C.I.A. IS SPYING FROM 100 MILES UP AS SATELLITES PROBE SECRETS OF THE SOVIET UNION

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP68B00432R000500020005-4
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 4
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 13, 2000
• Sequence Number: 5
• Publication Date: April 27, 1966
• Content Type: NSPR

C.I.A
NEW YORK TIMES 27 April 1966
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. Is spying From 100 Miles Up as Satellite
Probe Secrets of the Smoviet Union
Electronic Prying Grows
Following is the third of five
articles on ?the Central Intelli-
gence Agency. The articles are
by a team of New York Times
correspondents consisting of
Tom Wicker, John W. Finney,
Max Frankel, E. W. Kenworthy
and other Times staff menibers.
Special to The Vew York Time.%
WASHINGTON, April 26 ?
To the men most privy to the
seerets of th e Central In-
telligence Agency, it sometimes
seems that the human spies, the
James Bonds and Mata Haris,I
are obsolete, Like humans'
everyWhere, they are ,no match
for the computers, cameras,
radars and other gadgets by
which nations can now gather
the darkest i.ecrets of both
friends and foe3.
With comPles; 'machines cir-,
clinetlie" earth at 17,000 milest
an hour, C.I.A. agents are able
to relax in their carpeted offices
beside the notornac and count
the intercont nental nnssiles
poised in Soviet Kazakhstan,
monitor the conversations be-
tween Moscow md a Soviet sub-
marine near Tahiti, follow the
countdown of s. sputnik launch-
ink as easily as that of a
Gemini capsule in Florida, track
the electronic imprint of an ad-
versary's bombers and watch
for the heat traces of his mis-
siles.
Only a half dozen years ago,
at least one human pilot was
still required to guide a black
U-2 jet across the Soviet Union
from Pakistan to Norway, or
over Cuba or Communist China
from bases in Florida and Tai-
wan.
His cameras and listening de-
vices, capable If picking out a
chalk line or a radar station
from 15 miles 'ap, were incredi-
ble in their day, the product
of imaginative C.I.A. research
and developme ats. But spies in
the sky now o biting the earth
do almost as well from 100
miles up.
Cosmic Espionage
Already, the United States
and the Soviet Union are vying
with each other in cosmic spy-
ing. American Samos and Soviet
Cosmos satellites gather more
data in one 90-minute orbit than
an army of earthbound spies.
Other gadgets of the missile
age have taken oVer , the
counterspy function, Secretaryl
of Defense Robert S. McNamara
gave a Con?ressi-nal committee
a strong hint about that last
year when he mentioned "in-
spection of orbiting objects in
the satellite interceptor Thor
program as well as in the two
large ground-based optical pro-
grams at Cloudcroft, N. M."
His testimony suggested that.
the United States could orbit a
satellite capable of photograph-
ing and otherwise "inspecting"
Soviet space spies, while other
equipment could photograph
them from the ground with re-
markable detail.
Such electronic eyes, ears,
noses and nerve ends ? and
similar ones aboard ships and
submarines -- are among the
nation's most vital secrets. They,
are not exclusively the propertyl
or inspiration of the C.I.A. '
C.I.A. cameras and other
snooping equipment are riding
in spacecraft that are otherwise
the responsibility of the Defense
Department.
No clear breakdown of
responsibilities and cost is avail-
able, but, altogether, the an-
nual cost of the United States'
intelligence effort exceeds $3-
billion a year ? more than six,
times the amount' specifically
allocated to the C.I.A. arid more
than 2 per cent of the total
Federal budget.
Bugging From Afar
Not all the gadgetry is c
mic. The agency is now Ze 'p-
ing a highly s evice
, -
that will pick u afar in-
door conversations, by record-
ing the window vibrations
caused by the speakers'Nroices
This is only ?Kt :Orhnany
nefarions gadgets that a
made the word "prifie an
anachronism. It is polbI?tor
instance, with jequipineht-
tiny as to be all but invisible,
to turn the whole electric wir-
ing system of a building into a
quivering transmitter of con-
versation taking place any-
where within.
Picking up information is onel
thing; getting it "home" and'
doing something with it is an-
other. Some satellites, for in-
stance, are rigged to emit cap-
sules bearing photos and other
readings; as they float to earth
by parachute, old C-130 - air-
craft dash across the Pacifici
from Hawaii and snarel
the parachutes with brig, dang-
ling, trapeze-like cables. The
planes have a 70, per tent catch-
ing average.
- Sornetimes the intelligence
wizards, get carried away by
their , imaginations. , Several
years ago they spent tens of
millions of dollars on the con-
struction of a 600-foot radio
' telescope designed td,, eavesdrop
on the Kremlin. It was. to pick
up radio signals, stfch is those
omitted when a Soviet Premier
galled his, chauffeur by radio-
telephone, as they bounced off
the moon.
The project turned to an
engineering fiasco, but technol-
ogy came to the rescue by pro-
viding "ferret" "Satellites that
can tune In on the same short-
range radio signals as they
move straight up to the ibno-
sphere.
Overlooking the rights of ter-
ritorial sovereignty and na-
tional and human privacy, of-
ficials throughout the United
States GovernMent praise the
,
C.I.A.'s gadgetry as nothing
short of "phenomenal." The at-
mosphere everywhere, they say,
is full of information, and the
objective of a technological in-
telligence service is to gather
and translate it into knowledge.
At C.I.A. hedquarters in
Langley, Va., other intricate
machines, some unknown a dec-
ade or even a few years ago,
read, translate, interpret, col-
late, file and store the informa-
tion. Sometimes months or
years later, the data can be re-
trieved from tens of millions
Of microfilmed categories.
This effort has paid off monu-
mentally, according to thosei
who know most about it.
It was aerial reconnaissance
by the U-2 spy plane -- suc-
ceeded in many ways by satel-
lites in 1961 ? that enabled.
Washington to anticipate and
measure the Soviet Union's ca-
pacity to produce missiles in
the nineteen-fifties. These esti-
mates, in turn, led to the so-
called "missile gap," which be-1
came a prime political issue in
the 1960 Presidential campaign.
But it was also the U-2 that,
later produced proof that the
Russians were not turning out,
missiles as fast as they could,
thus dispelling the "missile gap"
from Washington's thinking and
jargon.
Still later, C.I.A. devices dis-
covered missiles being emplaced
underground in the Soviet Un-
ion. 11-2's spotted the prep-
arati:n of missile sites in Cuba
in 1962. They also sampled the
radioactive fallout of Soviet nu-
clear tests in 1961. Highly se-
cret techniques, including aerial,
reconnaissance, allowed the
C.I.A. to predict the Chinese nu-
clear explosion in 1964 with re-
markable accuracy.
Purloined Messages
Countless conversations and
messages the world over have
been purloined; even subtler
signals and indications, once
detected by the marvels of sci-
ence, can be read and combined
into inforrnt,tion of a kind once
lmpossible obtain?
,,The firX- duty of the C.I.A.,1
is to collect, interpret and dis-I
seminate what it learns froml
its worldwide nerve system ?H
weaving together, into the "in-
telligence" the government
Meets, every electronic' blip,
squeak, and image and the mil-
lions of other items that reach
its headquarters from more con-
ventional, often public, sources:
random diplomatic contacts,
press clippings, radio monitor
reports, books and research proj-
ects "and eyewitness evidence.
(Even some of these "open"
sources, such as a regional news-
paper from Communist China,
must be smuggled or bought at
a stiff price.)
Every hour of every, day,
about 100 to 150 fresh items of
news, gossip and research? reach
the C.I.A.'s busy headquarters
in Virginia and are poured into
the gigantic human-and-techno-
logical computer that its analy-
sis section resenlbles.
Four of every five of these
items, it is said, now come
either from "open" sources or
inanimate devices. But in many
important instances it is still
the human agent, alerted, to
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make a particular arrangement
,te chases specifAilbrb0(0121- F
formation, who provildds the unk
that makes all else meaningful
and significant; sometimes, now
as in the 38th, . century, it is
,Men alone? whO 'do the job in
danger and difficulty.
When it was discovered, for
instance, that Premier Khru-
shchev had shaken the Com-
munist wor,A with a secret
speech denouncing Stalin in
1956, it was a C.I.A. agent
who finally came up with the
text, sornewl. ere in Poland, and
other analys ts who determined
that it was genuine.
A Rebeflion Hastened
This feat of numan spying
in an elect ronic age yielded
vital information and, leaked to
the press in Europe and else-
where, hastened the anti-Stalin
rebellions in many Communist
countries and probably contrib-
uted to upheavals in Voland and
Hungary that are still among
the heaviest liabilities of Com-
munist history.
It takes a sub-agent in Tibet,
personally recruited by a C.I.A.
man there and paid either a
retainer or by the piece, to de-
liver a sheaf of secret army,
documents circulating among
regimental ccmmanders of Com-
munist China's People's Liber-
ation Army.
Only his ( ounterpart in Al-
geria can pi ovide some draw-
ings of the design of the in-
terior_ of Peking's embassy (al-
though such designs can often
be obtained Vpith no more effort
than asking for them at the
offices of the American who
constructed the building).
And beyond this large re-
maining value of the human
being in the humming world of
espionage, it is also the human
brain in the C.I.A. that gives
information i ts real importance
by supplying interpretations for ?
the President and his men.
The end product is a series
of papers, handsomely printed
and often illuitrated with 'fancy
maps to gain a bureaucratic
advantage over rival pieces of
paper from other agencies.
The agency produces intelli-
gence reports almost hourly,
and sweeping summaries every
'day. It provides a special news
,report for President Johnson's
nightly bedtime reading, some-
times containing such juicy tid-
bits as the most recent playboy
activities of the indefatigable
President Sukarno of Indonesia.
A C.I.A. Press Conference
More elaborate reports and
projections are prepared on
such matters as the rate of So-
viet ecenomic growth.
cm-J*40MM VeIRIAria
without credit to their origin.
Piqued by these announcements,
the C.I.A. called its first news
conference in 1964 to put out
the latest readings on Soviet
prosperity. The idea of the
"spooks," as C.I.A. men are
called, summoning reporters
caused so much amusement in
Washington?and perhaps dis-
pleasure in other agencies?that
;the C.I.A. has never held an-
other news conference.
' Still more important subjects,
such as Soviet nuclear capabili-
ties or Communist Chinese in-
tentions in Sotitheast 'Asia, are
dealt ,with in formal national
Intelligence estimates. These en-
compass all information avail-
able on a given subject and re-
flect the final judgment of the
Board of National Estimates, a
group of 14 analysts in the
C.I.A.
National estimate intelli-
gence is intended to reach a
definite conclusion to guide the
President. But as other depart-
ments are consulted and the
various experts express their
views, their disagreements,
caveats and dissents are noted
and recorded by footnotes in
the final document. These signs
of dispute are likely to herald
Important uncertainties, and
some officials believe the foot-
notes to be the best-read lines
of all the millions committed
to paper in the Government
every month.
The C.I.A. also produces rapid
analyses and predietions on, re-
quest ? say, about the likeli-
hood of the Soviet Union's going
to war over the Cuban missile
crisis, oLahout the consequences
of different courses of action
contemplated at a particular
rioment by the.Vnited States in
'Vietnam.
How Good Are the Reports?
How effective these reports
have been, and ,hoW well they
are hqeded by the policy-mak-
ers, aVe questions of lively de-
bate frj the intelligence com-
munity.
In recent years, the C.I.A.
is generally believed to have
been extremely good in furnish-
ing inforrhation about Soviet
military capabilities and orders
of battle, about the cninese
nuclear weapons prograin -and,
after constant goading frolp. the
White House, about the
progress of India, the United
Arab Republic, Israel and other
nations' toward a capacity to
build nuclear weapons.
Reports from inside In-
donesia, Algeria and the Congo
during recent fast-moving situ-
ations are also said to have
been extremely good.
13 50641-*OP1100511Cf0 20 0 OfirLthese and dozens of other in-
een criticized tor not hay-
stances, an agent who is meraiy
ing known more in advance
about the construction of the ostensibly gathering inttl-
ligence is in reality an activist
Berlin Wall in 1961, about the attempting to create or resolVe
divorce of the United Arab Re-.
public and Syria in 1961, about a Situation.
the political leanings of various Because a great many such
activists are also in the field
leaders in. the Dominican Re-
for a variety of purposes other
public and about such relatively
public matters as party politics than open or clandestine infer-
in Italy. mation gathering, the involve-
ment of fallible human beings
Some ? including Dwight D.
in the mo'st dangerous
Eisenhower ? have criticizedrerous and
the agency for not having rec- murky areas of C.I.A.Cb opera-
the
in time Fidel Castro's tions causes most of the
Communist leanings or the pos- agency's failures and difficul-
?ibility that the Soviet Union ties and gives it its fearsome
reputation.
would ship missiles to Cuba.
Men, by and large, can con-
Almost everyone, however, trol machines but not events,
generally concedes the neces-
City for gathering intelligence and not always themselves. It
was not, after all, the shooting
to guide the Government in its
w down of a U-2 inside the Soviet
worldwide involvements. Criti-
TJnion in 1960 that caused
cism goes beyond the value or
worldwide political repercus-
often
accuracy of C.I.A. repo sions and a Soviet-American
repots. For sions
crisis; each side conld have ab-
spills over at the scene of ' sorbed that in, some sort of
"cover." It was irather the So-
action into something else ?I viet capture of a living Ameri-
'subversion, counteractivity, I
sabotage, political and economic I can pilot, Francis Gary Powers,
in-1 want explained away.
that . could not be explained
interve ition and other kinds
away and that Russians did not
of 'dirty tricks." Often the
ter igence gatherer, by design
But the C.I.A. invariably de-
or 1 orce of circumstance, be-,
corn .ts an activist in the affairs velops an interest in its proj-
he was set to watch. ects and can be a formidable
advocate in the Government.
On-the-Scene Action
When it presented the U-2
C.I.A. analysts reading the ' program in 1956, fear of detec-
punchcards of their computers i ticn and diplomatic 'repercus-
n Virginia can determine that
Ad-
a new youth group in Bogota sions led the Eisenhower Ad-
ministration to run some "prac-
appears to have fallen under the
tice" missions over Eastern
control of suspected Corn- Europe. The first mission to
munists, but it takes an agent the Soviet Union, in mid-1956,
on the spot to trade informa- over Moscow - and Leningrad,
tion with the local police, col- Was detected but not molested.
lect photographs and telephone It did, however, draw the firSt
taps of. those involved, organize of a number of secret diplomatic
and finance a countermovement protests. ,
of, say, young Christians or After six missions the Ad-
democratic labor youth, and ministration halted the flights,
help them erect billboards and but the C.I.A pressed for their
turn mimeograph machines at resumption. Doubts were finally
the next election, overcome, and 20 to 25 more
Dozens ? at times hundreds flights were conducted, with So-
- of C.I,A. men have been viet fighter planes in vain pur-
employed on Taiwan to train snit of at least some of them.
men who will be smuggled into The Powers Plane is thought
Communist China and to inter- to have been crippled by the
view defectors and refugees nearby explosion of an antiair-
who come out; to train Chinese craft missile developed with the
Nationalists to fly the U-2; to U-2's in mind.
identify and befriend those who Risky and Often Profitable
will move into power after the The simplest and most modest
departure of the Nationalists' of these risky, often profitable,
President, Chiang Kai-shek; to sometimes disastrous human of-
beam propaganda broadcasts at forts are reported to be carried
the mainland; to organize har- out in the friendly nations of
rassing operations on the is- Western Europe.
lands (just off the shore of the In Britain, for instance, C.I.A.
mainland, and to provide logis- agents are said to be little more
tic support for other C.I.A. than contact men with British
operations in Laos, Thailand, intelligence, with British
Vietnam, the Philippines and Kremlinoloolists and other
Indonesia. scholars an experts.
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With MI-6, its Approved
counterpart, the C.I.A. com-
pares notes and divides respon-
sibilities on targe:s a mutual
interest. The agency, having;
come a painful cropper in'
Singapore a few years ago,
now leaves spying in Malaysia,
for instance, to tie old Com-
monwealth sleuths while prob-
ably offering in return the
C.I.A.'s copioui material from
Indonesia.
? Generally cooplTative ar-
rangements also prevail in
I countries such as Canada and
.Italy and, to a somewhat lesser
'degree, in France. In West Ger-
many, a Major cold-war battle-
ground, the C.I.A. it; much more
active,
The C.I.A. runs in office in
Bonn for general coordination.
Another in Berlin conducts spe-
cial activities such as' the
famous wiretap tt nnel tinder
East Berlin, a brilliant tech-
nical hookup that eavesdropped
on Soviet Army headquarters.
It was exposed in 1956 when
East German workmen, digging
on another project, struck a
weak spot in the tunnel and
caused it to collapse.
A C.I.A. office. in Frankfurt
supervises some of the United
States' own espionage opera-
tions against the Soviet Union,
nterviewS defector;; and re-
cruits agents for service in
Communist countrie;:.
In Munich, the C.I.A. sup-
ports a variety oF research
groups and such major prop-
'aganda outlets as Radio Free
Europe, which broadcasts to
'Eastern Europe, t,nd Radio
Liberty, aimed at the Soviet
Union.
Jobs for Refugees
Besides entertaining and in-
;forming millions of listeners in
ICommunik nations, these
;nominally "private" cutlets pro-
!vide employment for many
gifted and knowledgeable refu-
gees from Russia, Poland, Hun-
gary and other countries.
' They also solicit the services
of informers inside the Com-
munist world, monitor Com-
munist broadcasts, underwrite
anti-Communist lectures and
writings by Western intellectu-
als and distribute their research
materials to scholars and jour-
nalists in all continents.
But there is said t) be rela-
tively little direct C.I A. spying
upon the United Stal,es' allies.
Even in such unt emocratic
countries as Spin and
Portugal, where more independ-
ent C.I.A. activity might be
expected, the operation is re-
liably described as rr odest.
The American ager cy has a
special interest, for instance,. in
keeping track in Spain of such
refugees from Latin America
as Juan Per6n of Argentina.
Nevertheless, it relies Ho heavily
on the information of ;he SPan-
ish police that American news-
papermen are often a betAppr
source for American Embassy
officials than the C.I.A. office.
Defense Dept
DURING, THE CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS: This Soviet freighter was photographed after
leaving Cuba on tiov. 6, 1912: carrying on deck one of the missiles the Soviet Union
withdrew under intense pressure from the U.S. It was CIA. efforts that originally
uncovered the presence of Soviet missiles on the island that led to diplomatic showdown.
In much of Africa, too, despite I
, the formidable reputation it has
among governments, the C.I.A.
takes a back seat to the intel-
ligence agencies of the former
colonial nations, Britain and
France, and concentrates on
gathering information about
'Soviet, Chinese and other Com-
munist efforts there. (The Con-
go has been the major excep-
tion. The agency compiles lists
of travelers to Moscow, Prague
or Peking, attempts to infiltrate
their embassies and checks on
arms and aid shipments through
African airfields.
An Eye on Potential Rebels
The agency is thought
to have attempted to infiltrate
the security services of some
African countries but only
with mixed success. It gathers
special dossiers on the activi-
ties of various nationalist and
liberation movements and be,
friends opposition leaders in
such Countries as Algeria and
the United Arab Republic, in
the hope that it can predict;
upheavals or at least , be
'familiar with new rulers if theirj
bids for Power are successful. '
The. C.I.A., long in advance,
had information on the plan
by which Algerian Army of-
ficers overthrew Ahmed Ben
Bella last June but it did not;
know the month in which the of- I
ficers would make their move,
and it had nothing to do with
'Thanks to contacts with
pamal Abdel Nasser before he
eizecl power in Egypt, the
.I.A. had almost intimate
dealings with the Nasser gov-
ernment before the United States
drew his ire ,by reneging on
its promised aid to build the
Aswan Dam. '
Some of these Egyptian ties
lingered even through the re-
cent years of strained relations.
Thrpugh reputed informants
like' Mustafa Amin, a prominent
Catfoi editor, the C.I.A. is said
in tli United Arab Republic
to ha obtained the details of
gyptian arms deal
1964 d other similar in
formatio Thus, Amin 'a arrest
last fall y have clesed some
important annels and it gave
4,71U the 'United Arab Republic the
A' opportunity to demand 'greater
Aingtican aid in return for play-
hig-down its "evidence" of
activity in Cairo.
The C.I,A.'s talent for secret
warfare is known to have been
tested twice in Latin America.
It successfully directed a battle
of "liberation" against the left-
ist government of Col. J;Lcobo
Arbenz Guzman in Guatemala
in 1954. Seven years later, a
C.I.A.-sponsored army jumped
off from secret bases in Guate-
mala and Nicaragua for the
disastrous eivi a gement at
Cuba's Bay of Pigs.
Promoter of Fronts
Not so melodramatically, the
agency runs dozens of other
operations throughout the
hemisphere. '
It provides "technical assist-
ance" to most Latin nations by
helping them establish anti-
Communist police forces. It
promotes anti-Communist front
organizations for students,
workers, professional and busi-
ness men, farmers and political
parties. It arranges for contact
between these groups and
American labor organizations,
institutes and foundations.
It has poured money into
Latin-American election cam-
paigns In support of moderate
candidates .And against leftist
leaders such as Cheddi Jagan of!
British Guiana.
It spies upon Soviet, Chinese
and other Communist infiltra-
tors and diplomats and attempts'
to subvert their programs. When I
the C.I.A. learned last year that
a Brazilian youth had been kil-
led in 1963, allegedly in an auto
accident, while studying on a
'scholarship at the 'Lurnumba
University in Moscow, it.
mounted a massive publicity
campaign to discourage other
South American families from
sending their youngsters to the
Soviet Union.
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coup.
In -Southeast Asia cikiVieved RorReleatet1201T31-3/21 : CI
past decade, the C.I.A. has een now begun a program o rur
defense against Communist sub-
version. Working through for-
eign aid offices and certain air-
lines, agents are working with
hill tribes along the Burmese
and Laos borders and helping
to build a provincial police net-
work along the borders of Laos
and Cambodia.
- Furtive Operations
Few Americans realize how
such operations as these may
affect innocent domestic situa-
tions -- - the extent to which the
dispatch of a planeload of rice
by a subsidized carrier, Air
America, in Laos causes the
agency to set furtive opera-
tions in motion within the
United States.
When Air America or any
other false - front organiiation
has run into financial difficul-
ties, the agency has used its
influence in Washington and
throughout the United States
to drum up some legitimate
sources of income.
Unknown to most of the di-
rectors and stockholders of an
airline, for instance, the C.I.A.
may approach the leading offi-
cials of the company, explain
its problem and come away
with some profitable air cargo
contracts.
In other domestic offshoots
of the C.I.A.'s foreign dealings,
American newspaper and maga-
zine publishers, authors and uni-
versities are often the benefici-
aries of direct or indirect C.I.A.
subsidies.
A secret transfer of C.I.A.
funds to the State Department
tir United States Information
Agency, for example, may help
finance a scholarly inquiry and
publication. Or the agency may
channel research and propa-
ganda money through founda-
tions?legitimate ones or dum-
my fronts.
The C.I.A. is said to be be-
hind the efforts of several foun-
dations that sponsor the travel
of social scientists in the Com-
munist world. The vast major-
ity of independent foundations
have warned that this practice
casts suspicion on all traveling
scholars, and in the last year
the C.I.A. is said to have cur-
tailed these activities somewhat,
$400,000 for Research
Congressional investigation of
tax-exempt foundations in 1961
showed that the J. M. Kaplan
Fund, Inc., among others, had
disbursed at least $400,000 for
the C.I.A. in a single year to a
research institute This insti-
tute, in turn, financed research
centers in Latin America that
drew other support from the
Agency for International De-
velopment (the United States
foreign aid agency), the Ford
Foundation and such universi-
ties as Harvard and Brandeis.
Among the Kaplan Fund's
other previous contributors
thera. had beert. u. or
ME eitAsteaWiiii
rtsCIA-
so active that the agency in
some countries has been the
principal arm of American pol-
icy.
It is said, for instance, to have
been so successf al at infiltrat-
ing the top of the Indonesian
government and army that the
United States w as reluctant to
disrupt C.I.A. covering opera- ,
tions by withdrawing aid and
information programs in 1964
and 1965. What was presented
officially in VTashington as
toleration of President Sukar-
no's insults and provocations
was in much larger measure a
desire to keep the C.I.A. fronts
in business as hag as possible.
Though it is, not thought to
have been involved in any of
the maneuvering that has curbed
President Sukarno's power in
recent months, the agency was
well poised to follow events arid
to predict the, emergence of
anti-Communist forces.
Links ta Power
After helping to elect Raman
Magsaysay as r resident of the
Philippines in 1953, buttressing
the family government of Ngo
Dinh iDem and Ngo Dinh Nhu
in South Vietnanan 1954 and as,-
sisting in implar ting the regime
of the strongr-man Phourrif
Nosavarr in Laos in 1960, the.
C.I.A. agents responsible obVf-,
ously became f or long periods
much more intimate advisers
and effective lir ks to Washing-
tonth
than e formally designated American. Ambassadors
in those countr es.
And when e Kennedy air-
ministration come into off tit%
in 1961, the Pre ;ident conclu
that the C.I.A had so inor
gaged America n interests--
Photuni Nosavan that ther6 as
at first no alternating to deal-
ing with him.
Moreover, thiCC.I.A.'s skill at
moving quiettlY and in repOn-
,
able secre-cy drew for it Many
laWgnments in Southeaseaia
itHat would normally be given
to the Defense Department. It
was able, for instance, to fly
supplies to the Meo tribesmen
in Laos to 11.1p them fight
against the pro-Communist
Pathet Lao al a time when
treaty obligations forbade the
assignment of American mili-
tary advisers to the task.
In South Vietnam, the C.I.A.'s
possession of mergetic young
men with politlpal and linguistic
talents proved irtuch more suc-
cessful in wresting mountain
and jungle villages from Corn-
:munist control than the Penta-
gon's special forces.
But the C.I.A. was also deeply
committed to the Ngo brothers
hnd was tricked by them into
supporting the ,r private police
forces. These were eventually
employed against the Buddhist
political opposition, thus pro-
voking the coup d'etat by mili-
tary leaders in 1963 that
brought down the N
gApproved
tfiCtP:6884111R031850000005-4
ganizations. Five of them were
not even listed on the Internal
Revenue qe'rVice's list or foun-
dations entitled to tax exemp-
tion.
Through similar channels,
the C.I.A. has supported groups
of....41les from Cuba and refu-
gees from Communism in
Europe, or anti-Communist but
liberal organizations ,of intellec-
tuals such as the Congras for
Cultnral Freedom, and sone of
their newspapers and Tiiaga-
zines.
'Encounter magazine, a v?tell-
known anti-Comniunist intellec-
'Kula monthly with editions in
Spanish and 4enhan as well as
English, was for a long time ?
though it is nOt now -- one of
the indirect bepeficiaries of
C.I.A. funds. Through arrange-
oluents that haVe never been
publicly, explained, several
American book publishers have
also received C.I.A. subsidies.
An even greater amount of
C.I.A. money apparently was
spent on direct, though often
secret, support of American
scholars. The Massachusetts In-
stitute of Technology opened a
Center of International studies
with a grant of $300,000 from
the C.I.A. ini1951 and continued
to take agency funds until the
link was exposed, causing great
embarrassment to M.I.T.'s
I scholars working in India and
other countries.
The agency's support for
M.I.T. projects gradually dwin-
dled, but the fear of compro-
mising publicity led the uni-
versity to decide a year ago to
accept no new C.I.A. contracts.
Similar embarrassment was
felt at Michigan State Univer-
sity after the recent disclosure
that C.I.A. agents had served
on its payroll 'in a foreign-aid
project in South Vietnam from Government and among influeri-
1955 to 1959. The university tial members of Congress and
contended that no secret Intel- with the President.
ligence work was done by the But a "national interest" that
agents, but it feared that a is not a persuasive defense to
dozen other overseas projects men who have their own ideas
now under way would be ham- of the "national interest"
Tiered by the suspicions of other along with secrecy itself ? has
governments. the inevitable effect of convinc-
The C.I.A. was among the mg critics that the agency has
plenty to hide besides its code-
books.
The imaginations and con-
sciences of such critics are cer-
now widely emulated. Many tainly not set at rest when they
Scholars continne tO serve the learn, for instance, that in 1962
'
agency aS consultants, while an outraged President Kennedy
? obviously differing with the
others ,work on research pro)- agency about the "national in-
ects frankly presented to their terest" ? forced the C.I.A. to
superiors as C.I.A. assignments. undo a particularly clumsy
At a meeting of the American piece of sabotage that might
Political Science Foundation have blackened the nation's
here last fall, however, at least name all around the world.
two speakers said too many
scholars were still taking on
full-time intelligence services.
They also warned that the part-
time activities of others could
influence their judgments or
reputations.
Radio Free Europe and Radio
Liberty provide cover for C.I.A.-
financed organizations that
draw upon the research talents
of American scholars and also
service scholars with invaluable
raw material. The Free Europe
Committee even advertises for
public contributions without re-
vealing its ties to the United
States Government.
Radio Swan, a Q,I.A. station
in the Caribbean that was par-
ticularly active during the Bay
of Pigs invasien, Maintains un-
publicized contacts with private
American broadcasters.
The C.I.A. at times has ad-
dressed the American people
directly through public re-
lations men and, nominally in-
dependent citizens committees.
Many other C.I.A.-run fronts
and offices, however, exist pri-
marily to gather mail from and
to provide credentials for its
overseas agents.
Thus, the ramifications of
C.I.A. activities, at home and
abroad, seem almost, endless.
Though satellites, electronics
and gadgets have taken over
much of the sheer drudgery of
espionage, there remains a deep
involyement of human beings,
who ,project the agency into
awkward diplomatic situations,
raising many issues of policy
and ethics.
That is why many persons
are convinced that in the C.I.A.
a sort of Frankenstein's mon-
ster has been created that no
one can fully control.
By its clandestine nature, the
C.I.A. has few opportunities to
explain, justify or defend itself.
It can dbn the cloak of secrecy
and label all its works as neces-
sary to further some "national
interest. And it can quietly
lobby for support inside the
first Government agencies t
seek the valuable services o
American scholars ? an idea
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