THE POLITICAL SITUATION IN SOUTH VIETNAM: THE CURRENT CRISIS, POSSIBLE FUTURE DEVELOPMENTS, U.S. OPTIONS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP68B00432R000500010033-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 14
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 13, 2000
• Sequence Number: 33
• Publication Date: April 2, 1966
• Content Type: MEMO

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SUBJECT: The Political Situation in South Vietnam: The Current
Crisis, Possible Future Developments, U. S. Options
At the present time, South Vietnam is neither a "'state", in
our institutional sense of the word nor _a yet a- a "nation", as we
understand and define that term in the West. The Vietnamese have a
keen and proud sense of shared membership in a homogenous ethnic
group with a common cultural heritage stretching back for many
centuries, but they have little sense of shared membership in a
single body politic. Articulate and politically conscious elements
within South Vietnam .._ especially in the military es#:a.blishment and
in urban centers -- are rapidly developing a touchy sense of emotional
"nationalism", which is grafted an a traditional and highly developed
sense of racial pride, coupled with an equally traditional and developed
instinctive dislike for foreigners. As yet, however, there is little
sense of a national interest whose claims transcend those of personal
ambition or ties to family, associates, region or religion.
With U. S. assistance which they welcome, recognize as
essential but nonetheless also resent, non-Communist Vietnamese
south of the 17th Parallel are trying simultaneously to cope with an
externally directed Communist insurgency and to build something
that has never existed before: an independent Vietnamese nation.
This endeavor is drastically complicated by the stresses and pressures
generated by the insurgency. It is also complicated by other factors:
South Vietnam's political parties are all. fragmented factions of what
were initially clandestine revolutionary organizations. Their leaders
are incorrigibly inclined to plot the overthrow of governments and
reluctant to support any political structure in which they cannot have
the paramount roles. There are no traditionally accepted institutions
capable of providing forums for political dissent, measuring the .
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relative strength of conte -- -..ng groups, or striking peaceful political
bargains. The only orgar.i>_ . d and disciplined entity in South
Vietnam presently capable o managing a government is the military
establishment. In the absence of effectivee, political institutions or
organizations, religious groups provide the focal point for political
sentiments. In the absence of genuine nationalism, regional. ties
color political emotions and are stronger than nascent higher loyalties.
For the past year South Vietnam has been ruled by a military
government which has had to direct a war and, simultaneously, cope
with all of the problems outlined above. At the apex of this government
has been a Directory. of ten generals whose most prominent 1).-lembers
have been the Chief of State, General Thieu, and the Premier, General
Ky. Neithor, however, has possessed independent authority. Instead,
both have only exercised power delegated by a col.l.egiurn.
To survive and accomplish anything this government has had
to perform a continual. balancing act juggling the aspirations, claims
and jealousies of southerners, c:.entristes, and northerners, of
Buddhists, of Catholics, and all the other groups who have some
measure of political power in South Vietnam. It has also had to cope
with civilian restiveness at continued military rule and the widespread
desire among politically conscious civilian elements for the evolution
of a political structure with a clearer legal title to power and a
diminished degree of military authority. Furthermore, it has had
to cope with the fact that the military commander of each of the four
Corps areas (himself a member of the ruling Directory) is inevitably
a warlord whose personal writ within his Corps is at least as strong
as that of the central government. Over the past year this problem
has been particularly and increasingly acute in South Vietnamds five
northernmost provinces which constitute the I Corps area and have
been governed by the ambitious, tempermnental and sometimes
unstable General Nguyen Chanh Thi.
It is within this context that South Vietnamss current political
crisis developed, By 9 March, General. Ky had reached a decision
shared by most of his Directory colleagues that the central government
could no longer tolerate the Corps area satrapies best exemplified
by General This I Corps and, consequently, that Thi had to go. Thi
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was called to Saigon for a 10 March Directory meeting at which. lie
was relieved of his command and told, that lie would be. sent abroad
for a period of temporary exile. General Ky had prepared his ground
carefully for this meeting and was able to obtain the unanimous support
of his Directory colleagues. His follow-up execution, however, was
not well prepared and was not effectively carried out.
At the'10 March meeting Thi was told he could return briefly
to I Corps the following clay to wind up his affairs and participate in
a change*of.-command ceremony designed to save his face. That night,
however, the Deputy Prime Minister, General Go, another powerful
Directory figure, apparently had a, unilateral change of mind. On the
morning of the 11.th, Go went to the Saigon Airport, prevented Thi from
leaving, and in effect placed him under house arrest in Saigon. Five
days later the Directory changed its mind again. By then the I Corps
situation had begun to be troublesome and Thi was allowed to return to
I Corps for a couple of days" in the hope and apparently with. the
understanding ..a that he would exert his personal influence to calm
things clown before leaving the country. He went back to I Corps on
16 March, is still there, and has done more to aggravate than to
assuage the situation.
It was recognized that Thixs dismissal would cause some
resentment in I Corps but Ky and his Directory colleagues thought
they could keep matters under control. Events proved otherwise,
however, _t...r various reasons, among, the most important of which are.
the fact that protest reaction to This ouster was organized and is
still directed by key GVN officials in I Corps (e. g. , Nguyen Van Man,
the mayor of Danang), the fact that Thi.ls designated successor as I
Corps commander, General Chuaa:a., has so far shown himself unable
or unwilling to exert effective authority, and -- above all -- the fact
that the Buddhists have seized. on this opportunity to exert political
pressure intended to topple the government.
It was anticipated that This dismissal, would, be resented by the
Buddhists and generate some distress in their ranks. This in fact
occured, but in short order it be carne apparent that the Buddhists --
particularly Tri Quang and his followers, _.. were not so much interested
Thi himself, with whom they had already become mole or less
disenchanted, as they were in the opportunity for bringing down the
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government. Their initial probes for weakness were not effectively
countered and they have accordingly developed their protests into
a full-fledged pressure'1concexzt.ra.ted i.xa but by no means restricted
to I Corps.
In the three weeks since This ouster a serious situation has
developed in which, at the present time, I corps cannot be said to
be effectively.under Saigon control, in which Buddhist instigated
pressures are seriously threatening the stability and perhaps the
actual survival of the present GVN, and in which anti -Anieric an and
neutralist sentiments are being openly voiced.
In the complex political game now being conducted in South.
Vietnam there are a wide variety of players or groups thereof each
with divergent objectives, ambitions, and vested interests.
ley and the Directory General Ky and his immediate colleagues
obviously want to stay in power, prosecute the war, and conduct the
work of social development which they are sincerely if not always
efficiently setting in motion. By and large the Directory seems to
be hanging together (perhaps to avoid hanging separately) and for the
time being at least Ky enjoys the unified, though not necessarily loyal,
support of his immediate colleagues. Ky and his associates, however,
are obviously disturbed, and more than a little unsure of thein.selv-es.
As indicated above, they keep changing their minds on the best course
of action to follow. They are understandably anxious to avoid a head-
on collision with the Buddhists or an unwise use of force capable of
setting in train a course of events like those which led to Diena.?s
downfall in 1963. It appears, however, that they may be allowing the
obvious and very real need for prudence to serve as an excuse for
counter-productive procrastination and indecision.
General Thi: Thai provided the occasion for this crisis but is
no longer its central element. He obviously resents his ouster and is
not disposed to exert himself to ease the problems of his former
colleagues. So long as he remains in I Corps he will almost certainl.y7'
serve as an irritant and visible symbol of the Ky government's
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inability to enforce execution of its orders. Throughout his career
even in the 1960 coup attempt -- Thi has always been someone else's
cat's paw, the front _- witting or unwitting -- for other peopl.ess
political manipulations. He rernains so today.
The Directory's Key Executive Agezn.ts: One of the chief
contributors to the present crisis is the fact that Ky and his Directory
colleagues have been poorly served, if not actually ill.-served., by the
chosen executive instruments of their decision to dismiss General Thi..
General Chuan, as indicated above, is sitting on a fence. He talks
loyalty to Saigon but so far has done nothing to assert or re-establish
Saigon2's authority in. I Corps. There are good grounds for thinking
that he personally is more anxious to be on the winning side than to
discharge his present responsibilities as :L Corps commander. The
roles of MSS Chief Colonel Loan, and, particularly, of National. Police
Director, Colonel Pham Van Lieu, have been, if anything, even. more
ambivalent. Lieu has been the Ky government's principal go-between
in its dealings with Thi but where Lieals loyalties lie is very, much
an open question.
T.ixe I Corps Bureaucracy. Much of the agitation in I Corps has
been not only encoura?;,ad. 'lout in some cases actually organized by key
local officials. The Mayor of Danang, Nguyen 'Van Man, for example,
seems to be the person who organized the "civilian and military
struggle committee" which has become the spearhead of anti-GVN
protests and demonstrations. Man. has done nothing to curb the
recurrent strikes which have plagued Danang and may well have been
behind them. Bui Hearth, the province chief of Quan.g Ngai, has been
equally unhelpful. In fact, no I. Corps provincial or military official
has done anything effective to support the Saigon government.
"The wStrug(;l.e Group": The most active, vocal and disturbing
element in I Corps agitation has been the "struggle groups" and
"com.anittees" which have sprung up in Danang, Hue and elsewhex e.
By and large they seem to be composed of present or recent students,
faculty members in I Corps schools (including Hue University) and
junior civilian and military official; They are en.cou.ra.ged and
probably di.rected by Tri Luang?s wing of the Buddhist movement.
They could never have gotten off the ground without tht~ at least tacit
blessing of local officials, though it is not entirely clear if the latter:
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could now curtail these group--' activities. It is the struggle groups
who have taken over the Hue and Danang radio stations, led the
demonstrations, put out increasingly anti-American. propaganda
themes, and begun to voice neutralist and anti-war sentiments.
The Buddhists: South Vietnam's Buddhist movement has
considerably more to do with politics than with religion. It is not a
tightly organized and disciplined body but it does have widespread
support, particularly in youth and student circles. It bears sonic
analogies to the civil rights movement in the U. S. in that it channels
strong emotions, finds protest more congenial than constructive
advocacy, and has a number of would.-be leaders none of whom is
willing to let another appear more militant than he. The two major
factions within the Buddhist movement are those which coalesce around,
respectively, Which Tri Quang and Thich Tam Chau. Tri Quang `s
faction is the better organized. but is strongest in central Vietrnam,
including I Corps. Tana Chau's supporters are less well organized
but are. concentrated in the south, including Saigon, and hence give
Tam Chau a voice about equal to that of T'ri Quang on the national
stage. All of the political. Buddhists have been unhappy with the
continuation of military rule, and are anxious for a return to civilian
government. None, however, has ever been willing to articulate
exactly what sort of civilian government he would like to see or whom
he would like to have in positions of authority therein. Tam Chau
appears prepared to give the ley government at least some measure
of support and assistance so long as it is tangibly forthcoming on the
matter of progress of civilian rule. Tri Quang seems currently
bent on taking a harder line.
No one has ever been able to divine exactly what Tri Quan.g
wants and he himself would almost certainly be unwilling., -,d not
unable, to spell. out his goals with any degree of precision. I:le
apparently does not want the responsibilities of office. He does want
a veto power over GVN policies and personnel choices and. appears
determined to topple any government: he cannot control. There is
little doubt that Tr i Quang is the real driving force behind present
agitation, that in the aftermath of This ouster he probed for weaknesses
and thinks he has found them. He will almost certainly persist in
his pressure until the Ky government falls or until lie comes to believe
that he cannot succeed and hence must ease off to avoid public defeat.
A consummate political realist, he has a keen eye for his oppoaen.tsw
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strengths as well as their weaknesses. Ile would undoubtedly like
to see the present government fall but would almost certainly quiet
down if he became convinced that it was going to survive.
Other Vie tx.aaar.Y:aese, Groups, In addition to the ones enumerated
above, other Vietnamese groups and political figures are closely
watching current developments and participating in current activity
in various degrees. The Catholics by and large welcomed. Thies
ouster and are, prepared to give the government some z mea.ssuure of
support, they would become even more inclined to provide such
support if faced with a clear choice between the present regime and
a Buddhist dominated successor. Nonetheless, they are restless
and many would like to see a return to civilian rule. Similar
sentiments are to be found among other political groups, especially
those with ties to central Vietnam, such as some factions of the VNQDD.
Southerners (i. e. , Cochin Chinese) of all political'and religious
persuasions are irritated at the troubles caused in central Vietnam and
hence are in some 'measure prepared to'support the government, but
do not care to wind up on what may prove to be the losing side.
The Communists: Present agitation is a windfall for the Viet
Cong. None of the contending factions are now under v'ie' ' Cong control
but there is little doubt that some of them have been penetrated by
Communist elements. The slogans put out over. Hue. and Danang radios
and appearing in struggle committee organized demonstrations are
incorporating an increasing number of Communist propaganda. themes,
including ones directed against the Americans and designed to
exacerbate Vietnamese/-T. S. relations. Several sources have reported
that the Viet Cong are encouraging their followers to take a hand
in the current agitation and attempt to divert it to Communist ends-,
Given current ten:n.si.ons, the instinctive dislike for foreigners common
to all Vietnamese but particularly strong in those of central origin,
and the inevitable irritants produced by the large 15. S. presence,
the Viet Cong have a fertile field for disruptive propaganda and
political action at the present time.
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IV. POSSIBLE FUTURE DEVELOPMENTS
At the present time it is impossible to predict the outcome
of South ie'tnaam ts current political crisis. The future course of
events is not now inevitable nor is it yet inexorably ordained. What
happens nest will depend on what various key individuals do, or fail.
to do, within the next few hours, days and weeks. Broadly speaking,
however, events will probably follow one of five general courses.
(1) The current crisis will be resolved in the near future by the
present government which will emerge with enhanced prestige but
with some alterations in formal structure and key personnel.
(2) The crisis will drag on for several weeks with the present
government in nom inaa.l control but with a tarnished image and ever
decreasing authority. (3) A new government will come to power
different in form and. personnel but espousing similar political
objectives _- e.g., prosecution of a war and opposition to Conii-rnu.nist
insurgency. (4) A new government of neutralist persuasion will.
come to power determined to end the war as soon as possible and
invite the L.I.S. out of Vietnam. (5) South Vietnams will simply
descend into a state of anarchy and will split up along corps and
regional :Lines with no effective central control exerted from Saigon.
Survival of the Present Government. It is essential to realize
that the sspre ent goverznr:rre rnt of South Vietnaaxr rl is the Directory,
not General Ky or General Thieu@ If the Directory survives,, the
government will survive? The Directory is and always has been
a collegiate body wh.i h colol.ectively, holds supreme political
authority y will probably have to resign as premier but he can
do so without shaking the fzmdamental structure of the goverment,
particularly if he simply steps 'ack to resume running the Air Force
(which is what he has long said he wants to do anyway) and remains
a member of the Directory. If this happens,, the hest person to
succeed. him as premier is proba:blyp General. Chieu, or if he is
assigned another post (see 'elow), General. Thang;
government -- i eo, tha Directory -.. is to survive
without fatally daruaged authority it .must immediately initiate and
effectively follow through a number of actions -- some preventive,
some therapeutic, and some designed to seize the political initiative
from the Buddhists by meeting their legitimate demands and,
simultaneously,, capturing the support and imagination' of other
political groups.
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} `."lie }?nyernxne:at must -we vent hefuture read o
unrest outside of I Corpse This can be achieved by an effective
use of police authority, particularly in Saigon, embodying a
judicious mixture of firmness and restraints As yet the unrest
and, demonstrations outside of I Corps are not out of hand and
the strength of the organization directing present unrest
(particularly Tni Quaxxgg$s Buddhists) is considerably weaker
in Saigon than in I. Corpse In this field, therefore, the govern-
ment still has a little thee, though not rnuch.
(2) It -rco.ust re-establish its .ithoxity over I Cor-ps. This
cannot he done~by 11-.1 .itaxyLforce part cularly sixxce word of
the GVN s plans to use such force has already leaked out.
Also it will simply have to be recognized that I Corps is
always going to be a separate area -- more or less the
personal fief of whoever is chosen as Corps Commander.
Nevertheless, it is essential that the Saigon govexnx.ient
re-establish the appearance of its' authority and, above
regain control of flue and lea xmg radio stations and. got the
students off the streets. The best vay to do this is to appoint
a new I Corps Commander Nvh.orn the Buddhists could not
oppose at the outset and to whom they would have to give at
least a niinitxxal period of grace. In this context, the
shrewdest stroke the government could make would be to
recall General Duong V to ("Big") Minh from exile and make
him. Commander of I Corpse This would hoist Tri Quangos
Buddhists on their oarn petard, and give them a government
representative to whom they could not initially object. Putting'
"Big" Minh in I Corps has other advantages too; being outside
of Saigon he would be less likely to constitute a political threat
on the national level. Also, be Fng a Cochin Chinese,, he does
not have family roots in the center and hence could not create
a personal satrapy in. I Corps as easily as some general
native to that area. If "Big" March is not available or acceptable,
other possible choices for I Corps commander designed to
achieve the same results are General Chieux police director
Col,, Pharn Van Lieu, or General Tran Van Don. (though of all
of these, Don is least likely to be acceptable to the Directory).
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(3) The government must show concrete forward motion
toward the objective of reestablishing civilian rule. The best
way to do this is to announce within the next few days -- and
here the time factor is absolutely essential ..- the establishment
of a body charged with drafting a constitution. To pre-empt
Tri Quang and meet his stated demands, the bulk of this body
(say 60%) should be selected by the already existing elected
provincial councils, though such council representation could
be weighted on a population basis, (If it were, this could be
presented as "true democracy, " something Tri Quang would
find it hard to oppose; though such weighting would in fact
dilute the influence of his followers,,) The balance of the body
should be made up of members appointed by the Directory with
an eye to insuring that all political groups in South Vietnam,
including minority ones, are adequately represented. This
body should be charged with drafting a constitution which would
establish a legal base for a future government, the structure
of that government, and an electoral procedure for setting .it
up; It should be announced as part of the package that the
constitution written by this body would be submitted to "the
people" for ratification by popular referendum; Once the
constitution itself had been approved by "the people, " provision
would be made for holding the elections it required and, after
their results were in, installing a government in conformity
with the constitutionts provisions.
The procedures here outlined would constitute a tangible
plan, whose implementation would provide visible concrete
progress toward a legal government under civilian control.
Given Vietnamese politicians? proclivity for haggling over
clauses, however, this procedure would take at least a year;
probably mores to complete. It should be announced that the
present government will continue to hold power as a public
trust until a new one can be chosen in conformity with the
provisions of the constitution. Hence this procedure would
give the present government at least a yearts grace to continue
its work of prosecuting the war and rebuilding a new Vietnamese
society.
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(4) The government must in some measure save its face
and preserve its image: Ky may have to resign, but if he does
this must be presented as a realignment of responsibility
within a continuing and unchanged political structure, General
Thi must be gotten out of I Corps,'and, preferably, sent abroad
for at least a short period of "medical treatment" to prove that
the Directory is capable of making its rulings stick.
No one can guarantee that a plan such as that outlined above will
necessarily work. It has a good chance of success, however, if its
various provisions are immediately launched and resolutely followed
through. If the Directory does not take action along these lines within
the very near future, the situation will almost certainly deteriorate
along one of the other four lines outlined above.
In assessing the impact of the current political crisis on U. S,
interests it is essential to keep in mind a clear distinction between
immediate or near-term consequences and the longer-term effects of
current events. The present unrest is obviously unsettling, has damaged
the prestige and international image of the Saigon government, given a
propaganda and political action windfall to the Viet Cong, and provided
fresh ammunition for domestic and international critics of U. S. policy,
None of this, however, is necessarily permanent, fatal or, in the long
run, even harmful if the current crisis results in the emergence of a
stronger political structure with a greater command of civilian loyalties
and a better legal basis for its rule.
The longer-term consequences of current events will depend on
the way in which current troubles are resolved; It is not essential to
U. S. interests that Ky remain as premier but is vastly preferable that
the Directory remain in power and the essential structure of the Saigon
government not be radically changed under pressure of political unrest.
However, even if the present government should fall, our position and
interests in Vietnam could still be preserved if the present government
were replaced by a successor publicly dedicated to the objectives of
prosecuting a war and building a free Vietnamese nation independent
of Communist control. We would have to recognize that any such
successor, at least at the outset, would probably be even less efficient
11 -
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than the present regime and that its emergence would be a considerable
temporary setback for us. Nonetheless, given the background of the
present crisis and the present state of political dynamics within South
Vietnam, stresses and upheavals such as the one we are now witnessing
are something for which we will simply have to be prepared, much as
we obviously want to prevent them. The process of nation-building,
balance-structuring, and institution-creating in the midst of a war
will never be easy and will invariably be complicated by periods of
extreme tension within non-Communist ranks.
U. S. interests would be adversely affected if the present crisis
drags on much longer (e. g. , for more than another week or two at most)
even if the Directory and present regime remains nominally in power.
The longer present unrest continues the more difficult it will be to effect
a satisfactory resolution or create a stable successor to the present
political structure. Also the longer it continues, the greater will be the
risk of anarchy, dissolution of effective central authority, and the
acquisition of power within some segment of the country (e.g., I Corps)
by a neutralist-oriented group subject to Communist manipulation and
control. These are real dangers to which we must be alert. They are
not presently upon us, however, and we will stand a far better chance
of preventing their emergence if we retain our sense of perspective
and avoid premature panic.
VI. U. S. OPTIONS
A canvass of available U. S. options must also draw the
distinction between immediate options and those available to us over
the longer term. At the moment we have little choice but to continue
the lines of activity in which we are presently engaged; touching base
with and keeping tabs on all elements in the current crisis, working
behind the scenes with the present government in an effort to strengthen
its hand, exerting discreet pressure for forward movement on its part,
and providing useful, concrete ideas for its consideration.
Over the longer-term, the U. S. has basically the three options
of (1) continued close involvement in South Vietnamese political life,
(2) disengaging from internal Vietnamese politics and focusing our whole
attention on the military prosecution of the war and, (3) withdrawal from
South Vietnam.
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Given the U. S. stake and present public posture, withdrawal
is not a viable option at the present time. If we were to curtail our
commitments now and look for a way out we would only be vindicating
the arguments of those within the U, S. and abroad who are vociferously
criticizing our present policy.
Assuming that we are to stay in Vietnam at least for the
immediate future, disengagement from internal politics would be
neither wise nor realistic since the struggle against the Communists
could be lost politically by the South Vietnamese while our forces are
defeating the Viet Cong on the field of battle. Were this to happen,
our investment in lives, material resources and prestige would have
been in vain.
For the time being, therefore, our only viable option is that
of continued involvement in South Vietnamese political life. In operative
terms this involvement entails the following factors:
(1) We must recognize and keep continually in mind the
political impact of the U.S. physical presence in South
Vietnam and the degree to which it excites the emotional
sensibilities even of those who recognize the need for our
support, are grateful for our help, and want desperately
for us to remain in order that they may continue to exist
as free men. Our actions will have to be marked by great
delicacy, political finesse, and a continuing effort to make
American influence and presence as unobtrusive as
circumstances will permit.
(2) We must obtain some additional leverage over the
Vietnamese and make them aware that our continued support
is contingent upon some modicum of rational behavior on
their part. Few Vietnamese are politically sophisticated
in the international sense and most are prone -- for a
variety of personal and emotional reasons -- to overrate
the importance of Vietnam to the U. S. Tri Quang and
General Thi, for example, have made it plain that they feel
they can play political games in the midst of a war because
they can always count on the United States to protect them
from Communist control, We have got to disabuse influential
Vietnamese figures of the belief that American public opinion
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will support our continued effort in Vietnam no matter what
the Vietnamese themselves may do. Perhaps the best way
to get this message across would be to bring key Vietnamese
figures -- including perhaps even Tri Quang himself -- to
the United States for orientation or lecture tours and force
them to experience at firsthand the full measure of restlessness
about Vietnam now prevalent in America. At a minimum if
we cannot persuade such leaders as Tri Quang to come and
see for themselves, we must arrange for persons whose
reports they will credit to come to the United States and bring
back a politically sobering messaged
(3) The U. S. must avoid becoming too closely,, identified
with any particular South Vietnamese institutional structure
or politician and must avoid smothering emerging Vietnamese
leaders in too close a public embrace. The timing of news
announcements and policy statements, and the ether public
manifestations of joint endeavor must, wherever possible, be
structured to downplay the fact that the Vietnamese are our
dependent clients and build their image as independent allies.
(4) Finally, we must do all we can to foster nation-building
in Vietnam and the emergence of a stable non-Communist social
structure but we must avoid any attempt to force Vietnamese
political development into an institutional framework fashioned
in our image. Instead, we must encourage the Vietnamese to
devise institutional mechanisms responsive to their needs,
consonant with their traditions, and capable of reflecting the
realities of political power within their social structure.
25X1A
Acting Specs Assistant or 'Vietnamese airs
SECRET
Approved For Release 2001/07/26 : CIA-RDP68B00432R000500010033-4