FOREIGN AFFAIRS APRIL 1966 THE FACELESS VIET CONG

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP68B00432R000500010027-1
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 26
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 13, 2000
• Sequence Number: 27
• Publication Date: April 1, 1966
• Content Type: REPORT

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THE FACELESS VI ET CONG
By Ccorge A. Carver, Jr.
we [the Lao Doug (Corainunist) Party] are building socialism in
Vietnam We are building it, however, only in half of the country, while
in the other half, we roust still bring; to a corncltsion the dexraocratic-
bourgeois and anti. imperialist rev~olut`ion. Actually, our party must now
accomplish, come rnl?ixrasrecxzr ly, two Hifereut revolutions, in the north and
in the south. This is one of the most characteristic traits of our struggle.
----Ho Chi Minh, June ip591
HE present struggle in South Viet Nam is in essence the
third act of a. continuous political drama whose prologue
spanned. the 193os, whose first act was played in the years
between 1941 and t{94.5., and whose second encompassed the x946-
,945, Franco-Viet - ?irlh war. ':flee scene of major action in this
drama has shifted sc:ve:rai times, as have the identities of the aux-
iliary players (e.g. the Chinese Nationalists, the British, the
French, the Chit csc Communists and now the Americans) and
the political guises of some of the principals. Throughout its
course, however, the unifying theme of this drama has been the
unrelenting struggle of the Vietnamese Communist Party to ac-
quire political control over all of Viet Nam. Its chief protagonists,
furthermore, have always been and are today the small, dedicated
and doctrinaire group who, under Ho Ciai Minh's guidance and
direction, organized and nurtured Viet .arm's Communist Party
during the 1930s, usurped the nationalist revolution after World
.7 are the same men
mar ll: and subverted it to their cards. The-
who run the Communist state already established in North Viet
Nam and who are now directing the insurgency designed to bring
the southern part of the ~c:ountry under their domination.
The term "Viet ~'rrar'r came into circulatio around 1956 as a
FS-C'.31% a Hanoi irtervi . by MO, so: rc:sponcl,g:nts. of the Italian Communist Party journal
Ueit:a, publisbsl in (l+a;ta co rtjuly i, x959, and in the BOgiao Communist paper Le .Drapeau
"s on.) ily ro, i9y9.
Rang
A~iprd't~ FtSY~"R ~--e200l o7V4.' `CIA-RDP'68B0043 0Q 000 027
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348 FOREIGN AFFAIRS
means of distinguishing some of the players in the current act of
this ongoing political drama from the players in Act II. "Viet
Cong" is a contraction of the phrase "Viet Nam Cong-San," which
means, simply, "Vietnamese Communist(s)." It is a descriptive
term, not necessarily pejorative except, perhaps, in the sense of
"If the shoe fits...." It is a useful, precise and, as we shall see,
accurate generic label for the individuals leading the present in-
surgent movement, at all,levels, and for the organizational struc-
ture through which that insurgency is controlled and directed.
Not surprisingly, the reactions of many whose concern with
Viet Nam is of recent origin are analogous to those of theater=
goers who walk into the middle of the third act of an extremely
complex drama ignorant of what has gone before. To understand
the Viet Cong insurgency, its relationship to .the North Viet-
namese regime in Hanoi (the D.R.V.) and to the National Liber-
ation Front and the People's Revolutionary Party in South Viet
Nam (and their respective interrelationships), it is essential to
appreciate the historical setting within which the Viet Cong
movement developed and the ends it was created to serve.
Throughout their almost four decades of unremitting struggle
for political power, the Vietnamese Communists have demon-
strated great skill in coping with new problems and great tacti-
cal flexibility in pursuing unwavering strategic objectives. Yet,
though skillful in learning from past failures, they have often be-
come the victims of previous successes. For the past quarter-cen-
tury the Vietnamese Communists have been doctrinally addicted
to the political device of a broad front organization, dominated
and controlled from behind the scenes by disciplined Communist
cadres, but espousing general sentiments to which persons of all
political inclinations can subscribe (though the formulation of
these sentiments has invariably involved a special lexicon of key
terms to which Communists and non-Communists attach radi-
cally different meanings). They have always rigidly subordi-
nated military activity to political ends, and employed it not to
inflict strategic defeat on enemy forces in the conventional sense,
but as an abrasive to wear down their adversaries' will to fight and
force their enemies to accept interim political settlements favor-
able to the continued pursuit of Communist political objectives.
Because of this Vietnamese Communist penchant for repeating
political and military sr.ratageimas, a knowledge of recent Viet-
namese history is particn iarl_y helpful is understanding the pres-
p utt ?l O''F"i5~"i~'1 21DID 7-M i$` 21S f R 60 mf
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THE FACELESS VIET CONG
349
ent insurgency. Although Westerners may be largely ignorant of
the scenario and detaai.led plot development of the previous acts
of Viet Naam's continuing; political drama., the Vietnamese most
decidedly are not. Virtually all politically minded Vietnamese
have spent at least their adulthood, if not their whole lives, dar-
ing the Communist struggle for power. Few indeed have not had
their lives altered, conditioned or shaped thereby. Without ap-
preciating what the Vietnamese have lived through and without
rccog riiiinng some of the things they know intimately-often from
a[]-too-firsthand cxp .rienc Westerners cannot hope to under-
stand. the attitude of \rietn.:tinese now living south of the 17th
parallel toward the insurgency, the Viet Con, the National Lib-
eration Front and the Communist regime in Hanoi.
Sa
Under the direction. of the man who now calls himself HHo Chi
Minh, the Indochinese Communist Party was organized in Jan-
uary 1930. For the next decade the Vietnamese Communists con-
centrated on perfecting their organization, jockeying for position
within the rising anti.-French nationalist movement and attempt-
ing to undercut nationalist leaders or groups whom they could
not subvert or bring cinder Communist control, using any means
available, including betrayal to the Frein.ch.
In 194x, the Vietnamese Communists joined a nationalist or-
ganization called the League for Vietnamese Independence (Viet
Nam Doc Lap .Doug Minh.iioi---o.r Viet Minh) which was spon-
sored by the Chinese Nationalists as a vehicle for harassing
Japanese forces in ndochin.a but swiftly subverted by the Viet-
narnese Communists to further their own political objectives. By
194.5 the Viet Minh movement was under complete Communist
control, despite the continued presence and subordinate partici-
pation therein of rion-Communist nationalist elements whose
names and talents the Communists were more than willing to
exploit. In the chaotic aftermath of Japan's precipitate surrender,
the Communists used the Viet Minh as a device for seizing power
in Hanoi and (orr Sc p-, nibcr x, 1945) proclaiming the existence
of the "Derracbcraatic : ";c-pzublic of 'Viet. Nara" under the presidency
of Ho Clii Mirth.
On November x r '1 94.5, in an effort to make the Viet Minh
government xlaor e p;.,, .~:t; blc to non-,Cnin.m nist Vietnamese and
to the forces then ocracapying; Viet Nam down
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350 FOREIGN AFFAIRS
to the 16th parallel, Ho formally "dissolved" the Indochinese
Communist Party, though the impact of this gesture on the dis-
cerning was considerably attenuated when the same day wit-
nessed the formation of a new "Association for Marxist Studies."
Complete control over the Viet Minh and the subsequent resist-
ance struggle, however, remained unchanged in essentially the
same hands as those which control North Viet Nam and the in-
surgency below the 17th parallel today.'
By the late spring of 1946, the fact of Communist control over
the Viet Minh (despite the "non-existence" of the Party) was be-
coming increasingly apparent, as was the fact that Ho's political
manoeuvring and stalling; negotiations with the returning French
were not going to work. in preparation for the inevitable struggle,
Ho endeavored to broaden the Communists' base of nationalist.
support. In May 1946 he announced the creation of a new "pop-
ular national front" (Lien-Hiep Quoc Dan Viet Nam), known as
the Lien Viet, whose announced objective was the achievement
of "independence and democracy." The Viet Minh was merged
with, and eventually absorbed by, the Lien Viet, though its name
remained to serve as a generic label for those who participated in
the subsequent armed struggle against the French. The Com-
munists also brought into the Lien Viet two other small splinter
parties which by then were under complete Communist control:
the "Democratic Party," designed to appeal to "bourgeois ele-
ments" (i.e. urban trade, business' and professional circles), and
the "Radical Socialist Party," designed to enlist the sympathies
of students and intellectuals.
The war with the French broke out on December 1g, 1946, and
its general course is sufficiently well known to require no re-
hearsal here. The northern part of Viet Nam constituted the prin-
cipal theater of military operations; the struggle in the south,
though intense, was primarily a terrorist and harassing action
designed to keep the French off balance and prevent them from
concentrating either their attention or their forces on the war in
the north. Though the Viet Minh achieved these objectives, their
efforts in South Viet Nanl,were beset with a continuing series of
problems. French control of the sea, air and major overland routes
left the Viet Minh in the south dependent for supplies, reinforce-
2 Despite the Vietnamese Communists' claim that their party did not "exist" under any
name from 1945 until 1951, on August 31, r953, the Cominform journal noted that Vietnamese
Communist Party membership ilIcrcased frcan 2o,eoo in 1946 to 5oo,ooo in ig5o.
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THE FACELESS VIET CONG
rtmcnts, cadres and communications on a tortuous set of jungle
tracks running through Laos along the western slopes of the
Axanam.ite Chain) which ca.i.no to be known, collectively, as the
"Ho Chi Minh Trail.' Saigon politics were considerably more
complex than those of Hanoi, and. ratan-Conuriunist Vietnamese
political groups were both more numerous and more powerful
in the south than they were in the north. Furthermore, the Corn.-
tamunist leaders of the Viet Minh had a series of command and
control problems with their a,t.,azthern organization which, took
several years to resolve.
ha 19#-5, the senior Viet Mirth representative it, southern Viet
Naarn was a Moscow-educated disciple of Ho Chi Minh and the
Third International named Tra.n Van Clau, whose blatant ruth-
lessness and indiscriminate terrorist tactics alienated key groups
that the Viet Minh were anxious to bring into their fold, such as
the _f-I:oa Hao, Cao Dai and .Binh Xuyera. (')I;iau was accordingly
recalled to Hanoi in January .1946 and his duties as Viet Mirth
commander in the south were assumed by Nguyen Binh. Al-
though. eminently successful in harassing the French and further-
ing the cause of the .nationalist revolution, Binh---a former mem-
ber of the Communists' zx'xos;t militant nationalist rivals, the
V..a v'-.Q.D.D.---was never fully trusted by the Corr munist high
command in the north and came to be considered excessively
independent. In 195:[ he was replaced by Le Duan, a charter
member of the Indochinese Communist Party who is now First
Secretary of the Communist Party in North Viet Narn and one
of the most powerful figures in the Hanoi regime. Until 1954,
and perhaps even later, Le Dunn continued to play a major role
in developing and directing the Viet Minh organization in the
south and in ensuring that it remained under firm Communist
control. However, in late 1952, or early .1953 he was apparently
compelled to share his authority with Le Duc Tho, the present
head of the North Vietnamese Communist Party's Organization
Bureau and also a member of its Politburo.!
The 194.9 Communist victory in China had a profound in-
lia:tept.ce on the course of events in Viet Nam, particularly after the
-pit t:. !lis:xla offensive in. the tail of I950 cleared the French out of
the fso:nt:ia r area and gave the Viet .Minh a common. border with
!~D:,ria;f; the Vitt .l ink vra Le .Dua.z a,ul Lt D l'bo appaten.tty had a violent.. quarrel
Duos rocti,:.e which Ito Chi :'r:nh tii;nsel,` ?::?(i to scr?1,~:. The dt mils of thica dispute are, still
r lmclere, but (ho result :tt eiuois:y txt.t: er" el, ,1e two ,eo has r eve been completely dissipated.
Al~prb e" 1'F "i-"F I '~ 2'0'0 T( :" IA-R 68B0043 O0 U '~="
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FOREIGN AFFAIRS
their new Communist neighbor. The military consequences of
ensuing Chinese Communist support to the Viet Minh cause are
fairly well known. The political consequences, less well known in
the West, were of at least equal significance. With an increasingly
powerful fraternal ally in immediate proximity, the Communist
leadership of the Viet Minh became progressively less dependent
on the good will and support of non-Communist Vietnamese na-
tionalists. The mask could now be slipped. The fact of Com-
munist direction of the Viet Minh no longer had to be concealed,
the instruments of Communist control could be made more effec-
tive, the nature of that control more rigid and its extent more
pervasive.
The first major step in this direction was taken oii March 3,
1951, when the Indochinese Communist Party reappeared as the
Dang Lao Dong Viet Nam, or Vietnamese Workers' Party. The
Lao Dong swiftly assumed a position of. absolute political pri-
macy within the Lien Viet front, though for appearances' sake
the "Democratic" and "Socialist" parties mentioned above were
kept in existence. The overt reconstitution of the Communist
Party was doubtless prompted by a variety of considerations, of
which the most important was probably the fact that covert
domination of the Viet Minh movement via a clandestine appa-
ratus whose very existence had to be concealed was an awkward
and inefficient process. It necessitated reliance on persuasion as
well as coercion and, further, complicated the task of advancing
Communist political objectives within those areas under Viet
Minh control.
The Viet Minh was ostensibly a purely nationalist movement
dedicated to the twin goals of independence and democracy; its
stated objective during the first phase of the armed struggle
0946-1951) was simply to throw out the French. The emergence
of the "new" party, however, brought forth a new slogan: "The
anti-imperialist and the anti-feudal fights are of equal impor-
tance." What this meant became increasingly apparent during
the course of a systematic program which the Communists soon
initiated. and took five years to complete. It was designed to
make the Pa.f.ty itself more doctrinally orthodox and to restruc-
ture the whose: society, at least of North Viet Nam, along lines
consonant wi:ii Communist dogma. This program was conducted
in five stages, each carefully prepared and each preceded by in-
tensive sessicn.s of "thought reform" for both Party and non-
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THE FACELESS VIET CONG
Party cadres to e,isi.ire that they would in fact execute the orders
they were about to receive.
The first or "e:conornic leveling" stage, launched in i i was
designed to run the wealthier peasantry and the urban business-
men (to the extent that French control of the towns permitted
this) through a complicated system of arbitrary and. punitive
taxes patterned on Chinese Communist .remodels-a.s, indeed, were
all phases of this Vietuarriese Communist program.' The second
stage was a short, sh.arla wave of terror launched throughout
large parts of North Viet .Nam one evening in February 1953, a
week before ['et, the lunar .new year, and sustained. for precisely
fifteen days.' The paten.-it objectives of this terror campaign were
to cow the. jplopulace, in preparations for what lay ahead, and elim-
inate all potential centers of ci'ect.ive resistance. When the terror
was shut off il)a a't t%4 L' EC! an An eiinm
Apprtrved, f dr,!!R ie 200 fl 4 'jC1`A-RO 68B'017
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364
FOREIGN AFFAIRS
have made a lifetime practice of masking their identities under
various aliases and norm de guerre and who take particular pains
to stay hidden in the background in order to support the politi-
cal fiction that the insurgency is directed by the N.L.F. and the
Front's ostensible officers.
At the 1962 Geneva Conference on Laos, a member of the
North Vietnamese delegation inadvertently commented that the
published roster of the Lao Dong Party's Central Committee did
not include sortie me cabers whose identities were kept secret be-
cause they were "directing military operations in South Viet
Nam." One of the four examples he cited was "Nguyen Van
Cue,"" which is one of the aliases used by the Chairman of the
P.R.P. This Lao Dong Central Committee member, whose true
name we do not know, is probably the overall field directorof the
Viet Cong insurgency in South Viet Nam. The overall com-
mander of Viet Cong military forces (who would be a subordi-
nate of Cue's within the Communist command structure) is
almost certainly the Chairman of the (P.R.P.) Central Commit-
tee's Military Committee--a man who uses the name Tran Nam
Trung but whom several captured Viet Cong cadre members
have insisted is actually Lieutenant-General Tran Van Tra, a
Deputy Chief of Staff of the North Vietnamese army and an
alternate member of the Lao Dong Central Committee. The di-
rector of all Viet Cong activity in V.C. Military Region 5 (the
northernmost third of South Viet Nam) is Nguyen Don, a Major-
General in the North Vietnamese army and another alternate
member of the Lao Dong Central Committee, who in 1961 was
commander of the North Vietnamese 305th Division but came
south late that year or early in 1962. In short, not only does the
P.R.P. control all aspects of the Viet Cong movement, including
the N.L.F., and not only is it a subordinate echelon of the North
Vietnamese. Lao Dong Party, but the P.R.P.'s own leaders ap
pear to be individuals who themselves occupy ranking positions
within the Lao Dong Party hierarchy.
As indicated above., for the first year of its existence the N.L.F.
was as shado.iy and faceless an organization as the P.R.P. is
today. It was iile;ec.dy created "after a conference of representa-
tives of various forces apposing the fascist regime in South Viet
Nam," but tr. ~ identities of these representatives or the "forces"
7a 1', J. Honey, vieuiam'a Workers' Party and South Vietnam's People's Revolu-
tionary Party," I ac:;ic AQairt %earlrrly, Winter 1962-1963, p. 383.
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THE FACELESS VIET CONG 365
they represented were never specified. The myth of the Front
was not fleshed out with public organizational substance or overt
leadership until after the P.R.P was presented as its "vanguard"
element. The N.L.F. now claims to be a coalition of over forty
"associated organizations" which, collectively, purport to repre-
sent virtually all shades and strata of South Vietnamese political
and social life. This coalition includes three "political parties":
the P.R.P., the "Democratic Party" and the "Radical Socialist
Party." (The latter two tear almost exactly the same names as
the two "minor" parties allowed to exist in North Viet Nam and,
are obviously intended to play similar roles.) In their present
name or form, virtually none of its affiliated organizations ante-
dates the founding of the N.L.F. itself, many almost certainly)
exist only on paper, and a careful analysis of the N.L.F.'s own.,
propaganda makes it clear that a goodly number have identical
officers, directorates and staffs. Some of these organizations, how-
ever, have acquired substance after the fact, as it were, and now
play important roles in the N.L.F.'s efforts to organize and con-
trol the rural populace.
It is fairly easy to devise an organizational structure capable
of lending verisimilitude to a political fiction, doubly so if one is
trying to deceive a foreign audience unversed in local political
affairs. Fleshing this structure out with live, known individuals
to occupy posts of public prominence is considerably more diffi-
cult. The Viet Cong obviously hoped to attract to the N.L.F.
South Vietnamese of personal stature and renown, preferably in-
dividuals not immediately identifiable as Communists or Com-
munist sympathizers, who could enhance the Front's prestige
and political attractiveness and provide a more or less innocent
facade behind which the N.L.F.'s Communist masters could op-
erate in secure obscurity. To date the Viet Cong have been nota-
bly unsuccessful in this regard, though the full measure of their
failure is far better appreciated within South Viet Nam itself
than it is abroad. No Vietnamese of what could accurately be
described as significant personal prestige or professional standing
-not even one of known 1,.-ftist persuasion-has ever been willing
to associate himself publicly with the N.L.F. or lend it the use
of his name.
The N.L.F.'s first Cenral Co,:r unittee was not announced until
March 196-,, well over year 2 [ter the Front's supposedly spongy
t:at coos creation, Thoi. ii the 4? on-a ittee purportedly had 5z
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366 [OR=I.:GN AFFAIRS
rrs.errtbers, the N.L.F. was able to come up with only 3x names,
most of which were. virtually unknown even. within South Viet
Nato. The 41-me;mb:,cr second (arnd current) Central Committee,
announced in January rc)$_t, is egn.t.ally lacking in distinction.
The Chairman. of the N.L.he's Presidium and Central Commit-
tee is Nguyen Hun Tho, a former provincial lawyer with a long
record of activity in. Corug.nurtist-sponsored causes but of little
political repute or professional standing among his former col-
leagues at the South Vietnamese bar, who generally categorize him.
aas having been an `?crr'oc t scrra.s brefs."'g he N.L.F.'s present Secre-
tary-General (al?o the Secretary-General of the "Democratic
Party" and the Cha-rman of theN.L.F.'s Saigon Zone C'omna:nit-
tee) is Huynh Tan flat, usually described in N.L. '. propaganda
as an ccarchitect?" tho?t,gsa one would b c hard pressed to point to
~etA
any edifices he has From 194.5 until 1948 he apparently
served as a member of the Viet'Nflnh/Viet Con.g Executive Com-
mittee in Nambo and as tht: Communists' propaganda chief for
their Saigon Special Zone. The N.I.,..[' .'s First Secretary-General
(also the Secretary--Ceneraal of the "Radical Socialist Party")
was Nguyen Van ?: j it tf, now j its principal travelling representa-
tive abroad. A former journalist and teacher (some say of biol-
ogy, some of rnfatbesn.;atics), pieta has been a Communist propa-
gandist since the laic The Chairman of the N,L.Ir.'s
External Relations (1.e. foreign affairs and propaganda) Com-
mittee is '. 'rann. l:Iuu t ;.kan, a Central Committee member who
served briefly as Secretary-General after -lieu and before Phat.
Described in ofaricial N.L.I. biographies as an "intellectual and
ardent patriot," Kiem has .spent most of the past two decades
as a leader in various Cola munist-front youth groups. Such fig-
ures as these are the best the Front has been able to come up
with to staff its f host prominent public offices. 'I;'heir organi.za-
tional and revolutionary talents may be impressive, but their
personal stature and prestige among the South Vietnamese peo-
ple are not.
Over the: r;.tasr :fe a . years the \Ti t Cong have labored mightily'
to improve their br:_vond South Viet Naam's borders arid
to enlist a broad of international support for their
cause; to t evel:so ;ear organizational structure within South
Viet Nan, 3, fl-tur their internal political position,
~ ,
pprovedFir 1#e6e 2 n , /C 6 :.i 1A-RI P68B0 50 002T-1
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.. ... _: ~...ai ~... ,.. ~WM~:::.'M.
THE FACELESS V I ET C#'% a
and to expand their military effrsr..t, to t c.i[ Eal:e a hiev-ement
of their political goals aw..1 if pitssublc to 9 i 'ra e an aura of i l-
vincibil:ity capable of breaking their a, ver {es o'vrly to continue
the struggle.
The image-building campaign abn,ad 'VU:_, been. desi ncd to
publicize the N.L.F. and inflate its f at;;stiz r and reputation.. Its
goal has been to get the N.L.F. f;ea eiallly s.-eepted as an irzciige
nous South Vietnamese political coalition (: wrnittedly with some
Communist maiember?s) which sprang up spon taraeously to combat
the harsh excesses of the I..S.-supported Diem regime, and which
lcs only peace, democracy and reunification as provided for in
the Geneva agreements. Though. moral----and, to some extent
perhaps, physical--support may be affordcd by North Viet Naha
and other fraternal socialist states (so the argument rims), the
N.1-F. is basically an independent political entity with a policy
and will of its own. This campaign has been waged through the
propaganda disseminated by the Liberation News Agency, re-
played and echoed by Communist (af=si non--Cornmunist) media
throughout the world; through a steady flow of messages from the
Front to foreign governments and heads of state (particularly
of neutralist Afro-Asiaan. 1116011q); by ever mere isin,;'; attendance
at foreign conferences and meetings (generally Communist or
leftist sponsored) by a small handful of a tie faa:ti ;ailzle* N.L.f''.
[ .'[J`.
representatives; and by the establishment of permanent
"missions" in Havana, Peking, Moscow, Prague, East Berlin,
Budapest, Cairo, Djakarta and ,r.lgiers. All of this activity has
profited. from the fact that knowledge of the realities of political
life in. South Viet Naarn (toes not extend maauch beyond its fron-
tiers; all of it has been guided by a keen awareness of the effec-
tiveness of incessant repetition in convening myth to assumed
reality.
Throughout South Viet L"aani, the Viet Cong have developed
and employed the N.L. F. appairatus in their intensive effort to
organize the population (especially the ?i:zral populart:ion), in-
volve it in their insurgency campaign and bring it under their
political domination. The detailed application of this effort varies
from locali.ty to locality, and is materially- influenced by such
local factors as the relative degree of 'Vet: :..".trig; strength in. the
a ma. The objective, however, is .always to secure total participa-
tion and total involvement on the part of the local population
in order to establish total Vic t Corn; core i?nl.. They endeavor to
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368 FOREIGN Al'h'FAJRS
persuade---and, if conditions permit, compel-_--every inhabitant
of a, given aareaa, to Join and v,?ork actively in some N.L.F. compo-
nent organization. Farmers are (encouraged or forced to join
the Liberation Pca arats` Association; women, the Liberation
Women's Assoc:aaadao u; children, the Liberation Youth Associa-
tron, Where Viet control is strong, no one escapes the net.
Physically fit males not sent off to some other diet Cong military
unit serve in the kcal militia squad or self-defense platoon;
women, children and old men help make bamboo stakes and
traps or dig tap road.: to harass government forces. They serve as
informants and cou i? rs or go on purchasin expeditions to nearby
r?zr~.ment-c.carat:roll?:rl market towns. Everyone participates and
ensures that his neighbor does so as z .ell. All of this activity is
coordinated and ?1ir-ected by local N".I.Y, committees which,
where circumstances permit, asswrre the prerogatives and fuinc-
tio as of local oven)..ment. 11,hese local committees in turn are di-
rected by superior eechelons, capped, at least ostensibly, by the
Central Committee of the N.L.F. itself.
The .NJIS.'s organizational structure is paralleled and con-
trolled at each ecl;e_on by a complementary P.R.P. structure,
tinder the general con::;niaed of its Central Committee, the F.R.P.
is organized on a. geographic basis through the various regions,
provinces and districts down to the village level. Each geo-
graphic echelon ha,,, a directing committee responsible for con.-
trolling all F,.R.P _.. a,?ncc: all ? is Con g, including N.L,.-,a.e-
tiv-ities within its area These con- mittees vary in size and
organizational corn plex.ity, even among equivalent geographic
echelons, but each one has a single chairman and several sub-
ordinate members or subcommittees with specific functional re-
sponsibilities. The number and nomenclature of these func-
tional subcommittees also varies from area to area, but they
normally cover military affairs, economic and financial ;-affairs,
a nd what the Co-ms munists term "front affairs and civilian
proselytizing," -vvh.ose chairman is responsible for controlling
all N.LF. activity in that area. If the P.R.P. organization at
that echelon is suf:ci.cntly well developed, he in turn will have
subordinate aat ambers cr?' hi.s P.R.1', subcommittee to direct each
f lrr local ats:,cpcia =~;:.w nflil:aated with the N.L.F. Though cap-
aaar'c:d Cli}%i,;'aYaent 1: : irate that the Viet Con ; try to keep the
l
level of overt 7`.i". ~ , Fzrtr.ciuatioa below two-fifths of the total
,nernber?.;lai;r of ;ay' s' i,>e q', .,'@:' ctaat.a.Fponent, the organizational
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THE FACELESS VIET CONG 369
structure we have just described (reinforced by a network of
covert P.R.P. cells throughout the N.L.F.) keeps all components
of the N.L.F. at every level under complete P.R.P. control.
The Viet Cong's terrorist and military apparatus was de-
veloped and is directed by this same organizational structure,
which ensures that armed activity at all levels is rigidly sub-
ordinated to political objectives and kept under tight Party con-
trol. The Viet Cong military establishment now has over go,ooo
full-time troops (including, over iz,ooo North Vietnamese reg-
ulars) augmented and supported by something over roo,ooo
paramilitary personnel and hart-time guerrillas. This whole force,
however, was built up for political reasons, to serve political ends.
":i he Viet Cong political apparatus was at work laying the faun-,-
dations for insurgency long before there was even so much as
a Viet Cong hamlet self-defense squad.
The director of the military affairs subcommittee (mentioned
above) is frequently also the commander of the Viet Cong force
attached to that geographic echelon. Village directing committees
have village platoons under their control; district committees,
district companies; provincial committees, provincial battalions.
Regional committees have forces of regimental and multi-regi-
niental size at their disposal, and the whole Viet Cong military
establishment is subject to the direction of the P.R.P.'s Central
Committee. Throughout this military structure, the same basic
principles of organization and command relationship are uni-
formly applied. There is no such thing as a Viet Cong military
unit of any size independent of the Party's political apparatus
or free from tight political control. Probably no more than a third
of the Viet Cong forces are Party members, but by virtue of its
organizational mechanism the P.R.P. controls the "Liberation
Army" in the same way that it controls the National Liberation
Front.
An understanding of the Viet Cong's organizational structure
enables us to recognize the real significance and function of the
more than 5o,ooo persons infiltrated into South Viet Nam since
the Lao Dong Party's .rc a, dec:sion to pursue its objective of
political conquest by wee )in..g insurgent war. Until mid- to late
103 these infiltrators wen: virtually all ethnic southerners drawn
from the pool of re grout: e.d Vict Minh forces and supporters
taken north in 1954. ':f hey \ 'c're not foot soldiers or cannon fodder
(Sr least not until Hanoi began sending in whole North Viet-
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narnese units in J 'ate. 1964, or early 1965). Instead they were
disciplined, trained and indoctrinated cadres and technicians.
They became the squad leaders, platoon leaders, political cfl:icers,
staff officers, unit commanders, weapons and communications
specialists who bciit the Viet Con,,':; military force into what it
is today. They also became the village, district, provincial and
regional committee chiefs and key co.ni.n ittee members who built
the Viet Cong's lpcolitical .aapparatus..
`l he earlier r rrivup is had. had at least five years of indoctrination
and training in. Nnr:`h ' ,iet Nam, or elsewhere in the Communist.
blue, before deporting on their southern missions; soi:ne of the
liter arrivals hav had nearly a decade of such preparation. Until
the recent. sharp rise in Viet C:o.r,.g; battlefield casualties, approxi-
mately a third of all. the personnel in. Viet Cong military units at
and above the district company level were "returnees" trained
n the North. At least half of the membership of rn.ost P.R.P.
district committees, and an even larger proportion at higher
echelons, also appear to be "retu.rnees." Without this infiltration
from the North, iii short, the present Viet Cong organization
could never have been developed.
1i
`i'he Viet Cong insurgencyT is clearly a masterpiece of revolu-
tionary organiza.t:ion, but its total effectiveness and real political
strtcY:ca-.ag,thlp. are extremely difficult toa assess, W The bulk of the Viet
Cong's organizational a 5oL2.s have been expended in rural Krems
and it is there that they arc; strongest. (' he government controls
all of the cities, iria;or towns and provincial capitals and all but
a handful of the district seats.) There are indications, however,
that sharply rising Viet, Fong taxation rates, increasingly fre-
quent resort to impressment to secure troops, and the Viet Cong's
manifest inability to deliver on political promises of earlier years
are all beginning to erode their base of rural support. During the
past year nearly Soo,ooo refugees fled. from the hinterland to the
vicinity of govern rent-controlled towns. Some of these were fTee-
i.ug from natural disastet:s, some from the simple hazards of war
(thouggh the dire i ion in which persons of this category opted to
flee is sli nifs.' Irit 1tli. 3rr:trly ware obviously endeavoring to gCt
: y
out from under? 0 Viet Cong..li-u.rther'more, in assessing C-ollr-
tzra:;nist c,];iz c . of,, ::Etrd4l if should be Doted that over half of the
rural . e~3l~r lah~:i sir ; oted i.n the May 196- prov inciat elections,
despite Viet -.".Orr, :orders, to boycott them.
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In the cities, the Viet Cong -have an obvious terrorist capa-
bility but are politically quite weak a fact of which they are
aware and which, according to captured documents, causes them
considerable embarrassment. They have been unable to turn
the urban political ferment of the past three years to any obvious
immediate advantage. None of the' participants in the genuine
social revolution now taking place in the urban areas of South';'
Viet Nam has sought Viet Cong support or entertained overtures
of political alliance. Though they have undoubtedly penetrated
such groups as the Buddhists and the students, the .Viet Cong
have made no visible headway in subverting or bringing them
under the N.L.F. banner. just how weak the Viet Cong are in
the cities was demonstrated twice last fall (on October 15 and
December 1 9) when two p cblic calls by the 'Viet Cong for a
"general strike" went totally unlieeded and produced no visible
change whatsoever in the pattern of urban life.
Despite its leaders' obvious organizational talents and revolu-
tionary skills, the Viet Cony movement is beset with a number
of fundamental weaknesses. It has no universally appealing
theme in any way comparable to the Viet Minh's espousal of
anti-French nationalism, Persistent propaganda efforts to. por-
tray the Americans as succes. oz imperialists to the French have
simply never taken hold.. Thu concept of reunification has rela-
tively little appeal for peasaats who 'regard someone from the
next province as an alien. The idea of reunification does appeal,
to politically minded urban elements, particularly to refugees from
the North, but within such circles there is a great reluctance to
accept. the Viet Cong-s identification of "reunification" with
political domination by the present Hanoi regime. Having lived
through the sequence of historical, events we have outlined, po-
'litically conscious Vietnamese arc not easily deceived by the
N.L.F.'s pretensions to independence and freedom from northern
control, particularly since the military side of the Viet Cong
insurgency" is now being waged with an ever larger number of
North Vietnamese troops.
The current struggle in South Viet Nam is an historically
rooted, political phenomenon of infinite complexity, particularly
since it involves an extcrna'i,r directed Communist drive for
pxnier interlarded with a grail; inc indigenous social revolution. In
!fill:?lv ing such a plicr1A11"II Yt. +' C;'i.i1 lt?' is often a function of one's
ils . ti .at "iys casy.,to distinguish from
an le of vision, and 1)13
n!-Illity. Dcspite the, fact 11!.1 .ire many aspects of the cur-
THE' FACELESS VIET CONG
AP V,,ax Rl~ljas
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8Fo1R.ElcN AF t'\lRS
rent situation in Viet Nam concerning which confident assertion
is a mark of i;.,noraarnecc or disingenuous isntennt, there a are certain
aspects of the insure enc y, and. of the Viet Cong structure through
which it is being, waa{,;ed, r dhich are not open to intell ectu.ually
honest di.,pxate.
There are unquestionably .raa.aany nonCorninunists heroically
serving in various components of the National Liberation Froat
out of a desire to r dress genuine grievances or in. the honest be-
lief that they arc thereby helping to build a better political struc-
ture for their native land. As an organization, however, the
N.L.F. is a contrived political mechanism with no indigenous
roots, subject to the ultimate control of the Lao i. onr Party in
a i1 o;i.
The relationship ).-tween the Viet Gong; and the URN. is not
that of politically like-nninded allies. Instead, it is essentially the
relationship bct;'een a field cou-inland and its parent head.quar-
ters.Such relationships are never free from elements of tension
and discord. Within the Viet Cong movement, and even within
its controlling hierarchy, there ar?: unquestionably varying judg-
menats (at least ;privately held. ones) about the wisdom of present
tactics and the best: course of future action. (There are obvious
differences of opinion re arding the struggle in Viet Nam even
within the Lao Doug Party Politburo.) Nevertheless, the whole
Viet. Cong organizational structure and chain of command has
been carefully designed to rayinimize the risks of insubordination.
Though for tactical reasons the overt propaganda outlets and
spokesmen of the NIS. sometimes take political positions which
differ at least in emphasis from those emanating from Hanoi, the
chances of the Viet Cong's developing or adopting a genuinely
independent political line in opposition to orders received from
North Viet Nain through the Lao Doug Party apparatus are
slight indeed.
Finally, although the Viet Cong organization is unquestion-
ably a major factor in the South Vietnamese political scene,
the N.L.F. mechanism which it controls has no serious claim to
7
being: consade: -J.., as Hanoi insists, the r, 6sole legitimate voice of
th ',c:x th Vi. o'sn r; .;c people."'Wle.re it ever to be accepted as
sur-Ih, the re c