FOREIGN AFFAIRS APRIL 1966 THE FACELESS VIET CONG

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP68B00432R000500010035-2
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 26
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 13, 2000
• Sequence Number: 35
• Content Type: REPORT

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VOL. 44
FOREIGN AFFAIRS
APRIL 1966 No. 3
THE FACELESS VIET CONG
By George A. Carver, Jr.
? . . we [the Lao Dong (Communist) Party] are building socialism in
Vietnam. We are building it, however, only in half of the country, while
in the other half, we must still bring to a conclusion the democratic-
bourgeois and anti-imperialist revolution. Actually, our party must now
accomplish, contemporaneously, two different revolutions, in the north and
in the south. This is one of the most characteristic traits of our struggle.
?Ho Chi Minh, June 19591
linHE present struggle in South Viet Nam is in essence the
rj
il third act of a continuous political drama whose prologue
' spanned the 193os, whose first act was played in the years
between 1941 and 1945, and whose second encompassed the 1946-
1954 Franco-Viet Minh war. The scene of major action in this
drama has shifted several times, as have the identities of the aux-
iliary players (e.g. the Chinese Nationalists, the British, the
French, the Chinese Communists and now the Americans) and
the political guises of some of the principals. Throughout its
course, however, the unifying theme of this drama has been the
unrelenting struggle of the Vietnamese Communist Party to ac-
quire political control over all of Viet Nam. Its chief protagonists,
fur :hermore, have always been and are today the small, dedicated
and doctrinaire group who, under Ho Chi Minh's guidance and
direction, organized and nurtured Viet Nam's Communist Party
during the 1930s, usurped the nationalist revolution after World
War II and subverted it to their ends. They are the same men
who run the Communist state already established in North Viet
Nam and who are now directing the insurgency designed to bring
the southern part of the country under their domination.
The term "Viet Cong" came into circulation around 1956 as a
1 From a Hanoi interview by two correspondents of the Italian Communist Party journal
Unita., published in Unita on July 1, 1959, and in the Belgian Communist paper Le Drapeau
Rouge on July 10, 1959.
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means of distinguishing some of the players in the current act of
this ongoing political drama from the players in Act II. "Viet
Cong" is a contraction of the phrase "Viet Nam Cong-San," which
means, simply, "Vietnamese Communist (s)." It is a descriptive
term, not necessarily pejorative except, perhaps, in the sense of
"If the shoe fits. . . ." It is a useful, precise and, as we shall see,
accurate generic label for the individuals leading the present in-
surgent movement, at all levels, and for the organizational struc-
ture through which that insurgency is controlled and directed.
Not surprisingly, the reactions of many whose concern with
Viet Nam is of recent origin are analogous to those of theater-
goers who walk into the middle of the third act of an extremely
complex drama ignorant of what has gone before. To understand
the Viet Cong insurgency, its relationship to the North Viet-
namese regime in Hanoi (the D.R.V.) and to the National Liber-
ation Front and the People's Revolutionary Party in South Viet
Nam (and their respective interrelationships) , it is essential to
appreciate the historical setting within which the Viet Cong
movement developed and the ends it was created to serve.
Throughout their almost four decades of unremitting struggle
for political power, the Vietnamese Communists have demon-
strated great skill in coping with new problems and great tacti-
cal flexibility in pursuing unwavering strategic objectives. Yet,
though skillful in learning from past failures, they have often be-
come the victims of previous successes. For the past quarter-cen-
tury the Vietnamese Communists have been doctrinally addicted
to the political device of a broad front organization, dominated
and controlled from behind the scenes by disciplined Communist
cadres, but espousing general sentiments to which persons of all
political inclinations can subscribe (though the formulation of
these sentiments has invariably involved a special lexicon of key
terms to which Communists and non-Communists attach radi-
cally different meanings). They have always rigidly subordi-
nated military activity to political ends, and employed it not to
inflict strategic defeat on enemy forces in the conventional sense,
but as an abrasive to wear down their adversaries' will to fight and
force their enemies to accept interim political settlements favor-
able to the continued pursuit of Communist political objectives.
Because of this Vietnamese Communist penchant for repeating
political and military stratagems, a knowledge of recent Viet-
namese history is particularly helpful in understanding the pres-
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THE FACELESS VIET CONG 349
ent insurgency. Although Westerners may be largely ignorant of
the scenario and detailed plot development of the previous acts
of Viet Nam's continuing political drama, the Vietnamese most
decidedly are not. Virtually all politically minded Vietnamese
have spent at least their adulthood, if not their whole lives, dur-
ing the Communist struggle for power. Few indeed have not had
their lives altered, conditioned or shaped thereby. Without ap-
preciating what the Vietnamese have lived through and without
recognizing some of the things they know intimately?often from
all-too-firsthand experience?Westerners cannot hope to under-
stand the attitude of Vietnamese now living south of the 17th
parallel toward the insurgency, the Viet Cong, the National Lib-
eration Front and the Communist regime in Hanoi.
II
Under the direction of the man who now calls himself Ho Chi
Minh, the Indochinese Communist Party was organized in Jan-
uary 1930. For the next decade the Vietnamese Communists con-
centrated on perfecting their organization, jockeying for position
within the rising anti-French nationalist movement and attempt-
ing to undercut nationalist leaders or groups whom they could
not subvert or bring under Communist control, using any means
available, including betrayal to the French.
In 1941, the Vietnamese Communists joined a nationalist or-
ganization called the League for Vietnamese Independence (Viet
Nam Doc Lap Dong Minh Hoi?or Viet Minh) which was spon-
sored by the Chinese Nationalists as a vehicle for harassing
Japanese forces in Indochina but swiftly subverted by the Viet-
namese Communists to further their own political objectives. By
1945 the Viet Minh movement was under complete Communist
control, despite the continued presence and subordinate partici-
pation therein of non-Communist nationalist elements whose
names and talents the Communists were more than willing to
exploit. In the chaotic aftermath of Japan's precipitate surrender,
the Communists used the Viet Minh as a device for seizing power
in Hanoi and (on September z, 1945) proclaiming the existence
of the "Democratic Republic of Viet Nam" under the presidency
of Ho Chi Minh.
On November II, 1945, in an effort to make the Viet Minh
government more palatable to non-Communist Vietnamese and
to the Chinese Nationalist forces then occupying Viet Nam down
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to the 16th parallel, Ho formally "dissolved" the Indochinese
Communist Party, though the impact of this gesture on the dis-
cerning was considerably attenuated when the same day wit-
nessed the formation of a new "Association for Marxist Studies."
Complete control over the Viet Minh and the subsequent resist-
ance struggle, however, remained unchanged in essentially the
same hands as those which control North Viet Nam and the in-
surgency below the 17th parallel today.'
By the late spring of 1946, the fact of Communist control over
the Viet Minh (despite the "non-existence" of the Party) was be-
coming increasingly apparent, as was the fact that Ho's political
manceuvring and stalling negotiations with the returning French
were not going to work. In preparation for the inevitable struggle,
Ho endeavored to broaden the Communists' base of nationalist
support. In May 1946 he announced the creation of a new "pop-
ular national front" (Licn-Hiep Quoc Dan Viet Nam) , known as
the Lien Viet, whose announced objective was the achievement
of "independence and democracy." The Viet Minh was merged
with, and eventually absorbed by, the Lien Viet, though its name
remained to serve as a generic label for those who participated in
the subsequent armed struggle against the French. The Com-
munists also brought into the Lien Viet two other small splinter
parties which by then were under complete Communist control:
the "Democratic Party," designed to appeal to "bourgeois ele-
ments" (i.e. urban trade, business and professional circles), and
the "Radical Socialist Party," designed to enlist the sympathies
of students and intellectuals.
The war with the French broke out on December 19, 1946, and
its general course is sufficiently well known to require no re-
hearsal here. The northern part of Viet Nam constituted the prin-
cipal theater of military operations; the struggle in the south,
though intense, was primarily a terrorist and harassing action
designed to keep the French off balance and prevent them from
concentrating either their attention or their forces on the war in
the north. Though the Viet Minh achieved these objectives, their
efforts in South Viet Nam were beset with a continuing series of
problems. French control of the sea, air and major overland routes
left the Viet Minh in the south dependent for supplies, reinforce-
2 Despite the Vietnamese Communists' claim that their party did not "exist" under any
name from 1945 until 1951, on August 31, 1953, the Cominform journal noted that Vietnamese
Communist Party membership increased from 20,000 in 1946 to 500,000 in 1950.
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THE FACELESS VIET CONG 351
meats, cadres and communications on a tortuous set of jungle
tracks running through Laos (along the western slopes of the
Annamite Chain) which came to be known, collectively, as the
"Ho Chi Minh Trail." Saigon politics were considerably more
complex than those of Hanoi, and non-Communist Vietnamese
political groups were both more numerous and more powerful
in the south than they were in the north. Furthermore, the Com-
munist leaders of the Viet Minh had a series of command and
control problems with their southern organization which took
several years to resolve.
In 1945, the senior Viet Minh representative in southern Viet
Nam was a Moscow-educated disciple of Ho Chi Minh and the
Third International named Tran Van Giau, whose blatant ruth-
lessness and indiscriminate terrorist tactics alienated key groups
that the Viet Minh were anxious to bring into their fold, such as
the Hoa Hao, Cao Dai and Binh Xuyen. Giau was accordingly
recalled to Hanoi in January 1946 and his duties as Viet Minh
commander in the south were assumed by Nguyen Binh. Al-
though eminently successful in harassing the French and further-
ing the cause of the nationalist revolution, Binh?a former mem-
ber of the Communists' most militant nationalist rivals, the
V.N.Q.D.D.?was never fully trusted by the Communist high
command in the north and came to be considered excessively
independent. In 1951 he was replaced by Le Duan, a charter
member of the Indochinese Communist Party who is now First
Secretary of the Communist Party in North Viet Nam and one
of the most powerful figures in the Hanoi regime. Until 1954,
2nd perhaps even later, Le Duan continued to play a major role
i developing and directing the Viet Minh organization in the
south and in ensuring that it remained under firm Communist
control. However, in late 1952 or early 1953 he was apparently
compelled to share his authority with Le Duc Tho, the present
head of the North Vietnamese Communist Party's Organization
Bureau and also a member of its Politburo.'
The 1949 Communist victory in China had a profound in-
fluence on the course of events in Viet Nam, particularly after the
Viet Minh offensive in the fall of 1950 cleared the French out of
the frontier area and gave the Viet Minh a common border with
t During the Viet Minh era Le Duan and Le Duc Tho apparently had a violent quarrel
ov( r tactics which Ho Chi Minh himself had to settle. The details of this dispute are still
obscure, but the resultant enmity between these two men has never been completely dissipated.
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their new Communist neighbor. The military consequences of
ensuing Chinese Communist support to the Viet Minh cause are
fairly well known. The political consequences, less well known in
the West, were of at least equal significance. With an increasingly
powerful fraternal ally in immediate proximity, the Communist
leadership of the Viet Minh became progressively less dependent
on the good will and support of non-Communist Vietnamese na-
tionalists. The mask could now be slipped. The fact of Com-
munist direction of the Viet Minh no longer had to be concealed,
the instruments of Communist control could be made more effec-
tive, the nature of that control more rigid and its extent more
pervasive.
The first major step in this direction was taken on March 3,
1951, when the Indochinese Communist Party reappeared as the
Dang Lao Dong Viet Nam, or Vietnamese Workers' Party. The
Lao Dong swiftly assumed a position of absolute political pri-
macy within the Lien Viet front, though for appearances' sake
the "Democratic" and "Socialist" parties mentioned above were
kept in existence. The overt reconstitution of the Communist
Party was doubtless prompted by a variety of considerations, of
which the most important was probably the fact th 'it covert
domination of the Viet Minh movement via a clandestine appa-
ratus whose very existence had to be concealed was an awkward
and inefficient process. It necessitated reliance on persuasion as
well as coercion and, further, complicated the task of advancing
Communist political objectives within those areas under Viet
Minh control.
The Viet Minh was ostensibly a purely nationalist movement
dedicated to the twin goals of independence and democracy; its
stated objective during the first phase of the armed struggle
(1946-1950 was simply to throw out the French. The emergence
of the "new" party, however, brought forth a new slogan: "The
anti-imperialist and the anti-feudal fights are of equal impor-
tance." What this meant became increasingly apparent during
the course of a systematic program which the Communists soon
initiated and took five years to complete. It was designed to
make the Party itself more doctrinally orthodox and to restruc-
ture the whole society, at least of North Viet Nam, along lines
consonant with Communist dogma. This program was conducted
in five stages, each carefully prepared and each preceded by in-
tensive sessions of "thought reform" for both Party and non-
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353
Party cadres to ensure that they would in fact execute the orders
they were about to receive.
The first or "economic leveling" stage, launched in 1951? was
designed to ruin the wealthier peasantry and the urban business-
men (to the extent that French control of the towns permitted
this) through a complicated system of arbitrary and punitive
taxes patterned on Chinese Communist models?as, indeed, were
all phases of this Vietnamese Communist program.' The second
stage was a short, sharp wave of terror launched throughout
large parts of North Viet Nam one evening in February 1953, a
week before Tet, the lunar new year, and sustained for precisely
fifteen days.' The patent objectives of this terror campaign were
to cow the populace, in preparation for what lay ahead, and elim-
inate all potential centers of effective resistance. When the terror
was shut off after accomplishing its purpose, Ho Chi Minh made
one of his celebrated weeping apologies.
The next phase of the Communist program, implemented dur-
ing 1953 and 1954, was euphemistically labelled "Land Rent Re-
duction." Carefully selected and specially trained teams of hard-
core Communist cadres (some of which almost certainly had
Chinese "advisers") went quietly to each village, made friends
with the poorest therein, organized them into cells and helped
them to draw up lists classifying their more prosperous neighbors
with respect to wealth, status, political leanings and revolutionary
zeal. Once all was in readiness, the "land reform battalions" came
out in the open, set up kangaroo courts and administered sum-
mary "people's justice" to "exploiters" and "traitors." Each land-
reform team had a pre-assigned quota of death sentences and
hard-labor imprisonments to mete out and these quotas were
;eldom underfulfilled. In addition to calculated and extensive use
of terror, the Communists marshalled all the pettiness, jealousy
and vindictiveness of village life to serve their political ends. The
punishments carried out extended not only to those actually con-
victed of "crimes" but also to their families, who were stripped
4 North Viet Nam had virtually no large businesses in the Western sense; Vietnamese termed
"capitalists" by the Lao Dong were generally what we would term small businessmen or
merchants. Though there were inequities in land ownership in North Viet Nam, the Red
River delta had the most extensive pattern of private ownership to be found anywhere in
Asia and there were virtually no large "feudal" holdings of the kind that existed in pre-
Communist China, or even in the Mekong delta region of South Viet Nam.
5 Tet is the most important traditional Vietnamese family and religious holiday. Launching
a terror wave just before Tet in Viet Nam is like launching one a week before Christmas in
the United States.
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of their possessions, turned out of their homes, denied means of
obtaining a livelihood and deprived of the documentation (e.g.
ration cards) essential to existence in a Communist-controlled
society. They became, officially, "non-persons" whom it was a
crime to succor. The fact that many of those convicted and far
larger numbers of their immediate relatives who suffered the at-
tendant consequences had taken an active part in the resistance
against the French was considered immaterial and irrelevant. No
one was safe or immune from the judgments of the "people's
courts," not even life-long members of the Communist Party.
Despite its incredible barbarity and violence, the Land Rent
Reduction Campaign was but a preliminary?and a mild one by
comparison?to the Land Reform Campaign proper which fol-
lowed, and which lasted from 1954 until 1956. Essentially the
same methods and techniques were employed but on a much
larger scale (e.g. the mandatory quota of death sentences and
imprisonments for each village was increased fivefold). No one
will ever know the exact human cost of these two campaigns, but
the number of people killed was probably on the order of 100,-
000, and the number who suffered dire personal hardship was
probably about half a million. Since North Viet Nam has a popu-
lation of about 18 million, these campaigns had a political impact
roughly equivalent to that which would be felt in America if the
U.S. Government deliberately engineered the murder of over a
million American citizens.
The rationale for this politically motivated slaughter was rooted
in the dogmatic fanaticism of the Vietnamese Communist leader-
ship. The fact that only a small percentage of the Party member-
ship had genuine proletarian or "poor peasant" origins was doc-
trinally embarrassing and made a purge doctrinally mandatory.
Dogma required that the "feudal-landlord" class be eliminated.
Though no such class really existed in North Viet Nam, it had
to be created so that it could be destroyed. The object of the exer-
cise was to purge the Party, restructure North Vietnamese so-
ciety, smash all real or potential opposition, and impose an iron
grip of Communist control. The excesses, however unfortunate,
were 'necessary.),
Once the Land Rent Reduction and Land Reform campaigns
had accomplished their objectives, the Lao Dong in 1956 opened
the final phase of its five-step program. It was known as the
"Rectification of Errors" and designed to restore North Viet
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THE FACELESS VIET CONG 355
Nam to the Communist version of "normalcy." The excesses of
the recent past were officially admitted and, by implication at
least, apologies were tendered. Ho wept (again). Truong Chinh
resigned as Secretary-General of the Party (though he remained
a member of its Politburo); so too did the D.R.V.'s vice minister
for land reform. General Giap made a speech to the Tenth Con-
gress of the Party Central Committee during the course of which
he acknowledged a long list of "errors" and mentioned that Iz,000
Party members had been released from jails to which they had
been unjustly consigned. (How many were imprisoned in the
first place was never stated.) The apologies and explanations,
however, provided an overwhelming body of irrefutable evidence
regarding what had actually transpired and made it abundantly
clear that throughout the whole process the Party (as one of its
spokesmen admitted) had been guided by the principle that "it is
better to kill ten innocent people than to let one enemy escape."'
III
In the midst of the events we have so briefly described, the
1954. Geneva Conference brought the Franco-Viet Minh war to
a close and ended the second act of Viet Nam's present political
drama. This conference produced a set of four interrelated docu-
ments known collectively as the "Geneva Accords." Three were
cease-fire agreements (one each for Laos, Cambodia and Viet
Nam) and the fourth an unsigned "Final Declaration," whose
juridical status is open to dispute. A variety of external political
considerations and pressures (including French domestic politics)
had considerably more influence on the language of the Accords
than the objective realities of the situation in Viet Nam. The
problem of extricating France from her Indochinese entangle-
ments as gracefully as possible was effectively solved and the
shooting was temporarily halted, but more fundamental ques-
tions regarding Viet Nam's political future were ignored or swept
under the rug. At the time, the Accords' crucial lacunw and
ambiguities seemed relatively unimportant, since most of the
Conference's participants considered it virtually inevitable that
all of Viet Nam would soon be ruled by a Viet Minh regime
.headed by the benign and (so it was thought) universally es-
Hoang Van Chi, "From Colonialism to Communism." London: Pall Mall, 1964 (also
Praeger, New York), p. 213. This detailed study of the events we have outlined by a Viet-
namese scholar and former Viet Minh cadre merits the careful attention of anyone interested
ia Vietnamese affairs.
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teemed "Uncle Ho." Their significance did not become manifest
until several years later.
Although the legal predecessor of the present Saigon govern-
ment attended the Conference (as the "Associated State of Viet
Nam"), none of the documents emanating from Geneva men-
tioned it by name or assigned it any rights or status. The Viet
Nam cease-fire agreement was signed by a French general on
behalf of the "Commander-in-Chief of the French Union Forces
in Indochina" and by the D.R.V.'s Vice Minister for National
Defense on behalf of the "Commander-in-Chief of the People's
Army of Viet Nam." In discussing "political and administrative
measures in the two regrouping zones" (Article 14), it makes a
passing reference to "general elections which will bring about the
unification of Viet Nam," a theme amplified but not clarified in
the Conference's "Final Declaration" (which set a July 1956 dead-
line). Nowhere was it specified what precisely the Vietnamese
were supposed to vote on or how the rights of various elements
within the Vietnamese body politic were to be protected. Not
surprisingly, the Saigon government objected formally and stren-
uously to these vague and airy dicta concerning Viet Nam's fu-
ture fate, stressing that it was not a party to these agreements
and hence could not consider itself bound by them.'
Some of Ho's lieutenants felt that the Geneva settlement had
cheated them of the full fruits of their victory, but on the whole
the Communists had no reason to be dissatisfied with the results.
The land-reform program was then in full cry and consolidation
of Communist control over the North was the task immediately
at hand. The South could wait, particularly since its chances of
survival as an independent political entity seemed nil at the time.
The Lao Dong leadership went through the motions of overt
compliance with the provisions of the Viet Nam cease-fire agree-
ment, though in doing so they took a number of steps to preserve
The American position was formally enunciated by President Eisenhower in a July 21,
1954, statement, which said in part: ". . . the United States has not itself been party to or
bound by the decisions taken by the Conference, but it is our hope that it will lead to the
establishment of peace consistent with the rights and needs of the countries concerned. The
agreement contains features which we do not like, but a great deal depends on how they work
in practice.
"The United States is issuing at Geneva a statement to the effect that it is not prepared to
join in the Conference declaration, but, as loyal members of the United Nations, we also
say that, in compliance with the obligations and principles contained in Article 2 of the
United Nations Charter, the United States will not use force to disturb the settlement. We
also say that any renewal of Communist aggression would be viewed by us as a matter of
grave concern."
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a subversive potential in the South and thus ensure themselves
against unfavorable political contingencies. In accordance with
the agreement, some 5o,000 Viet Minh troops were regrouped in
specified areas below the 17th parallel and taken north, along with
2,5,000-odd Viet Minh adherents and supporters. The Communists
were very careful, however, to leave behind a network of cadres,
which were instructed to blend into the scenery, deny Communist
affiliation and agitate in favor of the scheduled elections. They
also left behind a large number of weapons caches (3,561 of
which were discovered between September 1954 and June 1959)
against the day when their southern apparatus might have to
augment political action with armed force. The composition of
the units taken north was also carefully structured with an eye
to possible future needs. The Communists made sure that many
of the persons involved were young, employing both coercion and
impressment to get the kind of people that they wanted. Be-
fore they departed, personnel designated for regroupment were
strongly encouraged or, in many cases, directly ordered to con-
tract local marriages and family alliances in South Viet Nam.
These would stand them in good stead if they ever had to return.
In the aftermath of Geneva, the area south of the 17th parallel
was in a state of political chaos bordering on anarchy. Ngo Dinh
Diem, who became Premier on July 7, 1954, had only the shell
of a government, no competent civil service and a far from trust-
worthy army. In addition to all its other difficulties, the Diem
government was also soon faced with an unexpected problem of
major magnitude: refugees from the North. The myth that the
Viet Minh was a purely nationalist movement to which virtually
all Vietnamese freely gave their political allegiance and that
"Uncle Ho" was almost universally loved and esteemed by his
compatriots was rudely shattered soon after Geneva by what be-
came, proportionately, one of history's most spectacular politi-
cally motivated migrations.
Article 14-d of the Viet Nam cease-fire agreement promised
that civilians could move freely to whichever "regrouping zone"
they preferred. The Communists accepted this provision with a
notable lack of enthusiasm, hindered its implementation in a
variety of ways and eventually, when its application became
al together too embarrassing, flagrantly violated it. Despite all
Communist intimidation, obstruction and harassment, however,
some 900,000 people fled from the North to the South uprooting
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themselves and their families in order to avoid living under Ho
Chi Minh's Communist regime. (Given the relative population
sizes, this was the political equivalent of 9,000,000 Americans
leaving the United States.) As many as 400,000 more wanted to
leave, and were entitled to do so under Article 14-d, but were not
permitted by the Communist authorities to depart.
The two-year period from 1954 to 1956 was one of political
progress and achievement in South Viet Nam that would have
been considered impossible at the time of Geneva. The situation
which prevailed in the summer of 1956 forced Hanoi to take stock
of its prospects. The rather pro forma protests made by North
Viet Nam at the passing of the Geneva election deadline suggest
that Hanoi's rulers were not so perturbed by the fact that the
elections were not held as they were over the increasing disparity
between political life north and south of the 17th parallel, a con-
trast considerably less than flattering to their regime. The North
was just emerging from the throes of the land-reform campaign
and was in a state of economic turmoil, while the South presented
a picture of increasing political stability and incipient prosperity.
Hanoi accordingly recognized that more decisive action would
be required if the South was to be brought under its control. In-
structions were transmitted to the Communist network left be-
hind in the South directing these cadres to begin agitation and
political organization. The Lao Dong Party set up a department
of its Central Committee called "the Central Reunification De-
partment," which was made responsible for all matters concerning
individuals who had been regrouped to the North during the post-
Geneva exchange of forces. The following year (1957) a P.A.V.N.
Major-General named Nguyen Van Vinh, who had served in
various responsible posts in the South during the Franco-Viet
Minh war, was named chairman of this Reunification Depart-
ment, an office he still holds.
The 1956-1958 period was unusually complex, even for Viet
Nam. Diem, in effect, reached his political high-water mark some-
time around mid-1957. After that, his methods of operation, traits
of character and dependence on his family became set with ever
increasing rigidity along lines which ultimately led to his down-
fall. Despite the undeniable progress of its early years, his gov-
ernment was never successful in giving the bulk of the South
Vietnamese peasantry positive reasons for identifying their per-
sonal fortunes with its political cause. The administrators Diem
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posted to the countryside were often corrupt and seldom native
to the areas to which they were assigned, a fact which caused
them to be considered as "foreigners" by the intensely clannish
and provincial peasantry. Land policies, often admirable in
phraseology, were notably weak in execution and frequently op-
erated to the benefit of absentee landlords rather than those who
actually tilled the soil.
Such factors as these, coupled with the still manifest conse-
quences of a decade of war, generated genuine grievances among
the peasantry which the Communists were quick to exploit and
exacerbate. Communist cadres began their organizational efforts
among the disgruntled and the ill-served. They harped on local
ssues and avoided preaching Marxist doctrine. Cells were formed,
'Tillage committees established and small military units organized.
A pattern of politically motivated terror began to emerge, di-
meted against the representatives of the Saigon government and
concentrated on the very bad and the very good. The former
were liquidated to win favor with the peasantry; the latter be-
cause their effectiveness was a bar to the achievement of Com-
munist objectives. The terror was directed not only against offi-
cials but against all whose operations were essential to the func-
tioning of organized political society: schoolteachers, health
workers, agricultural officials, etc. The scale and scope of this ter-
rorist and insurrectionary activity mounted slowly but steadily.
By the end of 1958 the participants in this incipient insurgency,
whom Saigon quite accurately termed the "Viet Cong," consti-
tui:ed a serious threat to South Viet Nam's political stability.
Despite the increasing trouble that Viet Cong bands were caus-
ing and despite the Viet Cong's initial success in organizational
vvo rk, Hanoi was far from satisfied with the pace of Viet Cong
progress and was particularly chagrined at the movement's fail-
ure to win a really significant political following. Several Viet
Cong cadre members who were subsequently captured have re-
port.ed that in late 1958 Le Duan himself was sent on an exten-
sive inspection trip in the South, and that upon his return to
Hanoi in early 1959 he presented a list of recommendations sub-
sequ ently adopted by the Lao Dong Central Committee and re-
fern d to in Viet Cong cadre training sessions as "Resolution 15."
The. e recommendations laid out the whole future course of the
southern insurgency, including the establishment of a National
Liberation Front to be controlled by the Central Committee of
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360 FOREIGN AFFAIRS
the South Vietnamese branch of the Lao Dong Party and sup-
ported by a South Vietnamese "liberation army." The Front was
to be charged with conducting a political struggle, backed by
armed force, designed to neutralize the South and pave the way
for "reunification," i.e. political domination by Hanoi. We can be
certain that some such decisions were made about this time, for
in May 1959 the Lao Dong Central Committee declared that
"the time has come to struggle heroically and perseveringly to
smash [the G.V.N.]."
The consequences of these Hanoi decisions became increasingly
apparent during the eighteen months which followed the Central
Committee's May 1959 meeting. The scale and intensity of Viet
Cong activity began to increase by quantum jumps. Communist
military moves in Laos secured the corridor area along the North
Vietnamese border and infiltrators from the North began moving
down the "Ho Chi Minh Trail": a few hundred in 1959, around
3,000 in 1960, and over 10,000 in 1961.
During 1959 and 1960 further evolution of the various stresses
within the South Vietnamese body politic occurred. Diem's mil-
itary establishment had been designed to counter the threat of
conventional invasion and proved ill suited to cope with insurrec-
tionary warfare. The quality of government administrators grew
worse rather than better as Diem became increasingly inclined, in
making key appointments, to put loyalty to himself and his fam-
ily ahead of ability. His agrarian policies, particularly the disas-
trous "agroville" program of 1959, provided fresh sources of rural
discontent. The Viet Cong were quick to take advantage of the
government's errors and steadily heightened the intensity of their
terrorist activity. To complicate matters further there were rising
political pressures within the non-Communist camp and a grow-
ing feeling that Diem had to be ousted before his methods of
government made a Communist victory inevitable.
During the 1958-1960 period, Hanoi's hand in southern troubles
was quite imperfectly concealed. In August 1958 Hanoi Radio,
billing itself as "the voice of the Liberation Front," broadcast
instructions to the Viet Cong armed forces and village cadres
directing them to adapt themselves to the requirements of the
South Vietnamese political situation in order to carry out their
missions. In October 1958, it openly appealed to the highland
tribes to revolt, noting that "the government of our beloved Ho
is standing behind you." In September 1959 and again in Feb-
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THE FACELESS VIET CONG 361
ruary 1960, Hanoi commented on recent Viet Cong military
forays by terming them "our attacks" and praising the "skill of
our commander and the good will of our soldiers."
In September 1960 an almost open official seal was affixed to
Hanoi's plans for southern insurgency when, at the Third Na-
tional Congress of the Lao Dong Party, Le Duan made a lengthy
speech in which he stated: "The present National Congress . .
will define for the whole Party and the whole people the line for
carrying out the socialist revolution in the North, for the comple-
tion of the national people's democratic revolution throughout
the country, for the struggle to achieve national reunification."
In this speech Le Duan made a public call for the creation of a
"broad national united front" in the South. In effect, he was
making public the policy decisions which the Lao Dong Party
had made during the preceding months. From the tone and tem-
per of Le Duan's address it was apparent that the Viet Cong
insurrection was about to move into the stage of open war.
IV
Toward the end of January 1961, Hanoi Radio announced
that "various forces opposing the fascist Ngo Dinh Diem regime"
had formed a "National Front for the Liberation of South Viet
Nam" (N.L.F.) on December zo, I960, and that it had issued a
manifesto and ten-point political program. The language of both,
as broadcast by Hanoi, made the Front's political parentage
abundantly clear. The program's fourth point, for example, was
"to carry out land rent reduction, guarantee the peasants' right
to till their present plots of land, and redistribute communal land
in preparation for land reform." To knowledgeable Vietna-
mese, such words as these made it chillingly obvious who was
behind the Front and what lay in store for South Viet Nam should
it ever come to power.
On February ii, 1961, Hanoi devoted a second broadcast to
the N.L.F.'s manifesto and program, blandly changing the lan-
guage of both to tone down the more blatant Communist termi-
nology of the initial version. However, even the milder second
version (which became the "official" text) borrowed extensively
from Le Duan's September speech and left little doubt about
the Front's true sponsors or objectives.
After the Hanoi Radio announcements, the Viet Cong imme-
diately began consolidating all of its activities?military as well
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362 FOREIGN AFFAIRS
as political?under the N.L.F. banner and conducting intensive
organizational activity in its name. A propaganda outlet, the Lib-
eration News Agency, was promptly established and began pour-
ing forth announcements and stories (replayed by Hanoi and by
Communist media throughout the world) designed to portray
the Front as a spontaneous, indigenous coalition of South Viet-
namese nationalists. For the first year of its alleged existence,
however, the N.L.F. was a shadowy thing with no definable struc-
ture and a faceless, unidentified leadership.
The Front was but one of the two organizational instruments
Hanoi had deemed essential to the successful pursuit of its po-
litical objectives south of the 17th parallel. The other?de-
signedly less well known in the West but more important within
South Viet Nam itself?was first brought to light in a Liberation
News Agency broadcast on January 13, 1962, which announced
that a "conference of Marxist-Leninist delegates" had met in
South Viet Nam "during the last days of December 1961," and
decided that "to fulfill their historic and glorious duty . . . work-
ers, peasants and laborers in South Viet Nam need a vanguard
group serving as a thoroughly revolutionary party." Accordingly,
the conference had established the People's Revolutionary Party
(P.R.P.), which came into official existence on January 1, 1962.8
The founders "warmly supported" the program of the N.L.F. and
"volunteered to join its ranks." In point of fact, the P.R.P. im-
mediately took complete control of the Front ("assumed the his-
toric mission of playing the role of vanguard body to the south-
em revolution") and is, currently referred to by Hanoi as "the
soul" of the N.L.F.a
Captured Communist documents have since made it abun-
dantly clear that the "creation" of the P.R.P. involved what
would be termed in American business parlance the "spin-off" of
a wholly owned subsidiary. The P.R.P. was and is, in fact, simply
the southern branch of the Lao Dong. As one pertinent Party
The only two of these "delegates" who have been subsequently identified are Vo Chi
? Chong, now a Vice Chairman of N.L.F.'s Presidium and member of the P.R.P.'s Executive
Committee, and Huynh Van Tam, now the N.L.F.'s representative in Algiers, where he devotes
? considerable time to cultivating Western newsmen, deceiving some of them about his own
political background and the true nature of the organization he represents in a manner reminis-
cent of Chou En-lai's similar successes during the mid-1940s.
9 These phrases appear in "The Vietnamese People's Revolutionary Party and Its Historic
Mission of Liberating the South," an article in the January 1966 issue of the Lao Dong Party's
theoretical journal Hoe Tap. The same article notes: "The experiences of the world and our
country's revolutions have shown that in order to win the greatest success, the national demo-
cratic revolution must be led by a workers' revolutionary party"--i.e. a Communist party.
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THE FACELESS VIET CONG 363
directive put it: "The People's Revolutionary Party has only
the appearance of an independent existence; actually, our party
is nothing but the Lao Dong Party of Viet Nam (Viet Minh
Communist Party) unified from north to south under the direc-
tion of the central executive committee of the party, the chief of
which is President Ho."" The P.R.P. serves as the principal vehi-
cle for maintaining Lao Dong---i.e. North Vietnamese?control
over the Viet Cong insurgency.
As the organizational structure of the Viet Cong movement
has expanded over the past four years, its general outlines have
become fairly well known. In the insurgency's initial phase
(1954-1959), the Communists retained the Viet Minh's division
of what is now South Viet Nam into "Interzone V" (French An-
nam below the 17th parallel) and the "Nambo" (Cochin China),
with each area under Hanoi's direct control. In late 1960 or early
1961, this arrangement was scrapped and field control over all
aspects of the Viet Cong insurgency vested in a still existing,
single command headquarters, originally known as the Central
Office for South Viet Nam (or C.O.S.V.N.?a term still in circu-
lation) but now usually referred to by captured Viet Cong as
simply the P.R.P.'s Central Committee. This command entity,
which also contains the headquarters of the N.L.F., is a mobile
and sometimes peripatetic body, usually located in the extreme
northwestern tip of Tay Ninh province in prudent proximity to
the Cambodian border. Under this Central Committee head-
quarters, the Viet Cong divide South Viet Nam into five num-
bered military "regions" and one "special zone" for Saigon and
its immediate environs. Each of the five regions, in turn, is di-
vided into provinces; each province into districts; and each dis-
trict into villages." The Viet Cong's provinces, districts and vil-
lages are administratively comparable and roughly equivalent
in area to those of the South Vietnamese Government. But their
boundaries do not coincide, thus complicating Saigon's adminis-
trative problems in reacting to insurgent activities.
Though the outlines of the Viet Cong's organizational struc-
ture are fairly well known, the identities of its leaders are not.
They are faceless men, veteran Communist revolutionaries who
10 This particular document, dated December 7, 1961, was captured in Ba Xuyen Province.
Its text may be found, among other places, in the Department of state's White Paper,
"Aggression from the North."
In Viet Nam' a "village" is not a cluster of huts but an administrative entity roughly
comparable to an American township.
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364 FOREIGN AFFAIRS
have made a lifetime practice of masking their identities under
various aliases and 11,071LS de guerre and who take particular pains
to stay hidden in the background in order to support the politi-
cal fiction that the insurgency is directed by the N.L.F. and the
Front's ostensible officers.
At the 1962 Geneva Conference on Laos, a member of the
North Vietnamese delegation inadvertently commented that the
published roster of the Lao Dong Party's Central Committee did
not include some members whose identities were kept secret be-
cause they were "directing military operations in South Viet
Nam." One of the four examples he cited was "Nguyen Van
Cuc,'12 which is one of the aliases used by the Chairman of the
P.R.P. This Lao Dong Central Committee member, whose true
name we do not know, is probably the overall field director of the
Viet Cong insurgency in South Viet Nam. The overall com-
mander of Viet Cong military forces (who would be a subordi-
nate of Cue's within the Communist command structure) is
almost certainly the Chairman of the (P.R.P.) Central Commit-
tee's Military Committee?a man who uses the name Tran Nam
Trung but whom several captured Viet Cong cadre members
have insisted is actually Lieutenant-General Tran Van Tra, a
Deputy Chief of Staff of the North Vietnamese army and an
alternate member of the Lao Dong Central Committee. The di-
rector of all Viet Cong activity in V.C. Military Region 5 (the
northernmost third of South Viet Nam) is Nguyen Don, a Major-
General in the North Vietnamese army and another alternate
member of the Lao Dong Central Committee, who in 1961 was
commander of the North Vietnamese 305th Division but came
south late that year or early in 1962. In short, not only does the
P.R.P. control all aspects of the Viet Cong movement, including
the N.L.F., and not only is it a subordinate echelon of the North
Vietnamese Lao Dong Party, but the P.R.P.'s own leaders ap-
pear to be individuals who themselves occupy ranking positions
within the Lao Dong Party hierarchy.
As indicated above, for the first year of its existence the N.L.F.
was as shadowy and faceless an organization as the P.R.P. is
today. It was allegedly created "after a conference of representa-
tives of various forces opposing the fascist regime in South Viet
Nam," but the identities of these representatives or the "forces"
12 P. J. Honey, "North Vietnam's Workers' Party and South Vietnam's People's Revolu-
tionary Party," Pacific Affairs Quarterly, Winter 1962-1963, p. 383.
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THE FACELESS VIET CONG 365
they represented were never specified. The myth of the Front
was not fleshed out with public organizational substance or overt
leadership until after the P.R.P was presented as its "vanguard"
element. The N.L.F. now claims to be a coalition of over forty
"associated organizations" which, collectively, pu;:port to repre-
sent virtually all shades and strata of South Vietnamese political
and social life. This coalition includes three "political parties":
the P.R.P., the "Democratic Party" and the "Radical Socialist
Party." (The latter two bear almost exactly the same names as
the two "minor" parties allowed to exist in North Viet Nam and
are obviously intended to play similar roles.) In their present
name or form, virtually none of its affiliated organizations ante-
dates the founding of the N.L.F. itself, many almost certainly
exist only on paper, and a careful analysis of the N.L.F.'s own
propaganda makes it clear that a goodly number have identical
officers, directorates and staffs. Some of these organizations, how-
ever, have acquired substance after the fact, as it were, and now
play important roles in the N.L.F.'6 efforts to organize and con-
trol the rural populace.
It is fairly easy to devise an organizational structure capable
of lending verisimilitude to a political fiction, doubly so if one is
trying to deceive a foreign audience unversed in local political
affairs. Fleshing this structure out with live, known individuals
to occupy posts of public prominence is considerably more diffi-
cult. The Viet Cong obviously hoped to attract to the N.L.F.
South Vietnamese of personal stature and renown, preferably in-
dividuals not immediately identifiable as Communists or Com-
munist sympathizers, who could enhance the Front's prestige
and political attractiveness and provide a more or less innocent
fa?e behind which the N.L.F.'s Communist masters could op-
erate in secure obscurity. To date the Viet Cong have been nota-
bly unsuccessful in this regard, though the full measure of their
failure is far better appreciated within South Viet Nam itself
than it is abroad. No Vietnamese of what could accurately be
described as significant personal prestige or professional standing
?not even one of known leftist persuasion?has ever been willing
to associate himself publicly with the N.L.F. or lend it the use
of his name.
The N.L.F.'s first Central Committee was not announced until
March 1962, well over a year after the Front's supposedly spon-
taneous creation. Though the Committee purportedly had 52
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members, the N.L.F. was able to come up with only 31 names,
most of which were virtually unknown even within South Viet
Nam. The 41-member second (and current) Central Committee,
announced in January 1964, is equally lacking in distinction.
The Chairman of the N.L.F.'s Presidium and Central Commit-
tee is Nguyen Huu Tho, a former provincial lawyer with a long
record of activity in Communist-sponsored causes but of little
political repute or professional standing among his former col-
leagues at the South Vietnamese bar, who generally categorize him
as having been an "avocat sans brefs." The N.L.F.'s present Secre-
tary-General (also the Secretary-General of the "Democratic
Party" and the Chairman of the N.L.F.'s Saigon Zone Commit-
tee) is Huynh Tan Phat, usually described in N.L.F. propaganda
as an "architect," though one would be hard pressed to point to
any edifices he has designed. From 1945 until 1948 he apparently
served as a member of the Viet Minh/Viet Cong Executive Com-
mittee in Nambo and as the Communists' propaganda chief for
their Saigon Special Zone. The N.L.F.'s First Secretary-General
(also the Secretary-General of the "Radical Socialist Party")
was Nguyen Van Hieu, now its principal travelling representa-
tive abroad. A former journalist and teacher (some say of biol-
ogy, some of mathematics), Hieu has been a Communist propa-
gandist since the late 19408. The Chairman of the N.L.F.'s
External Relations (i.e. foreign affairs and propaganda) Com-
mittee is Tran Buu Kiem, a Central Committee member who
served briefly as Secretary-General after Hieu and before Phat.
Described in official N.L.F. biographies as an "intellectual and
ardent patriot," Kiem has spent most of the past two decades
as a leader in various Communist-front youth groups. Such fig-
ures as these are the best the Front has been able to come up
with to staff its most prominent public offices. Their organiza-
tional and revolutionary talents may be impressive, but their
personal stature and prestige among the South Vietnamese peo-
ple are not.
Over the past four years the Viet Cong have labored mightily
to improve their image beyond South Viet Nam's borders and
to enlist a broad spectrum of international support for their
cause; to develop their organizational structure within South
Viet Nam, thus strengthening their internal political position;
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THE FACELESS VIET CONG 367
and to expand their military effort, to facilitate achievement
of their political goals and if possible to generate an aura of in-
vincibility capable of breaking their adversaries' will to continue
the struggle.
The image-building campaign abroad has been designed to
publicize the N.L.F. and inflate its prestige and reputation. Its
goal has been to get the N.L.F. generally accepted as an indige-
nous South Vietnamese political coalition (admittedly with some
Communist members) which sprang up spontaneously to combat
the harsh excesses of the U.S.-supported Diem regime, and which
seeks only peace, democracy and reunification as provided for in
the Geneva agreements. Though moral?and, to some extent
perhaps, physical?support may be afforded by North Viet Nam
and other fraternal socialist states (so the argument runs), the
N.L.F. is basically an independent political entity with a policy
and will of its own. This campaign has been waged through the
propaganda disseminated by the Liberation News Agency, re-
played and echoed by Communist (and non-Communist) media
throughout the world; through a steady flow of messages from the
Front to foreign governments and heads of state (particularly
of neutralist Afro-Asian nations); by ever increasing attendance
at foreign conferences and meetings (generally Communist or
leftist sponsored) by a small handful of indefatigable N.L.F.
representatives; and by the establishment of permanent N.L.F.
"missions" in Havana, Peking, Moscow, Prague, East Berlin,
Budapest, Cairo, Djakarta and Algiers. All of this activity has
profited from the fact that knowledge of the realities of political
life in South Viet Nam does not extend much beyond its fron-
tiers; all of it has been guided by a keen awareness of the effec-
tiveness of incessant repetition in converting myth to assumed
reality.
Throughout South Viet Nam, the Viet Cong have developed
and employed the N.L.F. apparatus in their intensive effort to
organize the population (especially the rural population), in-
volve it in their insurgency campaign and bring it under their
political domination. The detailed application of this effort varies
from locality to locality, and is materially influenced by such
local factors as the relative degree of Viet Cong strength in the
area. The objective, however, is always to secure total participa-
tion and total involvement on the part of the local population
in order to establish total Viet Cong control. They endeavor to
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368 FOREIGN AFFAIRS
persuade?and, if conditions permit, compel?every inhabitant
of a given area to join and work actively in some N.L.F. compo-
nent organization. Farmers are encouraged or forced to join
the Liberation Peasants' Association; women, the Liberation
Women's Association; children, the Liberation Youth Associa-
tion. Where Viet Cong control is strong, no one escapes the net.
Physically fit males not sent off to some other Viet Cong military
unit serve in the local militia squad or self-defense platoon;
women, children and old men help make bamboo stakes and
traps or dig up roads to harass government forces. They serve as
informants and couriers, or go on purchasing expeditions to ne,..rby
government-controlled market towns. Everyone participates and
ensures that his neighbor does so as well. All of this activity is
coordinated and directed by local N.L.F. committees which,
where circumstances permit, assume the prerogatives and func-
tions of local government. These local committees in turn are di-
rected by superior echelons, capped, at least ostensibly, by the
Central Committee of the N.L.F. itself.
The N.L.F.'s organizational structure is paralleled and con-
trolled at each echelon by a complementary P.R.P. structure.
Under the general command of its Central Committee, the P.R.P.
is organized on a geographic basis through the various regions,
provinces and districts down to the village level. Each geo-
graphic echelon has a directing committee responsible for con-
trolling all P.R.P.?hence all Viet Cong, including N.L.F.?ac-
tivities within its area. These committees vary in size and
organizational complexity, even? among equivalent geographic
echelons, but each one has a single chairman and several sub-
ordinate members or subcommittees with specific functional re-
sponsibilities. The number and nomenclature of these func-
tional subcommittees also varies from area to area, but they
normally cover military affairs, economic and financial affairs,
and what the Communists term "front affairs and civilian
proselytizing," whose chairman is responsible for controlling
all N.L.F. activity in that area. If the P.R.P. organization at
that echelon is sufficiently well developed, he in turn will have
subordinate members of his P.R.P. subcommittee to direct each
of the local associations affiliated with the N.L.F. Though cap-
tured documents indicate that the Viet Cong try to keep the
level of overt P.R.P. participation below two-fifths of the total
membership of any given N.L.F. component, the organizational
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THE FACELESS VIET CONG 369
structure we have just described (reinforced by a network of
covert P.R.P. cells throughout the N.L.F.) keeps all components
of the N.L.F. at every level under complete P.R.P. control.
The Viet Cong's terrorist and military apparatus was de-
veloped and is directed by this same organizational structure,
which ensures that armed activity at all levels is rigidly sub-
ordinated to political objectives and kept under tight Party con-
trol. The Viet Cong military establishment now has over 90,000
full-time troops (including over iz,000 North Vietnamese reg-
ulars) augmented and supported by something over ioo,000
paramilitary personnel and part-time guerrillas. This whole force,
however, was built up for political reasons, to serve political ends.
The Viet Cong political apparatus was at work laying the foun-
dations for insurgency long before there was even so much as
a Viet Cong hamlet self-defense squad.
The director of the military affairs subcommittee (mentioned
above) is frequently also the commander of the Viet Cong force
attached to that geographic echelon. Village directing committees
have village platoons under their control; district committees,
district companies; provincial committees, provincial battalions.
Regional committees have forces of regimental and multi-regi-
mental size at their disposal, and the whole Viet Cong military
establishment is subject to the direction of the P.R.P.'s Central
Committee. Throughout this military structure, the same basic
principles of organization and command relationship are uni-
formly applied. There is no such thing as a Viet Cong military
unit of any size independent of the Party's political apparatus
or free from tight political control. Probably no more than a third
of the Viet Cong forces are Party members, but by virtue of its
organizational mechanism the P.R.P. controls the "Liberation
Army" in the same way that it controls the National Liberation
Front.
An understanding of the Viet Cong's organizational structure
enables us to recognize the real significance and function of the
more than 50,000 persons infiltrated into South Viet Nam since
the Lao Dong Party's 1959 decision to pursue its objective of
political conquest by waging insurgent war. Until mid- to late
1963 these infiltrators were virtually all ethnic southerners drawn
from the pool of regrouped Viet Minh forces and supporters
taken north in 1954. They were not foot soldiers or cannon fodder
(at least not until Hanoi began sending in whole North Viet-
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370 FOREIGN AFFAIRS
namese units in late 1964 or early 1965). Instead they were
disciplined, trained and indoctrinated cadres and technicians.
They became the squad leaders, platoon leaders, political officers,
staff officers, unit commanders, weapons and communications
specialists who built the Viet Cong's military force into what it
is today. They also became the village, district, provincial and
regional committee chiefs and key committee members who built
the Viet Cong's political apparatus.
The earlier arrivals had had at least five years of indoctrination
and training in North Viet Nam, or elsewhere in the Commu.d'st
bloc, before departing on their southern missions; some of the
later arrivals have had nearly a decade of such preparation. Until
the recent sharp rise in Viet Cong battlefield casualties, approxi-
mately a third of all the personnel in Viet Cong military units at
and above the district company level were "returnees" trained
in the North. At least half of the membership of most P.R.P.
district committees, and an even larger proportion at higher
echelons, also appear to be "returnees." Without this infiltration
from the North, in short, the present Viet Cong organization
could never have been developed.
VI
The Viet Cong insurgency is clearly a masterpiece of revolu-
tionary organization, but its total effectiveness and real political
strength are extremely difficult to assess. The bulk of the Viet
Cong's organizational efforts have been expended in rural areas
and it is there that they are strongest. (The government controls
all of the cities, major towns and provincial capitals and all but
a handful of the district seats.) There are indications, however,
that sharply rising Viet Cong taxation rates, increasingly fre-
quent resort to impressment to secure troops, and the Viet Cong's
manifest inability to deliver on political promises of earlier years
are all beginning to erode their base of rural support. During the
past year nearly 800,000 refugees fled from the hinterland to the
vicinity of government-controlled towns. Some of these were flee-
ing from natural disasters, some from the simple hazards of war
(though the direction in which persons of this category opted to
flee is significant), but many were obviously endeavoring to get
out from under the Viet Cong. Furthermore, in assessing Com-
munist claims of control it should be noted that over half of the
rural population voted in the May 1965 provincial elections,
despite Viet Cong orders to boycott them.
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THE FACELESS VIET CONG
371
In the cities, the Viet Cong have an obvious terrorist capa-
bility but are politically quite weak?a fact of which they are
aware and which, according to captured documents, causes them
considerable embarrassment. They have been unable to turn
the urban political ferment of the past three years to any obvious
immediate advantage. None of the participants in the genuine
social revolution now taking place in the urban areas of South
Viet Nam has sought Viet Cong support or entertained overtures
of political alliance. Though they have undoubtedly penetrated
such groups as the Buddhists and the students, the Viet Cong
have made no visible headway in subverting or bringing them
under the N.L.F. banner. Just how weak the Viet Cong are in
the cities was demonstrated twice last fall (on October 15 and
December 19) when two public calls by the Viet Cong for a
"general strike" went totally unheeded and produced no visible
change whatsoever in the pattern of urban life.
Despite its leaders' obvious organizational talents and revolu-
tionary skills, the Viet Cong movement is beset with a number
of fundamental weaknesses. It has no universally appealing
theme in any way comparable to the Viet Minh's espousal of
anti-French nationalism. Persistent propaganda efforts to por-
tray the Americans as successor imperialists to the French have
simply never taken hold. The concept of reunification has rela-
tively little appeal for peasants who regard someone from the
next province as an alien. The idea of reunification does appeal
to politically minded urban elements, particularly to refugees from
the North, but within such circles there is a great reluctance to
accept the Viet Cong's identification of "reunification" with
political domination by the present Hanoi regime. Having lived
through the sequence of historical events we have outlined, po-
litically conscious Vietnamese are not easily deceived by the
N.L.F.'s pretensions to independence and freedom from northern
control, particularly since the military side of the Viet Cong
insurgency is now being waged with an ever larger number of
North Vietnamese troops.
The current struggle in South Viet Nam is an historically
rooted, political phenomenon of infinite complexity, particularly
since it involves an externally directed Communist drive for
power interlarded with a genuine indigenous social revolution. In
analyzing such a phenomenon, "truth" is often a function of one's
angle of vision, and myth is not always easy to distinguish from
reality. Despite the fact that there are many aspects of the cur-
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Ap
372 FOREIGN AFFAIRS
rent situation in Viet Nam concerning which confident assertion
is a mark of ignorance or disingenuous intent, there are certain
aspects of the insurgency, and of the Viet Cong structure through
which it is being waged, which are not open to intellectually
honest dispute.
There are unquestionably many non-Communists heroically
serving in various components of the National Liberation Front
out of a desire to redress genuine grievances or in the honest be-
lief that they are thereby helping to build a better political struc-
ture for their native land. As an organization, however, the
N.L.F. is a contrived political mechanism with no indigenous
roots, subject to the ultimate control of the Lao Dong Party in
Hanoi.
The relationship between the Viet Cong and the D.R.V. is not
that of politically like-minded allies. Instead, it is essentially the
relationship between a field command and its parent headquar-
ters. Such relationships are never free from elements of tension
and discord. Within the Viet Cong movement, and even within
its controlling hierarchy, there are unquestionably varying judg-
ments (at least privately held ones) about the wisdom of present
tactics and the best course of future action. (There are obvious
differences of opinion regarding the struggle in Viet Nam even
within the Lao Dong Party Politburo.) Nevertheless, the whole
Viet Cong organizational structure and chain of command has
been carefully designed to minimize the risks of insubordination.
Though for tactical reasons the overt propaganda outlets and
spokesmen of the N.L.F. sometimes take political positions which
differ at least in emphasis from those emanating from Hanoi, the
chances of the Viet Cong's developing or adopting a genuinely
independent political line in opposition to orders received from
North Viet Nam through the Lao Dong Party apparatus are
slight indeed.
Finally, although the Viet Cono, organization is unquestion-
ably a major factor in the South Vietnamese political scene,
the N.L.F. mechanism which it controls has no serious claim to
being considered, as Hanoi insists, the "sole legitimate voice of
the South Vietnamese people." Were it ever to be accepted as
such, the record of what has happened in North Viet Nam in the
years since 1951 makes it abundantly clear what lies in store for
the more than 16,000,000 Vietnamese who live south of the 17th
.parallel, especially for those who have resolutely fought against
the Viet Cong insurgency from its inception,
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