THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP67B00446R000500110005-0
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 6
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 29, 2003
• Sequence Number: 5
• Publication Date: August 6, 1965
• Content Type: NSPR

August 6, 1965APproved Fdr_13PieUe 2093.0 0/15 : CIA-BDP6ABMR000500110005-0
CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? SE
are part of that oppression?it must
blunt our faith and sap the strength of
our high purpose.
Thus this is a victory for the freedom
of the American Negro. But it is also a
victory for the freedom of the American
Nation. And every family, across this
entire searching land, will live stronger
In liberty, more splendid in expectation,
and will be prouder to be American be-
cause of the act I will sign today. [Pro-
longed applause.]
At 12 o'clock and 28 minutes p.m., the
President and Vice President of the
United States, followed by Members of
the Senate and House of Representatives
and distinguished guests who had been
Invited to witness the ceremony, pro-
ceeded to the President's Room, where
the President slgi, the Voting Rights
Act of 1965.
IfV
THE DOMI CAN REPUBLIC
Mr, CLARK. Mr. President, the Sen-
ate Committee on Foreign Relalions is
conducting an inquiry in executive ses-
sion on the armed intervention of Amer-
ican troops into the Dominican Republic.
One of the most controversial ques-
ti,ons are the extent of Communist infil-
tfation in Latin America generally and
the Dominican Republic in particular.
Another is what damage, if any, has
the intervention done to the standing of
the United States throughout Latin
America.
I ask unanimous consent to have
printed in the RECORD three articles deal-
ing with these questions.
The first is an article in the Atlantic
Monthly, written before our troops moved
in, entitled "The Decline of Communism
in Latin America."
The second is a column by Marquis
Childs which appeared in a recent issue
Of, the Washington Post entitled "Re-
luctant Allies in the Hemisphere."
The third is an article by Juan Bosch
former President of the Dominican Re-
public entitled "Communism and Democ-
racy in the Dominican Republic" which
appeared in the Saturday Review of
August 7.
I believe these three articles present a
point of view which should be seriously
considered by the Senate.
There being no objection, the material
was ordered to be printed in the RECORD,
as follows:
[From the Atlantic Monthly]
THE DECLINE OF COMMUNISM IN LATIN
AMERICA
(By Ernst Halperin)
(Norz.?Ernst Halpern, a research as-
sOciate at the Center for International Stud-
ies of the Massachusetts Institute of Tech-
nology, has spent 2 years in Latin America
studying communism and has arrived at
some surprising conclusions about its pros-
pects below the border. Currently living
in Hio de Janeiro, he has written for news-
papers and many major periodicals and is
the aufhor of he Triumphant Heretic," a
book about Tito.)
The contrast of opulence and poverty in
Latp .krgerica Is so striking that visitors
Irequentfy assume the region to be on the
verte Of a social cataclysm. In the big cities,
the elegant residential districts and the
downtown business sections with their sky-
scrapers are /*hilted with shantytown areas?
vast agglomerations of shacks that would
make any European slum dwelling look
palatial.
The streets in the shantytowns are un-
paved. There are no water pipes or drains.
The shacks of wood and cardboard are in-
fested by vermin. One would think that
their miserable, underfed inhabitants would
be kept in a constant paroxysm of envy and
class hatred by the sight of the villas, the
automobiles, the office buildings gleaming
with chromium and plate glass, the luxury
goods displayed in the windows of air-con-
ditioned shops. Yet although there have
been occasional outbursts of violence in
Bogota, Santiago, and other cities, the
shantytowns are not the hotbeds of revolu-
tion which the foreign observer assumes them
to be.
Truth is, there are many factors working
against the posibility of a dominant Com-
munist influence in the affairs of Latin
America. One is the emergence of a highly
nationalistic middle class more disposed to
exploiting Communist assistance than to
adherence to Communist discipline. An-
other is the absence of revolutionary zeal
among the urban working classes. Though
the prospects in store for U.S. in-
terests in Latin America may well be harsh,
the chances of a Communist-dominated re-
gime are slim indeed. There are many trends
and incidents to substantiate this conclu-
sion.
In the Peruvian presidential election of
1963, for example, the shantytown districts
of Lima, which are among the worst in Latin
America, favored Gen. Manuel Odria, the
most conservative of the four presidential'
candidates. In the Venezuelan presidential
election later that year, Arturo Uslar Pietri,
a conservative intellectual and representa-
tive of business interests, polled a majority
of the shantytown vote in Caracas. In the
Chilean presidential election of 1964, the
Christian Democrat Eduardo Frei prevailed
over the Marxist candidate, Salvador Allende,
in the shantytowns of Santiago and Val-
paraiso.
' Latin-American Mandsts attribute the fail-
ure of their propaganda in the shantytowns
to lack of political consciousness, but the
real reason would appear to be a different
one. Most shantytown dwellers come from
depressed rural areas, and city life -offers
them certain advantages not easily perceived
by the foreign visitor who is appalled by the
squalor of the shantytown. There are health
centers and other social services, and occu-
pational and educational opportunities are
far better than in the stagnant rural areas.
There is also the prospect of one day moving
out to an inexpensive apartment in a gov-
ernment housing project. Many Latin-
American countries are building government
housing on a vast scale, although unfortu-
nately even the most ambitious housing pro-
grams barely manage to keep pace with the
movernent of people from the rural areas to
the cities.
Only the most energetic of the shantytown
dwellers manage to take full advantage of
these opportunities, but these are exactly the
people who form the opinions and determine
the spirit of the whole community. They
are realists on the lookout for material im-
provement, and in politics they tend to sup-
port the man who is in a position to provide
such improvement, even if he is a dictator
or a politician with an unsavory record.
Shantytown dwellers may occasionally
vote for a Marxist politician, but they are
not attracted by Marxist ideology. Marxism
holds that the capitalist system inevitably
produces the pauperization of the toiling
masses: that at best it may permit a tempo-
rary alleviation of their suffering but never
a substantial, permanent improvement of
their condition; that this system is doomed
to disappear in a catastrophe; that it is the
1919A
histOric 'mission of the working clasS to over-
throw capitalism by a revolution; and that
this task must be carried out through the
collective action of the working class orga-
nized as a revolutionary political party.
This doctrine does not tally either with
the aspirations or with the experience of the
leaders of shantytown opinion. Their con-
dition is already better than it was when
they arrived from the countryside, and they
cannot be made to believe that revolution
is necessary to achieve the further material
improvements they desire.
THE LABOR ARISTOCRACY
Besides the shantytown population of un-
skilled laborers who have drifted in from
the rural areas, the urban working class of
Latin America contains a second element: a
highly organized and exclusive labor aristoc-
racy composed of groups such as dockers,
railroad men, and other transportation work-
ers, and the skilled labor employed by in-
dustry and the trades. Through political
influence and the militancy of their unions,
these groups have attainecta wage level that
in many cases compares favorably with that
of European, if not of North American
workers.
In some Latin American countries, the
Communists appear to have established a
measure of control over the labor aristocracy,
whose trade unions they have infiltrated.
However, this does not mean that they have
truly won the allegiance of the workers, let
alone converted them to Marxism. In times
of crisis, when the government moves to sup-
press and persecute the party, the workers
invariably fail to come out in defense of the
Communists. The Latin American urban
working class is clearly not a revolutionary
element. Furthermore, it lacks the pre-
Marxist tradition of militant socialism and
anarchism that causes French and Italian
workers to remain faithful to the party in
spite of material improvement.
As early as the 1920s. a brilliant Peruvian
intellectual, J. C. Mariategui, advised the
Communist parties to shift their efforts from
the urban workers to the Indio peasants of
the Andean highlands, and to base their
propaganda on a nationalism emphasizing
the native Indian element of Latin American
culture. Mariategui's proposal was not ac-
cepted by the Communist International, and
to this day, Latin American Communist
parties, in the face of constant disappoint-
ments, stubbornly cling to the Leninist for-
mula Of the decisive revolutionary role of
the urban proletariat.
In accordance with the precepts of Lenin-
ism, Communist Party pronouncements in-
variably stress the importance of "a arm
alliance of the workers with the peasants."
This is usually empty talk, since most Latin
American Communist parties lack the cadres
which the arduous and dangerous work of
proselytizing in the villages would require.
The Communists of some Central American
republics at one time exerted considerable
influence over the workers of the big indus-
trialized plantations, but they lost it after a
series of unsuccessful strikes. There are one
or two pockets of Communist Party influence
in the mountain valleys of Colombia. The
Chilean Communists?the only Latin Ameri-
can Communist Party with a substantial
corps of trained propagandists?has recently
made headway among agricultural workers
and tenants on the big estates. With these
and a few other minor exceptions, the Com-
munist parties of Latin America are an urban
phenomenon.
Nearly all these parties are very small, con-
sisting of a number of intellectuals of the
type known as drawing-room Communists,
some trade union leaders with their per-
sonal retinue, and a sizable but undisci-
plined student and youth group. Apart from
Cuba, where recruitment to the party ranks
is promoted by the government, the only
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920 CQNGFESSIQNAL RECQRD SENATE August 6, 1965
Citable exception to this, pattern is Chile.
There the intillatrial workers, particularly
those in the copper, nitrate, and coal mines,
have a tradition of nallitent unionism and
political activity dating back to the first years
of the century, and this has worked to the
advantage of the Communists. The Chilean
Communist Party is the only one in Latin
Arnerica which has a sound working-class
bee!.
,
The doctrine of the decisive revolutipnary
role of the uaban proletariat has had a aux-
!
prising effect on the policies of the Latin
American Communist parties ? ? it has rendered
_ _
them inglaly opportunistic. The diflicnit
task of proselytizing among a social group
entipathetie to Communist ideology can only
be Carried on Where party members enjoy
aotae freedern to operate. Latin American
"??Communiste therefore, reluctant to undergo
'the tisk of total suppression, have ;re-
qtlently come to terms with a dictator, agree-
ing to Miff* themsgliree to a purely verbal
position and to decline , cooperation with
e democratic opposition groups.
TOEEEANCE TOWARD ,SIEDVERSIVES
In Latin America, public opinion does not
regard subversion with the, same abhorrence
as it does in Enrope or the 'United States.
Mae most respectable Latin American demo-
Cratic parties of the center and right have
MOTO ealispiracies, uprisings, coups, and pro-
inftelamentos on record than the Corainn-
Mita have. The current communist guerrilla
catupaign in Venezuela is a departure from
the Usual pattern of Communist Party activ-
ities in Latin America. There has been atalY
Mae aarlier attempt to seize power by force in
the entire bietory of the Communist move-
inept in Latin America; the Brazilian u,pris-
Mg of 1935. This was an army coup in the
Pla!ssiCal Latin American manner; it failed
because the expected civilian support did not
Materialize, Tbe leader of the coup, Luis
Carlos Prestos, had been an army officer and
a Celebrated guerrilla leader before he had
joined the Communists. He has since be-
come One of the Most consistent and de-
tern:Lined adVecaJes of peaceful methods
ailiOng the leaders of Latin American
eCtarannisin.
The CoMmlinists' very lack of success has
Maale it posalble for non-CoMmunist political
groups to accept them as allies. Most Latin
Arnericen politicians do not regard their local
CoMMUnist Party as a serious threat, while
the Cemanallilists' small but tightly knit party
organization, their ability to mobilize
stlidente for, demonstrations, and their in-
fluence in the trade unions can make their
C011aboratien useful to dictators and demo-
crats alike.
The easygoing attitude of non-Communist
and even strongly anti-Communist Latin
American politicians toward the party is the
devair of European and North American ?la-
SeaVera, but their warnings are usually dis-
regarded because they am not borne out by
practical experience. In Latin America it
is simply not true that anyone who has deal-
ings With the Cornm.uniste becomes their
prisoner. Democratic politicians such as
Gonzalez Videla. of Chile aid caudillos sych
as Velasco Ilaarra. of Ecuador Welcomed Coni-
munist sopport in their struggle for power;
and later, when the Comraimists ceased to
be useful, these politicians had no difficulty
In Casting them off. The latest case in point
IS that of Fidel Castro.
When Castro began to favor the Cuban
Communists, and even entrnsted them with
the task of, organizing his own ruling party,
Moat foreign observers assumed he would
Soon be reduced to the eongitIon of a mere
pUppet in the hands of the pld Guard Cora-
Mainisit leaders. Yet today, Castro is in un-
disputed command of the party which the
Old Guard Comramaiats bad helped him to
build, and the old party leaders are either
gashed aside or relegated to positions of sec-
onlaty importance. This rank outsider, who
hat no Communist Party training and has
new been subjected to party discipline, has
evigi,forced the Russians to accept the situ-
ati On and to admit him into the councils
of world conmximlata?a telling symptom of
State Of =fusion and disintegration
inio which the Commileist movement has
be aiplunged since the outbreak of the Bine-
Bo g.et conflict. ,
adIDDLE-CLASS NATIONALISTS
Ono of the most widespread of the many
mi conceptions about Latin America is that
its political troubles are due to the absence
of a strong middle class. Democracy is said
to be the way of life of the middle class;
therefore, it is argued, there would be a func-
tioning, healthy democracy in Latin America
if . t had a middle class capable of asserting
its, af.
I hit this concept of Latin American society
as a rigid structure composed of the very
rlc I and the very poor is taken from the des-
criptions of 10th-century travelers. Today
!lipplies only to the backward rural areas.
Fc i ..the lest half, century, the cities of Latin
An erica have been the scene of great social
cluaige and economic development. Photo-
graphs of the downtown areas of cities such
as qaracas, Rio de Janeiro, Sao Paulo, Bentl-
eyde Chile that were taken 15 years ago
are !hardly recognizable today.
5 Octal mobility in Latin America is greater,
nol less, than in Europe. The amazing
eeoaornic success of immigrants from Euro-
pea a countries, as well as from the Near and
Far East, testifies to this. At the same time,
the cities of Latin America have witnessed
the ,emergence and rapid growth of an ambi-
tious, politically conscious, and highly as-
serilve native middle class. The political
wel Oat and influence of this urban middle
class is all the greater because the bulk of
Lat xi America's rural population is politi-
cally passive and inarticulate.
Li the more important Latin-American
couatries, political power long ago passed
froi a the hands of the aristocracy into those
of iniddle-elass politicians, or of army offi-
cers, who are also usually of middle-class
origin, These politicians and military men
may not represent the collective will or the
Int( rests of their class, as the Marxists would
hay it, but their policies certainly reflect
the attitudes prevalent among people of
the if middle-class background; specifically,
a vi ;mous nationalism.
Inevitably, this middle-class nationalism
expaesses itself in resentment against what-
eve. foreign power occupies a dominant po-
sition in the economy of the hemisphere.
4arig'el World War II, when British capital
still_held important positions in the econ-
om)pf some Latin-American countries, their
nationalism was anti-British as much as or
even more than anti-American. Through
the war, the 'United States came into a posi-
tion of undisputed economic and political
hegemony over the entire hemisphere, and
in c Msequence, Latin-American nationalism
is nivi directed almost entirely against the
Unt id States.
SLIND NATRED OIP THE UNITED STATES
Ti care are, however, varying degrees of na-
tionalism. The leaders of the middle-class
parties now in power in a number of Latin-
Atm rican states are fervent nationalists,
sem of them with an anti-American record,
but they are also responsible statesmen and
real ate. They recognize, that in view of its
overwhelming economic and military
streiwth, the United States must inevitably
play a leading role in the hemisphere. They
also _realize that their countries can reap
substantial benefit from association with a
pow, a? of such magnitude. They are willing
to accept partnership?but not blind sub-
servience in their foreign policy, or sub-
oral: teflon of their domestic policies to the
requ tremerits of American business interests.
Such is the attitude, for example, of the
Mexican and Venezuelan Governments, and
of President Fernando :Belannde Terry of
Peru and President Frei of Chile.
But there are also more extreme national-
ists, who regard any arrangement with the
United States as treason. Extreme national-
ism is not a mass movement in any Latin-
American country, with the possible ex-
ception of Cuba, where it is fanned by
extensive Government propaganda. It is
rarely to be found among workers, least of
all among those employed by American-
owned companies, which usually pay higher
wages and provide more social services than
any local capitalist does. In most Latin-
American countries, extreme nationalism and
virulent anti-Americanism are prevalent in
certain restricted sectors of the political and
intellectual elite: among university and high
school students and teachers, lawyers, jour-
nalists, writers, and artists. Since the ruling
political parties often recruit their leading
cadres precisely from these groups, the ab-
sence of a mass following does not render
extreme nationalism either impotent or in-
nocuous.
Roberto Campos, the Brazilian Minister of
Planning? and former Ambassador to the
United States, recently wrote of the extreme
nationalists of his own country that in many
respects their "false Brazilian nationalism
boils down to hatred of the United States, as
if Brazil's true interest were in direct mathe-
matical proportion to the harm we could
cause to the great country in the north."
This blind, hatred, as Campos rightly calls it,
is aroused by the mere fact of U.S. political
and economic hegemony in Latin America,
and not by any particular aspect of U.S. pol-
icy. The extreme nationalists object to any
and every, policy implemented by the United
States. Even when the U.S. Government gave
financial support to the Bolivian revolution-
ary government, which had nationalized the
tin mines and carried out the most drastic
agrarian reform in the history of the conti-
nent, the extreme nationalists only com-
plained that the Bolivians had sold out to
the United States.
The airs of the extreme nationalists is
nothing less than the destruction of U.S.
power in Latin America. Since no combi-
nation of Latin-American countries is strong
enough to achieve this, the extreme national-
ists seek an outside ally?a world power capa-
ble of inflicting a military defeat on the
United States.
Before and during World War II, Latin-
American extreme nationalism sought alli-
ance with Germany and Italy. After the war,
its interest was aroused by the new great
power which had emerged to challenge the
United States in Europe and Asia, the Soviet
Union. Extreme nationalism now swung left:
It established contact with the Soviet Union's
unofficial Latin-American agents, the Com-
munist Parties. The first fruit of their co-
operation was the establishment of a coali-
tion government of nationalists and Com-
munists in the Central American republic
of Guatemala.
When the Guatemalan Government was
overthrown by a CIa,as?poxieered uprising in
1954, indignation swept Latin America.
Moderate nationalists like Eduardo Frei of
Chile joined the extremists in condemning
U.S. interference in the internal affairs of
Latin-American country.
The Guatemalan affair demonstrated that
the time was not yet ripe for the establish-
ment of a Soviet base in the Western Hemi-
sphere. Three years later, a revolutionary
innovation in military technology completely
changed the situation: the development of
the intercontinental ballistic missile freed
Soviet military power from its restriction to
the Eurasian land mass. This at last put
Latin America within the range of Soviet
aspirations. As early as the spring of 1959,
the Soviet Union established contact with
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Fichal. Castro, offering him material support
against the United States. Soviet aid began
pouring in, and in 1960 the Soviet Govern-
ment uttered its first, rather cautiously
worded threat of nuclear retaliation in the
event of an attack on Cuba.
CUBA, A TEST CASE
There is some evidence of Russian hesita-
tion and doubt about the wisdom of the
Cuban venture. Nevertheless, Russia's ap-
pearance on the Latin-American scene had
an electrifying effect on the extreme nation-
alists; Cuba seemed to them to be the test
Case which demonstrated the Soviet Union's
ability and readiness to support them in an
out-and-out struggle against the United
States. They had hitherto been skeptical
of the Soviet Union, and in 1956 many of
them had condemned Soviet intervention
in Hungary. This critical attitude was now
supplanted by one of adulation.
There was something utterly artificial
about this enthusiasm; it was not accom-
panied by any genuine desire to observe Cur-
rent events in the Soviet Union and the
Soviet bloc. Such fascinating developments
as destalinization, the rewriting of party his-
tory, the rehabilitation of many of Stalin's
victims, the new trends in Soviet art and
literature, the strains in Soviet relations
with the satellites did hot arouse the in-
terest of these new admirers of the Soviet
Union. Although they could not help tak-
ing note of the Sino-Soviet conflict, they
failed to recognize its significance, its rele-
vance to Soviet foreign policy, and its effect
on the power and cohesion of the bloc.
Their lack of discernment was unwise but
understandable, To them, the Soviet Union
was a military ally, and the real subject of
their interest was Soviet nuclear and con-
ventional military capacity.
In the years 1960-62, numerous extreme
nationalists announced their loyalty to the
doctrines of Marx and Lenin. Theirs was a
very superficial Marxism-Leninism; it
amounted to little more than weptance of
Marx's definition of capitalism as exploita-
tion of man by man, and of Lenin's formula
that imperialism was the last stage of capi-
talism. There was no serious study of the
subject, no interest in current developments.
The unsophisticated observer nevertheless
found it impossible to distinguish the ex-
treme nationalists from party line Commu-
nists. And they were indeed Communists in
the sense that they professed belief in
Marxism-Leninism, supported Soviet foreign
policy, admired the Soviet economic system,
and strove to impose a similar system in
their own country. But they were not Com-
munists if that term is understood to imply
Subjection to Communist Party discipline
and readiness to implement the policies of
the international Communist movement.
The distinctien may appear to be mere
hairsplitting, yet it is of vital importance to
an understanding of the politics of the Latin
American extreme left, .Party line Commu-
nists are trained to follow Soviet instructions
to the letter, to retreat on order as well as
to attack. The extreme nationalists, who
cell themselves Marxist-Leninists, cannot be
relied upon to do so. To them, the Soviet
Union is not a leader to whom they owe un-
conditional allegiance but merely an ally, and
even this only so long as Soviet policy is to
their liking?that is, one of unrelenting and
unceasing hostility to the United States.
Fidel Castro is an example of this independ-
ence Of mind; although completely depend-
ent On Soviet epomonnie and military aid, he
UM often openly?and sometimes dramati.
early, as in his refusal to sign the test ban
treaty?registered disagreement with any
softening of the Soviet attitude toward the
United States.
REvolarrioN TI-iftouat rtason
Catsro's revolutionary strategy for Latin
America is diametrically opposed to the
strategy of the Oomiriunist parties. As ex-
pounded in Che Guevara's book on guerrilla
warfare, its three basic principles are that
guerrilla bands can defeat a regular army;
that by its activities, a guerrilla nucleus can
create a revolhtionary situation where it is
not already in existence; and that the
.peasants and not the urban workers are the
main revolutionary force in underdeveloped
Latin America.
A major effort to implement this strategy
was made in Venezuela, where nationalist
groups were joined by a Communist Party
which had seceded from the Soviet fold. In
December 1963, after a year of guerrilla fight-
ing, sabotage, and terrorism, the Venezuelan
people expressed rejection of Castroism and
communism by widespread participation in a
presidential election which the leftists had
first attempted to prevent and then to boy-
cott. Minor attempts to launch guerrilla
campaigns in Colombia, Peru, Brazil, the
Dominican Republic, and Argentina were
either nipped in the bud or crushed at an
early stage, leaving only scattered guerrilla
bands in the mountains.
The Cuban strategy of revolution through
guerrilla warfare has thus proved ineffec-
tive in countries where conditions are less
favorable than they were in Batista's Cuba.
Most Latin American governments have
greater popular support than that of Batista.
The armies of such countries as Venezuela,
Colombia, and Peru are efficient and have
a long fighting tradition; they cannot be as
easily demoralized by guerrillas as Batista's
inglorious army. And finally, Castroite doc-
trine probably overestimates the revolution-
ary potential of the Latin American peasan-
try, for the elements of this group most
likely to rebel are constantly being drawn off
to the cities.
The Cuban strategy of guerrilla warfare is
attractive to nationalistic youth. The older
generation of extreme nationalists know that
there are more effective ways of winning
political power. They are members of the
political elite; among them are influential
politicians and even top-ranking army offi-
cers. There is, therefore, always the possi-
bility of extreme nationalism coming to
power in some Latin American country
through a coup or even by constitutional
means. Such was the case in Brazil, where
an extreme nationalist, Vice President Joao
Goulart, acceded to the presidency in a per-
fectly constitutional manner after the volun-
tary resignation of his predecessor, President
Janio Quadroe. Goulart was a man of vacil-
lating charter, incapable of steering a definite
course, but his extremist friends were push-
ing him toward a revolution of the Cuban
type when in March 1964, he was deposed by
an army coup.
At that time the wave of extreme nation-
alisut and communism that had swept Latin
America was ebbing. The Cuban missile
crisis of 1962 had been the turning point.
The withdrawal of the Soviet missiles and
aircraft showed the Latin American extreme
nationalists that their entire policy had been
based on a miscalculation?an overoptimistic
assessment of Soviet possibilities and Soviet
Intentions. The Soviet Union was not, after
all, willing to risk war in order to back a
Latin American revolution. It had only
pushed onward as long as the United States
permitted it to do so, and had beaten a
hasty retreat as soon as the United States
showed its strength.
THE SWING TOWARD CHINA
One of the effects of the missile crisis has
been to awaken the Latin American extreme
nationalists' 'interest in the Sino-Soviet con-
flict and to swing their sympathies to the
Chinese side. Before the missile crisis, they
had regarded the Sino-Soviet conflict as ir-
relevant to the Latin American situation,
and Chinese criticism of Soviet foreign policy
as unjustified. The Chinese accuse the So-
viets of planning to betray the cause of
18921
revolution by coming to terfns with the
United States. This certainly did not seem
to apply to the Western Hemisphere, where
the Soviet Union was challenging the United
States by its support of Cuba. But after the
missile crisis fiasco, these accusations ap-
peared to gain in substance.
At the time of the missile crisis, the Corn-
munist Party of Venezuela changed over to
the strategy of guerrilla warfare. At the
same time, it ceased to support the Russians
against the Chinese.
In Brazil, a sizable faction broke away
from the pro-Soviet Brazilian Communist
Party to form a rival Communist Party of
Brazil apparently subsidized by the Chinese.
A similar split took place in Peru, while
minor secessions occurred in Bolivia, Ecua-
dor, and Chile. Too much importance
should not, however, be attached to these
events. The Latin American Communist
Parties are small and ineffectual; internal
dissensions will hardly lead to anything but
a further decline.
As for the nationalists, their sympathies
for China are likely to remain platonic; they
are primarily interested in military strength,
not in ideology, and China is not yet nearly
strong enough to assert its interests in Latin
America through the force of arms.
After the Venezuelan presidential election
of December 1963, and the Brazilian coup of
March 1964, the extreme left suffered a third
blow in the spectacular defeat of the Marxist
Salvador Allende by the Christian Democrat
Eduardo Frei in the Chilean presidential
election of September 1964, and Frei's sub-
sequent victory in the parliamentary elec-
tions this March. On all these occasions, the
weakness displayed by the leftists was un-
doubtedly an effect of the missile crisis,
which had robbed them of their hope of de-
feating the United States through alliance
with the Soviet Union. The following lesson
may be drawn from this.
Economic aid alone is not enough; it must
be supplemented by an effective American
foreign policy. The Alliance for Progress is
the proper way to win the friendship of the
moderate nationalists, who today constitute
the most important political force in the
area, but it cannot disarm the extreme na-
tionalists, who will only continue to de-
nounce it as one more maneuver to per-
petuate U.S. domination.
In themselves, these extreme nationalists
may be troublesome to American business
Interests, but they do not represent a threat
to the security of the United States. They
become dangerous only through their al-
liance with the Soviet Union. The aim of
American foreign policy in the area must
therefore be to persuade the Soviet leaders
that Latin America is not within their reach.
This cannot be done by inflicting punish-
ment on Central American army colonels,
Caribbean adventurers, and other exponents
of extreme nationalism while avoiding direct
confrontation with the real adversary.
The American policy of harassing the
recipients of Soviet arms has not been effec-
tive in Latin America or anywhere else. The
only effective policy is that of standing up to
the donor, to the Soviet Union itself. That
was done in the Cuban missile crisis, and
the result has been a very marked decline
of anti-American extreme nationalism and
communism in the area.
[From the Washington Post]
RELUCTANT ALLrES risr THE HEMISPHERE
(By Marquis Childs)
SANTIAGO, CHILE.?The U.S. State Depart-
ment line, observed with a letter-of-the-law
faithfulness, is that the crisis in the Domini-
can Republic has made no real difference in
the standing of the United States in Latin
America. Machinegun slugs fired into a
few embassies, bomb threats, yes; but, the
visitor is told, no big demonstrations.
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This is, dr course, literally true. Tet it
Seems to one observer to be a form of self-
deception. /t is not hard to detect a deep
. disquiet and not only in Government' circles
but, according to those with contexts at
- lower levels, among the people themselves.
The landing of the marines was taken as
a return to the use of naked power by an
America bent on exercising control where
Control in the national interest is judged
essential,
One of the first casualties was the Inter-
American Foreign Ministers Conference, orig-
inally scheduled for May and then postponed
to August 4. Now it has been pbstponed
again, presumably to a date to be set prior
to the end of the year. The Conference has
been an important prestige symbol for
Brazil, since it was to be held in ttio de
Janeiro on the 400th anniversary of that
City's 'founding. Moreover, it would have
been a pits for the hard-pressed government
Of President.tininbertO 'Ca.stelo tranco.
?Viie Countries voted against postponing
the Conference, Chile being one of the minor-
ity in opposition to the 14 nations, including'
the 'United States, that voted for delay. The
Chileans had a number , of things they
Wanted to say at the earliest opportunity
about the wea,kneS.s Of the Inter-American
system and the Meaning of the Dominican
crisis in this connection. Postponement was
interpreted as a confession that in vie* of
the vastness' of the problems confronting the
benitsPhere, With the Dominican mess still
tinrebolved, IV was better not to meet at all
rather than to have a session that would be
likely to descend to acrimony and vitupera-
tion.
'Washington's goal Was the creation of an
Inter-Amiericen permanent peace force ready
,to intervene to repel outside aggression. But
Wilde from a half dozen states in the client
or aerificlient relationship with the United
States, this concept has little support.
NOW the cloud of American involvement
in a full-scale war in Vietnam darkens the
horizon. The World War of 25 years, ago
began against a wholly different background.
The good-neighbor policy of Franklin Roose-
'Veit, purified with
4 such zeal by his Secre-
1tairy of State, Cordull Hull had created an
_atmosphere of good will and cooperation.
Most Latinos wanted to believe that this
'was 'the l'Uture order for the hemisphere.
But another and perhaps more important
'difference set that time apart. The leftist
leaning and even the center parties were op-
posed to nazism and fascism. When the
, Germans attacked the Soviet Union in June
of 1941 and Pearl Harbor followed 6 months
later, Washington and Moscow were allies.
The present crisis confronting the United
States comes after 20 years of hostile Cora-
`Mai:list and leftist,propagancla that has been
intensified in recent month. In a constant
drupffire_ through a wide variety of channels,
'radio in particular, the United States is pic-
tured as an imperialist power bent on sub-
jugating a small nation in seutheast Asia.
It is in this context, distorted and false as
.it is, that the Dominican intervention must
be put.
' Another factor in the atmosphere of 1940
as contraSted to the. present day was Presi-
dent Roosevelt'i refusal in 4938 to intervene
with force when Mexico nationalized the oil
properties of American companie: with corn-
penaation provided by the Mexican Govern-
ment. It made a deep impression through-
Out the continent that despite powerful po-
litical presaizes, F.D.R. declined to act.
Today the Hickenlooper amendment, auto-
.
poetically suspending aid to any country that
nationalizes, hangs over the heads of goy-
eminent leaders faced with mounting de-
Mande, from all sides. Foreign ownership
Of utilities and basic commodities such as
oil is bound to become , a hotter issue
throughout the continent.
T se, in he view of one observer, are
trogy's realities. They will be ignored at
the ;ask of serious miscalculation in assess-
ing the future of the relation between Wash-
ing:on and the rest of the hemisphere.
Am mica's power is overwhelming. That is a
moi important reason for the comparative
qui cacence with which the Dominican inter-
yen Eton was accepted. But this power, does
not necessarily mein 'loyalty, a willing al-
lbgance, when the chips are down.
[Friona the Saturday Review, Aug. 7, 16651
005 LIVIIINISM AND DEMOCRACY IN rara Domin-
ica* Raman=
( Cforz.?Juan Bosch is the first man in the
hist Ory of the Dominican Republic to have
bee me 1t President through a free election.
He won his overwhelming?and surprising
victory in December 1962. But in September
r 196 I, he was overthrown by the military. In
April of this year, pro-Bosch forces revolted
against the government of Donald Reid, lead-
ing to the present crisis. This article appears
in I laturday Review through special arrange-
met it with War/Peace Report in which Mr.
Bosth's article is also carried this week.)
(By Juan Bosch)
Srl Juitar, Pm= farm?After the U.S.
intervention in Santo Domingo, the Depart.-
of State Ant released a list of 53 Dominican
Communists; then a list of 58; and finally, a
list of 77.
'Mien I was President of the Dominican
, /tea tiblic, I calculated that in Santo Domin-
. go there were between 700 and 800 COM-
MIE lists, and I estimated the number of
Conitnunist sympathizers at between 3,000
and 3,500. These 700 or 800 Communists
weri divided into three groups, of which, in
ray judgment, the largest was the Popular
, Dor Unicorn Movement, with perhaps between
400 end 500 members in the entire country;
nexa came the Popular Socialist Party with
son fisthat less, around 300 to 400; and then,
, in it, number that in my opinion did not
reac h 50, the Communists had infiltrated the
June 14th Movement, some of them in execu-
tive Tpoeta and others at lower levels.
I ought to make clear that in 1963 in the
Dor dnican Republic there was much politi-
cal zoxdusion, and a large number of people,
esproially middle-class youth, did not know
for certain what they were and what they
wanted to be, whether democrats or Com-
mis lista. But that has happened in almost
all countries where there have been pro-
longed dictatorships, once the dictatorships
past-, After a certain time has elapsed and
the political panorama becomes clarified,
many people who began their public life as
Con imunists pass into the democratic camp.
In 1963 the Dominican Republic needed time
for the democratic system to clear up the
con aision, and in a sense the time was used
thal, way, since 700 or 800 Communists, di-
vided in three groups, with sympathizers
nun thering between 3,000 and 3,500, could
in 110 case?not even with arms in their
hania?take power or even represent a seri-
ous threat.
If _there weren't enough Communists to
takt_power, there was, on the other hand, a
stro az sentiment against persecution of the
Con munists. This feeling developed because
during his long tyranny Trujillo always ac-
cuse el his adversaries of being Communists.
Becianie of that, anticommunism, and Tru-
jillo Lem ended up being equivalent terms in
the Dominican political vocabulary. More-
ov.er, the instruments of oppression?the po-
lice and the armed forces?remained the
semi in 1963?with the same men who had
servmi under Trujillo. If I had used them
against the Communists I would have ended
up tit their prisoner, and they, for their part,
woug,have completely destroyed the Domini-
can democratic forces. For those men, hav-
ing Learned from Trujillo, there was no dis-
tinction between democrats and Commu-
nists; anyone who opposed any of their vi-
olence, or even their corruption, was a Com-
munist and ought to be annihilated.
My presumption was correct, as events have
.shown. From the dawn of September 25, the
day of the coup d'etat against the govern-
ment I headed, the police began to Perse-
cute and beat without mercy all the non-
Communist democrats who in the opinion of
the military chiefs would be able to resist
the coup. It was known that in all the
country soot one Communist had infiltrated
my party, the Dominican Revolutionary Party
(PhD), but still the leaders and members of
that party were persecuted as Communists.
The chief of police himself insulted the pris-
oners by calling them Communists. Many
leaders of the PRD were deported, and?a
curious fact--numerous Communists who
had been in Europe. Russia, and Cuba were
permitted to return. But the leaders of the
PRD were not permitted to return, and if
one did he was immediately deported again.
During the 19 months of the' government of
Donald Reid, thousands of democrats from
the PED and hundreds from the Social Chris-
tian Party and the June 14 movement were
jailed, deported and beaten in a barbaric
manner; the headquarters of these three
parties Were assaulted or destroyed by the
police. All the vehicles, desks, typewriters
and other valuable effects of the PRD were
robbed ba the police. In the months of
May and June 1964, more than 1,000 mem-
bers of the PRD who had been accused of
being Communists were in jail at one time.
That anti-:Communist fury launched
against the democratic Dominicans was an
important factor In the eruption of the
April revolution because the people were
fighting to regain their right to live under
a legal order, not a police state. If it had
been I who unleashed that, fury, the revolu-
tion would have been against the democratic
regime, not in favor of democracy.
It was not necessary to be a political genius
to realize that if anti-Communist persecu-
tion began in the Dominican Republic, the
-police and the military would also persecute
the democrats. Neithea need one be a po-
litical genius to understand that what the
country needed was not stimulation of the
mad forces of Trujilloisrn which still existed
in the police and the military, but rather
the strengthening of democracy by demon-
strating to the Dominicans in practice that
what was best for them and the country was
to live under the legal order of a democratic
regime.
Now the:n, in the Dominican picture there
was a force that in my opinion was determin-
ing the pointer of the political balance, in
terms of ideologies and doctrines, and that
force was the June 14 movement.
I have said that according to my calcula-
tions there was in the June 14th Movement
an infiltration of less than BO Communists,
some of them in executive positions and
others at lower levels. But I must state that
control of this party, at all levels, was held
by an overwhelming majority of young peo-
ple who were not Communists and some of
whom were strongly anti-Communist. How
can one explain that there should be Com-
munists together with non-Communists and
active anti-Communists? There is one
reason: the June 14th Movement was based,
in all its breadth and at all its levels, on in-
tense nationalism, and that nationalism was
manifested above all in terms of strong anti-
Americaniem. To convert that anti-norte-
anaericanism.o into dominicanismo there was
only one way: maintain for a long time a
democratic regime with a dynamic and cre-
ative sense.
I knew that if the country saw the estab-
lishment of a government that was not
elected by the people--that was not constitu-
tional and not respectful of civil liberties?
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August 6, 1965 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? SENATE 18923
the Communists would attribute this new
government to U.S. maneuvers. I also knew
that in view of the anti-Americanism of the
youth of the middle class--especially in the
June 14th Movement?Communist influence
would increase. The equilibrium of the po-
litical balance was, then, in that party. Any
sensible Dominican politician realized that.
The trouble was that in 1963 the Dominican
Republic did not have sensible politicians,
or at least not enough of them. The appe-
tites for power held in check for a third of
a century overflowed, and the politicians
turned to conspiring with Trujillo's military
men. The immediate result was the coup
of September 1963; the delayed result was
the revolution of April 1965.
It is easy to understand why Dominican
youth of the middle class was so nationalistic.
This youth loved its country, wanted to see
it morally and politically clean, hoped for its
economic development, and thought?with
reason?that it was Trujillo who blocked
morality, liberty, and development of the
country. It is also easy to understand why
this nationalism took the form of anti-Amer-
icanism. It was simply a feeling of frustra-
tion. This youth, which had not been able
to get rid of Trujillo, thought that Trujillo
was in power because of his support by the
United States. For them, the United States
and Trujillo were partners, both to be blamed
for what was happening in the Dominican
Republic, and for that reason their hate for
Trujillo was naturally converted into feelings
of anti-Americanism.
I am not discussing here whether they
were right or wrong; I am simply stating the
fact. I know that in the United States there
are people who supported Trujillo and Others
who attacked him. But the young Domini-
cans knew only the former and not the
latter, since Trujillo took care to give the
greatest publicity possible to any demonstra-
tion of support, however small, that was of-
fered directly or indirectly by a U.S. citizen,
whether he was a Senator or an ordinary
tourist; and on the other hand, he took great
pains to prevent even the smallest notice in
the Dominican Republic of any attack by
an American citizen. Thus, the Dominican
youth new only that Trujillo had defenders
in the United States, not that he had
enemies.
For his part, Trujillo succeeded in creat-
ing with the Dominican people an image of
unity between society and government that
can only be compared with what has been
produced in countries with Communist re-
gimes. For more than 30 years in. the Do-
minican Republic nothing happened?noth-
ing could happen?without an express order
from Trujillo. In the minds of Dominican
youth this image was generalized, and they
thought that in the United States also
nothing could happen without an order from
whoever goverened in Washington. Thus,
for them, when an American Senator, news-
paperman, or businessman expressed his sup-
port of Trujillo, that person was talking by
order of the President of the United States.
To this very day, a large number of Domini-
cans of the middle class think that every-
thing a U.S. citizen says, his Government is
saying too.
The pointer of the political balance, as I
said earlier, was in the June 14 movement
which was saturated with anti-Americanism.
This group included the most fervent youths
and even those best qualified technically?
but not politically?as well as the more
numerous nucleus of middle-class youth; it
also constituted the social sector where Com-
munist sermons could have the most effect
and from whence could come the resolute
leaders that the Communists lacked, Tru-
jillo had tortured, assassinated and made
martyrs of hundreds of members of the June
14 movement. To persecute these youths
Was to send them into the arms of com-
munism, to give strength to the arguments of
the few Communists that had infiltrated the
movement. The Communists said that the
democracy that I headed received its orders
from Washington, the same as had Trujillo,
to destroy the nationalistic youths. Little
by little, as the days passed, the non-Com-
munist and anti-Communist members of the
June 14 movement were gaining ground
against the Communists, since they were
able to prove to their companions that my
democratic government neither persecuted
them nor took orders from Washington. In
4 years the democratic but nationalistic sec-
tor of .the June 14 movement?which was
in the overwhelming majority?would have
ended the Communist influence and made it-
self into a firm support of Dominican democ-
racy.
The weakness of the Dominican Commu-
nists was also shown by the activity of the
Social Christian Party, which presented itself
as militantly anti-Communist. It persecuted
the Communists everywhere, to the point
that they could not show themselves in pub,
lic. But when the Social Christians realized
that the best source of young people in the
country was the June 14th Movement, they
stopped their street fighting against the Com-
munists and began a campaign against im-
perialism? Norteamericano. When they
showed with this battle cry that they were
not a pro-U.S. party, they began to attract
young adherents who had been members of
the June 14th Movement as well as many
others who already had a clear idea of what
they wanted to be: nationalists and demo-
crats. Thus, the Social Christian leaders
came to understand that the key to the Do-
minican political future lay in assuring the
nationalistic youth of a worthy and con-
structive democracy.
What the Social Christians learned by 1963
'would have been understood by other polit-
ical groups if the Dominican democracy had
been given time. But this was not to be.
Reactionaries in the Dominican Republic and
the United States set themselves ferociously
against the Dominican democracy under the
slogan that my government was "soft" on the
Communists.
This is the point at which to analyze
"weakness" and "force," if those two terms
signify opposite concepts. There are two
ways to face problems, particularly political
ones. One is to use intelligence and the other
is to use force. According to this theory, in-
telligence is weak, and the use of in-
telligence, a sign of weakness.
I think that a subject so complex as polit-
ical feelings and ideas ought to be treated
with intelligence. I think also that force is
a concept that expresses different values, as
can be seen in the United States or in the
Dominican Republic. In the United States,
the use of force means the application of the
law?without crimes, without torture, with-
out medieval barbarism; in the Dominican
Republic, it means quite the contrary: one
does not apply the law without instruments
of torture, not excluding assassination.
When a Dominican policeman says of a per-
son that he is a Communist, he is saying that
he, the policeman, has the full right to beat
him, to shoot him, or to kill him. And since
this policeman does not know how to distin-
guish between a democrat and a Communist,
he is quite apt to beat, shoot and kill a
democrat.
It is not easy to change the mentality
of the people who become policemen in
the Dominican Republic, especially with lit-
tle time to do it. When the New Eng-
landers burned women as witches, those who
did the burning believed absolutely that
they were destroying witches. Today, no-
body believes that they were witches. But
it is still like early Salem in Santo Domingo.
When a Dominican policeman is told that
he should persecute a young man because
he is a Communist, the policeman believes
with all his soul that his duty is to kill
the youth.
The problem that my democratic govern-
ment faced was to choose between the use of
Intelligence and the use of force, while the
time passed during which the hotheaded
youths and uneducated police learned to
distinguish between democracy and com-
munism. And if someone says that in this
period the Communists would be able to gain
strength and take power, I say and guar-
antee that they could not do it. Only a
dictatorship can give to the Communists
the arguments they need for progress in
the Dominican Republic; under a democratic
regime the democratic conscience would out-
strip the Communists.
To return to the concepts of intelligence
and force, I think that they apply to com-
munism itself in. its light for the conquest
of power. No Communist Party, in no coun-
try of the world, has been able to reach
power solely because it was strong; it has
needed, besides, a leader of exceptional ca-
pacity. The Dominican Communists have
not had and do not have force, and they have
not had and do not have a leader compara-
ble to Lenin, Mao, Tito, or Fidel; and ac-
cording to my prediction, they are not going
to have either the force or the leader in the
foreseeable future.
Dominican communism is in its infancy,
and began, as did Venezuelan communism,
with internal divisions that will require many
years to overcome. Only the long dictator-
ship of Perez Jimenez was able to create the
right atmosphere for the different groups of
Communists of the Venezuela of 1915 so that
they could come together into a single party,
and the lack of a leader of exceptional ca-
pacity has, in spite of the power of the
party, voided the chance of Venezuelan com-
munism coming to power.
How many Communists did France have?
How many Italy? But neither French nor
Italian communism ever had leaders capable
of carrying It to power. In the Dominican
case, there are neither the numbers nor the
leadership.
I cannot hope that men like Wessin y
Wessin, Antonio Imbert, or Jules Dubois will
know these things, will think about them,
and will act accordingly. But logically I had
the right to expect that in Washington there
would be someone who would understand
the Dominican political scene and the role
that the Communists could play in my
country. As is evident, I was mistaken. In
Washington they know the Dominican prob-
lems only as they are told of them by Wessin
y Wessin, Antonio Imbert, and Jules Dubois.
The lack of adequate knowledge is tanta-
mount to the nullification of the power of
Intelligence, above all in politics, and this
can only lead to sorry results. When intel-
ligence is canceled, its place is occupied by
fear. Today there has spread over the coun-
tries of America a fear of communism that IS
leading us all to kill democracy for fear
that democracy is the mask of communism.
It seems to me we have reached the point
where we consider democracy incapable of
resolving the problems of our peoples. And
if we have truly arrived at this point, we
have nothing to offer humanity. We are
denying our faith, we are destroying the
columns of the temple that throughout our
life has been our shelter.
Are we really doing this? No, I should not
say this. It is the others. Because in spite
of everything that has happened, I continue
to believe that democracy is the dwelling
place of human dignity.
NEBRASKA CENTENNIAL, 1967?
PART II
Mr. HRUSKA. Mr. President, last
year at this time I addressed the Senate
regarding the celebration of the 100th
anniversary of Nebraska statehood. My
purpose was to acquaint my colleagues
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8924 CON ,J ESSiO
th the planned celebrations and to
highlight the past 100 'years of Nebraska
'development. Since last June much
Work has been undertaken by the citizens
of Nebraska and the foundation Ls being
laid for a successful and enduring cen-
tennial year.
Now I would like to review some of the
activities of the people of Nebraska and
The enthusiastic response which the
local endeavors have engendered.
grassrbots approach is the keystone to
the many centennial 'celebrations being
planned across the State and in the many
,COMMunities. There has been a ground
-Swell of activity on the local level to 'plan
'and develop projects 'which will have a
'Significance not only for the centennial
ear of1907, but also for many years to
roe: There has been no request for
funds from the Federal Government to
aid in the planning and carrying out of
Centennial activities, as was the case in
geyeral other statehood anniversaries.
/The principal rnearis of support, finan-
cially and Morally, are coming from local
Orgaritiations and private individuals.
President, on March 1, 1967, Ne-
braskans will formally commence cele-
bration of their f 00th anniversary of
tehood. Carved out of the center of
the vase tOuislana-PUrcha.se, peopled by
'travelers Westward who crossed the Mts-
. sburi /liver 'to settle' aTong the famous
:overIana routes of The Oregonand Mor-
mon Traild, and organlied in the irnme-
dia,te post-Civil War period, Nebraska
'became, the Nation's g'7th State.
'TodaY a hew aWaretiess of the histo-
rical background of local areas in the
.State being given Impetus by the ap-
=proaching centennial. The local citizen
ls probing and questioning the long and,
gometimes, unknown past. Undoubtedly,
but of the prepal'ations and responses
,frein, this 1.00th anniversary, local his-
'tiOries will abound and new knowledge
1 be gained Of the mysteries of un-
reeorded eOns Of gine. The beneficiaries
-
?of this historical searching will not alone
' be the generation of' today but the ones
Of the future as welt The Lincoln Star
?etlitoriallY Put it in this way:
One' the early r'ewarffs of Nebraska's
centennial planning, is' not occurring on the
-State ceiel but in the communities them-
aehteS.
It is arising interest'in history of the area,
the sorti that goes wa? back, not the usual
kind that repeats the Story of how the pres-
ent town WaS starteff. All parts of the world
have a Ifistory of eeival length. The land in
Nebraska is the same age as that of ancient
' Greece. But we have not sufficiently con-
Idered bur history beyond our own time. We
,,tread onArOntid made sacred by great strug-
gles of En early and alinost unknown people.
?But in Of us don't know it.
The Nebra,ska town with the lovely
name Of Weeping Water is a case in point.
The town now has an historian. Recent-
ly, the poetry and narrative of the Indian
legends' which gave the area its special
significance have been collected and pub-
lished by the townspeople. The future
?
Will benefit.
In "other instanced, Nebraskans, on the
eVe Of their centennial, are planning
celebrations which Will both dictate 10
Of pioneer" heritage and initiate
Of lasting *Value in the coming
: CIA-RDP6714
A RECORO
-
!,ears. The centennial tree planting pro-
am is a fine illustration. Prairie voy-
agers of the 19th century on Nebraska's
la'assy seas found a land barren of trees
laid, seemingly, a desert of opportunities.
Turning to their most precious natural
ASource--the soil?ingenious pioneers
:Itshioned sod houses until timber could
lk brought in and seedlings planted.
- In keeping with the tradition of these
'71oneers and with the work of J. Sterling
'clorton, whose tree planting efforts are
.mcognized each Arbor Day, the centen-
alai tree planting program is encouraging
Sebraskans to plant 6 million trees per
Tear through 1967 on lands both public
ind private. Here again the key is the
beal efforts of the citizens to dramatize
their appreciation for the beauty of na-
ture and enrichen recreational facilities
arid leave a bountiful legacy of natural
beauty for future generations.
This, like most the other centennial
Programs, is being promoted and per-
formed largely at the local level. Each
of the State's 93 counties is forming its
Centennial committee, either alone or
With neighboring counties. Thus, Ne-
braska's 100th birthday will be a truly
grassroots celebration with emphasis on
organizations at the city and county
levels.
?- The people of Nebraska have been
tinite creative and have brought forth a
rmiltitude of ideas. Early in 1967 the
hard work and achievement of the local
towns and counties will be recognized by
the naming of a centennial city and a
Centennial county which have made the
'greatest contributions in the respective
'Centennial betterment programs. Al-
though all the cities and counties cannot
Win and be so honored, this is a contest
In which no one will lose. All of the
projects will enrichen the locale and
inspire the people.
The young people in the State have
teen enthusiastic and interested in the
.1nany programs being carried on at the
_local level. For instance, Otoe County
held a county flag design contest in
which the result would be the adoption
;of an official county flag. The winner of
-the most creative design was a 13-year-
-old student, Mary Lindell. This is not
-the only area where student participa-
tion and contribution have been signif-
=icant. In Burt County the students in a
local school have designed, written, and
published an attractive booklet on the
'many visiting places in the area, those of
historical significance and those of a
-recreational nature. The contribution
-of these students has been well received
'by the citizens of the community and
will be an invaluable aid to visitors.
, The citizens of Saline County have
been ambitious in their efforts to insure
a successful centennial. As in other
counties across the State, a historical
'marking program is being pursued. Sites
and symbols of local historical signifi-
cance are being carefully recorded and
marked for the benefit of the residents
and visitors. The story of the West is
- complex and contains many historical
"threads. Through efforts of these local
groups the complete and complex his-
torical weave of time will be more un-
derstandable and reveal the essential in-
044M1000500110005-0,
August 6, 1965
gredients of the broad Picture of Araeri-
can history.
In addition, the county is contemplat-
ing a centennial scholarship program for
students in the county schools. Here
the intense interest in education and the,
means, to provide the necessary oppor-
tunities for deserving young people are
the bases for a program of widepread
significance not just for the centennial
but for years to come.
Out in Deuel County, the impact of
centennial planning has taken another
course. The importance of history is be-
ing highlighted and efforts are being di-
rected toward the establishment of a
county historical society to insure that
the past is not lost to the future and
that records are preserved. For the mod-
ern-day traveler, the citizens of the
county are focusing their efforts upon
placing and improving rest stops and
parks along the Interstate Highway
which traverses the country, the State
and the Nation. This is a practical and
Important contribution.
Finally, it would be an oversight of a
Senator representing the beef State not
to mention the nationwide program to
boost Nebraska beef. Across the country
the appearance of the Nebraska centen-
nial sirloin has attracted the attention
of the connoisseur and the man in the
street who enjoys good beef. The cen-
tennial sirloin is the finest piece of corn-
fed beef that can be bought anywhere; it
must meet certain established minimum
specifications; and it must be Nebraska
beef. Increasingly, the restaurants and
fine eating places in Nebraska and
around the country are advertising and
using the Nebraska centennial sirloin.
This is a fine testimony in itself.
Senator CURTIS and I want to extend
to our colleagues and the citizens of their
States the hospitality and friendliness
of Nebraskans. Come to Nebraskaland
any time, and particularly mark the cal-
endar for the many activities of Ne-
braska's centennial year. The warmth
and openness of Nebraskans can be
found in few other places. The tourist
attractions and wealth of history of the
Old West abound in Nebraska. What-
ever your pleasure or fancy, seeing Ne-
braska will be immensely profitable and
satisfying. In this regard, I ask unani-
mous consent to have printed in the
RECORD an article I wrote on this subject
for the Omaha World-Herald on May 2,
1965, "Nebraska?Big as All Outdoors."
There being no objection, the article
was ordered to be printed in the RECORD,
as follows: .
[From the Omaha World-Herald, May 2,1965]
"HOY,DY, NEIGHBOR"--NEBRASKA?BIG AS ALL
OUTDOORS
, .
(EDITOR'S NOTE.?ROMAN L. HRITSKA was
born August 16, 1904, in David City, Nebr.
He was educated in Omaha and received a
law degree from Creighton University. He
practiced law in Omaha for years, then served
as chairman of the county board and eventu-
ally was elected to the U.S. Senate. A sports-
man, he loves the outdoor hunting and fish-
ing of his home State. For this tourist
magazine, we asked him to welcome travelers
to our State in 1965.)
(lty ROMAN L. HRTJSKA, U.S. Senator)
Nebraska is a land of diversity and variety.
It is diverse in offering to the traveler rolling
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