INDONESIA - MALAYSIA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP67B00446R000600260019-8
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 3
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 27, 2006
• Sequence Number: 19
• Publication Date: February 5, 1965
• Content Type: BRIEF

Approved For Release 200 7 n1a 6 ~B00446ROO0600260019-8
TS No. 186377/65
Copy 1_0 of 25
5 February 1965
DCI BRIEFING
FOR THE HOUSE-APPROPRIATIONS COMMITTEE
INDONESIA - MALAYSIA
I. One final trouble spot in Southeast Asia is
the confrontation between Indonesia and
Malaysia.
(MAP, SEA geopolitical)
A. This map is a geographical projection
centered on Bangkok. It shows how the
new state of Malaysia, which is tinted,
must look to either President Sukarno in
Indonesia, or the Chinese Communists in
Peiping.
1. From Sukarno's view Malaysia cuts him
off from Southeast Asia and the Asian
mainland.
2. To Peiping, Malaysia is a barrier to
southward expansion toward Indonesia
and Australia,
II. The British actually formed Malaysia with the
idea of adding enough Malay population to that
of the Federation of Malaya so that it could
safely unite with Singapore, which is about 80
percent Chinese.
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A. These overseas Chinese populations are a
source of considerable concern to their
host countries. In many cases they have
a predominant role in trade and commerce,
and there is a natural fear that if Na-
tionalist China should go under, the
Overseas Chinese will have no alternative
but to look to Communist China as their
Motherland.
B. Sukarno refused to accept a UN finding
that the people of British North Borneo
had agreed to the new confederation, and
proclaimed a "Crush Malaysia" campaign
which is even more militant than his cam-
paign to take over West New Guinea.
(MAP, Malaysia-Indonesia)
C. He has been trying to establish pockets
of guerrillas inside Malaysian Borneo,
He has also.sent .more .than 450 .guer.ril.las,
whom he calls "volunteers," into the Malay
Peninsula itself, in and around Singapore.
All of these 450 have been killed or cap-
tured, but the Indonesians continue their
efforts to infiltrate small groups by sea.
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Last fall one major infiltration; was
parachute,
III. The British are carrying the main responsibility
for countering Sukarno.'s moves. There are some
60,OQO British or Commonwealth troops deployed
against the Indonesians, and another 31,000 or
so native Malaysians. The British have also
beefed up their air and sea power in the area.
IV. The Indonesian Army, however, now numbers about
300,000, and is increasing its concentrations
in Borneo, and to a lesser extent on Sumatra
opposite the Malay Peninsula, Along the border
in Borneo, the Indonesians had 5,000 troops in.
December., and are now engaged in reinforcement
which will increase this to 18,000 by March.
A. Sukarno is probably trying to create enough
pressure to bring about more negotiations.
We doubt that he would seek a full state of
war with the British. His continued
provocations, however, create a strong
danger of open if undeclared warfare.
B. Negotiations so far have been fruitless
because Sukarno refuses to call off his
guerrilla operations. This is a Malaysian
precondition for any serious talks.
-3-
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