THE DOMINCAN SITUATION: SEPARATING MYTHS FROM REALITIES

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP67B00446R000500110026-7
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 26
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 29, 2003
• Sequence Number: 26
• Publication Date: September 23, 1965
• Content Type: OPEN

September 23, 1965 Approv~ ~R23Y1PRfilA=Ff~200446R000500110026-7 24073
To the second group of worriers we want
to give our reasons for stating so solemnly
that Soviet Russia will not enter into the
arena:
1. Soviet Russia has no desire to
strengthen the Chinese Communists as its
arch rival for leadership in world commu-
nism, and the Chinese Communists will de-
cline Russian help for fear of infiltration
and subversion.
2. Hard pressed by the forces of liberation
in Eastern Europe and the collective strength
of the NATO countries, Soviet Russia is not
in a position to open a second front in Asia.
3. Fully aware of the destructive nature
of a nuclear war, she will not start one while
the United States still possesses the nuclear
advantage.
We Asians must realize that now is the
hour for the free Nations in Asia to accept
our responsibility of saving ourselves through
unity. Now is the hour for the free Nations
of Asia through the determination of the
people, to safeguard freedom in Asia with
the combined strength of all our countries.
We, the Nations and peoples of Asia, must
rally together to go to the aid of Vietnam
and to pull down the Iron Curtain in Asia.
It is high time for the countries most di-
rectly under Communist aggression and
threat, for the Republic of China, Republic
of Korea, Republic of the Philippines, Thai-
land, and the Republic of Vietnam to estab-
lish an Asian Anti-Communist Alliance, for
closer military, political, and economic
cooperation.
We firmly believe this alliance will be able
to contain Chinese Communist aggression
and expansion, and will lead to the destruc-
tion of the Iron Curtain in Asia. We shall
look forward to the United States to give
timely support to the free Nations in $Mia
in our historic endeavor for self-hap tbi h
THE DOMINICAN SITUATION: SEPA-
RATING MYTHS FROM REALITIES
The SPEAKER. Under previous order
of the House, the gentleman from Ala-
bama [Mr. SELDErl] is recognized for 60
minutes.
Mr. SELDEN. Mr. Speaker, I deeply
regret the necessity for requesting this
hour today to discuss certain aspects of
the Dominican situation. But the cur-
rent debate in the Senate has convinced
me that it is imperative to set the record
straight-to separate fact from fiction,
myth from reality.
In July, the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee published a document en-
titled "Background Information Relat-
ing to the Dominican Republic." Part
A purports to be a chronology, 25 pages
of which are devoted to events beginning
with the April 24 uprising. This so-
called chronology is crammed with
grossly biased quotes, overwhelmingly
gleaned from the New York Times, the
New York Herald Tribune, and the
Washington Post. A footnote on the first
page states that the chronology was com-
piled primarily on the basis of "Deadline
Data on World Affairs."
"Deadline Data" is a service for quick
reference on world events. It is a brief
digest, on cards, of a handful of news-
papers, and makes no pretense of having
checked for accuracy the reports which
it quotes.
Mr. Speaker, the Senate document-
bearing the imprimatur of the Commit-
tee on Foreign Relations-goes out to
schools, universities, and private citizens
throughout the country. The fact that a
footnote attributes the quotations used
to "Deadline Data," which in turn at-
tributes the quotations to the original
sources, by no means exonerates the
Committee on Foreign Relations from
responsibility for the accuracy of the
material selected. In fact, although of-
ficial statements are inserted, the almost
unanimous selection of quotations from
articles critical of the administration's
intervention in the Dominican Republic
creates the impression that all the press
of the Nation was critical.
In effect, the so-called chronology
reads: "Official U. S. spokesmen said; but
intrepid journalists, on the other hand,
gave the lie to the official position."
Nowhere in the so-called chronology is
there is a quote from the eloquent phrases
of Eric Sevareid, from Marguerite Hig-
gins, from Hal-Hendrix, Jules Dubois,
Jerry O'Leary, or others whose views
differed from those of the Washington
Post, the New York Times, and the
Herald Tribune.
Nowhere in the so-called chronology is
there mention of the report of the five-
member OAS Special Committee which
conducted an investigation on the scene,
and on May 8 released the full text of
their 4-hour testimony before the OAS
Council.
Nowhere in the so-called chronology is
there mention of the findings of former
Ambassador John Bartlow Martin, friend
and sympathizer of former President
Juan Bosch.
One wonders why all reports which
corroborated the administration's evalu-
ation of the Dominican situation were
excluded from the committee print.
When I first saw the grotesquely dis-
torted "chronology" in August, I con-
sidered having the Subcommittee on
Inter-American Affairs compile a point-
by-point refutation. By that time, how-
ever, negotiations for a provisional gov-
ernment were well underway in the Do-
minican Republic. Bernard Collier of
the New York Herald Tribune, Tad Szulc
of the New York Times, and Dan Kurz-
man of the Washington Post were no
longer covering the story. The report-
ing out of Santo Domingo had become
less emotionally involved. The truth
seemed to be catching up with the fic-
tions which had emanated from the Do-
minican Republic. Hence, it seemed to
me no longer necessary to have to take
this action.
The reopening of debate in the Senate,
resurrecting arguments corresponding to
the highly colored reporting in the
earlier stages of the Dominican Repub-
lic, substantially changes the picture. I
noted in Monday's debate on House
Resolution 560, that several Members
alluded to the remarks of the distin-
guished chairman of the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee. His remarks do
indeed carry weight, since it is assumed
that he is privy to information not gen-
erally available. As chairman of the
Subcommittee on Inter-American Af-
fairs, I can assure you that I too have
had access to all the documentation.
For that reason, I feel an obligation to
clarify some of the points which have
been raised. -
Throughout the tragic turmoil in the
Dominican Republic, I was frequently
asked by worried colleagues about our
policy in the Dominican Republic. Their
concern invariably stemmed from some-
thing they had read in the newspaper
that morning or had seen on television.
This was evident because their remarks
were usually prefaced with something
like "The New York Times says," or "ac-
cording to the Washington Post," or "the
Trib reporter wrote."
The fact that three major morning
newspapers, as well as several networks,
all took the same critical position regard-
ing U.S. policy in the Dominican situa-
tion lent credibility to their views. ,
In brief, the argument ran:
First, that there was doubt that Amer-
ican lives, or those of other foreigners,
were ever in real danger;
Second, the United States intervened
in the Dominican Republic only on a pre-
text of saving American lives, but really
to block the return to power of former
President Juan Bosch;
Third, the U.S. Embassy grossly exag-
gerated the danger of a Communist take-
over and panicked;
Fourth, the United States collaborated
with the corrupt Dominican military and
the most retrograde elements in Domini-
can society, and against the legitimate
aspirations of a long oppressed people for
political freedom and social justice;
Fifth, the United States turned be-
latedly to the Organization of American
States to provide a cover for its interven-
tion;
Sixth, the intervention engendered
widespread indignation and anti-Ameri-
canism in Latin America, and could
wreck the OAS.
The quality of some of, the reporting
suffered from inexperience on the part
of the reporters, some of whom knew lit-
tle of the complex background of the sit-
uation unfolding around them. In justi-
fying their speculations, they complained
that they could not check with Embassy
officials. The lack of contact between re-
porters and U.S. officials was, indeed, a
drawback. But the beleaguered Embas-
sy and military staffs could hardly have
been expected to cope with the almost
200 foreign journalists who descended
upon little Santo Domingo in the midst
of anarchy. During the chaotic period
when Dominicans fled in and out of
asylum, when fortunes changed hourly,
when thousands of troops were being de-
ployed, and when delicate negotiations to
end the turmoil were being conducted, is
it not reasonable to assume that U.S. of-
ficials were too engaged in vital matters
to keep several hundred reporters in-
formed?
But not all the slanted reporting can
be chalked up to inexperience or to the
inability to clarify impressions and ru-
mors. Bernard Collier stated categor-
ically in the New York Herald Tribune
that no diplomats in other missions in
Santo Domingo agreed with the U.S.
evaluation of the Dominican situation.
From that statement, it must be assumed
that Mr. Collier did indeed interview a
goodly number of Western diplomats on
the scene. Presumably, Mr. Collier's in-
experience in Latin American affairs
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24074
would not be a li citation on his ability The New York Times correspondent, Fence in Santo Domingo, an American
to report so clear-cut a matter which Tad Szulc, makes no mention whatsoever Marine, Under Orders To Stay Neutral,
needs no interpretation. of the opinions of the Western European Fires at a Sniper." The fact that the
Mr. REID of New York. Mr. Speak and Latin American diplomatic corps re- marines were permitted to shoot back
er, will the gentleman yield? garding our intervention in the Domini- when shot at from outside the interne-
Mr, SELDEN. I would prefer to com can Republic. I find it hard to believe tional zone somehow escaped the Tribune.
plete my statement before yielding. that so seasoned a reporter, with his own The implication that the marines, by fir-
Mr. REID of New York. I ask th, European background and his experience ing in self-defense and to maintain the
gentleman just one question before h= in Latin America, would not query the international zone secure, were not begin-
proceeds. I have noticed a series of re- other ambassadors. Meanwhile, the neutral, is obviously an intentional dis-
marks impugning the integrity of th3 New York Times castigated the United torbion.
press, the accuracy of the reporting, and States for its action, leaving the irnpres- The impression that the United States
the quality of the reporting. sion that we stood alone in Santo Do- was aiding the Imbert forces in the
Is the gentleman trying to raise l mingo on our evaluation of the situation. battle in the northern sector was :L o
series of questions as to the integrity of One wonders-whether Szulc simply ne- fostered by a CBS news special, on M-y
the New York Times, the Washington glected to report views which ran counter 31, entitled "Santo Domingo-Why Are
Post, and the Herald Tribune? to his own, or whether the editorialpol- We There?" Perhaps you recall seeing it.
Mr. SELDEN. I stand on my state- icy in New York was to censor such Films were shown purporting to show
ment. May I continue? I am in the views. junta reinforcements moving through
middle of it quote, if the gentleman wit Similarly, Dan Kurzman in the Wash- U. S. roadblocks in the security zone.
allow me to continue. ington Post-while ridiculing U.S. evi- The,, were followed on the program by a
Mr. REID of New York. Mr. Speak- dence of Communist influence in the press conference with Deputy Secretary
er, will the gentleman yield? The Houf a rebel movement-left a vast silence with of Defense Cyrus R. Vance and General
should not have to sit here and listen to regard to the position of the diplomatic Palmer, who both stated that to the best
both the Times and the Herald Tribune community on the degree of Communist of their knowledge, there had been no
being castigated in this way. infiltration. deliberate U.S. violations of neutrality.
Mr. SELDEN. I might say to the get.- All three-Collier, Szulc, and Kurz- The viewer, having just seen the film
tleman he will have to listen unless I man-were also vociferous in their claims clip of Dominican troops waved past the
yield to him. I will be happy to yie:-d that the United States was helping the roadblocks by U.S. forces, naturally was
to him, however. Imbert. junta defeat the rebels in the skeptical of the statements by Secretary
Mr. REID of New York. Does tile northern sector. Said Collier in the Vance and General Palmer. Next, CBS
gentleman make a distinction betwec n Herald Tribune on May 20. Correspondent Charles Kuralt said:
the straight news reports and the edl- U.S. marines and paratroopers gave both The very nekt day we watched dozens of
torial page? direct and indirect help to Gen. Antonio trucks loaded with armed junta troops and
Mr. SELDEN. If the gentleman w 1l Imbert Barreras' junta forces yesterday as policemen, both of them in battle against
Imbert troops nearly completed a cleanup of the rebels, roll through American check-
let me finish my statement, I will be gltrd "constituionalist" rebels in northern Santo points without even slowing down.
to attempt to answer his questions. Domingo.
Yet, curiously, State Department re:,- The viewer was shown pictures of this
ords are replete with applause for tie Said Szulc in the New York Times on event.
intervention from the diplomatic corps May 21: The impression left upon the viewer
in Santo Domingo. Unfortunately, since The U.S. policy was reported on high au- was one of U.S. duplicity. Again, I
it would be a breach of confidence and thority to be one of allowing the Imbert checked to find out what really hap-
protocol to disclose names, I can orly forces to complete the cleanup of the north- pened. I am informed that a full-scale
assure you that practically all of tae ern area, but to halt them at the security corridor. investigation by the Department of De-
heads of mission in Santo Domingo have fence established that the first film clip
expressed their belief that the interven- At the time of the battle in the north- dated from May 5, when the Imbert
tion was timely and necessary. For in- ern sector, both the Times and the Herald junta was not even in power, and not
stance, one Western European diplolr at Tribune resorted to distorted editorializ- May 15 as charged, when the battle in
stated that presence of U.S. marines a as ing by pictures. The New York Times the northern sector was taking place.
"certainly the only solution to it sericus printed a picture of two armed marines The next pictures were not of Dominican
situation." Another stated that he ccn- marching a file of seven or eight Domini- Army troops, but of police who, accord-
sidered local events to be following the cans with their hands folded behind their ing to the OAS's cease-fire agreement,
classic Communist pattern. Another Ise- heads, with a caption which read: "U.S. had the right to move freely in and out of
lieved Caamanoto be completely don- Marines Arrest Rebels; United states the security zone.
inated by hard-core rebels. Another f.p- Claims It Is Neutral in the Dominican Clearly, the duplicity did not originate
plauded the presence of U.S. marines as Civil War." Under the picture, in small with U.S. officials.
the only solution to a serious situati jn. print, I noticed that the photo credit I could go on for hours enumerating
Peter Chew, writing in the May 17, listed the U.S. Air Force. So I called to the incredible misrepresentations foisted
1965, edition of the National Obseri er, find out where the picture was taken, upon the American people by certain
told of his conversation with a "hliJi- when, and what the Dominicans were sectors of the news media. Rather than
ranking Western diplomat, as follows: arrested for. I learned-by now, not to ssector to shoot down the many establish
Many of the rebels, he said, sought vas my amazement-that the picture had distortions, I would prefer to etaaiied
from him in the past in order to make their been taken 8 days before, in the interna- for the R:, w certain general truths
way to Cuba and Iron Curtain countries, tional security zone which had been es- regarding our involvement in era lorutes
and he had refused to grant them. T3ey tablished by the OAS, and that the ican imbroglio.
had managed to get out anyway. Dominicans had been picked up forsnip-
The Western diplomat, who fought ass ing. You will recall that the marines Myth No. 1: American lives were never
high-ranking officer in the second world +iad an OAS mandate at that time to de- really endangered. That was only an
woe, said many hT the street fighteth of the fend the international zone. excuse to land troops to head off the re-
s shad shown evidence e most turn to power of former President Juan
soopihisticacated urban guerrilla warfare train- . Clearly, the intent of the Times, in
p r Bosch or an alleged Communist take-
ragtag It's not the sort of training that the printing that picture with that caption,
ragtag Dominican armed forces, whence was to leave the impression that the over.
many of the rebels came, ever receive. arrests were connected with the then Reality: On April 26, 2 days after the
Now, it is possible to doubt the evalna- current battle in the northern sector, in outbreak of the revolt, Americans began
tion of the entire diplomatic corps in which Timesman Szulc charged we were to ask for evacuation. Standby plans
Santo Domingo as well as the same eval- helping the junta forces. were put into operation. Both sides in
uation by the U.S. team. But to say, as The Tribune ran a photo with a simi- the fighting gave the Embassy assur-
Mr. Collier did, that no foreign diplomats larly slanted caption. It showed a me,- antes that they would agree to a cease-
agreed with the U.S. appraisal goes even rine sitting on a fence firing his rifle. fire to permit our evacuation program to
beyond distortion of the truth. The caption to this one read: "On the be carried out.
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At first, evacuees were gathered at the citizens and anybody else asking for it. lent. The Embassy began to report
Hotel Embajador in Santo Domingo, The argument that has been raised that plotted coups an d intrigues.
taken by truck to the Haina port, and no Americans were killed in Santo Do- Meanwhile, known Communists began
there boarded American Navy craft. mingo, hence no protection was needed, to return, often secretly, from training in
On April 27 armed rebel mobs, many of is specious. None was killed because Of Iron Curtain countries and Cuba.
them teenagers, roamed the streets. the swift decision to protect them. I The April 24 revolt began with a variety
Radio Santo Domingo was inciting the cannot understand the reasoning that of participants for a variety of motives.
people to take reprisals against specific would have had us wait until some Amer- On that day, Reid sent his military chief
individuals. The radio announced that leans were killed to prove that protection of staff and a deputy to the 27th of Feb-
a well-known antirebel was at the Hotel was necessary. How many deaths should ruary military camp outside Santo
Embajador. So were 1,000 Americans, we have waited for? Ten? Fifty? Domingo to cancel the commissions of
who had collected there to await evacua- One hundred? four officers for plotting
tion.
against A mob of rebels arrived and fired Expressions of thanks by people of ernment. Elements of the ann y, lei Gov-
shots inside the hotel. That day, de- other nationalities for evacuating them disaffected middle grade and junior ofii-
spite the terrifying incident at the hotel
from the lawless
h
ti
i
,
, c
ao
c s
tuation have
the evacuation from Haina was com- been profuse. At the conclusion of my
pleted. remarks, I shall put in the RECORD testi-
By the night of April 27, various rebel mony to this effect.
leaders of the pro-Bosch faction-in- The initial marine landings were in-
cluding Molina Urena, the "provisional tended solely to provide protection for
president"-took asylum in foreign em- U.S. citizens and others who requested
bassies. it.
At this point, the Embassy believed Myth No. 2: We intervened in support
that the evacuation
ld
ti
cou
s
ll be effect- of the military, halting a social revolu-
ed. Gen. Wessin y Wessin, of the anti- tion. The danger of a Communist take-
rebel military forces, held overwhelming over was grossly exaggerated.
military force and it was believed that Reality: The fact that the President
he could put an end to the anarchy in ordered the marines to land solely to
Santo Domingo. Protect innocent lives does not exclude
On April 28, the police chief in Santo the additional fact that we were aware
Domingo reported that law and order of the growing Communist strength and
had broken down completely and he inhuence on the rebel side.
could no longer offer protection to for- Before proceeding, Mr. Speaker, it is
eigners. At the same time, the armed essential to understand the background
forces under command of Gen. Wessin y and nature of the Dominican revolt.
Wessin did not move. Colonel Benoit, After more than 30 years of one of the
head of the three-man military junta most brutal tyrannies in the hemisphere,
established at San Isidro that day, also the Dominican Republic is a country
informed our Embassy on the morning rent by suspicions and hatreds.
of April 28 that he believed American The triumvirate Government, ulti-
lives to be in danger in Santo Domingo, mately headgd by Reid Cabral, had come
and that junta forces were unable to to power after a coup d'etat and was very
extend any protection. Meanwhile, narrowly based. Although efforts were
many Americans began to gather at the made against graft and corruption in the
Hotel Embajador for evacuation at military establishment, the military
Haina scheduled for 3 in the afternoon. budget was cut in 1965, and a consider-
But around 10 a.m. the Embassy was able number of the more unsavory mili-
notified that the road to Haina was being tary officers were removed from the
fired upon by snipers. scene, the armed forces continued to ex-
The fact that the Haina road was ercise an oppressive weight on the coun-
closed, that the Dominican authorities try and was a source of popular dis-
could no longer safeguard foreigners in content. The same considerations ap-
Santo Domingo, and that the Dominican plied to the police force.
Army was sitting out at San Isidro base Economically, the country had been
doing nothing, finally convinced the Em- much buffeted. The price of sugar had
bassy that the time had come to protect fallen from over 11 cents to around 2
our nationals. At that time, there were cents a pound, a disastrous blow to a
about 1,000 people waiting for evacua- country more than 50 percent of whose
tion, many of them women and children, foreign exchange earnings come from
The Ambassador requested helicopter sugar. Cacao prices also were low, and
service from the aircraft carrier, Boxer, there was overproduction of coffee. A
to evacuate the Americans at the Hotel severe drought affected other products.
Embajador and a small force to protect The U.S. shipping strike in January and
the chancery. Some 450 marines were February heavily depressed the Govern-
landed to establish a, safety perimeter ment's income through the lack of receipt
around the hotel where the evacuees of customs duties for imports and the
were boarded on helicopters. At the lack of ships to carry away exports of
time the marines landed, Embassy guards sugar and other products. Payment of
and other Americans were under fire at Government accounts was behind sched-
the Hotel Embajador and the Embassy ule, and laborers on public works and
grounds. Eventually, more than 5,000 road projects were in many cases months
persons, Americans and citizens of 45 behind in receiving their wages.
other different nationalities, were These developments intensified the
evacuated, strains on the fragile Dominican institu-
In the rapidly disintegrating situation tions. By late fall of 1964, it was ap-
in Santo Domingo on April 28, the U.S. Parent that the situation was declining.
Ambassador would have been derelict not Broadcasts over the many Dominican
to have requested protection for U.S. radio stations grew more and more vio-
No. 176-21
ruary camp and made prisoners of
General Rivera and his deputy. That
sparked the revolt.
Word of these actions quickly spread
to Santo Domingo and was broadcast
over two radio stations. Shortly there-
after, a group of civilians seized the two
radio stations and announced the over-
throw of the Reid government.
While sentiment ran high against the
Reid regime, there was no consensus of
what or who should take its place. Some
army officers supported Juan Bosch and
wanted his return. They were joined by
Bosch's PRD and by three Communist
parties: the MPD-Peiping oriented; the
PSP-Moscow oriented; and the 14th of
June Movement-APJC-which had been
taken over by Castro-Communist-trained
leadership.
Some military officers favored the re-
turn of former President Balaguer. Still
others were against Reid because of his
efforts to reform the armed forces, but
they were also opposed to Bosch. Others
were merely opportunists looking for per-
sonal gain. Others wanted a military
junta in order to oust some of the senior
officers who blocked their promotions.
The struggle for power began. The
following day truckloads of arms were
sent into Santo Domingo from the 27th
of February camp and distributed, large-
ly by Communist leaders, among civil-
ians. Armed mobs, urged on by the anti-
Reid broadcasts, seized the national pal-
ace. Throughout the day, armed
marauding bands of looters roamed the
city, shooting at police and private citi-
zens. MPD leaders were particularly ac-
tive distributing bottles and gasoline to
be used in making molotov cocktails.
With the distribution of machineguns
and rifles to civilians, what had begun as
an essentially military uprising changed
to anarchic disorder. The superior or-
ganization and training of the Commu-
nists shortly found them in key positions
among the rebels.
At the height of the rebel strength,
early in the course of the revolt, there
were no more than 1,000 officers and en-
listed men. At that time, there were
also between 2,500 and 5,500 armed
civilians. Of these armed civilians, as
many as 1,500 at the outset of the revolt
were members of the three Dominican
Communist-dominated parties under di-
rect command of Communist leaders.
From the very beginning of the revolt
,
then, armed Communist-led elements
were greater in number than the orga-
nized military on the rebel side. There
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were, in addition, several thousand more- mafio-whom the Times, Tribune, and wavered from a single goal: the estab-
armed civilians who were not Commu?- Post wanted us to accept as the "consti- lishment of some form of viable author-
nists, ranging from patriotic Dominicans. tutional President" of the Dominican Re- ity to prevent the complete breakdown
who sincerely believed in what they were public-having been a military officer his of public order which in turn would
doing, to kids-some only 12 years old- entire adult life, was disqualified. create conditions conducive to a Com-
who were in the fight for a thrill, to In brief, the disorganization and con= munist takeover. The Embassy was
thugs who were out to kill. policemen trary motives of the non-Communist bombarded with appeals to take one side
and to loot. Although many of these rebels facilitated the rise of hard-core or the other. Throughout, Ambassador
non-Communist civilians probably nevei Communists to key positions in the rebel Bennett urged a negotiated settlement.
came under Communist control and dis forces. Some, people now say that, had As stated above, to have intervened to
cipline, they were dependent in varyin: we thrown our support behind Molina impose Molina Urena would have been
degrees upon the Communists for lead- Urena, Bosch's deputy, we would have untenable. To have intervened to wipe
ership and for arms and ammunition. struck a ,blow for freeedokn w what haivetmeantlk killing thousandslof d ~inuoa
backgrounds of the principal Communist
leaders in the Dominican revolt.
As John Bartlow Martin reminded rs
in his article in the May 28, 1965, issue c f
Life maga5drie, "Communists no longer
make revolutions, they.take them over "
That is what happened in the Dominican
Republic. The fact that the organized,
trained Communist agents were few in
number compared with the total Do-
minican population is no measure n)f
their capability. It is not only the
strength of the Communists that counts,
but the weakness of those with who ,.n
they have allied. Where there is a wei,,k
non-Communist component and a strong
Communist component, the communists
can seize the apparatus. In the Domir.i-
can revolt, the non-Communist rebels
were in disarray. The Communist lead-
ership, on. the other hand, acted with
purpose and calculation.
Here, the naivete of some journalists
merits mention: With the emergence of
Caamafio Deno as rebel figurehead, some
reporters leaped to paint him as the
symbol of "constitutionalism," much as
the New York Times had been instru-
mental in creating the image of Friel
Castro as the Robin Hood of the Sierra
Maestra. Caamafio became leader of
"the good. guys," anybody who oppoied
him-and. what loomed behind hire.-
was automatically "a bad guy."
What, exactly, were Caamafio Deno's
"constitutional" qualifications? His :.a-
ther had been a much-feared Trujillisa;
Caamafio had been bounced out of sv-
eral branches of the armed services End
the police. Several months before ';he
revolt, he had become involved in an in-
trigue against a general and had been
removed from his post by President Reid.
He hated Reid. When the revolt began,
Caamafio-now in the air force-joined
it But Caamailo's respect for the i iCe-
LUn111111+Z4aa yc.vy+~ ??.^'~~-~^, '--~ -
to the state of affairs existing under Contrary to rebel propaganda-echoed
Donald Reid Cabral? I - would remind by a sector of the press-the United
Members that there was not even a mur- States did remain neutral throughout.-
mur from the Dominican people when The following paragraph from John
Bosch was overthrown. Despite our pro- Bartlow Martin's article in Life states:
tests, our break in relations and cutoff If, as the rebels charged, our intention
of aid, the Dominican people showed lit- had been to defeat them, we would not have
tle regret at the loss of President Bosch. pressed for the-cease-fire. For the cease-
ity's
This is not to say that the overthrow of fire left the telephone company the the
cmain
the first constitutionally elected Presi- radio station. Nor did we completely seal
dent in the Dominican Republic after off the rebel stronghold in Ciudad Nueva-
three decades of tyranny was not a tragic we permitted noncombatants to cross the
event for the establishment of demo- corridor and, far frrrm starving them out,
cratic institutions in that troubled land. we, fed the rebels and gave them medicines
But it does indicate that in April. 1965 we and water. In short, the cease-fire benefited
had no way of knowing whether the the rebels. We had promoted it to save
Dominican people wanted Bosch reins- lives.
posed, with U.S. assistance, or Balaguer, Myth No. 4: The number of U.S.
or some other Dominican figure. troops far exceeded the amount neces-
One thing is certain, however. When sary for the declared purpose of protect-
Molina Urena became "provisional presi- ' ,,in.g American lives. This is another
dent" on April 25, the rebel movement variation of myth No. 2, that the danger
immediately broke into two camps, to ,pmerican lives was only a pretext for
Many moderate political leaders and the intervention. The buildup of forces
The military officers, who had been re- restoration of peace and order could halt
luctant to use their forces in support of a Communist takeover.
Reid, immediately mobilized to prevent - Reality: On May 4 there were some
Bosch's return. 20,000 U.S. troops in the Dominican Re-
It is clear that Bosch could not have public, deployed as follows: 2,013 guard-
been brought back to power without ing the Hotel Embajador area, 3,888
violent civil strife. U.S. diplomatic ef- guarding the remainder of the -safety
forts could hardly have overcome this zone, 4,416 securing the communica-
opposition. Use of U.S. military force tions corridor, 4,416 guarding the road
to reimpose Bosch would have meant to San Isidro airfield and the approaches
U.S. marines fighting Dominicans. In to the Duarte Bridge, and 4,416 sta-
sum, putting Humpty Dumpty together tioned at the San Isidro airfield.
again would not have been a viable The number of troops was a military
policy. decision. It was by no means out of
I shall comment
U.S. action. on the legal e proportion to the necessity. On a nor-
here, howe the r, t ac. I want s to note day in Santo Domingo, a police force
here, have not been some notably critics consistent. U.S. numbering over 6,000 men preserves the
action h have not Those were not "normal" days
On the one hnot the United States is in Santo Domingo. Furthermore, it must
of Bosch; not intervening in behalf be remembered that U.S. troops had
r Juan Bosch; t the other othet to hand, give ' it the is several missions to perform; the 20,000
Dominican people a chance to elect their would have us, believe, bayonets ready
own leaders. I do not 'think we can be to charge the poor rebels. Troops in the
on both sides of the fence at once. safety zone protected that area from
U.S. intervention not only prevented continual attacks and, at the same time,
a Communist takeover, but there is every conducted the evacuation of some 5,000
reason to believe it also will provide the people. Troops stationed in the com-
Dominican people another chance to let People.
corridor were charged with
their wills be known the ballot box. maintaining a safe route for evacuation
Myth No. 3: The United States col- and with distributing food and medical
lit a y with the corrupt
e- supplies to Dominicans of both factions.
retrograde Dominican
mlt i and the most ety 'Moreover, these troops acted as a de facto
ments Dominican society and ad against buffer zone subject to frequent sniper
the e lei legit timatte aspirations of a long op- fire and direct attack.
pressed people for political freedom and Math No. 5: The United States
social justice. turned belatedly to the organization of
Reality: From the voluminous docu-
Reality: at the Department of State, I turned. States to provide a cover for
it is clear that the United States never its illegal intervention. -
ties of constitutional procedure had
never been evident in the past. He in fide
no objection to the overthrow of Bo ch,
in whose name he later rose to def nd
"constitutionalism."
Maybe Caamafio got religion, butthe
pretense that he was a "constitutional"
descendant from the Bosch regime s a
travesty. The constitution which Caa-
mafio claimed as the source of his le?1ti-
macy does provide a line of command in
case the President, Vice President, and
so forth, are unable to exercise authority.
The constitution provides that the C on-
gress shall elect a provisional president
from the ranks of the party of the absent
President. The constitution also pro-
vides, however, that no military man can
belong to a political party. Hence C'aa-
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Reality: At 5:14 p.m., April 28, 1965,
when Ambassador Bennett called for
Marines to protect American lives, there
was no time for hesitation or debate.
Of course, those who cling to myths
Nos. 1 and 2-th4t there never was any
real danger to American lives but that
this was used solely as a pretext-must
perforce follow their theory of diabolic
machinations to its logical conclusions:
to wit, that the whole exercise was pulled
off intentionally behind the back of the
OAS.
This is sheer nonsense. The initial in-
tervention, as I have shown, was indeed
humanitarian. The President of the
United States knew the risks of interven-
ing unilaterally in a Latin American Re-
public-knew the memories this would
stir, and the propaganda advantage it
would give the Communists. Neverthe-
less, in the swiftly disintegrating situa-
tion in the Dominican Republic, Presi-
dent Johnson could not wait for the OAS
to intervene, to debate, and to await in-
structions from 18 different capitals.
As the depth of Communist penetra-
tion became apparent, the OAS was kept
fully advised of the matter. Continued
presence of U.S. troops in Santo Domin-
go was intended to permit the OAS to
function in the manner intended by its
charter.
Much has been made of articles 15 an4
17 of the OAS Charter, which stress the
obligation of member states not to in-
tervene in the internal affairs of other
member states. In conjunction with
those two articles, standing alone out of
context, it is essential to remember that
the purpose for which the American Re-
publics established the OAS, as set forth
in article I of the charter is "to achieve
an order of peace and justice, to promote
their, solidarity, to strengthen their col-
laboration, and to defend their sover-
eignty, their territorial integrity and
their independence." U.S. troops were
fulfilling this role until such time as the
OAS could assume responsibility.
I find it curious indeed that the very
commentators who deplore our initially
unilateral intervention in the Dominican
Republic as a breach of OAS agreements
are the very same ones who studiously
ignore the existence of the report to the
OAS 10th Meeting of Consultation by its
own five-member Special Committee.
Interestingly, every one of the five Am-
bassadors had previously expressed-in
speeches and comments in the OAS-
doubts concerning the fisdom of U.S. in-
tervention in the Dominican Republic.
When the obviously shaken ambassadors
returned from their on-the-spot investi-
gation, they demonstrated understanding
of the necessity of U.S. intervention, both
to save lives and to prevent an extremist
takeover.
The reaction of the members of the
five-man Special Committee is recorded
in the text of the minutes of the Fourth
Plenary Session of the 10th Meeting of
Consultation of the Organization of
American States, which I am including
in the RECORD at the conclusion of my
remarks.
The critics cannot have it both ways.
On the one hand, they decry U.S. unilat-
eral intervention; on the other. hand,
they choose to disregard an official OAS
committee sent to the Dominican Repub-
lic. to ascertain the situation. As far as
I have been able to ascertain, neither
the Washington Post, the New York
Times; the Herald Tribune, nor Senate
critics have ever acknowledged the ex-
istence of the Special Committee's en-
lightening report. I venture to state that
had the Special Committee come back
from Santo Dominga damning U.S. in-
tervention, the Post, the Times, and the
Tribune would have headlined the news.
Myth No. 6: The intervention has
caused widespread disaffection for the
United States in Latin America.
Reality: Initially, as might be expected,
editorial critcism in Latin America was
widespread. But, as the facts began to
filter out, a degree of understanding de-
veloped. Many acknowledged that this
intervention was unrelated to the old-
time protection of U.S. property inter-
ests; that, in fact, it was a tragic neces-
sity in defense of the entire hemisphere.
Had all the major news media in the
United States been telling the truth, it
is likely that the message would have
spread faster and further.
Myth No. 7: That our intervention in
the Dominican Republic marks a turn of
the goals of the Alliance for Progress to-
ward a policy of military force to stem
communism.
Reality: Support for reformist govern-
ments in Latin America continues un-
abated. We only wish there were more
of them, backed by institutional struc-
tures sufficiently strong to undertake
thoroughgoing reforms. But as the Sub-
committee on Inter-American Affairs
.noted in its report in April 1964 on Com-
munist subversion in the Western Hemi-
sphere:
Success of the Alliance for Progress and
hemispheric plans for economic and social
developments of Latin America will be en-
dangered by continuing Castro Communist _
efforts to increase the political tensions and
dangers of the region. Hence, long-range
economic and political plans must be com-
plemented by immediate steps to meet the
threat of subversive aggression.
Mr. Speaker, I have spoken today in
an effort to clarify the obfuscations in
the Dominican situation brought about
by the irresponsible reporting of. some
segments of the press and echoed by
highly placed foreign policy spokesmen.
I am not primarily interested in the moti-
vation or reason behind the bias shown in
connection with the Dominican situa-
tion by some of our news media-al-
though that in itself should be of inter-
est. But what I am interested in is that
such misrepresentation of our Nation's
foreign policy role be understood for
what it is-not the responsible report of
a free press, but the irresponsible'propa-
Banda of some who, under the protective
cloak of journalistic rights, have sought
to undercut and reshape our national
policy to suit their own preconceived
views of the story they have been as-
signed to cover.
. Especially dangerous, however, is the
practice by those in high positions of
Government-highly placed foreign
policy spokesmen-of embracing as the
basis of their statements, the incredibly
slanted reports of some journalists. It
is time that the pretensions of these
spokesmen be recognized for what they
are and what they are not.
To dissent out of what one believes to
be the Nation's interests is an act of
courage, but to dissent on the basis of
grossly biased information undermines
our Government's extremely difficult task
of combating our Nation's enemies.
At the outset, I stated that my purpose
today was to separate fact from fiction,
myth from reality, regarding the events
which occurred during the recent crisis
in the Dominican Republic. In the past,
some spokesmen have talked in terms
of old myths-and new realities regarding
our Nation's foreign policy. I would rec-
ommend that some time be given by these
spokesmen-and by the news media with
whom they collaborate in criticism of
U.S, policy-to reexamine some of their
own precious myths, in the light of the
violent realities of the world in which we
live today.
MAY 12, 1965.
PERSONAL INTERVIEWS WITH EVACUEES FROM
THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC
(NOTE.-Following are excerpts from per-
sonal interviews made with some of the
evacuees by VOA staffers.)
Argentine engineer Lorenzo Dotta,, inter-
viewed in Buenos Aires on May 8, 1965, said:
The reception (in San Juan) was unfor-
gettable. Every possible facility was offered
to the refugees. They helped us establish
communication with our countries of origin
and medical attention was given those who
needed It." Senor Dotta also said that those
who criticize the action of the United States
undoubtedly were ignorant of what was hap-
pening in the Dominican Republic. "There,
there is no respect for the life of any human
being," he declared, "and only the presence
of the marines was a guarantee of security,
a cause for tranquality for the foreigners."
In an interview at the Red Cross Center
in San Juan (date not available), Argentine
citizen Enrique Rodriguez voiced his grati-
tude to U.S. Marines "for having saved my
family." He described the rescuing heli-
copters as being punctured with bullets from
ground fire. "The U.S. participation has
been marvelous. Some countries critized the
North Americans for their intervention, but
it is more than intervention; it is a help.
The U.S. forces are not concerned in being
.occupying forces, but only interested in sav-
ing lives." Senor Rodriguez left the Domini-
can Republic with his wife and two children.
He had been a resident in Santo Domingo for
3 years.
A Peruvian university professor, Rafael
Reategui, interviewed in San Juan (date not
available), declared: "I do not have words to
express how grateful we are to the North
American authorities for having evacuated
us. The evacuation `could not have been
more opportune; and thanks to that measure,
we are here safe and sound. Really, one
could not have asked for more, because from
the moment we boarded the transport ship
Wood County to leave Santo Domingo, we
have received nothing but kindness."
A Haitian citizen who was evacuated from
the Dominican Republic was interviewed in
Puerto Rico on May 4. He requested that his
name not be used for personal reasons. He
said, "From the moment that I was under the
protection of the U.S. flag I felt secure, not
only for my life but in every way."
Thomas Paniagua, a Dominican refugee,
was interviewed in Puerto Rico on May 8.
He said the North Americans "with their
skill and compassion " * ? were helping
the Dominican people land] were providing
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a water filter [system] * * *. We are grate-
ful to the American people."
Brazilian Professor Joa Soares Veiga, direi-
tor of the Institute of Zootechnics of Perp
cununca in the state of Sao Paulo, and
Brazilian delegate to the meeting in Santo
Domingo of the Inter-American Society of
Agricultural and Livestock Development, wis
Interviewed in Sao Paulo on May 9, 19( 5.
"The presence of the NorthAmerican forces
produced tranquility among the residents
and foreign avisitors, many of whom 7t1t
threatened, if not by the rebel forces ther-
selves by elements foreign to the revolutitm
who possessed arms. The treatment received
by those who wanted to leave, before embar's
ing and during their stay on the North Ame r-
ican ship and arrival in San Juan, was of ti-
describable kindness, from the commander
of the Boxer down, to the last sailor. Tae
desire to help the refugees, especially tie
women and children, was notable."
In an interview at the Red Cross Center in
rera, an Argentine citizen whose husband haul
a photographic studio in Santo Domingo, de-
clared that U.S. forces "very much saved
lives, especially mine and those of my family,"
Senora de Barrera left the Dominican Repu a-
lie with five members of her family. (Date
of interview not available.)
In an interview on May 6 Alfredo Ballesttaa,
a Colombian airplane mechanic, declared that
"the arrival of U.S. forces was the salvation
of all foreigners" in Santo Domingo. Its
noted that. the evacuees were "royall 7"
treated on the U.S.S. Boxer where the Marines
treated the exacuees as their "guests." Met; t-
oal treatment was provided children on t:.ie
Boxer, "U.S. forces did not take sides in t. ie
conflict, their only role was to save lives."
Giovanni Constantino, an Italian musician
who has been with the symphony orchestra
of Santo Domingo for some years, was Inter-
viewed at Fort Buchanan, Puerto Rico a el
May 9. He recounted his desperate attemgts
to bring his family from the dangerous caa-
ter of the city to the neutral zone. .After ar-
rivingin the zonethey were evacuated in tie
last American ship leaving Santo pomin,o
(from then on the evacuation has been
carried out by air.) Mr. Constantino prais xd
the work of the North American soldiers and
recounted how from the first moment of
their arrival in Santo Domingo they htd
started to distribute medicine and food Ie-
gardless of 'which side the recipients were c G.
At the same time the soldiers were fulfilling
the task of evacuation and protection of fcr-
eign residents. He ended by saying, "I am
convinced that without the presence of tie
Marines the situation would have degenerated
into irreparable chaos."
A young Italian singer, Antonio Sciortino,
resident in Carcacas but fulfilling a, singing
engagement in Santo Domingo, was caugit'
by the revolution in the most dangerous part
of the city. Finally, he persuaded one of the
rebels to guide him to the refugee zone from
which he was evacuated by the A.mericfai
forces. He said on May 10, "all of us who
were evacuated feel grateful to the Unitssd
States-in the first place for the protection
which they gave us in the midst of. the dal t-
ger, and afterward for their treatment of its
from the moment that we placed ourselves : n
their hands."
Mrs. Maria de Badelt, born in the Argentine
but resident for some years in Santo Do-
Mingo Where she was professor of Spanish itt -
the university, was one of the first group of
refugees to be evacuated from Santo D)
mingo. She is now in Puerto Rico serving its
a volunteerwith the Red Cross. She com-
mented particularly on one of the Merit a
barbers. "I do not remember his name, but
I shall never forget the untiring dedicaticn
that he showed in preparing hundreds of
baby bottles when we were on board tl.e
Boxer." She added, "There is not enough
money to ps.y those pilots of the helicopters.
Once on board we were overwhelmed with
attention * * * from the officers down to the
least of the sailors," Mrs. Badelt said that
the thing that probably Impressed the refu-
gees most was to see the officers on board give
up their staterooms to the women and 'chil-
dren.
Guiseppe Bonasera of Sicily, who had been
in Santo Domingo on business, was inter-
viewed in San Juan on May 3. He said, "Be-
cause of the North Americans I am We here
in Puerto Rico."
In an interview in Miami on May 7, Roberto
Garcia Serra, a Cuban, declared that. "If the
U.S. officials had not exercised the proper
authority, lives lost (in the Embajador Hotel)
would have run Into the thousands." Mr.
Garcia had resided in the Dominican Re-
public for a year and a half and was employed
in the public relations field.
In an interview in Miamion May 8, Juan
Gonzalez Clemente, a Cuban journalist in
exile and a resident of the Dominican Re-
public, declared that, "If President Johnson
had not ordered the landing of the Marines
it would have been disastrous to the Domini-
can people." In addition, Gonzalez noted
the Communist danger, "If the Marines had
not Intervened I believe that within 3 or 4
days (of the beginning of the coup), Fidel
Castro would have been speaking in the
Parque de Independencia in Santo Domingo."
On May 5, a Dominican lady who had been
evacuated from her country was interviewed
in San Juan. She asked that hername not
be mentioned. She said of the situation
there when she left, "It was somewhat calmer
due to the assistance which the North Ameri-
cans were giving us. If it had not been for
the aid which arrived from the United States
the Dominican people already would have
been taken over by communism." She said
that "the evacuation was conducted very
well and we received very great help from
the American consul and others, and were
treated well." She concluded that "without
the food and medicines distributed by the
Americans many Dominicans would have
perished." -
In an Interview in Miami on May 6, Carlos
Manuel Gutierrez, a Cuban exile business-
man, observed that during the conflict "I saw
much food and supplies being landed by U.S.
vessels and helicopters. In addition I saw
many medical aid men being landed."
Cuban Alfredo Rubio, general manager of
the Hotel Embajador in Santo Domingo, in-
terviewed on May 6 in Miami said: "For the
Americans we were not foreigners, we were
all Americans. We were treated as if-we
were helped to evacuate in a manner as ef-
fective as if-we had been born on North
American territory. In this evacuation all
of us-all in general from Latin America,
Europe, Canada, England, from wherever,
who arrived at the Embassy office established
in the Hotel Embajador-were immediately
provided with the papers necessary for evac-
uation. I want to thank the United States
for this in the name of all the persons who
were evacuated. They have treated all of us
as if we were sons of.North America."
Mexican Performing Artist Fernando Bala-
dez, was interviewed in Miami on May 6.
"I am very grateful to the U.S. Government
because I owe it my life. As soon as I get
to Mexico I am going to publicize what hap-
pened-not what I was tyld, but what I saw,
what I suffered, what I lived. I will be grate-
ful for the rest of my life."
OTHER EXPRESSIONS OF APPRECIATION
(The following comes from a letter to the
editor appearing in the Daily Gleaner of
May 4) : "I should very much appreciateit
if, through the medium of your paper you
would allow me to express my appreciation to
the Government of the United States of
America for my recent evacuation from Santo
Domingo. I was with my husband and three
other Jamaicans on a business trip to the
Dominican Republic when the revolution
started at Saturday noon. Although the
Embajador Hotel was not in the heart of
the city where the fighting was concentrated,
we were able to see the frequent aerial bomb-
ing of the town, army barracks, ammunition
dumps, and also to hear regular bursts of
machinegun fire nearby. The most welcome
sight after 4 days of confinement was two
ships of the U.S. Navy steaming In to take
us to safety. Once aboard, every facility of
the ship was ours. Sleeping quarters were
turned over to us while the sailors and-
marines slept on deck. The comfort of the
chaplain or the assistance of the doctor were
ours for the asking. We were given a very
sumptious dinner and entertained by movies,
but the greatest gift of all was the knowledge
that we were out of danger. On arrival at
the U.S. base in :San Juan, we were offered
accommodations, transport, medical atten-
tion, and money. Nothing had been for-
gotten for our care and comfort. I am sure
I-express thoughts of all theevacuees when
I say thanks to God, America, and the gal-
lant marines and, sailors who: with con-
fidence and speed, efficiently landed to rescue
us from our plight.
"GLORIA KELLEY.
"KINGSTON, JAMAICA."
:In an interview in Miami on May 7, Luis
Roberto Flores, Salvadorean Ambassador to
the Dominican Republic, expressed his "most
sincere gratitude to the U.S. Government and
people for having saved all the elements of
the Salvadorean colony in the Dominican
Republic."
In spite of her 102 years, Dona Victorina
de :is Cruz, director and moving spirit of
the Santo Domingo orphanage Blessed Joseph
of Cadiz, spent the first days of the revolu-
tion. with all her 1.20 orphans isolated with-
in the orphanage. After a few days the food
supply was exhausted and Dona Victorina
despaired of help. However, the news of her
situation reached the U.S. soldiers of com-
pany 42 from Fort Gordon, Ga. They im-
mediately delivered 300 pounds of rice to
the orphanage and promised to continue sup-
plying food. Dona Victorina said, "It was
like manna from heaven- * * *, These are
my heroes."
Mr. Edgar Arias Chinchilla, a Costa Rican
citizen, was interviewed by a reporter from
the Costa Rican newspaper La Nacion on
May 8. Mr. Arias had been in Santo Domin-
go on problems related to rural youth. He
and others were taken from the dangerous
center of Sato Domingo in trucks to the
Hotel Embajador and from there by heli-
copter to the aircraft carrier Boxer. "What
organization,", he said. "We received mar-
velous, unbelievable attention. There were
specialists in the care of children and even
help for the women who were pregnant."
When they reached San Juan, after being
transferred to another ship, everything was
ready to receive them, he said. "There were
some who had no mmoney,-no passport, noth-
ing. They were- taken to the Red Cross for
special attention to resolve. their problem."
He added that among the refugees of num-
erous nationalities their comment was unani-
mous: "How wonderful are these North
Americans, and how many lives they have
saved in Santo Domingo."
EI Tiempo of Bogota published a front-
page Interview with Mr. Jaime Pradilla on
May 5 entitled, "A Colombian in Santo Do-
mingo." Mr. Pradilla said that "I and thous-
ands more owe our lives to the North Ameri-
cans." We were saved, he said, "by the
opportune and necessary intervention of the
American forces * * *. The rebels lost con-
trol of the situation and it degenerated into
a massacre in which no one knew why he
was fighting or killing." Mr. Pradilla escaped
to the Colombia Embassy which at that time
had neither electricity nor water. He added,
"When the North Americans landed they
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commenced Immediately the rescue opera- Palace on April 25, 1965. On April 27, armed 1963; was in Czechoslovakia in 1963. In
tion. Thousands of persons of an nationals- with automatic weapon, was part of group the first days of the Dominican revolt, was
ties were evacuated without delay * * ?. If which seized Listin Diario newspaper and active in distributing weapons to civilians,
the North Americans had not arrived in time prepared to publish Communist propaganda, and in moving arms into strongpoints in
and put an end to the killing, I believe that He was also seen distributing Communist Ciudad Nueva. Associate of Manuel Gonzalez
I would not have been alive today nor would flyshects. Gonzalez in directing military activities of
many of those who were with me."
ber. Was second in command of a rebel post 22. Estevez Weber, Gerardo Rafael: PSPD
APPENDIX 2 early in Dominican revolt. member, on the party's Central Committee..
COMMVNISTS PARTICIPATING IN THE DOMINICAN 13. Deschamps Erickson, Miguel Angel: On April 25, 1965, was among those dis-
REBELLION MPD member; traveled to Cuba and bloc tributing arms to PSPD and APCJ members
1. Abel Hasbun, Amin: Member of the countries In 1962-63 on a false passport. in the Dominican revolt. On April 26, was
executive committee of the APCJ and a leader Received guerrilla training in Cuba. Among observed at Communist (PSPD) strongpoint.
of the Oommunist-controlled student union Communists active since outbreak of Do. The PSPD Central Committee met in his
at the University of Santo Domingo. At- minican revolt on April 24, 1965; was cap- home the night of April 27. As of May 3,
tended the second meetin of the Com- tured by loyalist forces. .
was active Communist propaganda work.
International Union of Stu- 14. Despradel Roque, Fidelio: A founding 23. Evangelista Alejo, Rafael: PSPD mem-
dents in Hungary in 1964. Was active in member of the APCJ; adheres to Chinese ber. Attended meetings at the National
organizing Communist activities in the Do- Communist line. Received guerrilla training Palace on April 25, 1965, with other Com-
minican revolt on April 24, 1965. He was in Cuba in 1963. A leader of abortive APCJ rnunists.
seen at the revolt
opal Palace on April 26. uprising in late 1963. Was captured and de- - 24. Felix Rodriguez, Manuel Demostenes:
2. Abreu, Fritz Antonio: APCJ member. Ported to Europe in May 1964. Returned 11- APCJ member; fought in the guerrilla upris-
In September 1963, left the Dominican Re- legally to Dominican Republic in October ing in late 1963. He was deported to France
public for Cuba, later going to the Soviet 1964. Received large. sum of money from and from France went. to Mexico; later re-
Union. He returned to the Dominican Re- Chinese Communists. Participated in April turned clandestinely to the Dominican Re-
public in October 1964. Active Comm unist 25, 1965, distribution of arms to civilians public. Identified with the rebel forces in
from the outset of Dmiive revolt on in Dominican revolt. Commanded an APCJ Ciudad Nueva during the Dominican revolt.
the an
April 24, 1965. As of May 2, there was at post of armed Communists set up on April 25. Franco Pichardo, Franklin Jose de
his home a radio station which broadcast 26. One of top rebel leaders as of May 3. Jesus: PSPD member; in 1963 he attended
exhortations to sheaf Americans on sight. 15. Dominiguez Guerrero, Asdrubal Ulises: the 26th of July celebrations in Havana. In
Arms and am to shoion were Ame
ricans o is his PSPD propaganda chief and active student December 1964, was in the Soviet Union, and
stored
house. leader. Has received money from Castro in January 1965 was In Czechoslovakia. On
3. Bernard Vasquez, Maximo: Former regime. Received bloc training in 1962. Ac- February 1, 1965, returned to the Dominican
high-level Bernard Vasquez,
of the APCJ: was Former tive in revolt from outset, and, as of April Republic. Identified among Communists ac-
high liaison member with a subversive faction 25, 1965, led an armed group which seized tive in the current fighting in Santo Do-
of the Dominican with subversive faction offices of Listin Diario newspaper on April mango.
with the APCJ guerrilla military upising in necem- 27. As of May 3, one of top leaders of rebel 26. Garcia, Porfirio "Rabeche": PSPD
IM.
ber the Early in 1965 plates and negatives movement, member; on April 2b, 1965, was among those
16. Dore Cabral, Carlos: PSPD member
for PSPD propaganda were made in his print- and official of the pro-Communist student Communists directing the production of mol-
shap. On April 25, 1965, was active in the otov cocktails.
distribution arms t5 APCJ and PSPD federation, FED. On April 26, 1965, was
of arms t
Dominican
26
unist revolt. strap On April production of Molotov cocktails; was seen ber: On April 25, 1965, was seen distributing , was and garrison. As of May 3, was active nt during the rebellion at a Communist-con- Communist propaganda. On May 2, made an
trolled strongpoint. anti-American speech to a crowd of people
propaganda work. 17. Ducoudray Mansfield, Juan: He and his in Parque Independencia.
4. Blanco GGnao, Moises Augustin: APCJ family figure prominently in the top leader- 28. Genao Espaillat, Luis Bernardo: APCJ
member; observed with other Communists ship of the PSPD. In 1962, was in Cuba leader; was in Cuba in 1962; participated in
attending meetings at the National Palace working on the preparation of scripts for guerrilla uprisings in late 1963 and was sub-
on April 25. broadcasts by radio Havana beamed to the sequently arrested and deported. From 1963
5. Bot-ello Fernandez, Norge Williams: Dominican Republic. His foreign travel to early 1965, sent books to Dominican Re-
APCJ . member; in September 1963, went to since 1957 includes the U.S.S.R., Communist public from Paris for use in APCJ training
Cuba where he received guerrilla training. China, Poland, and Cuba. courses. Identified among Communists in
Active among Communists from the begin- He has had contact with the Soviet Em- current fighting in Santo Domingo. On May
ning of the April 24, 1965 Dominican revolt. bassy in Havana.. On April 25, 1965, was 3. he departed Santo Domingo for Santiago,
Was among those at one of the principal among those active in the distribution of and was later captured by loyalist forces.
APCJ strongpoints and headquarters with arms to PSPD and APCJ members. As of 29. Giro Alacantara, Luis Felipe Valentin:
Juan Miguel Roman Diaz. May 3, was among the top leadership group MPD leader: was in Cuba from September
6. Bujosa Moses, Benjamin: PSPD mem- of the rebel movement. 1963 to March 1964. Identified on April 29,
ber; identified on April 30, 1965, as active 18. Ducoudray Mansfield, Felix Servio, Jr.: 1965, as among Communists active in current
in the street fighting in the Dominican One of the directors of the PSPD; has lived Dominican rebellion. On April 29, partici-
revolt. in the Soviet Union; in Argentina in 1959, had pated in the attack on Ozama Fortress.
7. Calventi Gavino, Jose Viniclo: APCJ close contact with leaders of Argentina Com- 30. Gomez, Facundo: PSPD member; part
member. In August 1961 he visited the munist Party. In 1960 he was in Cuba where owner of the Scarlet Woman, a fishing
Soviet Union with his brother, later visiting he was employed by the New China News boat which landed three MPD leaders, with
East Germany and Czechoslovakia. In Agency, and in October 1960, went to China, arms and ammunition from Cuba, in the
for August 1963 left the Dominican Repulic blic traveling under a Cuban passport. In April Dominican Republic during the 1963 guer-
for Cuba. n
t In
the ition April 25, seizure 1963 he returned to the Dominican Republic rilla movement. On April 25, 1965, conferred
B. Conde Sturla, Alfredo: PSPD me ber from Cuba. On April 25, 1965, participated with top leaders of the Dominican revolt at
in distribution of weapons to civilians in the National Palace.
who received special training In Cuba during Dominican revolt. As of May 3, was Identi- 31. Gomez,. Perez Luis: Member of PSPD
1962. Identified as among Communists led as one of the top leadership group of the Central Committee and formerly a member
active in the Dominican revolt as of April rebel movement.
30, 1965. of the APCJ; studied in the U.S.S.R. on a
9. Conde Sturla, Amadeo: APCJ member; 19. Duran Hernando, Jamie: Important scholarship; known to have traveled to Cuba
ac 9 in subversive activities at the ember; leader of the APCJ; in 1964 received guer- and in 1963 he received training in Czecho-ive lty of Santo Domingo. Among leaders of rilla warfare training in Cuba; later went slovallia. Among those Communists attend-
armed civilian gin which seized Prenof to Soviet Union with other trainees. He Was ing meeting -in the National Palace on April
armed ci i-Commuu p newspaper, on April arrested in Santo Domingo on April 24, the 25, 1965.
Li e, a He was one of the more April first day of the Dominican revolt, but was 33. Gonzalez Gonzalez, Manuel: Member of 25, . terrorists In the first days of the rebellion. released on April 26. Immediately took over PSPD Central Committee: Spanish national
10. Conde Sedro: the r meion command of an armed Communist post. who participated in the Spanish Civil War;'
ac 10. Conde Sturla, Con-imunist la, Pedro stuPSPD dent em at 20. Erickson Alvarez, Tomas Parmenio: also reported to be a Cuban intelligence
in - group Member of the MPD Central Committee who agent. A military leader of the Communist
the University of Santo Domingo. As of was secretary for rural affairs in 1963. He forces under PSPD control in the Dominican
April 30, 1965, identified among Communists has gone to Cuba on at least three occasions revolt. On April 25, was seen bearing arms
active in the Dominican revolt. in 1961, 1962, and 1964. On the last visit, at a PSPD
at Indepen-
It. Cuello Hernandez, Jose Israel: PSPD he received guerrilla training. Identified as dencia; later thatrday set up auCmmunist
member; student and editor of Communist- of April 30, 1965, as among the Communists commando group. On April 26, was in
controlled newspaper at University of Santo active in the Dominican revolt. of an Domingo. He was seen with other Commu- 21. Escobar Alfonseca, Manuel: Prominent ingrarms to civilians and instructing them
nists who attended meetings at the National PSPD member; received bloc training In in using these weapons. Was among those
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 24080 Approved For Rele 6MWN6AA&@U4 P 5001100Ae r`,ember 23, 191
attending the PSPIh Central Committeey American Youth Congress held in Santiago, truck urging the people to revolt. On April
meeting the night of April 27. Chile, in March 1.964. Active in fighting 25, was also among Communists attending
33. Guerra Nouel, Jose Bienvenido: APCJ in Ciudad Nueva during the Dominican re- meetings at National Palace. Was-Also iden-
member, active in Communist-controlled cul- volt and; on May 3, 1965, was stationed at tided at a PSPI) stronghold leading an armed
tural group at the University of Santo Do-- a Communist command post in that area. PSPD unit.
mango. Was in Cuba in 1963 where he 41. Lora Iglesias, Josefina: APCJ member, 61. Mir Valentine, Pedro Julio: PSPD Cexn-
received guerrilla training. Identified as active in pro-Castro student group at the tral Committee member; close personal
among prominent APCJ fighters in the cur- University of Santo Domingo. She partici- friend of Fidel. Castro. A frequent traveler
rent Santo Domingo: revolt. On May 3, he pated in guerrilla activities in the Domini- to Cuba (1961 through 1963)., Traveled to
set up a Communist command post in the can Republic in late 1963 and was subse- Moscow in 1959. In 1961 he was sponsoring
Ciudad Neuva area. quently deported to Europe. a daily radio program originating in Cuba,
34. Hernandez Vargas, Hector Homeroi In October 1964 she was in Cuba, where beamed to the Dominican Republic.
APCJ member; recently returned to the Do. she received political training. She returned Mir brought large amounts of money to
minican Republic secretly from Paris where to the Dominican Republic in March 1965. the Dominican. Republic in 1963. Identified
he had been in exile since his deportatior. Among the Communists active in the April on April 30, 1.965, as among the Commu- ,,
in May 1964 for participation in the guerrilla, 24, 1965 rebellion in Santo Domingo and in nists actively participating in the Domini-
movement of late 1963. He received guer??- rebel radio broadcasts. can revolt.
rills training in Cuba in late 1964; a leader 42. Lora Vicente, Silvano: PSPD member; 52. Montas Gonzalez, Luis Adolfo: Member
of the APCJ travel committee arranging fo" received guerrilla warfare training in Cuba of the APCJ Central Committee and political
clandestine return of APCJ exiles to this from late 1963 to early 1964. Lora visited corrmiittee. He was a delegate to the Com-
Dominican Republic. In late March 19610 Moscow in late 1964. On April 25, 1965, was mu:nist-dominated Latin American Youth
was one of group preparing propaganda fo' one of the leaders o an armed Communist Congress held in Santiago, Chile, in March
a possible armed uprising. Among activ~r group at the National Palace. Later that 1964. Identified as among Communists ac-
APCJ leaders in the:present revolt in Sant) same day attended meetings between Com- tive In the Dominican revolt.
Domingo. On April 29, participated in th-e munists and rebel leaders at National Palace. 53. del Orbe, Henry Wilson: PSPD mem-
attack on Ozama Fortress. On May 3, was identified among rebel forces ber who received guerrilla warfare training
35. Houellemont Itoques, Eduardo "Piti": and was observed leading a group of PSPD in Cuba in 1963. He had previously lived
APCJ member; student agitator in 1961, or- members to collectammunition for distribu- 13 years in Cuba, and has traveled to the
ganizing disorders at University of Sant) tion among the armed mobs. U.S.S.R. On April 30, 1965, was identified
Domingo. Ii:nown as pro-Castro; was treas- 43. Macarrtrlla Reyes, Lisandro Antonio: among the Communists participating in the revolt. carer of the FED Student Federation, Was PSPD and the APCJ APCJ member;
Communist ce is in the Dominican
54 Ortiz Desangeles, Manuel: PSPD mem-
a Cuba in 1963. ists participating April 25, 1965, in the zers Ozama section of Santo Domingo. Took a ber and pro-Castro student agitator; has
among the Communists
distribution of arms to civilians in Dominican course in Marxism-Leninism in Havana in conducted indoctrination courses for. Uni-
students evolt. Was among armed mob which seized armed with machinegun at PSPD strongp int April. 26 of 965,, diirrectingothe p oduction of , April offices n anti-
r
25Communist newspaper Prens9 and garrison. Molotov cocktails. Later captured by loyal-
Lib6nde, 25.
Antonio Emilio Jose: PSP:3 44. Maldonado Belkis: PSPD member. ist forces and held prisoner.
36. . Is a Con
member; pro-Castro; student leader and ag - Identified as of May 3> among active Com- 55. Ozuna Hernandez, Daniel: Prominent taing part In the omnican
prominently the
tator. He attended 1 1the 926n of -July a guei- m45. Martinez Howley, Orlando: PSPDrmem 19E3J Aleader PCJ It uerr.Klla fighting; has.:given
tills a Havana ing i63 and received
year.. ber and student leader; active in organizing weapons familiarization instructions to
He warfare training in Cuba the same street agitation and stirring up anti-U.S. APCJ members. On April 25, 1965, was
Czechs received Prague later assistance Was from amotin.gg sentiment. ainong those distributing arms to civilians
meetings group attending meetings at Nationll 46. Matos Rivera, Juan Jose: APCJ mem- in Dominican revolt, and attendedmeetings
Palace on April 25, 1965. Member of the ber who attended the 26th of July celebration with rebel leaders at National Palace later
PSPD-APCJ group that seized control of the in Havana in 1963. He participated in the that day. Was captured by loyalist forces
plant of the anti-Communist newspaper APCJ guerrilla uprising in late 1963. He was on May 2, and held prisoner.
Prensa Libre on April 25. Seen distributing deported to Europe and returned secretly to - 156. Perez Mencia, Ignacio: PSPD member.
Communist Party flysheets calling on the the Dominican Republic in January 1965. OrL April 26, 1965, was observed directing the
people of SantoDomingo to arm themselves On May 3, 1965, he was active among Com- proxluction of molotov cocktails. Later
and fight for "workers' rights". As of May munists fighting in the Ciudad Nueva area. Identified at a Communist stronghold during
3, was identified as one of .the top leader- 47. Mejia Gomez, Juan Bautista: Leading the fighting.
ship group of the rebel movement. APCJ member who served in 1964 on APCJ 57. Perez Perez, Milvio: PSPD member;
37. Isa Oonde Narciso: Brother of Antonio. Central Committee; formerly in charge of owns a bookstore specializing in Communist
PSPD leader, central committee memb4d'. legal matters for Agrupacion Patriotica 20 de literature in Santo Domingo and has done
Octobre, an APCJ front group. photographic work for the PSPD. On April
those Among part o Communists active on April ale Identified as an active Communist, pr- 25, 1965, was among a group of armed Coin-
; part ci n epe armed PSPD group
lat that Pard d a sy ticipant in the Dominican revolt from the munists at the National Palace. - He has been
25, and later a
Ind n
was a
was among g prominent Communists atten3- outset: On May 2, a telephone interview observed distributing arms and molotav
ing meetings at the National Palace. On with him on the APCJ's role in the revolt cocktails to civilians: As of May 5, was en-
April 26, was identified as one of armed PSPD appeared in the Havana newspaper Hoy. gaged in preparing false identity cards for
members on the streets; one of the leadaTS 48. Mejia Lluberes, Rafael de Is, Altagracia Communist leaders.
of the armed group that seized the plant Of ("Baby") : APCJ member; secretary of youth 58. Pichardo Vicboso, Nicolas: PSPD mem-
the newspaper Prensa Libre. Was active in affairs of the party; received political indoc- ber; an officer of the Movimiento Cultural
May 1, distributing propaganda. trination and guerrilla warfare training in Uni.versitarifo (a Communist front group).
38. Johnson Pimentel, Buenaventuta: Cuba in 1963. Returned clandestinely to the He was a member of the group which seized
PSPD leader and a member of the party's ce n- Dominican Republic in January 1964. On anti-Communist newspaper Prensa Libre on
tral committee; also reported to be a mewl er April 30, 1965, was among Communists work- April 25, 1965, preparing immediately to
of the APCJ. On April 25, 1965, was active ing closely with rebel officers in the Domint- publish propaganda leaflets. Was engaged
in the distribution: of weapons to PSPD aid can revolt. On May 2, he was active in the in the production of molotov cocktails on
APCJ members in Dominican revolt. John- - Ciudad Nueva area, and was at one of the April 26, and was observed taking weapons
son's truck. was used to distribute arms to principal APCJ command posts with Juan to a PSPD center on Oalle Espaillat. On
civilians in the Ciudad Nueva area. IM Miguel Roman Diaz. - April 29, participated in the attack on Ozama
house on Espailiat Street in Santo Domir, go - 49. Melia Pena, Francisco Xavier ("Pichi") : Fortress.
used as a rebel garrison in the present :'e- APCJ member and a known Cuban intelli- 59. Pinedo Mejia, Ramon Agustin: MPD
hellion. Molotov cocktails stored there and Bence agent in Santo Domingo. He received leader who traveled from Czechoslovakia to
machineguns mounted on roof. On May 1, training in Cuba as a "frogman" for an un- Cuba in 1962. He was involved in APCJ
50 members (probably a high command known mission in the Dominican Republic. guerrilla activities in the Dominican Re-
group) of all three Communist parties-1-he Active rebel fighter since the outbreak of the public in late 1963. During the Dominican
PSPD, APCJ, and MPD-met at his botee. Dominican revolt and observed at PCJcom- revolt was MPD representative at a meeting
39. Lajara Gonzalez, Alejandro: AFCJ mando headquarters and at an APCJ supply with the APCJ on April 25, 1965, and later
member, named deputy director of investi- center. stationed apt an MPD command post.
gat-ion during 2-day regime of Molina UreIa. 50. Mercedes Batista, Diomedes: PSPD 60. Pumarol_ Peguero,- Catalina: APCJ
Arranged for the supply of additional arms member who traveled to Cuba in July 1963; member and-.student at the University of
to the Communists during the morning of attended the Communist-dominated Second Santo Domingo; close friend of Ema Tavrez
April 27. Latin American Youth Congress in Chile in Justo. She has been active in organizing
40. Licairac Diaz, Alexis: -Member of Al CJ March 1964. Active from outset of revolt on street agitation and stirring up anti-U.S.
youth section and a student at the Val- April 24. Was seen haranguing civilian sentiment.
versity of Santo Domingo. He was a dale- crowd at Parque-Independencia on April 25, (11. Ramos Alvarez, Benjamin: High-level
gate to the Communist-dominated Latin and later that day was operating a sound member of the APCJ, and head of the District
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 S?ptember 23, 1965ApproveFP Ye P / W A--R &if00446R000500110026-7 24081
Committee ' for Santo Domingo. All three
Communist Party leadership groups met with
him on April 29, 1965, to discuss future
tactics.
62. Restituyo Apolinar: PSPD member and
student agitator; active in organizing street
agitation.
63. Ricart Ricart, Gustavo Federico: MPD
Central Committee member, and the most
prominent MPD leader in the Dominican
Republic at the outbreak of the Dominican
revolt. Was in Cuba 1962-63 and brought
back approximately $50,000 to fund MPD
activities. Commanded a rebel stronghold
as early as April 26, 1965.
64. Rodriguez Acosta, Jose Francisco:
Member of PSPD Central Committee. Was
trained in Cuba in 1962. Known to have
been in Prague prior to February 1963; has
also been in the Soviet Union. He was active
in the party's military buildup early in the
rebellion. One of the leaders of a PSPD
armed group at a Communist strongpoint on
April 25, 1965.
65. Rodriguez del Prado, Carlos: PSPD
member and cousin of Cayetano Rodriguez
del Prado, one of the principal leaders of the
MPD. On April 25, 1965, he met at his house
with other armed Communists active in the
Dominican revolt.
66. Rodriguez, del Prado, Cayetano: Mem-
ber of the MPD Central Committee and sec-
retary of propaganda. Participated in Cuban
attempt to cache arms and ammunition, as
well as infiltrate three top level MPD mem-
bers into the Dominican Republic during the
APCJ guerrilla uprisings. Deported from the
Dominican Republic in May 1964 and tra-
veled to Communist China. Wrote a pam-
phlet outlining methods by which MPD could
use Dominican students in the Chinese man-
ner to carry out a successful revolution.
Was in police custody when Dominican re-
volt broke out, but was released on April 25.
Was known to be in contact with PSPD and
other Communists during the course of the
revolt, but did not participate in active fight-
ing because of ill health.
67. Rodriguez Fernandez, Orlando: APCJ
member; active among Communists in the
Dominican revolt; working energetically to
organize anti-U.S. sentiment.
68. Roman Diaz, Juan Miguel: Member of
APCJ Central Committee; participated in
guerrilla activities in the Dominican Re-
public in late 1963. Deported in May 1964
to Lisbon; returned clandestinely to the
Dominican Republic in January 1965. One
of the top rebel Communists from the out-
set of the revolt, and leading military figure
of the APCJ. Commanded one of the larg-
est rebel strongholds which served as a com-
mand post, arsenal, and prison. (Note:
killed in rebel assault on National Palace
on May 19, 1965.)
69. de la Rosa Cano, Jesus: PSPD member;
former ensign in the Dominican Navy. On
April 25, 1965, was inciting crowds to burn
and destroy property.
70. Sanchez Cordoba, Luis Rene: MPD
member; in 1964 was interim secretary gen-
eral of MPD. Identified as among Commu-
nists actively participating in the Dominican
revolt; was captured by loyalists on May 3.
71. Santamarfa Demorizi, Miguel Angel:
Communist agitator; involved in Dominican
subversive activities since at least 1961. In
1963, was in charge of making hand grenades
for Communist groups. Was deported from
both the Dominican Republic and France;
returned to the Dominican Republic in late
1963 from Venezuela. Identified among
Communists active in the Dominican revolt.
He was at the National Palace on April 25,
with other Communists.
72. Sosa Valerio, ,Ariosto: PSPD member.
On April 25, 1965, was with the armed Com-
munist group at the National Palace, and
later in the day attended meetings there.
73. Tavarez Justo, Etna: APCJ member
and student agitator; she is the sister of
Manuel Tavarez Justo who was killed while
leading the APCJ guerrilla. movement in late
1963. She was among the Communists at
the National Palace on April 25, 1965, and
was active in Communist propaganda ac-
tivities from the outset of the revolt.
74. Tavaras Rosario, Rafael Francisco
"Fafa": Member of Central Executive Com-
mittee of APCJ; received guerrilla warfare
training in Cuba in late 1963 and early 1964.
Returned to the Dominican Republic from
Cuba in December 1964 using a false pass-
port. As of April 30, 1965, was identified
among those Communists working closely
with rebel military leadership. On May 2,
was at one of the main Communist command
posts.
75. Tolentino Dipp, Hugo: PSPD member;
chief of a Dominican guerrilla unit trained
in Cuba. Was deported in February 1962
and received training in Soviet bloc coun-
tries. Returned clandestinely to Dominican
Republic. Participated in distribution of
arms to civilians in Dominican revolt on
April 25, 1965. As of May 3, was one of the
top leadership group of the rebel government.
76. Valdez Conde, Nicolas Quirico: PSPD
member; in 1959 was member of the execu-
tive body of the PSPD. Employed in Cuba
as Russian interpreter for Fidel Castro in
June 1963. Lived in Moscow for 3 years.
Identified among Communists active in the
Dominican revolt.
77. Vicioso Gonzalez., Abelardo Sergio:
PSPD member who has been active in stu-
dent affairs. Was in Cuba in 1960, and
again in 1962 and 1963; attended a student
congress in Cuba in August 1961, and then
went to Czechoslovakia and the U.S.S.R.
While in Cuba in 1962 was training for sub-
versive activity in the Dominican Republic.
Identified as of April 30, 1965, among Com-
munists active in the Dominican revolt.
APPENDIX 3
MINUTES OF THE FOURTH PLENARY SESSION
(CLOSED)
(Document 46 (Provisional) May 7-8, 1965)
Chairman: His Excellency Ambassador
Guillermo Sevilla Sacasa, special delegate
from Nicaragua.
Secretary general of the meeting: Dr. Wil-
liam Sanders.
Present: Their Excellencies Alfredo Vaz-
quez Carrizosa (Colombia), Roque J. Y6 dice
(Paraquay), Alejandro Magnet (Chile), Ra-
m6n de Clairmont Duefias (El Salvador),
Rodrigo Jacome M. (Ecuador), Juan Bautista
de Lavalle (Peru), Ricardo A. Midence (Hon-
duras), Enrique Tejera Paris (Venezuela),
Jose Antonio Bonilla Atiles (Dominican Re-
public), Humberto Calamarl G. (Panama),
Raul Diez de Medina (Bolivia), Ricardo M.
Colombo (Argentina), Carlos Garcia Bauer
(Guatemala), Rafael de la Colina (Mexico),
Gonzalo J. Facio (Costa Rica), Emilio N.
Oribe (Uruguay), Ellsworth Bunker (United
States), Fern D. Baguidy (Haiti), Ilmar
Penna Marinho (Brazil).
Also present at the meeting was Mr. San-
tiago Ortiz, assistant secretary general of
the meeting of consultation.
Recording secretary: Jose F. Martinez.
REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE
The PRESIDENT. Your Excellencies, I have
the honor of opening the 4th plenary ses-
sion of the 10th meeting of consultation of
ministers of foreign affairs, which has been
called for the principal purpose of receiving
a confidential report from His Excellency,
Ambassador Ricardo M. Colombo, Repre-
sentative of Argentina and Chairman of the
Special Committee that went- to the Do-
minican Republic, which has prepared a
confidential report. Ambassador Colombo
addressed the following note to me today:
"Your Excellency, I have the honor of
transmitting to you the first report of the
Special Committee of the 10th meeting of
consultation of ministers of' foreign affairs
of the member states of the Organization. I
respectfully request you to direct that this
report be distributed to the Special Dele-
gates to this Meeting of Consultation. Ac-
cept, Sir, the assurances of my highest
consideration. Ricardo M. Colombo, Am-
bassador of Argentina, Chairman of the
Special Committee."
First of all, I wish to express to His Ex-
cellency Ambasador Ricardo M. Colombo
and to his distinguished colleagues on the
Committee, Their Excellencies Ambassador
Ilmar Penna Marinho, of Brazil, Ambassa-
dor Alfredo Vazquez Carrizosa, of Colombia,
Ambassador Carlos Garcia Bauer, of Guate-
mala, and Ambassador Frank Morrice, of
Panama, the deep appreciation of the meet-
ing, and especially of all of their colleagues,
for the magnificent and efficient work they
have done in carrying out the delicate mis-
sion entrusted to them by the Meeting. We
have followed their work with a great deal
of attention and interest, and feel proud of
having appointed them; and we are sure
that the Americas, our people and our gov-
ernments, applaud that work, and this Meet-
ing expresses its appreciation and praise for
it. In accordance with the Regulations,
plenary sessions are public. When I spoke
this morning with our colleague Chairman
of the Committee, it seemed to me appro-
priate that this meeting be closed, precisely
because the report to be presented by Am-
bassador Colombo, in behalf of the Commis-
sion of which he is Chairman, is, precisely,
of a confidential nature. This decision by
the Chair, that this meeting be closed, I am
sure will not be objected to by the Repre-
sentatives. I am happy that everyone agrees
that this meeting should be closed. This
will be recorded in the minutes. I recognize
the Ambassador of Argentina, His Excellency
Ricardo Colombo, Chairman of the Special
Committee, so that he may be good enough
to present the report referred to in the note
I had the honor of receiving this morning.
The Ambassador has the floor.
Mr. COLOMBO (the Special Delegate of Ar-
gentina). Thank you very much, Mr. Presi-
dent. I should like to make clear, before be-
ginning to read the report, that it begins
by referring to the very time of our arrival,
or rather, to our departure from Washington,
for which reason we do not record here the
fact, which we do wish to point out, that at
the time of our arrival, and in compliance
with a resolution of the Council of the OAS,
the Secretary-General of the Organization of
American States, Dr. Mora, was already there
carrying out his duties, regarding which he
will give his own report.
[Reads the first report of the Special
Committee.I I
Mr. COLOMBO. May the meeting consider
the report to have been presented in behalf
of the Committee duly appointed. Thank
you very much, Mr. President; - thank
you very much, gentlemen.
The PRESIDENT. I take note of what Am-
bassador Colombo has Just said, and, clearly,
we have been most pleased with the report.
Your Excellencies will have noticed its fine
quality.
Mr. GARCfA BAUER (the Special Delegate of
Guatemala). If the President will allow me,
I should like to recommend to all- the Dele-
gates that they take the following note with
respect to the documents that contains the
report of the committee that has just been
read, and has also just been distributed, par-
don me. On page 9 there are certain errors
that were made in transferring the text to
the stencil. In the last line on that page,
where it says "guardia de policia militar," the
I The first report of the Special Committee
with the corrections indicated below by the
Special Delegate of Guatemala and accepted
by the other members of the Committee, has
been published as Document 47 of the
meeting.
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 24082
Approved For ReleWR A/' jRA B004 "J5001100 tember 23, 196S'
word "mixta" should be added, so that it will inatic corps accredited to the Government of
say "una guardia de poliela militar n:dxta." the Dominican Republic. It reads:
On page 12, in the next to the last linefrom
the bottom, where it says "y de quo ?stra
mantendria," it should say "y de que man-
tendria los contactos" On page 13, at the
end of the second paragraph, it is
necessary to add "En la ultima parts de la
entrevista estuvo presente el General Wes
sin y Wessin a solicited de la Comision" at
the end of the paragraph. And on page 26,
second paragraph, where it says "la resolu-
c16n del 30 de abril" it should be "resolu-
cion del 1.1 de mayor" [These corrections
were taken into account before the English
text of the document was issued.]
The PRESIDENT. The Chairman asks the
distinguished members of the Committee
whether they accept and consider incorpo-
rated in the text of their valuable report the
observations made by His Excellency the
Ambassador of Guatemala, The Chairn'?
of the Committee.
The CHAIRMAN OF THE COMMITTEE. I fully
accept them, Mr. President.
The PRESIDENT. Undoubtedly we shall re-
ceive a second edition :of this report contain-
ing precisely the amendments already ac-
cepted by the Chairman of the Committee.
Mr. GARCIA BAUER. Mr. President, they are
not things to accept, but rather the question
is that in the report of the Committee these
points were omitted.
The PRESIDENT. That is just what I was re-
ferring to, that the Chairman of the Com-
mittee has precisely accepted the incorpora-
tion of the omitted matter, the clarifying of
the points. He has accepted, as Chairman of
the Committee, in behalf of all its members,
that the observations should be taken into
account in the new edition that is to be made
of the report. In other words, they are cor-
rections of form.
Mr. GARCIA BAUER. No, Mr. President, those
are not corrections of form, they are omis-
sions made in copying the report of the Com-
mittee.
The PRESIDENT. Precisely, the Chair was
mistaken, they are omissions of form, pre-
cisely. Gentlemen of the Special Committee,
the report, which has just been read by your
distinguished Chairman, Ambassador Ricar-
do M. Colombo, of Argentina, reveals a job
done that the Chair would describe as ex-
traordinary, very worthy of the sense of
responsibility and the personal capabilities
of the distinguished Ambassadors who make ?
up this historic Committee in the inter-
American system. Being extraordinary, it is
a job worthy of our appreciation, of the
appreciation of this Meeting of Consulta-
tion and of those of us who are honored to
call ourselves colleagues of the Ambassadors
who make up the Special Committee. In
saying this, I am honored to confirm to you
what I said to His Excellency Ambassador
Ricardo Colombo in the message that I had
the honor to address to him today, which
reads:
"The Honorable Ricardo M. Colombo,
Chairman of the Committee of the Tenth
Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of
Foreign Affairs: I am pleased to express
to you and to your colleagues on the Com-
mittee of the Organization of American
States established by the 10th Meeting of
Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Af-
fairs the appreciation of the Meeting for the
prompt and interesting information fur-
nished in your two messages received on
May 3 and 4. The Meeting has taken note-
of the messages and hopes that the impor-
tant tasks being undertaken with such dedi-
cation and efficiency may soon be completed
with full success. Accept, Sir, the renewed
assurances of my highest consideration. Se-
villa-Sacasa, President of the 10th meeting."
I have the satisfaction of informing you
regarding a communication the Chair has re-
ceived from His Excellency Emanual
Clarizio, Papal Nunzio, dean of the diplo-
"Guillermo Sevilla-Sacasa, Presidentof the
Tenth meeting of Consultation of Ministers
of Foreign Affairs"-this communication is
dated May 5-"I thank you with deep emo-
tion for message Your Excellency sent me on
behalf of Tenth Meeting of Consultation of
Ministers of Foreign Affairs. I have sincere
hopes that providential assistance by Orga-
nization of American States quickly begun
In Santo Domingo by Secretary General Mora
and happily assumed by Special Committee
of worthy members headed by Ambassador
Colombo will soon achieve for the beloved
Dominican nation the humanitarian ideals
of peace and well-being that Inspire that
high and noble institution." It is signed
by Emmanual Clarizio, Papal Nunzio of His
Holiness.
I said at the beginning that naturally this
meeting is of a closed nature, which indi-
cates that, at the proper time, a public ple-
nary session should be held, in order publicly
to take cognizance once again of the text of
the report and the opinions expressed regard-
ing it. It seems logical for the first step to be
to obtain the second edition, as I call It, of
this report, in which the omitted matter
so correctly mentioned by our colleague
from Guatemala will appear: in order that
the General Committee of the Meeting of
Consultation may take cognizance of the re-
port and then submit its decision on it to the
plenary. This Is what the Chair has to re-
port on the matter for the present, but
naturally, we would like in this closed meet-
ing, in the private atmosphere in which we
are now, to hear some expression by some
distinguished Representative on the text of
the report that was read by the distinguished
Chairman of the General Committee. The
representative of Mexico, Ambassador de la
Colina, has asked for the floor, and I recog-
nize him.
Mr. DE LA COLINA (the Special Delegate of
Mexico). First of all I wish to express, or
rather, join in the comments that you, Mr.
Chairman, have made in appreciation and
deep recognition of the distinguished mem-
bers of the Committee we took the liberty
to appoint, in recognition of not only this
wonderful report they have presented us, but
also the efforts they doubtlessly have made
under most difficult conditions and with
great efficiency and dignity. Now I would
like to know, Mr. Chairman, whether it
would be possible to ask some questions,
-especially since we are meeting in executive
session, for clearly our governments surely
are going to want to know the very learned
opinion of our distinguished representatives
regarding some aspects touched on only in-
cidentally in this most interesting report,
with the reservation, naturally, that perhaps
in a later session, also secret, we could elabo-
rate on some other aspects that, for the
moment, escape us. Would that be possible,
Mr. President?
The PRESIDENT. I believe the question is
very important. The President attaches
great Importance to the question put by the
Ambassador of the Republic of Mexico re-
garding our taking advantage of this execu-
tive session to ask the distinguished Com-
mittee some questions.
Mr. COLOMBO. I ask for the floor, Mr.
President.
The PRESIDENT. You have the floor, Mr.
Ambassador.
Mr. COLOMBO. The Committee is ready to
answer, Insofar as it can, any questions the
representatives of the sister republics of the
Americas wish to ask its members.
The PRESIDENT. Very well. Is the Ambas-
sador of Mexico satisfied? You have the
floor.
Mr. DE LA COLINA. Thank you, Mr. Chair-
man. For the time being I would like to
know whether it is possible, after having
listened closely to everything our distin-
guished colleague, the Representative of Ar-
gentina, has told us. I have the perhaps
mistaken impression from the technique as
well as from the quick reading I was giving
this document we just corrected, that there
seems to have been a certain consensus be-
tween the opposing sides as to the possible
elimination of the generals. Perhaps I am
mistaken, but it seems to follow from that
reading and from this idea that on both sides
the colonels were more or less disposed to
create, let us say, a high command, other
than the one that has remained thus far.
I wonder whether it would be possible for
you gentlemen to elaborate on this, or
whether you simply have no Idea on the
matter.
The PRESIDENT. Would the Chairman of
the Committee like to respond to the con-
cern of the Representative of Mexico?
Mr. COLOMBO. With great pleasure. As the
report states, Mr. President, the request to
exclude the seven military men, whose names
I have read in the Committee's report, was a
complaint by the junta led by Colonel Ca-
amaflo and transmitted by the Committee to
the military ~u.nta led by Colonel Benoit.
The Act of Santo Domingo, furthermore, is
clearly written, and the stamped signatures
of the parties ratifying it are affixed. I be-
lieve I have responded to the concern of the
Ambassador of Mexico.
Mr.. DE LA COLINA. Another point now, if
I may.
The PREsmENi. With pleasure.
Mr.. DE LA COLINA. ]C would like to know, if
this is also pcssible, whether the distin-
guished representatives could give us their
impressions regarding the degree of Com-
munist infiltration in the rebel or constitu
tional forces, or whatever you want to call
them. For example, there was the reference
to this Frenchman -* * * who came from
Indochina, and who trains frog men * * *
etc.; perhaps there is some thought that this
person might have close ties, for example,
with other Communists; or do they have the
impression at least that, in the high com-
mand of that group, the rebel group, there
is now definite and significant Communist
leadership. Thank you, Mr. President.
Mr:. COLOMBO. As for myself, I, as a member
of the Committee, not as Chairman, have no
objection to answering the question by the
Ambassador of Mexico, but as a matter of
procedure for answers, I wish to provide an
opportunity for the Chairman to speak in
general terms in order not to deny the dis-
tinguished members of the Committee their
legitimate right to answer as members of the
Conani1ttee, which we all are; that is, I would
not want to be monopolizing the answers be-
cause, without prejudice to a given answer,
we oa;n. give another of the members of the
Committee an opportunity to give the reply
that, In his judgment, should be given.
Thus, in order to respect fair treatment and
not find myself in the middle of the violent
and inelegant position of monopolizing the
answers-and I ask the members of the Com-
mittee whether some of them want to an-
swer, then I ask you to give the floor first
to Alil.bassador Vazquez Carrizosa, of Colom-
bia.
The PRESIDENT. The: Ambassador of Colom-
bia, members of the Special Committee, will
answer the question by the Ambassador of
Mexico.
Mr. CARRIZOSA (the Special Delegate of
Colombia). Mr. President, the Representa-
tive of Mexico asks what the opinion is.
I will state mine, because I am not going
to answer on behalf of the Committee, as
to the degree of Communist infiltration on
both sides. Of course, the question must
refer to the command or sector led by Colonel
Francisco Caamafio, because I do not think
it refers to any Communist leanings by Gen-
eral Wessin y 'A essln, Colonel Saladin or
any of his colleagues. With regard to the
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 September 23, 196A;pproved yfCAWhW46M14 a O -RD 7'B8B446R000500110026-7 24083
sector led by Colonel Francisco Caamafio, Dominican Republic," and already he put ments, which can be easily controlled by
many diplomats accredited in the Dominican the political label on a good part of the clever agents and experts in the art of trans-
Republic, and I can include my country's snipers on both sides. It should be said, forming democratic popular movements into
diplomatic representative, feel that, if not Mr. Ambassador, that you will understand Marxist-Leninist revolutions. Thank you,
Col. Francisco Caamafio, whom I do not the extent of responsibility of the answers Mr. President.
know to be personally a Communist, there and the depth of the questions, and I would The PRESIDENT. The Representative of
are indeed numerous persons on his side like to satisfy your own concern; but I have Ecuador, Ambassador J6,come, has requested
that, if they are not members of the Com- fulfilled with loyalty by reporting the con- the floor.
munit Party, are actively in favor of Fidel versation to you objectively, telling you that Mr. JACOME (the Special Delegate of Ecua-
Castro's system of government or political I believe that those who have the answer to dor). I wish to adhere with all sincerity and
purposes. There is such a tendency in the this question is to be found among the ac- warmth of the words of the Representative of
opinion of many diplomats I spoke to, and tors, the protagonists of this hour who are Mexico, praising the selflessness and the ar-
I do not mention other countries in order living in the Dominican Republic. This is duous work as well as the spirit of sacrifice
not to commit countries represented here, what I wanted to say now, Mr. Chairman. with which the Committee performed its
They are firmly convinced that on that side The PRESIDENT. Very well, Mr. Ambassador. functions, and for having succeeded, by the
there are many persons, I do not say members Mr. DE LA COLINA. Mr. Ambassador of Co- time of its departure, in leaving a somewhat
registered in an officially organized Com- lombia, I greatly value this reply; I wanted more favorable situation than the one it
munist Party, but persons who do have lean- both, but naturally with reference to the found upon arrival. Now that we are asking
ings toward a well-known trend is prevalent reply whereby you explain one more aspect, for the opinions of the distinguished col-
in Cuba. Many thanks, Mr. Ambassador. leagues on the Committee, I would like to
Mr. DE LA COLINA. Thank you, Mr. Ambas- know if they have any impression as to a
salon. The PRESIDENT: Would the Ambassador of
Guatemala like to say something on the formula, or if there is any desire on the part
The PRESIDENT. Does any member of the of the two factions to brin about
Committee wish to add to the answer re- question put by the Ambassador of Mexico? g peace by
quested by the Representative of Mexico? Mr. GARCIA BAUER (the special delegate peace that w forming tran cease-fire, the truce, Into a
Is the Representative of Mexico now satisfied of Guatemala). Mr. Chairman, for the mo- e the inn political
and organiza-
Is the information given, to him? The ment, no; certainly this point was discussed ural ral of the
process Dominican m that t should rm obe be followed the lici in the rder
order
Ambassador of Guatemala. in the Committee; the Committee also had to have a constitutionally stable system? It
Mr. COLOMBO. If the President will allow a series of things, and since there is not yet has been gratifying to hear this opinion, at
me, I do not know what system the President any criterion of the Committee, I do not for least on one side, that the so-called constitu-
may have to gage the kind of questions. the moment wish to present any viewpoint, tional government of Colonel Caamafio is cer-
The PRESIDENT. Well, your Excellency said The PRESIDENT. The Ambassador of Bra- tain that it can at' a given moment control
that he wanted his colleagues to participate oil, and capture the infiltrators that are deter-
in the answers in their, let us say, personal Mr. PENNA MARINHO (the Special Delegate mined to block peace, and, in order to take
status, in order to distribute the task of of Brazil). Mr. President, I should like to advantage of that situation, to continue the
answering, and, naturally, the President took corroborate the statements made by my col- chaos that has prevailed in Santo Domingo
note of the fact that your Excellency had, in- leagues from the Colombia and Argentina, up to now. But if that command hopes to
vited his colleague from Colombia to answer and add one more aspect that I believe could keep and is confident that it can keep con-
the question put by the Ambassador of help to clarify the approach that could be trol it is natural that whatever the command
Mexico. I, by way of courtesy, am asking given to the problem. I should like to add, thinks with regard to the possibility of a for-
your Excellency whether any other col- gentlemen, that with the complete collapse mula for stable peace through an under-
leagues would like to express their opinions of public authority-since neither the forces standing with the others-the present ene-
on the same question the Ambassador of of the Government Junta of Benoit, San- mies-would be very useful and constructive
Mexico asked. I request your Excellency to tana, and Saladin nor those of Colonel Caa- to know because we would then, with a little
tell me, whether any other of his colleagues mafio were in control of the situation-the tenacity, through friendly, fraternal media-
would like to ask any questions. Dominican state practically disappeared as tion, have a favorable prospect of ,arriving,
Mr. COLOMBO. I am going to add very little, a juridical-political entity, and the coun- within a reasonably short time, at an under-
of course, to what the Ambassador of Co- try became a sort of no man's land. The standing between the two combatants. This
lombia, with his accustomed brilliance, has arsenal had been given to the people and an would be the best guarantee that the Ameri-
just said, by saying that this report, affirmed entire disoriented population of adolescents cas, as well as the Dominican Republic, could
by a large number of representatives of the and fanatics was taking up modern auto- have that those infiltrators and those ele-
Diplomatic Corps, is public and well known matic arms, in a state of excitation that was ments that wish the chaos to continue,
to anyone who cares to make inquiry. But further excerbated by constant radio broad- would be eliminated and hence definitely
despite the respect that I owe to the opinion casts of a clearly subversive character. Nei- neutralized.
of the Diplomatic Corps, in order to estab- ther do I believe that I am, nor does any of I would like to know what opinion the
lish this in precise tI was con- the members of this Committee believe that Committee formed, after it succeeded in talk-
cerned as much as precise was terms-for
the Ambassador with he is, in a position to state with assurance ing with the parties in conflict, what impres-
being able to verify this question-I wanted that the movement of Colonel Caamafio, sion does it have of the opinion or of the
to go to the source; and we spoke with the inspired by the truly. popular figure of for- formulas or of the hopes they have regarding
to oeto men who were in this srebel poke with t group- mer President Bosch, is a clearly Communist a final agreement that may return the situa-
different a men who thing, from the head of movement. But one fact is certain: in view tion to normal3
the revolution, le
Colonel Caamao, to thing, from i h some of of the real anarchy in which the country The PRESIDENT. Would the Committee like
known as Minister of the Presidency, has been engulfed for several days, espe- to answer the question raised by the Repre-
one they now nizd that they were Presidency, gnat cially the capital city, where bands of snip- sentative of Ecuador? One of the colleagues
preylem, they explained to a certain extent ers have been sacking and killing and obey- on the Committee; the Chairman, Ambassa-
proble the process of the hiertai of the ing no one, any organized group that landed dor Garcia Bauer, Ambassador Vazquez
Dominican Republic, they confess h on the island could dominate the situation. Carrizosa, Ambassador Penna Marinho, the
how ncaaRea number of elements confessed to us For that reason, and our understanding Chairman of the Committee, Ambassador
howg incorporated with them whom they were coincides with that of a majority of the dep- Colombo, in his capacity as Representative
b
called eing Commoratednd that of the chiefs of diplomatic mis- of Argentina?
was to avoid inists, a h e their problem
the purpose m sions accredited there, all of the members Mr. COLOMBO. Perhaps this is the question
springing inrpriaa and
e and for
seizing . of the Committee agree in admitting that that I shall answer with the greatest Ameri-
Then said this clearly, and z ng coontrol the Caamafio movement, fortunately truly canist feeling, Mr, Chairman. I cannot deny,
p-I cult aint s in the sometimes diffeven one task of democratic in its origins, since none of us Mr. Ambassador, gentlemen, that I also, like
T
dividing this formal nomination of the sincerely believes that Caamafio is a Com- the Ambassador of Mexico, have confessed to
div in which there no merit munist, could be rapidly converted into a him that I shared and still share the concern
chairmanship inris be Communist insurrection; above all it is seen expressed in his question and that, perhaps,
perhaps the that hi e other four there
greater than that anyone else, to be heading toward becoming a govern- It was the question that caused me the great-
members , be there ment of that kind, susceptible of obtaining est concern. The most urgent problem when
m hh taldi-I ent aent ar with doing f r Colonel the e Chairman is
and the support and the assistance of the great we left was not to find ideoligical banners
Marxist-Leninist powers. Therefore, Mr. distinguishing the parties, but to put an
asked him in a friendly way whether he hon- President, we do not believe that Colonel end to the conflict that was already becom-
estly believed that such infiltration existed. Caamafio and his closest advisers are Com- ing bloody and that could become a blood
He confirmed this to me, but he gave me the munists. Meanwhile, as the entire Caamafio bath in,the Americas. We talked with the
impression that he had the courage to face movement rests upon a truly popular basis, two parties and believe, me, Mr. Chairman,
it. He said to me: `They are not going to by certain areas escaping from the control I at first had the feeling that law was dead;
grab the movement, and my concern is that of that democratic group of leaders it would it -was chaos in the Dominican Republic.
in their losing the possibility of control they be quite possible for that movement to be We all shared it-all members of the Com-
have stayed behind the snipers, today there diverted from its real origins and to follow mittee, the military advisers, the General
are those that do not wish a solution for the the oblique plan of
o
ular
b
d
p
p
-
ase
move- Secretariat, our civilian advisers-and when
No. 176-22
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 24084 Approved For Re! e (gikM14AIPIA B9Q 05001162gt9rynber 23, 196
we arrived we found chaos, such as we had weary of struggle and would like to arrive I am certain that the two sides in the strug-
never seen or even imagined. I felt that law 1,t some solution. I, at least, found that gle are not controlling their movement, be-
did not exist, and we all thought there was -;here certainly is a basic desire to reach an cause the Oeae but was u accepted a by the
little hope that they wanted to find a solu- inderstanding between the parties and over- fighting groups;
tion that would be feasible, despite the moral dome present difficulties. We were sur- gredient conspired against the carrying out
authority that we represented. We were only ??rised, for example, when we began conver- of the act of Santo Domingo, an element
a very few, as men, as individuals, but stations with the Rebel Commander, that a that history shows does not find a solution
we bore the weight of the historic tradition colonel was present who was a liaison officer by peaceful means and that grows larger
of the system whose 75th anniversary we oetween the Military Junta of San Isidro and whenever attempts at reaching peace are
celebrated, and this Inspired all the mem- the Papal Nuncio. And the manner in made, because what will happen, to a great ned bers of the Committee.: From the first man which he was treated, by Colonel Caamafio extent, is what t whapp an abo s, incease parley-
of the rebel band with whom we spoke, Colo- as well as the other :members of the Rebel lug peace, nel Caamafio, to the first man with whom Command, surprised us because he was in a by the commands so as to talk with the
we spoke from the Command of the Military group completely opposed to the one he rep- peace mission, but we had to parley for
Junta, Colonel Benoit, we found that they resented. We did not see the hatred that 21/2 hours under incessant machinegun
were both weary of the conflict that dark- might have been expected in such circum- and rifle fire. Who did that? Colonel
ened the Americas. We found in both of stances. We can bear witness, therefore, to Caamafio? I think not, categorically, no. was
s the
because them a desire to achieve peace that was equal sthat hown. deference, Rthe ebel treatment
Commanderhofer d to wniwhere arms are ha ded out to civilians,
to turn. to the Committee itself to deliver about 500 there can be only two forms of control: either
untrue Mr. President
were It to would be that fot I fo r und d the wish to, if con- I prisoners so that it might take charge of when the civilians lay down their arms and
say fight time the at this stage w to e of the tragedy them; that is, acts such as these indicate surrender them willingly, or when this is
in the Dominican Republic. There was a how they wish to end this situation that is achieved by a force superior to the civilian
difficult
longing for peace and we were caught in the dividing the people of the Dominican Repub- force. . Let all of you' demtte in which
enthusiasm to achieve it. But we were com- lie; from these acts, and from others that we imagining a peace P
pletely surprised, Mr. Ambassador, by some- have seen, I have reached the conclusion that we again have the signatures of the two
thing more important than this objective at bottom there is a desire, a keen desire to parties, we have the security zone, and the
which is essentially what we all desire; the reach an understanding. The question is to incident is being provoked as a factor break-
two parties said that the solution lay in the find the formula for making this under- ing out into a tremendous catastrophe. I
system. Nobody assumed standing a reality' honestly confess that until now I could not
inter-American The PRESIDENT. Other representatives have explain how something much worse did not
tnhe right to impose peace because-and let asked to speak. I ask the members of the occur. The provocation of the snipers is
th no isre be triumph misunderstanding-the in Santo side that Committee if any of them wishes to join constant. There are among them, no doubt,
w
ft is Stab- .in the reply to the question raised by the the two classes of snipers that there are in
wshes the sister Santo Domingo
dens the si ster intensity factions a g u that Representative of Ecuador. The Representa- such events: those who grab a gun and con-
was tood unfolding he intensity t the tragedy that tive of Ecuador. tinue using it with a resentment that no
was unSanto Domingo; both JAcoME. Yes, thank you, Mr. Chair- reasoiii:ng will lead them to lay it down, and
placed their faith in the Inter-American ean n man. i am infinitely grateful for this reply those: who continue using it with the resent-
syem. which is truly promising because it has con- ment of one who cannot control the revolt.
Durir_g the rthese of Committee era asked them when firmed the suspicion that every human be- That is, these are factors that cannot be
ah y would be the Committ iin tif ing has who knows the tragedy of a civil war; controlled by a 'mission no matter what flag
they would h is nswe d res; With within that those persons who have stained their of peace it carries.
the system, they answered yes; with all their country with blood and caused so many The Government of Santo Domingo will
faith. But w was more than that, Mr. Am- deaths, who have seen so much suffering and not achieve peace until it can be imposed
valuator; it was ews anlaske Ch "If said, caused so much suffering, would now have in a climate where conditions in a peace-
cause w d ntarilyas A newsman asked him, a your reached the moment of longing for peace ful Santo Domingo exist for the recovery of
what would you do?" in the confessed oUnited Nations, and perhaps each of them feeling remorse for institutional normality in the country. Sin
he would he cnto us the sufferings and the misfortunes they have cerely, Mr. Ambassador, in the choice that
what r do that and
that t answered el because he in no way caused. This is an eminently human re- you have given me I sacrifice my wish-
accept that channel answer had was found action that we all know. But I am equally which is equal to yours-to a realistic con-
witsystem and the For had to be sounsatisfied to hear that both parties rest their cept that one can only appreciate, unfortu-
within the she C. For that that sent by reason the he OASwas. faith in the inter-American system, but I nately, by having been there. We wished,
happy to see the Committee have now seen a report, a report concerning and we five Ambassadors who were on the
He placed his faith in the Organization of the statements made by Colonel Caamafio mission mentioned it many times to one an-
American States to find the solution. And to the effect that he will not accept the other, that all of your could have been there,
when we spoke with Colonel Benoit he gave Inter-American Force established by the last that not one bad been missing, Mr. Presi-
us the same affirmation; his faith is in the resolution of this Meeting of Consultation. dent, That you could have been at the scene
system. We have already seen that it also seems that of events to see what we were seeing. In.
I believe that in the midst of the agony of Colonel Caamafio and his partisans have not the tremendous
en
to find a the thread that would it
the Dominican Republic, this system that accepted the present state of affairs, the open
among ourselves we have talked so much of presenceof foreign troops in Santo Domingo. the knot we were trying to untie, where
strengthening was more alive than ever and Hence, would not perhapsColonel Caamafio, there is political and military confusion, eco-
in an hour of testing, in the midst of a and in the end all Dominicans, whatever nomic disaster, confused people, general an-
struggle more fierce than any I remember their ideologies and whatever the barricade guish, no one can find the ingredient for
within the system, I could see that both sides on which they have stood, prefer a mission guidance. I believe, Mr. Ambassador, that it
felt this to be the only possible solution that of peace to a mission of guns? We might is urgent to seek peace in the Dominican Re-
could maintain peace in the Americas. Both think of a permanent peace mission of the public and to tarry as little as possible in
took into account the possibility that it was Organization of American States, which discussion, because every hour of discussion
being compromised: they knew that the would receive the same impressions but is an hour you give to someone who, with
peace of the hemislahere might be endan-- which would be seeking a concrete formula gam, or evil intentions, could still pull the
gered if the conflict wasn't soon stopped, to bring those parties together who wish to trigger that would prevent the Act of Santa
This, Mr. Ambassador, is what I can tell you, reach an understanding and give them the Domingo from being fulfilled. This is my
with great satisfaction, and I look to the opportunity of not feeling pressured by arms personal impreission.
system for the solution just as all of us arc or not having the inward suspicion that The PRESIDENT. The Representative of Ec-
going to look, and you will see that the sys, those arms are playing the game of their ad- uador has nothing more that he wants to
tem will find that solution. versaries. I should like and I venture to put say? I recognize the Representative of Uru-
The PRES::DENT. The Representative o:: this question to the members of the com- guay, Ambassador Emilio Oribe.
Guatemala will contribute to the answer mittee, and I beg your pardon, as tired and Mr. ORIHE (the Special Delegate of Uru-
that the Representative of Ecuador haze fatigued as you all must be, for still abusing guay). Mr. President, first of all, I want to
requested. your time with these question. Thank you adopt the words of the distinguished Ambas-
Mr. GARCIA BAUER. Mr. President, i wish very much. sadors who have spoken before me in con.-
to add a few words to what the Ambassador Mr. COLOMDO. I said something, a little gratulating the Committee on its work and deleg tion
replying to the question ex '
of Argentina has said, reply to the , circumstantially,
Mexico, regard- fort] ei ayhinawhichtthey h ve performed
posed
tion aby the Ambassador of E adol
as Amy ing this concern that troubles the Ambas- this first part of their task. And so, our of Ecu
as asked sk as a member of the Committee and as Am -
ations
cong
rat
the mo
all me bassador of Guatemala,
Ambassador the state , portant instance for. or telling the wholestru h, Sint a it is late. Mr. Free dent I would like to
amts made by the inter-American Argen sys n?r
as to the faith the thth that the inter-American sy= not part of it. And I am going to tell how tontine myself to some very specific ques-
tem can help in solving the problem that, s I I saw it. The effort-I said-is mutual and tions. The first of the questions is as fol-
unfortunately, is faced in the Dominica'. so is the desire to attain peace, Mr. Ambas- lows: for this Meeting of Consultation to be
Republic today. Obviously, that country is sador, but it is not that I suspect but that competent to take measures to bring peace
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 September 23,
oved Fo~R&Atf1WF6V6R000500110026-7 24085
and to carry forward the work begun, it is
necessary, above all, in the opinion of my
Delegation, to ascertain whether the situa-
tion in the Dominican Republic is a situation
that can endanger the peace and security of
the hemisphere. This is the requirement of
Article 19 of the Charter for carrying out col-
lective action in matters that normally are
within the domestic jurisdiction of the
states. As is known, Article 19 states: "Meas-
ures adopted for the maintenance of peace
and security in accordance wijth existing
treaties do not constitute a violation of the
principles set forth in Articles 15 and 17,"
which are those that refer to noninterven-
tion. Hence my Delegation believes that a
pronouncement must be made by this Meet-
ing of Consultation to the effect that the
events in the Dominican Republic constitute
a situation that endangers the peace and
security of the hemisphere. Departing from
that basis, I should like to ask the Commit-
tee if it is of the opinion that this is the
case, that is to say, that the situation in the
Dominican Republic constitutes a threat to
the peace and security of the hemisphere.
That is the first question.
The second question is as follows, Mr.
President: the first part of the task with
which the Committee was entrusted has been
carried out, and we all congratulate them.
We have received a very complete report,
which will be studied by the delegations and
the foreign ministries. There remains, then
the second part of the Committee's task,
under the letter b, which reads as follows:
"to carry out an investigation of all aspects
of the situation in the Dominican Republic
that led to the convocation of this Meeting."
Naturally, my Delegation understands very
well that this cannot be done in one after-
noon or one day. However, I should like to
ask simply if the Committee believes that
there is sufficient evidence to issue a report
on this point within a reasonable period of
time. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
The PRESIDENT. One of the distinguished
members of the Committee would like to
refer to the first question put by the Repre-
sentative of Uruguay. Ambassador Vasquez
Carrizosa, Representative of Colombia.
Mr. VASQUEZ CARRIZOSA (the Special Dele-
gate of Colombia). Thank you, Mr. Chair-
man. The first question is this: Is the situa-
tion, such that it can endanger peace and
security? My reply is yes. Yes, there is a
situation that endangers the peace and se-
curity. The reasons are very clear. A dis-
turbance or even a guerrilla action in a mem-
ber state where the elements of order and
constituted authorities exist is not the same
as in a state where the absence of the state
is noted, evaluated, and recorded. What is
to be done, Mr. Delegate, in the absence of
the state? What does the system do when
the state does not exist? What happens
when blood is running in the streets? What
happens, Mr. Delegate, when an American
country-and I am going to speak quite
frankly so that you may think about this
with all the perspicacity we know you to
have-is, under these conditions, in the
neighborhood of Cuba? Do we sit on the bal-
cony to watch the end of the tragedy?
Do we all sit down as if we were at a bull-
fight waiting for the crew to come? What
are we to do, Mr. Delegates? We are in a
struggle against international communism;
and we are in a world, Mr. Delegate, in which
America is not even separated from the other
continents even by the ocean. We form part
of the world, and we form part of the condi-
tions existing in the world. The Dominican
Republic, like any other country in the
Americas, is a part of the system, and it is
the system that will suffer from the lack of
a head of state in any of its members. The
matter and the problem cannot be expressed
in juridical terms, in hermeneutics, needed
to fit an act into a lawyer's criterion. The
problem is one of deep political meaning, of
profound significance, of hemisphere impor-
tance much more serious than any of the
other American revolutions could be.
There have been many revolutions in-
America. There have bene revolutions in my
country; there have been some, I believe, in
yours, and I do not believe that a revolution
in itself justifies the intervention of the
inter-American system. That has not been
my theory; that has not been the theory of
my country. However, the acephalous con-
dition of the state constitutes a problem
that has occurred on very few occasions.
What are we to do, Mr. Delegate, when, as
the report states, the president of a junta
says: "I cannot maintain order with respect
to the diplomatic missions"? And what are
we to do, Mr. Delegate, when the Chief pre-
sents a note in which he requests the assist-
ance of another country and confesses with
the sincerity that we have heard: "Gentle-
men of the Special Committee, have the dip-
lomatic representatives asked me for
protection and I did not have the elements
with which to protect them?" That is the
answer to his first question. Now we have
the second question: What is happening to
the investigation? It is very clear, Mr. Dele-
gate. The complex political events, the
multitudinous situations are very difficult
to investigate. All of us who have had con-
tact with problems of criminology know
about mob psychology; everything that is
studied in the classroom, which is very sim-
ple, an investigation of a local event, an
individual event, let us say.
However, when there as mobs, when they
are in the midst of great movements an
investigation can be conducted, investiga-
tions must be carried out. But they are
obviously difficult investigations. I would
spare no effort to support any machinery,
agency, or committee that would carry for-
ward that investigation. It would be very
desirable. But, of course, such investiga-
tions of complex events are not very easy,
because many things have happened. Actu-
ally, two or three revolutions have taken
place. There was the first revolt of colonels.
Then there was a revolt of a party; and after
that, a revolution of a whole series of guer-
rilla groups, so that each one may have a
different Impression of the same event.
I think that, rather than an Investigation
of the past, what is of interest to the Meeting
of Consultation and what is of interest to
America is not the investigation of the past,
but the investigation of the future. It is
the investigation of the future that interests
us. The problem is not to stop to fix re-
sponsibility, to ascertain who began to shoot
first, who entered the National Palace first,
who opened the windows, who got out the
machinegun, who saw, who heard; all that
would be an interminable process that would
fill many pages and many records of pro-
ceedings. The important thing is not to
look backward, but to look ahead.
The PRESIDENT. The Representative of
Uruguay.
Mr. ORrsE. I thank Ambassador Vazquez
Carrizosa for his remarks. He has told me
just what I wanted to know.
The PRESIDENT. The Ambassador of Brazil.
Mr. PENNA MARINHO (the Special Repre-
sentative of Brazil). Yes, Mr. President. And
I also want to say to the Delegates that my
reply is also yes. There are two governments,
but each one Is weaker than the other, com-
pletely incapable and powerless to control
the situation that prevails in the country.
Peace was made on uncertain terms, The
Act of Santo Domingo is not a definitive
peace; it is a difficult truce, a temporary
armistice that may dissolve at any moment.
Therefore, the Committee suggests, among
the measures that In its judgment might be
adopted immediately by the Tenth Meeting
of Consultation, the appointment of a tech-
nical military group in the city of Santo
Domingo to supervise the cease-fire, as well
as .other measures agreed to by the parties
to the Act of Santo Domingo. We must keep
watch over that peace and create conditions
to prevent the struggle from breaking out
again-because it could start again, Mr.
President, at any moment. Thank you.
The PRESIDENT. Does any other member of
the Committee wish to speak on this ques-
tion? The Chairman of the Committee, Am-
bassador Colombo.
Mr. COLOMBO. The truth is, Mr. Chairman,
that after the words of my distinguished col-
leagues, the Ambassadors of Brazil and Co-
lombia, there is very little that I might be
able to add; but the responsibility involved
and the importance of the question, so ably
phrased by the Ambassador of Uruguay, com-
pel all of us to make clear our position on
this question. When, among the powers and
duties, the duty of Investigating was decided
upon, I cannot conceal the fact that I felt
the same as I always feel whenever an in-
vestigating committee is named. Generally
it investigates nothing; few, indeed, are the
Investigating or factfinding committees
which, in the parliamentary life of all of our
countries, show any fruitful jurisprudence in
their results. But this Investigating Com-
mittee did have the possibility of good re,
Suits. And that was because it was aimed at
two fundamental objectives that were gov-
erning events in the Dominican Republic.
I understood, first, that the investigation
was to determine the scope of the danger re-
sulting from the events, which are a matter
of concern to the Ambassador of Uruguay.
If this was a situation that did not threaten
the peace, we would verify that Immediately.
If the situation was under the control of
groups intent on stirring up tension in the
Americas, in a struggle in the history of
America, which is full of struggle between
brothers, in this incorrigible vocation that is
periodically written into the history of our
countries, that delays the advance of law and
democracy, then we would verify it immedi-
ately; and we have verified It.
This could be the beginning of a struggle
confined to the two well-defined groups. But
the presence of those uncontrollable factors,
which I urge the Ambassadors to analyze in
detail, in the evaluation of facts In order to
reach conclusions, they are going to be im-
pressed, as we ourselves were impressed, with-
out seeing them; they have become more
dangerous than the groups themselves put
together. To my mind, they have become the
element that will determine the fate of what
is going to be done. If those groups did not
exist, and if those responsible for the strug-
gling movements had not confessed that they,
cannot control them, in view of the exist-
ence of a security zone, freely agreed upon
by both parties, with a U.S. military force
that is engaged basically in the process of
keeping custody over the diplomatic zone,
I would also believe, Mr. President, that per-
haps we might be able to delimit the process
and trust that the peace would not be so
obviously jeopardized as it is In this process;
because in all revolutions, even a small local
one, there is the possibility that there may be
the spark of a process that will affect the
peace of the Americas.
But the dimensions of this situation, with
elements of disturbance on both sides, who
are constantly lashing out against the pro-
tection offered by the security zone, and in
which, Mr. President-and this struck my
attention-there is still control to prevent
confrontation in a struggle that could tech-
nically be called a military struggle; or in
other words, there is no military confronta-
tion between the defenders of the zone and
the contending groups of the civil struggle.
And that struggle is capable of being un-
loosed, because of the constant harassment
by those who are seeking a way to unloose it.
Hence, Mr. Ambassador, this matter urgently
demands that all of us succeed in finding the
way to resolve this situation; that we find
the way to dispel the undeniable danger that
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threatens the peace in this hemisphere, which
is the purpose of our organization. Because
all of these things are important; economic
development, social tranquillity, justice, the
progress of the countries; but all of them are
built on peace; without peace there is no
possibility for the triumph of the inter-
American system. There cannot be the
slightest doubt, Mr. President, that the peace
of the hemisphere is in grave peril.
But with respect to the second part of the
investigation, which is also a matter of
anxiety, we have contributed something in
the time we had to make our investigation;
more than the investigation is the word of
the leaders themselves.. This act -is a con-
fession, and a partisan confession without
proof, Mr. Ambassador. It is not a matter of
our characterizing the ideology, nobody goes
about trying to do that when, actually, it has
already been characterized by the leaders of
the governments themselves. If necessary,
that should be left to the last. I have said
at previous sessions: my delegation is will-
ing to make and is going ,.to make an ex-
haustive investigation of the facts, in order
to determine the blame according to the
action. We shall do nothing to cover up a
sharing of responsibility. But in the matter
of priorities, investigation has been well
placed by the Ambassador of Uruguay. The
first thing to be investigated was the projec-
tion of the episode, the possibility of its
affecting the peace of the hemisphere, the
need for urgent action in, case it is proved.
We five members of the committee shared
that opinion when we were there, and we
reaffirm it now. The peace of the hemi-
sphere is in such danger, Mr. President, that
if the system does not respond to the call of
both parties to.the struggle, I believe that
the peace of the Americas would not be In
danger, that peace will be broken. - This ur-
gency is shown by the way we have tried to
answer the concerns of the Ambassador of
Uruguay.
The PRESIDENT. I ask His Excellency the
Ambassador of Guatemala if he would like to
speak on this point.
Mr. GARCfA BAU:ER. Mr. President, I would
like to add my voice and my opinion to those
of my distinguished colleagues on the Com-
mittee, I shall also reply, rather emphati-
cally, as was done by the Ambassador of
Colombia, that the peace and security are in
danger. As was already said, we in the Com-
mittee often asked. ourselves and commented
on the advisability of having all of the mem-
bers of this meeting visit the Dominican
Republic in order to see, on the scene itself of
the events, the situation prevailing in that
country: in a state of war, when we arrived, -
-without water, without lights, without tele-
phones, without public services. The lobby
of the very hotel where we stayed was a scene
of war-children and women sleeping in the
lobby itself. The Diplomatic Corps, which
met with us, also told us of the serious situa-
tion which they had gone through and were
going through; anarchy ruled; the attacks
that the diplomatic missions themselves had
suffered; the wounded, including the diplo-
matic missions that had given asylum to
wounded persons;; and this was something
that went on hour- after hour.
Undoubtedly, peace and security are seri-
ously affected when there is no authority
that is respected, for although there are
those who proclaim that they represent au-
thority in each sector, it may be seen later
that they do not possess it to such a degree
that peace prevails; and 'although they sign
documents, such as the cease-fire that was
arranged before we arrived, or the Act of
Santo Domingo, which we signed; neverthe-
less, it can be seen that they have no abso-
lute control over the situation when the
spectacle of -wounded and dead persons is
seen. We asked how many had died, how
many had been wounded; and I believe that
I can say, as an opinion gathered from per-
so; is of whom it can be said, insofar as this is
possible, that they are better informed on the
matter, that at least 1,500 persons have died
in Santo Domingo. And how are the forces
dif tributed? How is the country? Fighting
has taken place so far only in the city of
Salto Domingo itself, but who can assure
us that it will not spread throughout the
country?
The rebel command states that they have
m4,ntained peace there, because they have
not wished to arouse feelings in the rest of
th; country, and the military junta in San
Isidro states that they control the rest of the
wintry.' What is the real situation? The
Committee did not have time to travel
through all of the Dominican Republic; but
it is evident that chaos exists, that the situ-
at on is deteriorating; it changes from one
hour to the next; that is clear. The day after
we had an interview under the fire of snip-
ed; as has been said here-with the consti-
tutionalist military command, the next day,
I repeat, the chief of that command was
pr )claimed President of the Republic, Con-
stitutional President; and themilitary junta
of San Isidro, which we had talked with and
which signed the act of Santo Domingo,
does -not now exist, according to reports ar-
rh ing today through the news agencies. The
tel etype has just brought for example, a cable
reading: "Domingo Imbert, president of the
new five-member junta, quickly convened
a press conference and called for a peace-
mf.king effort to rebuild the country and
restore national unity without discrimina-
tkn on account of political affiliation." He
dekribed Colonel Caamafio as a good person-
al - friend.
the other members of the new junta are:
Ju to Postigo, 61 years old, a lawyer whom
some people consider a militant in the
Revolutionary Party of Juan Bosch; Carlos
Crlsella Polomey, 51 years old, governor of
one'of the provinces under the deposed re-
ghne of Donald Reid Cabral; Alejandro Seber
Ccpo. 41 years old, an engineer; and Colonel
Benoit, a member of the previous military
junta of three. Imbert did not explain how
or why the earlier junta resigned, or how the
new one was formed. Although Caamauo
co old not be found to give us a statement,
the leader of the Revolutionary Party, Jose
Francisco Pefia Gomez, stated over the rebel
ratio that the new group represented an
ujiderhanded maneuver against the interests
of the Dominican people. In the Dominican
Republic we constantly heard rumors, stories
that got to us, to the effect that they were
inciting to arms over the radio, even during
the cease-fire.
The circumstances prevailing in Santo
Domingo are most difficult, tremendously dif-
fi(ult; it would be a good thing if the
representatives were to go and see how
things are developing there and how, in the
report we have submitted, we cannot give
at, exact picture of the prevailing situation,
watch has disturbed us deeply, The situa-
ti )n undoubtedly endangers peace and se-
curity, and not of the Dominican Republic
alone. The representative of Uruguay also
referred to the missions of investigation; and
ir.deed, among the duties entrusted to the
C )mmittee was the duty of making an in-
vostigation of all aspects of the situation
e:lsting in the Dominican Republic that led
to?the calling of the Meeting. But the kind
o:' investigation that was asked is not one
that can be made in a few hours. The Com-
rr ittee had to give priority to what demanded
priority, and the first thing was to try to
rc?store peace and conditions of safety, to
restore things as much as possible to nor-
n,al, under prevailing conditions, in order
t'.nat it could carry out an investigation such
an we believed the Meeting of consultation
had requested.
We are in agreement that this investiga-
tnn should be carried as far as it is desired;
but in the short space of time we were there,
and with all the tasks we had'. and although
we sought opinions and points of view on
various sides; although we asked all mem-
bers of the diplomatic corps to give us their
views in writing; that is, their views on the
situation as they saw it; although we asked
the disputing groups also to explain to the
Committee and to the Meeting what they
considered the truth about.the Dominician
Republic, and also asked the Governors of the
Provinces 'whom we interviewed to do the
same, and did likewise with - everyone with
whom we had an opportunity to talk and
question; although we sought all of the evi-
dence that might serve as a basis for this
investigation and to enable the Committee
to offer Its conclusions to this Meeting of
Consultation; despite all this, the time was
very short and we cannot give conclusions in
the report we have just submitted,, not even
if we were to be able to change them a little
later.
Points of view have been given and inior-
mation collected, sometimes in personal con-
versations, as mentioned by the Ambassador
of Argentina with respect to his conversation
with Colonel Caamafio, or in conversa-
tions the members of the Committee had
with various' persons on the scene; but we
should also listen to all parties concerned, to
all who want to say something; and such an
investigation - takes some time. This is the
reply we must give to the Ambassador of
Uruguay. With respect to this second point,
we have done all that we could within the
short time available, in an attempt to make
the cease-fire effective for the protection of
refugees and those who had taken asylum,
and so that food distribution could be under-
taken, to bring in food, medicines, etc.,
that can be distributed with the necessary
safety. We did a vast amount of work in
a very short time, but in regard to investiga-
tion, we can say that we have scarcely begun.
And despite the little that was- seen, the
Committee has been able to contribute
something in reply to the questions that have
been asked here.
The PRESIDENT. Iunder stand that the rep-
resentative of Uruguay is very well satis-
fled with the thorough manner in which the
interesting questions put to the members of
the Committee have been answered.
Mr. OssiE. Of course, Mr. President, I
would like: to express my appreciation once
again, and I believe that what has now been
said here is fundamental; because the con-
viction of the members of the Committee
will surely allow us, through consultation,
to take appropriate measures without getting
into the problem of Intervention:
The PFxsIDENT. I recognize the special del-
egate of Paraguay, Ambassador Yodice.
Mr. YonrcE. Thank you, Mr. President.
First, I wish to join in the words of apprecia-
tion that have been spoken here to the am-
bassadors who composed our special com-
mittee that traveled to- Santo Domingo and
completed the great task of which we are so
proud. I am very happy that from the first
time the floor was requested until now we
have had a series of statements from the
distinguished ambassadors on the Commit-
tee, and their statements make my congrat-
ulations even warner. As the Chairman of
the Committee, the illustrious Ambassador
of Argentina, Dr. Ricardo Colombo, has said,
this is the moment of truth and the delega-
tion of Paraguay is quite pleased with the
action of the members of the Committee.
The delegation o: Paraguay, Mr. President,
is proud. of this Committee because it has,
in the first place, effectively carried out the
peacemaking aspect of it;s mission as fully as
is possible; it is proud of this Committee
because it has justified the confidence of
the Paraguayan delegation placed in it, in-
asmuch as the distinguished ambassadors
who composed it, -whose ability and inter-
American spirit all of us know, as was said
when the Committee's membership was ap-
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proved, would determine whether or not in- international communism in the Dominican ferrredoto by ode r adent In his statement that zone In
bloody o communism had a part the events. m is blooevents s in in the Dominican Republic. Once more, 2 congratulate the members of city, whose limits would be indicated in a
if the distinguished representative of Mex- our Committee; I am confident that the plan appended to this document. Mr. Presi-
ico had not raised the question he did on the conclusions they now bring to us from their dent, I believe that this security zone is a
matter, I would have done so. I might, how- trip to Santo Domingo and that they will highly important factor in the cease-fire that
ever, have put it differently, since I would continue to bring will greatly help this Meet- has been obtained and that a clear delinea-
not have confined myself to inquiring as to ing of Consultation. The inter-American tion of this zone and knowledge of it, not
the possibility of Communist intervention system must find the permanent solution re-. just by the parties involved but by everyone,
in a specific group, but would have extended ferred to by the distinguished Ambassador will be very helpful in forming an idea of
the inquiry to all aspects of the serious con- of Ecuador in order to bring about a return what might happen if, as may be feared, this the sis
secur
were flict the Dominican people are under- Republic, atreturionality ofithe reigntof repesenta- to the Cy ozmmitt e, I would request, W. P esi-
goi going today.
The Government of Paraguay, as I stated tive democracy and of human rights, and of dent, that this plan not only be incorporated
clearly when approval was given to the es- all those inalienable principles of sovereign into the Act, but also circulated by the see-
tablishment of the collective inter-American peoples that motivate the resolutions of this retariat as soon as possible.
force, believed from the beginning that con- Meeting of Consultation in dealing with the The PRESIDENT. I ask; I imagine that the
tinental security was at stake. The replies Dominican problem. i believe, Mr. Presi- Chairman of the Committee wishes to reply
by the Ambassadors composing the Commit- dent, that with the clarity of the conclu- to Ambassador Magnet's question.
tee reporting today on certain questions re- sions of the Committee we shall be walking Mr. COLOMBO. The Committee, through me,
garding these delicate aspects of the Domini- on firmer ground. The basic conclusion that reports that the map is now being distrib-
can situation have been categorical. My I want drawn from this statment I am now uted, and I apologize to the Ambassador of
government was right. Continental security making is that we should act on the basis Chile because it was not attached to the re-
is threatened. The danger existed, and still of these important conclusions furnished to port when this was distributed. The expla-
exists, that chaos and anarchy will permit us by the Committee; not only. the conclu- nation may lie in the undeserved expression
international communism to transform the sions appearing in the report that has been of appreciation for the Committee's work,
Dominican Republic into another Cuba. distributed, but also those verbally expressed on the part of the Ambassador. Material
With his customary clarity, courage, and en- tonight by the members of the Committee. I difficulties prevented distribution, but I now
ergy, the Ambassador of Colombia, Mr. Al- repeat my congratulations to the ambassa- present the map to the Chair so that, as the
ferdo Vdzquez Carrizosa, has categorically dors and my confidence that these highly Ambassador of Chile has wisely requested, it
mentioned the highly political nature of the important conclusions will shortly be brought may be distributed as soon as possible, since
problem we are facing. In reply to a ques- to the attention of all the Americas. Many tit is he A necessary for the proper information of
tion of the Ambassador of Uruguay, he has thanks, Mr. President.
rightly said that the peace of America is Mr. TEJERA PARIS (the Special Delegate of The PRESIDENT. The Chair will proceed
threatened, that the security of the hemi- Venezuela). Mr. President, I wish to make loaccor mbdingly, Mr. Chairman, Ambassador Co-
sphere is threatened, and that there is a pos- a motion. wish
my cri
to ex sibility that another Cuba, another Com- The PRESIDENT. What is the motion of the wordMr. s MAGNET. imply the slightest that
t cism
munist government in the hemisphere will Ambassador of Venezula? did not arise out the Republic. chaos and anarchy in the ago Mr. TEJERA PARIS. Mr. President, 2 when it was desired to undertake a thor- olMrrCOLOMBO. IC
Dominician wish to make quite clear
We are proud of the action of our Commit- ough analysis of the problem, I asked this that I have not even remotely suspected
tee, because, as the Ambassador of Uruguay distinguished meeting to await the return of such an attitude from one whom I know to
said, it is helping to clarify the problem we the Committee, so that we might question be a gentleman and distinguished ambassa-
are facing. Paraguay had no doubts when it and hear what proved to be an excellent dor who honors the inter-American system.
it voted on the resolution for the establish- and highly important report. On behalf The PRESIDENT. Your second question, Mr.
ment of the inter-American force. As I of my government, I wish to express apprecia- Ambassador.
said: "The Government of Paraguay ap- tion for the work that has been done and the Mr. MAGNET. It is more than a question,
proves the sending of U.S. forces to the Do- sacrifices that have been made. I now wish Mr. President, to try to achieve some kind
minican Republic, considering that this does to call attention to the following point: of friendship. I think it is quite clear both
not imply armed intervention prejudicial to perhaps this session should devote itself ex- from the text and the context of the report
the right of self-determination of the Do- elusively to questions and answers, so that we have just had the pleasure of hearing,
minican people, but, on the contrary, that by speeding things up we can obtain the in- especially the act of Santo Domingo-with
it is a measure of hemispheric defense formation as precisely as possible, leaving which we were already acquainted and which contained
signed against the intervention Castro-Commu- basic statements and
Paraguay is solutions until tomorrow's dplenaryo there that the e is 1 not, nor repoas there on that ate
asa forces. Government of Paraguay
U.S. armed intervention has been wise, we shall have to repeat many of the a constituted government in the Dominican
aware e that The
necessary in view of the urgency of prevent- things already said here. This is my mo- Repo blici able co re press t t tons. The , but
ing extracontinental and Cuban forces and ton, Mr. President.
funds from annulling the Dominican peo- The PRESIDENT. Mr. Ambassador, the Chair mittee, with the knowledge it gained through
ple's right of self-determination, since it entirely agrees with you. It would really be its on-the-spot activity, and with its spirit
was evident that it would be difficult for the interesting to devote ourselves to question- of impartiality, deemed it necessary to hear
inter-American system to act rapidly and ing the honorable Committee and its distin- the two parties or factions in order to reach
energetically. The Government of Paraguay guished members, and the answers that they some uanul result. Colnrnitld likerto ask y the
reaffirms its support of the proposed estab- give us will be very edifying.
lishment of a hemispheric force and will Time goes on, and we must take advantage Mr. President, if the evidence that has been
participate in 4 if a substantial majority of of the privacy of this meeting precisely to gathered corresponds to the truth.
the governments of the member states do present this type of questions and, in this The PRESIDENT. Shall I refer the question
likewise." same confidential setting, to obtain the an- to the Chairman or to the distinguished
Mr. President if there is anything to re- swers of the distinguished Committee mem- members of the Committee?.
gret it is that, for the time being, this valu- bers. Naturally, the occasion will come for Mr. COLOMBO. I think that, in substance,
able, clear explanation of the seriousness us to make detailed statements on behalf of we have already answered the Ambassador's
of the Dominican problem furnished to us our governments on the text of the impor- question. That is, all of us Committee mem-
by our committee is known Only to the dele- tant report presented by our colleagues on bers have confirmed the impression of chaos in t gates of this Meeting of Consultation. the Committee. I offer the floor to the Rep- that t complete fu lack ofhe Dhoritycane eepubli ,
Obviously we are going to come to a mo- resentative of Chile.
ment when the enlightened judgment of the Mr. MAGNET (the Special Delegate of Chile). of two groups that appeared to be standard-
President and of the Delegates, in my opin- Thank you, Mr. President. The opinion that bearers in the conflict and with whom we
ion, will decide that these vital conclusions the President has just expressed so wisely felt impelled to establish immediate contact.
reached by our Committee should be known is in complete accord with what I am about I do not know if this will satisfy the Am-
by all of the Americas, by all of the people to say now. Although, for reasons clearly ex- bassador, and I wish he would let me know
of the hemisphere. Because for my Dele- plained at the time, the Delegation of Chile if he has any doubts that I can clear up.
gation, Mr. President, these conclusions abstained from voting for the establishment The PRESIDENT. What does the Ambassador
which appear in the written report and in of the committee that has now returned to to Chile have to say?
see
corroborate
I
idst,
hastsa dmconfimstwhat Iat the
our
posed here
uestio
the lies t
hat wh shouldpnot beoknownthe by the Delegates; b r efly but sincerely, the expression of praise Amba MAGNET.
they should be known by all the people. I that the committee has earned. Moreover, Mr. COLOMBO. I think it is the same thing,
emphasize this point because I am proud the position taken by my country does not Mr. Ambassador.
AmbT. IS here any other ques-
that my Delegation, from the very beginning, inhibit me, for everyone's benefit, from ask- tion? The PRESIDENT
has been concerned and has established a ing some questions that are of interest to my ition on
position with regard to the seriousness of country, and, as I understand, to the others Mr. MAGNET. meetingIf it is not an
won-
Mr. Pre men , I n on
the conflict, in view of the intervention of as well. In the Act of Santo Domingo, re- you
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 24088 A roved For R C BO 00500112 -7
pp 1k L 1 :L~ F 9 ~ QQp9mber 23; 19Z
der if it would be too much to ask the Com- w3 received was precarious, and, above all, The PREsmas . I refer the question o Am-
mittee to tell us how many asylees or refu- ecntradictory. There was, however, a corn- bassador Colombo, Chairman of the Vora-
gees still remain in the embassies in Santo men consensus in these replies, that the mittee.
Domingo, if it has been able to obtain this arsenal of weapons had been opened, access Mr. COLOMBO. Mr. President, the question
information. to-it was given to the
Mr. COLOMBO. The truth is that at this population, and that asked the distinguished Ambassador of
time, Mr. Ambassador, it is im ossible to the civilian population, a part of whhich was Venezuela I have e also asked the various
answer our p controlled by Colonel Caamafio, was armed bands or groups in Santo Domingo. All of
y question because, fortunately, with automatic weapons considered by sev- them we're very sorry that they could not
the evacuation of asylees has already started. era authorities we interviewed as the best provide me with accurate pieces of evidence,
I have information regarding the asylees at and most modern existing in the Dominican which would have been very valuable. When
my embassy: there: were 14 who have already Re public. And we were able to ascertain, we were about to leave, in connection with
been able to leave. That is, this changes ac- when we opened negotiations with the group the activities reported on in our dispatch,
cording to the help received, food and other, lect by the Commander of the Revolutionary our report, the only part on which we ob-
because the sylees take advantages of arriv- Government, Colonel Caamafio, we were able tained a reply that would help allay the
ing planes in order to arrange their trans- to see various persons, teenagers, women, all Ambassador's fears was given by the United
portation; therefore, at this moment it armed with machineguns, forming small States, when the Ambassador of the United
would td eetpra has l aim ssi crus arrival-of Wimps in the streets of the neighborhoods of States In Santo Domingo told me that many
elapsed since our Saito Domingo that were under the control of those who are arriving in the security zone
to say how many asylees have been able to of the rebels. And so there was a distribu- bring arms with them and turn them in. I
leave the country. Fourteen have left my tien made of all the weapons that were tried to go further into this question to as-
embassy. etc red in the arsenal of the Dominican Re- certain the number of arms. The reply was
The PRESIDENT. Is the Ambassador satis- public to the civilian population that sup- not definite. I was told, merely that this
fied? posted Colonel Caamafio's group. This is was a report that he had received from Gen-
Mr. MAGNET. I hope I am not being too in- the information we were able to gather by eral Palmer, who had told the Ambassador
sstent, Mr. President, but perhaps with the means of the contacts we had with the varf- of the United States that they had a certain
testimony of the other members of the Com- out authorities of the Dominican Republic. amount of arms that were being turned in
mitt ee leas might obtain an approximate fig- The PRESIDENT. Ambassador Vazquez Car- by people who were arriving in the zone for
rizeiza, Special - Delegate of Colombia. diverse reasons, many of whom were coming
The SPECIAL DELEGATE or BRAZIL. Mr. Am- Mr. VASQUEZ CARRIZOSA. I cannot, of course, in search of food or medical care and who
bassador of Chile, I wish to inform you that gins an opinion on the way in which the were voluntarily turning in their weapons.
in the Embassy of Brazil there was 38 weapons were distributed, but the truth is This is the only thing I can say, but I believe
asylees, of which only 6 wished to leave the that in the sector of the city where Colonel that I have contributed something to allay
Dominican Republic. The, other 32 told us Caf maflo's command was located, the pres- your fears, W. Ambassador, nothing more.
that they would prefer to await the return ence of weapons, of machineguns, was visi- Mr. TEi:ER.A PARIS. Thank you very much,
of normal conditions In their country. ble and clear; of all citizens in the streets Mr. President, The other question would
Therefore, only six asylees in our embassy and of all who were around us, each citi- be this: I. was very favorably impressed and
left the Dominican Republic. zen carried a machinegun, so that weap- feel optimistic at the fact that the Com-
The PRESIDENT. Does Ambassador Vasquez one were as numerous as the persons who mittee noted among both the Constitution-
Carrizosa wish to contribute anything? wer- around us. Thank you. alists and the rebels a fervent desire to have
Mr. VASQUEZ C.AERIZOSA (the Special Dele- Tie PRESIDENT. Does the Ambassador of the OAS intervene to seek a solution; and
gate of Colombia). There were about 30 Guk temala wish to give any opinion In this that even, according to what I think I heard
asylees in the Embassy of Colombia in Santo respect?
Domingo, some of whom did not wish to Mt. GARCIA BAUER. Yes, of course it could Cthe n of the aama or himself said that the rejected the say, Colonel
leave Dominican territory. Many of them, be keen in'the city, as far as we could see, Security Council solution and preferred an
especially women and children, left on May -5 that automatic and other weapons were in OAS solution, because it belongs to the Sys-
on the plane that brought in food, medicine the hands of many young civilians, and even tem. Now. I should like to ask you this:
and medical equipment. of women. Now, according to information I Did the
The PRESIDENT. The Ambassador of Guate- received early Sunday morning, April 25, Committee explore the possibility,
male. or did it hear of any methodology of any
many young civilians were armed with auto- special system, for example, the presence of
W. GARCIA BAUER. There were 28 asylees at mat.o weapons from the 16 de Agosto Camp. a high commission of eminent persons or a
the Embassy of Gua,temala,of whom 9 left. TILE-PRESIDENT. The Representative of El high commission of good offices that could
There are now 19 asylees at present who Salvador, Mr. Clairmont Duefias. will be evacuated as soon as possible on the Mi CLAIRMONT DUEfAS. Thank you, fel- tutional assist In retualcy the country to Commit-
plane arriving from Guatemala with food low 9elegates. I have a second question, if tee ell normalcy now? be s the
some poss-
and medicine, The Secretariat has already the President will per q tee believe such that t a s would would some possi-
and inframed of this, permit me. I wish to bility that a solution wbe ac-ask ;be Mr. MAGNET. Mr. President, I wish to leave have seen, e foreseen, ortgathered, according understand d all that the now there bands as a anothe ther chrlch I
on record my gratification and to pay public to tow we use the term, the according underange
tribute to the patriotism of the Dominicans, that the sector controlled by, Colonel biCa- in the country.
so many of them have chosen not to amallo is receiving weapons supplied b an- Committee The Committee memem I bersrefer the questions C ri-
abandon their country, in spite of the pre- other country, not the Dominican Re ub- . M r. Vazquez ar-
vailing chaos. P zosa, please.
lie-:'rom another country, let us say, Cuba- Mr." VAzQUEZ CARRIZOSA. It is still prema-
The PRESIDENT. We give the floor to the or is it using the weapons that they have ture to go into that. Of course, we can find
Representative of El. Salvador, Ambassador there at this time.
Clairmont
Clairmont Dueflas. ere cnce, but within an atmo of common
of to ref-
CLAIRMONT DUE$AS (the Special Dele- to bia, Amba sador Vazqueze Carrizosa. . and anxiety such as Burrs undedous it s
gate of El Salvador). Thank you Mr. Presi- Mr VAQUEZ CARRIZOSA. There is such a difficult right now to think of formulas for
dent. I am going to ask a question, but I profusion of machineguns in thesector of a government that might unite the two
wish at this time to express my government's the city that we visited that in reality the parts. I do not exclude it as a possibility
appreciation for the excellent work of the importation of this item is unnecessary. for the future, but apart from a similar
Committee in the face of the tragic events Tea PRESIDENT. The representatives who reference to the Organization of American
in the Dominican Republic; Our thanks, may wL'h to add something to the reply. States, I think it is Impossiblefor the Com-
gentlemen. The question is as follows, and Thq 7l:epresentative of Venezuela, Ambassa- mittee (although my colleagues may believe
I wish to refer to the distribution of weapons dor Tejera Paris, has the floor.
to the civilian population. I wish to ask the otherwise
Mr. M9JERA PAR.
precisely.) No system that question more
came I.Iembers of the Committee whether they li a tl ask the Commlittee two questions, the thing is it was not our job to investigate
then had Sufficient time to investigate how first :Irecisely about arms. Did the Com- political conditions of a new government.
this distribution was made, what was the mitts i learn of the existence, or was it able Our mission, which was precisely set forth
source, if it is known, whether distribution to verify that there is some system of die- by the resolution of May 1, was to obtain a
was made indiscriminately or to persons of tribulion or some inventory whereby, in the cease-fire, guarantees for the departure of
any special tendencies, and who were the forthcoming peacemaking activities, it could refugees, and safe conditions for the em-
originators of this distribution. Thank you check what part of the arms has been re- bassies, and also to organize humanitarian
very much. turned? My experience The PRESIDENT. I refer the question to the been that it is ssible to have a veryrlarge of May 1 did not authorize 'us to enter Into
members of the Committee. The Ambassa- part of the arms given to civilians returned, discussions of matters that are the concern
dor of Brazil, if you please. and then, by a supplementary house-to- of the Dominican people, and
Mr. PENNA MARINHO. Mr. President, I wish house Search they can be controlled. In. my theory is that our mission was essentially
to reply to the question posed by the Am- general, the military are very good bureau- to bring about peace--not to prejudge the
bassador of El Salvador, and I do this on crats; they generally make inventories, and will of the Dominicans regarding their own
precarious bases, because the information so the question i ask Is not absurd. future; at least, that is my reasoning.
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 September 23, 19 65 Appro RggkOgMOW?OILDG1AMOB6EB00446R000500110026-24089
The PRESIDENT. The floor goes to the Rep-
resentative of Guatemala, member of the
Committee, to reply to certain aspects of the
question raised by Mr. Tejera Paris.
Mr. GARCIA BAUER. There is no better way
to answer the question raised'by the Ambas-
sador of Venezuela than to refer him to the
terms of reference of the May 1 resolution of
this meeting. The work mentioned by the
Representative of Venezuela is not found in
the terms of reference, and consequently, the
Committee was prohibited from entering
into that area. Undoubtedly, and this we
have already said, there is a desire for under-
standing; there is an evident wish for peace,
since a number of relationships are involved;
there are people, friends of one side and of
the other. The dean of the Diplomatic
Corps told us of how, through him, splendid
acts of humanitarianism had been per-
formed. People asked him about their
friends rumored to be wounded or dead,
and he was able to give them explanation
and set their minds at rest. In other words,
that atmosphere has existed, and if the Am-
bassador of Venezuela, for example, remem-
bers the cable that I read earlier, it men-
tioned one of the members of this new junta
who described Caamaflo as a personal friend,
and also mentioned a lawyer, whom some
think to be a militant partisan of the revolu-
tionary party of Juan Bosch. In other
words, it shows that there is a desire for
understanding, that that desire is evident,
and, of course, that there is faith in the
inter-American system. How is that desire
to be channeled? How can the OAS help to
solve that problem that essentially must be
solved by the Dominicans themselves? That
is something that must be considered at the
opportune time by the system, by the organs
of the system. I yield the floor to Ambassa-
dor Tejera Paris.
The PRESIDENT. The Special Delegate Of
Venezuela has the floor.
Mr. TEJERA PARIS. I first want to explain
that my question was not intended as crit-
icism of the Committee, nor did I think that
it could have wished to go beyond its terms
of reference. I was only referring-perhaps
I did not explain myself clearly-to the idea
proposed informally by the Delegation of
Costa Rica-I don't know if all of you know
about this-for setting up a delegated com-
mittee, a committee that, by delegation of
this conference, would go to the Dominican
Republic for the purpose of carrying out the
second part of the task of reestablishing
peace-that is, the administration of the
mechanics of reestablishing peace and a re-
turn to institutional normality, not the for-
mation of a government and other such mat-
ters. Then I asked myself if such an idea
had already occurred to other countries in
some form or other, since such ideas are
normal. That was my question. Now, I have
a third one.
The PRESIDENT. The Chairman of the Com-
mittee, Ambassador Colombo, will be so kind
as to answer these questions.
Mr. COLOMBO. I want to say a couple of
words regarding this concern of the distin-
guished Ambassador of Venezuela. I share
the opinion just expressed by Ambassador
Garcia Bauer that our immediate job was to
obtain a prompt peace. Also, we were ob-
matters, since precisely for the reasons given outstanding achievement in what has been
by the Ambassador earlier, we should con- our priority objective under the terms of the
centrate on the report and on the questions resolution, an agreement on an effective
and answers from the Ambassadors and the cease-fire in the Dominican Republic. As
Committee members respectively. Ambassador Colombo has reported, the Sec-
The PRESIDENT. The Special Delegate of retary of State has communicated to the
Venezuela has the floor. committee that the United States supports
Mr. TEJERA PARIS. I just want some per- its work in Santo Domingo, and pledges to
sonal information, as all of us do. And an- cooperate fully in the observance of the pro-
other thing. From my own country's experi- visions of the act of Santo Domingo.
ence, especially during the. dictatorship of Mr. COLOMBO. Mr. President, something has
Perez Jimenez, Communist infiltration is gone wrong with the interpreting equipment
generally chaotic everywhere and tries to because I heard -the English spoken by the
h
produce chaos in the various factions. Ex-
perience shows us that it is much easier and
more common for Communists to ally them-
selves with elements of the extreme right
than with liberal ones. And so I ask whether
the Committee noted or Inquired as to the
presence of agents and provocateurs on the
side of Benoit, Wessin y Wessin, and com-
pany, or whether they investigated the
presence of Communists from the other side,
because some of their actions seem-give
the Impression of being-provocations rather
than judicious acts.
The PRESIDENT. Would' the Chairman of
the Committee like to say something in this
regard?
Mr. COLOMBO. Thank you, yes. That also
is a very pertinent question, and I think
that we answered it to a certain extent when
we acknowledged the existence of snipers on
both sides. That is, there are snipers every-
where; they are a general disturbing element
throughout the country, although we can-
not attribute to them the particular ideology
mentioned by the Ambassador. But it is
apparent that anyone who plays the part of
a sniper and has escaped the normal com-
mand of either of two groups is following
is own ideology. That is all, Mr. President.
J The PRESIDENT. Would Ambassador Penna
Marinho like to comment on the question
presented by Ambassador Tejera Paris? Am-
bassador Vasquez Carrizosa? Ambassador
Bauer? Would you like to, Mr. Ambassador?
Mr. VASQUEZ CARRIZOSA. Well I just have
this thought: if there are snipers in both
parties, why can't they be snipers of the
Wessin Communists, or snipers of the Caa-
mafio rightists, or simply nationalists?
The PRESIDENT. Is there any comment on
these last statements, Mr.- Chairman?
Mr. COLOMBO. I should not like to con-
tinue this dialog because that would lead
us into a maze of conjectures, Mr. Ambassa-
dor, but I believe, and I will say, that there
is a fundamental difference: Colonel
Caamaflo's commands recognized the exist-
ence of Communist elements that were seek-
ing to infiltrate and to gain control of his
movement-an affirmation that I did not
hear, nor do I b'elievo that any of the mem-
bers heard it, from Colonel Benoit.
Mr. TEJERA PARIS. Maybe they are not so
politically sensitive.
The PRESIDENT. Well, reportedly so, accord-
ing to some opinions.
Mr. TEJERA PARIS. I thought as much, but
I just wanted to make sure. Thank you very
much, Mr. Ambassador.
The PRESIDENT. Our thanks to you, Mr.
Ambassador. We shall now hear from the
Ambassador of the United States, Mr.
Bunker.
e
Ambassador much more loudly than t
Spanish interpreter to whom I was listening.
The PRESIDENT. Is the Ambassador's speak-
er turned too high?
Mr. BUNKER. Shall I proceed? Well, it
seems to me, Mr. Chairman, that the ques-
tions which have been put by my distin-
guished colleague to the Committee, and the
answers of the members, have shed further
light and have made a very great contribu-
tion toward a greater understanding of the
situation existing in the Dominican Repub-
lic; a contribution so valuable that I think
it should become public knowledge, Mr.
Chairman. I believe that it was agreed at
our previous meeting that the proceedings of
the private meetings and the records would
become public. I trust that that will be so
in this case, because I think the record is ex-
tremely valuable to provide a much wider
public knowledge of the actual conditions in
the Dominican Republic.
The Committee has succeeded in taking
this first step of major importance. It seems
to me that this meeting can now move to
a second major stage of the task, for I think
we can all agree that much remains to be
done before conditions return to normal in
that tragic and torn country. It is quite
obvious, from what the Committee has said,
that there is today no effective national gov-
ernment in the Dominican Republic. There
are contending forces, each in control or
perhaps quasi-control in separate areas, but
no political grouping or faction can lay a
well-founded claim to being the government
of the country. I say quasi-control because
we had word from our Embassy in Santo
Domingo today that the palace inside the
rebel zone, in which 400 people, I believe,
have taken refuge, had been attacked three
times during the day. This may be indeed
a violation to the cease-fire.
But it remains, Mr. Chairman, for the
Dominican people, with the help of the OAS
to which I understand they are looking, from
the words of the Committee, to organize a
government and to provide for future con-
stitutional arrangements of their own choos-
ing. It seems to me that it is of the great-
est importance that the OAS should endeavor
to assist patriotic and outstanding citizens
of the Dominican Republic, and I am sure
they can be found, to establish a provisional
government of national unity, which could
eventually lead to a permanent representa-
tive regime through democratic processes.
Mr. Chairman, we must now seek to find
paths of peace and to build on the base
which has been established by this act of
Santo Domingo. I want again to express the
appreciation of my government for the
splendid work of this Committee becauc
they have established, through what they
one else was, without exception-that the behalf of my delegation, and indeed on be- have done here, really the first and essen-
solution to the Dominican Republic's polit- half of my Government, appreciation and tial base for any further progress. Thank
ical problem should be in complete keeping praise to all of the members of the Com- You, Mr. Chairman,
with the principle of self-determination of mittee of the Meeting, individually and col- The PRESIDENT. I recognize the Represent-
peoples, and that in the last analysis it was lectively, who, under the brilliant leadership ative of Uruguay, Ambassador Oribe.
the Dominicans who must determine the of my friend and colleague, Ambassador Mr. ORIBE. Mr. President, I would like to
direction of theivr institutional life. For us, Colombo, have accomplished so much in so second what the Ambassador of the United
it has been enough to know that they respect brief a period, and under, as they have de- States has said with regard to making the
the jurisdiction and authority of the system scribed to us, the most difficult and trying minutes of this session public. I do this
and that the system assures the solution. circumstances. We have heard the report of with the understanding, naturally, that they
But, Mr. President, with all respect to the the committee this evening, and I am con- will be published as is usual; that is, that
Ambassador of Venezuela, neither do I think fident that this meeting will agree with me, they will be complete, verbatim minutes.
that this is the time to start discussing these that the act of Santo Domingo marks an Thank you, Mr. President.
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 24090 Approved For Releas f gI ig~ [ 7 4SI p110026-September 23, 1965
The PRnneseT. It is so agreed. Ambassa-
dor Facto, Special Delegate of Costa Rica.
Mr. F.wio. First, I would like to join In
the congratulations given the distinguisl?ed
members of the Special Committee for tY.eir
splendid work. Second, the question I am
going to ask is to clarify a concern I have
with repsect to the possibility of secur.ng
an effective peace in the Dominican Repub-
lie. I wish to ask the members of the Com-
mittee if they interviewed Colonel Caamafio
or any members of his group after that band
was established as what they allege to be 1.he
Constitutional Government of the Domin-
ican Republic?
Mr. COLOMBO. The value of the Act of
Santo Domingo is precisely that it was signed
after the establishment of Colonel Caamallo's
group as the titular Constitutional Gover i-
ment, nothing more.
Mr. F&cio. Then, you had the opportunity
to discuss with them their claim to be the
only constitutional government of the Ito-
minican Republic, because whether or not
this claim. can be maintained in either rein,
tive or absolute terms depends on there being
peace through mediation between the two
groups.
The PRESIDENT. The Chair again recogni!les.
the Ambasador of Argentina.
Mr. COLOMBO. Mr. President, replying to
the important question asked by the Ambi z-
sador of Costa Rica, I am pleased to tell bin
that the Committee delivered the Act pre ri-
ously to Colonel Caamafio for consideratiz2t,
In order that he would have the opportunity
of going into the intricacies of its legal ibn-
plications, because what we wished to achieve
was the first step that would lead all of us to
achieve peace in the Dominican Republic,
and if you read the beginning of the Act of
Santo Domingo, it sets forth what Colonel
Caamafio and Colonel Guerra thought of the
Act and the opinion of the parties. I rec t1l
simply that it reads: "The Parties signing
below Who declare that they represent, in
the capacities mentioned," that is, In the set
of signing they declared their capacity avid
as we had no authority to pass judgment urn
the titles, which would have implied a dan-
gerous incursion into a territory that vas
forbidden to us, we limited ourselves to re-
cord the capacity of each one of the groups
and with all loyalty to say so frankly and
without any legal doubt at the beginning of
that Act which would, undoubtedly, be tae
road to begin working seriously to bring
definitive peace to Santo Domingo.
The PRESIDENT. Ambassador Facto wishes
to ask another question.
Mr. FAcio. Many thanks. No, I am satisfixi
and, of course, the question did not imply
any criticism whatsoever or any desire that
they depart from the norm.
The PRESIDENT. Ambassador Vazquez Car
rizosa, the Special Delegate of Colombia.
Mr. VAZQI*EZ CARRizosA. The Ambassador of
Costa Rica asks whether the constitutional
government invokes the qualification of gov-
ernment for the whole country and whether
it authorizes the presence of another govern-
ment.,
Mr. FACro. No. Naturally it is evident th it
each one of the parties which proclaims that
it is the government aspires to this, but did
you, specifically from this contract, reach tl e
conclusion that Colonel Caamafio was in Eon
irreducible position; not to yield. And I a3k
this question because after the signing of the
Act of Santo Domingo, Caamafio has insist xi
that he does not accept the participation of
an inter-American force and that the sol'i-
tion is that he is the President, and that Ito
be recognized as Constitutional Presider-t,
and that he represents legality.
Mr. CoLoiauo. First of all, Mr, Ambassadc r,
I would like to know whether this stateme;lt
by Colonel Caamaiip has been officially coil i-
municated,
Mr. Pacro,. No, it is a publication.
Mr. COLOMBO. That is why I was very sur-
prised that Colonel Caamafio transmitted
that note.
Mr. FACro. No, no, Doctor, it is a statement
made in a newspaper.
Mr. COLOMBO. If we follow the newspapers
in this process, Mr. Ambassador.
The PRESIDENT, The Representative of Co-
lombia.
Mr. VAZQITES CARRIZOSA. What the news-
papers say is one thing and what really hap-
pened is another, but it should be noted that
many news items that are published should
be investigated or it should be known to
what extent they correspond to what was
said or to what is done. I can only say the
following: the demarcation of the zone and
the existence of a corridor communicating
the San Isidro zone with the center of the
city were discussed personally with Colonel
Caamafio. There was even a doubt regard-
ing the conditions of the guard in the cor-
ridor. An incident had occurred the day
before-many incidents occur-regarding
some patrol that had entered farther than
the two blocks that on one side and the
other were authorized bythe regulations in
order to safeguard this public road; and
Doctor Rector Aristides maintained that it
was intolerable that United States patrols
should go beyond the limits. The military
adviser who accompanied us-he was the
military adviser of the Ambassador of Guate-
mala-who had had the occasion to read
the regulations and the truth regarding the
incident, explained in perfectly fair terms
the truth of the fact, rectifying Doctor. Arts-
tides' understanding, but as Doctor Aristides
insisted, Colonel Caamafio intervened, with
some vigor, to say "no, this is something be-
tween the military and we understand one
another. I believe that what the military
adviser says is true; I believe that it is ac-
ceptable; I have not objection." I am stating
this fact in case it clears up your doubts.
The PRESIDENT. The Special Delegate of
Guatemala, Mr. Garcia Bauer.
Mr. GARCfA BAITER. I only wish to men-
tion, with regard to something that has been
discussed before, especially by the Ambassa-
dor of Costa Rica and also with respect to
a question that was asked before, that in
Document 17 Add. 3, in which the fourth
radio-telephone message of the Secretary
General of the OAS, Dr. Jose A. Mora,
reports-you all have the document before
you-that the Military Junta has already
traveled to Santo Domingo and is installed
in the National Congress, it states, Center
of the Heroes, then-
The PRESIDENT. Of the Military Junta
that traveled to Santo Domingo? The fifth
or the-
Mr. GARCIA BAITER, Yes, the Military Junta
that was in San Isidro. It doesn't say here
whether it was the five-man Junta or the
three-man Junta, because I don't know if it
was done before the five-man one was es-
tablished, and then, in today's May 7 docu-
ment, it says: "as to what is happening
here, the situation continues to be very
delicate, since the cease-fire agreement- is
being enforced with great difficulty. It is
particularly - affected by radio broadcasts
that confuse and excite the population.
Every effort is being made to stop the Santo
Domingo station from issuing messages that
excite the people. If this is achieved it
would prevent a state of violence. The
same is true with respect to the San Isidro
Radio. Yesterday I went to the two broad-
casting stations and transmitted a message
intended to calm feelings and calling upon
the Dominican people to comply with the
agreements in the Act of Santo Domingo.
Nevertheless, Radio Santo Domingo and Ra-
dio San Isidro continue sending messages
that aid in inflaming spirits and maintain-
ing the situation of violence." And this
same document mentions the asylees who
have left and gives up-to-the-minute in-
formation regarding them. This is impor-
tant in relation to the questions that we
were asked previously.
The PRESIDENT. Thank you very much. Is
Ambassador Facto satisfied?
Mr. FAcco. Thank you very much.
The PRESIDENT. The Representative of
Honduras, Ambassador Midence. .
Mr. MIDENCE. My delegation wishes to join
in the congratulations extended to the Com-
mittee for its magnificent work under such
difficult circumstances. My Delegation feels
sure that the report that has been presented
today will be of immense value to this Tenth
Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of For-
eign Affairs. Thank you very much.
The PRESIDENT. Ambassador Bonilla Atiles,
Special Delegate Of the Dominican Republic.
Mr. BONILLA ATILES. Mr. President, Dele-
gates: I think that of all the delegates pres-
ent here none can feel the pain that I have
at what I have beard tonight. Words were
too few to express my appreciation to the
members of the Committee. I have just had
along-distance telephone conversation, from
Santo Domingo, with Mr. Antonio Imbert,
and he told me that in a search for possible
solutions the Military Junta- had turned its
power over to a civilian-military junta com-
posed of: Antonio Imbert, president; Julio
Ortigo, - Alejandro Seller, Carlos Grisolia
Palone, and Colonel Pedro Benoit. This
junta will try to cooperate with the mission
from the Organization of American States to
find solutions, which are still premature to
discuss. He also informed me that the Junta -
has discussed with Dr. Mora the problem of
the radio broadcasts, and it has been proved
that Radio San Isidro has not made any in-
flammatory broadcasts. As to the last at-
tack on the National Palace, of which Am-
bassador Bunker spoke, he confirmed to me
that there are civilian refugees there.
I am not mentioning this as accusation
but as fact. What Interests me most at the
moment, since it involves my own responsi-
bility and that of the government, whichever
it- may be, and that of the Dominican peo-
ple, is that out of this meeting shall come
the necessary and imperative declaration
that what Is happening in Santo Domingo
threatens the peace of the hemisphere. Af-
ter knowing the facts, this Is the only justi-
fication this body has for having taken the
steps that it has. I do not propose that this
problem be dealt with or discussed tonight
because It seems to me that we are all suf-
ficiently tired, morally and physically, so
as to be unable to face this problem immedi-
ately; but I do urge the Tenth Meeting of .
Consultation as soon as possible to make
emphatically this decision, so that the fire
will not be extinguished, not only in the
Western Hemisphere but in all political quar-
ters of the world. I have nothing more to
say.
Mr. PENNA MARINHO. Mr. President, before
ending this session and to a certain extent
supplementing the report of the special
committee, which has just been submitted
by its chairman, Ambassador Ricardo Co-
lomnbo, allow me to mention one point that
ought to be brought to the attention of
this Meeting of Consultation. I wish to
refer to the magnificent activities of Mon-
signor Emmanuel Clarizio, the Papal Nuncio
in Santo Domingo. He is an exceptional
figure, a veritable Don Camilo on a grand
scale, with free entree Into all political areas
of Santo Domingo. With astonishing ease,
he leaves the headquarters of Colonel
Caamafo to - go to the Government Junta
and from there to the American, Embassy.
Be is a respected friend of Caamafo, as he is
of Benoit and of Ambassador Bennett. They
all like him and they all have the same high
regard for him. it is due to histhorough
understanding of things, to his moving
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$liirit of human solidarity, and to his pro-
found love for the Dominican people, that
the drama in that country did not assume
more terrible proportions. I know that the
Meeting of Consultation has already paid
just tribute to Monsignor Emmanuel Clarizio,
but it never will be too much to point out,
for the eternal gratitude of America, the
admirable labor of this extraordinary prelate
In behalf of peace and tranquility in the
troubled Dominican Republic. The Delega-
tion of Brazil, expressing sentiments that I
know are those of all of ' the Special Com-
mittee of the Tenth Meeting of Consulta-
tion, manifests its deep appreciation and
above all its admiration for the continuous
and tireless collaboration rendered by Mon-
signor Emmanuel Clarizio, Papal Nuncio in
Santo Domingo, to the Special Committee
of the Tenth Meeting of Consultation dur-
ing its stay in the Dominican Republic.
Thank you very much.
The PRESIDENT. Ambassador Ricardo Co-
lombo has the floor.
Mr. COLOMBO. Mr. President, with deep
feeling the Delegation of Argentina wishes
to add to the words of the Ambassador of
Brazil concerning the outstanding work of
the Dean of the Diplomatic Corps, that mes-
senger of peace in the Dominican Republic.
The only tribute-because everything has
already been said-that I can pay under the
circumstances, is to repeat here, Mr. Chair-
man, before the entire meeting, his final
words of good-bye to us: Take-he said to
me-my blessing to the Meeting of Foreign
Ministers that they may achieve the high
objectives of peace; the peace that, at all
costs, must be preserved in this Republic
where I hold this apostleship. Nothing more,
Mr. President.
The PRESIDENT. Ambassador Vazquez Car-
rizosa, Special Delegate of Colombia, has the
floor.
W. VAZQUEZ CARRIZOSA. Mr. President, it
is only right to say a few words, as my col-
leagues from Brazil and Argentina have al-
ready done, to emphasize the merits of the
Dean of the Diplomatic Corps, the Papal
Nuncio, in. the fAce of such a difficult situa-
tion. There is more; none of our action
would have been possible without the advice,
without the help of that eminent diplomatic
representative. And still more, for the fu-
ture-for it .would be very difficult to think
about the future of the Dominican Republic
without speaking of him who so perfectly
represents the ideal of Pope John XXIII con-
cerning the coexistence of, men of good will.
But I have asked for the floor to speak on a
point which may not be appropriate at this
time but would be at another. Our report
ends with sever 1 recommendations, which I
do not propose to discuss at this session, but
I do want to point them out to the Chair
so that at the time and in the way provided
for in the regulations or when it is consid-
ered opportune, they may be submitted to
the Tenth Meeting of Consultation for dis-
cussion, because they do not deal with po-
litical questions, such as those we have dis-
cussed intensely, but specific points on the
future organization of activities in the Do-
minican Republic. They are specific points
of the greatest urgency, such as supervision
of the cease-fire, the appointment of a group
qualified to organize the relief measures for
the Dominican people and evaluate their
needs, the study and planning of an Inter-
American Force and the coordination of all
its services. Detailed, careful, and immediate
consideration of these points seems to me
absolutely necessary. Thank you very much.
The PRESIDENT. The Special Delegate of
Guatemala, member of the Committee, has
the floor.
Mr. GARcfA BAUER. At this time I only wish
to refer to the tribute that my colleagues,
the members,of the Committee, have already
paid to the Papal Nuncio and Dean of the
No. 176-23
Diplomatic Corps in Santo Domingo, Monsi-
gnor Emmanuel Clarizlo, for the great work
that he has performed since this grave con-
flict began in the Dominican Republic. The
Papal Nuncio was exceptionally kind to the
Committee, offering it every facility within
his power, and it was through his great serv-
ices that the Committee was able to accom-
plish what it did. He was present, tirelessly,
at our interviews with Colonel Caamafio's
command and with the Military Junta and,
because the confidence both parties have in
him, the act of Santo Domingo was signed.
He always used persuasion to the effect that
the purposes for which the Organization of
American States was in Dominican territory
should be borne in mind. As the Ambassa-
dor of Brazil has said, the Papal Nuncio was
respected In every area, regardless of which
authority was in power. He is a person who
has the confidence of the different parties
and through his good offices, because of the
great collaboration he rendered, the Commit-
tee was able to accomplish its task. Hence
the Committee was moved and felt that its
own wishes were fulfilled when, at the Papal
Nunciate in Santo Domingo, we delivered to
the Dean of the Diplomatic Corps the mes-
sage from the President of the 10th meet-
ing, Mr. Sevilla Sacasa, notifying him of the
action of this meeting some days ago con-
cerning Monsignor Clarizio's work.
The PRESIDENT. Ambassador Colombo, Spe-
cial Delegate of Argentina has the floor.
Mr. COLOMBO. I only wish to add one re-
mark that seems to be strictly justifiable. In
order to be able to act with the urgency that
the case requires, the five-member Commit-
tee had to move up its return so that the
10th meeting could be as thoroughly in-
formed as possible with all available data,
but we were deeply concerned that before
our departure the fundamental problem of
the faith in the system as stated by the two
sides in the struggle would not have been
resolved, and the Committee was the link,
at the scene of action, during the emergency,
remaining in order to be able to carry out
the powers accepted by both parties. It was
for this reason that the Delegate of Panama,
in an act that honors him, and which I can-
not ignore, remained at the center of action,
representing our mission. In this way, ac-
cording to the conversations we held with
the parties, it would be as though the Com-
mittee were present and together with
military advisers and the civilian personnel
he could undertake to solve whatever it
might be possible to solve, to the extent that
we are able-to solve the difficulties arising
from the events that have taken place and
that are taking place in the Dominican Re-
public. I want this generous act of the Dele-
gate of Panama, from a country that has so
many reasons for counting on the tradition
of brotherliness in solving basic problems,
to be recognized at this session. Panama is
with us on the Committee, represented by
its distinguished Delegate. Ambassador
Calamari also wanted to be here physically
with the Committee but was not able to do
so. I want to stress this act of the Delegate
of Panama because it is eminently fair to do
so-to take note of one who has'firmly car-
ried the banner of the inter-American sys-
tem into the midst of the fight. Nothing
more.
The PRESIDENT. We are sure that our col-
league, Ambassador Calamari, must be grati-
fled by the eulogy given by his compatriot
and our dear colleague, Ambassador Frank
Morrice. [Sic]
Ambassador Diez de Medina, Special Dele-
gate of Bolivia, has asked for the floor; and
then Ambassador Tejera Paris, Special Dele-
gate of Venezuela.
Mr. DIEz DE MEDINA. Mr. Chairman, I have
not asked for the ffoor to pose any question:
l have no questions to ask. I have only
words of praise-of warm praise and con-
24091
gratulatibns-for the distinguished members
of the Special Committee of the Tenth Meet-
1ng of Consultation, for the intelligent and
-devoted manner in which they carried out
the delicate mission entrusted to the Cotn-
mittee. I only wish, Mr. President, to add
my wish that the minutes of this plenary
session should also include words of con-
gratulation and appreciation for the task
being so successfully performed in the Do-
minican Republic by Dr. Jose Antonio Mora,
Secretary General of the Organization of
American States. Thank you very much.
The PRESIDENT. Very well, we shall do so.
Ambassador Colombo, the Special Delegate
of Argentina has the floor.
Mr. COLOMBO. The Ambassador of Bolivia
Is quite right in proposing formal recogni-
tion of the fact that the Committee was able
to fulfill its mission because of the brilliant
efforts that were begun by Dr. Jose A. Mora
before our arrival in the Dominican Repub-
lic. Appreciation should also be expressed
to the Secretariat, which, although few in
number, gave much in efforts and efficiently
contributed to the success of our actions.
Therefore, I second the Ambassador of Bo-
livia's proposal but would like to point out
that we had intended to submit this matter
during the session.
The PRESIDENT. The Ambassador of Bo-
livia and the Committee have interpreted the
feelings and thoughts of the Chair and of
all our colleagues very well, Ambassador
Tejera Paris, Special Delegate of Venezuela
has the floor.
Mr. TEJERA PARfs. The Delegate of Bolivia
anticipated what I was thinking and what is
certainly the thought of all of us here. My
intention was, I now confirm it, to ask the
Chair to ask this Tenth Meeting of Consulta-
tion to give to the Committee, to the Secre-
tary General, and to the members of the
General Secretariat a vote of applause for
the work they have done. The test that the
Committee has passed has been hard both
there and here, and I believe that since this
is a problem that affects the whole security
of the hemisphere, these colleagues deserve
not only our thanks but the thanks of our
governments and of their peoples, and, at
this moment, enthusiastic applause which I
am sure the President will be the first to
begin. [Applause.]
The PRESIDENT. All of us join in the praise
and tribute the Special Committee has given
to the prelate Emmanuel Clarizio, Papal
Nuncio in the Dominion Republic and Dean
of the Diplomatic Corps in Santo Domingo.
We share in this with real appreciation, with
affection, as our common duty. His services
for the peace of the Americas, his vows and
his blessings we applaud with emotion; with
emotion, I say, which corresponds to the emo-
tion that he experienced when he received
our expression of deep gratitude for his mag-
nificent labor for the peace of the Ameri-
cas and for that people that we all love so
well: the Dominican Republic. This closed
plenary session has been highly important.
We have heard the interesting report of the
Special Committee. We have posed broad
questions; we have obtained splendid and
very clear replies, from which we can ap-
preciate even more the extraordinary task
accomplished by the Committee. Our re-
peated applause and eulogy for it and its
members, all of whom we are honored to call
our colleagues and friends. Unless you think
otherwise a plenary session of the Tenth
Meeting of Consultation should be indicated
to consider the report in the aspects noted by
the Committee, so that the meeting may act
on that report. We have asked questions
and have obtained answers; now comes the
job of considering the report and analyzing
the action to be taken by the Tenth Meeting
of Consultation on the recommendations pro-
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 24092 Approved FoF-QifCaR3JP'SVR000506f6lipfry, 23, 1965
posed by the Special committee and the con- shortl3'-the one suggested by the distin- Mr. REID of New York. Mr. Speaker,
clusions that it reached. guishei Representative of Uruguay and sup- will the gentleman yield?
I ask you only whether tomorrow's plenary ported by the Representative of Venezuela, Mr.. SELDEN. I yield to the gentle-
session should be open =I uhderstand that :and the other just mentioned by the dis- man.
it should be. It should be open so that the tinguii.hed Ambassador Tejera Paris. I rec- of New Fork. As I listened
public will know everything that we have ognize the Representative of the Dominican Mr. REID
to the gEID.eman further comment listened
said, both with respect to the work of the Repubic.
Committee and to the contents of its inter- Mr. BONILLA ATmES. Mi. President, I shall to his characterization of the intent of
esting report. I would can another closed wait tntil tomorrow to formally present a the, New York Times, be subsequently
meeting, if the Committee so wishes, but the draft resolution on my proposal that the said, if I understood him correctly, it was
meeting I am going to convoke for a little Organ of Consultation declare the situation similarly slanted with regard to a cap-
later today, should be public and its pur- In the Dominican Republic to be a threat to believe in the Herald Tribune.
pose will be to consider the report of the the peace of the hemisphere. tion
Might I I ask bethe gentleman by what spe-
decisions Committee, discuss it and propose The PRESIDENT. Very well. The Represent- Might
competence en is is a position -
decisions concerning the recommendations It ative of Paraguay has requested the floor. makes. The delegates have already seen and Mr. YODICE.I only wish to ask two ques- judge the integrity of a great newspaper
have in your briefcases for later reading the tions, :VIr. President. I understand, or rather, such as the New York Times withregard
fourth radio-telephone message from our I actul,lly heard you mention a decision on to the full and fair reporting of the news.
Secretary General, Dr. Mora.2 It is not nee- the request of the Delegate of the "United Does he have any basis for the allega-
essary to have the Secretary read it, since I States that the minutes of today's session tions that he made of the intent of the
am sure all of you have read it. With respect be made public. This request was seconded Times?
'o the minutes of this plenary session, I ask by the distinguished Representative of Uru- New Mr. York ork Ti N. I think :it was obvious
you to take note that you have 24 hours in guay. From this I assume, that is, I hope,
which to give the Secretariat your corrections because the suggestion is also mine, that it from the statement I made as to what I
of style. I ask you to take note of that time will be agreed to make public the minutes believed was the intent of the New York
period so that the Secretariat can speed up of this session. Times in this instance.
the final. edition of the minutes of the The PRESIDENT. The Chair has so resolved. Mr. REID of New York. How do you
plenary session. Mr. YODICE. I beg your pardon. Thank know what the intent of the New York
Mr. COLOMBO. Mr. President, I should like you. Times was. The New York Times is one
you to repeat the last part as to the time and The PRESIDENT. That's quite all right. of the great papers of Anxeri and in-
place, according to the Chair's plan, as was Mr. YODICE. Now, I have another question of the rea entirers free o world. If the gen-
suggested. Please do me the great favor of to ask of the distinguished Representative of deed repeating it. Costa Rica, arising from an earlier statement tleman is familiar with newspapers at
The PRESIDENT. Yes, sir. We are going to by thx Ambassador of Venezuela, because all, he knows that the decisions on the
adjourn the session and meet again in a few it refers to the matter of considering meas- placement of news stories and reporting
hours, let's say, perhaps this afternoon. It ures to bring democratic normality to the and the accuracy thereof are matters. of
will be a plenary session of the Tenth Meet- Domirican Republic, and during this 10th the highest concern to any newspaper.
ing, public, for the purpose of considering meeting of consultation, I don't recall hav- Their overall concern is very simply with
the report of the Special Committee. To ing heard any informal proposal by the the integrity of the news and I know of
consider it, analyze it,, discuss it, and decide distinguished Ambassador Facio regarding
on the recommendations and conclusions the establishment, as the distinguished Am- no major newspaper or any newspaper
reached by the Committee. It is assumed bassac or of Guatemala said, of a committee in these United States that ever deliber-
that this session should be public. The next of sta-,esmen, or something similar. There- ately and knowingly tries to slant the
plenary session will not be closed like this fore, I would'like to ask if Ambassador Facio news.
one; it will be public, so that public opinion did or did not make such an informal pro- Mr. SELDEN. I do not agree with the
of the hemisphere will be informed, but not posal, because I would not want to fail to gentleman, I have made these charges
just of what is in the report of the Special inform my foreign ministry of something if these particular newspapers would
Committee, because I am hereby suggesting that lad been proposed here. Thank you. akdnd if answer them, I would be would
inter-
that the report should be made public, un- The PRESIDENT. Thank you. The Delegate
less for some reason the members of the of Costa Rica. ested in hearing their answer.
Committee indicate to the Chair that it Mr. FACxo. Mr. Representative of Paraguay, Mr. REID of New York. Will the gen-
should not be made public but that we I hav. not yet made any proposal of this tleman answer my first question-by
ought to wait until tomorrow's session. sort. Perhaps it can be clarified in this way: what -special information or Competence
Mr. COLOMBO. Absolutely, Mr. President. there has been some discussion of a proposal, does he feel he is able to characterize
The PRESIDENT. Therefore, gentlemen, as but rot one of mine, to put some of the what he calls, and. I quote him: "the in-
is now the report of the Special Committee recommendations of the Committee into ef-
is public. Consequently, it can be turned fect. I shall be very happy to give you a tent of the New York Times."
over to the press and sent to anyone wishing copy at the end of this session. But the Mr. SELDEN. I am an average news-
it. Naturally, if at tomorrow's meeting we PropoIal was not made by Costa Rica; it has paper reader, and I feel sure that others
reach,, conclusions on the suggestions made been discussed among several delegations have gotten from its reporting the same
by the Committee, we shall feel highly grati- but it nothing specific. impression as I.
fled. In any case I think that the time has Mr. YonroE. I understand. Thank you. I Mr. REID of New York. I thank the
come for the Meeting of Consultation to wanted to know if it was proposed here.
because
make concrete statements on the chaotic The PRESIDENT. Ambassador Tejera Paris. he now gentleman says for it his is his Clarification impression and
situation that seems to grow worse every Mr. TEJERA PARIS. I would like to ask the therefore I take it he retracts his earlier
hour. Therefore, within 5 or 6 hours, pos- Comnittee on Credentials if it would be pos-
sible for 4 or 5 o'clock this afternoon, I am sible to have a meeting early tomorrow to charge with regard to the intent of the
going to convoke the fifth plenary session reexa:nine all our credentials, because it ap- New York Times.
of the Tenth Meeting of Consultation to pears there are certain doubts that should Mr. SELDEN. I do not retract any-
meet in this same place and take up the be clitrified in the light of the information thing I have said. I stand on the state-
report of the Committee. transmitted in the cable that the Ambassa- merit I have made.
The Representative of Venezuela. dor o:` the Dominican Republic reported on a Mr. REID of New York. As I under-
Mr. TEJERA PARIS. Mr. President, only to short time ago. stand the gentleman, he stands by the
ask if you would be good enough to include Thu PRESIDENT. Ambassador Jacome, the clarifications that this was his impres-
in the order of business two specific points Representative of Ecuador. Sion?
that I believe are relevant to the announce- Mr, JtConIE. As Chairman of the Commit-
ment you have just made: first would be tee oa Credentials I can report that I have Mr. SELDEN. I stand by the state -
consideration of whether or not the present callec: a meeting of the Committee for to- ment I have made, I will say to the gen-
situation in the Dominican Republic affects morrow at 3:30 p.m. Any representative who tleman from New York.
the security of the hemisphere; second, es- has mny doubt as to himself or to his col- Mr. REID of New York. Mr. Speaker,
tablishment and implementation of measures leagues may present his complaints to the will the gentleman yield for a question?
to help the Dominican people return to full Committee. Mr. SELDEN. I yield to the gentle-
constitutional democracy. Th 3 PRESIDENT. Gentlemen, we have taken man.
The PRESIDENT. Very well; it seems to me note of the announcement just made by our Mr. REID of New York. With respect
there is no objection to discussing these two colle?gue, the Chairman of the Committee to the OAS :matter, l ask the gentleman
points in the public session we shall hold on Credentials, and it is now the time to ad-
jourr.the session and to announce that the whether the administration informed
The complete text of the fourth message 5th plenary session of the 10th meeting of the OAS of the United States Intention
of the Secretary General is published as consultation will be held here this after- to land troops prior to the actual land-
Document 17 add. S. noon at 4 p.m. The session is adjourned.. ing of our forces?
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Mr. SELDEN. I understand that the I believe it is very clear that the time easy to be a critic when one does not
Individual members of the OAS were in- was too important at this point to do have the responsibility-and this obser-
formed immediately following the order anything other than what our Govern- vation is not made with anyone in
to land troops. ment did. I believe that and I am sure mind-but I . ask myself many times,
Mr. REID of New York. The question that an endeavor was made to notify the what would you,do if you had the re-
I have asked the gentleman- members of the OAS, but perhaps they sponsibility? , I was faced with that
Mr. SELDEN. I answered your ques- did object at that time. I am not sure situation for a number of months, and
tion, You asked me whether the admin- of that, but I know this for a fact, that I thank God it never came about. But
istration informed the OAS members now they are very glad that we did move being a human being, I did ask myself,
before the landing of troops and I said as we did. "Well what would you do, JoHN Mc-
it is my understanding that they were I refer to the countries of Latin Amer- CORMACH, if you were in a certain posi-
informed immediately thereafter. ica,. for the reason that they now realize tion where you had the responsibility of
Mr. REID of New York. But not we had information as to what was tak- making a decision and had to do it-
before? ing place and took place, and we were would you have the courage to do what
Mr. SELDEN. That is correct. defending not only their people but our you had to do?"
Mr. REID of New York. Might I ask people, and the free world. in n the gentleman a second question? Mr. Speaker, I want to take this time I might ca that l c to re were at
Mr. SELDEN. I might 'add that in to compliment my colleague for his state- the Dominican Republic, tnae were at
connection with our intervention in the ment on the U.S. action in the Domini- tiont s,O of other cAmerican trt s there. and If I
Cuban missile crisis that troops had been can Republic. There has been a lack were es the United here: If I
?doployed as well as naval and air force of actual reporting concerning U.S. ac- such a time States when were President of the Unihad tobae
units prior to our notification of the tivities in many parts of the world. That made, , d say a decision had OAS members. made, I would say that I had a primary
was portrayed, and very unfavorably, in- obligation to protect the lives of of ththe
Mr. REID of New York. That is not cluding pictures, of what our desire is. citizens of my country and that I also
my understanding in talking with Sen- I think we should realize at this moment had another obligation to protect the
ator KENNEDY, but let me ask a second that we are doing these things for the lives of the nationals of other countries.
question of the gentleman. Was there protection of all people, for the protec- We must keep in mind the situation
any attempt by the administration to tion of our civilization, for the protection that existed there at that time-with
request that observers accompany our of our way of life. mobs roaming the streets of Santo Do-
forces and particularly that observers I think there is a point that the media, mango. We all know what can happen
accompany our forces pending any dis- including all newspapers, should con- as a result of mob psychology particularly
patch of an OAS peacekeeping force? sider at this moment. They have a grave when trained minds are directing the
Mr. SELDEN. As I pointed out in my responsibility not only to us, but to the mob and influencing it. We know the
statement, this was done in a matter of free world. I realize the tremendous Cov- dreadful results that can follow there-
hours, and there was no time to send - erage they have around the world, and from.
an OAS force since no OAS force was they should endeavor to give an impres- -I think it is only fair to say that if the
In existence. sion of that which we seek and that President of the United States had
Mr. REID of New York. The question which they know by seeing the media stated even 1 hour before the marines
I was asking the gentleman is, whether In this country, and that whatever wrong and our forces landed that they were
the administration has considered a re- impression is created by the media can going into the Dominican Republic,
quest to have a few observers-not an be harmful. there could have been hundreds of Amer-
OAS force, but a few observers-accom- I ask the gentleman if it is not true icans and other nationals killed and
panying our forces, pending a possible the reason he is taking this time today wounded. There would have been blood-
dispatch of OAS forces? is to emphasize to a large degree what shed there that would be too terrible to
Mr. SELDEN. I am not aware that we think is factual reporting, as I hope picture.
such a request was made. Is the gentle- all newspapers and media endeavor to
man telling me that such a request was do, that the impressions conveyed by a It very easy a look buck and say-ned- made and not granted? picture or any other means can be detri- well, nothing
made, looking but the de future
Mr. REID of New York. It is my un- mental. had to what could happen. o the sde t
derstanding that there was no attempt, I want to give one illustration. A serv- as to what could hapPresident
as understand the facts, either to inform iceman was seen lighting a match to a Johnson was faced with that decision
the OAS prior to the decision and con- hut in Vietnam. That appeared in many that and I rthr ferred to who i
e at the meeil ty
had o respenti
suit with them prior to the decision, nor papers. That picture portrayed a pic- that time. to the President made
was there any attempt to have observers ture that the United States was inhu- the I think the question of accompany our forces. This in my judg- man; but they did not portray the fact solve the g the the other decision. co The qest not be e ce-
ment was in contravention of the OAS that under that hut was secured, and as the case of Cut In
charter. It might also have been, and down in the ground, many weapons of Cuba we it was in the csthe Cuba. I that
in my judgment it was, a matter that was war for the destruction of our side. That there Cuba we were faced ed with the fact thae
deeply resented by many of the Latin is why I say the importance of today's and possibly installations there
states-not that we acted and impressions created by media or news- and possibly otter-continental ballistic
not that we acted promptly which I papers, or anything, is so vast that I ho. a that time if would Khrushchev
think all Americans supported, but we urge them to consider more carefully had
have
taken ad us b10 acked days down, to b h re
did not take the extra time to inform the their responsibility. - pared. us We have 2 weeks to n p our
to request observers. Am I right in endeavoring to seek sac- troops par. to would hhad tt bring cud
Does the gentleman feel that it was tuai reporting? States. certain parts had the bring our
so impossible that a telephone could not Mr. SELDEN. I think the gentle- A. We would to have had tt bring es-
be picked up? woman from New York is correct, and Air Force. en had to bring other neces-
be SELDEN. I understand that im- I thank her for her contribution. sary equipment-tanks and so forth-in
mediately after the landing all Latin Mr. McCORMACK. Mr. Speaker, that we to be had t make. But amen than
American Ambassadors were called. The will the gentleman yield? at least 100 ships do the ts for
transporting.
order to deploy troops was given im- Mr. SELDEN. I yield the gentle- So at at that time there was a p of 10
mediately, however, when it looked as man from Massachusetts the distin- days to 2 weeks at least where ewe had to
though the lives of Americans in Santo guished Speaker of the House of Repre- prepare in case the situation arose where
Domingo were In danger. sentatives. we had to do so.
Mrs. KELLY. Mr. Speaker, will the Mr. McCORMACK, It so happens So without entering into any contro-
gentleman yield? that I was at a meeting with the Presi- versy with anyone, all that I say is that
Mr. SELDEN, I yield to the gentle- dent when this question was discussed. this should be considered, having in
'woman from New York. It was a very important meeting. I was mind the situation that confronted the
Mrs. KELLY. I would like to make also present at the Cuban meeting, and -President of the United States when he
this very brief observation at this point. I have been to many others. It is very had to make the decision. In 'other
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Words, it is a question of making a de- Ilased upon all the information Icould discussed the subject in the meetings
cision on what might be termed before get, as with the gentleman from Ala- which he' has held and the distinguished
the fact. We should view it that way baina, it was my Judgment that Presi- service which he has rendered this body
11 and not from the perspective that per- dent Johnson ? did the right thing, and and the country over the years.
tains after the fact and wi tho ly thing, at that time. I of the masterful job that wasndonedby port everything that he did in order to not the need to act promptly. I think
our Armed Forces where not one single protect Americans and other nationals that was clear. It was not to do any-
civilian was killed or injured as a result and in order to prevent a takeover in the thing but to support the President's steps
hought
secur tytto p otects nationals in thenational
of te action that was taken in
our tion~with the Dominican Republic. re tative of the group not rep-
As I said, I was one of those at that Therefore, in conclusion, I should like and for other purposes.
ise; it
meeting. I know of no dissenting voices to say that the gentleman from Alabama, Bht there a is one point the would raleman gent
at that meeting and we all supported in bringing this report to the House, is is s: I seriousness. to not per-
the President. I think subsequent events performing his public trust as he sees it in equal l se io st was this i not I possible am take
have completely justified the decision in the highest sense of service to his suaded, 15 minutes, a s b bi not
eo
that was made on that occasion. country. I commend him for it. 5 even minutes, to minutes, for
Mr. SELDEN. I think the distin.- Mr. SELDEN. I thank the distin- , an hour have consulted slted with hem
guished Speaker of the House and cer- gushed gentleman from Florida [Mr. O Anthe nd at lealest ast to have informed them
and remarks
and situation. with his assessment of this ful toLhim forihis cont ibu ion. grate- to consult with them with regard to the
situat ation. Mr. Speaker, I yield to my colleague decision that we are planning to take. To
Mr. FASCELL. Mr. Speaker, will the from Alabama. say that we did not have the time is to
geMreman yield? Mr. MARTIN of Alabama. Mr. suggest that there was an immediacy
h SELDEN. I yield to Flthe orida. distin- Speaker, my distinguished colleague, the that was instantaneous. To suggest
gui shed gSCELLa from Floer, I want from Alabama, has presented further that had we informed them of
Mr. FASCELL. M everything ehat tc night a factual case, and I thank him our intention to act, it might have re-
to associate myself with that for it. I would also like to thank him sulted in the loss of the lives of Ameri-
the great Speaker of this House of Rep- for setting the record straight. It is cans does not particularly do credit to
resentatives, the gentleman from Mas- v'tal that men who have this knowledge the OAS, which I am sure would treat
sachusetts CMr. McCoRMACK] has just azd determination to set the record a communication of that kind with the
said. straight should do so. importance and the security which it
I think he has demonstrated once I am also aware that the gentleman deserves.
again that his vision, his long years of has dealt with the facts and the twist- My question is simply this: Diplomacy,
experience and knowledge are of such ilig and the slanting of the press. As an starting back with Franklin Roosevelt,
immeasurable value not only to this leg- P.labaman who read the Washington Post and for or many years since, and for every
islative body l5ut to our country. His during the trying months that have and f nysyears since then, has been
words spoken here tonight should be i acted, I have witnessed the distortion coAme ncerned with consultations. It has
considered very carefully and seriously of the press. I have watched the slant- been concerned with upholding our
by everyone? i ag of news. I have seen the vicious treaty :rights. It. has been trying to con-
Mr. Speaker, the gentleman from cartoons that depicted lies in this country vince our sister republics in Latin Amer-
Alabama [Mr. SELDEN] Is a consicenti- ~.nd that twisted and distorted the events. ica that we would consult and that we
7 commend my colleague for setting the would work together.
out, hard-working, dedicated and seri-
ous-minded i ecord straight. Do you not believe, Mr. Speaker, we
Member of this body. As The SPEAKER pro tempore. The could have found least 5 minutes to
chairman of the interred sub- lime of the gentleman has expired.
to have tried consult before we made to
the and complex hard Mr. SELDEN. Mr. Speaker, I ask have tried to I believe this we ld have
committee e he and has lerstan d long
problems o m ;manimous consent for 5 additional min- meant a great deal Latin America It
foreign gn policy problems of the Americas. rtes, and I thank my colleague from Ala- meant have been. in L within the spirit
His approach has always abeen cautious. 3ama [Mr. MARTIN] for his remarks. would
our treaty rightswholly
In all the years that I have worked with . The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there
n
him he has been very thorough and has jbjection? The Chair hears none and dips someone ii somewhat interested in
shown deep understanding of the public it is so ordered.
responsibility which he bears. The re- Mr. SELDEN. I yield to the distin- have made a signal and significant dif-
ports of his' subcommittee have always guished gentleman from Texas [Mr. dferen er sce to the recept
theist government ual
received strong bipartisan support and BECKWORTH].
have always been overwhelmingly well Mr. BE, CKWORTH. Mr. Speaker, Mr. MCCORMACB:. Mr. Speaker, will
received by this House. I rise to commend my chairman on the the gentleman yield2
re a member of the Committee y, statement he has made, and to emphasize Mr. SELDEN. I yield to the distin-
many ours list too gat and t earnestly many, the gentleman from Florida [Mr. guished Speaker of the House.
many hours listening to and trying to FASCELL] has just mentioned. Our Mr: :McCORMACE. Let me ask the
ing chairman always proceeds in a cautious gentleman from New York a question.
get to the facts to make a decision dur-
those hectic and fast-moving events sincere, and conscientious manner, and Assuming you were President of the
that took place in the Dominican Re- he undertakes to be sound in that which United States, and assuming you were
puWic he does. faced with the decision which confronted
We ion almost carefully to the pres- . Certainly I applaud our illustrious the President of the United States-with
accepted nment officials. Speaker on what he has said this even- 5,000 Americans and other nationals
entattn of none o aof our us Government
p everything ing. I know he has done his best at all faced with possible death; with the
But
that was said at face value. We guts- times to keep the facts straight. His is knowledge of what the slightest publicity
tinned and we questioned deeply and \a great contribution here this evening. would do, if it became known among tens
very penetratingly, as anyone would in Mr. SELDEN. I thank the distin- of thousands of emotionally moved peo-
our position. We also had reflected many guished gentleman from Texas. ple, many of whom had weapons; and
differing viewpoints on the committee. Mr. Speaker, I yield to the gentleman with trained mind:, there to exploit, to
As I say, we spent a- long time. from New York. engineer and to direct emotionalism-
Mr. Speaker, in tranquil times, it is , Mr. REID of New York. Mr. Speaker, the gentleman knows what I have in
difficult enough to get Wall the facts in any I thank the gentleman for yielding. mind--with those 5,000 lives in peril,
given situation in order to form an ob- I should like to address a question, if I what would you have done under the
jective judgment; but ctst is to make particularly the may, to the distinguished gentleman circumstances?
difficult judgments nets the ofc from Massachusetts. Mr. REID of New York. In response
took and fast-
moving in times of
Do events, such as took place in the riouFirst, I sess with vwhich the gentleman has understanding that; dthere Speaker, as is period se- to the! Domg nicah Republic.
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24095
of time-at least an hour; certainly 30 only to the witnesses and to the members ting a hair but of our sovereign obliga-
minutes-and it is my conviction A hat of the committee but also to bringing the tions under the treaty. Here, wherever
during that period of 30 minutes it would facts properly and fully to light. - we can do. it, it seems to me we should
have been possible to have informed the I would say, if I may, to the gentleman practice consultation and not just talk
OAS of our intention. from New York that the main question about it. I was not trying to talk about
I took the liberty of asking the White arising from our investigation and from the question of timing solely but of what
House that question, and I was informed the criticism which arose-and criticism has been built into our diplomacy and
that they could have done it, that it is always healthy whether it is against our relations in Latin America.
would have been possible within the span the press or from the press against us- I would say to the gentleman that the
to have informed the OAS. the question which we focused upon was information I have been given by the
Mr. McCORMACK. What would be this: Should there have been Ameri- White House very simply was and is-
the conscience of the gentleman today? can declaration of its position and its and I may say also by the Department of
We will assume there was no information possible action prior to the President's State-that we could have informed the
conveyed, although the representatives decision? I take it that the gentleman OAS prior to the action we took. I think
of all the countries are very thankful for from New York feels that under the cir- it might have taken only one telephone
what was done. We will assume that cumstances as the President saw these call to the Secretary General of the OAS.
there was no information conveyed. circumstances, that this is really not the Mr. McVICKER. Mr. Speaker, will
What would be the gentleman's consci- question; instead that the question is: the gentleman yield?
ence, if he were President of the United Should there have been a phone call Mr. SELDEN. I yield to the gentle-
States and as a result of advance infor- from the President immediately after man from Colorado.
mation given, which had to be only for his decision was made to responsible Mr. McVICKER. If the gentleman will
a short time, hundreds of Americans were Latin officials or to the OAS? My own yield further, if I may respond to the
killed or wounded? What would the con- very strong impression, gained sitting on point that the gentleman from New York
science of the gentleman speak to him the subcommittee and asking similar just made, again these questions were
under those circumstances? questions to those which the gentleman very closely delved into in the hearings
Mr. REID of New York. I believe from New York is,propounding here this which were held under the chairman-
there are two responses to that question. evening, is that the President of the ship of the distinguished gentleman
First, if the President was convinced United States did, at the earliest possible from Alabama. There should be no
that action had to be immediate- moment, when the action phase of his question of an impression being left from
Mr. McCORMACK. You would agree decision was no longer pressing upon him this colloquy or from the debate that
with that, would you not? and absorbing all his attention and his
has
Mr. REID of New York. If I may be being, immediately contacted the leaders, Houses, taking the lea are either the the peopltwo
permitted, I should like to finish the not only of the OAS, of our own di lo- , that the the Latin Americas
sentence. p of any country in the Latn Americas m
cou
develo Mr. McCORMACK. We want to see ofathetic
Latin co Latin ntr es,ntox ad vse were not aware of tha Republi si, o-
where we have an area of agreement. them of his action and to consult with wen ere' in not the in close Dominicacont n Republi the can, ad or
Mr. REID of New York. If the Presi- them as to the necessity for his action wntr with -
dent was convinced that action had to and for the followup action which he ministration of this country:
be immediate-that is to say, instan- hoped would be undertaken by ourselves the The SPEAKER KER pro temAlab ma time
ha ga from Alabama [Mr.
taneous-to protect a significant num- and by our allies and friends in txc Latin S gentleman
ber of American lives and nationals, countries. ELDEN7 has again expired.
then I believe the President, in all the A question of which split second sh-'gild Mr. Sus cons. Mr. Speeder, I ad-
seriousness of his office, should act the President have called the OAS or the unanimous cons to proceed for 5 ad-
seriousness If, however, the President Latin leaders is merely one of splitting ditional minutes.
had been advised that he had a period of hairs, of begging the question. The real The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is ntle-
a few minutes at least, that the marines issue is what was in the President's mind man objection to the a request of the gentle-
could not land for a certain number of and did he, in good faith and concordant from Alabama?
minutes and that he had time to inform with his responsibilities, act as he should serving Mr. the ANNUNZIO. IO. iMr.eet, I Speaker, ant
without any danger of loss of life- have acted. I believe the answer to this object, u d like ask the g-
Mr.
McCORMACK. Ali, that is the question is as clear as a bell. The Presi- tl mabut I would lto ask the gen-
question-without any danger of loss of dent did so act faithfully and responsibly. have from Alabama a question. I, too,
too,
life. How would you know it? It is a The principle upon which our policy with have a special order. The gentleman
big question. There is the big factor regard to the Americas has been founded has had 10 extra minutes. Is this going
and the gap; and the gentleman, with is still the policy of this country-name- to r the last 5 do not t
his usual honesty, has stated it. How- ly, that ourselves with our equals who est. SELDEN. I do not plan to re-
ever, I do not want my remarks to the are our friends and allies in the Latin quesMr. t additional time.
gentleman from New 'York to be mis- countries, acted in concert to bring into draw my reservation Speaker, I with-
with-
interpreted as to his motive or intent. being a police force to secure to the The reAvaon of objection.
In this colloquy I want the RECORD to Latin countries, to all of the countries The SPEAKER pro tempore. The
show that I have profound respect for of these two continents security from in- gentleman from Alabama is recognized
my friend from New York. I believe he ternal chaos and aggression. When for an additional 5 minutes.
is a great American. chaos and killing threatened, the im- Mr. McVICKER. Mr. Speaker, will the
The SPEAKER pro tempore. The mediate use of our forces was justified gentleman yield further?
time of the gentleman from Alabama and, in fact, became the basis for the Mr. SELDEN. I yield.
has again expired. present existence of an OAS force in the Mr. McVICKER. Mr. Speaker, in
(By unanimous consent, Mr. SELDEN Dominican Republic. This fact is proof answer further to the gentleman from
was allowed to proceed for 5 additional of the rightness of our policy. New York, this country was in consulta-
minutes.) Mr. SELDEb1. Mr. Speaker, I might tion with the major leaders of the Latin
Mr. McVICKER. Mr. Speaker, will say to the gentleman also I think it American countries and with the OAS
Mr. gentleman
the gentleman yield? might be quite difficult to call and con- as to the events which were unfolding
. I yield to the distin- tact and locate 18 ambassadors within a during the few days prior to the deci-SELDEN guished gentleman from Colorado. p
or 5 minutes. It eriod of an hour let alone 30 minutes sion made by the President. I think that
Mr. McVICKER. I echo the senti- difficult to contact all of them in that the President by tcertainendil iduals ais
ments which have been placed on record period of time. not d if it leaves the imresion
here, and properly so, by the chairman Mr. REID of New York. Mr. Speaker, thatlallto ea sudden, out of the blues the
of the Inter-American Subcommittee, on will the gentleman
yield? which I have the honor to serve. Dur- Mr. SELDEN. I yield President made a de islan and said,
ing the hearings on this matter, the gen- man from New York. to the gentle- "Friends and Th,t is I *ill now tell you what I di." tleman from Alabama has shown deep Mr. REID of New York. The point I That is not a statement of the facts. A
concern for giving fair treatment not was trying to make was not one of split- statement of the facts would report that
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6? VU 5 0 9 iB ier 23, 1965
Approved For eb U~t ~ b t~~.:~~7B
A inde- ERICAN FOREIGN POLICY IN
the President of our country in the days oil:? the integrity and freedom an
preceding his decision, kept in close con- pendence of this country from any sub- THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC
tact with the Latin American leaders and ver.,dve movement through . the soft (Mrs. GREEN of Oregon asked and
with the OAS, discussing` the situation une erbelly of this hemisphere, but to Was given permission to extend her ye-
as it was unfolding. protect the Western Hemisphere and all marks at this point.)
So far as I am personally aware-and sta'ees that believed in freedom and those Mrs. GREEN of Oregon. Mr. Speak-
that is as far as I can speak-he did not principles and ideas that made the er, in a rare and refreshing insight into
discuss specifically the action that he, Western Hemisphere what it is. American foreign policy, questions were
took or the time that he was going to Mr. Speaker, I commend the Presi- rai ed by the distinguished Senator from
take it, because I am positive that he did dent: I commend him for his action in Arkansas [Mr. FULBRICEET] on the floor
not know specifically that he was going Vietnam. And I say, Mr. Speaker, that of the Senate last week. He felt com-
to have to take such action. He did not we are fortunate in this country, the pelled to raise these questions follow-
know the specific time. But the pos-? American people are fortunate in having ing 2 months of closed door sessions of
sibility of certain actions including use a (tistinguished Speaker with his expe- the Senate Foreign Relations Commit-
of our forces to guarantee the safety was rieace, who served In this House with the tee in which the administration pre-
discussed with. the leaders of the Latin President of the United States, and who sented testimony on this Government's
American countries. is In touch with the Members of this role in the Dominican crisis. The ulti-
Mr. Speaker, my own impression, great body; and how fortunate we are to mate questions raised about American
gained from the hearings conducted by have a man of his experience and ability foreign policy in light of our policy in
the Inter-American Committee, is that to sit with the President of the United Latin America was an attempt to fore-
this country tried in every possible way Sates when making these momentous, stall another Santo Domingo-an at-
to act in good faith with its allies in the de;isions affecting the lives of millions tempt to explore the long-term implica-
OAS and in the Latin American coun- of people on this globe. tion of Dominican action in terms of our
tries, 3o, again, I want to congratulate and future foreign policy.
Mr. SELDEN. Mr. Speaker, I might commend my distinguished friend from I call to the attention of my colleagues
add that from the evidence presented to Alabama 1Mr. SELDEN] for his great editorials in recent days which point up
the subcommittee, no one indicated that service to this country as chairman of the necessity for legitimate debate.
$ phone call in 5 minutes would have this subcommittee. only from
een sufficient to notify all the members Mr. SELDEN. I thank my friend, the These the highly r es pected come New not York Timm
of the Organization.of American States. distinguished gentleman from South and Washington Post but also from such
Atli I correct in that statement? Carolina, for his kind remarks, and Washing newspapers as the Chris-
uisv
Mr. McVICKER. I certainly think so. Mr. REID of New York. Mr. Speaker, tiara. Science newspapers the the il
Mr. REID of New York. Mr. Speaker, would the gentleman agree to yield for tianrier Science Monit the San Loancisce Journal,
will the gentleman yieldfor one ques- 1 minute?. Chronicle, and the Benington Banner.
tion? Mr. SELDEN. I yield to my colleague, Christian Sc ence Monitor,
Mr. SELDEN. Mr. Speaker, before I tl.e gentleman from, New York. [From the Sept. 18, 1 c e]
do so, I ask unanimous consent that all Mr. REID of New York. I just want ept 1I 1 SPEECH
Members who have participated in this t( ask the gentleman from Alabama- THE PMBR
debate may have permission to revise & .id I am troubled by a part of the earlier It will. be a great pity if Senator F`UL-
and extend their remarks. colloquy, as he may know, and I feel BRIGHT'S HT'S Senate simply handling of
the imp t t a erce
The SPEAKER pro tempore. Without the gentleman has every right to ques- public arg Dominican nc crisis about leads
objection, it is so ordered. tion the accuracy of any news story, but self says, analysis of the past is useful only
There was no objection. I do not feel that the gentleman would if it helps to avoid mistakes in the future.
Mr. SELDEN. Mr. Speaker, I yield R ant to leave the impression that he Mere is validity in Senator FIILBRTGHT'S
to the gentleman from South Carolina, v ould question the integrity of the re- charges of initial "overtimidity" and sub-
who has been waiting, and then I shall porters themselves or of the newspapers sequent "over-reaction." But he is careful with
be glad to yield to the gentleman from and the Vnewsppers in this country are the advantage of hindsights Yare et even eif one
Newyork. very interested in and concerned with concedes that there were mistakes during
Mr. DORM. Mr. Speaker, I want resenting the news as straight and those early weeks of the upheaval, we believe
l believe the gentleman might want that the U.S. Governjnent has since done a
fairly as possible. good job in trying to pick up the pieces
guirosseshed colleague
for his his ll and timely presentation Alabama commend myof of distin- r
g from AV which it perhaps helped to shatter-albeit
sn
SELDEN] f
these facts about the Dominican crisis to make a distinction as to the act of involuntarily.
toward the first wobbly steps Domingo. maBut
to the House. It has been my privilege hews reporting and the integrity of the
over the years to consult with the dis- news reporters themselves, brssador Ellsworth Bunker, tireless and
tinguished gentleman from Alabama in Mr. SELDEN. As I pointed out earlier, Amresourceful, wou. never have been able to
reference to Latin American affairs. I am not primarily interested in the mo- encourage those steps if he had not had
cannot recall a single instance when the i ivation or the reason behind the bias Washington's backing. It has been a little
gentleman's advice was not only official ,liown in connection with the Domini- bit like Macmillan furiously repairing the
but was pertinent to the situation at that Ian situation by- some of our news media, damage! done by Eden at Suez, protesting
time and proved to be correct. I re- ilthough that in itself should be of inter- all the time that no damage had been done.
-
member the advice that he gave me on ~sf. But what I am interested in is that mBut in over Eden mica are e ubl bined , the in Macone
Venezuela and the Panama Canal and Such misrepresentation of our Nation's man-and h wears a Texas hot.
the Cuban crisis. foreign policy role be understood for already showever, we think
that what a important said, al now hIs to owever, we
So, Mr. Speaker, I want to commend what it is-not the responsible report of we have
the gentleman as strongly as I know how a free press, but the irresponsible props- the sane kind of mistake in the futrre. Sen-
for the splendid job he has done as ganda of some who, under the protec- ator F'ULBRIGHT uttered a few home truths,
chairman of this great subcommittee. tive cloak of journalistic rights, have among them:
Also I would like to say that at the time sought to undercut and reshape our "The movement of the future in Latin erica
and
the
is s
choice of the Dominican crisis I was in the cforeign policy one ved to suit their
of the story they hapre- ve which the IatinaAmericans make will a pend.
of f the distinguished chairman
company t
of f the e committee on Armed med Services of been assigned , but certainly some newspaper re- great inHuencew thel United States uses its cover. Perhaps I am in art on eastern part bases in the South- Wrong, that I have seen indicate to me that "Since just about every revolutionary
hsten vart of the United States. I such was the case in some instances in movement is likely to attract Communist
shall never forget how rpti, how the Dominican Republic. support, at least in the beginning, the ap-
proach civilian and militaryy peoiedople were, proach :followed in the Dominican Republic,
for the first time in quite some time, over The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. if consistently pursued, must inevitably make
the action which was taken, over the de- ROONEY of New York). The time of the us the enemy of all revolutions and there-all the 'cision made with allaicrity by the Presi- gentleman from Alabama has again fore the ally ~ fee hems pee a lar and corrupt
dent of the United States to preserve- not expired. oligaxchies
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"It should be very clear that the choice
is not between social revolution and con-
servative oligarchy; but whether, by support-
ing reform, we bolster the popular non-
Communist left or whether, by supoprting
unpopular oligarchies, we drive the rising
generation of educated and patriotic young
Latin Americans to an embittered and hos-
tile form of communism like that of Fidel
Castro."
Admittedly all this is easier to preach than
to practice. To begin with, effective com-
munication has to be established with that
rising generation-and their confidence won.
Their language will differ from ours in many
ways. But most of them want for themselves
what we have won and want-and the over-
whelming majority of them would still prefer
not to turn outside the American hemisphere
or to alien tyrannies to try to get it.
[From the Washington (D.C.) Post, Sept. 16,
1965]
STEMWINDER
Those who admire the analytical powers
of Senator FULBRIGHT have come to expect
penetrating truths from the chairman of the
Senate Foreign Relations Committee that
cut through the veneers of cant and illusion.
He has done it again with his incisive speech
about the American military intervention
in the Dominican Republic. What he says
about initial overtimidity, later overreaction,
and lack of candor throughout is sure to
lacerate a lot of feelings. But essentially his
point is that with the information available
to him President Johnson could have taken
no other course.
The pertinent question, of course, is why
the advice to the President was so bad. Be-
yond this the Senator asks several ancillary
questions: Why, for example, did the United
States veer so far from its general support
for Juan Bosch, the elected President ousted
by a military coup in 1963, as to oppose his
return? Was this part of a more ominous
shift against reform movements in Latin
America out of fear that the Communists
would dominate them? Do we lack confi-
dence in our own ability to influence the
course of revolution?
For social revolution, Mr. FULBRIGHT con-
tends, is the course of the future in Latin
America, and by seeming to oppose It blindly
we only drive those who are dissatisfied with
the oligarchical status quo into the arms
of the Communists. His characterization of
this country's role is acid:
"We are not, as we like to claim in Fourth
of July speeches, the most truly revolu-
tionary nation on earth; we are, on the con-
trary, much closer to being the most un-
revolutionary nation on earth. We are sober
and satisfied and comfortable and rich."
In another reproach Mr. FULBRIGHT con-
tends that the administration broke inter-
national law and damaged its own reputation
In not seeking a collective decision by the
Organization of American States before its
own unilateral action. His point is well
taken, but he might well have addressed him-
self further to the fundamental need for im-
proved machinery in view of the utter inabil-
ity of the OAS to reach a decision quickly
in emergency.
Happily, the situation in the Dominican
Republic now seems to be turning out better
than might have been expected from the
sorry beginning, and for this recovery the
administration deserves a share of credit.
In any effort to derive lessons from the ex-
perience, however, Mr. FULBRIGHT'S questions
deserve some frank answers, not merely
anguished screams from - wounded policy-
makers.
[From the New York (N.Y.) Post, Sept. 16,
1965]
FULBRIGHT'S HISTORY LESSON
Senator FULBRIGHT's review of U.S. policy
in the Dominican crisis deserves study by
responsible Americans. It Is as certain as
anything in the area of foreign affairs can
be certain that last April's revolution in
Santo Domingo is not the last of such up-
heavals in Latin America. Unless there is
careful, courageous analysis of where our
policy failed, such as Mr. FULBRIGHT pre-
sented to the Senate yesterday, the mistakes
will be repeated.
FULBRIGHT, perhaps too generously, ab-
solved President Johnson, U.S. failures in
Santo Domingo were principally the result
of the faulty advice given the President by
U.S. representatives on the spot, FULBRIGHT
said. But Ambassador Tapley Bennett, Jr.,
it should be noted, is still at his post In
Santo Domingo.
The danger to American lives was "more
a pretext," FULBRIGHT concluded on the basis
of his committee's inquiry, than a reason
for our intervention. It was the threat of
communism rather than the dapger to Ameri-
can lives that produced the massive land-
ings, he asserted.
"In their panic lest the Dominican Re-
public become another Cuba," continued
FULBRIGHT in the most significant part of his
commentary, "some of our officials seem to
have forgotten that virtually all reform move-
ments attract some Communist support, that
there is an important difference between
Communist support and Communist control
of a political movement, that it is quite
possible to compete with the Communists
for influence in a reform movement rather
than abandon it to them, and, most im-
portant of all, that economic development
and social justice are themselves the primary
and most reliable security against Com-
munist subversion."
The Fulbright formula lacks the simplicity
and he-man quality of landing the marines.
But it is based on a more accurate reading
of Latin American realities. It is sound
counsel for the explosive future.
[From the Bennington (Vt.) Banner, Sept.
20, 1965]
SENATOR FULBRIGHT'S UNPLEASANT TRUTHS
It will be surprising If Senator FULBRIGHT'S
blockbusting statement of last week on U.S.
policy in the Dominican Republic doesn't
produce a profound chill in his relations
with the White House.
Senator FULBRIGHT, to be sure, was care-
ful to blame what he considers gross mis-
handling of the Dominican crisis on the
President's advisers. Yet it is hardly flat-
tering to President- Johnson to say that he
was pushed by his subordinates into an un-
justified military adventure, and into mis-
representing the facts to the American peo-
ple.
The burden of the Senate foreign policy
chairman's argument is that the Marines
were sent into Santo Domingo last April not,
as the President claimed to save American
lives put to prevent "a return to power of
Juan Bosch or of a government controlled
by Bosch's party, the Dominican Revolu-
tionary Party."
He contends further that estimates of
Communist influence in the revolutionary
movement were grossly exaggerated and that
evidence doesn't verify the administration's
assertion that t4Ie revolution was in danger
of being taken over by Communist elements
when we intervened.
Senator FULBRIGHT also raised other im-
portant questions that our Latin American
policymakers would do well to ponder be-
fore they advise the President to intervene
in another revolution. Most important, Sen-
ator FULBRIGHT asks whether the adminis-
tration's reaction to the Dominican crisis is
part of a broader shift in its attitudes toward
Latin American countries.
He makes it clear that social revolution Is
inevitable in Latin America, and that the
United States can use its power to influence
the choice the Latin Americans make. This
choice, more often than not, will be between
corrupt military dictatorships and social rev-
olutionary parties.
"Since just about .every revolutionary
movement Is likely to. attract Communist
support, at least in the beginning," the Sen-
ator declared, "the approach followed in the
Dominican Republic, if -consistently pursued,
must inevitably make us the enemy of all
revolutions and therefore the ally of all the
unpopular and corrupt oligarchies of the
hemisphere."
The United States must decide, he sug-
gested, "whether, by supporting reform, we
bolster the popular non-Communist left, or
whether, by supporting unpopular oligar-
chies we drive the rising generation of edu-
cated and patriotic young Latin Americans
to an embittered and hostile form of com-
munism like that of Fidel Castro."
Predictably, the words had hardly left Sen-
ator FUBRIGHT'S mouth before he was ac-
cused of being soft on communism, but these
charges in no way detract from the impor-
tance of the issues he has raised. Interven-
tion in the affairs of another nation, as
the United States often loudly proclaims, is
an extreme and not easily justified course
of action. The lessons learned in the Do-
minican Republic should make us think
twice before trying it again.
Under normal circumstances, one might
perhaps question the propriety of such a
frontal attack by the Democratic chairman
of the Foreign Relations Committee on the
policies of a Democratic President. But the
circumstances in this case are not normal,
first, because the Republican leadership in
Congress is too illiberal to make the point
that FULBRIGHT has made, and second, be-
cause the issue raised by our Dominican
adventure is far too important to be stifled
by a senseless consensus.
It can be argued, perhaps, that the Sena-
tor does not make sufficient allowances for
the political dilemma which the Johnson
administration faced in the Dominican
crisis. Obviously the President and his ad-
visers were strongly motivated by a morbid
fear of what would happen to the Demo-
crats' political fortunes if they permitted
the establishment of "another Cuba." No
doubt they reasoned that even in a 1-in-20
chance of a Communist takeover was a risk
to be avoided at any cost.
But this is a pretty poor excuse for a de-
cision that alined us with the enemies of
reform, violated our solemn treaty obliga-
tions, and rendered our Latin Americanaims
deeply suspect among liberals everywhere.
FULBRIGHT is right when he says the John-
son administration should have had the
sense and the courage to take the minimal
risk entailed in casting our lot with the
forces of social justice.
[From the San Francisco (Calif.) Chronicle,
Sept. 17, 1965]
A DEVASTATING POLICY BLAST
After having conducted.a 2-month inquest
into the Dominican Republic affair, Senator
J. W. FULBRIGHT has delivered in the Senate
a devastating arraignment of the Johnson
administration's course of action,
It is a highly effective example of the duty
of a Senator to criticize and lay bare the
follies of Government policy when he pro-
foundly disagrees with it.
We sent troops into Santo Domingo last
April, he said, from "overtimidity and over-
reaction" which is not yet ended; the ad-
ministration acted with a "lack of candor."
The intervention a decision that the rev-
olution launched by the Dominican rebel
movement "should not be allowed to suc-
ceed."
It rested on exaggerated estimates of Com-
munist influence on the rebels and it failed to
perceive that if we automatically oppose any
reform movement the Communists adhere
to, we shall end up opposing every reform
movement, "making ourselves the prisoners
of reactionaries."
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Senator FULBRIGHT let the President down
easy by saying he had beeen given faulty
advice which exaggerated the Communist
danger. That is true, for the President does
have to base decisions on advice, yet it re-
mains a fact-though FULBRIGHT politely re-
frained from saying so--that basing foreign
policy too much on the advice of CIA and
FBI agents, as the President did, can be fatal
to the proper ends of that policy.
As the chairman of the Senate Foreign Re-
' lations Committee, FULBRIGHT has not only
struck a very hard blow at the President's
excuses for "forcibly and illegally" invading
Santo Domingo, but he has also raised the
ultimate question about American, policy
toward Latin America. His words were:
"The direction of the Alliance for Progress
is toward social revolution in Latin America;
the direction of our Dominican intervention
is toward the suppression of revolutionary
movements which are supported by Commu-
nists or suspected of being influehced by
Commuists. * * *
"We simply cannot have it both ways; we
must choose between the Alliance for Prog-
ress and a foredoomed effort to sustain the
status quo in Latin America."
This needed to be said. As Senator FUL-
BRIGHT remarked after dropping his bomb:
"I think maybe they'll stop and think a bit
before rushing into more military interven-
tions."
IFrom the Louisville (Ky.) Courier-Journal,
Sept. 17, 19651
WISE COUNSEL AND PLAIN TALK AGAIN FROM
SENATOR FULBRIGHT
It is possible that if there were no Senator
FULBRIGHT in the Senate he might have to
be invented. Time and again he expresses
the opinions of moderation-of what he
likes to call "flexibility"-against all the zigs
andzags of a foreign policy that seems to him
to respond too much to mood and not enough
to reason.
Senator FULBRIGHT'S observations on our
intervention in the Dominican Republic could
hardly be expected to bring the open approval
of President Johnson. But if the President
is willing to listen to counsels of modera-
tion, and recent events indicate this willing-
ness in increasing proportion, he must
acknowledge the wisdom and justice of the
Senator's criticism.
Mr. FULBRIGHT attributes what hecalls the
"failure" of our Dominican intervention to
faulty advice given the President. And in
particular he warned against the tendency in
this country to overreact against any sus-
picion of communism in Latin American ef-
forts for social change.' This attitude, he
feels, makes impossible any effective coopera-
tion from this country in the social revolu-
tions so necessary in nations to the south
of us.
Mr. FULBRIGHT, as he freely acknowledged,
spoke from hindsight. But it was informed
hindsight, gathered after 13 hearings of the
Senate Committee on Foreign Relations held
in the past 2 months. If it can help rechart
our policies, not only in Latin America but
toward the Western World, the Senator's
warning will have great value. What he is
trying to tell us? after all, is that the word
"Communist" no longer sums up one mono-
lithic evil to which we must react by instinct.
The currents and divergencev of commu-
nism are as great in their way as the clif-
ferences between democracies. All of them
are not potentially deadly to us and many
of the people who have been labeled Coin-
munist in struggling Latin American repub-
lics are homegrown revolutionaries strug-
gling to right their own homegrown in-
justices-. -
If we are to intervene in every such situa-
tion because people the CIA calls Commu-
nists are in the forefront of rebel movements,
we have already lost touch with the needs
and the desperation which are pushing all
Latin America toward change.
Senator FULBRIGHT is an effective ex-
ample of the duty of a member of a
r )presentative government to open doors
f )r this legitimate discussion. I am re-
minded of the words of Senator Van-
denberg that- "free debate is indispens-
able to ultimate unity. Every foreign
policy must be totally debated-and the
loyal opposition Is under special obliga-
t.on to see that this occurs." We cannot
avoid public discussion.
Senator FULBRIGHT counsels a return
t-) consistency in our relations with our
neighbors in Latin America.
Senator FULBRIGHT counsels American
involvement on the side of the people
instead of on the side of oligarchy.
He counsels well and wisely.
DOES THE DEPARTMENT OF
DEFENSE REALLY CARE?
The SPEAKER pro tempore. Under
previous order of the House the gentle-
man from Illinois EMr. ANNUNZIO] is
recognized. -
(Mr. ANNUNZIO asked and was given
permission to revise and extend his re-
marks and to include extraneous
L latter. )
Mr. ANNUNZIO. Mr. Speaker, I ask
unanimous consent that my distin-
guished colleague, the gentleman from
Wisconsin [Mr. KASTENMEIERI be permit-
ted to extend his remarks immediately
following my own remarks.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there
objection to the request of the gentleman
from Illinois? -
There was no objection. -
Mr. . ANI ,WZIO. Mr. Speaker, re-
cently, this body voted to increase the
pay of members of our Armed Forces.
However, by paying the serviceman
higher wages, we solved only one portion
cf the problem of debt management,
which is growing moreacute among our
L,rmed Forces.
It is not enough to give the serviceman
riore money in his monthly pay check,
1', at the same time, we stand by and
allow loan sharks,- sharp-practice fi-
r.ance companies, and other such opera-
tors to gouge the serviceman with
assorted illegal and unethical tactics.
For far too long the serviceman has
keen a second, If not a third-class citi-
zen in the area of consumer finance.
The proof of this statement is in the
type of establishments that habitually
thrive at the entrances to military bases
in this country and to a large part over-
seas. There is usually a pawnshop, fi-
nance company or small loan operation,
insurance offices, and an assortment of
lased car lots. These operations offer
credit, merchandise, or cash with little
Iedtape and a minimum of waiting time.
-.o compensate for their so-called ad-
zantages, the front-gate operators
charge servicemen enormous - interest
x ates, pad the contract with unneces-
x ary extras, and move with unusual
cuickness at repossessing any goods pur-
chased on an installment basis if the
borrower falls behind in his payments.
HIGH BRASS USED AS FRONT -
Not all of the operations which are
predicated on the premise of getting as
much from the serviceman as quickly as
possible, are lodged at entrances to mili-
tary installations. Many function in re- - -
spectable business districts or hide
behindthe guise of fancy facades such
as prominent figures on the board of
directors. It is particularly fashionable
for military finance companies to install
retired high-ranking officers on the
board.
The existence of, these operations is of
great concern to me. But of greater con- -
cern is the reluctance of the Department
of Defense to take action to protect the
se'vicernen. This has been brought home
witch deals primarily in personal and
automobile loans to the members of our -
Armed Forces.
Of the 12-member board of directors of
Federal Services, eight are retired admi-
rals or generals, many of whom held high
military posts,- such as Arleigh A. Burke
and Gen. Frederic H. Smith, Jr. Most of
the company's top operating personnel
are also former or retired military offi-
cers. It would appear that such a com-
pany with its predominately military
orientation would go out of its way to
protect the interests of the servicemen.
However, the subcommittee was shocked
to learn the number of ways that Fed-
eral Services had abused the serviceman's
trust and confidence.
A STUDY IN UNETHICAL PRACTICES
I would like to briefly list some of the
practices that Federal Services has en-
gaged in in dealing with servicemen:
Charged interest rates that amounted
to100 percent of a 2-year loan.
Charged military customers for auto-
mobile insurance and did not notify the
serviceman that the insurance had been
purchased.
In some cases the serviceman was
charged for insurance but no insurance
was placed on his automobile. In other -
cases the serviceman had already pur-
chased insurance on his automobile and
thus was forced to pay not only for his
own policy, but for a policy supposedly
purchased by Federal Services. In other
cases Federal Services would not supply
the serviceman with copies of the policy
that the company purchased on the auto-
mobile.
A $30 charge was levied against cars
purchased overseas for what the com-
pany termedmarine insurance. This is
insurance which covers a vehicle being
shipped back to the United States. A
number of witnesses told the subcom-
mittee that Federal Services did - not
notify the. serviceman that he was being
charged with this marine insurance. It
is interesting to note that automobiles
shipped at Government expense are
fully insured by the Government, thus
negating the need for additional marine
insurance. The subcommittee has not
learned of a single- instance where a
serviceman hasbeen shown a copy of
the marine insurance policy. -
Servicemen attempting to obtain the
payoff prices on- their automobiles were
quoted one price by Federal Servicesand
when they made :payment in that amount
were later informed that the serviceman -
still owed additional funds in many
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