CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP68B00432R000500010034-3
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 12
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 13, 2000
• Sequence Number: 34
• Publication Date: March 22, 1966
• Content Type: OPEN

Approved For Release 2001/07/26 : CIA-RDP68B00432R000500010034-3
CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE March 22, 1966
Mr, CLARK. I understand, of course,
that they carry supplies at least suffi-
cient to support the personnel.
Mr. RUSSELL of Georgia, Not only
for tae 4,500, but also to supply the
250,0C0 Vietcong and North Vietnamese
regulars who are engaged in the war.
Mr CLARK. I have heard it said that
the amount of tonnage coming down the
Ho Chi Minh trail this year is quite in-
significant. As I recall, the committee
had i;estimony to that effect. Perhaps
the Senator from Missouri will recall
that i;estimony before the Committee on
Foreign Relations. Much of the tonnage
came on bicycles.
Mr. RUSSELL of Georgia. I do not
agree that the amount is small or insig-
nificant. That is not my own estimate
of the situation. I have read everything
that has been written on the war be-
tween Vietminh and the French, and
the amount of materiel of war that those
peoplo were able to move around on their
heads and backs, on bicycles, and in
baske is is absolutely staggering to the
human imagination.
An occidental army could not begin
to exist if it were forced to supply Itself
in the manner in which the North Viet-
name,le and the Vietcong are compelled
to do today. I think that they move a
considerable quantity of supplies. I be-
lieve that we have slowed them down
somewhat by this bombing. But we have
not ir?terdicted them completely, and we
never will. That is why I have advo-
cated closing the Haiphong Harbor in
addition to knocking out the two rail-
roads from China.
Mr. President, I yield to my friend, the
Senator from Missouri. _
Mr. SYMINGTON. Mr. President,
this discussion is interesting. I happen
to have a very high regard for the fight-
ing characteristics of the American mili-
tary. They have been sent to South
Vietni~m to defend the United States.
They cannot ever expect success on a
man-to-man basis because there are so
many millions of people out there able
to fight in this war. Therefore, they see
qualit;r as their only hope, quality of mu-
nition.;, quality of supplies.
It f; interesting to watch the develop-
ment of these curious discussions in the
newspapers and on the radio and tele-
vision in the United States, concerning
what we should or should not supply in
the wiry of quality in our supplies, so as
to help these young men to be success-
ful in what they have been sent out there
to do.
I am in complete agreement with my
colleague from Georgia on the impor-
tance of destroying the docks at Hai-
phong. Nobody knows what and how
much is coming through that harbor.
It is little more than some 150 miles
at the most to Haiphong from Red China.
It is a, relatively simple trip, one which
can be taken, and is being. taken by
many ships, ships owned by countries
not friendly to the United States, as well
as ships by countries that are friendly
to the United States. But what worries
me most is this slow but steady effort
,to de.aigrate the qualitative advances
Nobody has considered the use of nu-
clear weapons. Nor should they. But
many people apparently are worried
about the amount of bombing we are
doing in Vietnam. They are also worried
about this limited defoliation. They ask
about the use of gas, as the Senator from
Georgia pointed out, a gas that does not
permanently hurt people, one used all
over the United States by policemen,
in carrying out their duties in our cities. `
People are worried about the type and
caliber of our airplanes. They wonder
whether these airplanes are too big, or
too fast. Perhaps the words airplane,
bomb, chemical defoliators and other
words expressing our quality will be es-
tablished soon as dirty words. What will
the result be?
I have seen many rifles that were
manufactured in China and Russia.
These rifles are placed in the hands of
the Vietcong and people from the north
who live on a small amount of rice, have
never had a good life and never expect
much change.'
We take a college graduate from the
United States and put him in the jungle.
He has a rifle. The Vietcong referred
to has a rifle which is just as good as the
rifle manufactured in the United States.
If the situation continues to develop
as it is developing, soon the only way in
which we will be willing to defend?free-
dom will be by putting our men out with
rifles to fight with their men with a
rifle. It would then become a numbers
game, a game which, in my opinion, our
position would be hopeless from the
standpoint of success; and it would also
involve heavy additional casualties.
Mr. President, I have a statement I
would make if the Senator from Georgia
would yield.
'Mr. CLARK. Mr. President, I have
the floor.
Mr. SYMINGTON. Mr. President, I
understand the Senator from Pennsyl-
vania had the floor for an hour, that he
had asked for an hour.
Mr. CLARK. The Senator is quite
correct.
Mr. SYMINGTON. If the Senator
would yield, I thought the Senator from
Georgia had the floor, was, so told by a
member of the staff.
Mr. CLARK. Mr. President, I shall
yield to the Senator from Missouri, but
I should like to have the RECORD show
that, having completed my comments in
something less than an hour, I yielded
the floor. Several other Senators took
the floor.
I came back and asked if the Senator
from Georgia would be willing to answer
a few remaining questions which I had
not had the opportunity to ask him
yesterday. He very graciously said that
he would.
We were in the middle of that colloquy
when the Senator from Missouri came in.
Mr. SYMINGTON. Mr. President, I do
appreciate the Senator yielding to me.
There are only 20 minutes remaining
before the vote.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without
objection, it is so ordered.
Mr. SYMINGTON. Mr. President, I
thank the able and distinguished Sen-
ator from Pennsylvania.
Mr. President, during recent weeks and
months, there has been much discussion
on this floor of the various Communist
units, political and military, in North
Vietnam and South Vietnam, primarily
the Vietcong and the National Libera-
tion Front; also others.
Many different statements and inter-
pretations of the structure and function-
ing of these units have been made a part
of the RECORD-to the point where,
frankly, I have been somewhat unclear
about the history and the actions of
these various components.
Now, and perhaps for the first time
in summarized fashion, a clear and con-
cise presentation has been made by a
scholar of political theory and Asian af-
fairs, who also has served in Vietnam.
Anyone who wants better understand-
ing of what has been and is going on in
the relationship between the Ho Chi
Minh government of North Vietnam and
the Communists of South Vietnam will
be intensely interested in this article.
Therefore, I ask unanimous consent that
an article "The Faceless Vietcong" by
George A. Carver, Jr., be printed at this
point in the RECORD.
There being no objection, the article
was ordered to be printed in the RECORD,
as follows:
[From Foreign Affairs, April 19661
THE FACELESS ViETcoNG
(By George A. Carver, Jr.)
"We [the Lao Dong (Communist) Party]
are building socialism in Vietnam, We are
building it, however, only in half of the
country, while in the other half, we must
still bring to a conclusion the democratic-
bourgeois and anti-imperialist revolution.
Actually, our party must now accomplish,
contemporaneously, two different revolu-
tions, in the north and in the south. This
is one of the most characteristic traits of our
struggle."
-Ho CHI MINE, June 1959,1
The present struggle in South Vietnam
is in essence the third act of a continuous
political drama, whose prologue spanned the
1930's, whose first act was played in the
years between 1941 and 1945, and whose
second encompassed the 1946-54 Franco-Viet
Minh war. The scene of major action in this
drama has shifted several times, as have
the identities of the auxiliary players (e.g.
the Chinese Nationalists, the British, the
French, the Chinese Communists and now
the Americans) and the political guises of
some of the principals. Throughout its
course, however, the unifying theme of this
drama has been the unrelenting struggle of
the Vietnamese Communist Party to acquire
political control over all of Vietnam. Its
chief protagonists, furthermore, have always
been and are today the small, dedicated and
doctrinaire group who, under Ho Chi Minh's
guidance and direction, organized and nur-
tured Vietnam's Communist Party during
the 1930's, usurped the nationalist revolu-
tion after World War II and subverted it to
their ends. They are the same men who
Mr. CLARK. Mr. President, I ask 1From a Hanoi interview by two corres-
unanimous consent that I may yield to pondents of the Italian Communist Party
the Senator from Missouri so that he journal Unite, published in Unite on July 1
wWNP% 4 SO9TeVg"~V -~ig #f -gll'L-tb sZ w O an. ouge on July 10, 1959nist paper
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March 22, 1966
CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE 6151
run the Communist state already established
in North Vietnam and who who are now
directing the insurgency designed to bring
the southern part of the country under their
dominatio:a.
The term "Vietcong" came Into circulation
around 1956 as a means of distinguishing
some of the players in the current act of this
ongoing p,>litical drama from the players in
act II. "Vietcong" is a contraction of the
phrase "Vietnam Cong-San," which means,
simply, "Vietnamese Communist(a)." It is
a descriptive term, not necessarily pejorative
except, perhaps, in the sense of "If the shoe
fits. . . . ' It is a useful, precise and, as we
shall see, accurate generic label for the in-
dividuals leading the present insurgent
movement, at all levels, and for the organ-
izational structure through which that in-
surgency is controlled and directed.
Not surprisingly, the reactions of many
whose con>ern with Vietnam is of recent ori-
gin are analogous to those of theatergoers
who walk Into the middle of the third act of
an extremely complex drama ignorant of
what has gone before. To understand the
Vietcong Insurgency, its relationship to the
North Vietnamese regime in Hanoi (the
D.R.V.) and to the National Liberation
Front and the People's Revolutionary Party
in South Vietnam (and "their" respective in-
terrelationships), it is essential to appreci-
ate the historical setting within which the
Vietcong movement developed and the ends
it was created to serve.
Throughout their almost four decades of
unremitting struggle for political power, the
Vtetname:e Communists have demonstrated
great skill in coping with new problems and
great tactical flexibility in pursuing unwav-
ering strategic objectives. Yet, though skill-
ful in learning from past failures, they have
often become the victims of previous suc-
cesses. For the past quarter-century the
Vietnamese Communists have been doc-
trinally addicted to the political device of a
broad front organization, dominated and
controlled from behind the scenes by die-
ciplined (lommunist cadres, but espousing
general sentiments to which persons of all
political inclinations can subscribe (though
the formulation of these sentiments has in-
variably involved a special lexicon of key
terms to which Communists and non-Com-
munists attach radically different meanings).
They have always rigidly subordinated mil-
itary activity to political ends, and employed
it not to inflict strategic defeat on enemy
forces in the conventional sense, but as an
abrasive to wear down their adversaries' will
to fight a ad force their enemies to accept in-
terim political settlements favorable to the
continued pursuit of Communist political.
objective:;.
Because of this Vietnamese Communist
penchant for repeating political and military
stratagems, a knowledge of recent Vietnam-
ese history is particularly helpful in under-
standing the present insurgency. Although
westerners may be largely ignorant of the
scenario and detailed plot development of
the previous acts of Vietnam's continuing
political 3rama, the Vietnamese most decid-
edly are not. Virtually all politically minded
Vietnamc se have spent at least their adult-
hood, if not their whole lives, during the
Communist struggle for power. Few indeed
have not had their lives altered, conditioned
or shaped thereby. Without appreciating
what the Vietnamese have lived through and
without recognizing some of the things they
know intimately-often from all-too-first-
hand experience--Westerners cannot hope to
understand the attitude of Vietnamese now
living south of the 17th parallel toward the
insurgency, the Vietcong, the National Lib-
eration front and the Communist regime in
Hanoi.
In
Under the direction of the man who now
calls himself He Chi Minh, the Indochinese
Community Party was organized in January.
1930. For the next decade the Vietnamese
Communists concentrated on perfecting their
organization, jockeying for position within
the rising anti-French nationalist move-
ment and attempting to undercut national-
1st leaders or groups whom they could not
subvert or bring under Communist control,
using any means available, including be-
trayal to the French.
In 1941, the Vietnamese Communists joined
a nationalist organization called the League
for Vietnamese Independence (Vietnam Doc
Lap Deng Minh Hoi-or Vietminh) which
was sponsored by the Chinese Nationalists as
a vehicle for harassing Japanese forces in
Indochina but swiftly subverted by the Viet-
namese Communists to further their own
political objectives. By 1945. the Vietminh
movement was under complete Communist
control, despite the continued presence and
subordinate participation therein of non-
Communist nationalist elements whose
names and talents the Communists were
more than willing to exploit. In the chaotic
aftermath of Japan's precipitate surrender,
the Communists used the Vietminh as a
device for seizing power in Hanoi and (on
September 2, 1945) proclaiming the existence
of the "Democratic Republic of Vietnam"
under the presidency of He Chi Minh.
On November 11, 1945, in an effort to make
the Vietminh government more palatable to
non-Communist Vietnamese and to the Chi-
nese Nationalist forces then occupying Viet-
nam down to the 16th parallel, Ho formally
"dissolved" the Indochinese Communist
Party, though the impact of this gesture on
the discerning was considerably attenuated
when the same day witnessed the formation
of a new "Association for Marxist Studies."
Complete control over the Vietminh and the
subsequent resistance struggle, however, re-
mained unchanged in essentially the same
hands as those which control North Vietnam
and the insurgency below the 17th parallel
today?
By the late spring of 1946, the fact of
Communist control over the Vietminh (de-
spite. the "nonexistence" of the party) was
becoming increasingly apparent, as was the
fact that He's political maneuvering and
stalling negotiations with the returning
French were not going to work. In prepara-
tion for the inevitable struggle, He endeav-
ored to broaden the Communists' base of na-
tionalist support. In May 1946? he announced
the creation of a new "popular national
front" - (Lien-Hiep Quoc Dan Vietnam),
known as the Lien-Viet, whose announced ob-
jective was the achievement of "independ-
ence and democracy." The Vietminh was
merged with, and eventually absorbed by, the
Lien Viet, though its name remained to serve
as a generic label for those who participated
in the subsequent armed struggle against the
French. The Communists also brought into
the Lien Viet two other small splinter parties
which by then were under complete Com-
munist control: the "Democratic Party," de-
signed to appeal to "bourgeois elements"
(i.e. urban trade, business, and professional
circles), and the "Radical Socialist Party,"
designed to enlist the sympathies of students
and intellectuals.
The war with the French broke out on
2Despite the Vietnamese Communists'
claim that their party did not "exist" under
any name from 1945 until 1951, on Aug. 81,
1953, the Cominform journal noted that
Vietnamese Communist Party membership
increased from 20,000 in 1946 to 500,000 in
1960.
December 19, 1946, and its general course
is sufficiently well known to require no re-
hearsal here. The northern part of Viet-
nam constituted the principal theater of
military operations; the struggle in the south,
though intense, was primarily a terrorist
and harassing action designed to keep the
French off balance and prevent them from
concentrating either their attention or their
forces on the war in the north. Though the
Vietminh achieved these objectives, their ef-
forts in South Vietnam were beset with a -
continuing series of problems. French con-
trol of the sea, air, and major overland routes
left the Vietminh in the south dependent
for supplies, reinforcements, cadres, and com-
munications on a tortuous set of jungle
tracks running through Laos (along the
western slopes of the Annamite Chain) which
came to be known, collectively, as the "He
Chi Minh trail." Saigon politics were con-
siderably more complex than those of Hanoi,
and non-Communist Vietnamese political
groups were both more numerous and more
powerful in the south than they were in
the north. Furthermore, the Communist
leaders of the Vietminh had a series of com-
mand and control problems with their south-
ern organization which took several years
to resolve.
In 1945, the senior Vietminh representative
in southern Vietnam was a Moscow-educated
disciple of He Chi Minh and the Third In-
ternational named Tran Van Giau, whose
blatant ruthlessness and indiscriminate ter-
rorist tactics alienated key groups that the
Vietminh were anxious to bring into their
fold, such as the Hoa Hao, Can Dal and Binh
Xuyen. Giau was accordingly recalled to
Hanoi in January 1946 and his duties as Viet-
minh commander in the south were assumed
by Nguyen Binh. Although eminently suc-
cessful in harassing the French and further-
ing the cause of the nationalist revolution,
Binh-a former member of the Communists'
most militant nationalist rivals, . the
VNQDD-was never fully trusted by the
Communist high command in the north and
came to be considered excessively independ-
ent. In 1951 he was replaced by Le Duan, a
charter member of the Indochinese Commu-
nist Party who is now first secretary of the
Communist Party in North Vietnam and one
of the most powerful figures in the Hanoi
regime. Until 1954, and perhaps even later,
Le Duan continued to play a major role in
developing and directing the Vietminh orga-
nization in the south and in ensuring that it
remainded under firm Communist control.
However, in late 1952 or early 1953 he was
apparently compelled to share his authority
with Le Due The, the present head of the
North Vietnamese Communist Party's Orga-
nization Bureau and also a member of its
Politburo.e
The 1949 Communist victory in China had
a profound influence on the course of events
in Vietnam, particularly after the Vietminh
offensive in the fall of 1950 cleared the
French out of the frontier area and gave the
Vietminh a common border with their new
Communist neighbor. The miliary conse-
quences of ensuring Chinese Communist sup-
port to the Vietminh cause are fairly well
known. The political consequences, less well
known in the West, were of at least equal
significance. With an increasingly powerful
fraternal ally in immediate proximity, the
Communist leadership of the Vietminh be-
t1 During the Viet Minh era Le Duan and
Le Duo Tho apparently had a violent quarrel
over tactics which He Chi Minh himself had
to settle. The details of this dispute are still
obscure, but the resultant enmity between
these two men has never been completely
dissipated.
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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD -SENATE March 22, 1966
came progressively less dependent on the after accomplishing its purpose, Ho Chi Minh
good will and support of non-Communist made one of his celebrated weeping apologies.
Vietnamese nationalists. The mask could The next phase of the Communist pro-
now be slipped. The fact of Communist di- gram, implemented during 1953 and 1954,
rection of the Vietminh no longer had to be was euphemistically labelled "Land Rent
concealed, the instruments of Communists Reduction." Carefully selected and spe-
control could be made more effective, the na- cially trained teams of hardcore Communist
ture of t:sat control more rigid and its extent cadres (some of which amost certainly had
more pervasive. Chinese "advisers") went quietly to each
The first major step in this direction was village, made friends with the poorest there-
taken ors March 3, 1951, when the Indo- in, organized them into cells and helped
chinese Communist Party reappeared as the them to draw up lists classifying their more
Dang Lao Dong Vietnam, or Vietnamese prosperous neighbors with respect to wealth,
Workers' Party. The Lao Bong swiftly as- status, political leanings and revolutionary
sumed a position of absolute political pri- zeal. Once all was in readiness, the "land
macy within the Lien Viet front, though for reform battalions" came out in the open,
appearances' sake the "Democratic" and set up kangaroo courts and administered
"Socialist," Parties mentioned above were summary "people's justice" to "exploiters"
kept in existence. The overt reconstitution and "traitors." Each land-reform team had
of the Communist Party was doubtless a preassigned quota of death sentences and
prompted by a variety of considerations, of hard-labor imprisonments to mete out and
which the most important was probably the these quotas were seldom underfulfilled. In
fact that covert domination of the Vietminh- addition to calculated and extensive use of
movement via a clandestine apparatus whose terror, the Communists marshalled all the
very existence had to be concealed was an pettiness, jealously and vindictiveness of
awkward and inefficient process. It nnces- village life to serve their political ends. The
sitated reliance on persuasion as well as punishments carried out extended not only
coercion and, further, complicated the task to those actually convicted of "crimes" but
of advancing Communist political objectives also to their families, who were stripped of
within those areas under Vietminh control. their possessions, turned out of their homes,
The V: etminh was ostensibly a purely na- denied means of obtaining a livelihood and
tional movement dedicated to the twin goals deprived of the documentation (e.g., ration
of independence and democracy; its stated cards) essential to existence in a Commu-
objective during the first phase of the armed nist-controlled society. They became, offi-
struggle (1948-51) was simply to throw out cially, "nonpersons" whom it was a crime
the French. The emergence of the "new" to succor. The fact that many of those con-
party, however, brought forth a new slogan; victed and far larger numbers of their im-
"The anti-imperialist and the antlfeudal mediate relatives who suffered the attendant
fights are of equal Importance." What this consequences had taken an active part in the
meant became increasingly apparent during resistance against the French was considered
the course of a systematic program which immaterial and irrelevant. No one was safe
the Communists soon initiated and took 5 or immune from the judgments of the "peo-
years to complete. It was designed to make ple's courts," not even life-long members of
the party itself . more doctrinally orthodox the Communist Party.
and to restructure the whole society, at least Despite its incredible barbarity and vie-
of North Vietnam, along lines consonant with lessee, the land rent reduction campaign was
Communist dogma. This program was con- but a preliminary-and a mild one by com-
ducted fez five stages, each carefully prepared parison-to the land reform campaign proper
and each preceded by intensive sessions of which followed, and which lasted from 1954
"though; reform" for both party and non- until 1956. Essentially the same methods
party cadres to insure that they would in and techniques were employed but on a much
fact execute the orders they were about to larger scale (e.g. the mandatory quota of
receive, death sentences and imprisonments for each
The first or "economic leveling" stage, village was increased fivefold). No one will
launched in 1951, was designed to ruin the ever know the exact human cost of these
wealthier peasantry and the urban business- two campaigns, but the number of people
men (to the extent that French control of killed was probably on the order of 100,000,
the towns permitted this) through a compli- and the number who suffered dire personal
cated system of arbitrary and punitive taxes hardship was probably about half a million.
patterned on Chinese Communist models- Since North Vietnam has a population of
as, indeed, were all phases of this Vietnamese about 18 million, these campaigns had a po-
Communist program! The second stage litical impact roughly equivalent to that
was a short, sharp wave of terror launched which would be felt in America. If the U.S.
through gut large parts of North Vietnam one Government deliberately engineered the
evening in February 1953, a week before Tet, murder of over a million American citizens.
the lunar new year, and sustained for pre- The rationale for this politically motivated
cisely fifteen days" The patent objectives of slaughter was rooted In the dogmatic fanati-
this terror campaign were to cow the popu- cism of the Vietnamese Communist leader-
lace, in preparation for what lay ahead, and ship. The fact that only a small percentage
eliminate all potential centers of effective of the party membership had genuine pro-
resistance. When the terror was shut off letarian or "poor peasant" origins was doc-
trinally embarrassing and made a purge
North Vietnam had virtually no large doctrinally madatory. Dogma required that
business in the Western sense; Vietnamese the "feudal-landlord" class be eliminated.
termed "capitalists" by the Lao Dong were Though no such class really existed in North
generall:r what we would term small busi- Vietnam, it had to be created so that it
nessmon or merchants. Though there were could be destroyed. The object of the exer-
inequities In land ownership in North Viet- cise was to purge the party, restructure
nam, th a Red River Delta had the most ex- North Vietnamese society, smash all real or
tensive pattern of private ownership to be potential opposition, and impose an iron grip
found azywhere in Asia and there were vir- of Communist control. The excesses, how-
tuaily n> large "feudal" holdings of the kind ever unfortunate, were "necessary."
th t x ,.led in -C m mist China r Once the land rent reduction and land
a e
re o mu o
mitt ci and, by implication at least, apologies
were tendered. Ho wept (again). Truong
Chinh resigned as Secretary-General of the
Party (though he remained as member of its
Politburo) ; so too did the DRV's vice min-
ister for land reform. General Giap made a
speech to the 10th Congress of the Party
Central Committee during the course of
which he acknowledged a long list of "errors"
and mentioned that 12,000 Party members
had been released from jails to which they
had been unjustly consigned. (How many
were imprisoned in the first place was never
stated.) The apologies and explanations,
however, provided an overwhelming body of
irrefutable evidence regarding what had ac-
tually transpired and made it abundantly
clear that throughout. the whole process the
party (as one of its spokesmen admitted) had
been guided by the principle that "it is better
to kill ten innocent people than to let one
enemy escape."
In the midst of the events we have so
briefly described, the 1954 Geneva Confer-
ence brought the Franco-Vietminh war to a
close and ended the second act of Vietnam's
present political drama. This conference
produced a set of four interrelated docu-
ments known collectively as the Geneva ac-
cords. Three were cease-fire agreements
(one each for Laos, Cambodia and Vietnam)
and the fourth an unsigned "Final Declara-
tion," whose juridical status is open to dis-
pute. A variety of external political consid-
erations and pressures (including French do-
mestic politics) had considerably more in-
fluence on the language of the accords than
the objective realities of the situation in
Vietnam. The problem of extricating France
from her Indochinese entanglements as
gracefully as possible was effectively solved
and the shooting was temporarily halted, but
more fundamental questions regarding Viet-
nam's political future were Ignored or swept
under the rug. At the time, the accords'
crucial lacume and ambiguities seemed rela-
tively unimportant, since most of the confer-
ence's participants considered it virtually In-
evitable that all of Vietnam would soon be
ruled by a Vietminh regime headed by the
benign and (so it was thought) universally
esteemed "Uncle Ho." Their significance did
not become manifest until several years later.
Although the legal predecessor of the pres-
ent Saigon government attended the confer-
ence (as the "Associated State of Vietnam"),
none of the documents emanating from Ge-
neva mentioned it by name or assigned it
any rights or status. The Vietnam cease-fire
agreement was signed by a French general
on behalf of the "Commander in Chief of the
French Union Forces in Indochina" and by
the DRV's Vice Minister for National Defense
on behalf of the "Commander in Chief of the
People's Army of Vietnam." In discussing
"political and administrative measures in the
two regrouping zones" (art. 14), it makes a
passing reference to "general elections which
will bring about the unification of Vietnam,"
a theme amplified but not clarified in the.
conference's "final declaration" (which set
a July 1956 deadline). Nowhere was it speci-
fled what precisely the Vietnamese were sup-
posed to vote on or how the rights of various
elements within the Vietnamese body politic
were to be protected. Not surprisingly, the
Saigon government objected formally and
strenuously to these vague and airy dicta
concerning Vietnam's future fate, stressing
that it was not a party to these agreements
., p
even in the Mekong Delta region of South reform campaigns had accomplished their ? Hoang Van Chi, "From Colonialism to
Vietnam. objectives, the Lao Dong In 1358 opened the Communism," London: Pall Mall, 1964
Tot is the most important traditional final phase of its five-step program. It was (also Praeger, Now York), p. 213. This do-
Vietnarrese family and religious holiday, known as the "Rectification of Errors" and tailed study of the events we have outlined
Launching a terror wave just before Tet in designed to restore North Vietnam to the by a Vietnamese scholar and former Viet-
Vietnam, is like launching one a week before Communist version of "normalcy." The ex- mink cadre merits the careful attention of
ChrAppM,Ofty l I ease 2001/09 6 ?fG414=f~P E~4?. PF YO~f'500~`Y~ r `tea in Vietnamese affairs.
 Approved For Release 2001/07/26 : CIA-RDP68B00432R000500010034-3
March 22, 1966
CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE 6153
and hence ,ould not consider itself bound by
them?
Some of Ho's lieutenants felt that the
Geneva settlement had cheated them of the
full fruits of their victory, but on the whole
the Communists had no reason to be dis-
satisfied with the results. The land-reform
program was then in full cry and consolida-
tion of Communist control over the north
was the task immediately at hand. The
south could wait, particularly since its
chances of survival as an independent politi-
cal entity seemed nil at the time.
The Lao Dong leadership went through
the motiors of overt compliance with the
provisions of the Vietnam cease-fire agree-
ment, though in doing so they took a num-
ber of steps to preserve a subversive poten-
tial in the south and thus insure themselves
against unfavorable political contingencies.
In accordance with the agreement, some
50,000 Vietminh troops were regrouped in
specified as eas below the 17th parallel and
taken north, along with 25,000-odd Vietminh
adherents e.nd supporters. The Communists
were very careful, however, to leave behind
a network of cadres, which were instructed
to blend Into the scenery, deny Communist
affiliation end agitate in favor of the sched-
uled electicns, They also left behind a large
number of weapons caches (3,561 of which
were discovered between September 1954 and
June 1959) against the day when their south-
ern apparatus might have to augment politi-
cal action with armed forces. The composi-
tion of the units taken north was also care-
fully structured with an eye to possible
future needs. The Communists made sure
that many of the persons Involved were
young, employing both coercion and impress-
ment to gist the kind of people that they
wanted. Before they departed, personnel
designated for regroupment were strongly
encouraged or, in many cases, directly ordered
to contract local marriages and family alli-
ances in South Vietnam. These would stand
them in good stead if they ever had to
return.
In the aftermath of Geneva, the area
south of the 17th parallel was in a state of
political ctaos bordering on anarchy. Ngo
Dinh Diem, who became Premier on July 7,
1954, had only the shell of a government, no
competent ivii service, and a far from trust-
worthy arrly. In addition to all its other
difficulties, the Diem government was also
soon faced with an unexpected problem of
major magnitude: refugees from the north.
The myth that the Vietminh was a purely
nationalist movement to which virtually all
Vietnamese freely gave their political alle-
glance and that "Uncle Ho" was almost uni-
versally loved and esteemed by his com-
patriots was rudely shattered soon after
Geneva by what became, proportionately,
one of history's most spectacular politically
motivated migrations.
? The American position was formally
enunciated by President Eisenhower in a
July 21, 1914, statement, which said in part:
"? ? * the United States has not itself been
party to or bound by the decisions taken by
the conference, but it is our hope that it
will lead tc the establishment of peace con-
sistent with the rights and needs of the
countries concerned. The agreement con-
tains features which we do not like, but a
great deal depends on how they work in
practice.
"The United States is issuing at Geneva a
statement to the effect that it is not pre-
pared to jcin In the conference declaration,
but, as IoyeI members of the United Nations,
we also say that, in compliance with the
obligations and principles contained in art.
2 of the United Nations Charter, the United
States will not use force to disturb the set-
tlement. We also say that any renewal of
Article 14(d) of the Vietnam cease-fire
agreement promised that civilians could
move freely to whichever "regrouping zone"
they preferred. The Communists accepted
this provision with a notable lack of en-
thusiasm, hindered its implementation in a
variety of ways and eventually, when its ap-
plication became altogether too embarrass-
ing, flagrantly violated it. Despite all Com-
munist intimidation, obstruction and har-
assment, however, some 900,000 people fled
from the north to the south uprooting them-
selves and their families in order to avoid
living under Ho Chi Minh's Communist
regime. (Given the relative population sizes,
this was the political equivalent of 9 mil-
lion Americans leaving the United States.)
As many as 400,000 more wanted to leave, and
were entitled to do so under article 14(d),
but were not permitted by the Communist
authorities to depart.
The 2-year period from 1954 to 1956 was
one of political progress and achievement in
South Vietnam that would have been con-
sidered impossible at the time of Geneva.
The situation which prevailed in the sum-
mer of 1956 forced Hanoi to take stock of Its
prospects. The rather pro forma protests
made by North Vietnam at the passing of the
Geneva election deadline suggest that Ha-
noi's rulers were not so perturbed by the
fact that the elections were not held as they
were over the Increasing disparity between
political life north and south of the 17th
parallel, a contrast considerably less than
flattering to their regime. The north was
just emerging from the throes of the land-
reform campaign and was in a state of eco-
nomic turmoil, while the south presented a
picture of increasing political stability and
incipient prosperity.
Hanoi accordingly recognized that more
decisive action would be required if the south
was to be brought under its control. In-
structions were transmitted to the Commu-
nist network left behind in the south direct-
ing these cadres to begin agitation and
political organization. The Lao Dong Party
set up a department of its central committee
called the Central Reunification Department,
which was made responsible for all matters
concerning individuals who had been re-
grouped to the north during the post-Geneva
exchange of forces. The following year
(1957) a PAVN major-general named Nguyen
Van Vinh, who had served in various respon-
sible posts in the south during the Franco-
Vietminh war, was named chairman of this
Reunification Department, an office he still
holds.
The 1956-58 period was unusually complex,
even for Vietnam, Diem, in effect, reached
his political high-water mark sometime
around mid-1957. After that, his methods
of operation, traits of character and depend-
ence on his family became set with ever
increasing rigidity along lines which ulti-
mately led to his downfall. Despite the un-
deniable progress of its early years, his gov-
ernment was never successful in giving the
bulk of the South Vietnamese peasantry
positive reasons for identifying their per-
sonal fortunes with its political cause. The
administrators Diem posted to the country-
side were often corrupt and seldom native to
the areas to which they were assigned, a
fact which caused them to be considered as
"foreigners" by the Intensely clannish and
provincial peasantry. Land policies, often
admirable in phraseology, were notably weak
in execution and frequently operated to the
benefit of absentee landlords rather than
those who actually tilled the soil.
Such factors as these, coupled with the
still manifest consequences of a decade of
war, generated genuine grievances among
the peasantry which the Communists were
quick to exploit and exacerbate. Communist
cadres began their organizational efforts
preaching Marxist doctrine. Cells were
formed, village committees established and
small military units organized. A pattern of
politically motivated terror began to emerge,
directed against the representatives of the
Saigon government and concentrated on the
very bad and the very good. The former
were liquidated to win favor with the peas-
antry; the latter because their effectiveness
was a bar to the achievement of Communist
objectives. The terror was directed not only
against officials but against all whose opera-
tions were essential to the functioning of
organized political society: schoolteachers,
health workers, agricultural officials, etc.
The scale and scope of this terrorist and in-
surrectionary activity mounted slowly but
steadily. By the end of 1958 the participants
in this incipient insurgency, whom Saigon
quite accurately termed the "Vietcong," con-
stituted a serious threat to South Vietnam's
political stability.
Despite the increasing trouble that Viet-
cong bands were causing and despite the
Vietcong's initial success in organizational
work, Hanoi was far from satisfied with the
pace of Vietcong progress and was particu-
larly chagrined at the movement's failure to
win a really significant political following.
Several Vietcong cadre members who were
subsequently captured have reported that in
late 1958 Le Duan, himself was sent on an
extensive inspection trip in the south, and
that upon his return to Hanoi in early 1959
he presented a list of recommendations sub-
sequently adopted by the Lao Dong Central
Committee and referred to in Vietcong cadre
training sessions as "Resolution 15." These
recommendations laid out the whole future
course of the southern insurgency, including
the establishment of a National Liberation
Front to be controlled by the Central Com-
mittee of the South Vietnamese branch of
the Lao Dong Party and supported by a
South Vietnamese "liberation army." The
Front was to be charged with conducting a
political struggle, backed by armed force,
designed to neutralize the south and pave
the way for "reunification," i.e., political
domination by Hanoi. We can be certain
that some such decisions were made about
this time, for in May 1959 the Lao Dong
Central Committee declared that "the time
has come to struggle heroically and per-
severingly to smash [the GVN):'
The consequences of these Hanoi decisions
became increasingly apparent during the 18
months which followed the Central Com-
mittee's May 1959 meeting. The scale and
intensity of Vietcong activity began to in-
crease by quantum jumps. Communist mili-
tary moves in Laos secured the corridor area
along the North Vietnamese border and in-
filtrators from the north began moving down
the "Ho Chi Minh Trail": a few hundred in
1959, around 3,000 in 1960, and over 10,000
in 1961,
During 1959 and 1960 further evolution of
the various stresses within the South Viet-
namese body politic occurred. Diem's mili-
tary establishment had been designed to
counter the threat of conventional invasion
and proved ill suited to cope with insurrec-
tionary warfare. The quality of government
administrators grew worse rather than bet-
ter as Diem became increasingly inclined, in
making key appointments, to put loyalty to
himself and his family ahead of ability. His
agrarian policies, particularly the disastrous
"agroville" program of 1959, provided fresh
sources of rural discontent. The Vietcong
were quick to take advantage of the govern-
ment's errors and steadily heightened the
intensity of their terrorist activity. To com-
plicate matters further there were rising po-
litical pressures within the non-Communist
camp and a growing feeling that Diem had
to be ousted before his methods of govern-
ment made a Communist victory inevitable.
~ qlr~ B~~yv~d O ~pn r?iui~i#dgl~~ ~O~~kipi> j{a~ 80 periq , Hanoi's hand
Cornxnti~l~,ipQgg;'e, jgrv
us as dd~i1II tEK `b `fir b r 4t krpe ~l~A !&411 ~bbKt Yi' Joe was quite Imperfectly
 Approved For Releas,200 x/07/26 : CIA-RDP68B00432R000500019034-3
6154
concealed, In August 1958 Hanoi radio, bill-
ing itself as "the voice of the Liberation
Front," broadcast instructions to the Viet-
cong aimed forces and village cadres direct-
ing then to adapt themselves to the require-
ments of the South Vietnamese political sit-
uation in order to carry out their missions.
In October 1958, it openly appealed to the
highland tribes to revolt, noting that "the
government of our beloved He is standing
behind you." In September 1959 and again
in February. 1960, Hanoi commented on re-
cent V letcong military forays by terming
them "our attacks" and praising the "skill of
our commander and the good will of our
soldiers"
In September 1960 an almost open official
seal wag affixed to Hanoi's plans for southern
insurgency when, at the Third National Con-
gress of the Lao Dong Party, Le Duan made
a lengt:ay speech in which he stated: "The
present National Congress * * * will define
for the whole party and the whole people the
line for carrying out the socialist revolution
in the north, for the completion of the
national people's democratic revolution
throughout the country, for the struggle to
achieve national reunification," In this
speech Le Duan made a public call for the
creation of a "broad national united front"
in the south. In effect, he was making pub-
lic the policy decisions which the Lao Dong
Party had made during the preceding
months From the tone and temper of Le
Duan's address it was apparent that the Viet-
cong insurrection was about to move into
the stage of open war.
rv
Towavd the end of January 1961, Hanoi ra-
dio announced that "various forces opposing
the fascist Ngo Dinh Diem regime" had
formed a "National Front for the Liberation
of Sout:a Vietnam" (NLF) on December 20,
1960, and that It had issued a manifesto and
10-point, political program. The language of
both, as broadcast by Hanoi, made the
Front's political parentage abundantly clear.
The pro gram's fourth point, for example, was
"to carry out land rent reduction, guarantee
the peasants' right to -till their present plots
of land, and redistribute communal land in
preparal ion for land reform." To knowledge-
able Vietnamese, such words as these made it
chilling:y obvious who was behind the Front
and what lay in store for South Vietnam
should it ever come to power.
On February 11, 1961, Hanoi devoted a
second broadcast -to the NLF's manifesto and
program, blandly changing the language of
both to tone down the more blatant Conamu-
nisrt ?terrainology of the initial version. How-
ever, even the milder second version (which
became the "official" text) borrowed exten-
sively fr)m Le Duan's September speech and
left little doubt about the Front's true spon-
sors or objectives.
After ,ho Hanoi radio announcements, the
Vietcong' immediately began consolidating
all of its activities-military as well as po-
litical-under the NLF banner and conduct-
ing intensive organizational activity in its
name. .i propaganda outlet, the Liberation
News Agency, was promptly established and
began louring forth announcements and
stories (replayed by Hanoi and by Commu-
nist media throughout the world) designed
to portray the Front as a spontaneous,in-
digenoue coalition of South Vietnamese
national sts. For the first year of its alleged
existences however, the NLF was a shadowy
thing wish no definable structure and a face-
less, unidentified leadership.
The Front was but one of the two or-
ganizational instruments Hanoi had deemed
essential to the successful pursuit of its
political objectives south of the 17th parallel,
The other-designedly less well known in
the West, but more Important within South
January 13, 1962, which announced that a
"conference of Marxist-Leninist delegates"
had met in South Vietnam "during the last
days of December 1961," and decided that "to
fulfill their historic and glorious duty * * *
workers, peasants and laborers In South
Vietnam need a vanguard group serving as a
thoroughly revolutionary party," Accord-
ingly, the conference had established the
People's Revolutionary Party (PRP), which
came into official existence on January 1,
1962.1 The founders "warmly supported" the
program of the NLF and "volunteered to join
Its ranks." In point of fact, the PRP im-
mediately took complete control of the Front
("assumed the historic mission of playing the
role of vanguard body to the southern revo-
lution") and is currently referred to by
Hanoi as "the soul" of the NLFP
Captured Communist documents have
since made It abundantly clear that the
creation of the PRP involved what would
be termed in American business parlance
the "spin-off" of a wholly owned subsidiary.
The PRP was and Is, in fact, simply the
southern branch of the Lao Dong. As one
pertinent party directive put it: "The Peo-
ple's Revolutionary Party has only the ap-
pearance of an Independent existence; ac-
tually, our party is nothing but the Lao Dong
Party of Vietnam (Vietminh Communist
Party) unified from north to south under the
direction of the central executive committee
of the party, the chief of which is President
Ho," 10 The PRP serves as the principal vehi-
cle for maintaining Lao Dong-Le., North
Vietnamese-control over the Vietcong in-
surgency.
As the organizational structure of the Viet-
cong movement has expanded over the past
4 years, Its general outlines have become fair-
ly well known. In the Insurgency's Initial
phase (1954-59), the Communists retained
the Vietminh's division of what is now
South Vietnam Into "interzone V" (French
Annam below the 17th parallel) and the
"Nambo" (Cochin China), with each area
under Hanoi's direct control. In late 1960
or early 1961, this arrangement was scrapped
and field control over all aspects of the Viet-
cong insurgency vested in a still existing, sin-
gle command headquarters, originally known
as the Central Office for South Vietnam (or
COSVN)-a term still in circulation) but
now usually referred to by captured Viet-
cong as simply the PRP's Central Committee.
This command entity, which also contains
the headquarters of the NLF, is a mobile and
sometimes peripatetic body, usually located
in the extreme northwestern tip of Tay
8 The only two of these "delegates" who
have been subsequently identified are Vo
Chi Chong, now a vice chairman of NLF's
presidium and member of the PRP's execu-
tive committee, and Huynh Van 'ram, now
the NLF's representative In Algiers, where
he devotes considerable time to cultivating
Western newsmen, deceiving some of them
about his own political background and the
true nature of the organization he repre-
sents In a manner reminiscent of Chou
En-lai's similar successes during the mid-
1940's.
u These phrases appear in "The Vietnamese
People's Revolutionary Party and Its Historic
Mission of Liberating the South," an article
in the January 1966 issue of the Lao Dong
Party's, theoretical journal Hoc Tap. The
same article notes: "The experiences of the
world and our country's revolutions have
shown that in order to win the greatest suc-
cess, the national democratic revolution must
March 22, 1966
Ninh Province in prudent proximity to the
Cambodian border., Under this Central Com-
mittee headquarters, the Vietcong divide
South Vietnam into five numbered military
regions and one special zone for Saigon
and its immediate environs. Each of the
five regions, in turn, is divided into provinces;
each province into districts; and each dis-
trict into villages?1 The Vietcong's pro-
vinces, districts, and villages are administra-
tively comparable and roughly equivalent in
area to those of the South Vietnamese Gov-
ernment. But their boundaries do not coin-
cide, thus complicating Saigon's adminis-
trative problems in reacting to insurgent ac-
tivities.
Though the outlines of the Vietcong's
organizational structure are fairly well
known, the identities of its leaders are not.
They are faceless men veteran Communist
revolutionaries who have made a lifetime
practice of masking their identities under
various aliases and noms de guerre and who
take particular pains to stay hidden in the
background in order to support the politi-
cal fiction that the insurgency is directed
by the NLF and the Front's ostensible
officers.
At the 1962 Geneva Conference on Laos, a
member of the North Vietnamese delegation
inadvertently commented that the published
roster of the Lao Dong Party's Central Com-
mittee did not include some members whose
identities were kept secret because they
were "directing military operations in South
Vietnam." One of the four examples he
cited was "Nguyen Van Cue," -2 which is one
of the aliases used by the chairman of the
PRP. This Lao Dong Central Committee
member, whose true name we do not known,
is probably the overall field director of the
Vietcong Insurgency in South Vietnam. The
overall commander of Vietcong military
forces (who would be a subordinate of Cue's
within the Communist command structure)
is almost certainly the chairman of the
(PRP) Central Committee's Military Com-
mittee-a man who uses the name Tran
Nam Trung but whom several captured Viet-
cong cadre members have insisted Is actually
Lt. Gen. Tran Van Tra, a Deputy Chief
of Staff of the Notrh Vietnamese Army
and an alternate member of the Lao Dong
Central Committee, The director of all Viet-
cong activity In Vietcong Military Region 5
(the northernmost third of South Vietnam)
is Nguyen Don, a major general in the North
Vietnamese Army and another alternate
member of the Lao Dong Central Committee,
who In 1961 was commander of the North
Vietnamese 305th Division but came south
late that year or early in 1962. In short,
not only does the PRP control all aspects
of the Vietcong movement, including the
NLF, and not only is it a subordinate
echelon of the North Vietnamese Lao Dong
Party, but the PRP's own leaders appear to
be individuals who themselves occupy rank-
ing positions within the Lao Dong Party
hierarchy.
As indicated above, for the first year of its
existence the NLF was as shadowy and face-
less an organization as the PRP Is today. It
was allegedly created "after a conference of
representatives of various forces opposing the
fascist regime in South Vietnam," but the
identities of these representatives or the
"forces" they represented were never speci-
fied. The myth of the Front was not fleshed
out with public organizational substance or
overt leadership until after the PRP was
presented as its vanguard element. The NLF
be led by a workers' revolutionary party"- 11 In Vietnam, a "village" Is not a cluster of
i.e. a Communist Party, huts but an administrative entity roughly
18 This particular document, dated Dec. 7, comparable to an American township.
1961, was captured in Ba Xuyen Province. is P. J. Honey, "North Vietnam's Workers'
Its text may be found, among other places, in Party and South Vietnam's People's Revolu-
Vietnam itself-was first brought to light in the Department of State's white paper, "Ag- tionary Party," Pacific Affairs Quarterly,
a 00~/0f19215n:' At B'g00432R00050*6010 5 p? 383?
 Approved For Release 2001/07/26: CIA-RDP- 68B00432R00050004-0034-3
March 22, 1966 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE
now. claims to be a coalition of over 40 who served briefly as Secretary General after dig up roads to harass government forces.
'associatec'. organizations" which, collec- Hieu and before Phat. Described in official They serve as informants and couriers, or
tively, purport to represent virtually all NLF biographies as an "intt,ellectual and go on purchasing expeditions to nearby gov-
shades and strata of South Vietnamese politi- ardent patriot," Kiem has spent most of the ernment-controlled market towns. Every-
cal and sccial life. This coalition includes past two decades as a leader in various Oom- one participates and ensures that his neigh-
three "political parties": the PRP, the munist-front youth groups. Such figures as bor does so as well. All of this activity is
"Democratic Party" and the "Radical Social- these are the best the Front has been able to coordinated and directed by local NLF corn-
ist Party." (The latter two bear at- come up with to staff irts moat prominent mittees which where circumstances per-
most exactly the same names as the two public offices. Their organizational and revo- mit, assume the prerogatives and functions
minor parties allowed to exist in North Viet- lutionary talents may be Impressive, but of local government. These local commit-
nam and a 'e obviously intended to play simi- their personal stature and prestige among tees in turn are directed by superior eche-
lar roles.) In their present name or form, the South Vietnamese people are not. Ions, capped, at least ostensibly, by the cen-
virtually none of its affiliated organizations v tral committee of the NLF itself.
antedates the founding of the NLF itself, Over the past 4 years the Vietcong have The NLF's organizational structure is
many almost certainly exist only on paper, labored mightily to improve their image be- paralleled and controlled at each echelon by
and a careful analysis of the NLF's own prop- yond South Vietnam's borders and to enlist a a complementary PR.P structure. Under the
aganda makes it clear that a goodly number broad spectrum of international support for general command of its central committee,
have identical officers, directorates, and staffs. their cause; to develop their oragnizational the PRP is organized on a geographic basis
Some of these organizations, however, have structure within South Vietnam, thus through the various regions, provinces, and
acquired substance after the fact, as it were, strengthening their Internal political posi- districts down to the village level. Each
and now play important roles in the NLF's tion; and to expand their military effort, to geographic echelon has a directing commit-
efforts to organize and control the rural facilitate achievement of their political goals tee responsible for controlling all PRP-
populace. and if possible to generate an aura of Invinci- hence all Vietcong, Including NLF-activities
It is fairly easy to devise an organizational bility capable of breaking their adversaries' within its area. These committees vary in
structure capable of lending verisimilitude will to continue the struggle. size and organizational complexity, even
to a political fiction, doubly so if one Is try- The image-building campaign abroad has among equivalent geographic echelons, but
ing to deceive a foreign audience unversed in been designed to publicize the NLF and in- each one has a single chairman and several
local political affairs. Fleshing this struc- subordinate members or subcommittees with
ture out with live, known individuals to flate its prestige and reputation. Its goal specific functional responsibilities. The
occupy posts of public prominence is con- has been to get the NLF generally accepted number and nomenclature of these func-
siderably more difficult. The Vietcong ob- co an Indigenous South Vietnamese political tional subcommittees also varies from area
viously hoped to attract to the NLF South coalition (admittedly with some Communist area, but they normally cover military
Vietnamese of personal stature and renown, members) to combat combat the which harsh sprang excesses up of the U.S.-sup- spontaneously affairs, economic and financial affairs, and
preferably :ndividuals not immediately idea- ported Diem regime, and which seeks only what the Communists term "front affairs
tifiable as Communists or Communist sym- and civilian proselytizing," whose chairman
pathizers, who could enhance the Front's peace, democracy and reunification as pro- is responsible for. controlling all NLF ac-
prestige an i political attractiveness and pro- vided for in the Geneva agreements. Though tivity in that area. If the PRP organization
physi
vide a more or less innocent facade behind moral-and, to some extent perhaps, - at that echelon is sufficiently well developed,
iet Viet- he in turn will have subordinate members
which the NLF's Communist masters could cat-support may be afforded by North Viet--
operate in secure obscurity. To date the nam and other fraternal socialist states (so of his PRP subcommittee to direct each of
Vietcong h.ive been notably unsuccessful in the argument runs) , the NLF Is basically an the local associations affiliated with the NLF.
this regard, though the full measure of their independent political entity with a policy Though captured documents Indicate that
failure is far -better appreciated within South and will of its own. This campaign has been the Vietcong try to keep the level of overt
Vietnam itself than it is abroad. No Viet- waged through the propaganda disseminated PRP participation below two-fifths of the
by the Liberation News Agency, replayed and total membership of any com-
as of what could accurately be described echoed by Communist (and non-Communist) p y given
as signiflct,nt personal prestige or profes- ponent, the organizational structure we have
sional standing-not even one of known media throughout the world; through a just described (reinforced by a network of
leftist persaasion-has ever been willing to steady flow of messages from the Front to covert PRP cells throughout the NLF) keeps
associate himself publicly with the NLF or foreign governments and heads of state (par- all components of the NLF at every level
lend it the are of his name. ticularly of neutralist Afro-Asian nations); under complete PRP control.
by ever increasing attendance at foreign The Vietcong's terrorist and military ap-
The NLF's first Central Committee was not conferences and meetings (generally Com-
announced until March 1962, well over a year munist or leftist sponsored) by a small paratus was developed and is directed which
that organizational armed structure, els lss
after the Front's supposedly spontaneous handful of indefatigable NLF represents- insures same
activity at all l leve is
creation. Ibough the committee purportedly tives; and by the establishment of perma-
e
col Ths
had 52 members, the NLF was able to come nent NLF "missions" in Havana, Peiping, and and kept to political
up with only 31 names, most of which were, Moscow, Prague, East Berlin, Budapest, Cairo, Vietcong ept under military tight establishment party eol. now has
virtually unknown -even within South Viet- Djakarta, and Algiers. All of this activity has over 90,000 fuu mill-time troops (including over
nam. The 41-member second (and cur- profited from the fact that knowledge of the 12,02,000 North Vietnamese rent) Cenral Committee, announced in realities of political life in South Vietnam 1 Vsregulars) ) suuer
JanuarY ' 1934, is equally lacking in distinc- ment0 and supported something over
does not extend much beyond its frontiers; 100,000 0 paramilitary personnel; and part-
tion. all of it has been guided by a keen awareness time guerrillas. This whole force, however,
The Chairman of the NLF's Presidium and of the effectiveness of incessant repetition was built up for political reasons, to serve
Central Committee is Nguyen Huu The, a in converting myth to assumed reality. political ends. The Vietcong political ap-
former provincial lawyer with a long record Throughout South. Vietnam, the Vietcong paratus was at work laying the foundations
of activity in Communist-sponsored causes have developed and employed the ELF ap- for insurgency long before there was even
but of 1Lttla political repute or professional paratus in their intensive effort to organize so much as a Vietcong hamlet self-defense
standing among his former colleagues at the the population (especially the rural popula- squad.
South Vietnamese bar, who generally cate- tion), involve it in their insurgency cam-. The director of the military affairs sub-
gorize him as having been an "avocat sans paign and bring it under their political committee (mentioned above) is frequently
brefs." The NLF's present Secretary General domination. The detailed application of also the commander of the Vietcong force
(also the Seretary General of the "Democrat- this effort varies from locality to locality, attached to that geographic echelon. Vil-
ic Party" e.nd the Chairman of the NLF's and Is materially influenced by such local lage directing committees have village pla-
Saigon Zone Committee) is Huynh Tan Phat, factors as the relative degree of Vietcong toons under their control; district commit-
usually described In NLF propaganda as an strength in the area. The objective, how- tees, district companies; provincial commit-
"architect," though one would be hard ever, is always to secure total participation tees, provincial battalions. Regional com-
pressed to point to any edifices he has do- and total involvement on the part of the mittees have forces of regimental and multi-
signed. From 1945 until 1948 he apparently local population in order to establish total regimental size at their disposal, and the
served as a member of the Vietminh /Vietcong Vietcong control. They endeavor to per- whole Vietcong military establishment is
Executive Committee in Nambo and as the suade-and, if conditions permit, compel- subject to the direction of PRP's Central
Communists' propaganda chief for. their every inhabitant of a given area to join and Committee. Throughout this military struc-
Saigon Special Zone. The NLF's First Secre- work actively In some NLF component or- ture, the same basic principles of organiza-
tary Generssl (also -the Secretary General of ganization. Farmers are encouraged or tion and command relationship are uni-
the "Radical Socialist Party") was Nguyen forced to join the Liberation Peasants' Asso- formly applied. There Is no such thing as
Van Hieu, now its principal traveling repre- ciation; women, the Liberation Women's As- a Vietcong military unit of any size inde-
sentative a )road. A former journalist and sociation; children, the Liberation Youth As- pendent of the party's political apparatus
teacher (some say of biology, some of mathe- sociation. Where Vietcong control is strong, or free from tight political control. Probably
matins), Hieu has been a Communist props- no one escapes the net. Physically fit males no more than a third of the Vietcong forces
gandlst since the late 1940's. The Chairman not sent off to some other Vietcong military are party members, but by virtue of its or-
of the NLF's External Relations (i.e. fare,n, ve In 1I 1 s a o,~g~Q?glxstipecpanism the PRP controls
affairs Ap prqlm lF= i}@i$eRy?t~Q i Holt } ) ~jf~ up -A3my" in the same way that
Buu Klerh, a Central Committee member men help make bamboo stakes and traps or It controls the National Liberation Front.
 Approved For Release 2001/07/26 : CIA-RDP68B00432R000500010034-3
6156 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE March 22, 1966
An understanding of the Vietcong's orga- twice last fall (on Oct. 15 and Dec. 19) when mechanism which it controls has no serious
nization:al structure enables us to recognize two public calls by the Vietcong for a claim to being considered, as Hanoi insists,
the real significance and function of the "general strike" went totally unheeded and the "sole legitimate voice of the South Viet-
more than 50,000 persons infiltrated into produced no visible change whatsoever in namese people." Were it ever to be accepted
South Vietnam since the Lao Dong Party's the pattern of urban life, as such, the record of what has happened in
,1959 decision to pursue its objective of po- Despite its leaders' obvious organizational North Vietnam in the years since 1951 makes
lltical csnquest by waging insurgent war. talents and revolutionary skills, the Viet- it abundantly clear what lies in store for the
Until mid to late 1963 these infiltrators were cong movement is beset with a number of more than 16 million Vietnamese who live
virtually all ethnic southerners drawn from fundamental weaknesses. It has no uni- south of the 17th parallel, especially for those
the pool of regrouped Vietminh forces and versally appealing theme in any way com- who have resolutely fought against the Viet-
supporters taken north in 1954. They were parable to the Vietminh's espousal of anti- cong insurgency from its inception,
not foot soldiers or cannon fodder (at least French nationalism. Persistent propaganda
not until Hanoi began sending in whole efforts to portray the Americans as successor Mr. unanimous CLARK. Mr. that I may President, I yield ask
sk
North V ietnamese units in late 1964 or early imperialists to the French have simply never
1965). instead they were disciplined, trained taken hold. The concept of reunification has the same terms to the distinguished sen-
and incoctrinated cadres and technicians. relatively little appeal for peasants who re- for Senator from Florida.
They b-.-came the squad leaders, platoon gard someone from the next province as an The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without
leaders, political officers, staff officers, unit alien. The idea of reunification does appeal objection, it is so ordered.
commanders, weapons and communications to politically minded urban elements, par- Mr. HOLLAND. Mr. President, I shall
specialists who built the Vietcong's military titularly to refugees from the north, but of course. vote for the pending bill. I
force into what it is today. They also be- within such circles there is a great reluctance supported the bill in committee. I sup-
came the village, district, provincial, and to accept the Vietcong's identification of re-
regional committee chiefs and key commit- unification with political domination by the port the bill now.
tee mer,Ibers who built the Vietcong's po- present Hanoi regime. Having lived through Mr. President, the Secretary of Agri-
litical apparatus. the sequence of historical events we have culture, the Honorable Orville L. Free-
The earlier arrivals had had at least 5 days outlined, politically conscious Vietnamese are man, spoke at the Governor's Day lunch-
of indoctrination and training in North Viet- not easily deceived by the NLF's pretensions eon of the Florida Citrus Showcase
nam, or elsewhere in the Communist bloc, to independence and freedom from northern sponsored by the Florida Citrus Mutual
before c eparti later n their southern missions; control, particularly since the military side in Winter Haven, Fla., on Friday, Febr'u-
some of,the ltearrivals have had nearly a of the Vietcong insurgency is now being in 1966, just a week after his return
decade of such preparation. Until the recent waged with an ever larger number of North arY 18from, 1966, His seek a er his the
sharp r: se in Vietcong battlefield casualties, Vietnamese troops.
approxinately a third of all the personnel in The current struggle in South Vietnam is main to his observations in Vietnam,
Vietcong, military units at and above the die- a historically rooted, political phenomenon with particular reference to food and the
trict company level were "returnees" trained of infinite complexity, particularly since it agricultural situation there.
in the north. At least half of the member- involves an externally directed Communist hfeel that Secretary Freeman's speech
ship of most PRP district committees, and drive for power interlarded with a genuine throws much light on conditions in Viet-
an even larger proportion at higher echelons, indigenous social revolution. In analyzing nam which are directly related to the
also appear to be "returnees." Without this such a phenomenon, "truth" is often a tune- contents of the pending bare t therefore
infiltration from the north, in short, the tion of one's angle of vision, and myth is not
present Vietcong organization could never always easy to distinguish from reality. De- ask unanimous consent to have the Sec-
have been developed. spite the fact that there are many aspects of retary's speech printed in the RECORD in
VI the current situation in Vietnam concerning full at this point as a part of my remarks.
The 'Tietcong insurgency is clearly a mar- which confident assertion is a mark of ig- There being no objection, the speech
terpiece of revolutionary organization, but noranee or disingenuous intent, there are was ordered to be printed in the RECORD,
Its total effectiveness and real political certain aspects of the insurgency, and of the as follows:
Vietcong structure through which it is being
streng are extremely difficult to assess. The waged, which are not open to intellectually SECRETARY of AGRICULTURE ORVILLE L. FREE-
bulk of f the Vietcong's organizational efforts honest dispute. MAN'S SPEECH AT THE GOVERNOR'S DAY
have been expended in rural areas and it Is There are unquestionably many non-com- LUNCHEON OF THE FLORIDA CITRUS SHOW-
there tant they are strongest.
cities, (The govern- munists heroically serving in various com- CASE, SPONSORED sY THE FLORIDA CITRUS
and provin ial acapita s and all butoa ha ds- ponents of the National Liberation Front out MUTUAL IN WINTER HAVEN, FLA., FEBRUARY
of a desire to redress genuine grievances or in 18, 1968
of seats.) tut s, the however, ever, tt that shn t sha These are ieteoag the honest belief that they are thereby help- Mr. Toastmaster, distinguished officers and
, gly req na, resort ue Vietcong ing to build a better political structure for leaders of Citrus Mutual, of the Citrus Show-
taxation es, in
to imr mires ressment to their native land. As an organization, how- case, the mayor of this lovely community,
o seccure ure se troroops,, ops andd thhe e
Vietcong's manifest inability to deliver on po- ever, the NIA' is a contrived political meth- members of your State cabinet, your State
litical )romises of earlier years are all begin- anism with no indigenous roots, subject to treasurer, your commissioner of agriculture,
ning t5 erode their base of rural support. the ultimate control of the Lao Dong Party in members of the State legislature, leaders of
Durin the ast year nearly 800,000 refugees Hanoi, the citrus industry, ladies, and gentlemen,
g p The relationship between the Vietcong and I am delighted to be here. I am flattered
fle)m go erteev fr ne the -controlled hinterland to townsthe vicinity se the D Is c that you would ask me back again. I was
t that oe sen ntial lly h erelation d here with you about a year and a half ago
weng fromn . Some S, s ome . Instead, it Is e
wore fleeing from a dof disast ou sgh om the e ship ies. betww s eeen a a fie eld d commmamandd y annd d Stts p patearent and enjo ed it thorou hl and am certainly
from the simple hazards of War (thouh leasedto be here once again, y
directian in which persons of this category headquarters. Such relationships are never p
opted to flee is significant), but many were free from elements of tension and discord. I want, today, to talk to you a little bit in
obviously endeavoring to get out'irom under Within the Vietcong movement, and even broad terms about agriculture in the world
the Vietcong. Furthermore, in assessing within its controlling hierarchy, there are in which we live. Agriculture is the key to
Communist claims of control it should be unquestionably varying judgments (at least world peace. Agriculture is the key to the
noted that over half of the. rural population privately held ones) about the wisdom of victory in Vietnam.
voted in the May 1985 provincial elections, present tactics and the best course of future First, however, I want to express my most
despite Vietcong orders to boycott them, action. (There are obvious differences of sincere commendation to you, your organi-
In the cities, the Vietcong have an ob- opinion regarding the struggle in Vietnam zations and to this industry, to the leader-
vious terrorist capability but are politically even within the Lao Dong Party Politburo.) ship, the foresight you have shown, to your
quite weak-a fact of which they are aware Nevertheless, the whole Vietcong organiza- excellent job of marketing. I remembers
and w'tilch, according to captured documents, tional structure and chain of command has quite vividly about a year ago, when your
causes them considerable embarrassment. been carefully designed to minimize the risks distinguished executive vice president, Bob
They have been unable to turn the urban of insubordination. Though for tactical ree.- Rutledge, who serves you so effectively, came
political ferment of the past 3 years to any sons the overt propaganda outlets and spokes- to my office and reviewed and discussed with
obvious immediate advantage. None of the men of the NLF sometimes take political po- me some of your marketing plans. And I
participants in the genuine social revolution sitions which differ at least in emphasis from listened with special interest because I have
now taking place in the urban areas of those emanating from Hanoi, the chances of been concerned. You had learned how, as
South Vietnam has sought Vietcong support the Vietcong's developing or adopting a gen- our agriculture has generally, to produce
or entertained overtures of political alliance, uinely independent political line In opposi- mightily. Sometimes that really challenges
Though they have undoubtedly penetrated tion to orders received from North Vietnam us in this country.
such groups as the Buddhists and the stu- through the Lao Dong Party apparatus are It is a blessed thing for which we ought
dents the .Vietcong have made no visible slight indeed, to be truly thankful, but we haven't always
he dvray in su v~~Itting i e ringing t,}~~ n- Final,lyyrr,,,,alt,.h.~o,-.u,, h the Vietcongo~r-ganiza- learned how to live with that abundance,
d pprove atnor I aase lCA' Q7/2a l(11V4is4D 80@*32Rfl 0f146 .aEtet it, and how to effectively get
Vietcong are in the cities was demonstrated South Vietnamese political scene, e t where it s needed at the terms and con-
 Approved For Release 2001/07/26 : CIA-RDP68BOO432R000,50O 03473
March 22, 1.966 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE
ditions and at the price where people will
utilize it. And so to note the excellent prog-
ress in your new plant, the fine reception
of the new ,oncentrate, to note some of the
good work you have done in marketing
abroad, I am glad to have the chance as the
Secretary of Agriculture to come here and
say to you, well done.
A week ago today. I was in a little village
in South Vietnam at a training camp called
Vung Tau. I was sitting on a folding chair
beside a canal listening to one of the most
impressive men I have ever heard in my life.
Dressed in a simple, black pajama, he out-
lined for me the course of training of the
rural construction cadres, made up of peasant
boys who volunteered to go back into their
home provi:ices and villages to hold those
villages, to pacify those villages, after the
military has taken them away from the Viet-
cong.
He was a tremendously impressive fellow.
Some had 1,kened him to a saint. He said
in a very soft voice that these young boys
are looking for some meaning in their lives
which had been wrecked by war. All their
lives had been'spent in a nation engaged in
war. They have been pretty cynical, gen-
erally, as tc their stake in Its future. And
he told a lit blo legend, very simple, about the
beautiful lady and the dragon and how an
accommoda ;ion between the lady and the
dragon was developed and sustained. The
spiritual sic.e of life was the beautiful lady,
the materialistic and powerful side of life
was the dragon, and the harmony of the two
was what gave meaning to life.
He went on with some other legends, and
then said in a soft voice, "to the Vietnamese,
this is muc:a more understandable than the
material of ommunism. The boys who have
gone out of here have learned to be for some-
thing. They go out to secure and to hold
these villages and fight to hold them if neces-
sary."
And then he developed some of the symbol-
ism which was a powerful part of this train-
ing course. He gave me one of their gradua-
tion pins. It has a T-H symbol on it, some-
what like our own 4--H Club symbol. He
drew a hananer and a sickle on the black-
board, and then put the T-H over it. The
hammer ani the sickle were obliterated and
he said these boys are obliterating that ham-
mer and sickle everywhere around Vietnam.
We then Looked at the rifle range. These
men, he told me, fire more ammunition than
the regular troops that are trained for actual
battle. Then we saw the classrooms where
they get general exposure to health, voca-
tional, and agricultural training.
At the conclusion of their rural construc-
tion training, the night before they grad-
uate, they At out all night long and make
up their minds whether they want to take
a pledge which is part of the graduation
ceremony next day, and take on the re-
sponsibility for caring for the ideals which
he outlined; self-discipline, service, honesty,
mercy to tae old, the sick and the needy.
This was couched in the traditional Viet-
namese terms rather than ours but the mean-
ing was exaotly the same.
He said that during the new year celebra-
tion, the big ceremony of Vietnam., down
the road in a single military camp they had
50 percent AWOL; in a military police train-
ing school -;hey had 25 percent AWOL. But
there wasn't a single man In the rural con-
struction cadre who left. I was tremend-
ously intrested in this training center, be-
cause they have a workable system and it's
based on hard experience that can win
peasant support and ultimately win the war
In Vietiitl n,
The military struggle is a bitter, difficult,
complicated one. You don't know who the
be done if agriculture is not in the forefront
in that effort. I said when I returned that
in this war, fertilizer is just as important
as bullets, and so it is. The essentials for
effective agricultural production are ready,
and we can make striking progress in agri-
culture in Vietnam.
What I found, really, was far beyond my
expectations in light of the hardships under
which those people live. If you ever wanted
to see a justification for some of our dollars
to be spent on helping other people, take a
look at agriculture in Vietnam. It has only
been 10 years and yet those little farmers,
most of them tenants, or landowners with
very small holdings, are using very modern
practices of improved seed, fertilizer, chem-
icals, and pesticides, disease control in ani-
mals, and all the rest, whenever they can get
it. They don't want it free. They want to
buy it. But so far we haven't done as good
a job as we should, in making it available.
But where it has been available, they make
every effort to get It.
I talked to one peasant who walked 15
miles with a basket on his head to buy 50
pounds of fertilizer and get a little package
of seed and walked 15 miles back to his
little hamlet. He knew about fertilizer. He
knew about improved seed. All he wanted
was a chance to use them, because, when he
does, his yield of rice goes up 50 percent.
And when yields go up 50 percent, he can
buy his kids some clothes, and they have a
little money in the village to build a little
school. They then build a little better home.
Then they have a stake In something.. Then
when the Vietcong come in after it, they are
prepared to fight, and Inform, and resist.
What we need to do is to integrate agricul-
ture effectively in the forefront of the second
front of this two-front war.
Last Sunday, I was on the coast about in
the midlands in Vietnam in an area called
Phan Rang. I stood on a little plot of land
on the coast that was plain sand. It had
been sand dunes: It had been government
land. It had been levelled off. Chinese
technicians from Taiwan were there. They
worked with the Vietnamese farmers on new
techniques in growing vegetables. An onion,.
an adaptation of the Granex onion out of
Texas that had been adapted by one of our
plant technicians-took them 4 years to do
it-was being planted on that hectare of
land the peasant had gotten as a part of
the land reform program. He netted on that
2V acres 200,000 piastres-that's $2,000 in
American money. Growing rice in the same
area, they were netting about $20 an acre.
That peasant had a little irrigation sys-
tem. He and a dozen others had gone to-
gether to buy a little gasoline engine pump
for a shallow well. They had put in a little
irrigation works-some shallow ditches. We
saw the water flowing out. Onions, garlic
and other kinds of vegetables were growing
profusely. I had a picture taken with him
with o' basket of onions and vegetables be-
sides, of all things, a bright red motorbike.
He had made a little money, the first thing
he wanted was a motorbike. Comparatively,
you'd buy a Cadillac. And maybe he will
one day, too. But a motorbike is a desirable
status symbol; it means transportation.
And in this same area, I went td the vil-
lage where he lived. They had a little self-
help program to build a warehouse. The
material was made available to them by the
Vietnamese Government with our help. The
people built the warehouse themselves. They
were renting space in it to dry garlic. The
rent was being paid. The village had made
a little money and they were putting it in
a school and a health clinic.
This was the only place I went in Viet-
nam where the province chief could travel
enemy is i, good share of the time. We muntsm, but also go on to start and carry at night out in the countryside. Most of
have t~~@@,~,11 ~1' s t~; p the/+~ usgD a a ?Qvial yl~~,, y uld go to see the people
lt 4 But ~ ~f "'^-"'" ~"~~~ 29000 iiktt~r3This fellow said to me, "I
fightin~'`Lf C Y vFaY.
But that doesn't do much good if a week I submit to you here today that that won't don't bother these people who are working
later the Vietcong Infiltrate the area and take
the village all over again. And that's what
is happening. What's got to be done is this:
We've got to win the hearts and minds of
those poor people who have been promised
and promised and promised and abused and
decimated all these years.
Last year, 1,500 local government officials
were brutally murdered, some of them tor-
tured and captured, simply because they were
doing a good job. The Vietcong is on an or-
ganized, purposeful program of terror and
destruction. This would be the equivalent in
the United States of 50,000 mayors and coun-
ty commissioners. Now if 50,000 local officials
in this country were murdered in. one year-
it's anybody's guess as to what It would
mean. Now these boys who go out of this
camp are to work with the military in areas
being pacified or already pacified. They are
to go into an area in teams of 59 men. They
are highly trained; highly armed. They
know how to use those weapons. They are
highly motivated to help the peasants, but
they are ready to fight. But they don't go
Into the countryside to fight, they go there
to build.
And as Gen. Nguyen Due Thang, )Minis-
ter of Rural Construction, a very Impressive
young Vietnamese' general, said to me, "we
don't go to hit and run, we go to hit and
stay." And they go to the villages-their
home villages in many cases-and they seek
to get close to where those people live; to let
them know that their government believes in
them, wants to help them, to give them a
stake in life.
I said to the general, "Well, now, I am the
head of a cadre and I'm going Into a village
that has just been reclaimed. What's the
first thing I do?" He said to me, "You keep
your mouth shut." I thought that was a
pretty good answer. He said when those
folks want some help, you help them to help
themselves. You don't give them anything;
because If you give them something, it's not
really theirs. If the Vietcong destroy it, it
is not their loss. But if you help them
build something and the Vietcong destroys
it, then it is their loss.
About 20,000 have been trained already,
and their training will be stepped up. The
Vietnamese Government has elected a num-
ber of villages to be pacified with the help
of these cadres. This is a hardheaded, hard-
hitting, systematic job of pacification. And
it is, as I say, a thoroughly planned and pur-
poseful one. It carries within it, I think, the
formula of victory.
Now this is the meaning of the spirit of
Honolulu. I have just been back a few days
and I have been rather shocked tq find a good
bit of cynicism about this in some quarters.
I have difficulty understanding that because
in Honolulu the President dramatized for the
attention of the entire world the best in
principles, the best in standards, that this
Nation has; that we built ourselves to great-
ness with service, humanitarianism, concern
for the people.
This is a second front of a two-front war.
We have to win the tough, hard, difficult
military part of this war. But of equal im-
portance has to be the second part, what
they call a social revolution in Vietnam. The
word revolution has.a much more positive
cast to it, and it is broadly used, to give an
identity, to give a meaning, to give a purpose
to the lives of those people so that when the
Vietcong come in, the people will notify the
authorities so they can be rooted out. If
they hide the Vietcong, if they protect them,
if they don't report them, then It is an almost
impossible task. So there is a two-front,
sharp, clear objective-an objective in which
 Approved For Release 2001/07/26 : CIA-RDP68B00432R000500010034-3
615E,' CONGRESSIONAL 'RECORD - SENATE March 22, 1966
in th,~ fields by going to see them in the
daytime. I go out and see them in the
night, when they are available."
He was able to do that because his area
was pacified. If the Vietcong move into that
area he would be notified. He was a tough
soldier but he was very good with these peo-
ple, and it is not a normal mandarin attitude,
you k:iow, to say, "I adapt myself to the peo-
ple." Politicians do that in the United
States. They do not normally do that in
Asia. But this philosophy was going for-
ward. He could go out at night, because if
anyboly infiltrated that area, he got the
word. And when he got the word, he got the
troops out there and the Vietcong didn't last
very long. This was an example of what can
bo done. It isn't easy.
The.;e peasants have been promised to
death. They are pretty skeptical; pretty
cynical. They have been terrorized, brutal-
ized, murdered, taxed by both sides, run off
their :and, run back on their land, and they
have ')eon in this war for 20 years. But I
feel, really, that the sense of hopelessness
and complacency that seems to permeate
some ?arts of this country is not permanent.
There is a base, for real hope; that we can
win this war; that we can help these people.
This ration can be a real bastion for freedom
if we remember that this is a two-front war,
that force alone is ineffective, that to go along
with it you have to have service, accomplish-
ment, and build a stake in society.
A lot of people have asked me, "What
about these young generals? Do they mean
it anc, will they do it?" It's hard to tell.
You can only make a judgment.
I spent 3 hours in an airplane with Gen-
eral Ky. He is 35 years old. He is the Prime
Minister. He was the commanding general
of their air corps; very colorful, very smart,
no particular background in government as
such. I met all the corps commanders and
all the top generals. The ruling group is
about a dozen. I found them, without ex-
ception, bright and alert. They said the
right words, and they said them with feel-
ing.
For example, General Ky said a number of
times: "It Is a military war and a war for
the hearts of our people. We cannot win one
without winning the other. But the war for
the hearts of the people is more than a mili-
tary tactic. It is a moral principle. We are
trying to bring about a true social revolution.
We ate instituting a program for a better
societ'"."
He then went on to say, "I think that the
present government by and large has the con-
fldenc: of the people. I think it has a greater
measure of support than any of the pre-
vious governments. But that's not enough.
We must have a government which has been
freely elected by the people. Despite the
many tasks we have on our hands today, I
feel we can take on one more. And one,
which next to winning the war I speak about,
is mcst important and that is building
democracy in Vietnam."
Prime Minister Ky said extemporaneously
when the Vice President left Saigon: "I am
sure Mr. HUMPFHREY, prior to his visit here,
was not convinced of the ability of the young
generals, sometimes called the young Turks,
to rub our nation. I'm sure that now he
must recognize that we are more civilian
than the civilians, and we love freedom
more than freemen and desire democracy
more than you do in the United States."
The Prime Minister grabbed a microphone
in Honolulu at the conclusion of the press
conference and said, "I'm not ec war lord.
I'm tired of fighting. I've been slot at all
my 111 0. I risk assamination every day. I
want o will this war and help may people."
Ho said, "I don't have a car. I don't have
any w?operty," and went on to bay that his
I wonder if the committee is in ac-
cord with the view of the Secretary, that
it would not presently be useful from our
overall point of view to attack Haiphong
either by bombing or mining.
Mr. RUSSELL of Georgia. That view
was stated in an indirect fashion by
General Wheeler, as I recall, in his testi-
mony before the committee. I must say,
with all due respect to General
Wheeler-and I do have very genuine
respect for hint-that in my opinion it
flies in the face of commonsense to say
that the closing of the harbor at Hai-
phong has a lower priority than the
bombing of the petroleum dumps, the
petroleum for which has come in through
Haiphong Harbor.
It seems to me it would be self-evi-
dent even to a lay mind that it would be
more effective to close the stopper of
a bottle than to pour out the contents
and set the bottle back down to be
refilled. That is all that would be ac-
complished by clearing the petroleum
dumps, because the next day a tanker
could come into Haiphong and replenish
these dumps.
There are a number of ways to close
this harbor other than bombing. I am
not committed altogether to closing the
harbor by bombing. It so happens that
there is a narrow waterway leading into
the harbor. Two dredges work there
constantly. Those dredges could be
sunk by naval gunfire to close the harbor
for a short period. It could be mined,
or it could, if desired, be bombed; or a,
naval blockade could be established with
a half dozen destroyers.
But I think it is self-evident that the
closing of the harbor itself would be more
injurious to the war effort of the North
Vietnamese than bombing supplies, even
as important as a petroleum dump,
which can be immediately replenished by
another tanker coming into that harbor.
It simply does not make sense to me to
say that closing the harbor has a much
lower priority than these petroleum
dumps.
Mr. CLARK. So to that extent, the
Senator disagrees with Secretary McNa-
mara?
Mr. RUSSELL of Georgia. Oh, yes,
indeed, I disagree flatly with him on that
point, and also disagree with General
Wheeler.
I wish to add that at one time all the
Chiefs of Staff thought that closing the
harbor at Haiphong should have a very
high priority, and it is only of late that
there has been any disagreement among
the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
Mr. SYMINGTON. Mr.
will the Senator yield?
Mr. CLARK. Gladly.
Mr. SYMINGTON. The Senator from
Georgia brought up the point I intended
to bring up, there is disagreement in
testimony before the committee. So I
hope the American people will be in-
formed, and information not classified.
There is disagreement among the mili-
tary as to the importance of closing the
harbor at Haiphong.
Why should they not close that har-
bor? Only two railroads conic down
stake was one of service. same result from bombing the harbor of from China. One which we have not
fillifftl e]11rlur~zeearD7Wkrga0 6Rt~ir since the resumption is the
tid~IFtt+~~ kellb 1 Fay ocdt5 `_ ptC3~ 1Y `~fY~3m the industrial section of
I was impressed with them, with their
ability and their dedication but also with
the fact that they are a smart, tough bunch.
They had to be to survive. Some of them
have been wounded six times. They were
fighting in the jungles almost before they
could walk. To survive that and the po-
litical wars, the coups and the rest, they
have to have something on the ball. And
they know as sure as day follows night that
they Can't win that war, repel that invasion,
and make Vietnam a free nation unless they
can earn the support and loyalty of their
people. And so for that reason if for no
other reason, they are going about their
business.. They don't do it always like we
do. They are not as efficient and effective
as your Conamissioner of Agriculture here,
for example, and your State Treasurer. Not
as experienced In government, but they axe
tough minded, alert, and determined.
I went to Vietnam and took with me at
the President's instructions 10 of the best
agricultural specialists in this country in the
fields of crops, chemicals, livestock, , c-
tion, and fishing-and we came back feeling
positive; not overwhelmingly optimistic,
building glowing word pictures, but feeling
that there .is a real purpose and that this Is
not a hopeless morass, that this war can be
won and that it is vitally important that it
should be won. We also felt real pride in our
own profession of agriculture, because it is
the key. Agriculture is the key in Vietnam,
as it is the key around the world in the great
race taking place between food and people.
On February 10, the President sent to the
Congress a great message, a food-for-freedom
message, calling on this Nation to mobilize
its agricultural resources and to wheel them
into action to help those nations who would
help themselves so that this race can be won
and the world will be able to feed itself.
This is the greatest challenge we face down
the road.
All of us who work in this great area, then,
work not only to serve our Nation and our
communities. We stand right at the heart-
beat of the future well-being of mankind.
A world that isn't fed, a world plagued and
dogged by famine and desperation and mal-
nutrition, is never going to he a peaceful
world. So as you skillfully carry forward
your work in this great industry, we join In
seeking to use the power that comes with this
great capacity to produce and as a great free
Nation to use it effectively, so other people
can have as great a stake in freedom as we
have and there is no stake where there is no
food.
The challenge down the road is a great one
but is one that I think we can meet. I came
back from Vietnam challengedbut reassured.
We'll win this one as we have won them
before.
Mr. RUSSELL of Georgia. ' Mr. Presi-
dent, will the Senator from Pennsylvania
permit us to have the yeas and nays on
final passage?
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there
a sufficient second.? There is a sufficient
second, and the yeas and nays are
ordered.
Mr. CLARK. Mr. President, there has
been some discussion in the last couple
of minutes about the possible bombing
or mining of Haiphong Harbor. I should
like to call to the attention of the Sen-
ators the statement made by Secretary
McNamara on page 177 of the record
where he testified that since the tonnage
required for the support of enemy troops
in South Vietnam is relatively small, the
function of mining the harbor of Hai-
phong-and I imagine it would be the
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March 22, 1966
CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE 6159
Manchuri o, into Vietnam. The other
railroad comes from west to east. From
the start point of commonsense and
economy, why would they use that? But
we have been hitting that latter rail-
road. There are a few roads which in
the main I understand are not in too
good shape.
But nobody could know what is com-
ing through the Haiphong Harbor. Tes-
timony be:'ore the committee admits, a
very large majority of the oil moving into
North Vietnam comes through the har-
bor at E:aiphong. Obviously, those
trucks that; go down the Ho Chi Minh
Trail must, have that oil to be used.
Statements have been made that It is
thought relatively little ammunition
comes through the harbor; but who
knows what; is in the boxes on the docks
of that harbor? There is no reason for
anybody to extrapolate what the many
ships going into that harbor have on
them. Anybody who looks at the map
knows the Haiphong Harbor is the eas-
iest, least e:;pensive, and most effective
way of getting in the tremendous
amounts of supplies coming into North
Vietnam to ;till our troops in South Viet-
nam. If anybody does not think most
of it is coming through the harbor, where
else it is coming from?
The answer we hear is, "They don't
need very much." But I was down in the
Mekong Delta in recent weeks, and saw
hundreds of ;magnificent weapons-made
mostly in China, but also quite a few
from Soviet Russia-on exhibit in the
center of the town square in Can Tho.
That exhibit showed to my satisfaction
where those weapons were coming from.
If they do rot come over the railroad
we are not attacking, and If they do not
come from the harbor, where die they
coming from 2 As we know, the Com-
munists do not have any logistic sup-
port in the vray of air power.
Mr. CLARK. I say to my friend, the
Senator from Georgia, I have only one
or two questions more. The hour is get-
ting late; we are almost ready to vote.
It appears In the hearings that if we
were to destroy the petroleum depots in
North Vietnam, and they got no fuel for
their trucks in the south, they-that is,
the enemy-could move the quantities of
supplies now being moved by animal and
by manpower. At page 299 of the hear-
ings, Admiral McDonald asserted that
the Vietcong in South Vietnam need few
petroleum items, because they walk
everywhere.
Mr. RUSSELL of Georgia. Well, that
is true when one measures their equip-
ment against the vehicles that are op-
erated in modern warfare.
But petroleum is still a very essential
element of war. Most of the materiel
that is carried from Haiphong down into
South Vietnam over the many branches
of the Ho Chi Minh trail is carried by
trucks. We have had the good luck
once or twice lately to find a truck con-
voy exposed on the roads and attack it
from the air, and have destroyed a great
many of the trucks.
Those people, however, are resource-
ful. We had evidence before the com-
mittee that they were using elephants
to carry supplies, and that they were
using large numbers of people, bearers,
who can carry three or four times their
own weight.
Mr. CLARK. And bicycles.
Mr. RUSSELL of Georgia. Yes; that
they would put on a bicycle 300 or 400
pounds of equipment, and push it along.
They are very resourceful people.
They have been engaged in a war of this
nature now for more than 20 years.
Mr. CLARK. Since the Japanese
moved in.
Mr. RUSSELL of Georgia. They have
had a great deal of experience in it, and
are probably the most efficient guerrilla
fighters on earth today, and would com-
pare favorably with any in recorded his-
tory.
Mr. CLARK. I thank my friend the
Senator from Georgia, and I yield the
floor.
Mr. RUSSELL of Georgia. Mr. Presi-
On page 1711, the Secretary of Defense
testified that the industries in North
Vietnam contribute very little to the sup-
plies used in the south for the prosecu-
tion of the w sr.
He also said that wiping out the en-
tire industry of North Vietnam would
have no measurable effect upon their
capability to :.urnlsh the supplies they
are presently ;;upplying to the Commu-
nist forces in ;South Vietnam.
Does the Ser. ator agree with that?
Mr. RUSSELL of Georgia. No; I do
not agree with it In toto. I think it is
substantially correct. But I have infor-
mation and we have had some evidence
that there is an iron foundry in the vi-
cinity of Hanoi, which manufactures
literally milliors of hand grenades that
are being used i a this war.
With that exception, I think that the
Secretary's statement is approximately
correct.
Mr. CLARK. I thank the Senator
from Georgia for his patience. I have
one final question.
Mr. SCOTT. Mr. President, will the
Senator withhold his request, and yield
to me for a moment?
Mr. RUSSELL of Georgia. I yield to
the Senator from Pennsylvania.
Mr. SCOTT. I mention to the distin-
guished Senator from Georgia that the
distinguished Senator from Missouri
[Mr. SYMINGTON] asked a question which
has not been answered, and I would ap-
preciate the help of the Senator in sup-
plying an answer.
Mr. RUSSELL of Georgia. I thank
the Senator for the compliment implied.
Mr. SCOTT. I am sure the Senator
has information which would be helpful
and useful.
The reference made by the junior Sen-
ator from Pennsylvania was to page 178,
the testimony of Secretary McNamara,
wherein he stated:
The industry in the north is so small that
it plays a very little role in the economy of
the north, and I think any of the analysts
who have studied the problem would say it
could be completely eliminated and not re-
duce in any substantial way the contribution
of the North to South Vietnam.
Paraphrasing the Senator from Mis-
souri, he said that if they are getting
their material -through Haiphong, it does
not amount to anything, and if North
Vietnam is not contributing anything of
substance to South Vietnam, meaning to
the South Vietnamese, the anti-
Mr. RUSSELL of Georgia. The Viet-
cong.
Mr. SCOTT. Yes, the Vietcong, in
other words-then said the Senator from
Missouri, where are the Vietcong-if I
can paraphrase him further-where are
the Vietcong getting their supplies from?
What would the Senator from Georgia
say to that?
Mr. RUSSELL of Georgia. I would
say that they are getting it from a great
many sources. As I stated a few mo-
ments ago, undoubtedly thousands of
hand grenades are being made in North
Vietnam. An iron foundry, I believe, is
located on the outskirts of Hanoi, or it
could be on the outskirts of Haiphong,
but they do have one iron foundry which
does make some equipment; but, the
great bulk of their equipment, all of
their sophisticated equipment, such as
50 caliber machine guns, 55 millimeter
recoilless rifles, their burp guns, and
rifles--some of which have telescopic
sights which can be favorably compared
to any weapons we turn out, the great
bulk of them come either from China or
from Russia. Most of those which come
from Russia are actually made at the
Skoda Works in Czechoslovakia.
Mr. SCOTT. Therefore, they have to
come down from China, not from Russia.
Earlier testimony indicates that the bulk
of petroleum comes in through Haiphong,
yet I am told to ignore that.
Mr. RUSSELL of Georgia. It practi-
cally all comes in through Haiphong.
Most of the weapons cone In through
Haiphong. That is the reason why I say
that we should close the port at Hai-
phong, It is a natural step for us to take.
Mr. SCOTT. I completely agree with
the Senator from Georgia that it should
be closed in one of the several ways the
Senator has mentioned, but we are asked
to believe something which, to me, is a
semantic impossibility. We are asked to
believe that North Vietnam contributes
nothing to South Vietnam, that anyway
it does not matter If petroleum does come
in, although it does come into Haiphong
from Russia, that the economy of North
Vietnam really contributes nothing to
South Vietnam and therefore we should
not worry about it. Admiral McDonald
clarifies the situation further by saying
that it does not matter about motorized
transportation because everyone in Viet-
nam walks, anyway. He goes on to ex-
plain that last statement by saying that
they walk from the 19th parallel but
use motorized transportation from the
north. If they use motorized transpor-
tation from the north, let me observe
that I know very little about motors but
I do know that they require fuel, lubri-
cants, gasoline, yet we are told that while
this comes entirely from Russia yet the
No. 49--4
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 _.,i - Approved For Release 2001/07/26.: CIA-RDP68B00432R000500010034-3
the two principal sources of supply. side of South Vietnam to support our
They ar, supplying them with vast quan- logistics and communication bases; and
tities of sophisticated, deadly, and lethal $63,421,000 is for construction in the
weapon,.
United States, which is solely to support
Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, the ap- our southeast Asia operations. As fur-
propriatlon for military construction re- ther examples, we plan to spend approxi-
quested in this supplemental bill mately $36 million in the Republic of
amount: to $1,238,400,000, distributed the Philippines mainly for supply and
among I he services as follows: Depart- operational facilities including hospitals
ment of the Army, $509,700,000; Depart- and utilities. Thirteen million, six hun-
ment of the Navy, $254,600,000; Depart- dred and ninety thousand dollars is ear-
ment of the Air Force, $274,100,000; and marked for Guam for hospitals and mod-
Departlr?ent of Defense, emergency fund, ical facilities, operational facilities and
$200 mil ion. troop housing.
I would like to point out that this is I would like to close, Mr. President,
only -a further Increment to military by saying that the effectiveness of our
construction funds for southeast Asia. highly trained forces with their modern
To date we have already appropriated equipment will be greatly enhanced
for southeast Asia, approximately $417,- when the items contained in this mili-
700,000, distributed as follows: Army, tary construction program begin to be
$162,200:000; Nav $117,600,000; r used.
ForcAppr,GJ cIJ?ror Release 2uu1/0712FpI; Fri [B~#3 (15
6160 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE ~ March 22, 1966
contribution from North Vietnam really By the way of explanation, I would GovERN In the chair). Pursuant to the
amounts to nothing to South Vietnam. like to point out that funds spent, funds unanimous-consent agreement entered
Now, let me say to the Senator from available, and the funds presently in this into yesterday, the Senate will now pro-
Georgia, the more testimony I read, the bill will make a total appropriation for ceed to vote on H.R. 13546.
more confused I get. Can the Senator military construction, southeast Asia, The question is on the engrossment of
help me find my way through this morass amounting to $1,656,100,000. the amendments and third reading of the
of semantics? In view of the urgency of this con- bill.
Mr. RUSSELL of Georgia. I had as- struction money for southeast Asia, the The amendments were ordered to be
sumed that the statement referred to by Military Construction Subcommittee of engrossed and the bill to be read a third
the Secretary referred mainly to princi- the Appropriations Committee, did not time.
pal weapons which might be manufac- review the many projects in this bill in The bill was read the third time.
tured in North Vietnam. I do not be- our usually thorough manner, meaning The PRESIDING OFFICER. The bill
lieve twat the Secretary would take a that we did not go into a detailed review having been read the third time the ques-
position the weapons did not come of each individual project and the hold- tion is, Shall it pass? On this question
throug.a, because North Vietnam Is the Ing of extensive hearings. A great deal the yeas and nays have been ordered;
only place they could come from. I be- of the information concerning these and the clerk will call the roll.
lieve that he is referring to sources of projects Is classified; however, the De- The legislative clerk proceeded to call
production more than he is referring to partment of Defense and the military the roll.
sources of supply. services did furnish the subcommittee Mr. LONG of Louisiana. I announce
Mr. 3ALTONSTALL. Mr. President, with classified information as to the lo- that the Senator from Tennessee [Mr.
will tho Senator from Georgia yield? cation of projects and the intended scope GoRE] and the Senator from New Mex-
Mr. RUSSELL of Georgia. I yield. of construction. ice [Mr. MONTOYA], are absent on official
Mr. EALTONSTALL. The Senator will This bill contains language which will business.
recall In one of the hearings that cap- insure that the Congress will be fully in- I also announce that the Senator from
tured North Vietnamese weapons were formed as to how the Department of De- Indiana [Mr. BAYHI, the Senator from
displayed as coming from China or fense and the military services expend Alabama [Mr. HILL], the Senator from
Russia. these appropriations. I am sure every- Michigan [Mr. MCNAMARA], the Senator
Mr. RUSSELL of Georgia. The Sena- one In this body knows my views con- from Rhode Island [Mr. PASTORE], the
for Is correct. corning the constitutional responsibility Senator from South Carolina [Mr. Rus-
Mr..ALTONSTALL. Certainly, none of the Congress In matters of defense SELL], and the Senator from Alabama
of them was manufactured In North policy. There is in this supplemental [Mr. SPARKMAN), are necessarily absent.
Vietnam. bill, section 102, subsection B, language I further announce that, if present and
Mr. RUSSELL of Georgia. But they which reads as follows: voting, the Senator from Indiana [Mr.
had to come in through North Vietnam. (b) Within 30 days after the end of each BAYH], the Senator from Tennessee [Mr.
Mr. SCOTT. Well, if the contribution quarter, the Secretary of Defense shall ren- GORE], the Senator from Alabama [Mr.
of North Vietnam to South Vietnam Is der to the Committees on Armed Services HILL], the Senator from Michigan [Mr.
not worth anything, in the words of the and Appropriations of the House of Itepre- McNAMARAI, the Senator from Rhode Is-
Secretary-if the Secretary is right- sentatives and the Senate, a report with land [Mr. Pnsroas), the Senator from
"it could be completely eliminated, respect to the estimated value by purpose,
referring to the industry of the north, by country, of support furnished. from such South Carolina (Mr. RUSSELL], and the
rand not reduce In any substantial way appropriations. Senator from Alabama [Mr. SPARKMAN],
would each vote "yea."
the contribution of the North to South I wish to point out to my colleagues Mr. DIRKSEN. I announce that the
Vietnam." of the Senate that part of this construe- Senator from New York [Mr. JAVITS] is
Mr. RUSSELL of Georgia. Yes. tion money will be expended on perma- absent on official business.
Mr. SCOTT. He is bypassing the fact nent facilities both in the United States The Senator from California [Mr.
that the North Vietnamese people are re- and overseas; for example, money will KUCHEL] is absent because of illness.
be spent for construction on bases for
ceiving oil and Chinese and Russian Guam, Senator from Iowa [Mr. MILLER]
weaponr>; is that not a fact? , Okinawa, Wake Island, and in is necessarily absent.
Mr. RUSSELL of Georgia. As I stated, the United States which I will discuss If present and voting, the Senator from
I thought the Secretary was referring to later in this presentation. New York [Mr. JAVITS], the Senator from
sources of production and not sources of A major construction effort is required California [Mr. KUCHELI, and the Sena-
supply. t0 provide the proper logistic base from tor from Iowa [Mr. MILLER] would each
which to project our military operations
Of course, North Vietnam has a very in South Vietnam. The major portion vote "yea."
limited industry. They do manufacture of the military construction funds in The result was announced-yeas 87,
some weapons, but the principal weap- this bill amounting to $736,600,000 is for nays 2, as follows:
ons being utilized against us are made construction in South Vietnam; approxi- INo. 59 Leg.I
in China or sent from Russia. They are mately $325 million is for facilities out- YEAS-87
Aiken
Fulbright
Mundt
Allott
Harris
Murphy
Anderson
Hart
tvuskle
Bartlett
Hartke
Nelson
Bass
Hayden
Neuberger
Bennett
Hickcnlooper
Pearson
Bible
Holland
Pen
Boggs
I
uy
Prouty
Brewster
n
e
Inouye
Proxmire
Burdick
Jackson
Randolph
Byrd, Va.
Jordan, N.C.
Rlblcoff
Cannon Va.
Kennedy, Mars.
Russell, Ga.
Carlson
Kennedy, N.Y.
Saltonstall
Case
Lausche
Scott
Clark h
Long, Lao.'
S atthoers
Cooper
Magnuson
smith
Cbtton
Mansfield
Stennis
Dl Curtis
o
d en
McCarthy
lan
M
Syxmad e
D
d
cGee
Thurmond
Dominick
McGovern
Tower
Douglas
re
Tyca
Eastland
Metcalf
llllams, N.J.
W
Ellender
Mondale
Williams, Del.
Ervin
Monroney
Yarborough
X0034- `?n
'Moss
Young, ah oa'`
 Approved For Release 2001/07/26 : CIA-RDP68B00432R000500010034-3
March ;22, 1966 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE
NAYS-2
Gruening Morse
NOT VOTING-11
Sayh Kuchel Pastore
Gore McNamara Russell, S.C.
Hill Miller Sparkman
,iavits Montoya
So the bill (H.R. 13546) was passed.
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, the
distinguished Senator from Georgia [Mr.
RUSSELL] again has used his unmatched
military expertise and his strong and
articulate advocacy to obtain the Sen-
ate's ove; whelming approval of the
defense supplemental appropriation.
Again, gnat outstanding statesman has
won for our fighting men, whose vital
needs he It vows so well, the decisive sup-
port they deserve so much. Ail America
is grateful for his deep and abiding devo-
tion. For all America recognizes that
he, more than anyone, has assured the
reality of his avowed objective: To see
that our soldiers are better supplied than
any other fighting men on earth. No
man has worked harder to achieve that
goal.
The success of this vital appropriation
was due also to the efforts of the Senate's
highly able patriarch, the distinguished
chairman of the Appropriations Commit-
tee, the Senator from Arizona [Mr.
HAYDEN] who backed this measure with
the wise advocacy which has character-
ized his many decades of outstanding
service ir.. this body. To .the distin-
guished senior Senators from Rhode
Island [Mr. PASTORE] and from Missouri
[Mr. SYMINGTON], a debt of gratitude is
owed for their strong and articulate
support.
Additiaially, we are indebted as always
to the distinguished senior Senator from
Massachusetts [Mr. SALTONSTALL] for his
cooperative support. The eloquent plea
for swift and decisive Senate action by
the rank Ing minority member of the
Appropriations Committee helped im-
mensely 0 assure this great success.
We appreciate too the help given by
the distinguished senior Senator from
Pennsylvssnia [Mr. CLARIL] and by the
junior Senators from South Dakota [Mr.
McGOVER:v] and Arkansas [Mr. FuL-
BRIGHT], whose analytical discussions
were typically provocative and enlight-
ening. To the distinguished senior Sen-
ator from Oregon (Mr. MORSE) goes high
commendation for again applying his
cooperative efforts to assure the prompt
and orderly action of the Senate on this
important measure.
Finally, I personally am grateful to the
Senate as a whole both for its swift and
efficient action and for giving its un-
equivocal backing to those brave fight-
ing men vrho deserve it so much.
DEATH OF MILTON KELLY, OF THE
ASSOCIATED PRESS
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I
have just noticed on the AP ticker a
news lteta to the effect that an old and
good friend, Milton Kelly, Associated
I have watched him in his illness over
the past several years. I have noticed
him come back time after time after
time, always with a cheery smile. He al-
ways did a good job. He was always con-
siderate of others.
It is with deep sadness that I note the
passing of Milt Kelly. Mrs. Mansfield
and I extend our deepest sympathy to
his family. Milt was a good friend and
a good man.
Mr. RUSSELL of Georgia. Mr. Pres-
ident, I hope the Senator will per-
mit me to associate myself with all he
has said with respect to Milton Kelly.
It has been my pleasure and privilege
to deal with hundreds of members of the
press during my public career, which
has stretched over a number of years,
but I have never known a man I trusted
more completely in discussing matters
that would help him with the story, but
were not for publication, than I did
Milton Kelly. He was indeed a gentle-
man to the manner born, a man of
integrity and courage. We mourn his
passing, and extend our sympathy to his
family.
Mr. COOPER. Mr. President, I, too,
wish to associate myself with the
remarks just made. It was with sadness
that I learned about the passing of Milt
Kelly. I knew him as a fine, searching
newspaperman, a fine reporter, a man of
great integrity and character.
I am saddened to hear the news of his
death. I am sure all of us extend to his
family our feelings of deep sadness and
affection.
Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, I
was saddened to learn of the passing of
G. Milton Kelly. Milt Kelly, as he was
affectionately known, was a highly re-
spected and capable journalist whose
pleasant and affable way won many
friends for him in his tenure as an Asso-
ciated Press reporter assigned to the U.S.
Senate.
His coverage of some of the most con-
troversial and heated investigations
which took place in the Senate during
his service here was noted for its objec-
tivity and fairness to all sides. Milt will
be sorely missed by the Members of the
Senate, his many friends, and by his
colleagues in the journalism profession.
AUTHORITY TO RECEIVE MES-
SAGES, FILE REPORTS, AND SIGN
BILLS
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I
ask unanimous consent that during the
adjournment of the Senate following
today's session, the Secretary of the
Senate be authorized to receive messages
from the President of the United States
and the House of Representatives; that
committees be authorized to file reports;
and that the Vice President or President
pro tempore be authorized to sign duly
enrolled bills.
The VICE PRESIDENT. Without
objection, it is so ordered.
Press reporter since 1930, died today in ORDER FOR ADJOURNMENT
George Washington Hospital after a long FRIDAY
Illness
6161
journ until 12 o'clock noon on Friday
next.
The VICE PRESIDENT. Without
objection, it is so ordered.
TIRE SAFETY
Mr, MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I
ask unanimous consent that when S.
2669, the tire safety bill, is reported from
the Committee on Commerce it be made
the pending business.
The VICE PRESIDENT. Without ob-
jection, it is so ordered.
Mr. MORSE. The bill just read is to
be the pending business on Friday?
Mr. MANSFIELD. The Senator is cor-
rect.
Mr. MORSE. Does the Senator from
Montana expect disposition of that bill
on Friday?
Mr. MANSFIELD. I do not know.
Mr. MAGNUSON. The bill as being
reported by the committee has been
worked over, and practically all of the
committee is unanimous in the, reporting
of the bill. Several sections were modi-
fied and amended. I do not expect too
much opposition to the bill as reported.
The bill merely affects uniform tire
safety as against another bill on which
we are holding hearings which deals with
automobile safety.
Mr. MORSE. Does the Senator an-
ticipate a rollcall vote on Friday?
Mr. MAGNUSON. I would like to have
a rollcall vote on the bill when we are all
through with it. That depends on how
far we get with the bill on Friday.
Mr. MANSFIELD. Would the Sena-
tor insist on a rollcall vote?
Mr. MAGNUSON. I would not Insist
on a rollcall vote.
Mr. MORSE. I think if the Senator
wants it we should have it. It may be
necessary to rearrange our programs so
that those of us who do not wish to miss
rollcall votes may be present.
I do not understand why we quit on
Tuesday and reconvene on Friday.
Mr. MAGNUSON. This bill has not
been reported. We are working on the
report. I believe it will be filed late
today. It is doubtful. It may be tomor-
row morning. I would be glad to accom-
modate any Senators if there is sufficient
interest in a rollcall vote and the leader-
ship says we will vote on it at a time
certain on Monday.
Mr. MORSE. I am not speaking for
myself, although I am included in what
I say, but I am advised that several
Members of the Senate plan to be away
on Friday for various party affairs-I
mean political party affairs-and per-
haps we could have a vote on Monday
and not have a vote on Friday, in view
of the fact that there is this long post-
ponernent from Tuesday until Friday
when we are ready to stay here during
the week and do business. I am ready
to stay Friday, but I wish to know if it
is necessary to cancel my engagement on
Friday to be here to cast my vote.
Mr. MANSFIELD. No; I would not
say that. We will see what we can do.
I am certain this can be worked out to
the satisfaction of all Senators.
I hAppmwedifti, dse 1/0F26M4N"EW6 O Ob5 q SON. The Senator from
years. Ii e was a man of sound integrity. ask unanimous consen a wen a as i n ould be the last to suggest
He was s, fair man. He did his job well. Senate completes its business today it ad- otherwise.