MEMORANDUM FOR MR. MCCONE FROM H. KNOCHE
Document Type:
Collection:
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST):
CIA-RDP68B00255R000200110005-7
Release Decision:
RIPPUB
Original Classification:
T
Document Page Count:
34
Document Creation Date:
December 21, 2016
Document Release Date:
July 10, 2008
Sequence Number:
5
Case Number:
Publication Date:
October 31, 1962
Content Type:
MEMO
File:
Attachment | Size |
---|---|
CIA-RDP68B00255R000200110005-7.pdf | 1.73 MB |
Body:
Approved For Release 2008/07/10: CIA-RDP68B00255R000200110005-7
31 October 1962
MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Mc Cone
The attached memorandum and maps spell out in detail the
answers to some of your questions relating to the chronology on Cuban
overflights.
Of particular importance are the following factors:
I. After were first discovered and immediately
on the heals of a U-2 which violated the Soviet Far East (7`'SeptemDer).
and the loss of the Chinese U-2 (8 September) a meeting was held in
Bundy's office on 10 September to discuss the question of Cuban
reconnaissance. We wanted to overfly all SAM sites not believed to
be then operational and all areas of Cuba which had not been covered in
the recent past. Because of growing concern for the safety of U-2
operations, however, it was the sense of the meeting (particularly
Secretary Rusk) that CIA would be permitted to make four flights against
Cuba; two peripheral and two overflights. The overflights were limited
to Banes, a coastal defense le !:site in Eastern Cuba and the area
around Guantanamo. We were given permission to overfly the Isle of
Pines in the course of one of the two peripherals.
II. The Agency made the operational determination that
none of these flights would be made unless weather along the flight routes
was less than 25 per cent overcast. The first of the four flights was made
on 26 September; the last one on 7 October. You will note that weather
was sometimes satisfactory during this interval and that flights were not
made. This is explained by the fact that as each of the four approved flights
was made we were looking for specific delimited weather breaks in areas
to be covered by the approved flights not ,yet flown.
III. SAC became responsible for U-2 operations over Cuba on
12 October. Its first mission on 14 October was planned to fly over two
SAM sites in the hope of triggering the SAM system to permit ELINT
collection from offshore. Included in the planned track was an area west
of Havana which COMOR suspected to be an area of possible missile activity.
In the course of the flight, the SAC pilot (the pilot was not the one later killed)
photographed this suspect area and turned up the first MRBM.
Approved For Release 2008/07/10: CIA-RDP68B00255R000200110005-7
Approved For Release 2008/07/10: CIA-RDP68B00255R000200110005-7
IV. There never was a stand down of Cuban operations. It
is true that we were inhibited by the guidelines set down at the 10 September
meeting, but the only stand down was on Taiwan, where all reconnaissance
operations have been grounded since the China incident on 8 September.
V. The peripheral flights did turn up additional SAM sites
and coastal defense cruise-missile sites, but that's about all.
Be sure to see the map attached at the very back of this package.
It shows the kind of coverage CIA wanted at the meeting on 10 September as
compared with what we were actually permitted to do.
25X1
Approved For Release 2008/07/10: CIA-RDP68B00255R000200110005-7
I. RE-CAP OF SAM AND CRUISE MISSILE SITE PHOTOGRAPHY
AND REPORTING
NOTES ON AUGMENTED SPECIAL GROUP MEETING ON
1a SEPTEMBER 1962
III. WFA'i'?." :; ';_~.i.3JATIVE TO U-2 OPERATIONS,
5 SEPTEMBER THROUGH 14 OCTOBER 1962 (23 MAPS)
IV. SEPARATE MAPS DEPICTING TRACKS OF U-2 OVERFLIGHTS
FOR AUGUST, SEPTEMBER, AND OCTOBER 1962 (4 MAPS TOTAL)
MISSIONS 3086, 3088, 3089, 3093, 3095, 3098, 3100, AND 3101
V. MAP SHOWING COMOR TARGET AREA FOR MISSION 3101 AND
DEPICTING CIA PLANNED ROUTE AND SAC ROUTE FLOWN ON
14 OCTOBER 1962
Approved For Release 2008/07/10: CIA-RDP68B00255R000200110005-7
Approved For Release 2008/07/10: CIA-RD P68B00255R000200110005-7
Approved For Release 2008/07/10: CIA-RDP68B00255R000200110005-7
28 October 1962
MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD
SUBJECT: Notes on Factors Bearing on Reconnaissance of Cuba
1. As a result of the Soviet protest of a SAC U-2
overflying Sakhalin
the initial dis -
covery of SA-2 sites on 29 August and additional SA-2 sites in
Western Cuba on the 5 September mission, a meeting was held
in Mr. McGeorge Bundy's office on 1: September 1962. Among
those present were Mr. Bundy, Special Assistant to the President;
Mr. Rusk, Secretary of State; Mr. Robert Kennedy, Attorney
General; General Carter, DDCI; General Lansdale, JCS;
Mr. Ed Martin, Assistant Secretary of State; Mr. Tom Parrott,
Secretary to the Special Group; Dr. Scoville, DD/R; Mr. Reber,
Chairman, COMOR; and Mr. Cunningham, DAD/OSA, et al.
Operations had submitted proposed tracks for additional coverage
of Cuba. These tracks were reviewed by those present and the
following was approved at this meeting:
a. Four flights to be flown against Cuba: two
peripheral and two overflights.
b. The overflights were limited to Eastern
Cuba east of 770 West.
c. Overflights to be designated to minimize
time over denied territory.
d. Isle de Pines could be overflown as an
individual mission.
safety.
e. All four flights to be designed to maximize
2. Four missions were planned and approved at this
meeting. A phone call at a later date between Mr. McCone and
L' L
25X1
2bA11
Approved For Release 2008/07/10: CIA-RDP68B00255R000200110005-7
Approved For Release 2008/07/10: CIA-RDP68B00255R000200110005-7
State Department authorized overflight of Isle de Pines and the
Zapata Swamps on a single mission. (See Mission 3095 flown
29 September 1962.) The other three routes were mission 3093
on 26 September covering Guantanamo area and the suspected
SSM site at Banes; mission 3098 on 5 October to cover peripherally
the Southern coast of Eastern Cuba and mission 3100 on 7 October
to cover the Northern coast of Eastern Cuba to search for addi-
tional SA-2 sites. Both peripheral flights were designed essentially
to remain outside the three-mile limit around Cuba. (See attached
maps. )
3. These missions--3095, 3093, 3100, and 3098--were
planned to enter the Cuban radar net at the latest time commen-
surate with shortest route from radar penetration to target. As
an additional safety factor the overflight and peripheral missions
were carried out at 73, 000 feet plus, instead of the normal 70, 000
foot altitude. This necessitated air-to-air refueling before enter-
ing or after exiting the radar perimeter and automatically limited
the amount of coverage due to range-fuel problems.
4. As was stated earlier, permission was given to
commence planning and flying four missions on 1d September.
Normally, the earliest date a mission could have gone would be
13 September. However, in anticipation the Operations Division
had been studying the weather daily commencing 6 September
through 26 September. The Isle of Pines mission was flown on
17 September, but the weather was worse than briefed and the
target completely cloud-covered (Mission 3091). Hurricane
Celia was approaching the vicinity of the Caribbean at this time
which accounts for much of the poor weather forecast and en-
countered in mid- and late September. The first successful
flight of the four flights approved, flew over Banes and Guantanamo
on 26-September. The weather was studied continuously, and
flights were to be launched only when the weather was forecast
to be.less than 25 percent overcast. The fourth mission was
flown on 7 October 1962, a time span for the four missions of
almost a month. Upon completion of the analysis of all missions
through 7 October 1962, it was concluded that virtually the whole
island of Cuba was now almost completely protected (potentially)
by Soviet type SA-2 sites. As a result of this analysis, it had to
be assumed that any further overflight of Cuba was or would be
in the near future subject to intercept by an SA-2 when the sites
became operational.
Approved For Relea
Approved For Release 2008/07/10: CIA-RDP68B00255R000200110005-7
yet operational. The film from mission 3101 was flown by jet
5. Shortly after 7 October, a proposal was made by
CIA to quick-fix a Ryan QZC drone with special ELINT collection
equipment. The concept of the operation. as planned was to over-
fly an SA-2 site most likely to be operational. The drone, if
tracked by the SA-2 associated FRUIT SET radar, would be so
designed that it would initially receive the FRUIT SET radar
impulses, convert the electronic impulses to another frequency and
re-broadcast the data to ground and air-borne receivers stationed
well offshore Cuba. The drone if fired on by the SA-2 site would
also possibly acquire the SAM fusing electronic signals and simi-
larly broadcast the signal to the offshore collectors before the
drone was hit and destroyed, or before it exhausted its fuel pro-
viding it escaped destruction. This proposal was made by CIA to NRO
and action was initiated to implement the electronic components
for the drone and modification of the drone to whatever extent neces-
sary to perform the planned flight and operation. The minimum
time frame for implementation of this operation was estimated to
bout six weeks which would have put the drone--on its first flight
in late~November or early December.
6. It was soon decided that the time element involved
was unacceptable and another plan evolved wherein the J-75 powered
Agency U-2 would be used to overfly_theSAM site and by stationing
specifically equipped ELINT aircraft in the vicinity, but at a legal
distance from the Cuban coast, the FRUIT SET signals would be
acquired from a safe distance. It was clearly understood that the
risk of sending the U-2 over one or more operational SA-2 sites
would be high, but the risk was considered to be valid relative to
the importance of the FRUIT SET signal acquisition.
7. The results of SAC mission 3101 (14 October) over
the planned route and target gave us our first look at a MRBM site
under construction in Cuba. The FRUIT SET radar signal was not
recorded at this time presumably because the SA-2 sites were not
transport to Andrews Air Force Base for processing
~ at about 6 a. m. on Monday.
~,? vctooer. During the photo interpretation phase at the
the first MRBM site was located
and the information passed to Secretary MacNamara; Tuesday
16
,
October, Secretary MacNa'mara`pre'senteci the photographic evidence
to the President. It is interesting at this point to re-cap the fre-
quency of U-2 flights during this period. One mission (3101) was
flown on Sunday, 14 October; two missions on Monday; none on
Tuesday. After the President viewed the evidence on Tuesday and
3
25X1
25X1
Approved For Release 2008/07/10: CIA-RDP68B00255R000200110005-7
Approved For Release 2008/07/10: CIA-RDP68B00255R000200110005-7
a limited number of people in the intelligence community apprised
of the results of mission 3101, SAC apparently received permission
to fly maximum effort over cuba. A total of six U-2 missions over-
flew Cuba on Wednesday, 17 October. A total of 17 missions were
flown by SAC in their first week of operations.
For the Record:
Date of
Previous
Photography
Coverage
First MIG-15/17 discovered in Cuba
15 Jun 61
N. A.
First MIG-Zl discovered in Cuba
05 Sept 62
N. A.
First MRBM discovered in Cuba
14 Oct 62
29 Aug 62
First IRBM discovered in Cuba
15 Oct 62
29 Aug 62
First IL-28 discovered in Cuba
15 Oct 62
29 Aug 62
Approved For Release 2008/07/10: CIA-RDP68B00255R000200110005-7
Approved For Release 2008/07/10: CIA-RDP68B00255R000200110005-7
s''sr`: . a e p~ ~e; f s x_'37" i/~ b d~~?2'/ Q
A/ay'`%e I /! fn1t F2 4' 4# ~ 'C e~ ?~
_` Or, ~ ~G d i"c;: ' C Chi ~,?%,
yi2l~ + ?s') GF ~' _ e
P
~t~ii
80?W
?;* 1.~: Cft~E /77011S 4~1e- moors c.~S~` cad/;j 19Z494 4
17L~'/~~ e'3 C toE
PREPARED BY ACIC, USAF, ST LOUIS 18, MO., JAN 1962
80?W
Approved For Release 2008/07/10: CIA-RDP68B00255R000200110005-7
s T
CUBA JPC-12a
75~ W
i
mom,.
Approved For Release 2008/07/10: CIA-RDP68B00255R000200110005-7
MEXICO
IDEALIST Missions from
5 August 1962 to
14 October 1962
_ rte-- ? 85' W
F:E%tiED BY A