DEAR MR. GORDON:

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP67R00587A000100040037-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 10
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 6, 2002
• Sequence Number: 37
• Publication Date: May 19, 1964
• Content Type: LETTER

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THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.
The Honorable Kermit Gordon
Director
Bureau of the Budget
Washington, D. C.
Dear Mr. Gordon:
19 May 1964
You have asked for my views concerning the magnitude
of the over-.all U. S. foreign intelligence effort required between
now and Fiscal Year 1969 and any changes which I anticipate in
the basic "mix" of collection techniques. You have also asked
about the budgetary implications of various special studies or
community-wide reviews which I have undertaken, as well for
my comments on the Consolidated Cryptological Program and
the National Reconnaissance Program.
These questions are of course interrelated. As regards
the Consolidated Cryptological and National Reconnaissance
Programs, you are aware that reviews for the purpose of developing
specific budgetary proposals are currently underway and will not
be completed until the latter part of June. The Consolidated
Intelligence Program, covering most of the other intelligence
activities conducted under the management of the Secretary of
Defense, is under review in the Defense Department. It will
also not be available for specific comment until late June.
Pending completion of these reviews, in which my repre-
sentatives are participating, my comments concerning probable
future trends in the cost of intelligence activities are necessarily
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very general. The figures which I have attached, projecting
the cost of the intelligence community as a whole, are based,
insofar as they relate to programs conducted by the Department
of Defense, on the Five Year Force Structure and Financial
Plan submitted by the Defense Department on 10 January 1964.
These figures, while adequate to suggest the general
order of magnitude of the U. S. intelligence effort through 1969,
may be significantly changed as a result of considerations outlined
below. In any event, the figures exclude the cost of certain
activities such as peripheral reconnaissance which perhaps
should be charged, in part at least, to the national foreign intelli-
gence effort. Whether this or other activities are properly
included in the cost of national intelligence can be better decided
after completion of an inventory which I have initiated of all
national intelligence activities. Differences in accounting proce-
dures as between different services and agencies, and differences
of opinion as to what is or is not a national intelligence activity
make such an inventory -a complex and difficult undertaking. I
do not believe that it can be completed, even in preliminary form,
for several months.
Considerations which may affect the cost and magnitude
of future programs are as follows. These considerations have
been suggested partly by special studies and community-wide
reviews which are under way. They are partly the result of my
own personal observations of the intelligence community and its
activities over the past two and a half years.
a. Adequacy of facilities for warning of a military
attack. lassisted by represen-
tatives o my personal staff, is undertaking a thorough
study of programs and activities conducted for the purpose
of providing early warning of an impending military attack
on the U. S. His study should help to establish a basis
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for determining whether the cost of these programs is
justified by the contribution which they make to our
warning system. Intelligence judgements in this field
depend very heavily on
a source of reliable information concerning Soviet inten-
tions and decisions will be necessary before any definitive
conclusions concerning their value are possible.
It is conceivable that our study could establish
that certain programs on which we currently rely for
indications of a possible military attack do not in fact
provide sufficiently dependable information to justify
their continuance for this purpose. It does not necessarily
follow that these programs can be reduced or eliminated
as they may serve legitimate requirements other than
"early warning."
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Pending completion of thel Ireport, which is 25X1
expected some time toward the end of this summer, there
is no basis for predicting any substantial change in the
cost of early warning intelligence as a whole.
b. Military Technology. Developments in Soviet
or Chinese Communist military technology are essential
ingredients in any assessment of the military threat to
the United States, its forces overseas, or the allies
which it is committed to defend. A break-through by a
hostile power in any one of a number of fields, such as
anti-missile missiles, biological and chemical warfare
capabilities, etc. , could present the U. S. with a menacing
situation. The earliest possible knowled e of any such
development is obviously essential.
The cost of systems calculated to detect and
monitor these developments is likely to increase with:
(a) a growing need for higher resolution photography to
identify smaller objects and the details of construction
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The cost of these systems
will be offset to some extent by the reduction or elimination
of activities involving obsolescent equipment but are likely
to represent a net increase in the intelligence budget.
c. Deployment of military forces. The national
intelligence effort is also likely to be affected by the
proliferation of strategic weapons and by what might
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be characterized as the need for local intelligence on
the deployment of the military forces of non-Communist,
as well as Communist countries other than Soviet Russia
and Communist China. With U. S. commitments around
the world and the certainty of struggles in and between
foreign countries which are likely to affect U. S. interests,
the need for intelligence coverage of local military
strength will predictably increase. This trend can be
illustrated by expanding requirements for intelligence
on the strengths and deployment of military forces EE
Re -se
requirements will continue to burden t e espionage
facilities of the Government and also those concerned
with overt collection.
i icu y o in ing and developing st a personnel with
just the right skills and the premium placed on highly
selective espionage programs make any substantial
expansion in clandestine collection unlikely. It is also
unlikely that political considerations will permit any
substantial expansion in either military attache or diplo-
matic representation abroad. The cost of overt and covert
collection programs is therefore unlikely to change very
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Operational and administrative considerations
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Local wars or situations involving insurrection
and violence will probably generate increased require-
ments for technical collection facilities over the next 25X1
five years. Illustrative of this requirement is the current
need for photographic coverage of routes providing access
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to South Vietnam from North Vietnam through Laos and
d. Political intelligence. Considerations somewhat
analogous to those expressed above with reference to
local military coverage exist with respect to requirements
for political coverage, particularly in Latin America,
Africa, Southeast Asia and the Middle East. Here again
the cost of programs for the overt or covert collection
of intelligence is unlikely to change substantially.
In this connection, a study which is nearing com-
pletion, under the direction of Ambassador Nolting, has
tentatively concluded that the intelligence effort aimed at
]appears in general
terms to be appropriate. Requirements for information
about these countries have been very carefully reviewed
and appear to reflect legitimate interests on the part of
Government agencies. The coverage developed appears
in general to be responsive to these requirements. Resources
in terms of manpower and facilities committed to the collec-
tion of information in this area appear to be adequate, but
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e. General reviews of collection requirements
and program efficiency. I have, jointly with the Secretary
of Defense, initiated a searching review of requirements
for information collected through intelligence programs
generally.
I am strengthening the machinery of the intelligence
community for determining the need for photographic intelli-
gence derived from overhead reconnaissance. The aim
here is to ensure that requirements for coverage are kept
as realistic as possible. This involves not only a continuing
check on the number of missions authorized, but also
analysis of the true need for new sensors and higher
resolution.
Surveys and reviews of the managerial aspects and
general efficiency of intelligence programs of course
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continue in CIA and the Department of Defense under
the direction of the appropriate supervisory officials.
As regards the "mix" of collection techniques, overt
collection and espionage operations are likely to remain at approxi-
mately their present levels. I believe that intensive reviews
conducted over the past two years have substantially eliminated
marginal activities from the collection programs of CIA. I do not
foresee any great likelihood of expansion of these programs although,
as a result of dissension within the Communist Bloc, representatives
of Communist countries may perhaps be more susceptible to exploi-
tation for espionage purposes than they have been in the past. No
substantial change in the numbers or responsibilities of military
attaches or diplomatic representatives appears probable.
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A change in the "mix" is likely to result primarily from
increased requirements for overhead reconnaissance, particularly
for somewhat higher resolution in photographic coverage,II
In conclusion, it seems pertinent to stress the importance
of adequate intelligence as a necessary factor in containing the
military budget within realistic limits. In the absence of an
intelligence system capable of identifying probable military and
political developments, the cost of developing forces required to
meet all possible contingencies would be clearly prohibitive. A
salutary development of the past two years has been the increasingly
close collaboration between the intelligence community and those
responsible for formulating budgetary and force level proposals
in the Defense Department. It is obviously in the interest of economy
that these proposals should be related as realistically as possible
to the military threats which they are designed to meet.
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Accurate information about enemy strengths and dispositions
enables us to avoid excessive as well as inadequate expenditures
for forces and armament. It is therefore a prerequisite to economical
and efficient military programs as it is also to national security. The
cost of good intelligence therefore must be reckoned in part at least
in terms of its relevance to economy in the military establishment.
This, of course, is possible only to the extent that intelligence estimates
are based on accurate, timely and comprehensive information and can
therefore be accepted with reasonable confidence.
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