task. In conclusion, we would not have the U-2 now
extensively used in Vietnam and Cuba, as well as portions of
China, if it had not been developed for its early missions in
the Soviet Union and subsequently maintained in operational
condition since.
ss an tor ec no ogy
Deputy for
Research and Development
Special Activities
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