REMARKS OF SENATOR THOMAS J. DODD CONCERNING A CHRONOLOGY PUBLISHED BY THE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS ON THE SITUATION IN THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC

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• Publication Date: August 23, 1965
• Content Type: NSPR

L4/ fi( tR)
YttimAnks OF' ATO
DODD CONCERNING A
OGY PUBLISHED BY THE COM-
M/Tfirg ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
ON tent SITUATION- IN THE DO-
MINICAN REPUBLIC
str.-PoLertioutT. Mr. President, the
mentor Senator from Connecticut (Mr.
Dom) ham today Issued a press release
entitled -Senator Doss Charges Foreign
Relations Publication on Dominican
Crbris Slanted Against Administration."
The allegation Is that the ettrono10417
A/litotes, exclusively from press sources
20616
-
Approved ForRe I Ras19FAINFA6. I AtrOnitteigarliaTh 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 3 -21tigUti t 23, 1065
I 'fhb& it Is inappropriate to come in
at this late hour and try to change the
site without any provision for money
to buy the site. The bill merely provides
for A sits In the vicinity of the Pennell-
yank Avenue development Merit= It
Ileallig,t0 me this is quite realistic. If it
had been provided for originalk and we
had been able in mit a alga 1t wOuld be
enotter matter, but a greet amount of
time, money, and effort have been-ax.
tended on the development of the site.
toq4at froe to tee to change it now. It
nt that fact. I think it comes
Weald destroy the present concept al-
together.
Mr. MORSE. Ur. President, I am
very glad that the Senator from Ar-
tiness has commented on the pending
Cultural Center site. Ass member of the
District of Columbia Conunittee. let me
my that in view of the developmetits, I
believe it is an excellent choice. It would
be a great mistake to try to disrupt the
megram now by getting Into controversy
over location of the center. The pro-
gram is coming along nicely.
As the Senator from Arkansas knows,
is is expected that a substantial drive
will he conducted to obtain private funds
and contributions. Our citizens have
been led to believe that the site has been
agreed upon.
Mr. FULBRICIHT. Some $15 million
has been raised privately.
Mr. MORSE. Yes, the Senator is cor-
rect, but not only that, as we look at the
situation in retrospect, and when we take
Into account the plans which are now In
the blueprint stage_ ,for other develop-
ments in the Menet of Columbia, I be-
lieve that it is an excellent site.
This may be a sentimental argument
on my part, but I believe it is a most
appropriate site in view of the fact that
President Kennedy's burial Place Is just
scram the river, with Its everlasting
torr,li aflame. Thus, this center will be
among other shrines in the area, such
as the Unooln Memorial, the Jefferson
Memorial, and other memorials. The
Cultural Center Is, after all, being built
en a orest memorial to our great Presi-
dent Kennedy, and is most appropriately
loaded at the site which hes been
selected.
Accordingly. I sincere/1 hope that
plans for completing the Center will pro-
ceed without any controversy being
raised at, this date over its location.
Mr. FULBIRIGHT. I thank the
Senator from Oregon for Ids comments,
entirety preps-late.
1,
J.
NOL-
critical of adminletratien policy In the
Dominican Republic. The remarks of
the senior Senator from Connoitiosit hie
eluded complaints that the sisrondloCI
did not bear statements favorabie to the
position of the administratism.
The facts are as follows:
Fh-st. 11m document to which the sen.
tor assuttor refers was termed In olleb!
Jut, for use at the econafttee hrNMI*.
ken with Its effort to learn in dated of
developments in the Doeninicem Repditio.
It was compiled, u noted in the prefans.
from material "collected with the mead-
since of the Legislative Reference thrift,
of the Library of Congress. the Depart-
ment of State, and the staff of the Ccen-
inittee on Poreign Relations." Because
or shortage of time, the staff of the com-
mittee In compiling the chronology made
extensive use of a research instrument to
which it subscribes entitled "Deadline
Data."
Second. The statement of the senior
Senator from Connecticut leaves the Im-
pression that the asintinistration views
were not adequately Presented in the
chronology. Members should note, how-
ever, that the chronoloaY and the ac-
companying printed material includes
not only a number of doetnnents issued
by the Organization of American States,
but six statements by President Johneon,
aed a number of statements by the De-
partment of State and one by Ambas-
sador Stevenson.
Third. I do wish to expres my regret
that it has not been possible for the
seedor Senator from Conneetteut liar.
Doul to attend meetings of the Mande*
Relations Committee on this subject.
Much of the material to which he re-
ferred has been considered by the oont-
Inittee.
? Fourth. Finally,, I wish the Raceme to
show that all at the witnesses which the
committee beard at the sessions net at-
tended by the Senator from Connecticut
were administration witnesses, save one.
We heard the testimony of Elecretery of
State Rusk. Under Secretary of State
Mann, Deputy Seeretaqr of Defense
Vanee, Ambassador Bennett, Admiral
Reborn. Director of the Central Intelli-
gence Agency. and Assistant Secretary of
State for American Republke Affairs
Vaughn, The only non-Government wit-
ness'called before UoLcommittee was the
former Governor of Puerto Moo. the
Honorable Lula Mufios-Marin.
Investrdations at sets of the executive
department by their very nature, es the
Senator well knows, put the burden an
the administration to prove that its ac-
tions were correct. I believe that a fair
criticism of the committee might be that
it put too much time and effort Into the
ministate:a of Government 'Mumma
and not enough Into esatutriatlau of
Government critics.
The committee has met on 13 different
occasions.some 'MO Pales of
testimony. 43?17= the meetings have
been 2 or 3 hours In length. The senior
Senator from Connecticut attended-one
of them meetings. and a search et the
oomanittee records indicates that he has
not seen fit to eansult tbe tranoidete of
those hearings.
FURTHER AMENDMENT 12,-- VOW
' ZION ASSISTIrriCE-ACT or 04,7:
? CONFERENCE REPORT
? Mr. ?ULBRICH/T. Mr. relaktaa_a,
beimiIt a report of the embattle* eit
rerenoe On the disagreeing
two Houses on the
agnate to the hill (H.R. 17514 siquid
further the Foreign Aimisnaggenellbarf
MI, as amended, and (Sr other paggeolu
I ask unanimous consent for doe limed
tonstderatton of the remit' 4
? The PRESIDING
report will be read for the
ovrtein.
of the Senate.
The legislative clerk read tiogaidart
(For conference report, inejeopeeeese
ceedtngs of Aug. la, 1906, ge: S50O3-
30135. Coreerressiowsz Receme)
The PRESIDING OPMER., litre
objection to the present considonctiplied
the report?
There being no objection. ..dm etionte
proceeded to consider the mart
VIWINAM
sfr. ruiatuanT. Mr. Preddeit,
day, there came to my attention a dime-
runt entitled "Why vietnam."4whieh
eludes some historical dommento?iste
tee written by President. Kennedy and
President Eisenhower, and statements
made by President Johntary of State Dean Rusk. It is a
atin and Se=
Informative document and will be heat-
ful to citizens who wish to study keit he
step the nature and extent of our HI-
irotirentent in Vietnam.
I ask unarensous consent to be,.
document printed in the Remo for-the
Information of all Senators. -
There being no ?bleak's% the docu-
ment was erdered to be atrdnejfi. the
Rscons am follows:
Wax vennosst
man's 5(s-old s+suggis for a 'gad
)fx Psi.Low Aarcercrare: 01Zerate,131
a 'road of peace, the whirkita. tifigtentitigd
oohipaselon of the American 'tetifile are
tateti the taut. This Is the meaning Of Abe
conflict In Vietnam.
In essetteg the present choose...ft Wm-
mongol that our people mak tosderelmillios,
and that our leaders speak mita eemenea
2 neve therefore directed Ong We sewn
to the American people be ,strksitiled- Arid
widely dietributed. In its pops yogi selli
And Matemeate on Vietnani by litee
le-
we of your Government?by your Proulesset..
your Mieretary of State sae yeer.aesserary
Defenee.
Them statements were prepared far dlilhr-
ent amilenees, and they ream, -dtlIketog
responsibilities of men opsekey ,Tita
gemstone' testimony has limn adftag to AS
undue repetition and to ineorporate
sense of the disatissions that egoalid.
Together. they merrarect etearesasteon
of Aisoirlate? row le the Vieleisitoete=
Iii. idiotism and hems that, .
for all fru mon. the firlinaeto
'our national oblectime,1114 tre die
met. the eminent s.ecei orisew part
nue
was we do not desire to a gut* peg
orabee or& .:a
? ?IirsiseesIL .
Anvers W. Mt.
. mamoors conseteesisei.
'inhe bletorba eoveriseato *et lAillAser.
two American Preskiesste deans AWL eillok
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August 23, 1965 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? SENATE
20503
TABLE 2.?Percent of total R. & D. performance funds and total federally financed research and development accounted for by the 4, 8, and
- ' $90 companies with the largest dollar volume of R. & D. performance, by industry, /962?Continued
Industry
Percent of R. & D. performance
Percent of federally financed R. (SZ D. performance
let 4 companies
let 8 companies
1st 20
companies
let 4 companies
lit 8 companies
1st 20
companies
1962
1958
1962
1958
1962
1958
1962
1958
Fabricated metal products
30
48
53
65
64
(3)
62
80
89
84
MaclanerY
62
48
62
58
74
64
64
77
79
90
Electrical equipment and communication
60
63
74
77
84
61
64
79
81
91
Communication equipment and electronic components
64
60
80
77
91
63
63
81
80
94
Other electrical equipment
78
89
82
91
88
89
97
91
98
94
Motor vehicles and other transportation equipment
89
90
93
94
97
91
93
96
98
98
Aircraft and missiles
52
50
71
71
94
52
51
72
71
95
Professional and scientific instrunaents
58
62
68
70
83
69
71
79
81
88
Scientific and mechanical measuring instruments
72
75
77
83
86
(1)
92
89
95
95
Optical, surgical, photographic, and other instruments
61
64
77
79
94
(I)
63
75
81
91
Other inanufacturing industries
43
60
53
66
67
75
(I)
66
(I)
Non,raanufacturing industries
32
33
44
40
60
38
69
50
73
88
I Not separately available.
As those interested in this field know,
there are enough forces in the economy mili-
tating against growth ?f small and medium-
eiZed business without adding sledge-ham-
mer blows from the disproportionate admin-
istration of Federal research and develop-
ment funds in favor of the giants in each
industry.
LOW PERCENTAGE OF FEDERAL R. & D, FUNDS
AWARDED TO SMALL BUSINESS
Yet, we have the spectale of about 85
percent of all Federal research and develop-
ment funds being awarded, under the system
of classification used by the National Science
Foundation, to large companies Of more than
5,000 employees. Medium-sized companies
of from 1,000 to 5,000 employees receive about
9 percent, with small businesses having less
than 1,000 egaployees receiving only about
6 percent of these enormous sums. (Most
recent figures from National Science Founda-
tion, 1962.)
Of course, the agency which has the
greatest effect upon these figures and trends
i.e the Department of Defense, which spent
more than 70 percent of "all Federal R. & D.
Money in 1961 and still spends more than
half. It is also pertinent to note that NASA,
which now spends close to 30 percent has
increasingly adopted the Department of De-
fense,position.
CONCENTRATION BAISEs /SSITE OF CIvIL-1y1ILI-
, TAY BALANCE
To illustrate the seriousness of the concen-
tration issue, particularly in the Defense
Department, may I quote the testimony of
Dr. Robert L. Longinotti, chairman of the
rootlet/nes Department of Michigan State
University, before the Senate Small Business
Committee in 1963, as follows:
"The Government R. & D. contracts ap-
pear to be highly concentrated among the
very large firms. While small business
averages around 16 to 17 percent of Depart-
ment Of Dcfense procurement, when it comes
to research and development small business
accounts for some 2 to 3.5 percent. In fiscal
year 1961, 20 corporations accounted for
nearly 75 percent (of total military R. & D.).
"Is it not inconsistent?not to say danger-
ous?for the Federal Government to nurture
such, concentration in tike technologically
most advanced elds which can be pre-
empted by the particular firms selected by
military officials?" ("Economic Aspects of
Patent Policies," hearings, Mar. 8, 1963, p.
121.)
The seriousness of this matter of selection
is indicated by the fact that in fiscal year
1902, 97 percent of DOD research awards
Were :Made ojc4 nonprice, noncompetitive
basis, (Hearings, testimony of Dr. R. J.
Barber, Southern Methodist University Law
School, p. 52.)
? It should be further noted that for the
same year, 10 firms received 56 percent of
DOD's total research money; and for NASA,
the top 10 companies received 51 percent.
Furthermore, five of these contractors are on
both lists. (Hearings, loc. cit., Mar. 7, 1963,
p. 56-7.)
CONCENTRATION OF PATENT ACQUISITIONS
Specifically as to patent acquisitions, a
Department of Justice study for the 5-year
period ending in 1956 found that, among
defense contractors, the top 15 companies ac-
counted for 3,559 patents out of 6,788 as-
signed, for a total of 52 percent. (Hearings,
loc. cit., p. 122.) I would urge that the sub-
committee obtain the updated figures, and
make a judgment as to the degree of corre-
lation between R. & D. contract administra-
tion and patent acquisition.
Mr. Chairman, I have recited these figures
In considerable detail because they are rele-
vant to the question of who would receive the
benefits of a policy of granting exclusive
commercial rights to contractors. At a mini-
mum Federal R. & D. policy, in the adminis-
tration of contracts, as well as in the alloca-
tion of patent rights, should attempt to
counteract trends toward monopoly and con-
centration, rather than reinforce them as
these policies appear to have been doing.
POSITION OF SMALL BUSINESSES SHOULD BE
PROTECTED
With the formulation of a general patent
bill, this committee has a golden opportunity
to do something about it in a practical way.
Yet, what do we find?
As you know, S. 1809 has no such small
business provision. The President's Science
Adviser admits at page 26 of the transcript
that patent questions are "especially impor-
tant" to small businesses. He admits at page
27 that the patent right problems of sub-
contractors are unresolved. Mr. Chairman,
in the name of the 90 percent of American
firms which are small business, and the
300,000 manufacturers which are small busi-
ness, we ought to give small business an even
break in any patent bill.
I am not asking for preferential treatment
for small business. But when, year after
year, the 2 or 3 dozen largest companies in
the country receive one-half or two-thirds of
the research money, and take out a half or
two-thirds of the patents, there is little ques-
tion that this policy is preferential to big
business.
In the name of all we value?independence
of business enterprise, of finances, of mind,
and of spirit?the Congress ought to take
the time and trouble to provide equitably for
small business in any patent legislation.
'S. 1809, which is the principal bill before
this subcommittee, is based very heavily upon
the language and philosophy of the Patent
Advisory Panel Progress Report of June 1984.
On page 3 of this report, we find the es-
sence of this philosophy. You will recall the
following language:
"Where _a Government contractor is ex-
pected to build upon existing knowledge in a
field of technology directly related to an area
in which the contractor has an established
technical competence and a non-govern-
mental commercial position, the Policy State-
ment stipulates that the principal or exclu-
sive rights to resulting inventions should
normally remain in the contractor * * * this
situation is perhaps best illustrated by the
typical Department of Defense contract
which is intended to build upon a contrac-
tor's established technical competence.
The statistical material above indicates
what has been happening to the structure of
our economy under a Government patent
policy dominantly influenced by the Depart-
ment of Defense. These trends threaten fur-
ther concentration in the economy if this
philosophy is projected into the future.
This would mean disadvantage for not
only small business and medium-sized busi-
ness, but all business in this country except
the favored few corporate giants.
Enactment of such a policy by the Con-
gress at this time of rapid technological
change and scientific discovery would cast a
pall on our system of free enterprise for gen-
erations to come.
It would assure that the top companies get
bigger and more powerful, while smaller rivals
would be under increasing pressure to merge,
sell, or be driven out of business. It also
means that many men of initiative would be
denied the rights of going into business, or
seeing their own businesses grow and flourish.
The philosophy of this proposal thus strikes
at the heart of our free enterprise system.
Accordingly, Air. Chairman, I recommend
that there be a mechanism by which small
businesses can gain access to public research
and development patents done by the giant
corporations with public funds. Retention
of title and a flexible system of licensing ac-
cording to the equities involved seems to me
an avenue that should be explored.
In S. 2160, a copy of which is attached as
appendix VI, one system of this kind is avail-
able for the subcommittee's inspection.
DOES S. 1809 PROTECT THE POSITION OF THE
TAXPAYER?
Now, at last, we come down to the individ-
ual taxpayer. How can we demonstrate how
his monetary interests are affected?
In the course of the "great debate," the
Senator from Louisiana [Mr. Lowe] has
raised the case of a test developed to detect
PKU, a cause of infant mental retardation.
While title was in the Government, commer-
cial manufacturers were producing this test
for 11/2 to 2 cents per baby, and making
a profit. When a private firm claimed a
patent on this teat, it was priced at 52 cents
per baby.
On August 12, 1965, two Senators intro-
duced a bill (S. 2402) that would appropri-
ate "such sums as may be necessary" to buy
a test for every newborn baby in the coun-
try. A little arithmetic demonstrates that
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CONG SSIONAL RECORD ? SEN
*es -Sums ne,ceseary would be more than $2
million higher under a license policy than
under a title policy. Sinde the original ap-
propriations for developing the FEU test are
estimated to be about $1 million, it can be
Beet that a failure to take title would result
In the taxpayers' being charged $21A million
every year for something they had 'already'
bought for $1 million.
The details,. Of this story are more fully
elf forth in appendix VII; attached, as I be-
lieve they are especially pertinent in view of
e Members of the Judiciary Committee who
4:131ve *taken an interest in this particular
=latter.
realise that S. 1809 contains a special ex-
aption for "fields which directly concern the
public health, Welfare, and safety." But this
is a limited'Aeld, Where less than 5 percent
01 fl & ID funds ,a.,r,e sPerit: "
Xf it makes sense to Safeguard the tax-
Payers' Investment in this area, where his
Oevernkaent puts up an estimated 15 per-
Cent of the research money, does not it make
even more Wide In - scientific `instruments,
'WheM 'the' frikpayer 'fiiinialies 57 percent, .or
eregilet end commtinleations equipinent,
erelthe, faxpa3rers' Share is 67 Percent: or
Where -the Share Is 89 percent. (See
Odere.,1-Bai 0e0s, November 1963. P. 357).
That aloont edneation, What about.
:OW Many lax cuts could be paid for by
Sal.p.or rese,riatign of rbyalties on "Borne
, this ektreWelY -valnable patent property
44140 r Per?read aisisting: the taxpayer in
+Ma': respea, e-1609 Would prevent agencies
.??10:W sharing royaltiee to 'continue to do so.
(letter -to the- Chairman Of the Judiciary
ininittee by 'Federal Avaition Agency, June
, 1965 (p.
.Froni the 'foregoing, it does not appear
chat 8, 1809:gives the 'taxpayer an even
,break. I, therefore, urge the Subcommittee
to 'seek te.stfin5U from qualified fiscal ex-
. ,Petts the &Mai' of a general sale or royalty
40141"Se5r Or, GENERAL PANT r?xoisr..Arrort
? -1.1ow, tin 'Chairman, let me comment fur-
ther as to the speciffcs of the legislation now
'before The cbinmittee. / have noted' that
. "?the'Vepartniefit's Of Justice and Health, tau-
"Dation, 'arid Welfare, have'both expressed the
alien 'that fiarther experience should be
accumniated 'under the 'President's patent
of 98 before it Is embedded per-
Iffitiently In the form of *statutory la*, and
'the" Atomie Energy Commission opposes en-
actinent' bf 8.-1809. the subcominittee
.does report a bill; I believe that these res-
-erVirtiOna and this leek ;of experience and
empirical 'data should be recognized by mak-
lng the legiSlation quite general and provid-
rihg for collection of the needed informs-
"don,. X beIlevi. that a bill on the sUbject
at this time should be governed by the fol-
lowing six principles: *
A clear policy statement that Federal
.researob, apd,eleveloprnent property is a na-
tural resource belonging to the people of the
:United StOtes and must, therefore be safe-
guarded accordingly.
2. Plain'and bertaip penalties for the give-
ay or 'unauthorized disposition of Federal
X). property.
8. Provision for preserving the many con-
gressional patent protections that have been
-Ordered into law over the Past three decades.
4. Practical means for discouraging /no/161)-
61Y and concentration, and thus protecting
the interests of small lousiness and an 'open
, ? .
eebnoinic System."
Clear and 'unambiguous standards sopa-
rating and providing for private interests
fittl the public interest in the commercial
development of the property.
-6. A system whereby 'Federal R. & X), prop-
erty sought by private companies for corn-
?rnercial development could be sold or licensed
to them for an ,amount : equivalent to fair
n:ia?ticet value, and; the same property sought
6R000500110003-2
ATE ? August 23, 1965
by _other public institutions for dedication
to public purpes could be sold or licensed
for half of the fair:market value, wherever
pr icticable.
_11.e language of the policy declaration as
you are aware is taken from the October 10,
1913, memorandum. In my judgment, it is
coasistent with settled law and sound pub-
lic-policy. A summary of the applicable law
Is attached as appendix V. "The absence of
suili a declaration or the adoption by ex-
prission or implication of a contrary policy,
woUld be, I believe, an historic failure by
the Congress.
EIOCEDERAL SECTIONS ARE AS IMPORTANT AS
ROLICE
Several of these provisions, pertain to mat-
te's of procedure and standards. These are
the vehicles by which any policy would be
carried into effect, and are fully as important
as the policy sections.
8. 789 is a fine example for a procedural
tr tp. As stated by the Department of HEW,
"the entire thrust of the bill is thus to
los-
pe de the Governments taking and retaining
of olvnership in inventions derived from fed-
er illy financed research, by making this a
losg aruous and exceedingly difficulty and
in many cases impossible task." As Dr. Horn-
ing stated: "In short, I think it leaves too
few rights to the Government." 4
AS to an appropriate standard for waiver,
I would recommend the one put forward by
e 1947 Justice Department report, that
there might be waiver under "emergency con-
ditions" where the head of the agency certi-
flid this was PO. I believe that this standard
would cover the equities to all contractors
ac equately, but I would be willing to change
mr view in the face of enough concrete
existence that it would not.
Where are several standards set forth in S.
1109, under which contractors would be able
te acquire exclusive rights. The principal
01Le of these is "exceptional circumstances."
The use of this phrase in connection with
p,tent administration by a Federal agency
,been speciAcally considered by Mem-
bi CI this body, the Senator from Connecti-
ell-, Senator 111EICOFF, when he was Secre-
tsry of Health. Education, and Welfare. He
wfrri-ed Of the dangerous ambiguities in the
u:* of this standard in the following terms:
"'The phrase in 'exceptional circumstances'
is relatively vague and indefinite and in the
al feente Of any indicated criteria in the policy
itself would appear to leave considerable tat-
tille to each agency head to determine what
cc hatitutes such circumstances. While this
daba have the advantage of flexibility, it does
Neve the disadvantages of exposing agency
lalistis to the pressures of those contractors
WI() Would urge that each circumstance of
luordship, however slight, represents an excep-
tional circumstances calling for more gen-
es fists allobation of invention rights."
The phrase "special circumstances" in sec-
ti m 4(c) of the bill is open to the same
criticism which I consider to be wholly
pi truatIve.
As a matter of fact, the report of the Patent
A ivisory Panel upon which LI. 1809 and S.
711) are based, admits, and I quote:
"The working experience of the subcom-
mittee has revealed that various agencies
h nit placed different interpretations on car-
te In key phrases found throughout the policy
statement. It is believed that unless addi-
tional guidance is given, this problem of
p-tper interpretation would only become
cloaggerated if left to the unguided judg-
ment of the hundreds of contracting officers
tilroughout the Government. The follow-
ir g are examples: "0 * * 3. The phrase 'ex-
ec ptlonal circumstances.'"
Mr. Chairman, / believe this confession is
tlie best evidence the subcommittee can have
tc;e:stablfsh two propositions:
1. That the disposition of these billions
1 'Transcript, p. 37.
of dollars; worth of patent properties should
be placed by Congress, once and for all be-
yond the power and discretion of "hundreds
Of contracting officers throughout the Gov-
ernment"; and
2. That the phrase "exceptional circum-
stances' is not an appropriate standard to
be used In this legislation.
It is my strong feeling that the power of
disposition should be given into the ultimate
responsibility of the head of any agency
who is responsible to the President of the
'United States. Every effort should be made
to preserve the actuality of responsibility
The the disposition of Federal patent prop-
erty, rather than perpetrating a misleading
appearance Of responsibility.
In S. 2i60, I have suggested additional pro-
visions for public licenses and royalties, and
procedures which would result in written
findings by the head of an agency as to both
public versus private interests and value of
patent interests. These proposals might be
helpful to the subcommittee in formulating
the necessary standards, and I commend
them -to the subcommittee's consideration.
If I can further assist the subcommittee
during its deliberations, I would be glad to
do so.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there
further morning business? If not, morn-
ing business is closed.
111111MMIIMIC
PUBLIC WORKS APPROPRIATIONS,
1966
Mr. INOUYE. Mr. President, I ask
unanimous consent to have Calendar No.
615, HR. 9220 laid before the Senate.
The PRESIDING GtotolCER. The
bill will be stated by title.
The LEGISLATIVE CLERK. A bill (H.R.
9220) making appropriations for certain
civil functions administered by the De-
partment of Defense, the Panama Canal,
certain . agencies of the Department of
the Interior, the Atomic Energy Commis-
sion, the St. Lawrence Seaway Develop-
ment Corporation. the Tennessee Valley
Authority, and the Delaware River Basin
Commission, for the fiscal year ending
June 30, 1966, and for other purposes.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there
objection to the request of the Senator
from Hawaii?
- There being no objection, the Senate
proceeded to consider the bill, which had
been reported from the Committee on
APpr amendme
Wii(DR)
?
???
THE STORY OF THE DO.,01); AN
75411711.1
UPRISING AND THE DIVISION IN
THE AMERICAN PRESS
Mr. bODD. Mr. President, 3 months
after the outbreak of the Dominican up-
rising, a" debate still rages over the wis-
dom of . President Johnson's decision in
sending in the U.S. Marines.
This debate has found a reflection in
the hearings that have recently been
conducted by the Senate Foreign Rela-
tions Committee.
In advance of these hearings, the For-
eign Relations Committee published a
brochure entitled "Background Informa-
tion Relating to the Dominican Repub-
lic," which was described as "a compila-
tion of material deemed useful in any
discussion dealing with the present situ-
ation in the Dominican Republic." In
addition to official documents and state-
irie`nta dealing with the Dominican crisis
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- ?
August 23, 1965 CONGRESSIONAL
and the' background to this crisis, the
publfoation contained an extensive chro-
nology of events.
Unfortunately, the chronology quoted
exclusively from press sources that were
critical of administration policy?the
New York Times, the New York Herald
Tribune, the Washington Post, Le Monde
of Paris, the London Observer, the Lon-
don Times, the oLndon Economist. All
told, there were over 100 quotas from
these sources. The chronology com-
pletely ignored the hundreds of newspa-
per articles by veteran correspondents
by columnists of national reputation
which, in general, substantiated the ad-
ministration's statement that it inter-
vened only because law and order had
breken down completely and because the
Communists were on the verge of taking
over.
The chronological summary also ig-
nored the statements issued by the AFL-
CIO and by Conatrol, the major Domini-
can labor federation, as well as by the
Triter-American Regional Organization
of Workers.
Even more serious is that fact that,
in the documentation which it repro-
duced, the committee's compilation of
"Background Information Relating to
the Dominican Republic" completely ig-
nored the Minutes of the 4th plenary
session of the 10th meeting of consulta-
tion of the OAS, at which the Special
Committee on the Dominican Crisis sub-
mitted its report.
"This was a document of the greatest
importance, because it makes it abun-
dantly clear, in the words of the five
Latin American diplomats who made up
the Special Committee, that they shared
the administration's evaluation of the
degree of Communist control in the rebel
movement, arid that, in general, they
felt that the administration had taken
the only poSsible course of action.
Since this publication was put out in'
the first instance for the information of
Congress, Vconsider it most unfortunate
that the referencesln the chronological
surarnary of events should have been so
.completely one-sided.
In a sense, however, this one-sidedness
Is simply inother manifestation of the
Widespread impression, especially in the
Eastern pa,rt of our country, that the
American press corps in Santo Domingo
was almost unanimously critical of Pres-
ident Johnson's decision and skeptical
of the reports put out by the American
Embassy in Santo Domingo and by the
Department' of State.
This impression stemmed more than
anything else from the bitterly critical
attitude of the correspondents assigned
to cover the Dominican uprising by the
three major metropolitan newspapers of
the Eastern area--the New York Times,
the New York Herald Tribune, and the
Washington Post.
AmbriVbtr European allies the impres-
sion was almost unanimous that the ad-
ministration had been completely repudi-
ated by our own press corps in the Do-
minican Republic?and this for the
simple reason that the Times and Trib-
Mat m 7,3ost are commonly regarded as
the most authoritative newspapers in our
country and are more frequently read
No. 155?'7
RECORD ? SENATE 20505
and more frequently quoted by Euro-
peans than the rest of the American
press put together.
The purpose of my remarks today is
not to denigrate the Times and Tribune
and Post. If believe that these great
newspapers richly merit the interna-
tional recognition which they today
enjoy. Not only are they the first three
newspapers I read every day, but I
honestly believe that no Member of Con-
gress or community leader can pretend to
be adequately informed about events in
our country and around the world unless
he includes the Times and Tribune and
Post in his daily reading material.
However, the Times and Tribune and
Post, are not by themselves the press of
America. Nor, despite the great reputa-
tions they enjoy, are their correspond-
ents any more experienced, any more
competent, any more deserving of credi-
bility, than are the correspondents of
our wire services and our news maga-
zines and of the many Other great Amer-
ican newspapers, large and small.
In a complex situation like the Do-
minican Republic revolt, it was easy
enough for the man who reads only one
newspaper to have a firm opinion be-
cause the one-newspaper reader, by and
large, is disposed to accept the informa-
tion printed in his daily paper as some-
thing akin to gospel.
If a reader was somewhat more as-
siduous and included the Times and
Tribune and Post in his daily newspaper
fare, it was also easy to have a firm
opinion on events in the Dominican Re-
public, because, except for minor points
of difference, the accounts appearing in
the Times and Tribune and Post agreed
with each other and supported each
other.
But those who try to follow the
world's events by reading, as broadly as
possible in the national press and in their
news magazines would have found it very
difficult, indeed, to determine what was
really going on in the Dominican Re-
public, because the version of events put
out by the correspondents of the Times
and Tribune and Post was flatly contra-
dicted by the accounts cabled by an im-
portant and distinguished group of cor-
respondents writing for other media, and
by authoritative Dominican and Latin
American sources?as well as by the
State Department and the administra-
tion.
The quality of this second group of
correspondents may be gaged from the
fact that it included two former Pulitzer
Prize winners?Marguerite Higgins and
Hal Hendrix?as well as the winners of
other journalistic awards, and that sev-
eral members of this group had 10 to
20 years' experience in Latin American
affairs.
Among this group were: Paul Bethel,
Mutual Network; Jules DuBois, Chicago
Tribune Syndicate; Howard Handelman,
U.S. News & World Report; Daniel
James, Newhouse Papers; Jeremiah
O'Leary, Washington Star; Virginia
Prewett, syndicated columnist, editor,
Latin American Times; John T. Skelly,
Latin American Times; the Latin Amer-
ican desk at Time magazine; Eric Sev-
areid, syndicated columnist; Rowland
Arts...wets ,esel ca.. le D.. I,..., C.I%
Evans and Robert Novak, syndicated
columnists; and Dickey Chapelle, the
National Observer.
While some of these correspondents
and observers were more sympathetic to
the junta, some less sympathetic, and
while there were other differences be-
tween them, they were all essentially
agreed on one basic fact: That the Com-
munists had seized complete control of
the revolt at the point where President
Johnson decided to intervene, and that,
had the President delayed or attempted
to handle the situation otherwise, the re-
sult would have been another Castro re-
gime in the Americas.
In the remarks that follow, I intend to
say a few words by way of establishing
the credentials of the more prominent of
these correspondents, and quote briefly
from their writing on the Dominican Re-
public crisis.
In doing so I shall quote first from the
writings of the two Pulitzer Prize win-
ners, Miss Marguerite Higgins, and Mr.
Hal Hendrix.
MISS MARGETERITE HIGGINS
Miss Higgins, now a correspondent for
Newsday Syndicate, served as a Herald
Tribune foreign correspondent for more
than 20 years. She covered World War
II, the Korean war, and the war in Viet-
nam, and she served as Herald Tribune
bureau chief in Tokyo, Berlin, and Mos-
cow.
Among other things, Miss Higgins
wrote that:
The Bosch-Caamano argument (which be-
littled the Communist role) is in total con-
trast in both its parts to the portrait brought
back by the OAS Special Committee to Santo
Domingo.
According to Ambassador Ilmar Penne Ma-
rinho, of Brazil, "The whole Committee (the
OAS Special Committee) agreed that the Ca-
amano movement could be rapidly converted
to a Communist insurrection that was sus-
ceptible of gaining the support of the Marx-
ist-Lenin powers."
As to conditions in Santo Domingo in May,
"It was a no man's land," said the Brazilian
Ambassador. "There had been a complete
collapse of public authority. The Dominican
Republic had disappeared as a legal and polit-
ical entity?arms had been given to a disor-
iented nation of fanatics and adolescents who
were in a frenzied state egged on by subver-
sive broadcasts?anarchy reigned?any orga-
nized group that made a landing in the Do-
minican Republic could have dominated the
situation."
Miss Higgins quoted the Ambassador
of Colombia as stating at the OAS special
committee:
What were we to do when blood was run-
ning in the streets?what happens when a
state in this condition is so close to Cuba?
Are we to sit silently on balconies and watch
the end of the tragedy as if we were watch-
ing some sort of bullfight? ?
Miss Higgins said:
It is important that these judgments on
Communist penetration and chaos were
made by Latins, because Latins are tradition-
ally the most apprehensive about Yankee
intervention.
HAL HENDRIX
Mr. Hendrix, of the Miami News, won
the Pulitizer Prize for his coverage of the
Cuban missile crisis. He serves as Latin
American editor of the Miami News as
well as correspondent for Scripps-
qnrvvirilia rin orloc7onnAAconnncnniinnrvx
5Q6
olArEkKele This is what Mr. Hendrix
_OU APR. gantp Domingo:
The bonainunista and pro-Castro June 14
moveznent leaders began to crawl out from
the woodwork and by Sunday night, April
, they had the rebellion going their way.
Maar leeid',s Sunday overthrow the real
Steam:We for power began.
By Tuesday it was over. The extremists
had gained control behind the scenes, using
COL Xrarieisco Caamano Deno as rebel chief-
tain Anci new ?cover. Caamano was installed
as ?conOittitionalist President."
The Communist design was to create chaos
?and anarchy. Now using Caamano's "con-
lititiationallet" movement as a shield, they
-04 ineered distribution of weapons to thou-
gabds of civilians?probably as many as
16,000 were armed in I day.
Communist and June 14 movement leaders
here continue to remain out of the lime-
light. ieet , no one, including the special
tia6 peace-seeking mission sent here to help
end the war, doubts that they still are active
inside the rebel-held section of the capital.
In addition to these two Pulitzer Prize
*timers, the groups of correspondents
'whose dispatches from Santo Domingo
supported the administration's versions
of events included many other seasoned
correspondents with long experience in
the area..
AuL BKTMEL
Mr. Bethel is a veteran of 20 years in
the American Foreign Service including
a period as press attach?n the U.S.
Embassy in Havana at the time of the
Castro takeover. He is the author of two
books on Latin America, and he covered
the Dominican situation for the Mutual
Broadcasting network and for the United
the United Features Syndicate.
In a serialized account syndicated by
United Features, Mr. Bethel wrote:
Ambassador W. Tapley Bennett told a
group of us on April 29 that the PRD
(Bosch's party) and the Communists had
been collaborating. He said: "The Com-
Munists worked with Bosch's PRD for
months and were prepared well in advance
for Reid's (civilian junta chief) overthrow."
That was the significance of the March
18 Communist manifesto. It was the blue-
print for the events that took place on
April 24 and thereafter.
I also learned from an unimpeachable
source that Bosch met with two members of
the Castro-Communist "14th of June Move-
ment" in San Juan in early March. The
two?Victorians Felix and Rafael Taveras?
got Bosch's agreement to cooperate. Taveras
Is a member of the central committee of the
party.
? I wish to add here that Mr. Bethel's
account has since been confirmed by the
State Department.
XULES DU BOIS
Mr. Du Bois, correspondent for the
Chicago Tribune Syndicate, has been a
recognized authority and prize-winning
correspondent on Latin America for over
two decades, and is one of the best known
officers of the Inter-American Press
Association.
Writing from Santo Domingo, Mr, Du-
Bois reported that rebel leader Col.
Francisco Caamano was taking orders
from the Communists from the day of
the outbreak of violence. In an inter-
view with the former commander. of
OZaraa Fortress, he quoted the com-
mander as saying:
. I know that on the night of April 24-25,
Caamano was with Dr. Daniel Ozuna-Her-
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CONQRESSIONAL RECORD ? SENATE
nu:idea, a known International Communist.
Toey were driving through the streets of
dcavntearn Santo Domingo where eight po-
ll( amen stationed at various points in the
* * * reported to me that Ozuna had
a .nap on his lap and they could hear him as
tits ear was halted at street corners tell
("semen? where to emplace a .50 and .30
ca.iber znachinegun and where barricades
should be erected.
Mr. DuBois also reported that on
March 16, just 5 weeks before the April
24 revolt, the Dominican Communist
Party (PSP-D) issued a manifesto call-
int' for the "return of Prof. Juan Bosch
to ,legitimate control of the government."
The manifesto incited the people to vio-
lence to restore Bosch in these words:
The entire population must fight in the
streets, in the squares, in the factories, in
the fields, for the return of Juan Bosch as
the head of the constitutional government.
ROWLAND EVANS AND ROBERT NOVAK
IR owland Evans and Robert Novak, the
distinguished columnists for the Herald
Tribune syndicate, were among the
many who did not arrive at the same
conolusions as Bernard Collier, the
Herald Tribune correspondent in Santo
Domingo; Tad Szule, the New York
Tim Is correspondent; and Dan Kurzman
'of th e Washington Post.
In one of their reports, Evans and
NOVE.k warned:
AcI7enturers are running the rebel corn-
meas, but they maintain only tenuous con-
trol over all their forces. Rebel strong-
point), particularly in the southeast section
of Sa to Domingo, are manned by Commu-
nists with only token allegiance to Caamano.
- HOWARD HANDELMAN
Mr ,Handelman of U.S. News & World
Repot, has covered Cuban and Carrib-
bean news since 1960. After weeks of
careful investigation under the direction
of MV, Handelman, U.S. News & World
Repo' t had this to say about the role of
Cuba in the Dominican revolt.
Cuba, it is clear, was a major staging area
for supplying men and weapons for the
uprisir g.
The article said that Cuba assembled
a qua:ter of a ton of small arms and
about 300,000 rounds of ammunition to
suppoi t Cuban-trained Dominican guer-
rillas. Those guerrillas reinfiltrated
their homeland in late 1964 as Dominican
agents for Cuba's General Directorate of
Intellieence. Thus, they were poised to
strike For power when the revolt broke
out in late April.
DANIEL JAMES
Dani .11 James, who covered the Domin-
ican crisis for the Newhouse papers, has
written five books on Latin America over
the past 12 years, and has also contrib-
uted articles dealing with Latin-Ameri-
can pro elems to Reader's Digest, Fortune,
Salim& y Evening Past, and many other
periodicale. He wrote many articles di-
rected against the Trujillo regime, in-
cluding an investigation of the assassi-
nation and kidnaping of the anti-Trujillo
scholar, Dr. Jesus De Galindez.
Writing from Santo Domingo on June
1, Mr. James said:
A majority of the persons this reporter has
talked with agree that the Communists had
begun surfacing within 24 hours after the
revolt had started on April 24, and that with-
in 72 hours were acquiring control over it.
August 23, 1965
.As of mid-May, Caamano was still in con-
tact with the Dominican Reds, according to
reliable informants. Hard evidence that
prominent Communists continued to play a
leading tole in the rebel military command
up until' the third week in May, is the fact
that four of them were killed at that time in
the heavy fighting around the national pal-
ace.
How many Communists there were, or still
are in Caarnano ranks, is relatively unimpor-
tant. A "numbers game," unfortunately
started by the State Department when it is-
sued a hastily prepared list of 58 Reds con-
spicuous in the revolt's early days, is being
played by ignorant or dubious writers who
are thus obLcuring the real significance of
the Communist role.
First of all, many of the leading Commu-
nist participants have been trained in Cuba
and/or Russia. The State Department named
18. Sources here put the total at nearer 50.
That is more than enough to seize the leader-
ship of a surging mass with little or no mili-
tary experience and no knowledge whatso-
ever of the strategy and tactics of revolu-
tiOIIS.
JEREDHAH A. O'LEARY
Mr. O'Leary, of the Washington Star,'
won the first prize of the Washington
News Guild for his report on President
Kennedy's assassination. After his re-
turn from Santo Domingo, Mr. O'Leary
wrote the following:
There are no Communists in the rebel high
command, ()facials believe, nor is Caarnano
himself a Communist.
As one official put it: "What is the use of
being minister of interior or foreign minister
in a government that only controls a few
acres of a poorer section of Santo Domingo?
Those with the real power are the Com-
munists who control the armed civilians, the
roughly disciplined youths who owe alle-
giance to the three main Communist groups.
"These groups are the PSPD, or othrodox
Moscow line party; the. MPD, which adheres
to the philosophy of Peiping, and the Ha--
vana-line APCJ or June 14 movement."
MISS VIRGINIA PREWETT
Miss Prewett has for many years been
? an expert on Latin American affairs.
She is a syndicated columnist, the edi-
torial director of the Latin American
Times, and the author of several stand-
ard works on Latin America. Among
other things Miss Prewett's coverage of
Latin American affairs have been cited
for excellence by the Overseas Press Club,
and she has several times served as the
Press Club's chairman for inter-Ameri-
can affairs.
Miss Prewett wrote:
If Mr. Johnson had taken the consultation
gamble and lost it, the American people
would never have forgotten that Americans
were massacred and the Caribbean fell to
communism while their President talked to
the OAS over the phone.
JOHN T. SKELLY
Mr. Skelly is associate editor of the
Latin American Times. He reported for
'UPI in Havana until January of 1959.
He knew Castro as a boy, and because of
his strong anti-Batista convictions,
served without pay as press coordinator
for the so-called revolutionary govern-
ment of Cuba, set up by Castro in
January-February of 1959.
In a recent article published by the
Latin American Times, Mr. Skelly wrote
from Santo Domingo that Colonel Caa-
mano's so-called consitutional govern-
ment now haa an indoctrination sec-
tion?the 0-5. Courses are given every
A ririrnwori rnr Poloacia 961-1//1S1/1g ? ri A _pnpn7Rnne Anpnnncnni I nnn1_9
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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? SENATE 20507
night atjebel command posts; and the'
Substance of those courses are Marxist.
Mr. Skelly writes:
One of the principal courses Offered to the
youths is the history of Marxism and the
Ways of communisni * ? ? collaboration
between deposed President Bosch's PRD
Party and bommunit elements, discovered
at the oUtSe3 of the Levolt, continues. Con-
sider for a mOnient that the indoctrination
section of Colonel Caamano's rebels is com-
prised of the PRD, representatives from the
Military, and the Marxist-Leninist-Fidelista
'faction.
TIME MAGAZINE
This is what the Latin-American team
at Time magazine bad to say about the
Dominican revolution:
What had happened, in its baldest terms,
Nwas an attempt by highly trained Castro-
Communist agitators and their followers to
turn an abortive comeback by a deposed
Dominican President Into a "war of national
liberation."
imm savanna
Mr. Seva,reid is internationally recog-
nized as one of our most distinguished
'columnists and commentators. Indeed,
I think it 4 no exaggeration to say that
there are very few commentators who
tommand such broad respect in all sec-
tors of the political commUnitY.
This is what Mr. Sevareid wrote;
For me it is impossible to believe that the
'Communist threat was a myth, impossible
to believe that a ,democratic and stable gov-
ernment could have, been formed by the
iMpassioned people, a vast number of them
youngsters. It is hard for me to believe that
Ire could not have prevented the tragic fight-
ing in the northern part of the city, easy to
believe that we dict prevent an even more
toiwfttil bloodletting in the congested down-
wregion.
DICKE T CHAPELLE
Miss Dickey Chapelle has for many
years now :been a frequent contributor
to Reader's Digest, the National Geo-
graphic magazine, and other leading
American periodicals. She has covered
virtually every important conflict since
World War TIT-the Korean war, the land-
ing Of the marines, in LebanOn, the Hun-
garian Resolution? the Castro takeover in
Cuba; the war in Lags, the Chinese inva-
sion, of India, the Vietnam war, and more
recently the Dominican uprising, which
she covered for the weekly newspaper, the
National Olperver. _
Miss Chapelle is a front line corre-
epondent rather than a rear echelon cor-
respondent. I3ecanse she believes in see-
ing things with her OWn eyes, she has
znade frequent parachute jumps with the
'Vietnamese and Laotian forces, and she
has been exposed to fire countless times.
In One of her articles, Miss Chapelle
told a very revealing story. She had
beard that an old-time Castro stalwart,
RaMon Pichirilo Mejia, a man whom she
had met in Cuba during the Castro take-
over, was active in the Dominican revolt.
She decided that she would try to find
hixn. Entering the rebel quarter, she re-
yeti...MVO:41 to,live with the rebels
a of Rural days. And it
turne4_out, that the ?rebel commandante
iti her_clistrict was the verY Man she was
look.ing for; Let me quote from Miss
Ch41511e's ac.,90.Unt other encounter with
the coraraanda.hte:
4 For the. Ansi time in the brightening morn-
ing light, I looked squarely into his face.
Was it truly familiar, or was my judgment
suspect after the night's misadvantures?
Standing amid the nibbled slum, I drew a
deep breath.
"Were you in Cuba then? I mean, were
you Castro's boatman?"
The eyes narrowed and the answer came
by reflex?proudly.
"I was the commander of Fidel's Gramm
and later, in the mountains, where you were,
Americana, a leader of a battalion for him."
"Are you Pichirllo?"
"My name is Ramon Pichirilo
"Did you remember who I was?"
He looked pitingly at me, "Si si, Ameri-
cana," he grinned and spoke slowly as if the
words tasted good.
"Are you then well after what happened to
you in Cuba?"
"Well enough to have led people against
their oppressors in Bolivia and Colombia and
Venezuela and Costa Rica and Guatemala
since last / saw you," he nodded.
He posed. I shot fast. He raised his hand.
"Now do not say I am a Communist, Ameri-
cana. If I were truly a Red, I could have a
good life staying in Cuba. But you see I am
here instead, where I was born."
Because I have endeavored to limit
myself to the best known correspondents
I have quoted from only a partial list of
those who reported in a manner which,
despite minor differences, generally au-
thenticated and endorsed the basic deci-
sion to intervene in the Dominican crisis.
THE ATTITUDE OF THE A5'L-C/0 AND OF LATIN
AMERICAN 'UNIONISTS
Finally, I wish to point out that the
statements of the AFL-CIO Executive
Council which was missing from the
chronological summary, welcomed "the
prompt and energetic measures taken by
the President to prevent the Communist
attempt to seize control of the Dominican
democratic revolutionary movement and
to foist a Castro-type dictatorship on
Santo Domingo."
The Inter-American Regional Orga-
nization of Workers?ORIT?an orga-
nization which embraces most of the im-
portant labor unions in the hemisphere,
adopted a resolution, couched in similar
terms, supporting American interven-
tion:
We must point out that the unilateral
action of the U.S. Armed Forces in this grave
Dominican conflict has, on the one hand,
served to save thousands of lives and, at the
same time, under the guidance of the OAS
Commission, has been able to contribute
toward making the horrors of civil war less
cruel.
THE REPORT OF THE OAS SPECIAL COMMITTEE
I have already referred to the report
of the OAS Special Committee. The
minutes of the meeting at which the Spe-
cial Committee reported to the fourth
plenary session is a document of such
Importance that I hope all of my col-
leagues will find the time to read the
complete text. Let me quote two state-
ments that were made at this meeting.
Ambassador Carrizosa, the special
delegate of Colombia, told the meeting:
With regard to the sector led by Colonel
Francisco Caarnano, many diplomats ac-
credited in the Dominican Republic, and I
can include my country's diplomatic repre-
sentative, feel that, if not Colonel Francisco
Caamano, whom I do not know to be per-
sonally a Communist, there are indeed
numerous persons on his side that, if they
4ire not members of the Communist Party,
are actively in favor of Fidel Castro's system
of government or political purposes. There
Is such a tendency in the opinion of many
diplomats I spoke to, and I do not mention
Other countries in order not to commit coun-
tries represented here. They are firmly con-
vinced that on that side there are many per-
sons, I do not say members registered in an
officially organized Communist party, but
persons who do have leanings toward a well-
known trend which is prevalent in Cuba.
Mr. Carrizosa's remarks were corrob-
orated by the other members of the
Special Committee. Summarizing the
views of the Committee, Ambassador
Yodice of Paraguay made this state-
ment:
The Government of Paraguay, as I stated
clearly when approval was given to the es-
tablishment of the collective inter-American
force, believed from the beginning that con-
tinental security was at stake. The replies
by the Ambassadors composing the Commit-
tee reporting today on certain questions re-
garding these delicate aspects of the Domin-
ican situation have been categorical. My
government was right. Continental security
is threatened. The danger existed, and still
exists, that chaos and anarchy will permit
international communism to transform the
Dominican Republic into another Cuba.
With his customary clarity, courage, and
energy, the Ambassador of Colombia, Mr.
Alfredo Vazquez Carrizosa, has categorically
mentioned the highly political nature of the
problem we are facing. In reply to a ques-
tion of the Ambassador of Uruguay, he has
rightly said that the peace of America is
threatened, that the security of the hemi-
sphere is threatened, and that there is a pos-
sibility that another Cuba, another Com-
munist government in the hemisphere will
arise out of the chaos and anarchy in the
Dominican Republic.
OTHER LATIN AMERICAN VIEWS
There were also many other Latin
Americans of stature who made com-
ments supporting the action taken by the
administration. For example, the Balti-
more Sun on June 9 carried a statement
by Dr. Rupo Lopez-Fresquat, first sec-
retary of the treasury in the revolution-
ary regime set up by Castro after he came
to power. Let me quote from the inter-
view with Dr. Lopez:
The Organization of American States has
stated that communism is incompatible with
the democratic principles of Latin America.
The United States has a right to intervene
against the Communists?the enemy.
Dr. Lopez believes that Communists were
Involved in the Dominican disorders.
"They are everywhere," he says, "and they
are trained to infiltrate popular movements."
"Their number is immaterial," he says,
"for 53 trained Communists working with
an armed civilian militia would be plenty
under the chaotic conditions that prevailed
early in the revolt."
In the light of all these statements,
Mr. President, I think it is clear beyond
challenge that the American press was
not unanimously critical of the admin-
istration's policy in the Dominican Re-
public, that the President's decision was,
in fact, supported by a very substantial
section of the press corps as well as by
Independent authorities, both Latin and
American.
Mr. President, I ask unanimous con-
sent to insert into the RECORD some of
the writings of the American correspon-
dents to whom I have referred, in the
order in which I have mentioned them.
I think it is also clear beyond challenge
that the administration's decision en-
joyed the endorsement of responsible
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Latin American diplomats who were on
tie spot or who made an on-the-spot in-
VOttigation, as well as of other Latin
Americans of liberal reputation whose
personal background qualified them to
speak with some authority on the prob-
lem of Communist subversion.
In this connection I ask unanimous
consent to insert into the RECORD the
minutes of the 4th plenary session of the
10th meeting of consultation of the OAS;
the interview with Dr. Rap? Lopez-
Presquat in the Baltimore Sun for
September 9; and the full text of the
statement of the Inter-American Re-
gional Organization of Workers.
Mr. President, one of the great advan-
tages of a free press is that in any con-
troversial situation it will generally come
up With reports, scattered through vari-
ous newspapers, that reflect all sides of
the controversy.
Iii attempting to make up our minds
in any such situation, Members of Con-
gress are confronted with the problem of
Weighing conflicting press accounts
against each other, of assessing each
account in the light of their own expe-
rience or knowledge, of supplementing
these reports wherever possible from
their own sources of information, and of
then making their own decision.
The fact that a majority of the Amer-
ican correspondents in any given situa-
tion sponsor a version of events which is
contradicted by a minority, is no clue at
all to the real truth?because in more
than one situation it has been demon-
strated that the majority of the press
corps can be wrong and the minority can
be right in their evaluation.
In the case of the Dominican situation,
It was unquestionably true that an
'arithmetical majority of the 160-man
American press corps were critical of
administration policy. But, by the na-
ture of things, I think there would be no
difficulty in establishing that most of
these 160 American reporters had had no
major experience in Latin American af-
fairs, that the great majority of them
were not seasoned foreign correspond-
ents or correSpondents of national rep- In fact Colonel Caamano confirmed this per-
Utation for the simple reason that there to Domingo on August 17, Scripps-How- sonally to me. Colonel Caamano labeled
are not enough of these to go around, ard Zorrespondent Hal Hendrix said: many of this snipers as belonging to a group
that few of them spoke Spanish, and that co annunist and other extreme leftists in that did not want a Dominican solution."
a number of them were relative cubs on the f ebel movement are blocking adoption of This account of what the rebel colonel told
their first or second foreign assignment. an OAS peace formula. Informed sources the Argentine Ambassador is of particular
I feel that it is of the greatest irnpor- here are convinced the front office rebel significance since both Caamano in Santo
lead(rs, headed by Colonel Caamano are cap- Domingo and Bosch in Puerto Rico have be-
tance and significance that the group of tives of the extremists in their camp ? * * littled the whole Communist aspect of the
correspondents and columnists I have sour ies here believe that extremist elements revolution, and indeed have been quoted as
quoted were all people of national rep- week a ago concluded that each day that believing that presence of American troops
utation and that most of them had spe- pass % without a settlement is another day of was not even necessary to restore order and
cialized for years in Latin American victory for them. The delay affords them save lives. This line of course is being echoed
affairs and either spoke Spanish fluently additional time for brainwashing efforts and by a wide range of opponents to the Johnson
or had a working knowledge of it. Even now ishes the seeds of anti-Americanism they doctrine ranging from President de Gaulle
though they may have constituted a
havc planted. of France to Fidel Castro to Mao Tse-tung.
The Bosch-Caamano argument is in total
minority, I believe that the exceptional It is high time that the OAS moved to contrast in both its parts to the portrait
quality of this group of correspondents Put an end to this intolerable situation. brought back by the OAS Special Committee
makes it necessary to accord a very high N.r. JAVITS. Mr. President, will the to Santo Domingo.
specific gravity to their version of the Senator yield? According to Ambassador Timar Penne
events in the Dominican Republic. Ir. DODD. I yield. Marinho of Brazil, "The whole committee
The remarkable conflict within the /VI-. JAVITS. Mr. President, I shall agreed that the Caamano movement could
be rapidly converted to a Communist insur-
American press corps in Santo Domingo read the speech of the Senator and the
Was the subject of an article in the press material which he had printed in the rection that was susceptible of gaining the
section of Time magazine for May 28, COr'GRESSIONAL RECORD with the greatest support of the Marxist-Leninist powers."
1 As to conditions in Santo Domingo on
965, which I also asked unanimous con- of titerest. May 2, "It was a no man's land," said the
Sent to insert into the RECORD. I believe that in the struggle over Viet- Brazilian Ambassador. "There had been a
Mr. President, the insertions I have nazi, the problem we have in the Domin- complete collapse of public authority. The
,
made here are extensive, but I consider Jean Republic has tended to become over- Dominican Republic had disappeared as a
r
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KEtAnt 1965
CONGRE5siONAL
It of tile greatest importance that they lOoked. I am convinced through my own
be broaght together in one place for the work that our hemispheric problems rate
inforn AtiOn of Members of Congress who equal attention with the problems in-
might conceivably have been misled by volved in south and southeast Asia. '
the uafortimately one-sided presenta- I Welcome contributions by our coi-
tion in the study published by the Sen- leagues upon these problems. I hope to
ate Fc reign Relations Committee during make one of my own soon.
I am pleased that the Senator from
ormecticut, who has a reputation in the
enate for thoroughness and courage,
hould have analyzed the matter in this
ay. I shall read everything the Senator
as to say on the problem with the
menti, and to select their press quota- reatest of interest.
tions in a manner that presents bath Mr. DODD. I thank the Senator from
viewpoints, or all viewpoints, rather than New York.
just Doe viewpoint. There being no objection, the material
It Ii also my hope that some of those was ordered to be printed in the RECORD,
corref pondents who assured us that as follows:
Cam ano and his immediate entourage [From the Newsday. May 12, 1985]
are rot Communists and that all the MARGUERITE HIGGINS "ON THE SPOT"
talk about Communist infiltration was (By Marguerite Higgins)
thereore vastly exaggerated, will find WAsHincrox.?There is a dramatic and
the time to take a hard look at the ominous contrast in what Dominican rebel
situation today in the rebel controlled leader Col. Francis? Caamano has been tell-
area of Santa Domingo. ing the world press about Communist infil-
All the accounts that I have read in tration of his movement and what he con-
recen t- weeks indicate that the Commu- fided to the special five man ambassadorial
nists and pro-Communists are not committee of the Organization of American
mere: y in complete control of the rebel
quarter, but that they are controlling
it more or less openly.
It has been reported that the only
visible political activity in the rebel quar-
ter is that carried on by the three Com-
muni at parties. They are responsible for
most of the literature published in the
area. They set the tenor of radio broad-
casts: They flaunt their pro-Castro
and Anti-AMeriCan slogans openly. But
even More serious is the fact that they
are taing their hold on the business and
banking heart of the Dominican Repub-
lic to strangle the economic life of the
nation, while they place one obstacle
after another in the way of a peaceful
settl sment.
It is almost as though the Communists
were permitted to seize control of Wall
Streit and then hold it for 4 months or
long, sr while we sought to negotiate a
polit teal settlement with them.
Writing about this situation from San-
the month of July.
I earnestly hope that the staff of the
'Foreign Relations Committee will be in-
struct sd, in preparing such future
studies, to bring together all pertinent
documents and not merely selected docu-
States.
This was brought out in question and
answer sessions of the five Latin American
Ambassadors held privately with their col-
leagues of the OAS after their return to
Washington last weekend. . Since the five
Latin American Ambassadors went to Santo
Domingo with a skeptical, show-me attitude,
their vivid eyewitness account of the Domin-
ican tragedy has special significance. For
one thing, what one Latin American tells
another is likely to have more impact on the
OAS as a whole than any number of State
Department releases.
In reply to a question from the Mexican
Ambassador on the Communist role in the
fighting, Argentine Ambassador Ricardo M.
Colombo gave this illuminating account of
conversations at headquarters of the rebels
who started the revolution in the name of the
return to constitutionality and support for
former President Juan Bosch.
"We spoke to a variety of persons in the
Caamano group," said the Argentine Ambas-
sador. "They recognized the possibility of
control being taken over by the Commu-
nists * * ? this was one of their problems.
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legal and political entity. Arms had been
given to Ad@oriented,nation p,f fanatics and
0010.8.Ce)its who were 111 nfrffliZi9d ,state
egged on by subversive broadcasts. Anarchy
reigned. Any organized group that made a
landing in the Dominican Republic could
have dominated,
In an even More inpassioned outburst of
oratory, the Afribasador Of Colombia said in
defending the American intervention: "What
were we to ad vikerclikood.ivai running in the
streets? What happens when a state in this
condition (anarchy) is so close to Cuba?
Are we simply to sit- silently on balconies
and Watch the end Of the tragedy as if we
were watching some sort of bull fight?"
Nobody in the OAS Missionto Santo Do-
mingo judged that rebel' Colonel Caamano
himself was a COMM11111St but there was
deep concern that his flirtations with the
Communists still might mean even now that
the entire ceitee-firer4,,ight at any time blow
up and the Reds choose the moment to sur-
face in full strength:
/t is important that these judgments on
Communist penetration and chaos were
Made by Latins because Latins are tradi-
tionally (and with reason) the most appre-
hensive about Yenkee intervention.
The OAS Mission tO Santo Domingo con-
cluded, in effect, that the American inter-
vention was not gun71oat diplomacy but pre-
Ventive diplomacy. As Colombian Ambas-
sador Alfred Vazquez Carrioza said: "It is
clear now that the world of communism is no
longer separated from this hemisphere by
the great oceans. Communism is a clear and
frightening presence."
? Ansi if Latin Americans grasp the merit of
preventive diplomacy, shouldn't it be pos-
sible to get the point across also to American
Intellectuals?
[From Newsday, May 13, 19651
? MARGUERITE so? THE SPOT"
(By Marguerite Higgins)
SANTO Dommico.Minutes before junta
planes silenced his hate-spewing Santo
Domingo radio, Rebel Colonel Francisco
Caamano in, an exclusive interview defiantly
rejected all compromise by way of a meeting
or a coalition with the rival junta regime.
Such a compromise had been urged all
the previous day by anxious delegates of the
Organization of American States as a way of
preventing more bloodshed.
"How can one cOfnpromise with mur-
derers?" asked Caainano speaking of the
ruling junta. This comment came as a blow
to the OAS which had thought for a few
bright minutes that eaarnano would at least
talk to General Imbert. It appears
Caaniano did agree for a few moments but
then his more militant advisers vetoed the
idea. But in the Dominican Republic
nothing is ever final. And the OAS is still
attempting to start a palaver between the
0pposing side whose Stand-Off hostility has
left the city divided and paralyzed with the
U.S. forces in between.
? At his Rebel headquarters filled with rifle-
toting civilians, Caamano was in a cocky
mood. Re was so cocky that he even ruled
out any official place in his future govern-
ment for Juan Bosch, the former Dominican
President in., exile, in whose name the re-
bellion was started. The 1.7.S. claims that the
Caamano rebellion hoe become heavily Com-
munist infiltrated but the rebels pooh-pooh
the charge.
? In speaking of Boa-ch, Colonel Caamano
'aid he was.`....a close spiritual adviser but he
Cannot be assigned any formal pOsitIon in
:toyernment.' Prior to the plane ttack
4
his, r441447 q019_01 bafnnano exicied 651:L-
P.* 004* r9154 wolald Win the entire
Ottntry.
Propaganda over the silenced rebel radio
has, called everyone from President Johnson
to Ambassador Bennet liars and -has alleged
that the United States was backing General
Intbert's junta regime.
The, claim to farae of this newest junta
leader is that he helped to assassinate Dic-
tator Trujillo. General Imbert (the title is
honorary) is at least a dedicated anti-Com-
munist and this 15 one comfort to the United
States which feels awkward about having to
depend on a one-time assassin as IIS best
hope for leading this country back out of
this wild anarchy.
In urging a bridge between Caamano and
Imbert, the United States lopes that some-
how in the, process the rebel colonel can be
separated from his more militant advisers.
This remains a very iffy question. On our
interview today it seemed to me that Colonel
Caamano was as interested in impressing his
aid, the militant Rector Aristy, with his
defiance as he was in conveying this to me.
Aristy who has the title of minister of, gov-
ernment was the rebel leader who allegedly
prevented Oaarnano from even meeting with
the rival General Imbert. It is the con-
clusion therefore of most Latin American
diplomats that Caamano is the prisoner of
the militants around him.
"There is no question of meeting with
General Imbert," said Colonel Caamano.
"He is an imposter." Asked if he was ask-
ing the junta government to surrender to
his rebel authority, Colonel Caamano claimed
that "General Imbert represents nobody."
"If the United States would leave," Caa-
mano said, "the troops now with Imbert
would flood over to our side. We would not
avenge ourselves on those who have been
loyal to the junta. We would only try the
criminals such as General Wessin."
General Wessin, one of the few incorrupt-
ible generals of the Dominican Republic is
credited with having intervened against the
Caliman9 led rebellion When it became ev-
ident that Communist elements were close
to taking over control. The United States
intervened on April 28 when law and order
disintegrated. Its purposes at the time were
to save lives and prevent another Cuba. Its
purpose now is to prevent a new blood bath
and find some kind of formula that will re-
store order, and get this country on the path
to some kind of democratic solution. The
cease fire has been a mockery from the start.
This correspondent has been caught in three
successive fire fights in 3 successive days, and
the side that started shooting was the
rebels?not our Marines or our 82d Airborne.
Today, the junta planes attacked and si-
lenced (at least temporarily) 'the Santo Do-
mingo rebel radio station and thus ruptured
the cease fire in their turn.
The fact that American Ambassador Ben-
nett hit the deck and crawled under his desk
during the junta air attack would appear
to bear out the claim that it came as some-
thing of a surprise to the Embassy. It was
a surprise to our troops who shot at the
attacking planes?and missed.
The mystery of whether Colonel Caamano
is a free agent was not pierced by his answer
to my questions as to why his wife and two
children had taken asylum in the Argentine
Embassy in the zone controlled by the rival
junta.
"Our house burned down," said Colonel
Caamano.
"But that was 3 weeks ago," I interposed.
"Why doesn't she join you now?"
"There may be bloodshed," said Colonel
Caamano. "I do not want to think about
my wife and children. I want to think about
my country."
In this Volatile land, rebel intransigeance
may well fade in the wake of the _display of
determination in :the, RUM of aerial strafing
of the rebel, racho which had had a great role
in inciting citizens to shoot at American
troops and otherwise harass us. But at the
incrnent the feeling is that things are going
to get Worse before they get better.
20509
[From Newsday, May 13, 19651
MARGUERITE HIGGINS "ON THE SPOT"
(By Marguerite Higgins)
SANT? Dommrco.?The authoritative rattle
of automatic weapons was mixed with the
occasional ping of a light rifle and the rebels
kept firing on the U.S. marine company for
a subborn hour and 20 minutes. The firing
came from a block away and the rebel snipers
stretched about two-thirds of a mile along
the demarcation line between their zone and
the international area held by U.S. forces.
The marines kept their heads down?behind
sandbags, stone walls, fences, cam?and re-
turned fire on the infrequent occasions when
they could get a decent look at their rag-
tag enemies. Finally, the firing stopped, as
Inexplicably as it had started and the long
lines of cars started moving through the
marine checkpoints at the intersections, ap-
parently unconcerned that the road they
were traveling had been a no man's land a
few minutes before.
And that's how it is with the crazy cease
fire that is supposed to be prevailing around
here.
But there is one good thing about it ac-
cording to U.S. Marine Capt. Charles Barstow,
of Dunellen, N.J.
"Those rebels fire high and wild," said
Captain Barstow, grinning reassuringly as
another round pinged in somewhere down
the block.
And in this case, he was right. For
Barstow's marine company has not sustained
any injuries despite what the marine cap-
tain?a practitioner of the art of understate-
ment?describes laconically as rather inten-
sive fire.
So the fracas would not even have been
reported on the incident sheet and his ma-
? cdinpany's luck?and remarkable re-
straint in the face of provocation?would
have gone unsung if this reporter and Howard
Handleman of U.S. News & World Report had
not happened to stumble into the tail end of
the fire fight while trying to make our way
to rebel headquarters in the sniper zone.
Was there any pattern or purpose in these
rebel sniper attacks? I asked Captain
Barstow.
"Militarily there is no sense to it," said the
young captain. "They never try to rush us.
They hide up there on the roofs or sometimes
dart in the middle of an intersection to fire
and run. What I think they are really doing
is trying to get some martyrs. And we are
doing our best not to give them any martyrs.
We only fire back when a sniper is getting
awfully close to target and awfully aggres-
sive."
We were standing in the front yard of a
home which had a stone wall in front. The
wall gave good cover against incoming fire
and so several marines had their pup tents
in it. A couple more were on the porch of
the house itself which, was heavily sand-
bagged.
Catching my glance, the marine said rue-
fully: "Of course we are a nuisance to those
people. But so help me we try to make it up
to them by courtesy and gifts of coffee and
such. It's bothersome to be in a fire fight.
But it is a whole lot more bothersome to
have tommygun-toting rebels setting fire to
your house and looting as was happening
around here when we came. And these peo-
ple have been absolutely wonderful to us.
I heard that some of the press say they hate
us. If so, these are some of the best actors
I have ever seen."
Later, over in the rebel zone, we could see
closeup the scary results of the indiscrimi-
nate distribution of guns after they had been
looted from police and military armories by
the rebelling mobs. It seemed for several
blocks as if no man was without a rine or
automatic weapons slung over his shoulder.
Few were in uniform. A great many simply
had on open white shirts and slacks.
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20510.
Was it youngsters like this, I wondered,
Who had been firing on Captain Barstow's
company? Were they under any orders?
Could the sniping be turned off?
Over in front of rebel headquarters we
found the so-called commander of the rebel
forces, Col. Monte Arrache. He was in a
camouflage uniform sitting in a jeep with
an aide talking to some of the gun-toting
rebels.
"Colonel," I asked, "do you have control
Of the people firing from your zone?"
"Of course I do," said the rebel colonel.
"They why don't you turn off the firing?"
I asked.
"But it is not the rebels who are firing,"
said the colonel "It is really soldiers who
represent the junta (the new provisional
government of General Imbert) who disguise
themselves as rebels. They sneak into our
zone and fire at the American troops to try
and provoke an American attack on our
headquarters."
It was all nonsense, of course, but that is
the way this off-again on-again cease fire is.
And in this crazy mixed-up situation any-
thing can still happen?including a blood
bath.
[Prom Newsday, May 17, 1965]
MARGUERITE HIGGINS "Ox THE SPOT"
(By Marguerite Higgins)
SANTO Dostinsso.?The role being played in
the Santo Domingo crisis by John Bartlow
Martin, writer, diplomat, and a darling of
the liberals, is so extraordinary as to defy
all the known rules in the practice of foreign
policy anywhere, anytime?ever.
In effect, the United States has two Am-
bassadors here. But wait, this is not cause
for any wringing of hands. For they work
Well in tandem, have a complete meeting of
minds on the nightmarish realities of the
situation, and have no reason to compete for
the favors of Lyndon Baines Johnson. They
are already both tops in his favor.
John Bartlow Martin was Ambassador here
during the epoch of the former President of
the Dominican Republic, Juan Bosch. The
progressive idealism of Bosch was betrayed
by his poet's dreams and his inability to see
that the Communists in his government
were determined. by definition and ideolog-
ical compulsion, to work for his undoing
in order to advance their own chances of
seizing power. So Bosch was overthrown by
anti-Communist generals who were alarmed
at his permissive attitude to the militant
leftists.
Nonetheless, both during his presidency
and beyond, Martin was close philosophically
and personally to the democratically-elected
Bosch and members. of his government.
So it has been former Ambassador Martin's
task to seek to persuade the moderate pro-
Bosch elements to turn their backs on the
Communist militants who sought to take
over the current rebel revolt and cooperate
in some sort of government of national union
that can guide this nation back to constitu-
tionality and whatever measure of democ-
racy is possible in a nation that is largely
illiterate and still in political swaddling
clothes.
Ambassador Martin has been the Embassy's
principal link with rebel dol. Francisco
Caarnano, the head of the rump constitu-
tional regime. And contrary' to press re-
ports, these links have been kept very much
alive?when the militant rebels would con-
descend to cooperate.
Ambassador W. Tapley Bennett, the Am-
ba,ssador No. 1 so to speak, is in overall com-
mand of the situation and recognizes that
John Bartlow Martin fills an invaluable gap.
For the rebels have made Arnbassador Ben-
nett their enemy No. 1. It would be unfit-
ting and demeaning certainly for Ambassa-
dor Bennett to seek to deal with a group
whose radio (until it was silenced) described
him as a liar, murderer and such.
The priority task for Ambassador Bennett
has been to work with the broadened coali-
tion gcwernment of junta leader Gen.
Antonio Imbert Barreras to bring about
whatever concessions possible in the Ameri-
can-inspired attempt to build a bridge be-
tween the junta and the pro-Bosch rump
regime , if Colonel Caamano.
The i :ony of the rebel abuse heaped on
Bennett is that the U.S. Marines would not
ba in SE Ilt0 Domingo today if it were not for
the judgments of John Bartlow Martin as
made w:aen he was whisked down here in the
early da ye of chaos.
When L.B.J. telephoned John Bartlow Mar-
tin at Wesleyan College to ask him to go to
Santo E ?ming?, the former Ambassador told
the Preildent: "The United States is backing
the wrong side. We should back the -Bosch
(constitutionalist) movement."
Once Sn the scene in Santo Domingo, John
Bartlow Martin quickly changed his mind.
Intercepting him for an instant the other
day as he reported in briefly to the Embassy
in between his 18 to 20 hours a day of "be
reason& ale" conference with Dominican poli-
ticians, Ambassador Martin explained: "The
revolutisn did not start out as Communist
but quilkly developed in that direction."
Once it bloodbath begins, all the factions
guilty ct it are in it together so what used
to be differences are wiped out. When you
go to ex Verne% the old niceties of philosophic
and ide gogical differences disappear. By ex-
tremes, / mean beheading, sending people "to
the we:I.:" 'killing of children, torture. In this
bloodlu it, all factions (pro-Castro, pro-Mao,
pro-Sot lei, and those pro-Bosch who partici-
pated ii the bloodlust) tend to be melted
togethe7,
It ws John Bartlow Martin's warnings
that couvinced President Johnson that there
Was a :soesible Cuba in the making in the
Domini-san Republic. If even an ardent lib-
eral hi.i come to this conclusion, L.B.X.
reasone4, then he could not afford to take
the pia:Meal chance of inaction, let alone
permit thousands of lives to be lost as the
United States stood Idly by.
The ist4nosphere around here even today is
a kind of wild west Magnified a thousand
times a ad with a severe shortage of good guys
to pit iigainst the bad guys. So there is no
doubt :1:1 this observer's mind that an orgy
of killisg was in the cards?and still might
be.
The rail, ulcer-ridden Martin, with his
gaunt , iheeks and chain smoking habits, re-
ports directly to President Johnson on a sit-
uation that despite his gargantuan efforts?
and those of Bennett and others?seems
strangled by hate and feuds.
But se is still trying, sometimes in Santo
Domingo, sometimes in long futile efforts to
persuac Le exiled Juan Bosch in Puerto Rico,
to cease giving killers and fanatics political
respect shinty.
Bled; as it looks. Martin keeps going be-
cause I ft the Dominican Republic, black can
often It an optical illusion and things are
seldom what they seem.
Asassusarrox DUMP EXPLOSION
(By Hal Hendrix)
SAN] 0 DOMINGO, May 12.?A tremendous
ammo:intim dump explosion here in June
1964 a as the initial stage of a Communist-
backe military plot to dump the triumvirate
regims of Donald Reid Cabral, a highly
placed diplomatic source disclosed here
today.
Reconstruction of events leading to last
month's eruption helps explain President
Johnson's decision to land U.S. forces here
quick17 to safeguard Americans and prevent
a pov tr grab by Communist strategists
alined with Castro's Cuba.
Thi is an authoritative account of how
the et:trent disaster took shape here during
the pa et year:
After having a relatively free run of the
range during the government of leftist Presi-
dent Juan Bosch, toppled by a bloodless mil-
itary coup in September 1963, Communists
and Castroites here were forced to carry on
clandestinely.
Quietly and carefully they sought a ve-
hicle on which they could move in, piggy-
back fashion. When Reid began to crack
down on corrupt high-ranking military of-
ficers, including a clique known here as the
San Cristobal group, early last year the ex-
tremists found their vehicle.
The dissident San Cristobal officers, at this
stage believed to be unaware ,g their silent
Red allies, made a deal with representatives
of Bosch's Dominican Revolutionary Party
(PRD) on overthrowing the Reid govern-
ment.
The officers had only in mind establishing
a military junta, with them In charge. They
didn't want to bring Bosch back to run the
show.
One major stumbling block for the plotters
was the huge 27th of February arsenal and
ammunition dump across the ?zeta:a River
from downtown Santo Domingo.
With this key installation on the eastern
side of the river and within control of Brig.
Gen. Elias Wessin y Wessint headquarters
at the San Isidro Air Base, the conspirators
feared they were highly vulnerable. So it
was decided that the ammunition base had
to be eliminated and its replacement put on
the west side of the river.
On the night of last June 11, a series of
mysterious blasts destroyed four of live
ammo dumps at the camp, along with tons
of military hardware. The blasts, which
rocked Santo Domingo, killed 14, injured
about 140 and caused 830 million damage.
The Reid government announced the ex-
plosions were caused by sabotage. Suspects
were arrested and questioned, but there was
never a complete explanation.
Six weeks later a special Organization of
American States (OAS) investigative com-
mission reported it had found indications of
Communist infiltration in the Dominican
armed forces and that the explosion .was a
result of this penetration.
The report and its implied warning went
generally unheeded here and elsewhere in the
hemisphere.
As the military plotters here had hoped,
the replacement base was constructed on the
west side of the Ozaana River. It was built
northwest of downtown Santo Domingo, and
called the 16th of August camp?an impor-
tant base in events of last month.
The plotting continued between the dis-
sident officers and PRD representatives here
and in San Juan, where Bosch is living and
agitating in exile.
The PRD knew of the Red infiltration in
their scheme, but figured it could control the
Communists when the time came.
Reid learned of the plot against him early
in April. The Military conspirators found
out that he knew of their plans and decided
to advance their timetable. They still were
thinking in terms of setting up only a mili-
tary junta to rule the country.
The plot unfolded April 24. The PRD
quickly moved to proclaim it a movement to
restore Bosch to the Presidency. The chief
military plotsers began to see their plans
getting out of control.
The Communists and pro-Castro June 14
movement leaders began to crawl out from
the woodwork and by Sunday night, April
25, they had the rebellion going their way.
After Reid's Sunday overthrow the real
scramble for power began.
By Tuesday it was over. The extremists
had gained control behind the scenes, using
Col. Francisco Caamano Deno as rebel chief-
tain and new cover. Caiimano was installed
as "Constitutionalist President."
The Communist design was to create chaos
and anarchy. Now using Caamano's "con-
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August 23, 1965 0
stitutionalist" mOvernent its a shield, they
engineered 'distribution of weapons to thou- t
sands" of Civilians?probably as many as
16,000 were arliedin 1 day.
MOO of the weapons carhe from the 16th
of August arsenal and ammunition dump
that the original military plotters figured
wouid be in their control:
WVen ragtag febeIs began appearing on
television brandishing their newly acquired
wea.pbils, the ban?Cristobarclique knew they
had been duped.
Borne of these officers scurried back to San
Isidro base to join in whit they considered
to be in anti-Communist fight. Others-
sought sanctuary in embaseies here.
To.,diplornats and other observers the arm-
ing of civilians, under an admitted block-by-
block plan, clearly reveals the insurgent
movdMent for what it is now.
Caamano, Who" is not believed to Share
Communist sympathies but now is consider-
ed a captive of the extremists, and his chief
adviser, Ffector Aristy, readily admit the
weapons were distributed according to plan.
1 deny that the Commu-
quickly to the 'rebel forces, expressed bit-
,
erness that the United States had flown
Guzman secretly to Washington for consul-
tation.
"What kind of business is this the North
American government is doing?" asked Im-
bert, sitting with his junta and military
chiefs.
"This still is a free and sovereign country,
so why does a Dominican citizen have to
be taken to Washington for approval before
being named President of the Dominican
Republic?"
The military also put the U.S. represent-
atives on the spot by declaring:
"If you want to turn this country over
to communism you will have to guarantee
safe evacuation of all the anti-Communist
Dominican armed forces and their families
and also all democratic Dominican citizens
who hold anti-Communist beliefs."
Commodore Francisco J. Rivera Caminero,
Armed Forces Secretary, said after the meet-
ing the military establishment solidly sup-
ports the Imbert junta. He said he wasn't
certain of the names of the American offi-
cials at the conference.
The Washington task force includes Mc-
George Bundy, Special Assistant to Presi-
dent Johnson on National Security Affairs,
Under Secretary of State Thomas C. Mann,
Deputy Secretary of Defense Cyrus R. Vance,
and Jack Hood Vaughn, Assistant Secretary
of State for Inter-American Affairs. Mann
flew back to Washington yesterday.
"I don't understand why the Americans
came to talk with us about this instead of
discussing it with the President of the Na-
tional Reconstruction Government," Rivera
Caminero commented. "We do have a Presi-
dent now, you know, General Imbert."
Imbert and his junta associates said their
gotfernihent rejects any attempt by the
United States to pressure acceptance of
"persons of Communist affiliation or sympa-
thizers." He said he supported the idea of
a national harmony government composed of
"all capable and honest Dominicans regard-
less of their political affiliation?except for
the Communists, of course."
The military leaders and Imbert also sug-
gested to the American representatives that
it would be helpful for the Organization of
American States to maintain a peacekeeping
force here for at least 2 months after hostili-
ties end and supervise a referendum so Dea-
minicans can decide by ballots whether they
want to live under the 1963 or 1962 con-
stitution.
The rebel or constitutionalist forces led
by Col. Francisco Caamano Deno have been
clamoring for return to the 1963 constitution,
prepared by the Bosch government.
In opposing Guzman as a provisional pres-
ident, Imbert and the military refer to him
as a puppet of Bosch. "When the National
Reconstruhion Government was being
formed," Imbert said, "we called Guzman
and asked him to be a member. He declined,
saying he was in ill health and added that
since he was a close friend of Professor Bosch
he would have to consult with him."
Other members of the U.S. proposed. coali-
tion government are reported to be Milton
Messina, currently an economist for the
Inter-American Development Bank in Wash-
ington and a 'former ambassador to Canada
during the Trujillo dictatorship, Hector
Garcia Godoy, Bosch's foreign minister, Dr.
Alejandro Grullon, a bank president, and
Marcos Cabral, a Santiago businessman,
Guzman, Garcia Godoy, and Cabral are
said to be members of 13osch's Dominican
Revolutionary Party.
VANCE DENIES U.S. TROOPS ASSISTING
DOMINICANS
(By Hal Hendrix)
SANTO DOMINGO, May 21.?U.S. Deputy De-
fense Secretary Cyrus it. Vance has cate-
gorically denied allegations that American
OUtDO
nist elements control the constitutionalist
movement.
Communist and June 14 movement lead-
ers here continue to remain out of the lime-
light. But no one, incliiding the special
OAS peaceseeking mission sent here to help
end the war, doubts that they still are active
inside the rebel-held section of the capital.
As for the original military plotters who
dreamed of establishing a military junta, all
were separated from the Dorninicad armed
forces last Sunday by decree of Gen. Antonio
/mbert Barrera, president of the U.S.-backed
civillan-Inilitary -junta.
DOMINICAN MILITARY tEADERS REJECT
tr.s. PRopo'sm.,
(By Hal Hendrix)
SANTO DOMINGO, May 19.?Top Dominican
military leaders supporting the civilian-
military junta governmeht created by the
United States only 10 days ago have turned
down fiat a U.S. proposal to replace it with
another provisional goverhment.
Tie White House and State Department
officials sent here Sunday bypassed Gen.
Antonio Imbert Berrera, the junta president,
and his four associates to ineet With the mili-
tary leaders.
Some of these members of the military
hierarchy were the very same officers who
20 months ago overthrew the leftist? govern-
ment of President Juan Bosch after conclud-
ing he was "soft" on communism in the
Dominican Republic and was an incompetent
adnainistrator?an opinion then sharedy
Washington.
Yet yesterday the 'U.S. diplomats asked the
Dominican Army, Navy and Air Force brass to
withdraw support from the stanchly anti-
Communist Imbert-led - junta and aline
themselves with a Washington-suggested
pro-Bosch provisional coalition government.
rhe rallitary hierarchy refused to buckle
under the preseure and countered with a
proposal that consideration be given to for-
mation of a government of "national har-
mony," composed of all democratic parties
in the country and including the Imbert
junta.
The Dominican officers rejected as totally
unacceptable the Washington-drafted scheme
for a government to be headed by Antonio
Guzman, Who was flovin by the U.S. Air
Force to Washington for secret conferences
last Friday and apparently was approved by
th'Wkilte Hpiise. -
i
tate Depairment spOkesman Richard T.
Ph llips can:fir-med. that Ouzman, a close
friend of Bosch, and minister of agriculture
in his cabinet, had been flown to WashingtOri.
-
But he declined to say With whom Guzman
.Irebert and the Dominic.?n lead-
ers, noting that Ouzman was acceptable
20511
trooPs are assisting either of the two battling
forces in the bitter Dominican civil war.
He said such allegations are "not correct."
"President Johnson's instructions are for
the U.S. forces here to observe strict im-
partiality and these instructions are being
carried out," he said at a news conference
here.
In reply to a question about reports that
troops of the civilian-military junta govern-
ment of national reconstruction are prepar-
ing to strike at the heart of the Communist-
infiltrated rebel resistance in downtown
Santo Domingo, Vance said:
"What happens in the future will be gov-
erned by events and circumstances at the
time."
Presumably, if such an attack is launched
by the loyalist forces they would either have
to cross the U.S.-controlled east-west security
corridor across the City or land fighting units
from the sea.
Presently, as emphasized by Vance, the pol-
icy of the American troops is to prohibit
crossing of the corridor by any armed Domin-
ican forces, rebel or loyalist. Also, U.S. nava:
vessels are patrolling the Santo Domingo axes
from close offshore.
Earlier, Gen, Antonio Imbert Barreras
junta president, said the loyalist forces wil
"very soon" launch a cleanup offensive
again the downtown rebel stronghold.
Vance said some armed members of the
Dominican police force, loyal to the Imber
government, have been permitted in the
corridor to help maintain law and order.
Some of the police wear army uniforms
since men in police uniforms were targets ofi
the rioting rebel extremists early in the
conflict here. Vance said the police now arc
changing back to the regular attire.
He also denied published reports that thc
U.S. forces were supplying arms to the junte
troops.
Vance acknowledged that two small U.S.
military radio units had been with the troop
in the northside battle and at the nationa
palace to help prevent the loyalist gunner
from firing into American installations in
side the corridor when shooting at the rebe
forces..
He also said the United States provided tie
helicopter assistance to the junta forces, al
though two U.S. helicopters were used tc
transport some civil officials of the junta 01
a survey trip outside the Santo Domingo area
Vance said published reports of America/
troops firing without provocation from thr
corridor into the rebel zones are not true
"American troops have returned fire wher
fired upon," he said.
Asked why U.S. forces referred to the rebel/
as "unfriendlies," Vance replied:
"Well, there have been 426 violations (rebe
fire into the U.S. corridor or safe zone) of tilt-
cease-fire agreement since it was made art(
to the best of my knowledge the (junta)
forces have not fired into the U.S. line ta'.
communication."
Vance could have added that rebel sniperr
have killed 19 American soldiers and Ma-
rines and wounded more than 100.
He added that "U.S. trucks are interpose(
in front of the (junta) air force planes? a'
San Isidro (air force base about 20 miles east
of the capital) and they are not taking off.
The trucks were placed near the planer
after five of them last week strafed Radic
Santo Domingo, then held by the rebels
The station now is occupied by loyalist
troops.
Gen. Bruce Palmer, commander of thc
U.S. military forces here, said all necessar
steps would be taken to prevent any bom-
bardment by air or sea of downtown Sante
Domingo.
Imbert and Armed Forces Secretary Com-
modore Francisco J. Rivera Caminero salt'
they expected to finish the battle against re-
bel forces north of the U.S. corridor by this
week end.
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Approved For Re
a permanent cease-fire, as
y the Organization of American
the United Nations Security
urti e LL'CINV out of the question.
'The fight against communism here is
being won by our troops and we will con-
t ue the aglit until the Communists Sur-
tier or are completely defeated," he said.
anyillile, both skies in the bloody war
to a ,24-locur truce, starting at noon
enable the Red Cross, to remove dead
w2Un4ed from the hattle zone. The
trtlep was worked Mit l/y the International
Red Cross and the U.N. rvresentative.
P.ouric41, 'SFTTLEATENT Wevie
" 'CAD." "AeAPTDONMENT," DOMINICAN OPPI-
y -Scripps-Howard Newspapers)
Buero De
-
.aa.krise, May 25.?Rather than ac-
Cillit a U.S.-proposed political settlement of
the tominleart Republic crisis, the Domini-
de= tolitary establishment "would be forced
te'abancion the country," Commodore Fran-
cisco J., Rivera Caminero, armed forces secre-
tary of the military-civilian junta govern-
ment said today.
?'IThp,_,Americaris will loiwe to evacuate the
Military and their families?about 25,000
Denitinicans," he said. "This is not just the
Dominican officers, it's the whole establish-
ment down through the troop lines.
'If the United States wants to help deliver
OM eatintry, to communism, it has the force
fe4de 4,4 ItArt, we will not surrender to a
CodunaInfit
qVire will light communism, but not the
United states. We would be forced to aban-
don.the colontry ? ?
Tbls adamant military posture is believed
to be a major cause of the stalemate in nego-
tiations between President Johnson's Special
Aailitarit, McGeorge Bundy and Antonio
Guzman, a Cabinet Member in the deposed
leftist ? government of ex-President Juan
Beitelo, for creation of a coalition govern-
ment headed by Guzman.
Officials of the junta government, created
earlier by American diplomats and headed
by Gen. Antonio Imbert ilarr,era, have not
'been consulted by Bundy about the coalition
government. But U.S. oitCb.ls now are tak-
ing a second look at a.proposal from the loy-
SAW forces,
Listralist leaders have suggested a referen-
Ma to deterinine whether Dominican vitt-
zerIS Wish to be governed by, Bosch's 1963 con-
Stitution or the 1962 version.
The Bundy formula would have the Guz-
Mat coalition govern under the Bosch con-
stitution, discarded when Bosch was top-
pled by a military coup in Seplember 1963.
"The only proper formula is for the Domin-
ican people themselves to decide what kind
of government and constitution they want
through referendum or election," says Rivera
Caminero.
Yesterday, General Imbert summoned
American Ambassador William Tapley Ben-
nett, Deputy Defense Secretary Cyrus Vance
add Dr. Jose A. Mora, Secretary General
of the Organization of American States, to
his residence to Inquire what the United
States was doing in its secret negotiations.
It was learned that Bennett assured Im-
bert the United States is not trying to im-
pose a government upon the Dominican Re-
public, emphasizing that "this is matter
for Eimninicans themselves to resolve,"
Nonetheless, sources in the rebel govern-
ment headed by Col. Francisco Caamano
Deno, hinted strongly to newsmen that a
"complete agreement with the United States"
on a coalition headed by Guzman was im-
minent.
American Embassy spokesmen insisted
there is nothing to substantiate the claim,
noting that there is a stalemate now, and
saying only that talks are continuing.
According to rebel informants, the Guzman
coalition would include these Dominicans
in a cabinet:
:ar. Ramon Ledesma, minister of presidency,
manber a Bosch's Dominican Revolution-
ar I Party (PRD); Hector Garcia Godoy,
famign minister, a strong supporter of
fanner Trujillo-puppet President Joaquin
Gcaloy; Silvestre Alvarez Moya (PRD),
madster of interior and police; Col. Jose
Alice:110 Deleon, armed forces secretary,
apolitical; Dr. Marcelino Velez Santana,
minister of health, Domicican Socialist Party
(PM); Senora Mineta Roque, minister of
edocation., an aunt of a top Dominican Corn-
mi Mist, Fidelia Despradel, and described as a
Iai tiat Virgilio Mainarcli Reyna, minister
of -labor, member of the splinter National
Dominican. Revolutionary Party and cam-
pa gn opponent of Bosch in the 1962 elec-
tiops;, Miguel Angel Brith (PED), attorney
geicerai; Milton Messina, minister of finance,
an tdoriothist working for the Inter-American
Derelopment Bank in Washington and con-
sidered apolitical; Cesar Brache, minister of
inCiostry and commerce; Tomas Pastoriza,
ml Sister of agriculture, apolitical; Ramon
Vila Piola, minister of public properties, a
PRD member and minister of finance in the
Balch government; Julio Postigo, minister
wilhout portfolio, apolitical, member of the
prceent Imbert government; Col. Juan Lora
Fernandez, army chief of staff; Col. Nelton
Gonzalez Pomare, chief of the air force;
ani Emilio Almonte (PRD), minister of
pu'llic works.
11 big question among traditionally anti-
Coinmunist and pro-American Dominicans
neor is why the U.S. attempts to ram Guz-
man into the provisional Presidency when
it 'vas obvious in advance he would be un-
acceptable to the anti-Bosch and anti-Com-
munist elements, but pleasing to the rebels.
It is argued by American manipulators
tint Bosch won the Presidency with about
60 percent of the vote in 1962. But how
much of this was vote against his opponent
is 11Dt discussed by the Americans. At least
40 percent of the Dominican voters still are
stn 'ugly anti-Bosch.
-1Saere is doubt here that Bundy and others
involved in settlement negotiations have
been made fully aware of the backgrounds
of acme of the "Constitutionalists" and PRD
figiires they are dealing with.
Washington officials, including Bundy,
cot tend they are distressed by the lack of
politicians on the Dominican scene.
Signe have not even, been approached by
U.S. officialdom.
There are such capable Dominicans as Dr.
Echtardo Read Barreras, former Chief Justice
of Me Supreme Court and now Ambassador
to Rome. And former President Emilio de
1.108_ Santos. Both have unsullied reputa-
tions and are not vulnerable to attack from
eitl ler side.
It is also puzzling to many observers why
the United States is using such emissaries
as :)r. Jaime Benitez, Chancellor of the -EMI-
vernty of Puerto Rico, who is well known in
the area for his anti-Americanism. He is
here now at Bundy's request.
Disturbing, too, is the manner in which
? diplomats persuaded General Imbert
an his four associates in the junta to ac-
cept the temporary government role, and
thee attempted to dump them?in an ap-
parent concession to the rebels and the PRD
'eaters in Puerto Rico.
"OGEFERILLA SCHOOL" OPENS IN SANTO
DOMINGO
(By Hal Hendrix)
SANTO DOMINGO, July 22.?A school to pro-
duct "instant guerrillas" has opened in the
rebel zone of this battle-fatigued Dominican
capital.
The setting is Parque Infantil, a block-
sqt are children's park studded with swings,
tee er-totters and big, red-blossomed trees.
Ter the time being. Dominican children
velsi play in the park must dodge small
ust 23 1965
groups of young men receiving basic guerrilla
training.
The school is in a. pocket of the rebel zone
controlled by the pro-Castro June Fourteen
Movement, which is alined with the "Con-
stitutionalists" of Col. Francisco Caamano
Deno.
A school director, who identified himself
as a June Fourteen member but asked to re-
main anonymous, said there are 600 youths
in training now, most of them supporters of
the June Fourteen group.
Most instructors also belong though some
are members of the Dominican Revolution-
ary Party (PRD), whose titular head is ex-
President Juan Bosch.
"Most of the people under arms now are
members of the June Fourteen Movement,"
the director commented. "So it is reason-
able that the majority farce be teaching
others how to carry on the struggle."
The director said there are about 12,000
armed persons in the rebel sector. He did
not speculate how many were followers of
his organization.
"We are teaching the people how to fight
urban guerrilla warfare, how to maintain the
fight in the city," the director said.
As he explained the school's purpose, he
indicated training would continue regardless
of the outcome of negotiations by the Or-
ganization of American States (OAS) for
settlement of the 3-month Dominican hos-
tilities.
U.S. Ambassador Ellsworth Bunker, chief
OAS mediator, said later he was unaware of
the school, but would be interested in look-
ing into its operations.
The trainees use wooden sticks to simulate
rifles in drills. The director said they would
learn to use every type of rifle and auto-
matic weapon available in the country before
the course is completed.
Instruction is given also in the art of
concocting Molotov cocktails?bottles filled
with gasoline.
As a teenage girl drill sergeant, in muddy
blouse and bluejeans, gave combat instruc-
tions, the director said tactics being taught
are the result of experience in the recent
fighting here.
"Dominican armed forces often shoot from
a kneeling position," he said. "So the re-
cruits are learning to shoot on their stom-
achs and fire at the right level."
Another group crawled back and forth
across a muddy patch. "They are learning
how to sneak up for an attack on a bar-
racks," said another June 14 member,
A series of obstacle courses has been built
for the trainees.
One has lots of barbed, wire less than a
foot off the ground. The object is to teach
the youngsters how to crawl at curb level
In city street fighting.
The school day extends from 5:30 a.m. to
6 p.m. with a noon lunch break. Classes
are held 7 days a week.
There also is classroom instruction. The
director said students are taught morality,
proper use of free time and the basic reason
for "the Dominican struggle," which includes
sovereignty, human rights and intervention
by foreign troops.
It was apparent the school has the po-
tential of creating the nucleus for a Do-
minican FALN, initials of the Castro-model
Armed Forces of National Liberation in
Venezuela.
For older boys?and some girls?a more
sophisticated school is opening across the
street under direction of Col. Manuel R.
Montes Arache, secretary of the armed forces
in the Ca.amano regime.
Montes .Arache, a frogman in the Domini-
can Navy, is offering courses in sabotage,
espionage, demolition, communications and
guerrilla warfare.
Among other things, his students will learn
how to pick off a sentry with a crossbow
and arrow.
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August 23, 1965 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? skisi
COMMUNISTS TOON LEAD 'ROLE ns REBELLION
FROM START, SAYS 'WRITER WHO WAS
THERE?ARTICLE 1
(By Paul D. Bethel)
Row did the Dominican Republic revolt
start on April 24? Who were the prime
Moyers? Who are the "gcxxl guys" and who
are the "bad guys?" Was U.S. action justi-
fied? What is *U.S. policy today?
There is impressive evidence that the Corn-
mUnists were in on the rebellion from the
very beginning. They did not snatch the re-
volt from the hands of deposed President
Juan Bosch's party, the PRD, as has been
widely supposed.
On March 16, just 5 weeks before the April
24 revolt the central committee of the PSP-D
(Communist Party) issued a manifesto. It
called for "the return of Prof. Juan Bosch to
legitimate control of the government."
? The manifesto said: "The working people
will achieve total liberation if it unites and
fights to conquer?to eliminate the economic
domination by North American imperialism
and to establish Socialiit democracy which
puts the wealth in the hands of the people."
The manifesto thus endorsed Juan Bosch
as the surest means of establishing its So-
cialist democracy. It incited the people to
? violence to restore Bosch to the presidency in
these words:
"The entire population must fight in the
streets, in the squares, in the factories, in
? the fields, for the return of Juan Bosch as
the head of the 'constitutional government."
The Commit-list Party knew that Donald
Reid Cabral, president of the civilian junta,
- was unpopular and that his overthrow was
imminent. The party had tested his strength
In seven labor strikes over the period of a
year. The strikes weakened the national
economy, struggling under Reid's austerity
program. Rational as his policies were, they
made no friends for Reid among the Nation's
business and labor leaders.
? Then there was the military.
Under U.S. guidance, Reid cracked ctown
hard on graft and corruption in the armed
forces?the first Dominican leader with the
courage to do so. Bosch never challenged the
authority of the generals nor made any ef-
fective moves to curb corruption.
Under Bosch, the three big shots in the
COntraband racket were the National Police
Chief, Peguero Guerro; Air Force Gen. Atila
-Luna and Army Gen. Vines Roman. They
ran everything, from nylons to dope, and put
millions of dollars. into their own pockets.
-Reid dumped all three generals early this
year in a cleanup of the government. He
removed Luna and Roman from their com-
mands and fired Peguero.
Reid had thus alienated the three pillars
,needed for support?the military, labor, bus-
iness, Bosch's PRD and the Communists
organized and waited for Reid's ouster.
Ambassador W. Tapley Bennett told a
group of us on April 29 that the PRD and the
Communists had been collaborating. He
said: "The Communists worked with Bosch's
PRD for months and Were prepared well in
advance of Reid'e overthrow."
This was the importance of the March
16 Communist manifesto. It was the blue-
print for the events which took place on
April 24 and thereafter. -
I also learned from an unimpeachable
eource that Bosch met with two members of
the Castro-Communist "14th of June move-
ment" in San Juan in early March. The
two?Victoriano Felix and Rafael Taveras?
gbt Bosch's agreement to cooperate.
'Taveras is a member of the central corn-
Alittee ,of the: party. Ale arranged to tape
a qUestion-afid-'answer session with Bosch.
The tape was taken by them to Santo Do-
mingo and turned over to Jose Brea, secre-
tary of finance of Bosch's PRD. He also
owns the radio station, -Cristal.
No, /55--,--8'
Prevented fictra airing the tape by a Reid
law, a transcript was made and read over the
air April 9 on the program "Here is Santo
Domingo." The program was sponsored by
the 14th of June movement.
Bosch's message was anti-American, rab-
ble-rousing and pro-Communist. The facts
of the story have since been confirmed by
official Washington sources.
Another fact cementing the United States
case that the revolt was Communist is pre-
sented by Jose Rafael Molina Urena, Bosch's
provisional president during the first 4 days
of the rebellion. He called on our U.S. Am-
bassador Tuesday night, April 27, and was,
in the Ambassador's words, "a thoroughly
defeated and dejected man who admitted to
me that the rebel movement was in the
hands of the Communists." Molina took
asylum in the Colombian Embassy that same
night.
There can be little question that the Com-
munists, Bosch and Bosch's PRD collabo-
rated from the very beginning. Timing was
the key element. The pocket-sized rebel-
lion of a few military officers on April 24
provided the opening. The collaborators
took it. Here is what happened:
At 1:30 p.m. on that fateful Saturday,
rumors began to fly in the slum areas of
Santo Domingo that the Reid Cabral junta
had been overthrown. People began to pour
into the streets as the rumors multiplied and
spread.
Only a few hours earlier, Reid had dis-
patched Army Chief of Staff Gen. Marco
Rivera Cuesta to the 27th of February Bar-
racks to sack two officers for graft and dis-
loyalty. Instead, Rivera Cuesta was sur-
rounded and taken prisoner. Immediately,
the 16th of August Barracks threw in with
the rebels, and the revolt was on. The bar-
racks are named after famous dates in Do-
minican history.
Why the revolt?
Officer of rank lower than general ap-
plauded Reid's moves against Roman, Pegu-
ero, and Luna. It gave them a chance to
move up. But when Reid reached down, as
he did that Saturday, to fire officers of rela-
tively junior rank, those same officers re-
belled. They saw in his move?perhaps ac-
curately?a plan to crush the power of the
military.
It is important to note at this moment,
however, that the military insurgents had no
intention of expanding their pocket-sized
rebellion into a civil war. They merely
wanted to get rid of Reid and the threat he
posed to their privileged position.
Gen. Elias Wessin y Wessin stepped in and
tried to mediate the dispute.
A career military officer, untainted by graft
or corruption, Wessin y Wessin was feared by
the Communists and respected by his col-
leagues. He has other power. He commands
the military training center (CEFA) and,
through it, the San Isidro Air Base with its
Dominican armored force, paratroopers, and
counterinsurgency teams.
The Air Force is privileged. Not only does
it have all the planes, but virtually every-
thing else.
The rebels refused to surrender to Wessin
y Wessin, and gambled that he would not
push them too hard. They were right. The
general had also begun to look upon Reid's
moves againit the military with some con-
cern, since he felt that a weakening of the
military establishment could only play into
the hands of the Communists. He talked the
situation over with the rebels and came up
with a formula. That formula was to set up
a joint military junta?rebel and loyalist?
and call for elections within 90 days.
Wessin y Wessin defends his actions. He
had backed Reid for nearly 2 years. But he
said he knew that Reid could never pull
through the April crisis. He urged Reid to
20513
resign "rather thin see the country plunged
Into chaos."
Reid had a few things to say. In an inter-
view on May 3, while in hiding in Santo
Domingo, he said: "The Communists used
the resentment of the military toward me
and were able to undermine civilian con-
trol."
Nevertheless, the doughty Scotch-Domini-
can made a stab at staying in power, over-
riding the advice of General Wessin y Wessin.
That Saturday night he broadcast an ulti-
matum to the rebels. They were to surren-
der by 5 am, the next day, he said, or they
would be attacked by loyalist forces. But
there were no loyalist forces.
Wessin y Wessin refused to back him any
longer. Reid Cabral was through.
Taken in the context of Latin-American
politics, Reid's critics had a point. True,
they say, he was cleaning up corruption.
True, they also say, he tried to develop ra-
tional economic policies. Not true, they say,
that he intended to hold elections as prom-
ised in September of this year?unless he
was sure of winning.
He made himself Secretary of War. He
brought the 10,000-man national police force
under his control. He tried to unite smaller
political parties behind him.
However, Reid's views or alleged views
about elections also had a point.
In that same May 3 interview, he stressed
the need to prepare for elections. Illiteracy
in the Dominican Republic runs around 70
stcrcent. The people were under the suffo-
cating dictatorship of Generalissimo Rafael
Trujillo Molina for 32 years.
Commencing only with the assassination
of Trujillo on May 30, 1961, political parties
have little real strength and no tradition.
The Communists have that. Reid seemed to
feel that early elections, without several
years' preparation, would play into the hands
of the Communists and demagogs.
No rational budgetary procedures had been
followed under Bosch, "The first freely
elected President in 32 years," and he made
a mess of things. Military-contracting offi-
cers made all kinds of import deals?when
they could get a rake-off of between 10 and
20 percent. Importers vied with each other
in offering higher rake-offs. So the mili-
tary signed deals that committed the budget
for 5 or 10 years ahead.
Reid established a budget commission and
headed it himself. No purchases were per-
-misted unless this commission stamped the
contract to show that the Government had
the money to pay. All purchasers had to
deposit 40 percent in advance against the
purchase of foreign goods. But by the time
Reid was in a position to enforce economic
control, the debt was already sky high.
One effect was to close the door after the
horses had escaped. The other was to lay
him open to charges of wanting to become
a dictator. It did not seem to matter that
Reid Cabral had few trusted aides to turn to.
The facts suggest that civilian junta
President Donald Reid Cabral came on the
scene too late. Badly needed in 1962 and
1963, his policies in 1964 and 1965 satisfied
nobody and alienated sources of support
needed to keep him in power and carry out
those policies.
[From United Feature Syndicate, Inc., June
15, 1965]
DOMINICAN DILEMMA-KNOWN REDS AMONG
REBELS HARANGUED POPULACE TO INDICATE
REBELLION HAD POPULAR SUPPORT?ARTI-
CLE 2
(By Paul D. Bethel)
On Sunday, April 25, the second day of
the Dominican Republic revolt, Can. Wessin
y Wessin sent a personal representative to
meet with the rebels of the 16th of August
Barracks. They were jointly to set up a
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-20514 CONGA SSIONAL RECORD --- SENATE August 23, 1965
dietaker. junta composed of rebels and Radio and television pounded home these domination of the rebel movement. Much
of it comes from Havana.
For example, on May 11 I found that Rafael
Mejia (alias Pichirilo) was in Santo Do-
mingo with the rthisls. Mejla was
loyali? sts until until elections were called. mei cages:
The general's emissary was met by banners , "'ye are the PR."
carrying the slogan of Communist manifesto '"Ye are for the Constitution."
issued the month before: "We are for the re- "'/Ye are not Communists."
turn of President Bosch at the head of the "Ire want Ilreeicient Bosch." ' man for the yacht Gramma which took Fl-
constitutional government." This was a "ticene to tlie old airport and pick up your del Castro and 82 men from Mexico to Cuba,
dramatic switch from the agreed-upon elec- weapons." where they landed on December 2, 1966, and
"dons. The PhD-Communist combine had . Te musclemen for the rebels are the took up The guerrilla light against Gen.
/I to them. tur/8se. Turbas are street gangs, roughly Fulgencio Batista.
- The emissary also found that a large num- comparable to those who terrorize subway I got Mejia's telephone number and
ber of the Army rebels had slipped into the riders in New York City. But they also do called. His wife answered. I told her that
Centel' or the city from the two Army en- the dirty work for whoever happens to hold I was a reporter and that I'd met Mejia be-
caratinients. Xt was there that the real politi- power in the Dominican Republic. fore in Cuba and would like to talk with him.
Cal and military decisions were being made. Daring Trujillo's time, street gangs were He was asleep. Could I speak with Pichi-
,Tne PRID.-Peannatinist combine was at work, used, by the police to keep the populace in rib o when be woke up? His wife said that I
,
The day before, Mobs seized Radio Santo line , ,They were given missions to beat up should call back in an hour. I did. His
_,,, . .
Domingo. known Communist leaders? or i atiraidate Trujillo foes. And they were sister-in-law answered. I again used the
among them Castro-Cuban Luis Acosta-- paic_ for those missions.
_ , nickname Pichirilo and was told that he was
narangued the populace with: "We are for Daring the April revolt, the bates were still asleep. I called back that night. He
the return of President Bosch at the head of used: by Communist organizers. Their rola- had gone. Further a man answered the
the constitutional government." , sion.,7-to loot, kill, steal, create chaos, intimi- phone. He cut me off, say that I shouldn't
This was early-2:80 p.m. on Saturday. date the populace, exterminate those not in bother to call again.
-People were paraded across the TV screens aYm2althy with rebel aims. Although Mejia is a Dominican by birth, he
dragging rifles, armed to the teeth. Some The horrors committed by the turbos is holds Cuban citizenship, as well. He does so
of the demonstrators were from the Army, told by Ina French, a Negro domestic servant: by virtue of being commissioned a captain in
some from the Navy, others) were imposters "I law them kill a Chinese merchant who Castio's rebel army: He is a graduate of
?vil6qIng uniforms, still others were civilians, lived' above his store. Ile heard the turbas guerrilla training and political agitation
'
One purpose was to give the impression Coming Saturday night, ran down to close schools in Cuba. He worked for a year in
that everyone was supporting the rebellion, his shutters and was shot through the Maj. Erneeto "Che" Guevara's Ministry of
Another was to throw the loyalist armed stomach, and he died right there. Industries. Guevara is chief of Cuba's ex-
forces into confusion. Beth purposes were "The turbas," she continued, "attacked ternal guerrilla warfare operations and his
achieved. horn as, killed people, and broke down the ministry is? the front for those operations.
Control of .radio and television by the steel doors of a department store. When The extent of Castro Communist influence
Othinnunlats nearly delivered the country they Were finished with the store, you in the rebel camp is fully documented in re-
into their hangs. The confusion in the coulln't find one pin left. * * * Bodies of ports of John Bartlovr Martin, President
ranks of the loyalists was enormous. skin- peotle assassinated by the turbas were all Johnson's special envoy. He has named
ful radio and television propaganda made over the streets, names and given positions of several hard-
it appear that the country was in the hands "Slime of the bodies had stomachs which Core Communists. Their activities range
of the rebels, were higher than their faces. They had been from introducing large sums of money into
As late as 10 p.m. Sunday night, loyalist 13finii there for 3 whole days in the sun. The the Dominican Republic to running
.
Commodore Rivero Careinere was unable to peot le started scratching dirt over the bodies. for Communist indoctrination." . Aal school
Commodore wereo
give a definite answer as to where the Do- Thee, began to bury them where they could, trained in Cuba, and some had received
minican Navy stood. He told a junior coin- and put little sticks together as crosses. We training in Russia and China, as well.
Mender,: "X am with the people but against knew_ When We saw the sticks that a body A five-man factlinding Commission of the
communism." Broadcasts ,that the navy Was there." Organization of American States gave a de-
had thrown in with the rebels were appar- A similar story was told by a Puerto Rican, vastating report on Communist and Castro-
entIy interpreted by the commodore to mean Maria de los Santos. Her home was broken Comunist rebel activities. Several Senators
that the joint rebel-loyalist military junta into, her car stolen, and her family beaten, among them, Alaska's ERNEST GREENING and
had been established. There were no clear Anceher eyewitness was Hector de Vries, a Connecticut's THOMAS DODD, are critical of
_instructions from the San Isidro base on Dutch West Indies migrant worker, our press for not reporting those findings.
the politics of the moment simply because A Scottish news photographer went into In speaking of that oversight. DODD at-
Gen. Wessin y Wessin was trying to sort the eity on April 28 and came back sickened tributed it bluntly to the fact that, as he put
out the confusion, at the wanton murder. He counted 90 it, "there has been a tendency on the part of
, ? Adding to the confusion, . on Sunday the bocilIs in one block. The Scottsman was also some writers to oversimplify the situation
National Police set prisoners free?criminals arres ted for a period, accused of being a in the Dominican Republic and overidealize
and political prisoners. They were rushed Yankee spy. Hate and murder stalked rebel_ the rebel movement. Their articles suggest
to the TV station by the rebels. The police, held streets, that what is involved in the Dominican Re-
they said, had gone over to the side of the Mc et foreign reporters arrived i to public is a conflict between a dictatorship
people's movement. Powerful, propaganda. Domingo well - In
well over a week following the -
(new junta, chief Imbert Barreras) and a
ini
Tremendous confusion.
tial outbreak of the revolt B that time constitutional democracy (Caamano Deno)."
Hut it was organized confusion. Four most
truckloads of arms roared into Independence
Park in the rebel-held portion of Santo n a cor- of o the bodies
had been removed. A
By
In fact, Gen. Antonio Imbert Barreras is
s a reported
e des stked up i net really a general. He was given the hon-
ner cr the hospital. But since there were no orary rank by Juan Bosch himself for his
Domingo. As one Western displomat stated: bodins in abundance, as reported by U.S. Em- part in killing Rafael Trujillo. Imbert's col-
"I Saw Peiping Communists, Castro Com- bassy sources, overly hostile reporters scoffed leagues jokingly say that he "couldn't direct
munists, and Moscow Communists passing "
at tire? reports. a squad on an assault on a Coca-Cola ma-
out arms to criminals and to the street/ chine, if each member had a dime in his
gangs." These, then, were the armed civil- Yet, even the Peace Carps volunteers said hand."
that hoes and shovels given to the people for
ians referred to in news accounts by overly
objective observers, back rard gardening were used to bury the ma?x --
's' CIVELDINS DIED WH EN REBELS USED
dead and more were requested. Those same
Two precious days had been gained for THEM AS A SHIELD AGAINST STRAFING BY
the rebels. During that period they were volunteers, from their vantage point of work-
ing cut in the barrios (neighborhoods) with Am FORCE--ARTICLE a
able to secure and to hold the central part
of the city. Saturday night and early
the oeople, also reported that leaflets had (By Paul D. Bethel)
Sun-
day morning Gen. Wessin y Wessin's tanks been passed around by Communist organic- At about noon on Sunday, April 25, the
moved across the Duarte Bridge over the era 1 everal weeks before the revolt, with rebel-held radio in Santo Domingo an-
Ozaraa River to curb the mobs. instr actions on how to make Molotov cock- flounced that Juan Bosch had designated
But Gen. *eosin y Wessin did not know at tails out of Coca-Cola bottles and gasoline. Jose Rafael Molina Urena as "provisional
the time that he had been doublecrossed. A woman in the rebel-held section of Santo constitutional President." He was installed
He expected the Army rebels to join him in Domaago was raped 12 times by street toughs. in the presidential palace by rebel armed
cleaning out th,e city. Instead, his troops She was known to be anti-Communist, units, members of Bosch's PRD, and a large
were faced by those same rebels now working Other groups of toughs known as Tigers, as- number of Communists and leftists.
together with the organizers and the mobs. sault id police stations of precinct size, Molina Urena signed several decrees de-
The blow to loyalist morale was nearly fatal. slaughtered the inmates, and seized the signed to establish his authority and give
Communist and leftwing , parties openly arser ale.
the impression that the loyalist cause was
ed
endors the revolt and called for the return Three eyewitnesses reported independ- lost.
of Bosch?the MPD (Popular Democratic ently that the warden' of a prison was be- Dominican Air Force planes bombed and
Movement), the Communist Popular Social- head ad. His head was stuck atop a pole and strafed rebel positions in the city Sunday, the
1st Party, the 14th of June movement, among paraded around the city by mobs. U.S. Em- day after the revolt started. One objective
others. All are pro-Castro organizations. basey officials corroborated the storie*. was psychological. AM Force Lt. Col. Mario
Palanco told me that the attacks were also
The PRD provided the all-Important front. Th re are other evidences of Communist
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NAT, Ricoinj-_:._-5FR9MR000500110003-2 '20515
1H uses were carefully searehed and
intended te show the people that the air
force had not gone over US the rebels, as the
rebel radio was claiming. However, rebel
announcers deftly countered by saying that
the planes were flown by Cuban exile "mer-
cenaries." Several thousand Cubans were
living in Santo Domingo.
When that fiction no longer held up, the
turbos (street' gang mustlemen) were called
into action. They rounded up the relatives
of pilots who were living in the city and
took them to the television station. There,
they were forced to plead With the pilots to
stop the strafing. In some cases, rifles aimed
at them were clearly visible to the viewers.
When the televised appearances did not
stop the air force, families of the pilots were
herded into military targets to be among the
first to die. The planes came anyway.
"Everyone ran," said Colonel Palanco,
",`pilots' wives, children, fathers, and their
turba guards who counted on the presence
of the hostages as a shield for themselves."
Crtule leaflets were dropped on the city
by the Air Force warning the public to get
out of certain areas marked for bombing.
, The rebel radio countered by urging the pee-
-pie to rush to those areas in cold-blooded
use of civilians to protect rebel positions..
How many Were killed is not known, but
by April 29 the U.S. Embassy estimated that
'there had been 1,800 casualties in the city
from all causes?among them around 600
dead,. It turned out later that this was a
conservative figure.
By Sunday night, outwardly it appeared
that the rebels had the upper hand. But at
the same time, many leaders were taking
asylum in Latin American embassies?
among them a relatively obscure lieutenant
colonel by the name of Francisco Oaamano
Deno. Up to this point, he had played no
significant role in the revolt.
The tide began to turn slightly in favor
of the loyalists, and at 7 a.m. Tuesday the
main base of San Isidro got a radio station
operating. It told the people in target areas
to get out and go to the Quisqueya baseball
stadium, the El Embajador Hotel, and the
Perla Antillana_ Hippodrome *here they
could seek refuge and get food and water.
The, rebel-held Santo Domingo radio de-
manded that the people stay where they
were, and in some instances they enforced
their demand for nearly a week.
With San Isidro on the air, the scattered
elepaen-ts of the Dominican armed forces
began to pull themselves together. The first
target to be knocked-out was the rebel radio.
The radio was the only one which reached
the ,entire country, and it carried accounts
Of a complete rebel victory.
In retrospect, it seems miraculous that the
whole country did not throw in with the
rebels during those first few days. It serves
as a cominentary on rebel claims that theirs
_
was a social, popular revolution. The coun-
try remained quiet and under loyalist control.
At 8:45 a.m. on Tuesda-y, Dominican Air
Force vampire jets hit the' rebel station. The
Dominican Navy cruised slowly offshore lob-
? bing shells at the rebel-held Palace and the
rebel radio. At '11 :50 a.m, the radio abruptly
left the air.
Provisional President Jose Molina Urena
fled from the 'Palace. IVIllitary personnel,
ddisillusioned by ' the anions Communist
takeover, began to defect. By Tuesday night,
April 27, the PRD-Communist strike for
poWer had bogged down in a tiny enclave in
the, center of Santo Domingo.
nebel claim that forces withheld
cr.prp ee,_rtain v,ictorx by encircling their
aVe- are Arstated. Only 686 Marines
ha landed to April' 29, and they were
used only to protect the.V.S. Embassy-from
sniper fire and to secure the El Embajador
Hotel, which was headquarters for the evac-
uation of eivilians.
And. it Was not until: 3 434 liter" that
raa?tine Unkts and the Fpo Aixborne Division
forged a corridor through the outskirts of
the city as an evacuation route. This cor-
ridor hemmed in the rebels, but it also pre-
vented loyalist forces from attacking rebel
positions in the city.
In fact, on April 30 in the first interview
held with the rebel command's political ad-
viser, Hector Aristy, I was told that the
rebels intended to hold the center of the
city. They planned to enter into negotia-
tions with the peace commission of the Or-
ganization of American States which was to
arrive the following day. The tactics were
to gain at the conference table what they
had been unable to win by force of arms.
Aristy said that the rebel zone was well-
stocked with arms and food. "We can hold
out indefinitely here," he said. "In fact, I
expect to get fat on all of the good food we
have."
By this time, Lt. Col. Francisco Caamano
Deno was the nominal leader of the rebels.
With PRD-man Jose Molina Urena in asy-
lum, the leaderless rebels needed a new front.
Again, Juan Bosch made the selection?or
agreed to it. Caamano came out of asylum
in the Argentine Embassy on Tuesday, April
27, and took over.
The rebels moved fast to prepare for the
peace commission of the OAS. They stalled
on the cease-fire until they could round up -
some members of the old Bosch congress.
Caamano was voted in as tstitutional
President on May 4, and the ame of the
rebel movetnent changed to the constitu-
tional government. The cease-fire was for-
mally ratified by them in that name. The
loyalists signed merely as "the Governing
Military Junta."
Any thinking person can see which title
carries the greatest propaganda appeal. Thus
the rebels got the OAS to deal with them
on a level generally reserved for govern-
ments of legally recognized authority. They
had gotten the rebel radio functioning again,
and were winning the propaganda battle.
Caamano's pretensions were given a dose
of Johnsonian diplomacy. Highly placed
U.S. officials pointed out that under the
constitution a military man may not be pres-
ident. But the damage had already been
done. The signing of the OAS document
had extended to the rebels a certain dignity
and status.
Highly placed 'U.S. officials threw another
dash of cold water on rebel enthusiasm.
They said that the night before Caamano's
investiture, he had met with four top Com-
munists. He could be top man the next day
on two conditions, he was told. One, that
if he should win out in negotiations and
come to power, he mutt give important po-
sitions to the Communists. Two, in those
negotiations, he must get concrete assur-
ances of safe conduct for Communists out
of the country, should he lose. U.S. officials
say that he agreed to both demands.
The three-man military junta had given
way, under the patient prodding of President
Johnson's civilian envoy, John Barlow Mar-
tin, to a five-man Government of national
reconstruction, headed by Antonio Imbert
Barreras. By May 17, a combination of
forcea from the Navy, Army, the tank corps,
and the police began to mop up the north-
eastern part of the city?north of the armed
U.S. corridor and the international zone.
The goal of the mop-up was to flush out
snipers, capture caches of arms, and thus
return the greater part of the city to a sem-
blance Qf normalcy.
went along with the lead tanks for several
lapclis, at times under heavy the. The troops
maintained, good discipline. They searched
each house over a vast area. Suspected
snipers had their shoulders examined for
bruises from rifle and automatic weapons re-
coil. Their pants were rolled up above their
knees for signs of extended kneeling in sniper
nests. Telltale evidence sent suspects to the
rear for further interrogation. Others were
et go. o
arms caches sent to the rear in trucks and
armored vehicles.
One vignette of the wax:
A group of 11 rebels, firing a .50-caliber
machinegun sandbagged atop a British-made
Land Rover, were cut down as they raced into
loyalist lines. An army ambulance arrived
almost immediately and took away the
bodies.
People in houses around the vehicle began
to emerge as the loyalists moved up the
street. They talked. One said: "When the
tanks are in the next block, we can dis-
mantle it." They meant the vehicle.
I had to leave to make a broadcast for
Mutual News. I came back in an hour. The
car was completely stripped?its headlights,
steering wheel, tires, most of the engine,
even the brake drums. I asked why they did
it. One turned to me and replied: "Chico, we
have to live, don't we?"
I talked to people in the houses. Almost
as soon as the loyalist troops had passed,
housewives began to sluice down their side-
walks with water and clean the streets.
I noticed that they referred to loyalist
troops as our troops. I asked how come?
Only a few hours before this section had
housed rebel snipers, hadn't it? They
shrugged and said they had no means to get
them out. And besides, it now looked like
the loyalists were going to win.
Friday noon was the deadline for a 12-hour
Red Cross truce. It was agreed upon by
both sides so that bodies could be removed.
However, there was the feeling that this
wedge-opener would be used to extend the
truce. (It was.) This meant that loyalist
forces had to complete their mop-up by
noon. They did so.
By exactly 12 noon on Friday. May 21,
loyalist forces had driven across the north-
ern part of the city and stood on the banks
of the upper Ozama River. They had the
rebels completely surrounded, with U.S.
forces interposed between rebels and
loyalists.
There is an importance to this story.
When it became clear that the U.S. forces
were preventing the loyalists from attacking
the last rebel, stronghold, questions were
asked. The answer, from one official source,
is that the "Dominican Army couldn't fight
its way out of a paper bag." Another opined
that the rebels, entrenched in the city, would
clobber them. Still another source was
bitter about Wessin y Wessin's failure to
move into the city on Sunday, the day after
the revolt had broken out.
However, there were no U.S. liaison Army
men with Dominican troops as they cleaned
up the northern part of the city. There is
an apparent failure on the part of our offi-
cials to recognize the power of Communist
propaganda?powerful enough to virtually
Immobilize Dominican forces for 3 days.
REPORTER TELLS How REBELS USED PROPA-
GANDA AGAINST YANKEES To GET CIVILIAN
STJPPORT?ARTICLE 4
(By Paul D. Bethel)
On Saturday, May 22, photographer
Andrew St. George and I saw something of
the rebel propaganda organization in the
Dominican Republic rebellion?on the firing
line.
We had interviewed the entire Dominican
general staff. The cease-fire was to end in
an hour. Dominican troops were loading
Into trucks at the headquarters of Army
Chief of staff, Brig. Gen. Jacinto Martinez
Aroma. They were headed for the firing line,
ready to enter the rebel-held part of the city.
Suddenly sirens sounded and a trumpet
blared. Four staff cars rolled into the court-
yard. The Secretary of War, Rivera Cami-
nero, had arrived. With him were the chiefs
Of the air force and the navy and other staff
officers. They invited Howard Handleman,
an American adventurer by the name of
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tchell liVerBell, Andy St. George, and me
to Gen. Martinez Arena's office.
There, the combined chiefs of stair told us
Of their plans and frustrations less than an
hour before they would be free to fight
again.
General Caminero said:
k First, junta forces will not shoot unless
ponnnunist rebels shoot first. He expected
eni to shoot. Re stoned to hope that
Sr would.
, ,Becond, junta forces will not try to fight
'their way through American lines which had
, tat them off from the rebel stronghold.
. Third, although junta forces are cut off,
they have every intention of cleaning out the
Chninaunista from their tiny downtown
?There are ways, said Gen. Martinez Arena,
to Move into the rebel positions without
Crossing US. lines: by boat down the Ozarna
River, and by spa.
?#linta Chiefs, he said, were debating
Wriether the 17.$. Navy would be ordered to
turn against the original American mission--
"to prevent Communists from taking over
, this cOuntry"?and physically restrain loyal-
Let. trecips from cleaning out the city.
to May 22 he pointed out rebels killed
?-.EActiers, wounded another 111, and
killed untold numbers in the city's center.
.13y contrast, junta forces had not fired one
single round at Americans,
arainero's last point was to stick with
5 and me. ?Following the interview, we
t to the Only restaurant open in Santo
DOraingo?the Italia. It is situated just in-
side 17.S.-controlled territory.
We ordered a cold beer. Suddenly we
heard the sound,of machinegun fire and the
heavy crrrr-ump of mortar shells impacting
nearby. We looked longingly at the unfin-
-1811,1d beer, and ran out to my car.
_ Thefiring was coming from the vicinity of
the presidential palace, a loyalist stronghold
earrOunded by the rebels. We drove through
the marine checkpoint, ever so slowly, and
approached the palace. The streets were a
Shambles of tree branches and electric lines
?8eVpred by shells and bullets.
We entered the palace grounds, across an
tikpoSed expanse of street. Loyalist troops
? Waved Us ,bAck, but we Went in anyway.
,7tw,o,tauks had their guns trained on rebel
StrOngpoints. Infantry units were lying
Prone, sighting over their rifles and auto-
matic weapons. We talked for a moment
With squad and platoon commanders, and
they told us to talk with the colonel in
charge of the unit.
1,?.drove through more gates and arrived
at the command post. The colonel looked
at us in astonishment.
. the colonel's aide was suspicious. He
flaked for identification. We gave it. Re
etr for more. , We gave that, too. Still
InisPielous, the aide reluctantly permitted us
to talk with the colonel. He said that the
rebels might launch another attack on the
palace.
Andy suggested that we drive down into
the rebel lines to see what was going on.
We did. I drove about eight blocks, lateral
to the line of fire, and parked the car. We
got out and walked another several blocks
into the rebel zone.
Suddenly bullets started zipping around
is., We flattened ourselves against the walls
as heads bobbed out of houses and motioned
us to make small targets of ourselves. On
the street corner opposite, two men motioned
us to cross. When the firing had died down,
we clid ,so.
One of them said that Wessin y Wessin's
troops were firing on Marine positions. I
looked around and saw American uniform
several blocks away. They marked the armed
corridor to the airport, forged by the 82d
Airborne and the Marines 2 weeks earlier.
Speaking halting English, the Dominican
insisted that Wessin y Wessin's troops were
slIoating at U.S. Marines, not the rebels. He
painted down into deep rebel-held' Santo
Deiningo: "There are two bodies of Wessin
y Wessin soldiers there." Andy and I looked
w; one another. / replied in Spanish that
we were not idiots, and turned to leave.
,f'No," he said, in Spanish. "Don't go."
A aother 10 toughs L.ppeared, making a
mlque. All insisted that the Wessin y Wessin
troops were trying to get rebels and U.S.
BC idlers fighting each other. They kept re-
puting that the two bodies of the Wessin y
Wessin troops were there. "How do you know
tt at they are troops of Wessin y Wessin?" 1
ked.
"Because they wear the insignia," the lead-
er replied.
They did not know that Andy and I had
just come from the palace. They did not
In ow that we knew where the lines were.
Alai they kept insisting, to the point of where
the leader said the bodies of the alleged Wes,
sin y Wessin soldiers "had been there for 3
days."
Andy looked at the organizer and mumbled
to me: "And just why, Paul, do you think
th ay should be left there for 3 days, eh?"
rhe answer was phony evidence to be
sh awn to unsuspecting people?OAS and re-
porters. With the battle going on at this mo-
nt, we couldn't go to the bodies. I
ag.dn told the leader that we weren't idiots,
th at insignia could be planted. He thought
for a moment, and said nothing. Suddenly,
hif face lighted up. "I want you to see the
horses blown down by Yankee fire."
Andy saw the opportunity for some good
ph ztos, so we moved out of our sanctuary
ant edged our way along the line of inter-
mittent fire.
10'e almost didn't make it. A mortar shell
eq loded in an alleyway about 50 yards away.
All of us, the turbas included, dived for
sat sty. We looked up to see smoke and dust
bil: owing out of the alley. We also saw a
wo:nan dash out of a house nearby, holding
her bleeding head in a towel.
The cry went up from the turbas: "Yan-
kees are killing Dominicans. Yankees are
killing Dominicans. Each street corner came
alive with well-organized groups of between
6 and 10 persons, all shouting: Yankees are
killing Dominicans. Out with the Yankee
dogs." One variation was: "Out with the
wh: te Yankee dogs." It was a ticklish situa-
timi
he organizer of the group we were with
yelled to the woman to cross over. He saw
the opportunty for Andy to take shots of the
ble(Tling creature. I said nothing. Both
Arany and I knew from the trajectory that the
mo] tar shell had come from loyalists at
the palace. We knew that the turbas knew
it.
Tae woman, now helped by a man, was
airs id to cross over the street in the line
of ire. The two of them ran down another
alle Tway, lateral to the sniper fire hammer-
ing at U.S. positions. We met them on the
flex ; earner?also in the line of fire. The
won an was bleeding but was able to run like
hell_ A Red Cross ambulance, a Volkswagen
station wagon, roared up. The mobs on the
corr*r shouted: "Yankees are killing Domin-
icans." She collapsed gracefully into the
arm 3 of the crowd. They put her into the
amt filance. Andy took shots, furiously.
A/ the ambulance rounded the corner, I
saw her sitting between two men in the
bad:, chattering away excitedly.
'Bre crowds on the corners shouted "Yan-
kees are killing Dominicans." Then a
Swei Bah car, a Saab, came roaring at us from
the rebel lines. It was crowded with rebels,
in motley dress, carrying submachine guns
and rifles.
They glowered at us fiercely, and pointed
their guns at us menacingly. Then one of
the mob shouted: "You're in the line of
maxi Ce fire."
Plorce expressions turned to slack-jawed
pant,. The driver slammed the car into s
gear, roared around the corner, and out of
sight. Andy and x took a deep breath. I
looked at the leader and sold: "Wessin y
Wessin's troops, eh?" He shrugged and
laughed.
The only way we could get out of the zone
and back to my car was to walk about a
hundred yards with our backs to rebel snip-
ers. Thus far, there had been more noise
than actual fighting. But just then, rebel
snipers winged a burst into the wall just over
our heads, and we heard the screeching sound
of the ricochet.
"That was for US," Andy said. "Let's get
out of here."
We walked the hundred yards slowly and
nonchalently, our spines tingling. After an
eternity we rounded the corner and gave a
sigh of relief.
We walked along the relatively safe area
next to U.S. troops. We talked to the people
in the houses. They were tired of having
their houses turned into snipers' nests. They
were afraid of the turbos and the law of the
streets. They were leaving the rebel zones in
droves.
Two civilians of pleasant mien attached
themselves to us. Andy is Hungarian, with
the accent.. Our two companions asked who
We were. And
.n Spanishthat we
were Brazilian. "Good," they said, and urged
Andy to tell the story of how Yankees were
killing Dominicans.
The next day around noon, Andy rushed
into my TOORIS. "This is Havana, 1959," he
exclaimed. "There are bearded guys, and the
whole smell of the place is exactly like it was
in 1959 in Cuba."
Andy had gone into the center of the city.
He had an appointment with rebel leader
Francisco Caamano and photographed him.
"But guess what," Andy said to me, "Re-
member the two fellows from yesterday?
Well, I was walking Into the Caamano head-
quarters, and someone said: 'Hello Brazilian.'
I asked him how he knew I was Brazilian and
it turns out that he was one of the two we
saw yesterday. The two of them in Caama-
no's headquarters, armed and guarding the
place."
I later learned from the loyalist G-2 that
arms were cached in strong points in the
rebel-held part of the city. Actually, strong
points were few. NO one was permitted to
take arms from one strong point to another,
even though personnel were rotated frequent-
ly for intelligence-gathering purposes. Un-
armed, and on the street, the rebels were just
ordinary citizens.
Mobs were organized and controlled in the
classic manner. What was going on in rebel
territory was a carbon copy of Cuba's mobs
of neighborhood informers?viligance com-
mittees?controlled and directed by Commu-
nists and Communist-trade cadres.
--
JOHNSON AIDS CALL FOR A CONSENSUS RE-
GIME DASHED HOPES OF GETTING ANTI-RED
GOVERNMENT?ARTICLE 5
(By Paul D. Bethel)
As the first handful of correspondents en-
tered the El Embajador Hotel in Santo
Domingo on April 29, a fleshy, confident-
looking man left. Driven to the helicopter
port set up by Marines near the hotel in a
U.S. Embassy station wagon, Antonio Imbert
Berraras left for San Isidro Air Base to set
up a new junta.
Imbert Barreras is tough. and purposeful.
He had to be. He and four colleagues killed
the hated dictator Generalissimo Rafael
Trujillo Minn? on May 30, 1961. By doing
so, Imbert Barreras became a sort of national
hero. A sort of national hero because his
background is not unblemished. But few
backgrounds in the Dominican Republic are.
However, Imbert Barreras is a stanch
Catholic. More, he is a graduate of the.
strong anti-Communist Catholic cursillo.
Other graduates?Gen. Elids Wessin y Wes-
in, chief of staff to Arm General Ja I t
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Martinez Arabs. The three ' are dedicated
anti-Co ifthsts. They are -Welded together
n
in ,son's Lu . WIF *Prpose. '
= .The hert junta is not a military junta.
Discounting Imbert's status as a general,
there is only one military man represented?
Air Voice Colonel Pedro Bartolome Benoit.
The others mien lawyer; a businessman, and a
tiliasi-liatelleetual. Im-bert's junta does,
however, enjoy the confidence of the Do-
minican armgcl forces: '
Installed 1:4 us on May 12, the GNR was
having the nig 'Milled from under it by the
United Statei" on May 18. The rug-pulling
act was done by Presidential Security Ad-
viser McGeorge Bundy -and Deputy Secretary
01 Defense Cyrus Vance: Apparently alarmed
at press repotting from Santo Domingo that
the GNR was militarist and rightwing,
Bundy and Vance sought to replace it with
What was described in Bundyese as a con-
sensus governinent.
Treasures put upon the junta to resign are
t
related by an indignant chief of staff, Gen.
./acintO Martinez Arena.
The general is e,hort-and stocky, energetic.
15, has had 36 years of military service. He
doesn't drink: Ie tola me on May 19 that
fie Could be retired but wouldn't sit idly by
and vietcht the country taken' over by com-
munism.
The general was enraged at the antics of
the Washington mission composed of Un-
der ,Secretary 'Thomas Mann, Bundy, and
Vance. Lea by Bundy i the mission was there
_to create a cOnserisns :goVernment.
.... "What the hell does that mean?" Mar-
tinez Arena asked rhetorically, pounding the
desk with his open palm. Tfe answered: "It
..fneans turning the country over to the Com-
munists."
Little by little the story poured out.
"On ,Sunday, May _13, Mr. Mann met with
us at junta headquarters. All of the mili-
tary chiefs were there. Mr. Mann said that
we should., accept Antonio Guzman as presi-
dent, and later, in a few Months, hold elec-
tions ,under the 1983 constitution." The
general pauted, rolled his eyes, spread his
hands. "Well," he continued. "Mr. Guzman
Is a nice man. He is intelligent. But he is
not a person of firth Purpose." Mr. Mar-
tinez Arana 'again spread his hands, leaned
Over his alesk and pinched it with his in-
dex finger in rhytlun with "And he is a
friend, a close friend, of Juan Bosch." Guz-
man served in Bosch's cabinet and has been
charged with inefficiency and corruption in
that position.
Gen. Martinez, Arena continued: "He
could never' handle the Communists. And
the 1963 constitution." He uttered an oath.
' "It is made for a dictator."
He had, anoint there. A Bosch constitu-
tion, rammed through by an incompetent
and largely illiterate group of Congressmen
swept in with Bosch in elections in late 1962,
it is a blank check. Its provisions are so
vague that a President can do anything he
wants under it. The 1963 constitution is
deliberately and dangerously vague. It is
a resentful document; the product of resent-
ful men. .
In section 4, on property, there are pro-
visions like ,these:
- "Expropriation may take place in the
general interest" Article 28 says that: "It
Is declared that only Dominican nationals
have the right to acquire land. But Con-
gress may authorize the acquisition of land
in urban area.s by foreigners, when this is
in the national interest."
? Excessive holding of land is outlawed.
?Iput -pl c,q,n1Aiti,4191i., does not say what is
" eXeosOie- and' teaves it up to Congrees to
" determine. 'ikil"fiubsiiil wealth, oil and min-
erals is doctored (as in Cuba) to be the piop-
arty of the state. Other provisions of the
1963 Constitution are of deep concern to
. DominicanJthaine,aainen. ?Nor is there any
mention of Goa, causing' religioue people to
question the motives of the originators of had influenced President Johnson's staff, lie
the Bosch constitution, referred to McGeorge Bundy.
Convinced of the Communist makeup of Asked why the United States was pressur-
the rebels, the Imbert junta rejected Mann's ing the junta to step down, an official from
proposal. They liked Mann, however, de- Washington said that Imbert had "failed to
scribing him as a sensitive and intelligent capture the imagination of the people
diplomat, quickly enough." The official continued:
They did not like Cyrus Vance. "We were gambling?hoping that Imbert
"Monday," said the Army Chief of Staff, could form a government that could win
"Mr. Cyrus Vance came to see us. He acted public approval quickly."
like a Hitler, a real dictator. He took out a When queried regarding that statement, a
notebook and briskly ticked off the points junta member angrily replied: "You seem to
to which we would have to agree." The gen- want instant democracy. How can a junta
eral uttered a micily dirty word. "He said we? which was installed by you 10 days ago expect
would have to agree to the Guzman govern- in that period of time to win a wave of
ment and to the 1963 Constitution. popular support?"
"We consulted and said we would accept He went on: "Don't your negotiators from
Guzman but not the 1963 Constitution. We Washington know that there are no news-
wanted the 1962 Constitution, which is ex- papers being published, no mass media com-
plicit and understandable. Well, this Mr. rnunications we can resort to, to explain our
Vance said that we couldn't have it. We position and develop public understanding
of the issues?"
My Washington source also said that even
if Imbert managed to defy the United States
and remain in power, the result would be
civil war. Arms would be cached, plots
hatched, and the revolt would spread.
An officer of the Dominican counterinsur-
gency force said that Cuban arms had been
cached over a period of several years. He also
said that in the sweep by Imbert forces across
the northern part of the city, "tons of cached
arms had been found." He continued: "If
our forces had not made the sweep, those
arms would never have been found." The
counterinsurgency officer was trained in the
United States.
Regarding the lack of real support for
Imbert, I asked my Washington source:
"What about the fact that the 130,000-mem-
ber National Confederation of Free Workers
(CONTRAL) is supporting Imbert?" Here
he got a little vague, and fell back on his
earlier statement that Imbert did not win
popularity fast enough.
The inescapable conclusion is that Presi-
dent Johnson's advisers are sensitively at-
tuned to "world opinion." They were in-
fluenced by initial press reports which dog-
gedly refused to recognize the Communist
menace and tended to romanticize rebel
leader Lt. Col. Francisco Caamano Deno.
Thus influenced, Johnson's advisers went
looking for compromise rather than solution.
As of this writing, the rebels still control
the center of Santo Domingo and have
launched a potent propaganda campaign
from their festering pocket of resistance.
What started out as a vigorous and just
a select few journalists personally known action by President Johnson has bogged
to him," as a spokesman later revealed. He down in a mire of international and na-
told them that he was rather optithistie that tional bureaucrats. It could end in a dip-
a "solution" would be found to install a lomatie defeat as disasterous as our failure
"consensus government." to follow through at the Bay of Pigs 4 years
He implied that Oaamano had agreed to ago. For the lesson of the Dominican Re-
step down in favor of Guranan and rather public to Latin American Communists and
believed that Imbert would do the same, leftists is this: seize territory, no matter how
much, and force the United States and the
Later, a high U.S. official in Santo Domingo OAS to negotiate.
said that the United States was prepared to
exert economic pressures against Imbert to [From the Chicago (Ill.) Tribune,
force him out. Apr. 30, 19651
The story of the Bundy conference leaked ?
out. Reporters who had not been invited dar;VENrx..e.N HUNDRED MARINES IN DOMINGO?
were not bound to the no-attribution rule. 2,500 PARATROOPERS ALSO FLOWN IN?INSUR-
GENTS ArrAcK U.S. EMBASSY-5 Din-5-DAT reported that Imbert was on his
way out. REVOLT BY LEFTISTS TAKES 400 LIVES
Imbert was furious. The next day, Sun- (By Jules Dubois)
day, he blasted "malintentioned" reports SANTO DOMINGO, DOMINICAN REPUBLIC,
(meaning certain reporters whom he felt April 29.?A band of rebels dressed in civilian
were representing him and his junta as a clothes fired on the U.S. Embassy today.
rightist threat). He said that the people American marines fired back and repelled the
of the Dominican Republic knew that he was attackers in a 30-minute fight.
no dictator. They knew he had risked his At least two of the attackers and possibly
s life to rid the country of the Trujillo four were killed by the marines. There were
dictatorship, no casualties on the U.S. side. Three other
Imbert Barreras and his staff were also attackers were killed by Dominican Army
incensed at efforts by reporters of thre troops as the leftists fled marine gunfire.
influential U.S. dailies to prove that no Corn- Later, other leftist bands that have been
Munist menace existed in the country. He roaming the city fired sporadically at the
said privately that these reports apparently Embassy but the attacks ended as night fell.
asked why. And he said because the rebels
demanded the 1963 Constitution. Of course
they demanded the 1963 Constitution. It is
an open door for the Communists to walk
in."
"We blew up," Gen. Martinez Arena con-
tinued. "Just who are the rebels, anyway?
They control only a part?and only a tiny
part?of the city of Santo Domingo. Every-
where else in the nation people are working
Stores are open. There are no disturbances.
What the hell does this man want, this Mr.
Vance?"
The general paused, then continued: "So
we ask him, just who are the rebels? Why
are they so important to you when they are
your enemies, and American Marines are
being shot by them everyday?
"Then do you know what he said? He
said we could take it or leave it. And he
also said that if we leave it, the United
States would be forced to make a deal with
the rebels. Then he left. Day before yes-
terday we met with another American of-
ficial. I won't tell you who it was (it prob-
ably was McGeorge Bundy), but he was im-
portant. We told him that if the United
States insisted on Guzman and the 1963
Constitution, we would accept on certain
conditions. The United States must trans-
port out of this country all of our fighting
men and their families. The Communists
would slaughter them. The United States
must also transport out of the country all
Dominican families who want to leave.
There would be nobody left."
Saturday, May 22, Bundy held an un-
attributed background press conference for
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TatteaS Rarat
An Embassy spokesman said afterward that
"the Tact marines stationed at the Embassy
Win be reinforced.
Marine reinforcements, as expected, were
landed tonight, from the Wood County, a
Landing ship. A tank company of the 10th
Marines rolled ashore en the beach west of
the Hotel Embeijador, They were followed by
I company of the 6th Marines. The rein-
A:meet:teats joined 556 marines landed last
night.
In Washington, the State Department said
that the El Salvador Embassy in Santo
Domingo had also been attacked but that it
had no further details.
The incident at the U.S. Embassy was the
first exchange of fire involving American
Marines taho were landed to protect and help
Americans caught in the Dominican civil war.
TAKES 400 LIVES
Tile 5-day-old leftist revolution has taken
400 lives and xesulted in injuries to 1,200
persons. Hospitals are filled with casualties.
Mopping up operations ordered by the mili-
tary junta failed to dislodge leftists from
positions in the center of the city. There
were air strikes and Some heavy ground fight-
ing this Morning and sporadicfighting
throughout the night.
There was an afternoon lull but then the
Dominican army resumed action. There was
considerable tiring in the city and mortars
apparently were being used.
The leftiats held 15 buildings in what they
call the free territory of Santo Domingo.
The major street, which is the Communist
stronghold, is called the 20th of October to
commemorate a Communist demonstration
several years ago.
ate ATTACKS FAIL
? The strafing attack by the air force failed
to dislodge the rebels, many of whom are
dressed in olive drab uniforms similar to
those used by Cuban Premier Fidel Castro's
rebel army. Others are in civilian clothes.
Helicopters which had brought in the ma-
rines evacuated 650 more Americans and
other nationals to the aircraft carrier Boxer.
Among the evacuees were 18 Christian
Brothers who had been expelled from Cuba
by Castro. The brothers said the revolt here
followed the Sanaa pattern that had been
during the Communist takeover In Cuba.
The Christiantrothers left because leftist
militia, which had seized a police station,
later captured a Roman Catholic school and
were Using it as a position for snipers.
[France announced it had ordered two
warship. at Port de Prance, Martinque, to
sail 'for the Dominican Republic to evacuate
French natimials jf necessary. Britain said
it had asked the United States to evacuate
any of the 120 Britons there if they requested
it Canada asked the marines to protect its
dtizena. ]
The diplomatic corps met with Msgr.
Emanuelle Clarizio, the apostolic delegate to
seek ways to halt the war which is raging
only in the capital. American Ambassador
W. Tapley Bennett attended the meeting.
caaras Tr SA1)
After the meeting Monsignor Clarizio flew
to the San Isidro air base where he broad-
cast another appeal to both sides to halt the
fighting.
I interviewed Monsignor Clarizio and he
said the "situation in the city was "very sad."
Col. Pedro Benoit, president of the junta,
spoke over the radio for the first time since
he took power. He announced that the
United States had urged an end to the fight-
ing and had offered to send in medicines and
food.' American naval planes and helicopters
landed at the airbase with medical supplies
' today. "
Benoit said that free elections would be
held as soon as possible, "with all political
parties participating."
.War ? conditions. caintinue in the capital.
There is still no electric power. Many tele-
phone lines are out. There is no, water in
the laitel Aanbassader except in the swim-
ming ]fool where I took DaY bath today, with-
out map. To provide drinking water the
hotel c arlier took water out of the swimming
pool aid poured the water into clean trash
cans. It is hoped that water will be back
before It is used.
The hotel faces the loss of $45,000 worth of
frozen foods, because it has been unable to
obtain Jgasoline for an auxiliary generator.
'Phis his not only blacked out the hotel but
it also as stopped the elevator.
The American E.nibasey installed a radio
comrat nications operation in the eighth floor
jaenthc use. The men who are operating that
installition must climb eight flights of stairs
in orde e to reach their radios.
[Prom the Chicago (Ill.) Tribune,
Apr. 30, 1965]
TELLS ROLE OF REDS IN DOMINICAN REVOLT
(By Jules Dubois)
SANT) DOMINGO, DOMINICAN REPUBLIC,
April 21.?The inside story of how this coun-
try came within 12 hours of a Communist
takeovie last Monday was related today by
the priocipal actor in that drama.
Gen. tias Wessin y Wessin, the Dominican
Govern inent's anti-Communist military
leader at the time, said in an exclusive inter-
view ti at had he failed to convince the re-
luctant _air force and army chiefs to attack
the Communists at 6 a.m. Monday, the Reds
would aave been in power that night.
POE OF REDS
I interviewed the tired general?who had
not slept or eaten a solid meal since Satur-
day night and wore a stubble beard?in his
office at the army training center several
miles fr cm the San Isidro air base. Wessin's
telephoae lines had been cut by the Com-
munisti land he had to use the air force head-
quarter 3 as a command post.
Wessi fa is no longer the strong man of the
military-here, but he remains the most out-
spoken anti-Communist. Be was shoved
into th background because he refuses to
eompro:nise with the leftists.
He toad me that he hoped to resign from
the army soon, at the age of 41, and become
a farme e. Wessin was educated at the mili-
tary academy in Venezuela and at the Los
Chorrill is Military School in Lima, Peru,
when Gen. Nicholas Lindley was comman-
dant. lb 1962, General Lindley headed, the
military 'junta in Peru.
Weed: I blamed deposed President Donald
J. Reid- Cabral for ignoring reports that an
army co is-piracy was-brewing against his rule.
"The gmspiracy was very big," Wessin said.
"We sad the country by ,only a hairpin.
There v Tee conspirators even here at the
aining,penter.
"The I great majority of the people here did
not knee w what was really happening.
"I had reported the conspiracy to President
Reid for al.5 or 20 consecutive days," Wessin
said, "bit he did not pay any attention to
me." _
Wesshe had bitter words about Gen. Marco
Rivera-C -fiesta, at the time army chief of
staff. Viessin said Rivera also was lax about
the conspiracy. The rebels captured Rivera
last Satiarday and held him hostage at the
16th of august fortress. 18 miles from here.
The air force blasted that fortress into use-
lessness, Passin said.
TELLS THEIR AIM
"This ionspiracy was not an isolated one,
nor was it exclusively military," Wessin said.
"The conspirators were in league with the
Communists from the beginning. As part
of the subversive preparation they instigated
fires thai were set in the sugar cane fields
and inet gated a strike at the La Romans/.
plantation. The fires there .alone caused $7
million damage."
Wessin said the primary objective of rebel
officers was to restore teenier President Juan
Bosch to power.
"I consider this conspiracy was directed
by him from Puerto Rico and that Fidel
Castro [Communist premier of Cuba] also
participated in it. Both.have caused so much
damage. The Dominican people must now
have come to realize that," Wessin said.
While I visited diplomatic friends at the
Argentine Embassy today, where eight rebel
officera had received asylum, four of them
asked permission to leave the Embassy. Em-
bassy officials told me the officers wanted
to return to rebel command posts. They
were allowed to leave the Embassy.
CONFIDENT OF VICTORY
The Argentine diplomats said that the
rebel officers,. who were dressed in civilian
clothes, were confident that their side would
ultimately win in the capital because the
junta had up to now been unable to wipe
them out. They want to be on the winning
side.
Wessin charged that Fidel Castro is in-
volved in the revolution. He said the armed
forces intercepted a call to Castro that was
made from the presidential palace after the
Communists took possession Sunday after-
noon.
Wessin said leaders cif the Communists
entered the palace Sunday afternoon with
Bosch's candidate for the interim presidency,
Jose Rafael-Molina-Morina. Among the
leaders were Dato Pagan: who was one of the
prisoners released from La Victoria by the
military rebels, and the Ducoudray-Juan and
Felix Servio, old guard Members of the Com-
munist party.
I asked Wessel why he did not attack on
Sunday morning as ordered by President
Reid.
"The navy started in this with us," Wessin
said, "and then decided to be neutral. The
same happened with the air force. Then a
group of the 'officers of the air force were
ready to surrender and accept the conditions
of the rebels."
[From the Chicago (Ill.) Tribune, May 2,
1965]
GI TOLL Rises IN DOMLNGO---4 AMERICANS
DIE, 36 HURT IN RED ATTACES---.-REBELS
IGNORE Cease-Fine
(:By Jules Dubois)
SANTO DOMINGO, DOMINICAN REPUBLIC, May
1.?Four and possibly five American soldiers
have been killed in action, and 36 wounded
in attacks by Communists in this war-
stricken city.
An 82d Airborne Division soldier was killed
today. He was shot in the back as his patrol
vehicle passed a building. An armed civilian
emerged, and the patrol immediately shot
and killed him.
Meanwhile, the airborne division an-
nounced that it has captured 33 armed
Communist militia and turned them over to
the Dominican army,
PQ'ff REPORT L3 FIRST
This is the first report of the capture of
prisoners of war by our farces. The Domini-
can army is conducting the interrogation.
A paratroop patrol advanced into the city
to meet a paarol from the U.S. Marines.
After a brief linkup, both withdrew to their
respective positions. The paratroop patrol
returned to the key bridge on the Ozama
River, ail:doh the troeps secured yesterday.
The Marines returned to a paint about 6
blocks west of the American embassy.
The airborne division elements yesterday.
relieved 200 Dominican soldiers on the east
bank of the river.
TWENTY MARINES WOUNDED
In the attack against the paratroopers to-
day, there was automatic weapons fire and
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Augtist 23) .19
eight soldiers were wounded.- The Marines
suffered?tar?. men killed, in action, and the
8W. airborne has lost two -men, One of the
men Serieusly wounded yeeterday died. -
Of the wounded 20 are marines and -16
are troopers.
The fringe area patrolad today is almost
Mles from the heart of the rebel-held
territory in the business 'district of Santo
Domingo. '
Communist mllitia actipn against Amer-
ican troops declined this afternoon. Some
shots were fired but no further casualties
were , reported.
CEASE-1'1SE I91,1-0RED
The cease fire which wae, agreed to yester-
day has not been respected by the Cornmu-
nists. The rebel's commander has no con-
trol over the Communists.
Col, Francisco .Caamano, Deno, rebel mili-
tary chief, added' his signature today to the
cease-fire agreement signed by the new mili-
tary funta and two rebel leaders, including
Caarnano's brother FaustO. Col. Caamano's
decision to sign raised hopes for a halt in the
fighting. ?
There was fighting all night. The marine
who was shot in the chest and killed this
morning was hit in the perimeter of defenses
set up by the marines for the American Em-
bassy. The wounded marine was shot in the
Among thousands of well-armed young
men entrenched in the downtown area were
young officers who bee= the revolt a week
ago. r
"We are friends of the, ,rorth Americans,?
one soldier said. "We do ,,not, want to fight
your marines, but we have to defend our-
selves."
. DENIES ComivroNISTI ACTIVITY
They denied that Communists had been
active among the rebels.
Snipers, who tried all night to infiltrate
the defensive positions around the Hotel
Ambassador, were repelled by the fire of the
platoon of the 3d battalion, 5th marines.
This platoon was reinforced last night by a
platoon from the 82d Airborne Division.
"We were fired at by the snipers almost
all night," Pvt. Ben Palomar Contreras, 24,'
Whose parents, 1V/r. and Mrs. Amadore Palo-
mar, live at 5040 E. Southdale Street, Chi-,
ce.go' Heights, Ill., told me. 45'Ontreras is in
the '7th squad of the 81st millimeter mortar
platoon.
,
'Our outer line repelled the sniper's with
rifle fire, Contreras said.
Contreras was Cleaning his rifle when / in-
terviewed him beside his, foxhole- near the
polo field here early this morning. He said
he had not slept for 3 nights.
, s
FORMER N.v. PROPM5.O11.TI1!IP
A former professor' of military Science at
Northwestern University, Who was in charge
of the Naval Reserve Officers Training corps
there from 1060 to 1963, is playing an im-
portant role in the defense of Santo Domin-
go. He is- Maj, 'Joe Garabardello, New Ro-
chelle, N.Y., executive officers of the 6th Ma-
rine headquarters.
? Major Gambardello had as his bodyguard
Corp. Howard Hummell, 24, of Easton, Pa.
who served in Vietnam frem April I. to June
15 last year. The major calls Hummell his
"shotgun."
Jose Antonio Mora, secretary general of the
Organization of American States, arrived to-
day from Washington to attempt to end the
NITST, It 1:S:, not beltied he will succeed
un4e0 hi can get the m, llary to control the
Communists.
proved Foe8Mmts6gpeRAJL1ittEKRIFP6M0A111R000500110003-2
?
[From the Chicago (_111.) Tribune,
tkay 9, 1985]
,
UNITED STATES, PROTESTS., DOMINGO REBEL
Iva
TICE, VI? ATIL,O!,,I,--ZtOpp, CAS-IEE ;IRO-
11 5- __-, WRWI rtffiXaCR , ,
( I Yulei bub&s)
SANTO DOMINGO, DOMINICAN REPUBLIC, May
8.?The United States tonight Protested to
the ''OrganiatiOn of American States- a new
violation of the cease-fire in Santo Domingo
by the rebel forces of Col. Francisco A.
Caamano against American troops. -
A separate note also protested the vitriolic
attacks on the Dominican and 'United States
Governments by the rebel radio.
ANOTHER MARINE KILLED _
American Ambassador W. Tapley Bennett,
Jr., sent a note to Ambassador Frank Morrice,
Jr., of Panama, the senior OAS representative
here. Morrice received the note at the Hotel
Ambassador where he has his headquarters.
The note was drafted after another marine
was killed today by rebel inflltraters at the
port of Haina, 12 miles south of here. This
casualty boosted the grand total of American
dead from rebel bullets to 12. A sailor who
fell overboard from his ship was the 13th
death. .
Of these dead there have -' been seven
marines, five soldiers, and one sailor.
amens MORE HOSTILE
The protest letter was sent after attempts
by Jose Antonio Mora, Secretary General of
the OAS, to talk with Caamano and get him
to agree to end hostilities and lay down his
arms, failed.
It is understood that the Caamano camp
was more hostile to Mora today than it has
been before and the rebel "constitutional
president" could at no time talk with Mora
alone. He was always surrounded by men
who blocked the efforts of Mora to talk alone
with Caamano.
Radio Santo Domingo, which went silent
at 2:15 p.m., returned at 5 p.m. on the regu-
lar frequency of the powerful transmitter
that is in rebel hands, instead of the special
one it was using.
The radio increased the intensity of its
attacks against the United States and against
(len. Antonio Imbert-Barrera, head of the
five-man military junta formed to oppose the
rebels.
The, foreign minister of Caamano's "con-
stitutional government," Jottin Curry, sent
a . strong protest to Ambassador Morrice
against the international security? zone
which is manned by U.B. troops with token
forces of Dominican police in army uniforms.
RAPS SECURITY ZONE
Curry complained that the security zone
is there solely to confront the Caamano
forces with opposing forces and to harbor the
Imbert government, which has its seat in-
side the zone.
No mention was made by Curry of the fact
that the headquarters of Bosch's Dominican
Revolutionary Party (PHI)) are also 'inside
the security zone and are open for business.
Imbert was not inactive today. He met
with all provincial_ governors and mayors of
provincial capitals. With the exception of
the national district of Santo Domingo, they
reported the entire country is calm.
[From the Chicago (111.) Tribune, May 9,
1965]
HIGH GI SPIRIT IN DOMINICAN FIGHTING
TOLD?TRIBUNE WRITER, SON MEET
(By Jules Dubois)
SANTO DOMINGO, DOMINICAN REPUBLIC,
May 8.?A Roman Catholic chaplain from
Chicago finds the morale of the men of the
82d Airborne tiiviSion very high.
The chaplain, Capt. Edward Kita, whose
mother, Mrs. Victoria Kite, lives at 3845
Ser;thAlbAny Avenue, had returned from 13
months in iCores, last November when he was
assigned to the 82d Airborne Division.
r found a few other Chicagoans here to-
day, land also by coincidence, my son, who
is. in the Air Force].
MEETS ILLINOIS OFFICER .
Maj. Robert Kingsbury, 41, whose parents,
Lee awl. Alice. Kingsbury, live in St. Charles,
Ill, is, information officer at the 82d Air-
borne headquarters here. He was in the
Panama Canal Zone during the flag riots
20519
last year as director of the Armed Force's tele-
vision station at Fort Clayton.
"/ am very proud to be a member of the
same army as these people," Major Kings-
bury said. "They've done a heck of a good
job."
Pfc. James R. Wall, 23, who lived in Chi-
cago before his family moved to Marion, Ill.,
has been subjected to sniper fire along the
neutral zone. A bullet missed his vehicle
by only a foot.
LOYAL SOLDIER TORTURED
His patrol saw the tortured and burned
body of a loyal army soldier. The man was
presumed to have been caught by rebels and
brutally tortured before they killed him and
set his body afire.
I rode through the corridor and across
Duarte Bridge over the Ozama River with
Major kingsbury and Pfc. Allan Prestergard,
Soh Of Mr. and Mrs. Ole -Eiieltergard, of Owa-
tonna, Minn., and Pfc. David Creathbaum,
son of Mr. and Mrs. Jess D. breatlibsUin, of
Liberal, Kans.
While interviewing Maj. Gen. Marvin L.
McNickle, commander of the air task force,
5th logistic command at San Isidro Air Base,
after visiting the airborne units, I was in-
formed that my oldest son, 1st Lt. Jules Ed-
ward Dubois, 25, had just arrived.
General McNickle ordered an aide to escort
me to the officer's tents, where I found my
son being assigned his bunk while his fellow
officers were taking their first bath hi a wel-
come rain. (There is no water at the base
where the airborne and Air Force headquar-
ters are located.)
My son told me he had received his orders
yesterday afternoon and was shipped out
immediately. He arrived early this after-
noon, leaving behind at Shaw Air Force Base,
Sumter, S.C., his wife, Ann, and their new-
born son, Shawn Mitchell, my first grandson.
[From the Chicago (Ill.) Tribune, May
10, 1965]
PURGES DOMINGO MILITARY?JUNTA OUSTS
TOP BRASS IN PEACE EFFORT?SEEKS SUR-
RENDER OF REBEL Cum,
(By Jules Dubois)
SANTO DOMINGO, DOMINICAN REPUBLIC, May
9.?The government of national reconstruc-
tion, headed by Brig. Gen. Antonio Imbert
Barrera today purged the military forces of
ranking officers. It indicated that it will
exhaust every peaceful effort to get the rebel
forces of Col. Francisco A. Caamano to capit-
ulate before trying to blast them out of the
10 percent of this city which they hold.
That 10 percent is almost the entire busi-
ness district. Imbert emphasized that his
government controls the rest of the country's
27 provinces.
Imbert held a press conference with the
four other members of the government. Be
announced that six of the officers purged al-
ready have been shipped out of the country
In the best interests of the nation.
NAMES OF OFFICERS
They were: Belisario Peguero-Guerrero,
former chief of police; Salvador Augusto
Montas-Guerrero, former army chief of staff
and commander of the Operation Cleanup
that never materialized here; Miguel Atila
Luna-Perez, former chief of staff of the air
force; Marcos River-Cuesta, former chief of
stag of the army; and Felix Hermida, Jr.,
former director of intelligence. All were
brigadier generals.
Also shipped out was Commodore Julio
Rib-S,antamaria, former chief of staff of the
navy.
Two army brigadier generals were purged
and, allowed to remain here--Manuel Maria
Garcia-Urbaez and Renato Hungria-Morell.
OAS ENVOY CONFIRMED
Imbert announced that Ambassador Jose
Antonio lionilla-Atilles haa been reconfirmed
in his post as envoy to the Organization of
American States. He has been acting in a
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20520 Approved ForMgeftglabN/Alf iamtvEgm6R0005oo 10003-2 ,
augusr 28 '1965
dual Capacity as Ambassador to the White
House. As the United States does not yet
cognize the Imbert regime, no mention was
Made of that post.
The new Foreign Minister, Horacio Vicioso-
Soto, was introduced to the press by Imbert.
Vicioso said he had cabled all Dominican em-
bassies abroad and instructed the a3nbassa-
dOrS to notify the respective governments of
*he new regime and request recognition.
Imbert announced that Commodore Fran-
Mac? Javier Rivera-Carninero is the Secretary
of the armed forces and police and as such is
overall commander of the forces, lie also
announced the three chiefs of staff as Brig.
Oen. Juan de los Santos-cespedes, air force,
a reappointment; Brig. Gen. Jacinto Mar-
tinez-Arana army, a new appointee, and
Commodore Emilio Jimenez, navy head.
Imbert said the high officers who were
palmed and shipped out today acceded to his
personal request in behalf of his "partners'
in the new civilian-military junta.
4r put as a condition that it was necessary
for the country that they leave the ranks of
our armed forces," Imbert said. "We thought
that it was a good step to get tranquility and
peace in this country."
ZS Meta Wzaster
Asked about Brig. den. Elias Wessin y
Wessin, the officer most smeared iv the Corn-
=Mists, Imbert said Wessin will remain in
his post as corranander of the training cen-
ter. Ile added that he will not allow
Illeamario t? linpose the purge of Wessin as a
precondition for the rebel leader to lay down
his arms.
"We haven't asked him to resign and we do
not intend to ask him, to resign," Imbert said.
Lfftbert stressed that he and his colleagues
Will not wait indefinitely for Caaman,o to
/Cake up his mind to capitulate. The deci-
sion to act Will ,not be made by Imbert alone
but will be a result of unarihnity with his
four "partners," as he calls them.
Imbert reiterated what he said in his in-
augural address on Friday?that the rebels
will be offered all guarantees for their per-
natal safety and safe conduct if they sur-
render. He indicated that diplomatic ef-
forts are being made to persuade Caamano
to capitulate, although the latter and his
spokesmen have stated the contrary.
? ,,"Polorrel ,Oaaniano and myself have been
for Several years, good, good friends," Imbert
Said. "We are doing all that we can to avoid
any action,"
Six 105 mm. howitzers were placed in front
of the Hotel Ambassador after bulldozers pre-
pared their sites. The guns have a range of
7 ulnae and are pointed at the city, toward
'the rebel etronghold. Tanks reinforced
Avenida Abraham Lincoln., Imbert ltva in
the area of these reinforcements.
mem MEN arIVisse
Two seabees and a sailor held for 2% days
by the rebels were released today through
the OAS. They. were Ellard Dana, Virginia
Beach, Va., and Donald Martin, Wichita,
Kans., seabees, and Mike Monk, a sailor from
New York.
Another American marine was wounded
.today by sniper fire at Checkpoint Chip on
the northern flank of the security zone. This
brings the total number of marines wounded
to 24 and the total wounded to 72, in addi-
tion to 2 American correspondents.
001. Pedro B. Benoit, No. 2 man of the
government, reported that a regular army
major who had defected to the rebels with
180 army cadets at San Pedro de Macoris,
sugar port to the east, asked a Roman Cath-
olic priest there to arrange his return to the
loyal lines. This was dope yesterday and he
voluntarily became a prisoner at police head-
quarters.
? The 180 army cadets also laid down their
arras, Benoit aaid. Most of them were al-
lowed to return to their homes.
Irabert and Benoit said they consider the
cease-fire pact acceptable by the govern..
mei et Of national reconstruction. Benoit had
sigetd the pact for the former military junta.
[Fa An the Chicago (Ill.) Tribune, May 10,
- 1965]
4, ?
UNI TED STATES FINISHES BIGGEST AIR LIFT
S WeE 1948 OPERATION TO BERLIN?FLAT
T caz Is ONLY MISHAP DURING 1,702 Tares
(By Jules DuBois)
SOTTO DOMINGO, DOMINICAN REPUBLIC, May
9.?The biggest airlift since that of Berlin in
1941 was completed here with only 1 mishap.
'Mat was a flat tire on a C-130 after it
lam led at the San Isidro Airbase with the
man who directed the operation from Pope
Air Force Base near Fort Bragg, N.C.
E e is Maj. Gen. Marvin L. McNickle, a
veteran of 29 years of service in the U.S. Air
For N. Today he commands the 5th logistics
command, which is the air task force here.
- FLIES 13,412 TROOPS
Prom the time the deployment period
star ted on April 30, until it ended last Thurs-
day the C-130 and C-124 transports made
1,7q trips from the United States, an aver-
age of 243 a day.
The planes carried 13,412 troops and 20,-
774 600 tons of cargo.
The outstanding feature of the lift was
the fact that the planes were turned around
hen, in record time. The average ground
time was only 19 minutes for the C-130 and
the C-124 in 59 minutes. The latter took
40 minutes more than the former, McNickle
explained, because of the more obsolete un-
lora ling facilities and the type of cargo, such
as graders and mixers.
- rrozirrNa 'To cosanutz
"there has never been anything to corn-
part with it in a span of time," McNickle
answered when asked for a comparison with
the ,/Ei.erlin airlift. "I have never seen any-
thing like it in my 29 years of experience."
'I he airlift here failed to surpass the daily
real trd of the Berlin airlift in cargo tonnage
but if the aggregate of troops flown in were
added it most certainly did outdo it.
The record for the Berlin airlift was 1,432
tont a cargo delivered in 1 day. Here the
feescai7d was 1,403 tons of cargo, only 29 tons
VAMPIRE IS DAMAGED
'lite entire Dominican Combat Air Force,
moictly F-51 Mustang fighters, is at the San
Isle ro Airbase, with the exception of a dam-
age a British Vampire jet which is at the
Sat tiago de los Cabelleros Airbase, 75 miles
north-northeast of here.
"We asked the Dominican Air Force to
bring them all in from outlying bases," Mc-
Nic de said, "and they have been most
cooperative."
- PRAISE POE CoNnrritari
F-51's are lined up in formation on a
ramp to the left of McNickle's headquarters.
The headquarters are in the Dominican Air
For se operations building, where a joint
we tiler station?in which Dominicans and
Americans work side by side?is in operation.
A 6cNickle had high praise for the opera-
tics ;al conditions of the more than 30 Mus-=
tangs.
"they are in perfect operational shape,"
he said. "I have on my staff here former
Wo.'ld War n fighter pilots who have ad-
mired them and say they would just love
to Ay them."
75, CoNickle may not know It but his state-
ment is a tribute to a Florida newspaper
puidisher. He is David B. Lindsay, Jr., pub-
lisher of the Sarasota Herald-Tribune and
Jot rnal and president of the American News-
parer Publishers Association Foundation.
KEEPS UP REPAIRS
Lindsay, also a pilot, has for several years,
wita the approval of the State Department,
bees conducting all the repair and mainte-
nar ce work for the Dominican Air Force at
his. Trans-Florida Aviation Co. in Sarasota.
McNickle met his wife, the former Betty
O'Byrne, of Champaign, NI, while he was
on duty at Chanarte Field, Rantaii011. She
worked for the auditing firm of Haskins &
Sells in Chicago when he met her.
[From the Chicago (Ill.) Tribune, May 12,
1965]
WON'T RESIGN DOMINGO JOB, GENERAL SAYS?
VOWS To CONTINUE FIGHTING REDS
? (By Jules Dubois)
SANTO DOMINGO, DOMINICAN REPUBLIC, May
11.?This country's leading anti-Communist
military commander will not resign from the
service until the Reds are wiped out.
This is the determined and uncompromis-
ing position of Brig. Gen. Elias Wessin y Wes-
sin, commander of the army training center.
He so told me today in an exclusive interview
at his headquarters outside the perimeter
of the San Isidro Air Base. ?
The U.S. Embassy had announced yester-
day that Wessin had resigned in a move to
bring peace to this embattled Republic but
said earlier today that he had changed his
mind.
STILL IN COMMAND
Wessin was in command at the base and
his morale and that of his officers and men
were high..
"I have not resigned," he said. "I do not
intend to resign, and nobody is going to pres-
sure me into resigning."
Wessin said that both American Ambassa-
dor W. Tapley Bennett, Jr., and Lt. Gen.
Bruce Palmer, Jr., cbmmanding all US..
forces in the Dominican Republic, were very
courteous to him yesterday. But, he added,
he resisted pressure by them to quit and to
leave the country.
"I did give Ambassador Bennett, at his
request, a letter in which I certified that I
would be willing to resign as soon as peace
was restored to the country and the new
government was on its road to reconstruc-
tion," Wessin said.
Wessin raid that he has not been asked to
resign by Brig. Gen. Antonio Imbert Barrera,
President of the Government of national re-
construction.
WOULD HELP REDS
"The morale of my troops was at a low ebb
yesterday," Wessin said. ""My resignation, or
my enforced retirement, would not only be
a major victory for the rebels but would in-
vite the disintegration of the army."
Wessin said that he was certain that his
troops here at the army training center, who
total about 2,000, and those in garrisons in
the provinces, would, on learning of his
resignation from the army, immediately lay
down their arms and go home.
. "There would be no fight left in them," he
added.
"It would be the delivery of the country to
the Communists on a golden platter."
TIED UP BY TRUCE
Wessin said that his troops are ready to
clean up the rebel city but that the hands
of the loyalist forces are tied by the truce of
the Organization of American States.
"While the rebels freely attack American
troops along the corridor and the entire in-
ternational security zone," Wessin said, "we
are not even allowed to move."
President Imbert said today that he has
received no resignation from Wessin, but that
he would be "glad to accept one."
Imbert was relu&tant to issue a decree
yesterday that would have sent Wessin into
enforced retirement. He does not plan to do
that unless he gets a signed resignation from
Wessin. Neither does he plan, at this time,
to ask Westin for his resignation.
The move to force out Wessin was intended
by the Embassay to placate rebels led by Col.
Francisco A. Caaraano, who calls himself the
constitutional president.
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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? SENATE 20521
August 23, 1965
Meanwhile, the United State e made the
at direct contact with?Cdieniano, rebel
Chieftain. 'rt- was Made By "eitAinbassador
John Bartlow Martin and Harry' Solilaude-
Man, chief of the Dominican desk of the
State Department.
An EmbasSy spokesman described the visit
to Caamano as "exploratory." He would not
go into any details.
The Wessin situation captured the spot-
light from. the 15 incidents of skirmishing
and Sniper fire yesterday at the 82d Airborne
Division sector along the corridor.
One paratrooper was killed and seven were
wounded by the rebels when they were at-
tacked in a crossfire from the north and
South of the corridor.
In Washington, the Pentagon identified an
Army paratrooper lieutenant and a Marine
corporal fatally shot here.
Second Lieutenant Charles T. Hutchinson,
of Ipttanning, Pa., died of gunshot wounds
yesterday, the Army said. Marine Cpl. David
W. Allen, of Gardiner, Maine, died of acci-
dental gunshot wounds May 9.
[From the Chicago (HI.) Tribune, May 27,
19651
rim FOILED IN DOMINGO?REDS REMAIN?,
DUBOIS TELLS OF MOVEMENT
[knife swingers' as well as army troops.
The machetemen slashed the wrists of cap-
tured invaders and the brutal treatment of
the prisoners made the frustrated invasion
and its date an attractive slogan for the ad-
versaries of the tyrant.
Between 1959 and June, 1960, the 14th of
June movement was organized in the under-
ground. Its original declaration of principles
and platform appeared attractive to a con-
siderable segment of the Dominican people.
The man who organized the movement
was Dr. Tavares, a brilliant young lawyer.
Many Dominicans rallied around him. In
June, 1960, when Trujillo's security police
arrested Tavares' wife, two sisters-in-law,
and five other organizers, many more persons
rallied to his movement.
ORDERS SISTERS EXECUTED
On November 15, 1960, Trujillo ordered
three sisters executed without trial. They
were Minerva Mirabel de Tavares, Maria
Teresa Mirabal de Guzman, and Patria Mira-
bel de Gonzalez, wife of Pedro Gonzalez-
Crus.
This Trujillo brutality added to the indig-
nation of the people and enabled Tavares to
build a broad basis of support for his move-
ment, which was not necessarily Communist
at the outset.
It was considered liberal, democratic, and
patriotic and Tavares was the single most
popular figure of the group. Many of the
original affiliates left the movement because
of its swing toward Castro communism, as
enunciated in statements by Tavares pub-
lished ,in the clandestine paper Claridad in a,
July 26, 1962, special edition.
Although both the 14th of June movement
and the Partido Socialista Popular publicly
ordered its partisans to abstain from voting
in the December, 1962, elections [so as not to
taint /3osch's candidacy], the rank and file
were secretly ordered to vote for Bosch.
Still to cover a secret alliance with Bosch,
Tavares on June 14, 1963, delivered a Com-
munist-line speech in which he attacked the
pro-U.S. policy of Bosch. Three months
later Bosch was overthrown and Ta-
vares denounced the destruction of con-
stitutional rule
After Tavares was killed by the army, the
14th of June formed a united front with the
other CoMmunist parties. Some of the
guerrillas had been captured and were jailed.
Although the party gave permission to the
imprisoned guerrillas to accept the alterna-
tive of voluntary exile instead of trial,
Leandro Guzman, now the top 14th of June
leader after the death of his brother-in-law,
refused and remained in jail.
(By Jules DUbbiS)
Sirtro DOMINGO, DOM/NICAN REPUBLIC.?
Fidel Castro had plans to be 'Welcomed
here as a conquering hero of a second Cuba
on June 14, it was Martial today. Those
plans have been dashed, hut the Communist
clan er remains.
Te 14th of June mover/lent, which has the
predominant Communist command of Col.
Francisco A. Caamano's forces, had planned
to have Castro present to help them celebrate
another victory for the Master planners of
Moscow and Peking.
Castro' was to arrive on June 10, by which
time the 14th of June `movement (known
here as the A.P.C.J.) hoped to be ruling the
country. They were going to dump both
Caamano and ex-President Juan Bosch.
TWENTY IN ACTIVE ROLES
Twenty of the top leaders of the 14th of
June movement played active roles in the
near takeover, a month ago. All of them
were trained in the Soviet 'Onion, Red China,
and Cuba. One of' them, Juan Miguel Ro-
man-Diaz, was killed 'flit week in a corn-
-Majado assault on the presidential palace.
Another casualty in the same attack and
from the same party was Rafael Mejia-Llu-
berea, who was gravely wounded.
he 14th of Tune movement has what the
=cabers call its "Joan or Arc:" She is Emma
Tavares-Justo 25, sliter of Manuel Tavares-
Just?, who led domniuriist guerrillas into
the hills in November 1963 to fight "for the
return of constitutional governnient." Ta-
vares was killed' in a battle with the army.
TO 'MARX AN1,11VEISAICT
The Communist plans called for a great
rally on the 14th 'of June to commemorate
the sixth anniversary of the Castro-mounted
invasion that was dispatched from Cuba to
overthrow the late dictator, Rafael Leonidas
It was on June 14, 1059, that Castro au-
thtrized a Venezuelan DC -3 aircraft to take
oft from Cuba for La Constanza, a mountain
reiort north of here, with Capt. Enrique
Moya, a Dominican exile who fought beside
him in the Sierra Maestra, as commander of
the expeditionary force.
Haul Castro dispatched reinforcements by
sea to land at beaches on the Dominican
north coast. Those beaches were Playa
galmon; and Este*. Hondo.
HP *astorr
Trujillo crushed the invasion, using his
cUnpesino [peasant] militia machetemen
? No. 155-9
elections on
fists would
Bosch.
In March and April this year, the 14th of
June brought back into the country more
than 40 of its partisans who had undergone
activist and guerrilla training in Red China
and Cuba.
The movement began to take a distinct
three-way split. There was a pro-Chinese
faction led by Fidel? Despradel-Roque, son
of Trujillo's ex-foreign minister Arturo De-
spradel. There was a PSP oriented group
which advocated following the Soviet line.
And there was a group that desired to main-
tain the Socialist party.
The 14th of June movement gained as-
cendancy in the so-called "constitutionalist
revolt" on the night of April 25-26.. Emma
Tavares-Justo appeared April 25 on televi-
sion and radio inciting the people to rise to
support constitutional rule. Then she took
over one of the Communist commands.
What originally had begun as an old-
fashioned Latin American military coup by
disgruntled officers, who were purged, and
whose excesses of corruption and other privi-
leges were whittled down by Donald J. Reid-
Cabral, who they deposed as president on the
morning of April 25, quickly became the
"constitutionalist revolt."
They installed Jose Rafael Molina-Urena,
speaker of the dissolved house, as "constitu-
tional president," while the three Commu-
nist parties, together with the Communist-
infiltrated Partido Revolucionario Social
Cristiano [PR,SC or Christian Social Revolu-
tionary party], demanded arms.
[From the Chicago (Ill.) Tribune, May 27,
1965]
FIRST 650 U.S. MARINES LEAVE SANTO
DOMINGO DUTY?RED REBELS DIG TRENCHES
IN CAPITAL
September 1 but the Conamu-
not wait and neither would
GO INTO RED EXILE
The strategy was to agitate for an immedi-
ate trial and rally public opinion around the
guerrillas.
But many 14th of June guerrillas went into
exile to undergo training in the Soviet Union,
Red China, and Cuba. The party also used
underground channels to send others abroad
for training in Cuba.
The 14th of June had gained control of the
Dominican Federation of University Students
and used the latter's contact through the in-
ternational students' union in Prague to help
get scholarships for selected members and
gain them prestige.
During the same period, the 14th of June
accelerated its efforts to solidify liaison with
the Partido Revolucionario Social Christiana
[PRSC or Christian Social Revolution party]
and the PRD of Boston and infiltrated the
latter to such a point that a lot of people
of the masses who had supported the ex-
president did not know whether they were
14th of June or PRD.
404st. January, leaders of the infiltrated
PAM flew to San Jan to sign a pact With
Bosch for the restoration of constitutional
government. The country had been promised
(By Jules Dubois)
SANTO DOMINGO, DOMINICAN REPUBLIC,
May 26.?Communist rebels began digging
trenches today in their stronghold of Ciudad
Neuva, in downtown Santo Domingo for a
last ditch stand against loyalist farces as 650
U.S. marines were shipped home.
The marines, who were the first here, were
airlifted by helicopter to the carrier Boxer.
This withdrawal should raise no hopes
among parents and relatives that the 32,000
servicemen who are still here will be leav-
ing soon.
ACTS AFTER PARLEY
COL Francisco A. Caamano ordered the
trenches dug after he had conferred for
4 hours yesterday with McGeorge Bundy,
special assistant to President Johnson; Un-
der Secretary of Defense Cyrus R. Vance;
Jose Antonio Mora, Secretary General of the
Organization of American States and Dr.
Jaime Benitez, chancellor of the University
of Puerto Rico.
Benitez, who was brought here by Bundy
as an adviser, is an intimate friend of ex-
President Juan Bosch.
IN THROUGH WINDOW
At a press conference, Caamano praised
Bundy and said with amusement that he had
met with him and other U.S. officials in the
conservatory of music on Avenida George
Washington. This is in a virtual no man's
land.
"We had thought that the Americans would
reconnoiter and secure the meeting place,"
Caamano said. "And the Americans thought
that we would do that. Nobody had a key so
we had to break a window to get in."
Caamano said that Bundy sought the meet-
ing because he wanted to take his views back
to Washington with him today to report to
President Johnson. He said the talks were
satisfactory. Vance remained behind for
further meetings.
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Qase i 2003/10/15 : CIA-RDP67600446R000500110003-2
NG FSSIQNAL RECOR.D ? ,SENATE
August 23, 1965
14el.aring that any solution of the civil chologicaa victory for the Communists. Be-
ww should be based on the constitution of sides, the United States is giving food to the
190 and the congress elected December 20, rebels but Caamano makes political capital
19f 2, to be guaranteed by "persons of recog- out of it by making the distribution. There
niz rid democratic and constitutionalist tra- is no like treatment for the Imbert govern-
fee toi7," the PSP added.: , ment."
The achievement or a compromise with Reid emphasized that there must be a deft-
the enemy, on the basis of those objectives nite military solution here before there can
of %lie democratic constitutionalist move- be a visible political solution.
meat, signifies an important step that allows German Emilio Ornes, editor and publisher
the strengthening of the revolutionary forces of the newspaper El Caribe, and who is un-
ant I the preparation of the working class and able to publish because his plant is in the
the_people in order to continue fighting for rebel zone, asks:
higher objectives."
"What the hell is the United States trying
WILLING TO COMPROMISE to do to us? It will now take us at least 20
years for our economy to recover and each
la Simpler language, the Communists ad- day that goes by without a solution here adds
vocate a compromise solution that will enable another year to our troubles. Our economy
them to make this a second Cuba. This is paralyzed."
switch in policy Is due to the fact the mill-
fan-political strategists of the party are con- THREE SOLDIERS CAPTURED
yin ;ed. that the Imbert forces, with their Ornes conveyed his thoughts in a brief
mo bale high and flushed with victory after talk with Ambassador Bunker, U.S. member
the northern sweep, are now fully capable of of the Organization of American States mis-
cru Ming the insurgents led by Col. Francisco sion. The mission was in Santiago de los
A. tlesmano. caballeros today to pulse the situation there.
I is based on the Marxist-Leninist policy Three American soldiers in a jeep wandered
O Wo steps forward and one step back. into rebel territory today and were captured.
Is step back is not an about face. On the They said they got lost.
contrary, the PSP does not discard the possi- An hour after the capture, arrangements
bill EV'of a return of ex-President Juan Bosch, were made to hold them overnight and then
,
, raticattx TO PROVINCES turn them over to the OAS.
. QOM Ottzsyksr
nitsz asserted that the only solution
for the country is a compromise government
headed by Sylvestre Antonio Guzman, a mem-
ber of the old Bosch cabinet.
"Why I have more Communists in the
'University of Puerto Ricq than there are
here," flenitez said. "Guzman is the solution
because it Will bring a constitutional govern-
.
e/nano said that. he told Bundy there
06t1c1 be no compromise on certain specific
points. These include:
1. The constitutiqn of 1963 must be
restored.
2. The legal position
f II a government in.
StitUt ions under the 1963
constitution must
be recognized,
especially the congress, the
Etwatellateola a officials. f other high ocials. Hi
iZti e
s constitutional president
its negotiable.
. 3. All MiiitaryRicers serving under him
Will have to be re--) inedin their posts.
4, "All interventionista forces,"?including
the inter-American peace' force of the OAS--
must be withdrawn,
41:4?treIlIz Paz'
y uch pressure was put on
him
Iced if in 9' 8-197!la
b Bundy, Vance, and 1Vl9ra at the talks,
Daamano replied:
"The Americans have intervened here Mill-
arily. That is the heaviest pressure that a
gOVerntnent, can be. put under."
94p. Ap 1,tlrabsasy spokesman an-
0 Odd Ance, Mora, and Ambassador
Tapley Bennett, Jr., met with Brig. Gen.
Antonio Im13ert-Barrera.
IMbert, president of the government of
tiational reconstruction, again flatly rejected
OSSeless efforts to dump him. "Neither the
United States, the OA*, or any organization
is going to impose any government on our
people," he said.
MESsadeS,aar UNITE) STATES
Caamano's "senate and house" assailed
the united States today in cablegrams sent
to the United Nations security council and
the?OAS. They charged that:
1. Through the employment of dilatory,
coercive, and blopking tactics the United
States is pressurins personalities and respon-
sible organizations in Santo?Dorningo and
abroad to finpose solutions contrary to the
democratic interests of the Dominican Peo-
ple, especially to dump the 1963 constitu-
tion.
2. The United States is making a new at-
tempt to strangle the right of self-deter-
mination of the Dominicans,
.8. The parliaments of the world are urged
to make themselves heard "for 3 million men
Who only wish to find a better, free, and
democratic destiny."
(Prom the Chicago (Ill.) Tribune,
i. 7, 7, 19651
DOMINICAN REPUBLIC REBELS READY To
ComPsomi.sxt
(By Jules Dubois)
SANTO DOMINGO, DOMINIUAN REPUBLIC,
June 6.?The Communists , have ordered a
change in rebel strategy in the civil war here.
. The order Was issued aiiter the successful
sweep by the army of the government of
national reconstruction in the northern sec-
tor of Santo Domingo and the unofficial
armistice that prolonged the cease-fire last
month.
The switch was spelled out in another
manifesto issued jv the secretariat of the
central committee of the Pertido Socialista
Popular (PSP) dated May 25. This was 4
days after Brig. Gen. Antonio Imbert-Bar-
rera's army routed the Communists in the
northern sector and the cease-fire was im-
poted to produce a military stalemate.
coivrarin ?lour
The Communists made a reassessment of
the situation in the manifesto which they
headed, "To combat until victory."
A a part of the new strategy. Communist
leaCers have been trickling out of the rebel
zona since May 25 and going to the provinces
to organize and command guerrilla bands.
These bands rided loyalist police stations
and military posts five times in the last week.
The leader of an attack at San Juan de la
1Vlaruana, 125 miles west of here, was one
-of Ouban Premier Fidel Castro's men. He
was -Arsenio Ortiz de Ferrand, grandson of
Arsonio Ortiz, who was known as the "Jackal
of irjente Province" during the dictator-
shir of Gerardo Machado in Cuba in the
late 'I.920'8. The grandson was killed yester-
day While trying to escape from prison at,San
Jua i.
A terrorist plot to sabotage an anti-Corn-
mum fist rally in Moca City, 80 miles north-
wes :" of-Santo Domingo, was foiled today.
A -homemade bomb exploded in a house
near' the corner of Caceres Park?the main
pla2a of the city of about 15,000 inhabi-
tants?and a crowd of several thousand
threatened to lynch a suspect after a roof-
top lase. Be was rescued by the police and
taken to jail with his wife for questioning.
-,,IF'rom the Chicago (Ill.) Tribune,
June 9, 1965]
Ex-1 'RESIDENT ASSAILS U.S. POLICY /N DO-
M :NCO?GIVE SUPPORT TO IMBERT, REID'S
'FLTTION
I (By Jules bubo's)
NTO DOMINGO, DOMINICAN REPUBLIC,
Jun q 8.?Ex-President Don,ald J. Reid-Cabral
said ,teday that the United States should
support President Antonio Imbert-Barrera
and is government of national reconstruc-
tion end the civil war here that Washing-
ton las stalemated.
In ,an interview, Reid, who was overthrown
on. 1.?Pril 25, expressed concern and bewilder-
ment over the U.S. policy.
"I ,cannot understand the Americans," he
Cain!, "I don't know what objective they are
purs klieg, but I can see that they are con-
tributing only to the continued paralysis
of the life of our country."
, SHOULD DECIDE QUICKLY
"The United States should quickly decide
whe: her it wants to ruin the country perma-
nently and turn It over to the Communists,
or End the Communist menace which is
local ed in the business district of the city,"
Reid added.
"As each day passes and Col. Francisco A.
Caamanodeno (the rebel leader) remains
protteted by the United. States in the forti-
fied :sone," Reid went on, "it is another pay-
4
"We were looking for a house and we went
too far," said Sp. 4c Alton P. Blakely, 21,
of Richmond, Calif.
The two others identified themselves as
Lt. Henry Cephus LeForce, 24, a communica-
tions expert from Nash, Okla., and Pfc. Nelson
Belengeri, 21, of Lima, Peru.
Belengeri told a reporter he went to the
United States to study English and joined
the U.S. Army "because it offered me a ca-
reer." He had lived with an uncle in Belle-
ville, Ill.
The rebels kept the jeep and three rifles
carried by the soldiers.
[From the Chicago (111.) Tribune,
June 14, 19651
COMMUNISTS HAD ROLES OF LEADERS PROM
START DV DOMINICAN REVOLT, HERO
CHARGES
(By Jules Dubois)
SANTO DOMINGO, DOMINICAN REPUBLIC, June
13.?The myth has been shattered that the
Communists jumped on the bandwagon and
took over after a revolt erupted here last
April 24. At least a dozen Reds were identi-
fied_ in leadership roles from the start.
This has, been documented in an interview
with Col. Manuel Demradel, commander of
the 16th century Ozama fortress the day the
revolt began and hero of its siege before the
rebels captured it at noon April 30.
-
WALL IS BREACHED -
Despra,del lost the fort when a 75-mm. gun
fired from a French tank which rebel Col.
Francisco A. Caamano had captured from the
troops of Brig. Gen. Elias Wessin y Wessin
breached the wall of the fortress and allowed
the rebel militia to pour into the courtyard
and subdue the demoralized, starved
defenders.
De_spradel has been recovering from wounds
at the San Isidro air base hospital. Per-
mission for the interview was obtained from
Commodore Francisco J. Rivera-Caminero,
secretary of the armed forces. Colonel
Despradel's story follows:
"I know that on the night of April 24-25,
Caamano was with Dr. Daniel Ozuna-
Hernandez, a known international Commu-
nist. My police reported to me that they
saw Caamano driving his car with his uncle,
Capt. Deno Suero, seated beside him. In the
rear seat behind Caarnano was Ozuna.
FREED BY CAAMANO
"Next to Ozuna was ex-Lt. Ool. Jorge Ger-
ardo Marte-Hernandez of the police farce.
Selene was one of the common criminals
freed from La Victoria prison by order of
Caamano. Marie had been sentenced to 6
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August 23, 1965
years imprisonment for homicide by a court-
martial on March 10, 1964, and Stripped of
his rank.
"My patrols on El Conde, which totaled 18,
2 for each of the 9 street corners, were
reduced to 8 when 10 of them defected.
Of the loyal eight, all reported to me that
Ozuna had a map on his lap and they could
hear him as the car was halted at street
corners tell Caarnano where to emplace .50
and .30 caliber machine guns and where
barricades should be erected.
"On the morning of April 25 Oaamano left
the American embassy, which he had visited
while Ozuna remained in the car, and both
were recognized by Maj. Jose Lopez-Benitz of
the national police force. Caamano told
Lopez: 'I have taken the government and I
am going to be the president. Tell Despradel
that.'" ?
ORGANIZE FOR GUERRILLAS
Crane, who apparently was Caarnano's
tactician, organized the Commtinist guer-
rillas of the 14th of June patriotic move-
ment, known here as A.C.J.P., who fought the
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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ?
"I replied bluntly that all those circum-
stances mentioned by him made it impera-
tive that I remain loyal to my brother as
chief of police and loyal to my command be-
cause I knew for a fact that since April 24
he had been with Ozuna, an internationally
known Communist, that I am anti-Commu-
nist and moreover, by order of Colonel Ca-
amano, who calls me 'compadre' (blood
brother) the supposed great and good friend,
my house has been sacked and destroyed and
my wife and children were being hunted
down as hostages to force me to surrender the
fortress."
DECLINED TO SURRENDER
"They didn't stop there, but Ca,amano,
Col. Hernandez Ramirez and Lt. Claudio
Caamano-Grullon, a cousin of the rebel chief,
called me on different occasions from Tuesday
on to surrender the fort. Whenever, they
called, I gave them the same answer: I will
not surrender the fort to a man who had as-
sociated with the Communists from the
start.'"
Despradel has saved Caamano's life at Pal-
army in the hills in 1963. Manuel Tavarez-
ma Sole in 1962 when the police were sent
iusto, head of the movement, was killed in there to capture a voodoo priest named Lib-
that fighting. orior. The fanatical population attacked the
Ozuna had been shipped out of the police with machettes and clubs.
country by the council of state in 1962 for
Communist subversion. He was captured [From U.S. News & World Report, May 17,
with the guerrillas in 1963, imprisoned and 1-965]
shipped out to Lisbon, Portgual, on May 8, OFFICIAL RECORD: HOW REDS CAPTURED THE
1964. He returned clandestinely to the DOMINICAN REVOLT
country, presumably early this year.
Despradel returned to his story:
"Before dawn on April 26, officers in the na-
tional palace informed me that among those
giving orders inside the palace were the fol-
lowing Communist leaders:
"Fidelio Arturo Despradel-Roque, son of
former Foreign Minister Arturo Despradel,
trained in Cuba, who fought with the 14th of
June guerrillas, being a member of the move-
ment, was captured, imprisoned, and shipped
to Lisbon with Ozuna and other Communists.
He returned clandestinely from Cuba with
Arsenio Rafael-Ortiz de Ferrand, a Cuban
leader of the 14th of June movement.
?TITERS ARE NAMED
"Antonio Isa-Conde, member of the Par-
tido Socialista Popular and the Prague, Com-
munist university student movement, who
Was trained in Cuba.
"Narciso Iso-Conde, brother of Antonio,
member of the same party and of the Fra-
gile, who was trained in Moscow, Prague, and
Cuba.
"Juan Ducoudray-Mansfield, and his broth-
er Felix Servio, both leaders of the Partido Red-ruled Czechoslovakia.
cow and Cuba. been involved in the revolt. leader of the Dominican Communist Party
"A,sdrubal Dominguez-Guerrero, a member
Their strategy was to move in on what with ---
of
contacts among Communists
P.S.P. and Fragile, Who was trained in Mos- started out as a military coup d'etat and turn outside the Dominican Republic. He is de-
of the Movimiento Popular Dominicano, the
cow. It into a Communist take-over of the Domin- scribed as a link with Cuba in suplying
ican Government. Dominican Communists with weapons.
, ,
"Delta Soto, Communist women's feder-
It was on the basis of this documented in- TRAINING FOR REDS
June movement. U.S. marines on April 28 to save the Domini- To show the links of Dominican rebels with
ation leader and a top figure in the 14th of
formation that President Johnson sent in
"Freddy Beras-Golco, who virtually de-
can Republic from going the way of Cuba Communist regimes in other countries, U.S.
clared himself a Communist on television, officials cited some of their records. Some
and providing communism another Carib- examples:
Jose Rodriguez Acosta took guerrilla train-
ing in Cuba, he also been in Czechoslovakia
and the Soviet Union.
Cayetano Rodriguez del Prado was trained
in Cuba. Europe and Communist China.
He was involved in a Cuban intelligence oper-
ation in 1963 to sneak into the Dominican
Republic accompanied by two companions
and carrying arms and ammunition.
Nicolas Quirico Valdez Conde has lived
in Moscow and speaks Russian so fluently
he was Russian interpreter for Fidel Castro
in Cuba.
Jaime Capell Bello traveled in Cuba, the
Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia.
Rafael de la Oltagracia Mejia Lluberes?
nicknamed "Baby"?Was involved in a 1963
attempt to overthrow Venezuelan President
Betancourt. He was trained in Cuba.
The Communists who took over a revolu-
tion?it's quite a cast of characters turned
up by U.S. intelligence officials. Names,
places, background?that's the U.S. docu-
mentation on the plotters. Many were in
action in Santo Domingo. Official files show
why the President moved to block what
amounted to a Communist offensive in the
This is the official story of how Commu- The rebelling officers seized a Govern-
Caribbean.
fists took over the revolution in the Domini- ment stock of arms and ammunition. A Biz-
can Republic. able quantity of those arms fell into the
The story comes from U.S. Government hands of the orthodox Communist leaders
sources and is based upon information gath- of the PSPD.
ered by inIelligence_auencies. Members of that Red party were quickly
It names 58 known Communists and Cas- formed into paramilitary teams which fanned
troites who played leading roles in fomenting, out in the downtown and slum areas, tale-
organizing and directing the Dominican re- ing control of military targets and organiz-
hellion. tag the populace.
Among them are 18 persons who are known Among the known Communists named
or reliably reported to have been trained in by U.S. officials as particularly active in
subversive and paramilitary tactics by the organizing the paramilitary teams wee
Cuban intelligence service or other Cuban or- these:
ganizations. Fidelio Despradel Rogues, who got guerrilla
Several had training in Soviet Russia or in training in Cuba in 1963.
Jaime Duran Herndo, who reecived pars-
SOcialista, Popular and both trained in Mos-
/WA political organizations known to have Juan Ducoudray Mansfield, a long-time
Nearly all are members of three Commu- military training in Cuba in 1962.
Largest of the three organizations is the
Fourteenth of June Political Group (APCJ) ,
which is known to have connections with the
Russian, Cuban, and Chinese Communist
regimes.
A'S START?A COOP
The story of the Dominican revolt, as told
by U.S. officials, begins as far back as 1963,
soon after the former Dominican President,
Juan Bosch, was overthrown by a coup.
After that coup, the Fourteenth of June
group and the Dominican Popular Movement
launched an open campaign of guerrilla war-
fare in the country's hinterland. Some
Dominicans known to have received training
In Castro's Cuba took part in that campaign.
After the guerrilla campaign failed, the
bulk of the captured rebels were deported,
in May 1964, and most of them became exiles
in France. From France, many traveled to
Communist countries, including Cuba and
Red China.
Beginning late in 1964, the exiled APCJ
and MPD leaders began to infiltrate back
into the Dominican Republic, some secretly.
They rejoined their political groups and be-
gan to prepare them to take advantage of
any opportunity that presented itself. The
opportunity came on April 24, when a small
group of Dominican Army officers attempted
to overthrow the Government of President
Donald Reid Cabral.
U.S. officials say that the officers' revolt
was inspired by the DOITHIliCall Revolutionary
Party (PRD), the party of former President
Bosch.
Communists, however, moved into it quick-
ly. Within an hour or two after the first
move in the revolt, members of the Castorite
14th of June movement were busy in the
streets of Santo Domingo calling on the peo-
ple to come out and demonstrate for Bosch.
ARMS FOR REDS
lie is a nephew 0f Archbishop Thomas Beras.
Hitler Fatule-Chain and his twin brother bean base.
Mussolini Fatule-Chain, members of the 14th
of June.
"Jose Francisco Pena-Gomez of the ex-
treme left wing of the Partido Revolucionario
Dominican? of Juan Bosch, and Luis Arman-
do Asunision of the same faction."
"At noon Tuesday (April 27) Caamano
called me on the phone," Despradel con-
tinued, "and in a very friendly manner, in-
voking our previous friendship, asked me to
surrender Ozania and join his faction be-
C4Se ho reftlized'Ihis would be a very favor-
able psi6/161.6kical "blaticfar him. This was
becaus0 I WEIS Well known throughout the
country, he said comlnander of the
'moos blanoos4 (the shock brigade) which
WEIR the best trained police force, and also
a brother of the chief of police.
RED MILITARY BOSS
Named as a key man in directing the
DOIlliniCall rebel forces is 'Manuel Gonzalez
Gonzalez. 'U.S. officials describe him as an
experienced Spanish Communist Party activ-
ist who has been working with the Domini-
can Communist Party for at least the last 2
years. He is known to have a knowledge of
military tactics and is reported to be an
agent for Cuban military intelligence.
One of the three Communist political or-
ganizations involved in the plot is the Domin-
ican Popular Socialist Party (PSPD), an or-
thodox Communist group which follows
Moscow's direction.
Another is the Dominican Popular Move-
ment (MPD), which follows the Chinese
Communist ideological line.
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Approved For Relea
lix Servio Ducoudre,y Mansfield, Jr., h
lived in the Soviet Union and in Cuba. He
believed to be a leader in the Dominica
Communist Party.
Silvano Lora Vicente had training in Cul
lad in 1964 traveled to Moscow and Algeria
Franklin Franco Pichardo trained in U.
ft/Cadet Uniop and made a recent trip to Moe
COW an4 Prague.
Isa Conde trained in Cuba, the
Vent t, ,nussia and prague.
Pedro Julio Mir Vidention 1.8 reputed to
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p GIUSSIONAL ,RECORP -- SENATE August 23, 1965
es As many as 20,000 civilians now carry
Ls arms. Many arms will be hidden away. It is
n not going to be easy, either, to track down
and immobilize the Communist leaders?a
,a good many of them trained in Cuba or in
Eastern Europe.
WHAT VIOLENCE PROVED
Some conclusions seem clear to one who
knows the island and who has gone through
the recent days of violence.
e _The first is that there is no real base on
which political stability can rest in a country
a close friend Of Qastro's. His travels to
with a rapidly rising population and an
' economy depending for the most part on
sugar, the price of which is severely de-
pressed.
The -United States is probably going to be
Communist countries go as far back as 1941
,With Anph well-trained Communists lead-
ing the way, the Dominican rebels quickly set
up a military headquarters and armed strong
points, ,, , ., t
- , , i AN EinTOrt M Kritzer , .
They overran a police station, captured and
Shot policemen, seized police weapons. All
. anti-Cehicenniet newspaper editor was ma -
bhinegunned to death. .
". They stormed the gates of the National
Palace. Newspaper buildings were sackee I
and their ,equipment was used to put ou ;
propaganda leaflets. Banks were looted.
Rebels too.* over the ,government's radio encl.
television Stations.
' tT.S, olficials describe the operations of thf.
rebel leaders as being in "typical Castrc;
style.' The rebels paraded captured loyaliste
before Ty camerae, They harangued TV anc
r,a_dt.. OAWittenCall With Qornmunist slogans ane
cirknri.PMeticelle of -"the bourgeois reaction-
aries", and "imperialists."
Violence spread, and, American officials say,
the character of the revolUtion changed.
poilutainists and their extreme-leftist al-
flee soon made up a significant portion of the
rebel . forces. The Communists were also
decisively influencing the political leadership
or the, repe)lion, which in the beginning had
heen iriAbe,h,ancla of, Vie, Bosch party leaders.
A ' ?.7,6Efe COMMVNISTS COVET !
The provisional government that had been
set up by the rebels were induced to appoint
eeVeral persons whose ponlmunist sympathies
and Associations have been well established.
e positions they got were ones which are
important to,Ccannanniste?such as attorney
general a .41:director of investigations.
t
' e ..qr ginal leaders of the revolt soon
a iZed,t at :tbeir movement had been cap-
tried by bornmunists, So they gave up the
fight and sought asylum.
No important civilian leaders of that orig-
inal group now remain with the rebels, ac-
cording to U.S. officials. Martinez Francisco,
IsltD secretary general, summed up the sit-
nation, in a radio address to the nation on
April 28. He said:
'I beg all to lay down their arms, because
this, i g ween political
par ties!' e
It was nil, that cia.cp, April 28, that U.S. .
Marines Moved in. A political revolt, in just
4 days, had been turned into a Communist
takeover. ? ' ' '
Tile story of those 4 days, now revealed by
1.7.S, officials, is what caused President John- .
son to act.
I
[From U.S. flews efr World Report,
May 17 1965]
_
A ere TI;.IE HATTLE IN THE CARIBBEAN
(It wil e an uneasy peace, at best, for a
' t )a
long time in the Ponainlean Republic. U.S.
troops who rushed in won't rush out so fast.
Roward Handlernan,of the staff of U.S. News
et World Report tells why in this dispatch
front'. tbe ,scene.) _
SANTO Doeureso.?Every sign here is that
Americans will be saddled with a policing
job in thiarepublic fora long time to come.
A new government, when one can be estab-
lished, will, need time to prove itself, Ten-
anana,4ip tqp?fleep-seated for a conglomerate t
oree of f..eatin-ilaneriCan. Military units to e
Iterovide the stabilizing element need,cd? ,
'forced' to make a sharp increase in aid.
' Another point being made is that there is
no room for a "dreamer" at the head of any
new government. When Juan Bosch was
President, people got the idea that there
was pie in the sky, when actually the out-
look without sizable U.S. help would seem to
be hopeless.
A firm conclusion is that U.S. military
intervention was unavoidable if slaughter of
foreigners was to be prevented. It is re-
garded as a good thing that U.S. power was
adequate to deal with heavily armed, Com-
munist-organized mobs. If action had not
been fast and in force, loss of life would have
been much heavier, and a takeover by Reds
an accomplished fact.
With slower action, experts say, there read-
ily could have been another Castro-type base
for Reds in the Caribbean.
When U.S. troops had been on Dominican
soil 5 days, President Johnson, on May 3,
officially stated that the role of those troops
was to prevent a Communist takeover as
well as to save lives. In a speech, Mr. John-
son said:
, "The American nations cannot, must not,
and will not permit the establishment of an-
other Communist Government in the West-
ern Hemisphere."
The President with those words reaffirmed
U.S. policy justifying intervention in Com-
munist revolutions anywhere in Latin
America the United States chooses to move.
That policy was not in effect in January 1959,
When Fidel Castro came to power in Cuba.
FOR U.S. TROOPS, NO ENEMIES
The performance of U.S. military services
in Santo Domingo was a model of restraint.
Marines of the Second Division and soldiers
of the 82d Airborne Division have not been
permitted to shoot unless shot at first. On
the night of May 4, troops were ordered to
end combat patrols outside their lines. This
was considered a risky restraint in the midst
of heavily armed guerrillas. Idea was to keep
I.T.S. troops from appearing aggressive.
; Rebels have not been referred to as the
enemy. An airborne division spokesman, to
avoid using the word enemy, even went so far
as to describe snipers who machinegunned
U.S, paratroopers as people who are anti-
82c1 Division.
, Americans have big guns and tanks but
have net been. permitted to use them.
Troops were cautioned, also, to avoid a nor-
mal practice of blowing up houses filled with
snipers. ,Officere said that marines and para-
troopers were limited to hand-held weapons
seri the fighting.
A few rounds from 106-millimeter recoil-
less rifles and from antitank bazookas were
fired against boats that sailed into the mouth
of the Ozarna River carrying snipers. Each
of the boats was knocked out, one a large
Wessel apparently filled with ammunition for
the rebels. The ships had come presumably
from Cuba.
By May 8, the number of American service-
men here, either ashore or afloat, was more
than 30,000. The Army had 14,345 para-
roopers , on the island; the Marine Corps,
,924; the Navy, 8,314, and the Air Force, 626.
any Will be iricorTorated into, anT Peace-
keeping force set up by the Organization of
American States. Others will be replaced by
Latin-American troops.
U.S. DEATH TOLL
Casualties among U.S. forces between April
28, when first marines came ashore, and May
6 included 13 dead, more than 60 wounded.
That toll was mounting despite a so-called
firm cease-fire. On May 6, four marines were
killed when their patrol made a wrong turn
into the rebel-held zone of Santo Domingo.
Rebel machineguns cut them down without
warning.
Refusal of the rebels to observe the cease-
fire was taken as new evidence of Commu-
nists' taking over what started out as a pann-
ier revolt against the military junta that had
been in power.
A semblance of order was restored here
only after U.S. troops established an im-
penetrable cordon around rebel-held terri-
tory in the heart of downstown Santo
Domingo. In effect, American servicemen
bottled up the rebels.
Until that cordon, was established, danger
was great that the capital would fall to the
insurgents. More than 1,000 citizens lay
dead in the streets. Rebels had broken the
back of Government; resistance and captured
the police stronghold of La Fortaleza Ozana
after a 4-day siege. Large quantities of guns
and ammunitiOn were captured.
When the truce was signed, rebels held an
area of about 2 square miles in the teeming
heart of this city of 400,000. U.S. marines
had carved out and are holding an interna-
tional refugee zone to the west of the rebels,
and are linked by a 3-nille corridor to U.S.
paratroopers to the east of the rebels and at
San Isidro Air Base.
RICE: IN THE CORRIDOR
This 3-mile corridor is a busy place now.
A large part of it includes the gay quarters
of the town, and as long as American soldiers
stay clear of diehard rebels they do not seem
to be unwelcome to Dominicans. Stores are
open, and the troops are making purchases
and many are making friends.
Oh an average day, at 10 points along the
"armed corridor," U.S. troops handed out
20 tons of rice to civilians?all corners, no
questions asked--as well as tons of beans and
powdered milk.
In U.S.-held areas, Dominicans seem to
respond warmly to the idea that U.S. civil-
ians, as well as they, are stopped at check-
points for identification.
American troops are trying to overcome
initial fear and resentment. They are seek-
ing to leave a good impression with local
citizens.
At first there was fear the Americans would
charge into the city to wipe out the rebels.
In that case, thousands upon thousands
could have been slaughtered.
Instead, U.S. troops went swiftly about the
job of evacuating more than 1,000 foreign
civilians, including 2,694 Americans and
1,373 from 41 other nations. Anyone who
wanted to leave got a hand from the United
States,.
RELIEF: WILL IT BE REAL?
American officers have been waiting for
the first Latin American military contin-
gents to start showing up in force, after an
OAS vote of May 6 to pitch in with truce-
keeping chores.
There was skepticism, however, about any
idea that the United States would be able
to cut back in its own commitment substan-
tially, in any case.
Some Latin American states voted against
the peacekeeping idea altogether, and some
big countries?Mexico, for one?indicated
they 'wouldn't send any troops. Intense
Jealousies and rivalries furlong Latin Ameri-
cans raised further doubts in the minds of
some US. officials, about the ability of many
OAS members to Pull their weight. For now,
Amellcans here agree, it will be the United
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States that will continue to bear the bur-
den?MiIitary as well as economic?of keep-
ing the colintry from going down the drain.
What Latin American peacekeepers will
find is a situation that U.S. diplomats de-
scribe as "an unholy mess."
The republic is drifting without a leader?
and two sides claiming power.
The United States is officially neutral but
has granted a sort of "working recognition"
to a military junta backed by Brig. Gen.
Elias Wessin y Wessin. It was General Wes-
sin y Wessin who kept the rebels from power
until U.S. forces arrived.
Rebels are led by Col. Francisco Caamafio
DO?, who was inaugurated as "provisional
President" by his supporters on May 4. Be-
hind Colonel Cos/natio and 400 other mili-
tary rebels are between 10,000 and 20,000
armed civilians who now appear to be under
the control of foreign-trained Communists,
Intent on keeping the revolt going at any
cest.
Colonel Caamafio, although a 'U.S.-trained
Career officer, does not stand high with the
United States. He Is not known to be a
Communist, but 'U.S. officials say Caamafio
"seems to be Moving closer to the Commu-
nists." One of his chief advisers is Commu-
nist leader Fidelio Despradel, a Castroite.
17.S. officials here report that Caamafio
conferred with Despradel and other Red lead-
ers who asked for jobs in his government if
he Won power, and that he assure their es-
cape from the country if he lost. Caamafio
was said to have agreed to this in return
for Red backing.
CONTINUING THREAT
Danger of a Communist takeover still ex-
ists. American officials here say they have
no doubt of that. The whole rebellion is
said to fit into a blueprint for subversion
that was drawn Up-in Havana last November
at a secret meeting of 22 Latin American
Communist parties.
As U.S. officials reconstruct the revolution
here, the Castro-Communist influence stands
out in a striking way.
When 18 rebels took over the government
television station on April 24, to start things,
the two announcers who were used were
chosen because they were easily recognized
as Communists.
The whole Communist organization here
was geared to move on short notice, and the
three main Red groups, previously split,
United to move together.
ZnoVat CommMists stood on trucks and
passed out guns and ammunition to any
Dominicans who wanted them. At the Na-
tional Palace, 15 well-known Communist
leaders were deliberately conspicuous in the
way they gave orders to rebel elements. On
television, in those first days, Reds wore
Castro-type fatigue caps to give a Castro
flavor to the revolt.
American officials believe the Reds did all
this to make the point that this was "their
revolution."
. WHAT tr /TED STATES WANTS
Trouble with the Communists, piled on
top of the Country's natural problems, adds
up to a formidable chore for the United States
In the period ahead. Getting the OAS to
she peacekeeping tasks?even in token
form?is the first step toward a solution.
What the United States would like to see, be-
yond a durable Armed truce, is a political
compromise that would bring a moderate
provisional regime to power until free elec-
tions can be held?preferably under OAS
auspices.
The hig U.S. problem is to find a politician
ca able of running the Dominican Republic
Witb ?Ei.' Arm hand?even an iron hand, if
14ClesCall-allff enable the United States to
withdraw its troops soon.
Assizrance of any lasting political settle-
ment is regarded as dim. Fighting, it is
felt, has Solved nothing, merely deepened old
resentments.
Now, with Reds committed to action,
there's prospect of prolonged guerrilla-style
war in the countryside.
U.S. occupation of the Dominican Repub-
lic once before was undertaken with hopes
of getting out quickly. That occupation,
started in 1916, lasted for 8 years.
Once again, the United States is finding
that getting in is a lot easier than getting
out.
[From U.S. News & World Report,
May 17, 1965]
WHO WH.L. RULE Now IN DOMINICAN
REPUBLIC?
(Next big job: finding the man who can
put the Dominican Republic back together
again and still keep Communists at bay.
United States wants no port of present rebel
leader or former President Juan Bosch.
Both have been tainted by the Reds.)
SANTO Dommao.?American offlicals here
are convinced beyond any possible doubt
that the man who rose to the top of the
Dominican rebellion?Col. Francisco Caam-
afio Defio?is only a front for the real con-
spirators, the Communists behind his move-
ment.
Colonel Caamafio was sworn in by the
rebels as "provisional President" of the
Dominican Republic on May 4.
To reach that point, according to evidence
in U.S. hands, the colonel was forced to
make a marriage of convenience with the
Conimuntsts. And now an old-line Commu-
nist, Fidelio Despradel Rogues, is his key
adviser.
PROMISE TO REDS
This, say 'U.S. investigators, is what hap-
pened:
Early in the second week of the rebellion,
Caamafio met with half a dozen of the top
Communist leaders in Santo Domingo. They
were men who represented the three Com-
munist parties on this island?followers of
the Chinese Reds, the Kremlin Communists,
and Fidel Castro's Cubans.
Caamafio mode a deal:
If the revolution succeeds, the Commu-
nists will have key positions in his Govern-
ment.
If the revolution fails, Caamafio has agreed
to insist that the Organization of American
States guarantee safe passage for the Bed
leaders so they can get out of the country.
Despite Caamafio's claims and activities,
the United State says there is no effective
government in the Dominican Republic.
Americans here are determined, as one puts
it, "to help the Dominicans find a democrat-
ic solution to their problems." But finding
it is going to be difficult, indeed.
The United States is opposed to accepting
either Caomafio or former President Juan
Bosch as the political leader of this troubled
country. While neither is considered a Com-
munist, each owes big political debts to the
Reds. Of Bosch, one American said, "He
has done things that favored the Commu-
nists."
Thoughtful Dominicans not involved in the
current disorder are casting about now for
a man who can lead their nation back to
order.
Former President Joaquin Balaguer, pres-
ently in exile in New York, is sometimes
mentioned as a possibility. He has been
keeping his political image alive here through
taped broadcasts for a year or more. He is
believed to retain a good deal of popularity.
Gen, Antonio Imbert, one of the two sur-
viving members of the group that assassi-
nated former dictator Rafael Trujillo, also is
He too is considered po-
being mentioned.
litically popular.
THE
There is no easy
The more you
going on in the
more you come to
REAL VILLAIN
solution to today's chaos.
hear about what's been
Dominican Republic, the
this conclusion: The real
villain is dictator Trujillo, even though he
is 4 years dead. Every line you follow seems
to lead, in the end, to the old dictator. Under
Trujillo, graft became a privilege of the gen-
erals. One reason for the downfall of Presi-
dent Donald Reid Cabral is that he tried to
take this privilege away. He got rid of
two generals and fired the powerful chief of
the national, police. But it was enemies
within the armed forces who toppled him
from office.
Among the things Reid Cabral wanted to
eliminate was a contracts racket operated
by top military men. Until Reid Cabral took
office, military contracting officers had a free
hand in buying supplies from abroad. The
standard practice was to buy only from sales-
men who would give the contracting officer a
kickback of 10 or 12 percent.
This is but one example of the kind of
widespread corruption that has riddled the
country in recent years. The Dominican Re-
public had no foreign debts at the time
Trujillo was assassinated. Four years later,
its debts totaled almost half a billion dollars.
As President, Reid Cabral ended the con-
tracts racket, but the fact he did so helped
bring him down.
SON OF "THE BUTCHER"
The Trujillo era even casts a shadow
over the new rebel leader, Colonel Caamafio.
He is the son of the late Gen. Fausto
Caamafio, known to Dominicans as El Car-
nicero?"The Butcher"?in the days of Tru-
jillo. Like most professional Army men in
the Dominican Republic, Colonel? Caamafio
has a Trujillo background?one he has tried
to obscure?and he has powerful enemies.
You don't have to be on this island long
to sense the conflicts and bitterness that
permeate the place.
These conflicts ousted Bosch in 1963. They
brought the downfall of Reid Cabral at the
start of the current rebellion, even before the
Communist elements came to the surface.
They persist now, leaving many powerful Do-
minicans hating each other.
That is why it will be a long, long time
before a stable government can be set up to
guide this troubled country.
[From U.S. News & World Report, May 31,
19651
CARIBBEAN RIDDLE: How To LET Go
SANTO DOMING0.?Communists remain a
very real threat to the Dominican Republic,
4 weeks after the U.S. Marines moved in to
block a Red takeover here.
Known Communists are commanding an
estimated 80 to 90 percent of the rebel posts,
even though they are not always the men
who appear publicly to be in charge.
There is some danger?presently calculated
as slight?that the Communists will move
out into the countryside and try to spread
the revolt, even if it is choked off here in
the capital.
What heightens the Communists' oppor-
tunities for troublemaking is the almost im-
possible job of putting together a broad-
based coalition government. Several times
In recent days negotiators have been on the
brink of getting a cabinet organized, only to
have everything collapse because of prema-
ture publicity.
Under the circumstances, it is clear now
that it probably will be a long time before
the bulk of the 30,000 U.S. troops on the
scene can go home.
U.S. officials were heartened by the decision
of Brazil on May 21 to send a substantial
force?probably as many as 1,250 men?to
join a Latin American peacekeeping mission
here. By that date, only token forces were
on the ground, and they had not been orga-
nized.
Even when the U.S. goal of a broad-based
coalition government is attained, Dominican
problems remaining will seem insIzrmount-
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CCINGRESStONAL RECORD ? SENATE
able, Satreds run deep. So do internationa. The United States has encountered trouble
earriplications. in finding people who might run a govern-
LOQIC at.thie tangle of events: ment of national unity.
The United Nations moved into the Do- wx HAVE SOME LEVERAGE
Minican Aepublic--its first intervention in
In spite of the difficulties, the United States
this U.emisplaere?to try to achieve a cease-
1.einained determined to help set up a
P4e, coalition government. One U.S. official said:
,,V,ti, move aroused the anger of the
We think we have some leverage in this
13.0AlZatien of American States, which had "
situation. By keeping a strong force of
edged Itself 0, restore order but actually
.e
la.h.fiti nothing. marines and soldiers we are making it clear ,cin,Pl
Aangleials, many of them disgusted with that we have no intention of tossing in the
V
s
delays, were determined to get up some sponge. We are here until a solution is
Orallipetion, of Dominicans to govern the reached.
Olintra7. "The basic plan remains. We want a
4
broad-based Johnson rushed a top-level team road-based regime respresenting the widest
p
frOpi nenhington?McGeorge Bundy, 'White possible spectrum of leadership. That
0.1
on foreign policy; Under Sec- means professional men as well as politicians ge,AtiNieler
retary of State Thomas Mann; Deputy Secre-
drawn from several parties. The broader
and Jack Hood the better. We don't put as much stock in
llgt
atairY.e.i Defense Cyrus Vance, 4eSistant Secretary of State of In_ getting one man?`the' man?apain getting
Xa 4S,"
t4lxiftrle522. Affairs. The mission: to get a representative group that will have broad
? ebeieteteg_stopped and set up a provisional appeal."
me.aWptable to bmtet sIdes.? F. WHAT BOSCH LACKED
DOMINICAN* KAMA DIVIDED An opinion expressed by some Americans
here is that Mr. Bosch?once thought the
idol of the rebels?ruined his chances for a
comeback by not returning immediately from
exile in Puerto Rico when the revolt began
on April 24. One comment: "When Bosch
didn't show up, people said he lacked the
guts to do so. And if there's one thing that
Latins scorn in a man it is lack of `macho'?
manliness or courage."
? Political worries?and the fighting that,
through May 20, had cost the United States
20 men killed in action, 102 wounded and
I missing?are only part of the problem.
Economic headaches already acute have been
aggravated.
Living conditions are miserable for the
rreat mass of the country's 3,5 million people.
leIany are illiterate.
*P-Stlgar is the main foreign-exchange crop.
nut production costs here are high, world
gar prices are down, and deeper financial
ieouble results.
Politically, the people are naive. The
season is that, for more than 30 years under
the Trujillo dictatorship, no political ac-
tivity was permitted.
Now, with all the bloodshed and chaos in
Santo Domingo, some Dominicans, rich and
peor, are talking wistfully of the "good old
dsys" when Trujillo maintained order with
an a iron hand.
This attitude has led diplomats to believe
that the Dominicans still need a firm, guid-
ing hand?and that if the OAS is unable to
do the job, it must be done by the United
S ates.
INSTANT HERO
The high-ranking troubleshooters found
that the DOpeirileaus themselves seemed al-
Malst hepelessly divided.
ti!aiti One Worried diplomat: "Everybody's
playing in tiles ball game?and there are too
-Man! umpires."
The frustrations of diplomatic maneuver-
ing, in which the United States, the U.N., the
014 anderiereil_Dominican factions were in-
'.*Veele fee,be...Wed, What the United States was
'ffP"against in trying to put the Dominican
Republic back together.
r.arly in the revolution, the United States
tried without Success to get rid of the rebel
eader, Col, Francisco Caamaffo Defto. Then,
* to placate the rebels, futile attempts were
Made to perspade Gen. Elias Wessin y Wes-
tin, military chief of the loyalist junta, to
quit, ,
' peeeler sreils PAT
, the. ,40111333. week of the conflict, the
united States turned its pressure on Gen.
Antonio Imbert Barreras, the man It had
PerSbacledl to take on the presidency of the
jUnia just 10 days before. But General Im-
bert resisted all suggestions that he step
aside.
,play 20, General Imbert, at a news
00reterence, denied that the Bundy mission
&Aka.. him to resign. His associates,
hoWever, told a different story. Said one of
the junta's top military men, who attended
negotiating sessions:
"Mr. Vance told us that we had to accept
ton0 Guzman, a friend of Juan Bosch, as
nterlin President and then have elections in
60, days under the constitution of 1963,
eAlopted before Bosch was deposed as
President.
We paid we did not object to Guzman
but that we could not accept the 1963 con-
stlitition. Ur. Vance said we had to accept
the constitution because acceptance was the
rebel's top demand.
Then we got mad. We asked, 'Who are
the rebels? What do they control?' We
peinted tint that they controlled only down-
tietvie Sante Domingo.
`,-ifind we controlled all the rest of the
Cdtultry.?
General Imbert argued that, if the United
States put Mr. Guzman in the Presidency,
the Communists would take over.
No claim is made that Mr. Guzman is a
Communist. He is a Santiago landowner
Who was Minister of Agriculture when his
close friend, Mr. Bosch, was President. But
the junta anti its supporters maintain that
Mr. Bosch and his associates showed that
they were too weak to stave off the Com-
munists. tanks, the sharp crack of rifle fire, the omin-
That is an example of the suspicion and ous booming of heavier weapons, the acrid
enmity which permeate the Dominican odcr of gunpowder, the stench of garbage
political atmosphere and hamper U.S. efforts burning in the streets.
40 restore stability. AIPiost nothing is normal. .
The way the unknown Colonel Caarnafto
wm wide support overnight was a shocker
for U.S. officials. The Americans said that
it showed how Communists might be able to
exploit an "instant herb" as a figurehead
%cline they executed a Red plot to take over
the country. .
ro those here, it seems certain that the
United States will have to dig in for a long
sti,y if the Dominican Republic Is to over-
cone the effects of years of oppression, an
imbalanced economy and the political
hatreds which exploded in civil war.
From U.S. News & World Report, May 31,
19651
TE V NIGHTMARE OF Civet, WAR?LIFE IN
DOMINICAN CAPITAL SANTO DOMINGO
J.fter 4 weeks of anarchy, life in this em-
battled city has taken on the character of a
nig ntmare.
This is accentuated by the sights and
sounds and smells of war?the troops and
I I
August 23, 1965
In Santo Domingo's northern suburbs,
armed bands have disrupted crowded indus-
trial, 'areas. Major plants have been forced
to Close, idling thousands of workers. Food-
distribution trucks have been hijacked.
PASSWORD: FOOD
FCod reaches both the rebel-held zone in
downtown Santo Domingo and the Interna-
tional safety zone sealed off by U.S. forces via
trucks from the countryside.
Tile U.S. ring around the rebel zone opens
for food trucks going in and out. Attacks
on the trucks have occurred outside the sec-
tor guarded by American marines and sol-
diers. Food distribution continues, but fear
or marauders causes truckdrivers to race
away at the first sign of trouble.
In the International zone, food stares and
restathants are reopening. The aromas of
strong, black coffee and Dominican rum are
in the air again.
An 'outdoor market began operating before
the end of - the first week of the revolution.
It has become a flourishing center of street
stalls.. For sale are fresh vegetables, fruit,
freshly butchered lambs or goats, hanging
on dirty boards hi the hot sun, attracting
buzzing swarms of flies.
On the street alongside the market, young
Dominicans hawk American cigarettes?by
the carton.
Inside the rebel zone, few stores are open.
Most are boarded. up. There has been loot-
ing. Walk down the palm-lined streets, and
you see stores that have been stripped of
their goods.
In the international zone, Dominican police
are back at work, directing traffic, guarding
buildings against looters.
When the civil war erupted, schools were
closed. In the third week of the revolution,
a few primary schools reopened in the safety
zone. But schools in the rebel area still are
closed. Children cluster around rebel sen-
tries on the street corners.
Water and electricity again are usually
available in both zones. But not always.-
Electric power was shut off for several hours
on May 16, for example.
The main post office Is in the rebel zone.
But a Substitute main office was set up in
the. fairgrounds, Inside the international
zone, and mail service?including postal
money orders?has been carried on with re-
markably efficiency.
Throughout the revolution, hundreds of
government employees has been hard at
work. From the beginning, the Ministry
of Public Welfare has been helping to dis-
tribute food, even inside the rebel zone.
Employees of the Ministry of Public Health
have tolled to clean up the city, hoping to
avert an epidemic.
MEETING THE PAYROLLS
The United States gave the beleaguered
city's shaky economy a lift by lending $750,000
to the Ministry of Finance to meet overdue
parolls. People living in the rebel zone can
go through U.S. military checkpoints to col-
lect their back pay.
In the ? rebel zone, grocery stores serve as
banks. With most other stores closed, gro-
cers were authorized by rebel leaders to cash
government checks. The Dominican junta
announced on the radio that It would guar-
antee payment of the checks.
As weeks of tension and terror go on, some
people work, some fight?and some just seem
to sit and wait for the nightmare to end.
[From 'U.S. News & World Report, June
7, 1965)
AND Now: WHAT NEXT IN SANTO DOMINGO?
SANTO Doteneco.?The cost has been high:
lives of 20 American servicemen, more than
100 wounded, uncounted Dominicans
killed?plus millions of dollars involved he
supporting an operatien of 2e,000 U.S. troops.
, ?
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August 23, 1965 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? SENATE
Yet, out of it all, these things are being
counted as accomplishments.
A second "Cuba" in the Caribbean has
been checked. Slaughter among the thou-
sands of American and foreign residents of
the island was avoided. The Organization of
American States, for the first time in its
history, Was prodded into taking on the role
of armed policeman.
Brazil, Honduras, Nicaragua and Costa
Rica are the countries that have come
through with contingents of troops or police
for the inter-American force under the OAS
banner. V.S. troops make up the bulk of
that force, but a Brazilian general commands
A WARNING TO "CASTROS"
?
As a result of the Dominican precedent,
Castro-type leaders all through Latin
America are on notice that they can face
military intervention if they attempt a take-
over. ? '
As for this island republic: It is clear that
outside military forces, including U.S. troops,
will be here for a long time. The alternative
Is revival of fighting between heavily armed
groups all over the country.
A major task of rebuilding the Dominican
economy lies ahead.
Whoever leads a new government will be
under much pressure to redistribute land.
During the 31 years of Trujillo dictatorship,
the Trujillo family gained control of 35 per-
cent of the arable land and 65 percent of the
sugar production, which is the mainstay of
the economy.
The Trujillo holdings now are in the
hands of the goverriment, but no move has
been made to put the land into individual
hands. In any event, a sugar economy no
longer Can support the island's 3.5 million
people. There will have to be a basic change
in agricultural production, probably financed
and directed by farm specialists from the
United States.
Mon COST OF ARkY
Another essential is to cut down on the
cost of the Dominican military establish-
ment. The government has been spending
40 percent of its income to support the
anted forces. Officers have struggled to ob-
tain poets which, foreign diplomats say, have
proved immensely profitable to some in graft
and favors.
The-problems that lie ahead are compli-
cated by the poverty and illiteracy of the Do-
minican people. About 70 percent cannot
read or write. Per capita income of $200 a
year comparee with $2,650 in the United
States.
Since Trujillo's assassination in 1961, the
United States has poured economic aid into
the island. Despite this, the economy is in
dire shape. Oppreasive taxes and unrealistic
wage rates, along With the decline in world
sugar prices, have Made sugar plantations
uneconomic.
The country is a mixture of races. Offi-
cial estimate is that 15 percent of the Do-
minicans are white, 15 percent Negro, and 70
percent of mixed blood. Political views of
these groups often conflict.
Politically, traditions are based on the
legacy' of hatred and violence left by Tru-
jillo. All of this compounds the political
confusion. Says one 'U.S. official:
"There is a very deeP-seated division
among the leaders here. There is almost
a polarization of opposing opinions. Our
task is to find political figure's and forces that
can pull together the /MSS of the people in
the Middle ground, those who would reject
either communism or Trujilloism."
an Interview On May. 28, Gen. Antonio
Trabert Baire'rai told" me that the junta he
heads will make no oonceasions to the reb-
els and Will not accept any solution "im-
posed from outside." That's an example of
what mediators are up against.
One hot dispute involves the rebels' in-
sistence upon.a constitution tailored to their
demands.
Among other points of disagreement: How
to deal with known Communists who have
had key roles in the civil war. How to dis-
arm the groups and ordinary citizens who
were issued weapons?or armed themselves?
when the rebellion erupted. How to enforce
guarantees against vengeance.
YEARS FOR REBUILDING
Much remains to be done before the pres-
ent crisis is ended. Then comes the big job
of rebuilding the economy?a job which
could take years, with the United States pro-
viding much of the technical aid and most
of the money.
[From U.S. News & World Report, July 19,
1965]
U.S. AID WHILE THE BULLETS FLY?THE REAL
DOMINICAN STORY
(If you are wondering what's really go-
ing on in the revolt-torn Dominican Re-
public?it is the sporadic gunfire, political
jockeying, the presence of United States and
other foreign soldiers that make headlines.
But the- deeper story is a massive under-
taking by the United States to save the
country from itself. U.S. aid officials rushed
in with the troops. Mission: emergency re-
lief to stave off collapse, then long-range
development to remake the place. That
started almost the moment the revolution
broke. So far, $41 million in U.S. aid has
gone in. Millions more are on the way.
In charge is Alexander Finer, a 'U.S. expert
sent in from Bolivia after earlier experience
in Puerto Rico's Operation Bootstrap. Fol-
lowing is the story of U.S rescue operations
In the Dominican Republic in Mr. Firfer's
own words, as told to Howard Handleman
of the staff of U.S. News & World Report.)
SANTO Dommoo.?When this thing broke
in April, we were faced with a problem that
can be compared with the problem of getting
an automobile moving. An automobile has
three gears. We had three stages to go
through.
Let's take our three gears in order.
The first, low gear, consisted basically of
doing everything we could to make sure the
revolution didn't break up the channels of
distribution?or the functioning of the econ-
omy.
We had to do that to make sure that peo-
ple had enough to eat. So we started with
the, program to distribute food. We had to
make sure that if Dominicans were going to
fight each other, they would be fighting
about the real issues that were bothering
them?not get pulled into the fight because
somebody's baby was hungry.
The easiest way to measure what this oper-
ation did is to point out that, before the
revolution, the food program here was feed-
ing about 7 percent of the people of the
country. As we got into stage one?our low
gear?we raised that to 17 percent of the peo-
ple. That is an extremely high figure.
The 7 percent was high. It points up the
fact that our country recognized, even be-
fore this revolution, that the Dominican Re-
public was coming out of a period of dicta-
torship and was going through substantial
change in the social structure, and therefore
needed help to feed its people.
With the revolution, the need for food aid
increased enormously. Let me give an exam-
ple:
In the town of Monte Cristi, a liter of
peanut oil cost 70 cents before the revolu-
tion. Peanut oil is essential in Dominican
cooking. The price started climbing the
minute the revolution broke out. It went
all the way up to $2.60. The moment we
announced that we were sending peanut oil
into Monte Grist!, the price dropped back
to 90 cents a liter.
Now, roughly, that's what this first-gear
operation did. It kept tempers down in this
20527
tropical climate, where tempers can flare
easily.
T other part of this operation was meet-
ing the Government payroll.
So gear one consisted of emergency steps
to keep the economy moving, so that ex-
traneous issues didn't get mixed up with
the real political differences they were fight-
ing about. We wanted them to concentrate
on their real differences?and hope that
somehow these can be resolved.
To meet Government payrolls, we gave
about $11 million?and another $10 million
or so is being paid out in the current
distribution. The money goes to pay all
Government employees?including the mili-
tary.
As gear 1 got going full speed, we were
able to start thinking about gear 2.
This gear 2 consists of a series of prob-
lems. How can you get the economy moving
once more? How can you avoid a plain dole,
where people get American money but are
not on their jobs? Is there some way to get
some works projects going?
Over all, is there some way you can get the
economy running enough so that you are at
least getting something for the American
dollars you spend?
As the first moves in gear 2, we tried
to get a series of nubile works projects going.
Many of these had been sidetracked by the
revolution.
The aid mission before us had been here
only a year. Aid had been stopped for 11
months after Juan Bosch was overthrown,
and a whole new aid team had to be formed.
Well, it normally takes about a year to gear
up an aid program and begin to show results.
Heaven knows how long it's going to take
us now. We've got orders to do it in much
less time than a year. But we have one ad-
vantage. A lot of projects were left hanging.
We were able to review these projects, and
also to take a look at a number of public
works projects.
Let me give you an example:
There is a big pipeline coming in from the
river near Heine that is supposed to bring
water to Santo Domingo. The water supply
here has been a constant source of irritation.
The project was held up by routine nego-
tiations. We said, "Well, let's get through
all this. If we're going to spend money, let's
spend it on something useful. We'll put
up the money for the pipeline, and there
won't have to be any more negotiating about
it." So, at this moment, we've got a contract
with an American construction firm to build
the three major supply lines for this water.
That will bring water to the city. This will
cost about $2 million.
Another project, which was easy to get
started, is for irrigation. This country has
a substantial supply of water. It has many
dikes for irrigation.
A lot of these dikes have not been main-
tained, partly because, as far back as last
November, it looked like the country was
going to fall apart economically. I've run
across some people, little people, who haven't
been paid since as far back as November.
Well, these irrigation canals could be
cleaned easily. What we did was bring in
another American company, and said, "Go
take a look at the canals, and let's see what
we can do." Well, we put $400,000 into this.
Both these contracts were signed the other
day in Washington?June 30, to be exact.
And the engineers are down there now, work-
ing out final details before work starts.
The main point in gear 2 is to get people
working. You have to have these works
projects to keep people working and eating
during the time it takes you to plan develop-
ment projects and get them going.
Gear 2 was put together in about 2
weeks' planning. We kept going to the tech-
nicians, beating them over the head. We
made some of them try to justify old ideas.
We made them pull old papers out of un-
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,CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? SENATE August 23, .1965
USed files. We made them try to recons
I, old plans that had been lost or burned,
. the Embassy had to d,estroy some of its
In the first days of the revolution.
We really -put together a package of a
$6 worth of emergency pa
Wetkoo. operations. We now are straighte
Otos ros4 between Azga and San Juan.
Isbini up a number of schools
en, Started, We are building a
cutural..pchools that the mission had
Sta.ect, planning before. This makes sense
in preparing for stage 3, when we get to
it, because then agriculture will be the No. 1
priority.
,give .people employment--which is a
gear', 2 job?and we keep them on the
Mos, Where they will be needed when gear
, starts., the, kind of integration
Iro* get as you cross from one gear to an-
other. ,.
letV, look at, stage 3?the third
gest. Prank4? that's what interests me the
mast. That's Where, you take a look at this
edOriemY and ask what is needed to make it
ticks Yn].,1 try to find the major areas where
ypt might beable to do something to change
the_eeOnefiny for the better. You start ex-
' / Plering; .rs_.# commerce? Is shipping? Is
affrktIltUre? Is it industry? What is it
that would make the difference here?
Mier that, you come up with a scheme
hat in #gency for International Develop-
line ..t.ejaninnIngy, you call priorities. You
-Puttilerte AMA...Where you can get the
fggest results the quickest.
?/ e most important priority, it seems to
Us, Is agricuittire---fOr a number of reasons.
:First you've got a fairly good agricultural
Sy]atetn. going in this country. The real ques-
Pleal is; ,Peut you shove it along, can you
bot.Yew Perttanly can do a good deal,
, for, example, growing the kinds of things
tel1 pan sellto,Puerto Rico and Florida. The
Cuba/is used, to have these markets. T
dernand there LS beef. . There is no reas
, Why the Dominican, Republic shouldn't gr
enough beef to meet its, own needs and e
port to the Caribbean countries, too.
SVp,g we can divide_ the priority call
agriculture into suhpriorities.
The .A.rst. Suhpriority under this will be
V5M PRIMA, ,S4,Aliese coramodities we know
Ont. a44. ?dart ,producing. What we've
one?and, fortunately, this was in the
orks?we've got a contract with Texas
. ,& M. for 11 top technicians in forage
001,8, vegetables, cattle. They are just start-
ing to come a.board. The first two arrived
? at the.entl,nr.Alne.. These people will help
1,t,S decide which crops Make sense, Which
crops you shod get at first.
Then along with this .team, we'll have a
group of people working on marketing. But
bet/2re, YreJet 411to marketing, which is sub-
pilorIty what you've got to look at is:
"Well, all right, but once, you make up your
-mind what ought to be ,produced, how do
you make sure it does get produced?" And
the answer. to Allis was,: "Why don't we
divide up this fairly small country into, say,
ig regional zones?"
, "Why don't we pick, for instance, the seat
Of the agricultural bank, where the credit I
handed ent? Then see if we can't put on
really top _American extension type in each
orp gtese xxl tell these 12 guys we pick
? Up: "You're in nOMpetition with each other
Boy, let's see what your zone can do,"
Now, backstopping?or really, supporting_
this, emphasis on production in subpriority
B, which is marketing: We've got to make
'Sure that what .we tell someone to produce
he can sell. So there is a, substantial effort
on tolarketing-Lfirst, internal; second, the
Caribbean; third, the United States. We are
aiming at the markets that the Cubans used
to Meet be ere-7-tobacco, cigars, fruits, vege-
tahea--.-particillarly the winter vegetables
end fruits.
trust The next subpriority is credit. It's
when to take a fair amount of money, the w
files does back home, to help a man buy the
and the animals he needs, and to fix u
bout place so he can produce.
blic- What I want to emphasize in all th
fling that we still, in effect, are designing a
We development program?that stage titre
that still a dream.
few But let's get back to P
rio
No. 1, which we have been discussing, is
culture. No. 2 has to do with transports
Unless you can get this product you
into the market, unless you can get the p
? ucts off the farm, onto some of the m
roads, you're not going to do much g
You've got to make sure that the man s
out in the country, producing. He ha
be able to send his products out, and t
the income comes back to him?and ma
the can even end up buying a television
So we must have farm-to-market roads.
BRIDGES THAT STOP IN MIDSTREAM
The problem varies tremendously in
country. Some places have good roads.
there are places which I have seen wh
bridges don't go all the way across riv
There are roads in the mountains which
traveled where, frankly, I had my fin
crossed, and wondered whether we could
across the narrow strips of roadway left a
landslides.
OK, let's get into the third priority?e
cation. Some figures I have on educat
are pretty shocking. Thirty percent of
kids in this country apparently don't go
school. And about 70 percent of the tea
era don't have more than a seventh-
eighth-grade education. -
Well, you can't do very much educati
with that kind of thing, so we are thinki
af making education priority No. 3. We w
ioncentrate first on agricultural educati
Actually, some of these children may e
up in a Government bureaucracy. Ma
OK, too. It would be useful to have peop
rith better training than some of those wh
row work in some of these agricultur
I astitutions.
Priority four is an interesting one. For
v bile, we didn't think it was going to he
priority at all. It's industrial developmen
We weren't quite sure that the industri
dsvelopment in this country had gotten
Cie stage where you sould say, "OK, let's ai
gat out behind industry, and let's try t
it aloe something go." But the more we'v
eKainined the Dominican situation, and th
IT ore we talk to Dominican entrepreneur
the more we've run into a buccaneer spit
that is really encouraging.
For example, the people of Monte Grist
have a development association. They al
ready have made a deal with some compan
s in Florida to sell melons and tomatoes tha
s they aren't even growing yet. But the
e khow they can grow them and satisfy th
Funds market.
We find many people with ideas. So many
. in fact, that we are bringing in a man, Undei
contract, to take a look at a number of ideas
th 3,t we didn't originate?ideas that came
from Dominicans.
.lot me tell you about one of these, because
It llustrates the kind of thing we run across.
The other day the mayor's office of the
tool of Beni sent a delegation of very solid
citizens to see me. They have a number of
inclustrial-development ideas,
One was this: They have a building and
say ring machines and workers who are idle.
Th.y want to go into the shirtmaking busi-
going ness. But they need some working capital
ay it to buy material to make the shirts. They
seed added that, frankly, they also would like to
p his have someone who can help out on produc-
tivity. Well, when you get people coming to
is is you with ideas like this who've put in two-
new thirds of the resources needed, and then say,
e is "Can: you help us go the rest of the way?"
this is encouraging.
as
he spend 4 years, or even 3
tears, on a youngster, making him what the
011 :atinos call perito. That means half an ex-
OW ;vit. With that much training, we then can
x" :ell the youngster, "All right, now you know
ed ilomething about agriculture. Go back to
our father's farm and do something with
It.',
to
agri-
ton. What has happened to us is this: The more
_ we look at this place, the more convinced we
grow are that there are many possibilities for food
rod- processing, for textiles, for a number of other
ajor
ood. industries. So I'm beginning to think in
terms of my old experiences with the Puerto
:at's) Rican development program. I think you
can stimulate a series of new industrial in-
hen
ybe vestments here, and we've already started by
set. signing a contract to have some feasibility
studies made.
Finally, let's take a look at priority No.
5?the whole range of administrative and
this fiscal reform. The question for us is:
But How do you help this Government shape up?
ere How do you cut down, for instance, the ex-
ors. penditure on the military? If it's safe to
I've do that, it would go far toward bringing
gers the budget into balance.
get We stopped at priority five because that's
fter as much as you should try to think about
? at the moment. Actually, as we go along, we
du- may cut the size of the program, because you
ion just can't cover too many fronts at the
the same time.
to Right now, for example, we are entering
oh- what they call the dead season in sugar.
to The sugar corporation people came to us and
said, "Under the emergency financing, we
ng normally do a lot of repair work and fix up
ng the mills during the dead season, to keep the
millhancis working, at least. But there is
on. no Government to turn to now, and we don't
have e:nough money, because we are losing
money at this time."
So we have built into the emergency Orga-
nization of American States budget about
$2.6 million to help buy some machin-
ery for emergency repairs. We had to do it.
If we didn't, sugar production would be hurt
next year. Secondly, you've got to keep as
lad many people working as you can?prefer-
vs ably on productive projects like this.
le HELP THEM FIND THEIR DESTINY
0 What. about the future?
al Well, all I can tell you is from what I
know as an economist. This country needs
a a good deal of help. I am sure that any
a people has enough pride in itself, is inven-
t. tive enough?if you can only help these
al people find their own soul, their own destiny.
to Then they can cut short the period of time
I in which they will need development aid.
0 The real question for the Americas here is
e not to develop the Dominican Republic but
e to find some way to make these people decide
s, to solve their own problems, and get at them.
[From Newhouse newspapers, June 19611
CASTRO-COMMUNIST TAKEOVER MENACES
DOMINICANS
(By Daniel James)
y MERICC CITY.?The main danger threaten-
e ing the Dominican Republic, in the wake
of the assassination last week of Generalis-
simo Rafael Trujillo, is of a Communist take-
over with the aid of Fidel Castro. That is
the fear expressed by Dominican exiles here.
"In my opinion, I think the Communists
have been preparing for this situation and
are ready to jump in at any time. That is the
main danger."
These are the words of a veteran former
Dominican diplomat and ex-son-in-law of
the fallen Caribbean dictator, Dr. Ramon
Brea Messina.
Dr. Brea Messina was married to Trujillo's
oldest daughter, Plor de Oro?Plower of
Gold?after she divorced Porfirio Rubirosa,
es. . MANY POSSIBILFFIES FOR INDUSTRIES
3
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her first husband, some years ago. He was
the Dominican Ambassador to Mexico three
times, until early 1957, when he was trans-
ferred to Venezuela. There, In AUgust 1957
he broke with Trujillo and thereafter came
to Mexico to live.
"I devoutly hope that we don't fell into
Communist hands," said Brea Messina.
The Communists are not strong in the
Domtnican Republic, he pointed out, but
they have kept their organization intact and
can expect plenty of help from Red Cuba.
The "Popular Socialist Party of the Do-
minican Regal)lic"?as the Communists are
formally known?is in fact the creation of
its Cuban counterpart and bears the same
name.
The strangest thing about the birth of
the Dominican PSP is that Generalissimo
Trujillo himself presided over it as a sort
of political midwife.
Immediately after World War II, the Do-
minican dictator was anxious to establish
domestic relations with the Soviet Union,
and in order to curry its favor he thought it
might be pleased to have a branch of world
communism in his island. His fellow dic-
tator in Cuba at the time, Pulgencio Batista,
had given the Communists two posts in his
Cabinet and the Cuban Communist Party
"was then (as now) the center of Caribbean
-Red activities and the logical group to sup-
ply Trujillo's need.
Accordingly, he sent his Undersecretary
?of -Labor, Ramen Marrero, to see the Cuban
TSP leaders in Havana. (Marrero, who be-
g:lame Secretary of Labor, died under mysteri-
roue Circumstances '2 years ago after reveal-
ing to a U.S. newsinan that he was secretly
alined against Trujillo.) The Cuban Reds
obliged by sending three of their organizers
to Ciudad Trujillo, the Dominican capital,
and they established the Dominican PSP,
Started a Communist newspaper, El Popular,
and organized some labor unions.
Today, thanks to Trujillo, the Communists
have what may Well be the only well-orga-
nized group inside the Dominican Republic
apart from the Government's own Dominican
'party. The latter, which was purely a per-
sonal political machine of Trujillo's, may
split up into warring factions now that its
-Chief is dead, exiles here feel.
Although Trujillo outIaWed the PSP not
long after it wee formed, because it began
'to attract popular support and the dictator
grew afraid Of his Red Frankenstein mon-
ster, it thrived under the dictatorship as
Communist parties usually do.
The democratic groups opposed to Trujil-
lo, on the other hand, have little or no orga-
nized= inside the Dominican Republic.
This applies, at any rate, to the known ones.
Their leaders have been in exile for as long
as a quarter-century. Few Dominicans have
ever heard of them.
Castro, of course, lurks in the wings ready
to take advantage of the confusion in the
Dominican Republic, whieh, Dr. Brea Mes-
sina and other exiles feel is almost sure to
grow.
The former Trujillo diplomat doesn't think
that Castro had anything to do with the dic-
tator's assassination, although he has made
several attempts in the past to overthrow
hi= The last attempt was Inade in June
1950, when "TrUjillo stopped an invasion
armed and manned by Castro.
At that time; Castro, who had been In
power 6 Months, did not have enough arms
to insure the success of the invasion. Since
then, however, lie has received so much
armament from the Sine-Soviet bloc that he
catild supply more than enough for a suc-
estSttil 'tweet= end/or revolution in the
DoMinican
"This time, if -Castro decided it was oppor-
tune to try to 'install a Dominican Govern-
Intelt in his atm Image, he would be more
eatettli than in 1959. In all likelihood, he
No. 155-10
Would try to eat through disaffected people
now in the Dominican Republic rather than
rely entirely, as before, upon an invading
force from outside.
Subversion, perhaps supplemented by in-
vasion, would be his tactic. And he would
operate, of course, through the Dominican
PSP and a Red front established in Havana
called the Dominican Liberation Movement.
As if Cuba weren't enough of a headache,
the United States must now keep close ties
on events in the Dominican Republic to see
that that Caribbean country does not folloW
the Cuban example.
[Prom Newhouse newspapers, May 3, 1965]
LATIN AMERICA AND TFIE DOMINICAN CRISIS
(By Daniel James)
MEXICO Crry.?Despite the loud protests,
Latin America is not really opposed to the
swift U.S. military prevention of a Com-
munist takeover in the Dominican Republic.
Though they had to rail against our inter-
vention In Santo Domingo, Latin American
leaders privately welcomed it.
"On the whole, the governments of Latin
America have shown a great deal of under-
standing of our position," a U.S. official
in this crucial Latin capital volunteered.
They themselves were put in a "difficult
position" by the rapid dispatch of marines
to the embattled Dominican Republic, since
that did violate Latin America's traditional
nonintervention policy. Specifically, as
Latin editorialists have pointed out, it vio-
lated article 17 of the Act of Bogota, which
guarantees the right of each American re-
public to settle its internal affairs without
outside intervention.
The presence of marines in Santo Domingo
also evoked emotional memories of their
landing in exactly the same country 50 years
ago, then subsequently occupying it and
paving the way for the Trujillo dictatorship.
Leftists throughout Latin America have,
in fact, been recalling every U.S. interven-
tion and alleged intervention since the be-
ginning of the century. Even our recogni-
tion of Batista in 1952 has been listed, by
one leftist writer, as an act of intervention
in Cuba although all the Latin countries
eventually recognized him.
Still, the Latin response to our pretty
obvious military intervention in the Domini-
can situation has been "relatively mild" as
one American observer here termed it.
It is recalled that in the less obvious in-
tervention in Guatemala, in 1954, there was
a far more severe concerted criticism in
Latin America of the U.S. role there. At
that time, the "Societies of Friendship for
Guatemala" sprung up in many Latin coun-
tries, and Mexico, in particular, became the
center of anti-U.S. feeling.
This time, the situation is considerably
different.
Mexico, for example, which is the tradi-
tional champion of nonintervention, issued
an official statement which did little more
than "deplore the blood that is flowing" in
Santo Domingo, during the fighting.
Recognizing the "reasons of a humanitari-
an character" which induced the United
States to send more Armed Forces to evacuate
Americans and foreigners from the Domini-
can Republic, the Mexican statement then re-
marked that the presence of marines "evokes
such painful memories" in Latin America,
and ended hoping that the Dominicans "can
resolve their internal problems without any
influence * supplied from the outside."
Other Latin governments took a similarly
understanding approach. Honduras went
further, in stating that if the Organization
of American States isn't able to function
rapidly in such crises as the Dominican,
someone must take the Initiative.
The Brazilian Government, mindful of
that country's own recent narrow brush with
communism, has offered to send military
20529
forces to Santo Domingo, preferably under
a collective OAS command. Argentina and
Colombia have made similar offers.
One of the loudest reactions has come, sig-
nificantly, from the country which has most
to fear from communism: Venezuela. At a
secret meeting of Latin Communist pasties
in Havana, last November, Venezuela, Colom-
bia, and Guatemala were designated as the
three main targets of a new Red subversion
drive in Latin America.
Understandably, to keep in line the strong
non-Communist left and prevent it from
falling for Communist propaganda against
the United States, President Raul Leoni and
his supporters were forced to roundly con-
demn our Dominican role.
La Republica, the daily organ of Leoni's
Democratic Action Party, rapped Washing-
ton for committing "a unilateral act vio-
lative of the norms which govern the inter-
American system." But, significantly, it did
not use invective or speak of "Yankee Im-
perialism," as the Communists are doing all
over Latin America.
Indeed, a new depth of understanding of
the U.S. problem is noticeable in Latin cir-
cles, with respect to the Dominican crisis.
That was most evident in an editorial on
May 3, in Mexico's Novedades, a newspaper
that is regarded as close to the government
of President Gustavo Diaz Ordaz.
The editorial began by recognizing that
the rebels who refused to heed the cease-fire
arranged by the Papal Nuncio "are the Com-
munist shock forces activated from Havana."
Their aim, it went on, was "to strengthen the
Castroite influence in the Antilles and, from
there, extend it with greater force over the
whole continent."
President Johnson, continued the Nove-
dades editorial, could not remain indiffer-
ent to that threat, nor could "the rest of
the countries of this hemisphere." His state-
ment condemning the attempted Commu-
nist takeover in Santo Domingo "constitutes
a denunciation of Cuban intervention" there,
and a "logical explanation of the arrival there
of North American forces."
Novedades then drew these highly signifi-
cant conclusions:
"The United States could not assume the
responsibility for making possible through
Indolence or indifference, the installation of
another Communist government on the con-
tinent. Of a government that would not be
the result of the self-determination of the
Dominican people, but the outcome of the
audacity of armed groups directed from out-
side the country."
Those editorials are highly significant for
two reasons. They, and the editorial as a
whole, are the closest anybody in Latin Amer-
ica has come, publicly, to virtually endorsing
the U.S. action an Santo Domingo. Second,
they come from an important daily in the
most antiinterventionist country in Latin
America?Mexico?and a paper that is close
to that country's Government.
Adding to the importance of the "Nove-
dades" editorial is the fact that it was pub-
lished even as Mexico had just finished com-
memorating the 51st anniversary of the U.S.
naval landings at Vera Cruz, in 1914?an
event recalled in connection with the Domin-
ican crisis and always mentioned here as a
black mark against the United States.
Is "Novedades" reflecting what the new
Diaz Ordaz Government really thinks but
does not dare to utter in so many words?
That is the question foreign observers here
are pondering.
There is no doubt, however, that our in-
tervention in Santo Domingo, though well
understood in Latin America, is raising havoc
hero.
It came unfortunately, on the eve of the
crucial Second Extraordinary Conference of
American Foreign Ministers to take place in
Rio de Janeiro, on May 20. And that will
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0530 CpGRESIONAL RECORD?SENATE
prObablY determine the tone of the meeting, go on record against our Dominican inter-
which was originally called to discuss eco- vention.
noraic and OAS structural problems. High officials noted for their friendship
Some observers here believe that the Rio toward us are also being forced to criticize
Conference will now be used as a platform, vs openly. Thus Argentina's foreign minis-
by certain Latin leaders, to flay the United ter, Miguel Angel Zalava Ortiz, who strongly
States. A charge frequently heard nowadays favors an inter-American force "which will
Is that we are re:giving the Teddy Roosevelt prevent subversive war imported by corn-
era of 'big stick" diplomacy, under the lead- munism," has had to state that "politically
ership of Under Secretary of State Thomas C. the attitude. of the United States (in Santo
Domingo) has been mistaken."
Men, nonleftists see in our Dominican in- Even conservatives are openly lining up
tervention a radical departure by President against us.
john.sosi from the late President Kennedy's Thus the president of the Brazilian Chem-
perky of "understanding" Latin America, ber of Deputies, Bilac Pinto, who belongs to
and 'respecting" its right to self-determinas the conservative National Democratic Union,
tion. Tltas found it necessary to declare that the
irdean crisi,s, then, may well turn United States committed a lamentable error
Oat -6 `be a crisis for the Johnson Admin- in sending troops to the Dominican Republic
letratiell'a Latin AI:aerie= policy by the time without previous authorization of the OAS."
nif tile Wet meeting. Yet Bilac knows, as all Latin leaders do,
But it it also _going to challenge the Latin that had Johnson sought OAS authority to
?rapraientativee, there tc) regard the Commu- send armed forces to Santo Domingo he
hist threat in this area more realistically, would have been turned down.
it will challenge, in particular, the lone hold- Criticism of Johnson's policy, by Latins
, east against breaking with Castro: Mexico. who have usually been considered more or
What will the new Mexican Government do less pro-United States generally falls into
'three categories:
By, the question is almost sure to be 1. He did not consult the OAS,
rtfset: "Is traditional norantervention valid There is great resentment over that failure,
? in a world where the Communists are con- even though, as noted above, everybody
stantly intervening to overthrow established knows that the OAS would never have ap-
regimes?" Thus the Dominican crisis al- proved sending soldiers to Santo Domingo.
ready casts a long shadow over the future. A variation; of that criticism is that John-
onshould have at least called in the Latin
Prorn,liewhouse newspapers, May 11, 1965] relsresentatives in Washington, if only to
bOaSierioeir Cstiara Now. Larrza-Arazascer; advise them personally of what he intended
to:tio or had already done.
y Daniel James) 2. lle did not prepare public opinion.
Inevitably, comparisons are made with
exico QrrY.?As the Dominican crisis
tete its 4th week it becomes starkly clear
that it has been transformed into a hemi-
'spheric It is ..causing, in particular,
grave exAcerbaticei in 'United States-Latin
American relations.
' President Johnson's initial dispatch of
Marines to the Dominican Republic was
lamented by Latin leaders, but not roundly
aOridertaled. In the first week or two of the
crisis, Latin America revealed a surprising
?tolerance and Understanding of the American
ei.letl3ep Johnson has concentrated a re-
`Therteci_49A00 American armed men in or
near the island, plus commensurately great
lacteal and air forces, and that is making
Latin opinion veer toward decided opposi-
tiori to him. One might say, further, that
each day the PernirilCan Crisis is prolonged
sOes a correeponding growth of opposition.
sPictures of U.S. marines in full battle
dress patrolling the streets of a Latin city,
appearing daily in newspapers and on tele-
%sigma , here, stir up half-forgotten resent-
ments of Atte marines' traditional role in
Win America ?or invader and oppressor.
Nowadays every opportunity is seized to
flay the United States.
,Meeting in the Mexican capital at this mo-
hient are 300 delegates to a conference of
the U.N.'s Economic Commission on Latin
4aerica, which had been scheduled for
Santo Domingo but was removed here be-
cause of he crisis. Although the confer-
ence's sole business is supposed to be Latin
America's economic problems, speaker after
taker has preceded his discussion of them
th remarks condemning the U.S, interven-
ion in Sante Domingo.
that has been true not only of delegates
from Cuba, Russia, Yugoslavia, and other
.COmratarast countries?who participate in
the Econemie Commission deliberations
through their U.N. membership?but also
those from such friendly nations as Uru-
guay and even Veneznela.
Orie netices a. sharper tone toward the
nited $tatea in the normally friendly press,
as the,. days go by, and a growing number
of statements and articles by prominent
Latin Americans who feel the necessity to,
President Kennedy's handling of the missile
:mists, and one hears this pithy summing up:
- "Kennedy masterfully mobilized public
minion to support action he did not take.
,rohnson masterfully moved troops into ac-
-don without the support of public opinion."
- People here ask, "Why didn't Johnson call
in his U.S. Information Agency chiefs, be-
lore acting, advise them of what he planned,
I hen instruct them to pull out all the props-
sainfd.wa Washington on then had evidence of Corn-
annist infiltration of the Dominican rebels?
ss it is believed to have had?why was the
USIA not told to publicize it everywhere,
and so prepare people's minds for retaliatory
action?
3. Johnson sent too many soldiers to Santo
remingo.
"Did he have to send practically 1,000
soldiers for each Communist?" the Latins are
a (king sarcastically. They refer to the re-
p srted 40,000 U.S. forces in or near Santo
D Mingo, and the State Department's official
figure of 58 Reds in the rebel camp.
"And why did Marines have to be in-
cluded?" other Latins ask. "Why couldn't
saes have sent plain soldiers or sailors?"
It is the Marines, as much as any other
aspect of our Dominican policy, who work
up more and more Latins. To appreciate
hew violent they are on that particular sub-
jea, one must realize that the Marines,
us fortunately, are the "ugly Americans" here
bes,ause of their occupations of Haiti,
Nizaragua, and Santo Domingo herself, in
the fairly recent past.
On the other hand, criticism is also made
of the Latin's role?or absence of one?in
tho Dominican crisis,
leftwing friend from a Central Ameri-
can Republic admitted to me, frankly:
'None of us really cared about the De-
mi iican Republic. We really don't care
abeut any other nation but our own. You
do. You worry about everybody. So what
happens is that we leave the dirty work to
pat , and when things don't turn out right
we give you hell."
The Latin Republics are, in short, funda-
mei itally isolationist in their outlook. They
are always eager participants in inter-
August 23, 165
American conferences, but primarily as de-
fenders of their own nationalisms or seekers
after economic. or other material advantages
for their respective nations.
Few Latin countries?as distinct from cer-
tain leaders?really think or act in terms
of the American community of nations.
That is a fundamental reason why the OAS
is weak. Or, as a wag here put it, why it
functions "only between crises." There is
some recognition of the fact that were the
OAS strong?and had it its own collective
armed force-17.S. Intervention in Santo
Domingo might have been avoided.
That question?indeed, the very fate of
the OAS will almost certainly be discussed
at the Rio foreign ministers meeting on
May 20.
Perhaps the key problem that requires air-
ing is the question of nonintervention, a
fetish with the Latin Americans. Is non-
intervention valid in the modern world? Is
it not suicidal to speak of not intervening to
prevent "wars of liberation" from sweeping
over Latin America?
Even as criticism of our Dominican policy
was mounting here, word was received of
another Cuba-sponsored effort to provoke
"wars of liberation."
From May 5 to May 9, representatives of 40
"student" and "youth" groups from all over
the world attended an "International Con-
gress for the Liquidation of Colonialism in
Latin America," in Havana. They passed 23
resolutions "solidarizing" themselves with
"peoples struggles" not only in Santo Do-
mingo but also its next-door neighbor and
U. S. associate, Puerto Rico, as well as in the
Carribbean colonies of England, France, and
Holland and those favorite Castro targets,
Colombia and Venezuela.
One resolution made it clear that more
than moral aid is intended.
"Solidarity and moral help, to be truly ef-
ficacious and to constitute real help to the
movement of national liberation," said the
resolution, "must be accompanied by mate-
rial aid that is effective."
And what "material aid" can be more "ef-
fective" in a "war of liberation" than arms
and tramed fighters?
One wonders what De Gualle will say and
do if one day he soon is confronted by "Santo
flamingos" in French Guiana, Guadeloupe,
and Martinique, all of which were singled
out at Havana "anticsionial" meeting to
receive Communist "material aid" in the
future.
The Dominican crisis, then, deepens and
broadens and is engulfing the whole Western
Hemisphere, in a universal crisis of pro-
foundest gravity,
[From Newhouse Newspapers, May 27, 19651
SANTO DOMINGO THREATENS TO BECOME
POLITICAL BOG
(By Daniel James)
SANTO D0AIING0.?The Dominican crisis
threatens to beceme a treacherous political
bog for the United States, unless the John-
son administration approaches the problem
here with more realism than it has thus far.
The efforts of Presidential Adviser Mc-
George Bundy to form a broad provisional
government have failed, after 10 days of ne-
gotiations with both sides in the Dominican
civil war, because they were predicated upon
the impossible notion that both warring
parties could be brought together under
the same roof.
Bundy left here utterly bewildered by a
situation that grows increasingly confusing.
Yet certain basic facts stand out clearly.
The first is that the rebels, under Col.
Francisco Camaafio, are now eager to join
a provisional regime because they have lost
the military struggle and have everything to
gain politically by such a move. Their
waterloo proved to be the northern zone of ?
this city, which they tried to occupy but
were expelled from after a week of heavy
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fighting in Which they sustained an 'esti-
mated 1,000 casualties.
The rebels are now loffired in an enclave
only 11/4 miles square in doWntown Santo
Domingo, with the sea at their backs. Dur-
ing several Visits to that enclave, the re-
porter saw few armed men and almost no
big arras. Alsd, Carman() is said to be run-
ning out Of a munition, and it is hard to see
how or from where a new supply could be
shipped in to him.
Judging by the forlorn look of Ciudad
Nueva?New 'City, as the revel enclave is
named ironicaIly--and its poor citizens, it is
doubtful whether Camaano can Count upon
&Lich of a civilian response.
The next -key fact to consider is that Gen.
Antonio Imbert's government of national
reconstruction, on the other hand, now con-
trols not only nearly all of this capital but
everything in the rest of the country. Its
forces hold Santiago, the second city, as well
as all other urban centers and the rural
areas.
A significant fact apparently unnoticed in
the United States is that neither the peas-
-antry?comprfsing Perhaps 80 percent of the
Dominican Republic's 31/2 million inhabi-
tants?nor the urban working class has lifted
a finger anywhere in this country to help the
13 I
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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD -- SENATE 20531
arms from crossing from one side to the Where are they? What has happened to
other. This neutrality as it is officially them?
called, is having the effect of protecting This reporter can find nobody here who
Camaafio from certain annihilation. is willing to suggest that the Dominican
The American attitude is based partly up- Communists have disappeared off the face
on the desire to prevent death and destruc- of the earth. True, they are no longer vial-
tion to the noncombatants?including worn- ble?mark that word, visible?either in the
en and children?and buildings in downtown rebel ranks of Col. Francisco Camaario or
Santo Domingo. anywhere else in this country. But they are
Another civilian element supporting Im- alive somewhere, and as far as anyone knows
bert is what is left of organized labor, known pretty much intact as a force.
by its initials as Conatral. Its leaders have Indeed, excepting a handful who met
been conferring secretly with Imbert this death in battle, a case could be made out to
past week. Conatral claims to represent show that Dominican communism is stronger
150,000 Dominican workers, today than it was when the revolt began on-
Still another fact Bundy and other Presi- April 24. The threat it represents, then
dential aids have apparently overlooked in with all due respect to Secretary Rusk, has
their eagerness to patch together a provi- probably been substantially increased
sional regime is that their candidate to head rather than reduced.
it, Antonio Guzman, is personally unaccept- Dominican communism has traditionally
able to the dominant Imbert forces, been a cat with nine lives. Every time
"He is a Don Nadie"?a "Mister Nobody"? somebody thought it dead, it suddenly came
as they frequently put it. back to life more vigorous than ever.
"Guzman has neither the energy, the char- On June 14, 1959, Castro backed an insur-
acter, nor the education to resolve this C01111- rection here to overthrow Trujillo and the
try's problems," in the opinion of a former Dominican dictator drowned it in blood after
member of Juan Bosch's cabinet who sat in a few weeks. The Communist threat was
it when Guzman was Agricultural Minister, thereupon pronounced dead.
Above all, those who support Imbert fear But out of that insurrection was born the
that through Guzman the Bosch elements June 14th Movement, a typically Castro
and the Communists will somehow infiltrate organization, and it grew over the years into
a formidable force. It was strong enough by
November 1963, to launch what it has called
the November Insurrection.
Whereas the 1959 affair was helter-skelter
and touched only three small towns, its 1963
successor w a well organized guerrilla war
which embraced six zones. The J/14 cora-
mand was, in fact, divided into six distinct
military districts and was organized along
classic guerrilla lines.
The fighting lasted 23 days, and was
bloody. The founder of the J/14, Manuel
Tavares Justo, lost his life, and so did other
important leaders. "Surely with Manolo
Tavaxes and the ringleaders out of the way,"
many Dominicans reasoned, "we shall live in
peace from now on."
Then came the April 24,1965, revolt, with
the results we now see.
The June 14 proved, by its performance in
the present revolt, that it was stronger than
in 1963. And more practiced, more expert.
The writer has in his possession an inter-
esting document, "The Insurrection of No-
vember," published by the June 14, on March
30, 1964, which it calls a self-criticism of
its behavior during the earlier insurrection.
It is intelligent and frank, and for that
reason formidably dangerous.
The doctiment complains that preparations
for the "November Insurrection" were "de-
fective" and its participants "disorganized
and precipitate." Then it goes on:
An authoritative inilitary estimate given the government machinery again, and the
this writer is that the Imbert regime's armed present conflict will inevitably flare up once
forces total "about 16,000 trained men more.
"The 'United States can impose a Guzman
as against only 4,000 for Camaalio, of
Which perhaps One-quarter are former reg- upon us, but he will last only a few months
idar Military men and the rest untrained and then we will have to fight allover again,"
volUnteers.
_is what the Imbertistas are saying.
Asked if it were not unreasonable to try
finished here, there is no doubt that the vast
Though Bosch and Boschism are apparently
to "equalize" such manifestly unequal sides
majority of Dominicans yearn for what the
by making them partners in a new govern-
ex-President symbolized: democratic civil
.711ent, a high 'U.S. official here grinned and
government. The people identify with
"Ycafraakeense to me." Camaafio to the extent that he represents
answered:
Yet Bundy tried to do just that, "constitutionality"?to them synonymous
Another reality the administration is fail- with civil rule?but reject his Communist
ing to take into aceatint is that the Imbert
to military domination.
allies as well as anything resembling a return
government is adamantly opposed to doing
business with the rebels on political It is just possible that the point has now
grounds. It .belieVes that even though the been driven home to the generals. Wessin y
Wessin told the writer:
Communists are no longer openly in corn-
"There will never be a military govern-
manci, and that Camaafio himself is no Corn- "There
here, nor a dictatorship, of either right
munist, they are all '"compromised." or left. We want a civilan democracy."
That word Was used by Gen. Elias Wessin
y "WesSin in an interview with this reporter. Imbert has made similar statements pub-
Wessin y Wessin is presently the forgotten licly. Furtherfore, to add to the many ironies
maxi of thie crisis, hilt is very much a factor abounding in this incredible crisis. Imbert,
to be reckoned With. Ms 'forces form the who has been labelled Stateside as a "right-
"bulwark," as be Put It, of ' the Imbert re- winger," has in fact had recent ties with the
gime, and he was 'responsible' for the decisive extreme left. This reporter has it on utmost
-authority that earlier this year Imbert actu-
Victory over Camaailo in the nothern zone
last week. ally trafficked with the Castroite June 14th
,The seneral proVided me with documents movement and is said to have supplied it with
some arms. A nephew, Manuel, is commonly
that the rebels were heavily infiltrated by charged with being a Communist sympa- "These technical and. organizational de-
seized in rebel homes whicha evidence
the Corrununists. lie said that copies of thizer. fects * * * do not permit one to be cat-
them have been turned o-ver to ' the U.S. What it all shows is that nothing here is egorically certain that 'the absence of con-
Army intelligence. black and white, and any effort by admin- ditions for the development and triumph
:Though Wessin y Wessin's armed forces istration leaders or the press to classify the of the armed insurrection' was the 'funda-
are im13ert's bulwark, there is little doubt Dominican factions according to preconceived mental cause, the determining factor in the
that he enjoys a good deal of civilian sup- political formulas will be proved folly by bed- failure of the guerrillas.'"
port as well. Exactly how 'much, it is dim- rock reality. This is not a computerized It concluded by reaffirming the June 14
cult to say. ManyDominicans are either too American election campaign but a deepgoing thesis that guerrilla warfare is practicable in
afraid or too confused to say Where they civil war in which every known human emo- the Dominican Republic, and "calls atten-
stand. But in the. past few days there have tion is finding expression. tion to the errors committed (before) for
been three pro-Imbert demonstrations in And it is a war whose end is not yet in purposes of their correction."
Santo Domingo, and two coneisting entirely sight. Anybody who has witnessed the Commu-
of Women, each of which drew 2,000 to 3,000 ? nist performance here during the revolt
participants. [From Newhouse Newspapers, May 29, 1965] knows that the 1963 errors, were, indeed,
A Women's demonstration before the U.S. DOMINICAN COMMUNISTS ? WHERE ARE THEY? "corrected." The Reds took military corn-
Embassy here Tuesday, carried sueh slogans . ? 4 mand of it with a speed and efficiency that
as "let us clean communism out of Ciudad (By Daniel James) knocked Washington off its feet, and made
Nuevy'anid '."Vtie. don't want another Ber- Szarro Domnaho.?Washington has been imperative the sending of armed forces to-
lin,' ' '' . ' 'strangely silent of late about the Commu- taling near 40,000 at their height. What
The slogans refer to Irribert's insistent de- nists it intervened here to save the Domini- makes Washington think today that those
Tnand that he be permitted to send his can Republic from, and now Secretary of same men, nearly all of them still alive,
forces against the Rebel" enclave .and light State Rusk has declared that the threat they cannot bring off a similar performance
, .
Carnaafio to the finish. He is prevented presented a month or so ago has been very again?and next time succeed?
from doing go by American troops holding substantially reduced: Next time, the attack might not neces-
the corridor Which separates the rival groups, Has it? Have Santo Domingo's Red min- sarily come in the capital itself. Prevailing
and tMo li'ave ciitiers-to forbid anyone With ions been killed off? Have they been jailed? opinion among seasoned Observers here is
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,COisGRESSIOI?iAL RECORD ? SgNATE
that, rather, we can expect guerilla war
In the countryside.
Already, the mountainous area in the north
is being called the "logical Sierra Maestro.'
of the Dominican Republic. And it is there
some suspect, where some of the Communists
fighting cadres have hidden themselves.
To be sure, the Communists suffered a re-
bounding defeat when our troops moved in
and preventing them from making this court-
s `,.`seoontl Cuba. But they have made
tain gains which we should be intelligent
enough to recognize.
?.1. They have gained valuable military ex-
perience, They learned how to fight pitched
battles, as well as urban guerrilla war. They
pinked up some formal Military knowledge
train the regular troops who revolted and
fOughE alongside them.
, They acquired a great store of weapons
Of kinds: _Ca,anaano gave out untold
rittinhers of, arms eei,zed by the revolting
eoldleae fa0an, army supplies, and it is known
here that the Reds eaclied away a large
clUantity soon after the U.S. forces moved in
and they knew the Military struggles was
lost
S. They undoubtedly won over adherents
frOta the wild-eyed ",tigres"---"tigers"?the
kotirtg street rabble who supplied the back-
bone of the Rebel army. They will almost
italrely follow their Communist mentors into
:the hills, for no matter what political settle-
ment is,. effected .here they will feel unsafe
?34eK QA 4 trusteeship, for there are
y "loyalists" out fer revenge.
4. It wonal not be surprising if many, or
even most of the estimated 1,000 former reg-
ular tacops vaith the Rebels joined the Com-
fflithists although they might differ with
*them ideologically. The reason is self-
preservation: they are deserters, formally
stpealdng, and it is certain that the Domini-
-can atrked.,fprees Will deal With them BUI/1-
' truirlly if and when they lay hands on them.
5. The rising anti-Americanism here as a
result not of our intervention but our fumbl-
ing and bumbling, has created an atmosphere
More favorable to the communists than has
ever ekieted before.
chance thanks to President Johnson's swift
action, The letter was turned over to Do-
minican authorities by a Communist courier
' who was searched at the airport here as she
, was leaving. Written by Asdrubal Domin-
guez, a well-known PSP figure, it said:
_ "If it had not been for the intromission of
the Yankees, this [revolt] would have termi-
nated by the end of April and the hero of
Latin America, Comrade F. C. [Fidel Castro]
would have entered the country in triumph."
Dominguez continues:
"I must tell you that we counted on much
help from C. [Cuba], which P.C. [Fidel Cas-
tro] has promised to send us, but the
presence of the imperialists prevented its
arrival."
Dominguez reveals, further, what the real
Communist attitude is toward the rebel
leader, Caamatio:
"Of the man who leads the struggle, you
and the others know much about him, but
don't feel upset, because he will be nothing,
he will represent nothing when this [coun-
trylis in our hands."
He predicted that on the next day the
arebels would try to seize the national
palace to establish themselves there, and
they did then launch their attempt but
without success.
Castro has shown often enough, most con-
spicuously in Venezuela, that he is ready
and willing to help out needy guerrillas at
any time. There is every reason to believe
that he will do so if the Dominican Com-
munists begin as they apparently plan, a
guerrilla war.
It was the decision of a secret meeting
in Havana last November to give "active
aid" to "national liberation movements" in
Latin America. The Dominican Republic,
-unlike Venezuela, is only a stone's throw
from Cuba. Even Secretary Rusk should not
he surprised if he wakes up one morning
to find "substantially reduced" threat here
has taken on the form of a Castro-supplied
"Sierra 1Viaestra."
-ff. Finally, the disorder and chaos, and the
-tendency to violence winch runs through all
gmeitte,ofilip tragic people, provide ideal
Onitidiaeikalie growth of communism,
-l
V-eza ;thelraialaility to criticize acutely their
"tanticaI, and , strategic errors, as the 3/14
-Movement did after the "November Insurrec-
tion," the Dominican communiets, in this
writer's judgment, are much stronger today
than they were on April 24.
Next time _too?for there will be a next
-tipne--anothea factor is likely to come into
play whose role in this revolt was essentially
indirect:, cuha,
Curaamely,
the Corrununists joined the
revOlta?.V.thent Oralere ,from Havana or
sfiy other Red center, It took them by sur-
prise, Lor it waa a. spontaneous affair or-
ganized not by Corrunianiets but by a pro-
Ensch military faction working with Bosch's
Democratic Revolutionary Party (PRD) .
The oldest Commainiet group, the Popular
-Socialist Party (PSP) had in fact been
,polemicizing against the J/14 before the
revolt, t the time is not ripe for in-
' that " "
'aurreetiop. The matter in quotes, in
the J/14 critique of the November Insurrec-
tion abeye, referred to Pr;;Z discouragement
Of further attempts at violent upheaval.
? Broadly speaking, the J/14 follows the in-
surrectionary fine of Castro and Peiping,
While the PSP favors the more "peaceful"
Moscow, approach- Ellt F leaders assumed
?.00Minanding positions in the April revolt
en tp came, just the, manic. And so, of
urSe, did the "cabeZas ealientes"?"hot-
eads"?as the PSI' terms its younger
j/14 cararndefs,
'lettey ,written by a PSP leader reveals,
oWeyer, that?castro was preparing to hop
to the DonahilOan fray, but never got the
[From Newhouse newspapers, May 29, 19651
.REBEL CRY: "CoNsaruczOrr, Si!"
(By Daniel James)
SANTO DORCING0.?In the tiny downtown
district held by the rebels in this strife-torn
capital, you see scrawled on the walls of
many buildings the slogan, "Constituciam,
Sir
A crowd gathered at a meeting in the cen-
tral plaza to eulogize the killed rebel com-
mander, Col. Francisco Fernandez Domin-
guez, chants "Constitucionl Constitucian!"
The "government" of Col. Francisco Cama-
alio, the rebel chieftian, is called the "con-
ititutional government," anti its army the
'cOnstitutional army."
. Even outside Santo Domingo, you hear on
many lips the phrase, "Constitucion,Si!"
rou hear it in the second city, Santiago, far
the north. You hear it in the third city,
13an Pedro tie Macoris, to the east.
Wherever you go in the Dominican Repub-
)ic, people will tell you all they want is
lthe Constitution, nothing more. That, in
:act, was the original rallying cry of the re-
bellion that broke out on April 24, and that
lies since altered radically the destiny of this
country, and shaken the entire Western
I remisphere.
Yet, paradoxically?nearly everything heFe
Is a puzzling paradox?ask a Dominican what
the Constitution is all about and you will
likely get a blank stare in return. Even
the educated Dominicans cannot cite specif-
i ?ally what it is in the Constitution which
tiakes them passionately for?or against-
1 a
The Constitution they refer to was passed
by the Dominican Congress in 1963, while
Jaen Bosch was President, and went into ef-
f ;et on April 29 of that year. It was promptly
s ispended 5 months later when Juan Bosch
yes overthcovm.
August 23, :1965
Since then, the 1963 Constitution?some-
times called the Bosch Constitution?has
been the issue in Dominican politics and has
deeply divided. the Dominican people, de-
spite the curious fact that few here can cite
any of its key clauses even in general teams.
There is as much vehemence among op-
ponents of the 1968 charter as among its
supporters. They usually attack It as
"communistic," "antireligious," "anti-pri-
vate .property," and so on.
The demand of the rebels that the 1963
Constitution be restored is the central rea-
son?so stated, at least, by the rival "gov-
ernment of national reconstruction" of Gen.
Antonio Imbert?why the two sides in the
Dominican civil war have thus far been un-
able to form the broad provisional regime.
The Imbert forces insist that the country
be governed, instead, by the 1962 Constitu-
tion. That was passed after the assassina-
tion of the Dominican dictator, Generalissimo
Rafael Trujillo, and was the basis of the rule
of a seven-man council of state?called
simply, the Consejo?until Bosch was inau-
gurated in February 1963.
What is there about the 1963 Constitution
which so divides Dominicans? What are the
basic difference between it and its 1962 pred-
ecessor?
The befuddling answer is: The two docu-
ments are practically identical.
An official U.S. Government analysis of
them shows that they differ on only the
most minor issues.
Take for example, the key question of
property rights. Both constitutions safe-
guard them. Both agree that the state may
take private property for public purposes,
and must pay fair compensation in return.
One difference between the two documents
on the property question is that the 1963
version provided that compensation be deter-
mined by balancing the public and private
interest, both.
A more serious difference?but not funda-
mental?was that it limited one from own-
ing land "in excessive quantity," and pro-
hibited "latifundios"--that is, big estates.
But such prohibitions exist in many Latin
American constitutions, and by no means
resemble anything communistic.
The Bosch constitution also forbids for-
eigners from owning property except with
congressional approval, while its predecessor
of 1962 says nothing on the subject. That
is perhaps the most serious difference be-
tween them, but again not unusual in Latin
America. Mexico, for example, makes It just
as tough for foreigners to own land, and
within a certain distance of her borders and
coastlines no foreigner can _own property at
all and no Congress can change that.
Far from being "communistic" the 1963
Constitution says in article 3, that "private
economic initiative is declared free." Such
an open statement favoring capitalism is not
contained in the 1962 document.
Both. constitutions favor social security,
and the 1963 version adds a clause encourag-
ing free trade unionism. And both jealously
guard national sovereignty and inveigh
against foreign intervention.
Nowhere in the Bosch document can there
be found a single word on religion. Any
charge that it is "atheistic" or "antichurch"
is therefore untrue.
On balance, the 1963 Constitution is about
as far from being radical as any document
can get. It is, in fact, much milder than the
Cuban Constitution of 1940, the banner
under which Batista was overthrown, and
it is downright conservative compared with
the revolutionary Mexican Constitution of
1917 which rules Mexico to this day.
Why, then, has the 1963 Constitution
caused so much division here?
It is only after many days here, and many
hours of talking with all sorts of Domini-
cans, that the answer begins hazily to pene-
trate one's mind. The key that unlocked
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the puzzle came to the writer one day when it, indicates that there are still Communist
he conversed with two young women from elements among the rebels who don't want a
the Cibao, the rich north-central region. settlement."
They were embarrassed when I asked them He added that a 4-hour rebel attack on
why they favored "Constitucion, EL" and the electric plant here during the last week in
could not quote anything from it. Then one May, the destruction of which would serious-
of them burst out: ly inconvenience everybody in the war-torn
"We don't want military rule." city, shows that there are people in the rebel
It suddenly dawned on me that that was ranks "who want economic chaos"?a known
what the Dominicans were driving at. It Communist aim.
wasn't a question of citing this or that Other officials supply names of persons in
clause which distinguished the 1963 consti- Caamafio's government with suspected Corn-
tution from any other, but a yearning for munist leanings.
civil rule?for democracy, for representative
government.
Under Bosch, the Dominicans did have
civil, representative democratic government
for the first time since Trujillo became dic-
tator in 1930. Actually, it was the first time
in half a century or more, because Trujillo's
predecessors were not elected under condi-,
tions of complete freedom. Bosch was.
The Dominicans, then, identify the 1963
constitution with the brief 7 months they
experienced democracy Under Bosch. But?
here goes another paradox?they no longer
identify with Bosch personally. "We will
take anybody," a worker answered in reply
to a uestion whether he wanted Bosch to
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FelliESegneAfaIM D.
second day, April 25, that the U.S. Embassy
and other foreigners here realized it was com-
ing under Red control.
At about that time, it has been learned, a
certain Oscar Luis Waldez, suspected of being
a Cuban G-2 (intelligence) agent, landed in
Santo Domingo on a false passport. Things
got really rough.
Soon, known Communists, leading rebel
military formations were spatted by "relia-
able eyewitnesses," in a U.S. official's phrase,
and rebel-held radio Santo Domingo?
possessing the Republic's most powerful
rn
Jottin Cury, Caaano's "foreign minister, transmitter?began spewing forth "Havana-
is regarded as of the same stripe as Castro's style' propaganda.
foreign minister, Raul Boa, who, though not Among Caamafio's Red commanders then
a professed Communist, is willing to be a were, besides Roman, at least three other
Red wheelhorse. important June 14 leaders: Jaime Duran, Fl-
Working under Cury is an alleged member delio Despradel, and Luis Genao; plus leaders
of the Agrupacian Politica 14 de junio of the other Communist groups, among them
(APCJ), the "mass" front of the Peiping- Roberto Duverge and Julio de la Pena.
oriented June 14 movement. His name is One of Caamano's close military advisers
Francisco "Quique" Acevedo. is said to have been the Spaniard, Manuel
Camaafios "public health minister," Dr. Gonzalez Gonzalez, who has lived here since
Marcelino Velez Santana, is also considered a 1940 and is a veteran PSP leader. He is
"Roa type." He was asked to lead the June reportedly an expert on military tactics.
14 movement after its abortive insurrection When the writer inquired about him, he was
in November 1963. told:
"Gonzalez Gonzalez knows guns backward
and forward."
Caamario's under secretary of interior and
return, "as long as he adheres to the Con- police, Euclides Gutierrez Felix, is another
stitution." That is as long as he governs alleged Communist sympathizer in the rebel
democratically. regime. He was the defense lawyer of the
"The Constitution has become a symbol, June Fourteen guerrillas arrested after the
a mystique," is the way a Latin American 1963 insurrection.
observer familiar with the Dominicans put Silvio Nolasco Pichardo, a member of the
it. He added, "It might be imperfect. If APCJ's central committee, is also in the
so, it can be amended?always constitution- Caamafio regime (as director of a cadastral
ally." survey).
The mystique over the Constitution is not As of mid-May, Caamafio was still in con-
likely to disappear from the popular imagi- tact with the Dominican Reds, according to
nation. Quite the contrary, it seems to be reliable informants. Hard evidence that
taking a firmer root every day among the prominent Communists continued to play a
vast majority of Dominicans. leading role in the rebel military command
Since that is the case, it appears obvious up till the third week in May, is the fact that
that no solution will be found to the Do- four of them were killed at that time in the
minican problem unless it is based upon heavy fighting around the National Palace,
what the 1963 constitution symbolizes: civil Most prominent of the four was Juan
government under representative democracy. Miguel Roman, who had been leading an at-
Any other formula will meet, eventually, with tacking unit with Col. Francisco Fernandez
the wholesale disapproval of the Dominicans. Dominguez, the close associate of ex-Presi-
It could produce a revolt more widespread dent Juan Bosch, who had just been flown in
and even blodier than the present one. from Puerto Rico and also succumbed in the
fighting.
[From Newhouse Newspapers, June 1, 19651 Roman was a member of the June Fourteen
DOMINICAN REBELS AND REDS: How CLOSELY central committee and its chief advocate
RELATED? of guerrilla warfare?its "Che Guevara."
Trained in Cuba, he was a top commander in
(By Daniel James) the June Fourteen abortive 1963 insurrection.
SANTO DO5iIN,90.?Dld DO/111111C1111 uommu- After its failure he escaped, and last Novem-
nista control or substantially influence the ber turned up in Algeria on a June Fourteen
rebels during the early days of the revolt mission.
Another little-known foreign Red in the
Caamafio military hierarchy was a French-
man, Andra Riviere, a relatively recent resi-
dent of the Dominican Republic. An
informant claims that Riviere organized the
assault on Ozama Fortress early in the revolt.
The little group of Haitian Communist
exiles in Santo Domingo, numbering perhaps
12 to 15, also eagerly joined the Caamafiocamp.
How many Communists there were, or still
are in Caamafio ranks, is relatively unimpor-
tant. A "numbers game," unfortunately
started by the State Department when it
issued a hastily prepared list of 58 Reds con-
spicuous in the revolt's early days, is being
played by ignorant or dubious writers who
are thus obscuring the real significance of
the Communist role.
First of all, many of the leading Commu-
nist participants have been trained in Cuba
and/or Russia. The State Department named
18. Sources here put the total at nearer 50.
That is more than enough to seize the leader-
ship of a surging mass with little or no mili-
tary experience and no knowledge whatsoever
of the strategy and tactics of revolutions.
Secondly, the chief Communist group, the
June 14 group had had ample experience in
revolutionary warfare during the 1963 in-
surrection, and when the April revolt occur-
here, as the Johnson administration has
Seven other June Fourteen central corn- red could throw into it seasoned fighting
charged? Is there dicernible Communist in-
mittee members with training in Cuba have cadres.
fluence today in the regime of rebel leader
been identified among Caamano's command- Besides, the June 14 group is not just a few
Col. Francisco Caamafio? How strong is Do-
ers in the revolt, names on an official U.S. list but a formidable
minican communism? -
To try to answer those key questions?they Ten other Communist leaders?most of movement with "thousands" of followers, to
are at the root of our armed intervention
them from the Popular Socialist Party (PSP), quote an observer intimately acquainted with and continued presence in the Dominicanthe official Dominican Communist Party? Dominican politics. Mainly through its front, Republic?the writer has talked to many
also trained in Cuba, have been likewise iden- the APCJ, it has a hold on certain segments
people here, both Dominicans and foreigners titled. of the people, notably the youth and three
of various shades of political opinion. He Obviously, these are not just any Commu- major professional groups, the doctors,
has also drawn upon his own past firsthand nista but a group of men highly trained to lawyers, and engineers.
knowledge of this country, going back more lead masses of people in revolutionary situa- Third another Communist group promi-
than a dozen years, and of continual reading tions such as the one of last April. neat in the revolt, the Dominican Popular
and studying of it. For highly visible evidence of how impor- Movement (MPD) , is also experienced in con-
A majority of the persons this reporter has tent the Reds were?and may still be?in the ducting violence and guerrilla warfare.
talked with agree that the Communists had Dominican revolt, drive through the grimy. Thus it, too, accounted for more than its
begun surfacing within 24 hours after the re- garbage-littered streets of the rebel enclave relatively few members in terms of ability
volt had started, on April 24, and that within in downtown Santo Domingo right now, to lead masses.
72 hours were acquiring control over it. There you see scrawled on the walls such in- The MPD is Peiping oriented like the June
, ..
mijaar)ty believes-that Communists, pro-
flammatory slogans as "Arms to the People," 14 group; 'and a splitoff of the Moscow-lean-
Communists and a few who serve Communist A
and underneath, usually, the initials PSP lag PSP. It has been considered the "action
designs Without approving Of the Reds
(Popular Socialist Party) or June Fourteen, arm" of the formal?that is, non-Castroite?
'
Arms to the People" is a basic Commu- Communist movement.
ideologically are still inside the rebel regime. "
nist slogan, first used by Lenin in 1917 to Finally, even though the PSP and still a
Since the latter statement may come as seize power in Russia. fourth Communist grouping, the National
news to the reader, let'us begin with it.
It was when Caamafio, perhaps lanaware of Revolutionary Party (PNR), are seemingly
A top U.S. official here believes that the significance of his act, gave arms to the more "peaceful" and smaller than the other
Camaafio's intranSigent opposition to the "people"?actually to a young street rabble two, they contributed significantly to the
.021E, and to cot-Lyn:anise solutions offered by called "tigres" (tigers)?on the revolt's revolt.
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f I
The veteran PSP leader, Juan Ducouclrity,-' These 'officials said they doubt that Even today, the location and exact quan-
for example, is probably the leading Domini- Caamano, even if he were inclined, could tity of these arms is not known by U.S. Intel-
can Marxist theoretician and on a first- ate sign a meaningful truce; order his men to ligence. This uncertainty and the threat of
brain?no small asset for revolt Beard, of lay down their arms or join in a coalition possible new uprisings in the interior have
prOfessional revoliationats. While president, government, a direct bearing on official estimates that the
Incidentally, Juan Bosch signed an o 'Fier Inter-American Peace Force will have to re-
per-refitting Ducoudray to return home main in the Dominican Republic for an ex-
wale to lead the ,P5P?a case of misguided tended period.
Former President Donald Reid Cabral, now
DESCRIBED AS TOUGH
The 22-year-old colonel is described as
tough and hotheaded and Impressed with
a sense of -dramatic involvement of the
rebels. _
There are no Communists In the rebel high
command, officials believe, nor is Caamano
himself a Communist.
As one official put it: What is the use of
being Minister of Interior or Foreign Min-
ister in a government that only controls a
few acres of a poorer section of Santo Do-
mingo? Those with the real power are the
Comn-eunists who control the armed civilians,
the roughly disciplined youths who owe al-
legiance to the three main Communist
groups.
These groups are the PSPD, or orthodox
Moscow line party; the MPD, which adheres
to the philosophy of Peiping, and the Ha-
vana-line APCJ or June 14 movement.
Caamano, son of a prominent figure of the
Trujillo regime, is regarded here only as a
frontraan in which can hardly be called a
governinent at all. Caamano presides over
what is basically a revolutionary command
post.
Hector Aristy, 32, who wears the title of
"Minister of Government" in the rebel re-
gime, is thought to be a sort of "gray emi-
nence" behind Caamano's public posture.
Quite a bit is known In Washington of
Aristy's past and he is regarded as more an
opportunist, a typical product of the Trujillo
years, than a partisan of any political school
'Of thought. He has a record of involvement
in movements of both the far left and the
far right in the past.
,
BLESSING .EROM BOSCH
The Caamano faction bases its claim to
legitimacy on the blessing it has received
from Juan Bosch, who was ousted as Presi-
dent in 1963. Caamano had himself named
President to finish Bosch's term and prom-
ised elections in December 1966.
The problem of the Organization of Ameri-
can States and President Johnson is to bring
about an effective cease-fire and find a in-
terim government until elections can be
held. Washington wants them to be held at
an early date so that the intervention can
end.
But Caamano will not consent to disarm
and the rebel militia probably would not
obey him if he ordered one. The alternatives
may be to go after the rebels in full-fledged
battle or starve them out.
In the meantime, the Caamano forces are
separated from the junta forces of Gen.
Antonio Imbert Barreas and Gen. Elias
Wessin y Wessin only by the presence of
21,000 U.S. Marines and paratroopers. Offi-
cials say it is an impasse that could continue
for a long time unless some solution is found
, soon.
[From the Washington Star, May 15, 196
[From the Washington Star, June?, 1965]
DOLIINICAN PUPPEI??CAAMANO'S CONTROL, DOMINICAN DISPERSAL OP ARMS SPARKED U.S.
democreic zeal.
The Ng is the, smallest of the four Gun- in hiding and out of the political picture,
nagfilst, groups but its leader, Dato Pepin, told this reporter he knew that the arms
teriiio Nee released, from jail after the re wit seized by the rebels early in the insurrection
started, is also an able Marxist intellect.al. did not all go to the forces of Col. Francisco
In a 1962 interyle,w with the writer, he
prophesied: Caamano Deno in downtown Santo Domingo.
Many truckloads of weapons and ammuni-
,. ,
4 PQM 1 TI)Cag Republic has beco Me, tion were spirited into the interior, he said.
ba, the neuralgic point of all Ainari,- Reid and U.S. sources agree that these arms
ary strategy in the Caribbean. 'elle
constitute the biggest menace to a lasting
n Will become a zone of antilinpe- peace in the Dominican Republic, even if the
Organization of American States is able to
either, of Dominican corninunilln, negotiate a political settlement.
enough, is none other than the U.S. officials, who initially released a list of
Tuggle."
atOi,peneredissirno Trnjillo. _
53 known Communists participating in the
d the Incredible Trujillo sent ward revolution, now say they have identified sev-
rhe Cuban Popular Socialist ,(Communist) eral hundred. Most of these are members of
Party to organize a Dominican counterp irt, the three illegal Dominican Communist
&TO NITITLIT obliged. With the wartime
Parties: the Moscow-oriented PSPD; the
.HoV,fe -, lies Marriage still on, Trujillo ho?ecl
Peiping-aligned MPD, and the 14th of June
therehy-,:to please both Moscow?with which movement, which follows the Havana line.
he sought diplomatic relations--and the Informed sources said these three parties, a]-
West, with his display of "democracy." though usually in disagreement on strategy,
He went so far as to heap praise upon united as one to take advantage of the chaos
.Stalin ,and referreF1 to communism, accord-
spawned by what started as an army revolt.
"itto to Heiden Rodman's excellent batik The three-man OAS Committee now in
i.fisqUeya, a History of the Dominican I te-
as "One q the great forces for tc. 017.
formulas in the renewed effort to achieve a
fare and progress on, which the deinoenIle settlement. However, authoritative sources
world can count," ,. , hare said the most likely direction to be
7,niclireptly, too, Trujillo spawned COM13111-
,_ . . - taken by the Committee would be to seek a
14go .111 oreatiog o political atmosphere An provisional government now with OAS-super-
Which only extremism can flourish. It is I LOO
vised elections to follow no later than 6
11044, , tbeTefpre, that in Dominic an n:ionths.
cOh),,,x,? vt repack today are many Porn ier The Committee consists of U.S. Ambassador
aiNtent, Vistas, _,Coloncl Carnaario 11417 Ellsworth Bunker; Brazilian Ambassador
'Reif, thong ' no Communist as far as, we Haar Penna Marinho and El Salvador Ani-
know, is an old Trujillista not averse _to ba,ssador Ramon de Clairmont Deenas. It
working with the Reds. ,.., , was appointed to guide OAS Secretary Jose
'. Aithongh the, April revolt took the Cop-. A. Mora in his mediation efforts and to ad-
' Iiellinatklay surprise, and they acted withc lit vise the peace - force commander, Brazilian
, Orders_ from Havana' or Moscow, they had Oen. Hugo Panasco Alvim. But the commit-
0een,,, :preparing for revolution during the, tee has taken over the main responsibility for
prgViotur6 to $ n*.e.,ontlas. , . . finding a solution.
,.. Ilaa,k l r, 4 Kl,. 47 , for example, the June 14
s,gries,?of ,fOfletinInatory broscl- nican President Joaquin Balaguer, who was
Some officials here feel that former Donn-
' frOgi"0":.1 to ?:40 p.m. daily. One can-
. , - ?, , . , . , chief of state when Dictator Rafael Trujillo
.111sted Of a taped statement by Bosch him-
, , . was assassinated in 1961, might be able to
self.
- - weld a government acceptable to a majority
And week after week, the June 14and at er, of Dominicans.
Red groups would virtually take over dow P-7,
town Santo Domingo with demonstrations, [From the Washington Star, June 13, 19651
? .
andstreet ineetinge which paralyzed all bit ii-
ricial 'era tre4c. ft is now apparent, too, UNITED STATES DOCUMENTS RED ATTEMPT TO
that behind the scenes they must have be in ?, SEIZE REVOLT-3 SEPARATE GROUPS WORKED
PreParitig their fighting cadres. TOGETHER LE Domicil...Timm CRISIS
'PLOP the revolt was not Red-organized,
" (By Jeremiah O'Leary)
It Is not, surprising in the light of the above The organized effort by three Communist
lacts?and many others still to be learned, parties to capture the revolt in the Domin-
no doubt?that the Dominican conununk te lean Republic and seize power in that coun-
shOtild surface into its leadership and car le try has been documented in an official U.S.
Within striking distance of capturing It paper compiled by intelligence sources expert
altogether. ,iri Ocanmunist activities.
' I ...a.,-..
The report, chronologically and in narra-
tive form, describes the day-by-day activities
in Santo Domingo between April 24 and May
5 of 77 known Communists Many of the '77
(By Jeremiah O'Leary)
. _
Washington authorities expressed doubts
-,T;oday that Dominican rebel leader grand& p
CaamaneDeno for all his ranting and quasi-
military posturing actually controls the
15,000 mixed 'force of armed civilians and
sOldlere #nder his nominal command,
ey leIieve he ;nay merely be a figura-
' head, a puppet of well-organized Communii
leaders of, three separate movements, The y
say that the Red leaders most of whom
probably hold the real power withi a
10644ctini'pae by U.S.sources earlier the
ia
6 aye of .*arito Domingo where the
are potreo,ect.
(By Jeremiah O'Leary)
The massive U.S. troop buildup in the
Dominican Republic after the Marines landed
there was impelled by intelligence reports
that large quantities of arms seized by the
rebels had been sent to interior areas of the
country, authoritative U.S. sources disclosed
today.
President Johnson's advisers recommended
increasing the strength of U.S. forces from
400 Marines, to about 22,000 troops because
it was feared the chaos and the Communist
take over of the revolution might spread to
areas far beyond the capital of Santo
PeTeltige.
Approved For Releas
were previously identified as participants in
the revolt by U.S.. Government sources on
May 6, but the new document gives intimate
details of their participation before and after
the American intervention.
The document, obtained last night, is the
first disclosure of details of the Communist
participation in th.e revolt from U.S. sources
since a list of 156 leftists was disclosed.
At least 45 of the extremists had been de-
pox ted from the Dominican Republic in May
1964, and most of them received guerrilla war-
fare training in Cuba before they started fil-
tering back into the Dominican Republic last
October, the document disclosed. Cuba's
priic.cipal agency for promoting revolutionary
2003/10/15 : CIA-RDP67B00446R000500110003-2
Augitst 23, 1965
Approved For Release 2003/10/15 CIA-RDP67600446R000500110003-2
CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? SENATE 20535
activities in Latin America, the General Di-
rectorate of Intelligence (DCII) , trained many
of the Dominican rebel leaders, the document
said.
THREE RED PARTIES LISTED
DOI has for some time provided financial
support to two of the three Dominican Com-
munist Parties: the 14th of June Political
Group (APC3), and the Dominican Popular
Movement (MPD) . The APCJ Party, accord-
ing to U.S. sources, has between 3,000 and
5,000 members and has been Communist-run
and _pro-Castro since early 1963. MPD, which
follows the Peiping line, has about 500 mem-
bers. The other Dominican Communist
group, which cooperated in the rebellion, is
the Dominican Popular Socialist Party
(PSPD) with between 809 to 1,000 members
who follow the Moscow line.
The U.S. document said the parties acted
in harmony in the current rebellion.
It said the largest department in the DOI
is the one responsible for directing Latin
American guerrilla warfare activities. Iden-
tified as the DCII officer who handles revolu-
tionary operations for the Dominican Repub-
lic is Roberto Santiesteban Casanova, who
was deported by the United States for engag-
ing in espionage in 1962 while serving with
the Cuban delegation to the United Nations.
The 26-page document is virtually a "white
paper" on the Dominican revolt and reflects
the official U.S. version of what transpired
there. The following is a day-by-day account
of Communist activities in the Dominican
revolt as compiled by U.S. intelligence sources
from April 24 to May :
APRIL 24
Elements of the Dominican Army, led by
disaffected middlegrade and junior officers,
revolted against the government of Donald
Reid Cabral. They seized control of the 27th
of February Military Camp, making prisoners
of the army chief of staff and his deputy.
A group of civilians seized two radio sta-
tions in Santo Domingo and announced that
Reid had been overthrown. The radio sta-
tions were retaken later in the day by Reid
forces, but just before they were forced
off the air, the rebels called on the civilian
population to join the anti-Reid move-
ment and to go into the streets to sup-
port the rebellion.
Communist leaders of all three' parties
Issued orders to their members to incite the
civilian crowds gathering in the streets, and
to stage rallies and demonstrations. The
Communists began organizing their forces
and assigning members to various functions
throughout the city.
Araong those Communists active in the
first hours of revolt were: Narcisi Isa Conde,
of the PSPD, already armed with a sub-
machine gun; Diomedes Mercedes Batista
(PSPD), who was relaying instructions to
- party members to stand up for further or-
ders; and Amin Abel Hasbun, APCJ member,
engaged in organizing for Communist partic-
ipation in the revolt, operating from a house
on Elvira de Mendza Street.
The situation in Santo Domingo became
increasingly confused. Senior officers of the
Dominican Air Force and Army informed
Reid that they would not support hirn, and
he resigned and Went into hiding.
P$PD members carrying weapons gathered
at Parque Independencia early in the morn-
ing and harangued civilian crowds in sup-
port of the revolt. Among these again were
Diomedes Mercedes Batista and /Cards? Isa
Conde., Also active was Asdrubal Dominguez
Guerrei'O, a student leader who received
training in Russia in 1962. Throughout the
morning, mobile loudspeaker units, includ-
ing a Vthite Volkswagen station wagon oper-
ated laY Diomedes Mercedes Batista, patroled
the city urging the population to join the
revolt.
In what later proved to be a key element of
the revolt, rifles and niachirie guns seized by
rebellious army elenients were handed out
to the civilian crowds during the day. One
of the rebel officers, Capt. Mario Pena
Tavares, arranged for distribution of several
thousand weapons, including machine guns
and hand grenades. Arms from the camp
were loaded on trucks and sent to the down-
town area of Santo Domingo where they were
passed out to civilians. The following Com-
munist leaders participated with army rebels
in uhgodantn e
in handing out arms and, in some cases
assumed control of the distribution:
Hugo Tolentino Dipp, PSPD leader who re-
ceived guerrilla training in Cuba; Fidelio
Despradel Roque, APCJ leader, trained in
Cuba and one of the chief figures in the
guerrilla uprising in late 1963; Felix Servio
Ducoudray Mansfield of the PSPD, former
resident of the Soviet Union and Cuba and
one-time employe of the Peiping Communist
New China News Agency; Eduardo Houelle-
mont Rogues, APCJ, who was in Cuba in the
1963 guerrilla operation.
Other Communists who handed out arms
were: Buenaventura Johnson Pimental, Juan
Ducordray Mansfield, who once worked on
Havana Radio broadcasts to the Dominican
Republic, and Gerardo Rafael Estevez Weber,
all of the PSPD; and Maximo Bernard
Vasquez, of the APCJ, who worked with sub-
versives in the Dominican military in the
1963 guerrilla movement.
Bottles and gasoline from tank trucks at
several points in the city were distributed to
civilians for making Molotov cocktails, MPD
members being particularly active in this
work.
A mob of several thousand civilians, armed
with clubs and rifles, marched on the Na-
tional Palace, responding to a call issued over
a rebel-held radio station. Among them
were armed Communists.
Rebels seized the National Palace and the
rebel army officers gathered to assume con-
trol. Members of the Dominican Revolu-
tionary Party (PRD) arrived with the inten-
tion of installing an interim government
headed by PRD leader Rafael Molina Urena,
pending return of the ousted former presi-
dent, Juan Bosch. The PRD leaders and
rebel army officers who were pro-Bosch pre-
vailed and Molina became provisional presi-
dent. But military officers who had not
joined the rebellion declared they would
attack the rebels unless a military junta were
installed to prepare for national elections
in September.
Many important Communists attended po-
litical meetings in the National Palace that
clay. Among those conferring with Molina
was Facundo Gomez, a PSPD member and
part owner of the Scarlet Woman, a boat
used in the attempted landing of Cuban
arms in the Dominican Republic in Novem-
ber 1963. Another, Alejandro Lajara Gon-
zales, an APCJ member who had been active
in distributing arms to civilians, was ap-
pointed by Molina to be Deputy Director
of Investigation (the Security Service).
Communist agitators began inciting the
armed mobs to burn, destroy property and
seize additional arms. MPD members were
told their party planned to kill any police-
man found on the streets. Armed civilians
roamed the city, many of them looting stores
and private homes.
The offices and plant of the anti-Commu-
nists newspaper Prensa Libre were seized by
an armed group which included Communists.
They prepared immediately to publish prop-
aganda leaflets.
The offices of three anti-Communist po-
litical parties, the democratic conservative
Union Civica Nacional; the moderate right-
wing Partido Liberal Revolucionista and the
moderate center Vanguard i Revolucionaria
Dominicana, were broken into and sacked.
During the afternoon, Communist orga-
nizers continued to distribute weapons to
groups regarded as reliable by the Commu-
nist parties, as well as to round up additional
manpower for civilian militia units. Weap-
ons depots and distribution points were set
Up.
Mercedes Batista, and other PSPD leaders
were observed leading a paramilitary force
armed with submachine guns, rifles and gre-
nades.
Other armed Communist groups were ob-
served on streets and in buildings including
one led by Manuel Gonzales Gonzalez, Span-
ish Civil War veteran and Cuban intelli-
gence agent.
APRIL 28
Antirebel forces, which had been badly
disorganized, now began to move against the
rebel-held area of the city under command
of Gen. Elias Wessin y Wessin, head of the
Armed Forces Training Center. The Domin-
ican Air Force bombed and strafed rebel-held
installations. The ferocity of this and sub-
sequent attacks consolidated public resent-
ment and inadvertently presented the rebels
with an effective propaganda weapon.
A large quantity of arms and ammunition
had, by this time, fallen into the hands of
the Communists. Teams of party members
were fanning out through the central part of
Santo Domingo organizing paramilitary
groups.
Agitators from all three Red parties con-
tinued to exhort the mobs. They distrib-
uted mineographed propaganda sheets calling
on the people to fight, and stating, in part,
that "the hour has arrived to give arms to
the working class * ? * to form common units
of soldiers and civilians and to organize
people's combat units."
Additional Communist leaders were iden-
tified among the armed mobs and in the
rebel military forces, including Juan Miguel
Romman Diaz, of the ACPI, who participated
in the 1963 guerrilla operation, and Jaime
Duran Herando, Cuban-trained guerrilla ex-
pert.
Gustavo Ricart who returned from Cuba
in 1963 bringing money to finance MPD ac-
tivities, was identified as the commander of
another rebel stronghold. Five other Com-
munists were in charge of production of a
considerable number of Molotov cocktails
during the day.
The leaders of the various Communist
parties were well equipped with weapons and
became an increasingly important element
in the rebel force. Rebel army officers and
men, numbering about 1,000 at the outset,
were soon greatly outnumbered by armed
civilians who, in a state of disorganization,
became easy prey for disciplined Communist
leadership.
Efforts by the U.S. Embassy toward a cease-
fire between the rebels and elements of the
Dominican armed forces were unsuccessful.
During the clay, a large number of American
citizens assembled in the Hotel Embajador
seeking safety. They requested assistance
from the U.S. Embassy in evacuating them
from Santo Domingo, which was under
bombardment by the Dominican Air Force
and was by this time the scene of widespread
rifle and artillery fire between the oppos-
ing factions. The Embassy secured from
the rebel leaders agreement to cooperate in
evacuating Americans from the nearby port
of Haina. Armed civilian groups, over which
the Molina regime had lost control, paid no
attention to this agreement.
APRIL 27
About 100 armed civilians, hearing over
the rebel radio that a prominent Dominican
newspaperman and broadcaster, well known
as anti-Communist, was at the Hotel Em-
bajador (actually he was not there) went to
the hotel and fired several hundred shots.
April 27 saw the complete breakdown of law
and order. Molina, the so-called provisional
president, went to the U.S. Embassy in ap-
parent defeat, accompanied by rebel army
leaders, Col. Miguel Angel Hernando Ramirez
and Col. Francisco Caamano Deno. Shortly
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Approved For Relea
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fli9NGlIESSIONAL RECO4D-7S,ENATE
etterwards, Molina abandoned office and teok
;Wham in the Colombian Embassy.
Dur1r4 the day, Lajara Gonzalez of the
APCJ arranged fer additional arms to be
passed to Corameniete The offices and plant
of the newspaper Listin Diario was tieten
Over by armed PSPD Communists headed by
Asdnileal Donainquez Guerrero and Jose
Israel Cuello Hernandez, both carrying auto-
Weapons. t
SPIUL 28 t
e antirehel armed forces commenced
by Cteneral Wessin established a three-man
Military junta headed by Col. Pedro Bar n-
kern I3encet (air force), Col. Enrique Al o-
_Arlen? Caaado Salaelin (army), and Ca It.
Manna Santana Cense? (navy). Early in
the day, the junta seemed to make progrrws
ageinst the rebels but encountered heav er
reeistioace in, the Afternoon and lost re o-
MeOtliM. '
.the City was increasinEly
,t,enee.a11.14 PeellUiled. Junta forces, tired and
disorganized, began to crumble. Arm ei
Mobs terrorized the, city, firing on homes al el
Other lanildings, including the United States
ancl? other embassies- With collapse of the
AttgliPil government, PRD leaders abdicated
their ,positions Qf .1e,adership fearing their
eatiee lost and their lives in danger. They
left the rebel inneement in the hands
politieally immature army officers who hid
lot, command Over armed civilians who now
far, nP3tindnred the rebel army force,.
9144,41111.11Ate rlere by then in control of
is armed plebs, Moved quickly into the
political leade,rship vacuum in Santo Di -
`mingo.
tate in the afternoon, the junta and police
thitherities informed the U.S. Embassy they
&Add no longer assure the safety of Ameri-
Cans lives, U.S. Ambassador W. Tapley Ben.
zett recommended that U.S. Marines be
landed teeestebileh a safety perimeter hoe;
qblcllAmericaAs and other foreign citizen;
Otilci be evacuated. By that night, approxi
inately 600 Marines were landed and had
.1 taken positions areund the lintel Embe,taclor
;Wan, 20
The rebels held the central part of the city
arid retained the military initiative. Az
armed mob under CeM.raunist MPD, leaders
otali, a .Pelleacele aseault on the remaininE
p etrenghold, Ozaxna Fortress. The
r fortress fell next day. Another armed mot
sacked the cathedral,
Communists among the university stu-
dents were active in organizing the crowds.
House-te-houee fighting continued The
United States and several other eml;assies
remained under sniper fire. The US Gov-
ettineent ordered the landing of an additional
'1,100 garines and during the night oi April
29.O approximately2,000 troops of the 82d
Ailloorne,P,ivision landed at San Isidro. Re-
einfeeetnients arrived pn succeeding days.
Leaders of all three Communist groups met
to discuss tactics in the light of new develop-
ments, They also met with rebel military
officers.
20
The pmclal rebel radio broadcast instruc-
tions ter armed. mobs not to fire on U.S. troops
but. Arlpg continued and a number of casual-
ties were indieted on le.$ personnel.
Two Communist commando groups were
particularly active roaming the city look-
ing for targets. Other Communists working
closely with rebel army officers included two
Who received political and guerrilla training
In Cuba in 1963.
MAX
A shaky cease-fire was achieved but snipers
Verb aetivethroughout the day, firing on the
Aintreesy and U.S. troops. This was in
eying with propaganda emanating from
reirete4erl4 area that the real purpose of
ceareeeeirse wea to permit junta forces to
4eSerniale and attack from a sanctuary pro-
ded by U.S. troops.
About 50 Communists probably a high
command group of all three parties, met in
one of the Communist stroiagpointra fortified
with machinegun emplacements on the roof.
MAY 2
A short-wave radio transmitter in the
home of a Communist broadcast instructions
to the civilian mobs to shoot Americans on-
eight. A large crowd gathered in the Parque
independka heard a violently anti-American
speech from a Communist.
MAY 3-4
Rebel leaders began to consider how to give
their movement the form and strueture of
a legitimate government. Communist lead-
ers discussed among themselves the desir-
ability of their top leaders withdrawing from
open participation in the rebel movement in
order both to support rebel claims that the
movement was free of Communist influence
and to afford protection to the principal
figures of the Communist parties.
Col. Caamano Deno, generally regarded as
anti-Communist, had said on several occa-
sions during the revolt that he was aware
the Communists had been playing an increas-
ingly important role.
MAY 5
It was the consensus at meetings of Com-
munist leaders that, while rank-and-tie
members of the three parties should light on,
prominent Communists should begin with-
drawing from the scene. Some went into
hiding, others attempted to leave Santo
Domingo for towns to the north. One of
these was later captured by antirebel forces.
Some of the APJC and PSPD leaders who
left Santo Domingo were under instructions
to attempt to organize local party members
and sympathizers for eventual guerrilla ac-
tion in the north. False identity cards were
prepared for Communist leaders.
MPD leaders also agreed that the more
prominent party figures should go under
cover for the time being. They further de-
cided that arms and ammunition in the
, hands of party members should be hidden
r for possible use in guerrilla operations. Or-
ders were given to secure as many arms as
they could and deliver them to party head-
quarters.
From the Washington Star, June 14, 19651
SUBSTANTIAL NUMBER Ole REDS ACITVE IN
DOMINICAN REPUBLIC, U.S. AIDE SAYS
(By Jeremiah O'Leary)
There are still substantial numbers of
Communists and Communist sympathizers
on the rebel side in the Dominican Republic
impasse, Assistant Secretary of State Jack
H. Vaughn said yesterday.
Vaughn, who heads the Government De-
partment's Inter-American Affairs Division,
held out scent hope for an early end to the
deadlock and the outpouring of U.S. funds
to keep the Caribbean nation from slipping
into chaos. He said:
"We have spent nearly $20 million for . . .
food (and other relief supplies) and this
could go on for many months . . ."
He said Communists have influenced Gen.
Francisco Caamano Deno's rebel side from
the beginning of the revolt.
In an interview on the ABC show "Issues
and Answers," Vaughn said, "Our guess is
that there are close to 5,000 Communists in
three groups in the Dominican Republic.
Dozens more have been identified as leaders.
"The point is they were well organized
land trained in Cuba, Russia, Czechoslovakia,
land Red China. They came back to the
Dominican Republic in a clandestine way
from exile determined to take advantage
of this revolt and to subvert it. It has been
their interest for many years."
He identified by name several Communist
leaders of Dominican, Spanish, and Haitian
origin whose roles in events leading to
learn intervention were ciescrihed in a
I
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August 23, :1965
Star story yesterday based on a government
document.
Vaughn said many of the Communist
leaders have 'filtered out of the rebel zone
into the Dominican countryside.
A resumption of fighting, he said, is con-
sidered possible because the United States
knows large quantities of arms were dis-
tributed by rebels and Communists. Some
of these arms had been hidden in the interior
of the republic and there is a threat that
they might be used.
IIVIBERT STRENGTH GAINS
The junta forces of Gen. Antonio Imbert
Herrera are believed to be stronger now than
they were when the fighting was stoppedby
the intervention, Vaughn says.
He indicated belief the junta forces might
be able to win a military decision but that
such a clash is unlikely due to the presence
of the enter-American Peace Force, sent by
the U.S.-supported Organization of Ameri-
can States.
Vaughn also indicated disbelief in infor-
mal polls taken by some newsmen purporting
to show that Catun.ano has overwhelming
popular support in the Dominican Republic.
"We question whether either Caamano or
Imbert has overwhelming support. It's easy
to take a poll and have all the cab drivers
agree.
"What the overvrhelmiele majority of the
Dominican _people want is the sort of demo-
cratic government that has been denied
them for so many years."
SEES ELECTIONS FAR OFF
He said a civilian, more moderate than
Gellman?, would be more attractive to the
Dominican people, and cited former presi-
dent Joaquin Balaguer as a man who would
be a frontrunner in any future election,
Vaughn said he did not believe the rebel
conetitutionalists would win if elections
could be held in 3 to 6 months.
However Vaughn added, his personal belief
is that elections will not be possible in the
Dominican Republic for 12 to 18 months.
He said .the OAS committee that includes
11.5. Ambassador Ellsworth Bunker has been .
in the Dominican Republican for 10 days
now and has made little progress in finding
agreement on a coalition government. The
negotiators aren't even close to finding a care-
taker government in advance of the hoped-
for elections, Vaughn said.
Her added that there is a complex military,
political, and emotional situation and that
even: if agreement is reached with leaders, it
might be difficult to enforce among the
Dominican People.
[From the Washington Star, June 16, 19651
PEACE CHIEF LAYS FIRING TO DOMINICAN
REBELS
(By Jeremiah O'Leary)
The Brazilian general in charge of the
Inter-American Peace Force in the Domini-
can Republic charged today that rebel forces
under Col. Francisco Caamano Deno were in
flagrant violation of the cease-fire in Santo
Domi ago.
Gen. Hugo Panaseo Alvim, in a preliminary
report to the Organization of American States
on the fighting yesterday in the Dominican
capital, said "indiscriminate firing * * * al-
ways originates from the Caamano zone"
against the troops under his command that
divide the rebels and the junta forces.
He asked the OAS three-man committee
charged, with the task of resolving the coun-
try's internal dispute "to bring an immediate
end" to the attacks,
U.S.. officials, meanwhile, were attributing
the new shooting incidents to the growing
strength of the Communist 14th of June
Movement in the Caamano-held zone of
Santo Domingo.
MORE CLASHES FEARED
Yesterday's battle between rebel forces and
the largely American troops of the peace force .
August 23, 1965
had been expected, Washington sources Said, The OAS session was called at the request
and it is feared the clash will not be an iso- of two opponents to the intervention, Chile,
lated incident. and Venezuela, and Mann appeared to bridle
Informed sources said they believe the at some comments concerning the original
shooting was brought about by increasing unilateral American intervention.
divisions among the groups under the osten- He said he had not heard, of all the discus-
sible control of Caamaraa. sion of intervention, any reference to the fact
The view' in Washington today is that the that "a year ago we were talking here of in-
14th of June group of hard-line, Havana- tervention by Cuba in Venezuela."
influenced Communists is gradually gaining Mann said the Communists intervened in
control in the rebel enclave. the Dominican Republican on June 14, 1962,
Officials pointed out that the speeches in again in 1963, and added, "my government
the Parque Independencia Monday celebrat- had reason to believe a third attempt was
Ing the June 14 national holiday were made made by international communism in 1965."
by known members of the Communist MPD He said the United States has suffered
and 14th of June parties. The speeches were many casualties and cited 900 separate viola-
of "foreigners" in the Dominican Republic. tions of the cease-fire by the Caamano side.
ATTITUDE CHANGED The only U.S. motive, he said is to create a
situation in which the Domincian people can
Last month in the same park, rebels who elect a government that suit them.
tried to make anti-American speeches were ?We are not partial" either to Caamano
shouted down and even pulled away from the or to the junta under Gen. Antonio Imbert
platform by other Caamano partisans. Barrera," Mann said. "Between the two ex-
In. his report to the OAS on yesterday's tremes there must be a ground of reasonable-
battle, Alvim said fighting began when his ness the great majority of the Dominican [From the Washington Daily News,
taoops were attached at 8:1.0 a.m. people will accept. We had only two May 7, 19651
Approved For Release 2003/10/15 : CIA-RopiToo446R000500110003-2
CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? SEN E 20537
Not a single OAS member?and this in-
cludes the United States?had any specific
plan ready to bring before the May 20 hemi-
sphere meeting to be held in Brazil that
would provide a quick orderly and multilat-
eral answer to such situations as developed
in the Dominican Republic.
Venezuela and Costa Rica reportedly meant
to suggest new rules for judging whether
de facto governments should be recognized.
But mechanisms for deciding questions of
recognition would be useless in restoring civil
order and political justice out of the chaotic
Dominican situation.
The OAS, with Washingtons tacit encour-
agement, has been dragging its feet and try-
ing to ignore that deadly power struggles
threaten all over Latin America.
But things are changing. If the Latin
Americans don't want the Marines moving
in on such situations, says the Johnson mes-
sage, they had better get busy on effective
OAS solutions for them.
"The IAPF did not return the fire for 20a 4
cacaces?to turn our backs and walk away, L.B.J. COULDN'T GAMBLE ON CONSULTATION
to 25 minutes, but after this period my troops or to take the strong action we did."
returned fire in order to defend themselves Venezuelan Ambassador Enrique Tejera (By Virginia Prewett)
after we had sustained wounded. Paris said he hoped the peace force would What risks did President Johnson run
"The brigade commander observing the not be an instrument of war against a when he sent the Marines into the Domini-
Caamano troops reported that the attacking heroic Dominican people. can Republic without consulting the Or-
troops were trying to maneuver and capture Chilean Ambasador Alejandro Magnet said ganization of American States?
positions in the security zone. We denied the number of deaths In the recent battle Frantic appeals from the 'U.S. Embassy
them this objective. was "distributed unequally" and said the there said the provisional regime of pro-
"All this occurred until 11:30 am, at which "action has not been quite equal." Bosch Dr. Jose Molina Urena had collapsed
time events were calm once again. At 12:25 Mann said all of the peace force casualties and nobody controlled the lighting. Wild-
p.m. the Inter-American troops located near had been Americans except for one wounded eyed teenagers with tommy guns had lined
the Hotel Jaragua were violently attacked Brazilian lieutenant. up Americans at their Hotel Embajador
and were compelled to return fire. _ refuge and shot over their heads. Others
"ARSON REPORTED [From the Washington Daily News, May 3,, soon might shoot straighter.
"We have information that armed civilians ' 1965]at any moment could seize an airstrip, de-
A small band of Communist conspirators
in the Caamano zone were putting fire to LB.? TAKES NEW TACK ON LATIN AMERICA dare themselves a government-in-arms and
warehouses on the waterfront." (By Virginia Prewett) call in Fidel Castro's Russian-trained pars-
The United States has identified dozens
of members of three Communist parties
The explosion in the Dominican Republic troops or other units of his 200,000-man
as
means that the United States and the Latin army.
having joined the rebellion presumably with
American members of the Organization of If Mr. Johnson had consulted, high ofil-
the intention of taking it over. Caamano is American States must find fresh solutions cials would have had to make the calls, each
not regarded as a Communist, of which would have taken at least 20 min-
. utes. Even if Secretary of State Dean Rusk,
Under Secretary Thomas Mann and our OAS
Ambassador, Ellsworth Bunker, had worked
on it, calls to 19 embassies would have taken
nearly half a working day.
If President Johnson had lost the time
gamble, he would have had to face an enor-
mous uproar from an outraged American
people, one many times greater than the out-
cry after the Bay of Pigs.
Mr. Johnson's relations with Congress
would have been deeply impaired. Congres-
sional and U.S. public backing for his Viet-
nam policy would have splintered on the
question?"Why fight for peace and freedom
in Vietnam and let the Caribbean go?"
- In the next election, the Democrats would
have been accused of giving both Cuba and
the Dominican Republic to communism.
Further, a Cuba-backed regime in the re-
public would have meant another confron-
tation with Russian and new danger of
nuclear war over the Caribbean. It would
have dashed hopes of settlement of Vietnam
in any foreseeable future.
If Mr. Johnson had taken the consultation
gamble and lost it, the American people
would never have forgotton that Americans
were massacred and the Caribbean fell to
communism while their President talked to
the OAS over the phone.
[From the Washington Star, June 17, 19651
DOMINICAN RED EFFORT To STIR U.N. IS SEEN
(By Jeremiah O'Leary)
officials analyzing attacks by Domini-
can rebels against the Inter-American Peace
Force believe the rebel strategy is to attempt
to bring the United Nations further into the
crisis.
Sources said this is a policy of despera-
tion by the Castro-leaning 14th of June
movement and is not necessarily a policy Col.
Francisco Caamano Deno, the nominal rebel
leader, can do anything to change.
It is believed, the sources said, that the
Communists in Caamano's camp hope to lure
the largely U.S. peace force to retaliate with
Such vigor that Washington will be forced to
make an otherwise unacceptable settlement
for hemisphere problems.
Latin American outcry against President
Johnson's dispatch of Marines to the Domini-
can Republic was predictable and completely
understandable.
In their never-ending power struggles,
Latin Americans fear U.S. intervention.
For if the United States favors one side
today, it may favor the other tomorrow.
In the light of history, it is surprising that
the Latin American protests have not been
shriller.
The Johnson administration's action means
three things:
It recognizes the defeat of the theory so
long espoused by Washington that "raising
Latin American living standards" can by
itself establish peace and political stability in
Latin America.
Mr. Johnson is making new policy and
With the rebel side or, alternatively, stand

does not mean to be limited by all the fictions
branded before the world as the Russians and shibboleths of inter-American relations.
were after crushing the Hungarian revolt. When he sent the marines into the Domini-
This theory of the cause of the latest out- can Republic he made it plain that the lives
break of shooting in Santo Domingo was of American citizens may not henceforth be-
supported last night by Under Secretary of come pawns in internal Latin American
State Thomas C. Mann in a rare speech be- struggles. Nor will the United States stand
fore the Organization of AIIIBTICELD States. idly by when such internal struggles deter-
Mann, sitting as American representative in iorate toward Bogotazo-type anarchy which
the absence of Ambassador Ellsworth Bunker, would open the way to a Communist take-
took the floor to defend the American inter- over.
vention. In so don he laid the blame for Most clearly of all, the U.S. action, followed
- the new crisis at the feet of the June 14 closely by the President's personal appeals The ever-stronger latent U.S. resentment
Movement. for the OAS to act, says to the Latin Amen- over foreign aid costs would have flowered.
He cited a panapiiiet distributed in Santo can governments that they, too, must quit Whatever popular sufferance still remains
Domingo Tuesday by the group urging that fiddling around with the thesis that the for our much-criticized Alliance for Progress
the backers of ..Caamano set off a struggle hemisphere's political problems can wait till would have diminished sharply.
throughout the Doininican Republic with economic problems are on the way to solu- Our President must have known when he
the aim of shoving the Yankees out, tion, decided not to consult that most Latin
Every day, Mann said, the evidence of Com- The one most significant fact in all the American governments would be secretly re-
mtmist involvement in the revolution be- circumstances surrounding the Dominican lieved not to have to give their prior indorse-
come ? more overwhelming. ' explosion is this: ment to his sending the Marines.
No.15-5L?i1 -
i
,
. Approved For Release 2003/10/15 : CIA-RDP67600446R000500110003-2
Approved For Releas 003/10/15 : CIA-RDP67B00446R000500110003-2
CpTGR,ESSIONAL, RECORD ?SENATE August 23, 1965
gr..`Tolanson's action in fact permitted the Marines into the Dominican Republic. The headed by Gen. Elias Wessin y Wessin,
Latin Americans to have their cake and et source, which must not be named but is of against constitutional rebels favoring the de-
It top. For they can deplore his sending In the highest and most unimpeachable rank, posed President Juan Bosch.
affords them.
the Marines yet enjoy the benefits of the provided the material for this vivid account The administration had to endure these
protection the act
-.--- by Virginia Prewett, Washington Daily News charges for the moment. Refuting them
[From the WashIngton Daily News, columnist on Latin America and winner of would have hindered chances cif
progress
the Maria Moors Cabot Gold Medal for out- in the fast-moving Dominican situation.
. May ,14, 19851 standing hemisphere coverage in 1964.)
Rsa-Censarx Px.arx , UPSET BY DOMINICAN (By Virginia Prewett) . CHARGES REFUTED
? . ,' REP, LMLIC BLAST But Mr. Johnson's firefighting team con-
' t At 5:30 p.m. on Wednesday, April 28, 1965, founded the critics first by attempting to get
P' (By Virginia Prewett) . - President Lyndon B. Johnson and five of his General Wessin to step out in the Interest
oininican explosion upset a Com-
top advisers were discussing Vietnam at the
natinist-Cuban timetable that called for a of a coalition. Again, Mr. Johnson refuted
White House. An urgent message from the
Chinese-Guatemalan guerrilla leader to start the charge of favoring the military clique
Dominican Republic interrupted him.
by sending a top team to Santo Dominigo
. h_r_nish-4re action in. Central America whea There was silence in the little, newly deco- to lay to negotiate a coalition headed by An-
- the cpnimunists launch their monsoon offen ?
Sive in South Vietnam. tonic Guzman, a former member of Bosch's
rated green West Wing lounge as the Presi-
, dent scanned the slip of paper. He sat in his cabinet.
I The leader is Marco Yon Sosa, called E I favorite high-backed, deep-cushioned chair, Nevertheless, as U.S. efforts to help settle
GUaternalan Mother. As an army officer in
Chino and son of a Chinese father and 3 tangled problems of personalities and power
his long legs stretched out by the hassock
he often props them on. On the wall nearby
_ in the tragic country continued, a world de-
1960 he tried to lead a rebellion becauso hung a new decoration that he proudly shows bate rolled on about the intervention itself.
former President Miguel Ydigoras Puental visitors?the pictures of five Presidents with Speculation returns again and again to
allowed the IA-backed Cuban exiles to train whom he has worked, mounted in one frame.
friends arranged his escape.
in Guatama . prisoned but armr ADVISED
With him were Secretary of State Dean
thas he did not bring the Organization of
Mr. Johnson's reasons for intervening. And
the impression rolls on, often cited as a fact,
_
To Sosa began to operate in easterx. Rusk, Special Assistant for National Security American States into the crisis.
' euatenlaia, I Izabal St t with a band ce McGeorge Bundy, Secretary of Defense Rob- MANN'S ROLE
20 men. Pining Col. Enraque Peralta's :
'Into a toughened forge of 500 men. . .Moyers
yeahel Military rule, this band has grOWr George Ball, and Special Assistant Bill charged with being overpersuaded by his
ert McNamara Assistant Secretary of State As a corollary, President Johnson is
former Assistant Secretary of State for Latin
colvwssarrrE . The President told them that all the nine America, the present Under Secretary of State
Though he never attained the rank, El top U.S. officials in our Santo Domingo Em- for Economic Affairs, Thomas C. Mann.
Chino._ opals _Jaattleelf "comandante"?the nassF requested urgent military assistance to The left-of-center. Americans for Demo-
apeinis)a Jar Major?like top Castro officials. save American lives in the Dominican cratic Action, who do not like Mr. Mann
As 44 Caatro in the Sierra Maestra, yon Republic. . because he is supposed to have favored send-
Soia grants foreign newsmen interviews in Earlier messages had warned that Santo ing U.S. military help to the Cuban exile
his hideout.
_ .- Domingo city was engulfed in anarchy. brigade battling at the Bay of Pigs, have
Infernaation abaut the master plan for About 1,000 American men, women, and chil- officially demanded Mr. - ann s r gnation
Central America comes .from the same Latin then, gathered for evacuation at the Hotel for supposedly masterminding the Domin-
Americans who revealed that atomic missiles Ernbajador at the city's edge, were cut off ican landing.
wee la Cuba bang before the United States from the escape route via the little Carib- The charge is false.
Officially admitted they were. The plan was bean port of Haina, 9 miles away. The U.S.S. The answer to these continuing questions
fel' Yon Sega to start ,a, Vietnam-type action
in Guatemala and spread it to Honduras, not
Boxer and other naval ships had been lying 1sh967.1d not be lost to history as a new black
off Haim since Sunday, April 25
far legend of U.S. intervention hardens now in
from Isabel. From there, the fire could THE MARINES The story can now be told.
creep on.
At its briefes t, It is this:
Yon Sosa's Chinese blood gives him a discussed sending in U.S. Marines to pro- The immediate reason for landing the ma-
sending
President Johnson and his advisers now
trong propaganda link with southeast Asia. tect the stranded Americans. rifles was to save American lives. The grow-
Guatemala is communism's "lost province," At 6:30 the President gave an order that Ing danger of s, second Cuba on the island
de-
where a TA-backed revolt toppled a heavily made April 28, 1965, one of the world's hls- of Hispaniola reinforced the President's filtrate 954, And the unpopu- toric dates, comparable in drama to Octo- termination.
arity of Colonel Peralta's regime, which took ber 22, 1982, the day of the Cuban missile samar's PATE
Met In 1963, gives the guerrillas their open- showdown. He sent in the Marines. Presi- But, Mr. Mann was not even present at
Ing. , . dent Johnson immediately started a series the meeting when President Johnson and his
Even auti-conamunist Guatemalans today of statements and speeches to as the advisers st considered landing the marines.
fir
admit sadly that Yon Sosa is winning peas- world he sent them to save lives. He re- And incidentally, the untrue ADA attack
ant support. Peralta is ruling under martial vealed that a Communist apparatus had been has guaranteed Mr. Mann will be in 'U.S. Gov-
law, with tight censorship, all political spotted surfacing in the anarchy. He stated eminent as long as Lyndon B. Johnson is
parties paralyzed, and all rights suspended -President.
his goal: to restore peace and help establish
that could protect citizens from arbitrary democratic government in the Dominican Moreover, the charge that the United
aealbh and Seizure. States acted without the knowledge of the
_.,,..._,,..; ..., The great majority of Americans, say the
. . , tRePublig. , , ,
other member states of the OAS is not so.
To complicate the situation, coffee prices
-. '`a"'"'"4"'l 'ALL - trillblie opinion polls, heard and approved. The White House and the U.S. State De-
have Alien. in recent. months and this is But the image of Marine landings has been partment, long before the order to land
df used in anti-American propaganda for over marines was given, had established contacts
tnlyfing the relatively bright economic out-
100k that bas been Peralta's one boast till with Latin American embassies over the
half a century.
Latin American nationalists use it. Nazis situation. The machinery of the OAS had
now. I " hied it before World War II and the Com- -already been set in motion, at U.S. request.
The bcaninican situation Was a "target of rnunists before and since. Most Americans, Not only were the embassies in Santo Do-
OpPortunity" for the Communist apparatus if they think about it, disapprove of the mingo of South American countries notified,
there, not the prime Caribbean target. The Caribbean landings of the 1920's, when Cal_ the Washington embassies were as well.
aPparatus emerged there ,to promote chaos yin Coolidge said: "The business of the President Johnson, when he ordered in
after army men and civilian opponents of united states is business,-
the Military-backed regime began to rebel. the marines, also ordered all Latin American
The CarartaWaist shock troop organizations Woodrow Wilson's still earlier Marine mis- embassies In Washington to be notified as
emerge and Submerge, according to the situa- :dons in the Caribbean to counteract German quickly as possible of the landing and of
Vatting during World War I and to try to the 'U.S. request for an OAS meeting at
ton. { ' ' Melp along democracy afterward were blurred the earliest possible hour. By 10 that night,
Having the showdown with the United by the later use of the marines in "dollar all were notified.
States over new infiltration in the Caribbean diplomacy."
take place as it has. On the island of His-
OUTLAY The day-by-day log of events as they af-
panto a is disadvantageous for the Com- fected the White House will tell the story.
Vitalist World. Their longtime objective is Two criticisms greeted the Johnson action
to start serious trouble on the continent's an April 28. There was outcry in the un- [From the Washington Daily News, May 25,
,
friendly segment of the U.S. press that the 19651
niainland? where it is pat easy to "'Alain' President, did not amply consult our Latin rf' '
THE .CNSIDE STORY: KNOWN REDS SPOTTED
Prom a American allies in the Organization of Amer- the Washington Daily News, DURING ARMS HANDOUT
Lean States. Senator ROBERT KENNEDY echoed
' l'Vtay 24 19651 (Norm?This is the second of three articles
, this in a public statement comparing Presi- in which Virginia TEE 'mins Syealc,..: THS ORDER TpLAND THE dent's actions with those of his late brother,
Prewett, prize-winning
- -"' 4r ' aXarnisIns and faulting President Johnson. Washington Daily News columnist on Latin
INcrez.--This is the story of how President Next, the President was accused of inter- how Px esident Johnson decided to send U.S.
America, gives a behind-the-scenes report on
Johnson came to his easion to send the ening to help an unpopular military clique, forces into the Dominican Republic. Miss
,
003110145 : CIA-14DP671500446ROGG500110003-2
August 23, 1965
Prewett received information from a high
source, who does not wish to be identified.)
(By Virginia Prewett)
Trouble broke in the Dominican Republic
at 3 p.m., on Saturday, April 24. Army offi-
cers seized their chief of staff and Santo
Domingo's most powerful radio station pro-
claimed a coup against President Donald
Reid Cabral.
Fortner President Juan Bosch was not
mentioned.
The White House was informed. Coup
threats had been frequent since Gen. Elias
Wessin y Wessin and other officers deposed
Juan Bosch in September 1963. But General
Wessin did not move that Saturday.
At 5 a.m., Sunday, the White House was
told the revolt was serious. At 7:10, Sr.
Bosch, by radio from Puerto Rico, named
Jose Rafael Molina Urena constitutional
president for his cause. General Wessin
now acted. Crowds around the centrally lo-
cated presidential palace shouted for Sr.
Bosch. At 10:30 am., President Reid Cabral
resigned.
NAVY MOVES
Approved For Release.g003q a/3 it ? CIA-sINFM00446R000500110003 2
CONGRESSION L R ? - 20539
States, Argentina, the Dominican Republic, into the Dominican Republic. Miss Prewett
Colombia, and Nicaragua, discussed calling received information from a high source, who
an emergency foreign ministers' meeting. cannot be identified.
ENVOYS CONCERNED (By Virginia Prewett)
When President Johnson checked reports When President Johnson between 5:30 and
later, he saw that Mr. Vaughn had also briefed 6:30 p.m. on April 28 quickly telephoned or
the Venezuelans. At 7 p.m., he learned, the called in the Nation's top officials about land-
Costa Rican Embassy asked 'U.S. aid in ing marines in the Dominican Republic, a
evacuating Costa Ricans. During the day, conversation was being held between our
the Embassies of both Peru and Ecuador Embassy there and the Washington message
called our State Department to express con- center.
cern about their nationals. They stressed the News was relayed to the President that the
need to protect their nationals and to pro- embassies of El Salvador, Argentina, Guate-
tect law and order in Santo Domingo. male, and Ecuador had been fired on. The
A little later, L.B.J. learned with relief U.S. aid mission had been raided. The evac-
that the first thousand or so evacuees were uation zone around the Embajador Hotel had
safe aboard American vessels. New refugees been broken into again.
were filling the Hotel Embajador. At 5:30 p.m., a unanimous request had
General Wessin's men were attacking heav- come from our nine-man diplomatic "coun-
ily. In the late afternoon, Molina Urena try team" in the Dominican Republic re-
and 15 rebels, including Col. Francisco Caa- questing immediate military assistance to
mano Deno, called on Ambassador Bennett save the lives of a thousand Americans in
and asked him to help arrange a settlement. the Embajador Hotel.
Mr. Bennett tried, but the move failed. THAT CUTS IT
Around Tuesday midnight, Molina Urena "That cuts it," said President Johnson.
took refuge in an embassy. Colonel Caamano ,
I'm not going to have the American people
`
left the front of the stage. He did not re- wake up tomorrow morning and find a hun-
dred as rebel chief until April 30. dred of our people dead down there because
On Wednesday morning, President Johnson
I didn't do anything."
learned more arms were passed out indis- He took the position that if he did not act,
criminately. he risked immediate blood guilt for the
REDS EFFICIENT Americans. The vision of another Cuba was
"I never saw such efficiency," read an eye- strong in his mind.
witness report. "Thousands of rifles were He said later of the moment: "We know
distributed in what seemed minutes." there are evil forces everywhere?in this
Known Communists were spotted in the op- country and everywhere else. But here in the
eration, which bore the earmarks of para- United States, they're not in control. At that
military planning. moment, in Santo Domingo, they were in
President Johnson had known for months control."
that Castroite Communists planned to take Mr. Johnson ordered multiple messages to
over the expected action against Sr. Reid go into effect at 6:30 p.m. The marines were
Cabral. Now they were surfacing. The TV to land. The first pathfinder group did land
took on "a Castro tone." Shouts of "pare- in LCT's at Haina seaport not long after-
clone!" (to the firing wall!) were increasing ward. By 7:60 p.m., 406 marines were ashore.
In the tumult.
At 10:30 am. Wednesday, our OAS Ambas- SETTLEMENT SOUGHT
sador, Ellsworth Bunker, briefed the OAS With the military order, Mr. Johnson
Council. stressed his urgent hope for a cease fire and
Around noon came more messages. Colom- a settlement of Dominican differences.
bian Ambassador Jesus Zarate reported from He also called for congressional leaders to
Santo Domingo: "It is now a question of meet with him at 7:15 p.m.
Communists versus anti-Communists." When he issued the landing order, he di-
A bank had been looted, police stations rected the area officers of the State Depart-
overrun. Thousands were dead and wounded. ment's American Republics Division to notify
all Latin American Ambassadors that many
YAWNS ctrr OFF Latin American Embassies and diplomats in
The Americans at the Embajador were cut the Dominican Republic had called on the
off from Haixta. Soon after 1 pm. Wednes- United States for help, that the U.S. Marines
day, the President learned the crisis was Were landing to save American and other
worsening. lives, and that the United States urgently
In the afternoon, Col. Pedro Benoit, in requested an OAS meeting the next day.
charge of military ground forces, warned he REDS SPOTTED
could not protect the Americans. Police _
Chief Col. German Despradel said the same. me congressional leaders stayed with the
At 6:30 p.m., when President Johnson was President until 9 p.m. When they asked
discussing Vietnam problems with Dean about Communist influence, Mr. Johnson
Rusk, Robert McNamara, George Ball, Mc- told them that the Communist apparatus
George Bundy, and Bill Moyers, came the had been spotted emerging.
plea for military assistance. At first two known members of the Corn-
After discussing landing Marines L.B.J. in.,_ u_nist apparatus were spotted seizing stra-
tegic -Deaic command of groups or objectives, then
sent out calls to other officials. They in- nine were spotted, and more and more. Dur-
eluded Deputy Secretary of Defense Cyrus Ing the day the pro-Castro talisman cry of
Vance, Ambassador Bunker, Mr. Vaughn, ?Paredon 1" (to the wall!) had multiplied as
Under Secretary of State Thomas Mann, CIA mobs sacked, looted and killed.
Director William Raborn, the ChairmairOr After 6:30 p.m., nine State Department
rueJo nt umelrerf-eltaiit-Ehen. Earle Wheel-
er?the full team.
The hard and historic decision had to be
made.
?
At 8:45, Sunday morning, President John-
son, from Camp David, ordered U.S. Navy
units to move near Santo Domingo and lie
offshore, out of sight.
This was no novelty. When the longtime
Dominican dictator, Rafael L. Trujillo, was
assassinated in May 30, 1961, the then Vice
President Johnson, acting for President Ken-
n.edy in his absence,Thent U.S. Navy ships to
stand off Santo Domingo.
President Kennedy himself sent them there
in December 1961, when Trujillo's surviving
family threatened to retake power.
President Johnson learned on Monday,
April 26, that Santo Domingo's city manager,
around 11:30 a.m., called to urge our Ambas-
sador W. Tapley Bennett: "Do something
about your people, for God's sake." Rioting
and fighting had spread. The Pepsi-Cola
plant, an. American symbol, was burned and
bottles were stolen for Molotov cocktails.
At noon Monday, the Embassy began warn-
ing all Americans to gather for evacuation
at the Hotel Embajador, on the citys' out-
skirts. About 2,500 Americans were in Santo
Domingo?diplomats' families, business resi-
dents, tourists.
At 5 p.m. Sunday, the Dominican Air Force
joined General Wessin. On Monday, they
bombed the presidential palace and strafed
the rebel-held end of the strategic Ozama
Bridge.
On. Monday, the rebel radio broadcast the
names and address of the pilots' families.
The pilots' wives and mothers were taken to
the Ozarna Bridge as hostages against further
strafing.
On Monday, our State Department dis-
cussed the situation with the Brazilian and
Chilean diplomats.
A cease-fire was arranged for from 11 am.
till 2 p.m. on Tuesday, so the 1,170 Americans
at the Embajador could be taken by bus to
Haim port and evacuated.
LUCKY
, Soon after 8 a.m. Tuesday, an armed rabble
burst into the Embajador. They had been
given rifles and tommyguns by defecting
army men. They sprayed bullets over the
heads of prostrate Americans inside and
outside the hotel. By luck, no one was shot.
The later cease-fire held long enough for
the Americans to reach Heine, 9 miles away.
That same morning, Colombia's OAS Am-
bassador, Emilio N. Oribe, called on Assist-
ant Secretary of State for Latin American
Jack Hood Vaughn. They discussed bringing
the OAS into the crisis.
White Vouse approval was prompt. And
at Tuesday noon, the U.S. alternate repre-
sentative ' to the OAS, Ward Allen, called
an urgent meeting of the Peace Committee.
The owmnittee composed of the United
[From the Washington (D.C.) Daily News,
May 26, 1965]
THE INSIDE STORY: L.B.J.'s PROMPT DOMINI-
CAN REPUBLIC'S ACTION SAVED AMERICAN LIVES
NOTE?This is the last of three articles in
which Virginia Prewett, prize-winning Wash-
ington Daily News columnist on Latin Amer-
ica, gives a behind-the-scenes report on how
President Johnson decided to send U.S. forces
area chiefs for Latin America were called to
their offices. Their instructions were to tele-
phone the President's message to every Latin
American Ambassador. This the nine diplo-
mats did. Not only OAS members, but also
Jamaica and Trinidad were called.
Senator ROBERT KENNEDY, Democrat, Of
New York, has critically compared President
Johnson's procedure with the Latin Ameri-
cans with that of his late brother during the
Cuban missile crisis.
WHEN J.F.K. SPOKE
On October 22, 1962, President Kennedy
spoke to the Nation at 6:30 p.m., announcing
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NGRESSIONAL RECORD -- SENATE August 23 1965
his intention to order a naval quaranti tie
around, Cuba. That night he had the Lalin
American Ambassadors notified and like gr.
Johnson, called an OAS meeting for the nc xt
day. After the meeting officially approved
his action, he ordered U.S. Navy units alrealy
in position, to impose the quarantine.
President Kennedy could do this becalge,
the United States had the initiatisa in t
crisis, This permitted him to control the,
timing.
President Johnson in contrast was at t
Mercy of timing imposed by the wild mobs
Santo Domingo. If he had announced ie
Meant to send in Marines the next day, It
Virtnally would have invited a mob attack 0,n,
the_Embaja.dore Hotel?and the emergence of
a 'regime of some kind controlled by Cora-
autikits. ?
REAS01,/s =missal) ;
Gn ThInsday, April ap, at 10:30 a.m., tie
and .Arribassador Ellsworth. ;Bunk gr,
reStiewed the. landing and the reasons for Lt.,
The Co'AS asked the Papal Nuncio in Santo,
Domingo to arrange a cease fire. ,Late 'Unit
night the OAS Called an emergency foreinn,
tairdsters! meeting and approved establisA.-
men If an fatP.P144911a1 safe haven In
Eo ,
n can Republic.
'On4rrII SO, the special meeting sent Sec-
retary General Jose Mora to Santo Domini; o.
The next day the OAS named a special fivs-
inaripeacemaking team and sent it to San V)
3344,46,on 'ILK Military plane.
dId'S'ailiteit, the OAS thus
. aged' to get its peace team in 4 days after -die
crisis peak when a thousand Americans wets,
'In danger at the EMbajacior.
The .GAS snriplY did not have the mi-
Chinery or the precedents to go in quick Ly
and protect the foreign nationals. The holle ,
tliatwill develop the needed muscIts
? -
' . I
out Of the Domlnir crisis, -
colFriss11 crfoxvs silow
- I
. A significant feature of the T.T.S. press crit 1-
cm of the order to, land the marines, is to ,
it comes from the _same spokesmen svho molt ,
'vOcife,ronsly and tenaciously defended the ,
Castro regime. Antiwar crusaders condeirp.,
.the .91:der to land the,?inarines in, one br9al ,
and sail for_Ouha7type revolutions through-
oflt 0.9441..,the,next?
0?14,t?191;_t5rer4gentj_onrison recalls is th, ,
thcalaancia, Of "Ameri,can lives were in dangcr.
?e..es anew and yicious subveraion creel
1-
lug into the Western Hemisphere, the kir d
we are fighting in Vietnam.
be. had it to do,- over, he would land tip ,
Marines again.
Iniportant in the Story is the fact that U.
forces in Santo D,orningo have evacuatql
Mans radre nationals of other countries thanour own lpuzitrymen.
,
esfi,N1/40,VED OUT .
_ ,
In ai aoout Americana Were. mqvcd ,
Ont. And more, than 2,500 citizens of 4? ,
- other nations, ,
They include _people from Canada, Chin
Europe, Israel, Saudi Arabia, Bulgaria?tr 9
t World. I'Atin Achericans evacuated ncluc p.
-Arfentines, scinvia.p.s, Brazilians, Ghileanl,
09 oinbiane,,Oosta, Ricans, C`ubaris,,pomin.r.,
Oats, 'Ecuadorians Salvadorians Guatenakr
Itaittaz, Panamanians, Nicassiguani,
-MeXioinsk lierusibins, Uruguayans, Venezia -
-lans, and Jamaicans
These are the people you might ask
Whether Mr. Johnson should have sent in th .
Marines.
' '
rom the Washington Daily News, -
May 31, 1965]
d?..n13.0 THREAT IN :CRISIS WAS Rxsi?-041
(By Virginia Prewett) "
tin AAIS?rieans Who balk at grupportin ;
r,ole of the Organiz,atio
of American States , should read the repos t
the OAS alabassadom themselves made
the threat of Communist subversion in the
DOMinican Republic.
When the OAS special peace commission
turned, its formal report, its members also
answered, in a closed session, the direct ques-
tion about the extent of Communist Involve-
men
_No DISSENT
The Ambassadors of Colombia, Argentina,
and Brazil, without dissent from those of
Guatemala and Panama, the other two peace
team members, stated their belief that the
forces of Col. Francisco Caamano Deno were
during the crisis heavily infiltrated by pro-
Gas troi tes
They said the Santo Domingo diplomatic
corps agreed with this view.
Ambassador Alfredo Vazquez Carrizosa of
Colombia reported :
-"With _rep.rd to the sector led by Col.
Francisco Ca.amano, whom I do not know
personally to be a Communist, there are
numerous persons on his side that, if they
are not members of the Corrununist Party, are
actively in favor of Fidel Castro's system of
government or political purposes."
Argentina's member of the peace team,
Ambassador Ricardo M. Colombo, said the
above was "affirmed by a large number of
reprehentatives of the Diplomatic Corps," in
Santo Domingo.
NO AUTHORITY
Ambassador Draw Penna Marinho of Brazil
said there was "a complete collapse of public
authority. The country became a sort of
no man's land.
"The arsenal had been given to the people
and an entire disoriented population of ado-
lescents and fanatics was taking up modern
automatic arms, in a state of excitation that
was further exacerbated by constant radio
broadcasts of a clearly subversive nature."
He ,salci that xio one believed, that either
Juan Bosch Or Col. Outman? was -a Commu-
nist. But he said it was agreed by the ma-
jority of the Ambassadors at Santo Domingo,
that in the anarchy "any organized group
that landed on the island could dominate
the situation" and the revolution that had
been democratic in its origins "could be
rapidly converted into a Communist insur-
rection."
; ?_? -
[From the Washington Daily News, June 9,
19651
U.S. PRESS HIT FOR &roams ON VITAL SPEECH
(By Virginia Prewett)
U.S. press coverage of the Dominican crisis
has become the subject of an international
debate. Among incidents that liberal Latin
Americans are now deploring is that an ex-
tremely important pronouncement by a great
Latin American gtAtelaman was compressed in
the U.S? press into a stark, one-point com-
ment:
When ex-President Romulo Betancourt of
Venezuela June 3 spoke to more than 800
meMbers and guests of the inter-American
Association for Democracy and Freedom in
New York, he did indeed, as our press high-
lighted, say unilateral U.S. intervention in
the Dominican Republic was, in his Spanish
term, "repudiable."
Depending on your ear for languages, this
can mean "repudiate-able" or "objectionable"
or perhaps best of all, "inacce tabl "
ONLY A PART
But this was not by far the whole Betan-
court message, as the press reports implied.
Rather it was a preliminary statement of the
Speaker's conviction that unilateral inter-
vention must not become acceptable in the
Inter-American system after so great an ef-
fort has been spent to make it unacceptable.
The Venezuelan statesman said the out-
come of the Dominican_intervention will be
fateful for 'U.S. relations in the hemisphere
and fatal to the Organization of American
States unleas the outcome is "the reestab-
'
lishment of constitutionality and democracy"
and not another military dictatorship.
Then he began firing his salvos. Preserv-
ing Latin America from "new Cubes," he
said, or "further Sovietizing misadventures"
is "an inescapable duty and responsibility."
This can be done, he said, only when OAS
maintains in function an effective mechan-
ism for Collective action "directed alike
against the perils of Communist expansion
and the present reality of arbitrary and self-
elected governments."
He warned:
"In all the Latin American countries where
usurper governments are in power, peoples'
rebellkins are incubating, similar to that
which has shaken the Dominican nation to
its roots.
The Communists infiltrate these uprisings
because they are trained for violent sub-
version and not for peaceful indoctrination.
Their most favorable climate is insurrec-
tion."
Dr. Betancourt stressed the urgency of the
thesis?now so well proved in both Cuba and
the Dominican Republic?that Latin Ameri-
can governments not originating at the
polls?"those that are dictatorial and at the
service of the wealthy minorities, national
and foreign"?are excellent breeding grounds
for uprisings and collective upheavals, "which
the Communists take advantage of."
The true pacification of Latin America, he
said, categorically, will not be possible until
an OAS mechanism, backed by democratic
Latin governments and the United States
guarantees democratic regime.
1DEPOSED DOMINICAN CHIEF?REID CABRAL
BLAMES COMMUNISTS FOR REVOLT
(By John T. Skelly)
WASHINGTON, July 15.?The deposed head
-of the Dominican Republic triumvirate, Don-
-aid Reid Cabral, today questioned President
-Johnson's view that the Dominican uprising
was democratic in origin but was immedi-
ately taken over by Communist forces.
In his speech before the National Press
Club, Cabral said:
"What happened in Santo Domingo on
that fateful clay of April 24, was not a con-
ventional Latin American military coup that
got out of hand and, as one observer put it,
was taken over by the Communists In a
flash almost as rapid and blinding as a nu-
clear explosion.
''To the contrary, it was a revolution that
had long been planned by European and
Havana-trained Communists, it was triggered
by Communists, and to this day remains in
the hands of hard-core Communists."
(On June 1, President Johnson said: "Thefl
Communists did not, in our judgment, origi-
nate this revolution, but they joined it and
they participated in it. They were active in
it, and in a good many places they were in
charge of it.")
However, he backed up the President's
decision to send in American marines and
paratroopers. Reid Cabral also expressed
hope that the Inter-American Peace Force
would not stay in the Dominican Republic
longer than necessary.
"No Dominican can be free of sadness at
seeing his country occupied by foreign
troops, but President Johnson's courageous
decision in Sending marines and paratroopers
to the Dominican Republic without a shadow
of a doubt saved thousands of lives and
spared us occupation today by Soviet troops,
such as those now in Cuba.
_ "I am convinced that the Inter-American
Peace Force will not remain in the Domini-
can Republic for a moment longer than is
necessary, and that my country will have
suffered less from their temporary presence
than it would have suffered from permanent
occupation by extra-continental forces."
Reid Cabral said that he did not think "it
prudent or wise to attempt to hold elections
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too soon after the installation of a provi- "4. The OAS and its functions, as a Ministry
sional government." of Colonial Affairs of the United States.
In a question and answer period, he said "5. Why the United States is an empire.
that many of the Communists in the revolu- "6. Latin American integration.
tion entered the Dominican Republic by "7. Human Rights. The U.N. Declaration
boats from Cuba. He said that the only way of Human Rights.
to get rid of Castro and Communist infiltra- "8. Makeup of the family, the state, and
tion in other Latin American countries was society.
by a complete isolation of Cuba. "9. The Dominican Republic revolution.
Asked to supply some specific names of the ? "10. The structure of the constitutionalist
hard-core Communists who control the rev- government."
olution in the Dominican Republic, he an- Each command post in the rebel zone is
swered that it was difficult since most of them represented by members of all political par-
keep out of sight. ties, as well as thousands of independents
"They don't show their faces," he said, who before the uprising did not belong to
"However, one of the leaders is Pedro Mir." any organized party. The number of exact
(Pedro Julio Mir Valentin is listed on the command posts and members in each unit is
U.S. Embassy's list of 53 and has traveled to a military secret.
Cuba and the Soviet Union.) In some posts, members are all armed and
In answer to a question he explained that estimated at anywhere from 25 to 150-200.
there is much fear in the Dominican Repub- The Social Christians have one such post
lic now and under these circumstances "only located on one of the corners of Plaza Inde-
the extreme left can win." pendencia. Their office occupies the top floor
"How can a free and honest election be of a two-story building.
held in this poisoned and fear-ridden atmos- They are the only command post in the
phere?" he asked. "An election in such a zone made up entirely of armed men from
climate would be a mockery, and only the one party. Communist groups have leaders
extreme left could emerge victorious," he distributed throughout the various coin-
said. viand posts. In five or six posts they are in
Reid Cabral said that the deposed Presi- charge of the commandos.
dent Juan Bosch introduced racial and class Almost all weapons. in the command posts
hatred to the country for the first time in have been registered with the military ?it-
its history. Asked if he would serve in a cers who operate their own little armed
coalition government with Bosch, he said at forces. The Caamano officers conduct their
this moment in history every responsible own court martials. Those found guilty of
Dominican should work for the good of the violations of any of the constitutionalist
country. government's rules and regulations are
packed off to jail in the Ozama Fortress where
INDOCTRINATION COURSE REVEALS AIMS OF they are separated from prisoners of the
REBELS other side.
(By John T. Skelly) The Social Christians who lecture to the
commandos are all well versed in Social
SANTO DOMINGO.?O-5, indoctrination
Christian ideology. They are university
branch of the constitutional government graduates, many who have studied in their
headed by Col. Francisco Caamano Deno is
controlled by the Social Christians. How-
own colleges, as well as universities in the
ever, represenatives from the PRD, the largest United States and Latin America.
political pasty in the rebel zone, are also They have all passed through IFEDEC (In-
frorri the armed forces as well as from the stituto de Formacion. Democrats Cristiana?
Marxist-Lenninist-Fidelista group. They lec-
Institute for the Formation of Christian
tare at every command post or commando in
Democracy( in Caracas, the hemisphere in-
Ciudad Nueva every night. docrination center for all young Christian
The two non-Marxist parties with the Democrats. It is conducted by professors
most influence in the zone are the PRSC
(Social Christians) and the PRD?Partido
Revolucionario Dominicano?the party of de-
posed President Juan Bosch, now in exile in
Puerto Rico. These two parties joined in
January 1965, in the pact of Rio Piedra,
Puerto Rico, to return the Dominican Re-
public to government under the constitu-
tion of 1963, that was in effect when Presi-
dent Juan Bosch was overthrown in Septem-
ber of that year.
The principal Dominican military officers
who were not part of the Rio Piedra Pact,
but who were in the conspiracy to over-
throw the triumvirate headed by Donald Reid
Cabral, were Col. Francisco Caamano Deno.,
Col. Miguel Hernandez Ramirez,,,and Col. Marxist.
Rafael Fernandez, the leader of the military. One of the PRSC lecturers says that on
He was the liaison man with the PRD and some subjects?like family life, the state and
the Social Christians. According to persons society in general?each side presents the
who signed the Rio Piedra document, the material according to its beliefs. The audi-
PSD, the 14th of June, knew about the con- ence asks questions.
spiracy but at no time were an active part Many of the armed rebels?ranging in age
of it nor were they ever consulted.
Thus, as soon as the Cabman? government from They invariably show eagerness to form 16 to 21?are sons of laborers and farm-
rs.
was installed the- key jobs like indoctrina- a workers party as the nucleus of the revo-
tion courses were controlled by the Pm and
PRSC. lution.
The following is a list of topics that are One point that the PRSC lecturers have
discussed nightly at reber indebtrination trouble with is American and Russian los-
courses: perialism. Everytime they bring up the sub-
"1. The Constitutionalist uprising, its Pact of Russian imperialism, there are heated
meaning and objectives?a precedent 'in the debates from the Marxists.
Dominican Republic and Latin America.. "We try to tell them that the Russians are
"2. Constitutionalism in Latin America? imperialist as well as Americans, but they re
past and present situation. ' ject this argument. They always counter
"3. Imperialism in history. American in- argue by pointing out that American troops
tervention. (a) U.S. imperialism, (b) Rus- are occuping our country, not Russian
sian imperialism, troops," the lecturer said.
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? shN A i k,
from Latin America and Europe and main-
tained by contributions of Christian Demo-
cratic Parties in Europe and Latin Amerca.
One of the principal courses offered to
the youths is the history of Marxism and the
ways of communism. Thus the Dominican
Social Christians who lecture to command
posts?as well as the Social Christians and
other rebels who are occasionally exposed to
Marxist theories?are well aware of the Com-
munist line.
All lecturers in the constitutionalist gov-
ernment courses have sworn to be as objec-
tive as possible in their presentation of mate-
rial. They must not present material from a
strict party line, whether it be PRD, PRSC, or
The Social Christians explain their posi-
tion by saying:
"We know that the Russians are worse in
that they deny all freedoms while in the
United States you have basic freedoms, But
your freedoms are for your own people. Your
foreign policy denies other people freedom.
"We cannot afford at this time to attack
the Communists. We have to let the people
see that we are on their side in this fight
against the Americans. Maybe someday we
will say something nice about the Ameri-
cans."
The Dominican Social Christians are di-
vided, not in numbers but in leadership.
One of the founders of the party, Guido
D'Allesandro, was put out early this year be-
cause he followed the "linea suave"?soft
line?as opposed the the "linea dura"?hard
line?of the present leadership of the party.
Those who follow the soft line favored
closer relations with the U.S. Embassy, like
attending embassy functions and receptions,
or trying to get along with the Triumvirate.
The hard line advocates, such as President
Antonio Rosario, believe it unwise to be
friendly with the U.S. Embassy..
The PRSC, founded in 1961, forms part of
ODCA (Organizations Democrats Christina de
America), the hemisphere-wide organization
of Christian Democrat parties. For this rea-
son, both President Frei of Chile and Rafael
Caldera of Venezuela have denounced the
U.S. landings in the Dominican Republic.
The fact that President Frei, first Christian
Democrat to be elected chief of state of a
Latin American country, has endorsed the
Constitutionalist government of President
Caamano has given the Dominican PRSC's
stock new value in the eyes of the masses.
The PRSC's slogan in the revolution is
"green light for the poor of the Americas."
They have thousands of posters all over the
rebel zone. The man who operates their
headquarters in the absence of Dr. Antonio
Rosario in exile in New York, is Andres
Lockward.
Lockward, a public accountant by profes-
sion, studied the cooperative movement at
the University of Wisconsin for a year. He
sits behind a plain wooden desk, machine-
gun by his side, and directs both the military
and political operation. He frequently smiles
and appears to have the right temperament
for the frustrations and confusions that go
on continuously in the constitutional
government.
The PRSC, Lockward says, will not partici-
pate in the Provisional Government. It is,
however, fully behind the Caamano govern-
ment. The probable President of the Pro-
visional Government, Hector Garcia Godoy,
conferred with Lockward and his top advisers
last week for about an hour.
Backing up Lockward in the high com-
mand is an attractive mother of eight
children, nonpracticing physician, Dra. Jose-
flna Padilla. Two of her oldest boys, 18 and
19, participated in the fighting and are now
part of the yellow helmets MP's of the
constitutionalist.
The PRSC's got 60,000 votes in the last free
elections in 1962. Lockward points out that
they had at least 150,000 but that many vot-
ed for Bosch, because they knew that the
PRSC's could not win. The PRSC's will not
say how many armed followers they have in
the rebel zone. They point out, however,
that in addition to the party militant, they
have the Christian workers with them
(CASC)
Furthermore, they point out, the leaders
and members of most Catholic groups in the
Dominican Republic have joined them in the
fight to restore the constitution. These
- groups include BRUC (the Christian bloc at
- the university) , JRC, Young Christian Revo-
lutionaries, and FEDELAC (the agrarian
Christian leagues), that are spread through-
out the country.
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The PRSC's, mostly young, are entlaustas-
_ tic. Ithwever, there are many sympathisers
to their cause whq raise serious doubts ainit
their ability to organize and their abiliV, to
Meet the Communists head on.
This also appears to be the U.S. view let-
ward the PESO in the Dominican Republic
Ba Well as the other Christian Democrat jr-
tie s in the hemisphere.
? 'Friends of the Dominican Social Christians
pObit out that the Communists are all oys
wigx organized and disciplined, follow a ilic-
tatorial line, and will eventually make Nola
of the Social Christians. These sources be-
lieve that the PRSC's are boo demagogic in
-"elf attacks on the United States. t
kward and the other PRSC's laugh iis
, They point out that the Coramu4lst
/No, and 14th June mc ye-
axe small and lack leadership. Toey
think that the qpnamuniSts should be al-
laWad to participate in elections as they did
IR 1i1k. iecuitipae, the PRSC's contirpn,
,i/lohiWitla the other rebels, to chant, "Clids-
rilleya si?Yankees no.
[From the Latin American desk at Tipagaxip
,
1144,tractiisi il'ETTELic: Tint Cove Taai
, =atm A WAR
Led by-tanks with 90-millimeter cannon tp.d
arniored troop carriers, the 2d Battalion .,of
the dtb U.S. 14a4nes rolled across the .44
41169r..4 Once trim.polo field on the west Irn
'On We of Santo,Domingo and moved alai-
tioualy into the war torn capital of he
Dominican Republic. As the col= 94
blinrned down AV4nicip, Independencia, pest
thampty side streets, people suddenly :a/-
I/eared in windows and doorways. Sone
tattled. Others stared. A few spoke. "I w sh
the Americana would take us over," muttel :ad
ial/Oniall. A. man nearby sighed and noddtd.
IStuoe they are here, we had better take ial-
-Vantage Of it."
. . ,
to: counterpoint to those desperate wortls
of welcome, the rattle and burp of re'lel
,
?gunfire echoed from the smoking city carrier
la.arely a mile up the road. Down the stnwt
went the marines, most of them green, all of
them scared, grimly clutching /d14
IMO ? machineguns and 3.5-inch. bazookts,
'Now the firing zreiir in intensity, and rel Fel
past the U.S. troops. NM'
:the ,, 0,,S.,Embassy,, two marines caught the
blast from a hidden raachinegun mist
in an unfinished building a short dieter
*sty. Nine more were wounded before to-,
abOlia Men came pp to blast the nest to,
-dirreds,
At approximately the same time, a bit,-
tall?la of the B.S. sqd Airborne Division roll hi
out of San Isidro airbase, 14 miles away rn
the other side of the city. Linking up wiAa
loyal Dominican troops, the GI's drove up to
the bridge spanning the Ozama River?al Id.
4;09 another volley of rebel fire. Throe
tours passed and the casualty toll mountid
20 wounded hefpre the U.S. forces could.
eni4e their objectives secured: the par a-
troopers to clear the approaches to the D/-
iirte, 3ridge into qanto Domingo, the
vines. to carve a 5.5-square-mile international
_
aOiit it of the
y as a refuge for U.S. n
ItiOnals and anyone else who hoped to I./.
inA()) alive in a city, zone berserk in 'Ow
hloodicat,ciyil war in recent Latin ,Arnerice
met /.exe WALT:, ,
-Itwas the first time that U.S. troops hs a
gone ashore on huainess in the Caribbean
Iglnee,-4,14, the first time since .1927...when
anartnek landed in Nica ' ragua that US.forams
hett Pefervened [LW Latin America nn .
Yet if ever a firm hand was needed
.to ,,keep. order, last week was the time and
the Dominican llepnbiie was the place. In
conues/ days of coup, counterattack, and
otiing warfare the small Caribbean it$.
land'republic had experienced a blooelhat
I
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U$SIONAL )1ECOAD.-,--.54NATE 42,tgus,t 23, 1965
surely as violent, and certainly more pro- ordered the Secretary of Defense to put the
longed than the ilag_aLeigs invasion by necessary American troops ashore in order
Cuban exiles against Fidel Castro. to give protection to hundreds of Americans
No one had an accurate chunt of the cas- who are still in the Dominican Republic and
unities as frenzied knots of soldiers and civil- to escort them safely back to this country..
Jana roamed the streets, shooting, looting and This same assistance will be available to the
herding people to their execution with cries nationals of other countries, some of whom
of "ParedOn. ParedOn." (To the wall. To have already asked for our help."
the waIL) Some reports put the dead at The Soviets, Red Chinese and Cubans re-
around _2,000, with the wounded perhaps 5 acted with howls about imperialist aggres-
times that. The Dominican Red Cross was sion. In a shrill May Day speech, Castro
burying people where they lay. In the hos- called the U.S. landing "one of the most
pitals, harried doctors were operating by criminal and humiliating actions of this
flaablight and without anesthetics, Santo century." The comment from the rest of
Domingo was a city without power, without Latin America was surprisingly mild. Few
Weter,,without food, without any semblance of the expected mobs materialized to hurl
of sanity. The rebels executed at least 110 rocks at U.S. Embassies. Chile's President,
opponents, hacked the head off a police of- Eduardo Frei and Venezuela's Rafil Leant
ficer and carried it about as a trophy. issued public statements deploring the U.S.
In the narrow sense, U.S. troops were there landings. But privately, many Latin Amer-
merely to protect some 2,400 terrified U.S. ican statesmen admitted the necessity for
citizens and other foreign nationals after quick U.S. action. Some even went on record
U.S. Ambassador William Tapley Bennett, about it. Mexico's Foreign Ministry said
Jr. had informed Washington that Domini- that it regretted a move "which evokes such
can authorities wanted 1745. help, that they painful memories," but recognized the hu-
comicl no longer guarantee the safety of nianitarian reasons and hoped the marines
American lives. in a much larger sense, the stay "will be as brief as posible." Added
troops were there quite simply to prevent Argentina's Foreign Minister Miguel Angel
another Cuba in the Caribbean. What had Zavala Ortiz: "Sometimes those who appear
happened, in its baldest terms, was an at- as intervening actually are only reacting
tempt by highly trained Castro-Communist against a hidden intervention."
agitators and their followers to turn an The Argentine was talking directly to Fidel
abortive comeback by a deposed Dominican
President into a "war of national libera-
tion."
The fighting started as a revolt by a group
of junior officers in favor of ousted President
Juan Bosch, currently in exile in Puerto Rico.
Within 3 days, that military revolve fizzled.
But not before vast stocks of arms had been
passed out to pro-Bosch civilians and their
Castroite allies, who succeeded in transform-
ing the attempted coup into a full-scale civil
war.
PLANE SPEED AHEAD
The Dominican most responsible for the
U.S. military presence was Elias Wessin y
Wessin, a tough little brigadier general who
commands the country's most powerful mili-
tary base and at the time the marines landed
was the key force for law and order. Twice
before, General Wessin y Wessin, 40, had
relied on his planes and tank-equipped sup-
porting troops to settle political disputes in
the Dominican Republic. He was the man
who deposed Juan Bosch in 1963, after a
series of angry confrontations over Com-
munist infiltration in the government. Now
he was fighting again, as he saw it, to pre-
vent a political struggle from becoming a
Communist takeover. And for help this
time, he called on the United States. Said
Wessin y Wessin: "We saved the country by
only a hair. The conspiracy was very big.
The majority of people did not even know
what was going on.
The U.S. decision to go in involved well-
knoWn risks. Memories of previous U.S. in-
terventions are still very much alive in Latin
America; the words "Yankee imperialism"
are a rallying cry for leftists everywhere.
President Johnson weighed the possible
damage to U.S. prestige and to the Alliance
or Progress, huddling with Secretary of says much. But he is a devout Catholic in
State Dean Rusk, Defense Secretary Robert a part of the world where males pay little
McNamara. CIA Boss William Raborn. As attention to their religion, and he regards
the situation grew more a1arminjbTTiour communism with a bleak, uncompromising
he snapped: "I will not have another Cuba hatred. As commander of the military train-
in the gari-hhean.," At last orders went out ing establishment at San Isidro airbase, he
to task Force 124, centered on the aircraft instituted mandatory Sunday Mass for re-
carrier Borer and with 1,800 combat-ready emits, taught courses in how to spot Com-
marines, to make 'flank speed for Santo munists. He also has at his disposal a six-
Domingo. Another set of orders started the able chunk of the Dominican Republic's fire-
82d Airborne at Fort Bragg, N.C., toward its power: 8 F-51 propeller-driven fighters, 8
C-124 and C-130 transports. Vampire Jets, a company of 23 tanks, and 2
On TV, Johnson explained his decision to infantry battalions totaling 1,700 men.
the Nation. "The United States Government In 1962, Wessin y Wessin helped stop the
has been informed by military authorities in Armed Forces Secretary from overthrowing
the Dominican Republic that American lives the seven-man civilian Council of State that
are in 444,ffer," said the -President- "I bays aci,laulistererg the couhtrJr after Trujillo. ? A
Castro. The 1962 missile confrontation may
have taken Russian IRBM's out of Cuba--
or so the United States believes?but it did
nothing to halt Castro's campaign of sub-
version around the hemisphere. According
to U.S. intelligence, Cuba training schools
turn out more than 1,500 American graduates
each year as guerrilla cadres.* Venezuela's
Army has been chasing them through the
interior without notable success. Colombia's
even more expert army no snoner cleaned out
the country's bandits than a pair of Castro-
style guerrilla bands cropped up in the
same Andean hills. There have been reports
of Communist guerrillas in Guatemala, Hon-
duras, Peru, Argentina, Brazil?and of course
the Dominican Republic, for which Castro
has a special affinity. Way back in Septem-
ber 1947 Fidel himself, then a student, was
involved in an unsuceccssful attempt to
launch a 1,100-man invasion force from
Cuba.
Considering the island's ugly history, it is a
wonder that the Dominican Republic's left-
ists did not make their move long before.
The tinder for revolution has been building
for generations, and in the unstable years
after dictator Rafael Leonidas Trujillo, the
Dconfinican military has been the strongest
anti-Communist Influence. Most often it
was in the person of Wessin y Wessin.
The son of poor Lebanese immigrants, Wes-
sin is a rare bird among the fine-feathered
Dominican officers. He prefers fatigues or
su:atans to fancy uniforms, scorns the usual
fruit salad decorations, and no one has ever
accused Elm of growing rich on graft. He
lives in a modest $12,000 concrete house with
his wife and two sans, enjoys cockfighting
and baseball. He is painfully shy among
strangers, speaks only Spanish and seldom
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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? SENATE z0543
year later, he led a coup to depose the coun-
try's newly elected President, Juan Bosch,
whose promises of reform won wide praise
but whose attitude toward Comniunists was
highly permissive. Bosch declared an am-
nesty for all exiles, permitted scores of far
leftists to return from Cuba and Europe?
"the better to watch them," he said. When
Bosch refused to restrict the Communists'
right to travel and even allowed trips to
Cuba, Wessin y Wessin demanded that the
President outlaw the Communist Party.
Bosch refused and demanded Wessin y Wes-
sin's resignation. Instead, in September
1963, the general staged the bloodless coup
that ousted Bosch and sent him into exile
In Puerto Rico. "As far as I'm concerned,"
says Wessin. y Wessin, "Bosch is a Commu-
nist."
Donald Reid Cabral, 41, a Santo Domingo
auto dealer, emerged as the leader of the
civilian triumvirate that succeeded Bosch.
With the general's backing, Reid instituted
some beginning social and economic reforms,
even tried to stop the time-honored military
practice of smuggling in goods from over-
seas. All the while, Bosch's supporters
plotted for their leader's return?and ap-
parently found considerable backing among
young armY officers. Bosch's men also
found encouragement among the country's
leftists, notably the Castroite 14th of June
movement, which attempted an abortive
anti-Trujillo invasion from Cuba in 1959.
To exactly what extent Bosch himself knew
of the Castroite involvement is unclear. The
fact remains that in the past few weeks, ac-
cording to intelligence sources, considerable
numbers of Cuban-trained Dominicans have
been slipping across the Windward Passage.
Last week three boats loaded with about 65
Dominicans were seen leaving the Cuban
port of Santiago, "I reported the conspiracy
to President Reid for 15 or 20 consecutive
days," says Wessin y Wession, "but he paid
no attention to me."
"KILL A POLICEMAN"
On Saturday, April 24, at 3:30 p.m., three
army sergeants and a handful of civilians
seized Radio Santo Domingo and announced
a "triumphant revolution to restore Juan
Bosch to the Presidency." The announce-
ment was enough to send the croak's boiling
out onto the streets, where agitators whipped
them into a frenzy. Army units at two near-
by bases joined the revolt, and mobs invaded
the central fire station, stole the engines
and drove them all night, sirens h6wling,
through the city streets.
The next morning, high-ranking army
officers, anxious to use the revolt as an excuse
for getting rid of Reid, told him that they
would not fire on the rebel troops. Reid had
no choice but to resign, and fled into hiding
at a friend's home. It was already too late
to smother the mob's pent-up passions. In-
sistently, the rebel radio exhorted: "Kill a
policeman i Kill a policeman!" "Come into
the street and bring three or four others with
you!" The frightened armymen who had
forced Reid's resignation turned the gov-
ernment Over to lawyer Rafael Molina Urefia,
a Bosch supporter, until Bosch himself could
return. In San Juan, Bosch announced that
he would be in Santo Domingo "just as soon
as the air force sends a plane for me."
"BRING TI-IEK TO ITS"
The Dominican Air Force was loyal to Wes-
sin y Wgssin. Up to this point he had only
watched from the sidelines at San Isidro.
At last he took a hand. Instead of a DC-3
to San Juan, he ordered his F-51.'s to strafe
the palace and the approaches to the Duarte
Bridge, which his tanks would cross to reach
the city. Several people were killed in the
raids, which roused the rebel radio and TV
stations to a new frenzy. Well-known mem-
bers of three Communist groups, including
the 14th of June, appeared on TV in Cuban-
style uniforms to harangue the audience into
action. They broadcast the addresses of loy-
alists' supporters and relatives. "Wessin's
sister lives at 25 Santiago" "Find the pilots'
families and bring them to us." And the
mob did. Wives and children of air force
pilots were dragged before TV cameras.
Warned the announcer: "We are going to
hold them at the bridge. If you strafe there,
you kill them."
On Sunday afternoon, army defectors dis-
tributed four truckloads of weapons among
rebels in the Ciudad Nueva, a low-cost hous-
ing area in the city's southeast: bazookas,
.50-cal. machineguns, automatic rifles. Pro-
Bosch rebels numbering about 2,000 to 4,000
began waging an urban guerrilla war, making
forays into the business district, thus para-
lyzing the city. Rebel mobs sacked the new
Pepsi-Cola plant, set fire to the offices of a
pro-Reid newspaper, destroyed Reicl,s auto
agency.
From his command post at San Isidro,
Wessin y Wessin announced operacian libre
to liberate the city. The army garrison at
San Cristobal rallied to his side; the navy
joined in, lobbed 3-inch shells at the palace.
Air Force planes made repeated strafing runs.
Then across the river rumbled the tanks,
firing almost point-blank into rebel Ciudod
Nueva.
Meanwhile the U.S. Embassy was gathering
Americans and other foreigners at the Em-
bajador Hotel for evacuation. More than 500
people were waiting at the hotel and on the
grounds when a group of rebel teenagers,
most of them kids from 16 to 18, suddenly
appeared waving burp guns. They lined the
men up against a wall as if to execute them,
then fired their automatic weapons harm-
lessly into the air. "Those brats just seemed
to delight in terrorizing us," said one U.S.
housewife. Only the arrival of a rebel army
colonel stopped the gunplay and permitted
the removal of the refugees to the port of
Haina, 12 miles away. There the U.S. Navy
was already waiting to load 1,172 of them
aboard transports. Some 1,000 other Ameri-
cans elected to stay behind, hoping the dis-
order would soon be ended.
COLLECTIVE MADNESS
For a time, ft did seem about over. Decid-
ing that they were licked, most of the leaders
of the army revolt trooped into the U.S. Em-
bassy, asked U.S. Ambassador Tapley Bennett
to arrange a cease-fire. He called Wessin y
Wessin, who immediately agreed. Fearing
reprisals, dozens of rebels, including Acting
President Molina, fled to political asylum in
foreign embassies. A junta composed of pro-
Wessin y Wessin officers was sworn in as a
provisional government.
The surrender of the army rebels had little
effect on the civilians, who by now were
beyond recall. All day Wednesday the fight-
ing intensified; Wessin y Wessin's troops
launched assault after assault in an attempt
to cross the Duarte Bridge. Each time they
were driven back. President Johnson or-
dered the first 405 marines ashore to protect
American lives at Embajador and to guard
the U.S. Embassy downtown. Helicopters
evacuating the remaining AMeliCalls and
Other nationals drew rebel gunfire. Snipers
opened up on the Marine company dug in
around the Embassy; the leathernecks fired
back, killing four rebels. The Salvadoran
Embassy was sacked and burned; shots spat-
tered into the Mexican, Peruvian and Ecua-
dorian Embassies. "This is collective mad-
ness," U.S. Ambassador Bennett told news-
men. "I don't know where we go from here."
LIST OF REDS
In San Juan, Bosch had his kind of an-
swers. He charged that the United States
had been duped into intervening by military
gangsters in the Dominican Republic. "The
only thing that Wessin y Wessin has done,"
he said, "is to bomb the first city of America
like a monster." Bosch conceded that "a few
Communists" might be fighting on his side,
but insisted that his supporters were in com-
plete command of the rebels. In reply, the
State Department released a list of 58 Com-
munist agitators, many of them gradautes of
Red Chinese and Czechoslovakian political
warfare schools, who were leading the street
fighting. Some of the leaders: Jaime Duran,
a Cuban-trained member of the Dominican
Young Communists' Party; Jos?. Issa, a
Communist who received guerrilla training
in Cuba, visited Prague in 1963, Moscow in
1964; Fidelio Despradel Rogues, a Peiping-
lining Communist.
The tragic fact was that no one seemed
to be in real command any more?not Bosch's
people, not the remaining army rebels, not
the Communists. At one rebel headquarters
in the Ciudad Nueva, a group of young rebels
pleadingly told Time's reporters: "We are not
Communists. We are active anti-Commu-
nists We are fighting for the constitution,
for Bosch. When the constitution is re-
stored, we will keep the Communists out.
We can handle them." Very possibly those
youngsters genuinely thought that they were
fighting for democracy. But before anyone
could talk rationally about restoring any-
thing in the Dominican Republic, there had
to be a cease-fire, and at week's end that still
seemed beyond any immediate grasp.
Meeting in emergency session in Washing-
ton, the Organization of American States
asked Msgr. Emanuelle Claxizio, the papal
nuncio in Santo Domingo, to negotiate a
cease-fire until a five-man truce team could
fly down to work out a lasting settlement.
Wessin y Wessin and other loyalist com-
manders and some rebel elements agreed
under two condtions: that no one would be
punished for any acts during the fighting,
and that the OAS would supervise the for-
mation of a provisional government. Even
as Msgr. Clarizio reported the hopeful news
to Washington, rebel forces captured Ozama
Fortress, the police headquarters, with its
stocks of weapons and ammunition. The
shooting continued throughout Saturday,
and the rebels claimed 10,000 armed fighters
compared with 3,000 for Wessin y Wessin's
loyalist forces.
DRIVING IN EARNEST
That was probably a gross exaggeration.
However many there were, there was no
letup in the bloodbath or in the sniping at
U.S. troops. Going into action for the first
time in earnest, the 82d Airborne joined
Dominican infantrymen in pushing out from
the bridge perimeter, fought their way
through the city's heart to link up with a
Marine column attacking from the western
International Zone. The drive cost another
two U.S. dead, at least a dozen wounded?.
and brought an announcement from Wash-
ington that 2,000 more troops were being
sent in bringing the total contingent to
7,000 men.
The likelihood is that some sort of peace,
either through force of arms or OAS per-
suasion, will eventually be imposed. But
the dangers of anarchy-fed Castroism will
remain for a long while. To prevent that,
President Johnson has accepted a clear and
unwavering U.S. responsibility. "The United
States," said the President, "will never de-
part from its commitment to the preserva-
tion of the right of all of the free people of
this hemisphere to choose their own course
without falling prey to international con-
spiracy from any quarter." The meaning
was as unmistakable as the presence of U.S.
combat troops in Santo Domingo.
HISPANIOLA: A HISTORY OF HATE
"There, in that high and mountainous
land, is the land of God." The date was
September 12, 1504, the speaker was
Christopher Columbus, and the occasion was
his fourth and final departure from the is-
land he discovered in 1492. Columbus
named it La Isla Espanola because it re-
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20544 C',INGRESSIONAL RECORD ?Stl'ITATE
4A1n4ed him of Spain. For the IS/mallard/ and Of Haiti's 4,500,000 people, 90 percent are
Await who follaWed hina, for the hull-AM 1131tanite. Life expectancy is 32.6 years; per
-they slaughtered, or the Negro slaves tley capita income has slipped to $70 a year, law-
Imported, and for anyone within a 131I ?let's est ha. the hemisphere. "Haitians," says
range last week, Hispaniola was more like Jaen puvalier in hisaott whisper, "have a destiny
on earth than the Warm, Jasmine-sceetecf to suffer.". And if his people complain, they
Paradiee it might be. Last week market., ran .nray?from a 63-page "Catechism of the
third tfree In 501years that U.S. troops aaye Revolution" turned out by the Government
been !tamed to intervene in the affairs 0a,the Printing Office and circulating last week 111
teetotal, hate-filled little Cari.latitiall idea 4., Bort-au-Prince. The Lord's Prayer.: "Our
Ihepaniola became Spain's -first permaaent Dec who are in the National Palace for Life,
Atilt:My in the New World, its key harbor and hallowed be Thy name by present and future
free port to all the andiee. Prom the 54340 generations, Thy will be done at Port-au-
-Domingo capital, Ponce de Lean sailed fOrth Prince and in the provinces. Give us this
to 5'1:wide, Balboa discovered the Pa lifk, day our new Haiti and never forgive the tree-
".o invaded peru, and Cortee conquered passes of the enemies of the Fatherland, who
relcp. Ii WAS the site of Latio Amer tea's spit every day on our Country. Let them
East cathedral in 1514, its first universil y in succumb to temptation and under the weight
1438. Even then, it was a land of viol& pee, of their own venom. Deliver them not from
Where Maefi carried the law in their 1mb/es, any evil. Amen."
-and the captains from Castile thought nth-
-5g of shearing an ear from a casaba:101A
Indian -ea letting their dogs disembowel Um.
,through war, wife and treaty, France nee:L-
*401 to get possession of the 30,000-squ are-
Mille island toward the end of the 18th iezi-
tory. Concentrating on the western taird
fatralitablons land the French hem gilt
Onearitis of Colonists, and with t leo]
came' tut numbers of Negro slaves f rom
Africa. The French called their Cariblean
ossesSion Saint ,Domingue, termed it the
Queen of the Antilles." So it was. In Ate
TOW& lit,s_forelgn.,,tTade approached $140 ? nil-
y ear , with vast profits from sugar, *of -
_cotton and indigo flowing hack
e. Before long, 40,000 whites were lard-
aig it over 45%060 blacks. Then one nght
st 1791, the island's painfully op-
slaves ros4 in bloody revolt. Sr: ned
h pitchforks, torches and machetes and
-mhanting voodoo dirges, they masseA wed
2,000 .ftenell planters and their familief on
DOMINICAN REPUBLIC
Th the Dominican Republic, the people
speak Spanish rather than Creole French.
Its soil is more fertile, and its population
density only half that of its smaller neighbor.
What it shares is a common history of chaos.
As in Haiti, bloody rebellions drove out the
European governors, first the French in 1809,
Then the Spanish, who had tried to reassert
their dominion. No sooner had the Domini-
-can "Republic declared its independence in
1821 than it was invaded by neighboring
Haiti, which occupied the country for 22
brutal years. The Haitians banned all for-
eign priests, severed papal relations, closed
the University of Santo Domingo, and levied
coriMscatory taxes. Not until 1844, when
Haiti was torn by one of its many civil wars,
did the Dominican Republic finally break
tree?only to stagger through 22 _revolutions
nver the next '70 years, including a brief pe-
riod (1861-65) when it once again reverted
`Vas Nireftern the. to Spanish rule. 154" 1 I one point, In 1860, the hapless Domini-
_ _ & clans .actually sought annexation by the
The fighting lasted more than a dee OP. United States and won support from
Prance sent 26,01/9 troops to 41d the re PresidentPresident Ulysses S. Grant. Congress re-
/10-1:i?only to see half of them wiped met, lo,Y fused on the grounds that it would
ow fever and 'the rest thrown MO violate the country's sovereignty. In 1916,
array: In 1804, a, former slave nained J1 the United States did the next best thing?it
Jacques Desialince proclaimed Haiti a 4'e,e sent in the Marines after a bloody series of
ild Mdo,Pendell-t Ration and hsoame its COI"- revolts. Unlike the intervention in Haiti,
E'Te draw up the charte:' of there were no puppet presidents. In the
endence," he telt "would reqiire words of the U.S. Navy's official order, it was
:Whi,te. =an- as parchment, bis "military occupation ? * * military govern-
bkufl an inkwell., his blood as ink, and a meat * ? * military law." The occupation
bayonet as a pen." Dessalhies died by an lasted 8 years, and along with their public
-Assassin's bullet '?;eithin 3 years. His E RC" works, the Marines created a national police
-ceksor, Henri Christophe, cared little por to keep peace after their departure. The po-
' Aliartera?black Or, white. Xte proclaiz ;ed lice became the instrument for one more
41InisPlf -Kind, set UP a ludicrous aristoolacY dictator: Rafael Leonidas Trujillo Molina, an
-(111alucling such titles as the Duke of Man pe- ambitious colonel who rigged elections in
lade a' 0, oracle), and ruled. as .2,980 and ruled the country for 81 deadening
a 'Mere UM despot until 1820, when his ei0a- years.
Sere 1-4,I.dit4 and; he committed suicide .12Y Trujillo's favorite titles were "benefactor of
? firing a silver bullet Into his brain, the fatherland," "chief protector of the work-
ever the net penturY, dictator foliaged ing class," "genius of peace." In a grim way,
dictator in Haiti. ,By 1910, rebellions :)all there was something to the brags. He hn-
oustea 13 of Haiti's , first 18 Pres1de:04. posed a rare order on his powder-keg country,
?Then, in the space Pf 47 months, one Prasi.- built elfielerit hospitals, crisscrossed the coun-
Idest Was blown tIP in his palace, another ya,s try with good roads, built housing projects for
believed, poisoned, three were deposed, and his 2,900,000 people, improved the water sup-
?' Vie last was grabbed by a mob and hae:ted ply, and increased literacy. Business pros-
- Into small pieces. President Woodrow Wile pared, and so did Trujillo?to the tune of an
soil"finejly ordered U.S. Marines to occirpy estimated $800 million fortune. He and his
the e.mantry in iins. They remained _19 family owned 65 percent of the country's
lears?and gave Haiti the only true peaco it sugar production, 12 of its 16 sugar mills, 35
has ever known,, Acting through puppet percent of its arable land. Home was a dozen
Presidents, theYdlearined rebels and bands, palaces and ranches dotted around the CO1112-
, built roads, irrigation projects, sanitaton try, each with a full staff of servants who
facilities, and Organized schools and hear faithfully prepared every meal every day in
pitals. F.D.R. witladaevi the Marines in 11a4, case the benefactor stopped by.
and Vaiti retiumed, to its Old. Ways: nine, Thousands of political opponents died in
governments in 20, years, the last headed by his secret police dungeons, mysterious auto
'Francois ,,papa Doe" Duvalier, 58. a onetime accidents, and suicides. There were electric
. cOntitu. _physician Who took office in 1157. chairs for slow, electrocution, another many-
proclaimed lainiSeH "President for lire," a pd armed electrical device attached by tiny
-Vale! tagcnigh voodoo mysticism and /a, screws Inserted into the skull, a rubber collar
tatrona-arm terror of his 5,000-man Tonipii that.cOlild be tightened to sever a man's head,
*ovate secret police. plus nail extractors, scissors for castration,
Aust 23, 1965
-leather-tonged whips, and small rubber
hammers. PA systems in the torture rooms
carried. every blood-curdling scream to other
.prisoners waiting their turn. If Trujillo fa-
vored variety, he also favored volume. One
-October night in 1937, he ordered his army
to eliminate all Haitian squatters in the Do-
minican Republic. In a 36-hour bloodbath,
some 15,000 men, women, and children were
massacred.
*Wino's end came in 1961 when four gun-
men intercepted his car on a lonely road out-
side the capital and riddled him with shot-
gun and pistol fire. In the 4 years since, the
Dominican Republic has suffered four coups,
and five changes of government, trying to
find its way out of the political vacuum cre-
ated by Trujillo's death. Democracy is still
hardly more than a word in a land that has
never known any law save force.
parom the Washington (D.C.) Evening Star,
June 1, 1965]
? SOME ANSWERS TO SECOND-GUESSERS
(By Eric Sevareid)
The tide of second guessing about the
American intervention in Santo Domingo--
as to its justification, its size, its methods
and its alma?had reached oceanic propor-
tions by the time this writer managed to get
to the first European city _established in the
New World. There in what Columbus called
"the land of God," had come the first teach-
ers and preachers, yet here remains, after five
centuries, one of the political hellholes of the
hemisphere, its soiled streets once again
thronged with armed men from abroad.
The scenes of bitter Sorrow in Santo Do-
Mingo have been well described; there are
other things, perhaps, worth putting down
at this late date. I thought I had rarely seen
such brave work by combat reporters, rarely
such emotional Involvement on the part of
some of them, rarely such a wealth of un-
confirmable reports and rumors, rarely such
a disastrous lack of contact between reports
and American officials who were not only
physically remote but for a long time si-
lenced by Presidential orders. And rarely
have I read such certain conclusions in
American press editorials about a phenom-
enon in which so much was uncertain and
inconclusive.
For me it is impossible to believe that the
Communist threat was a myth, impossible to
believe that a democratic and stable govern-
ment could have been formed by the im-
passioned leaders of thousands of armed and
impassioned people, a vast number of them
youngsters. It is hard for me to believe that
we could not have prevented the tragic fight-
ing in the northern part of the city, easy to
believe that we did prevent an even more
awful bloodletting in the congested down-
town region.
I cannot understand the cry that we put in
far too many men. An airport, several miles
of corridor and a safety sector with a long
perimeter require thousands of soldiers who
require other thousands to support and sup-
ply them. Nor can I understand the com-
plaint that the President acted with too
much haste.
Over many years I have been adjusted to
the complaint of "too late with too little."
I. find it hard to make a quick switch to
the complaint of "too soon with too much."
I fail to understand the editorialist who
points out with disdain that after all, there
were only a few handfuls of Communists
present.
In a very real sense their lack of numbers
is their strength. It was because they were
few that President Bosch had not bothered
to deal severely with them. It was because
they Were few that they could do much of
their work undetected. It was because they
were few that they could act with rapidity
when the explosion came. It was because
they :were few that ,foreign opinionrnakera
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August 28, 1965 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD -- SENATE 20545
?
ectuid make the Americans seem- ridiculous
and give us a propaganda defeat. As John
Bartlow Martin reminds us, Communists do
not make revolutions, they take them over.
Partly because of this?their small num-
bers?American troops could not invade the
heart of the city, or allow anyone else to
invade it.
You cannot risk causing many deaths in
order to capture a few individuals and expect,
ever, to justify such an action to anybody,
certainly not to the American people. So,
at this writing at least, the Dominican Com-
munists remain, finding safety as they first
found strength, in their numbers?their
small numbers.
And their small number in various other
Latin American countries lies near the heart
of the profound dilemma that confronts the
United States for the future. Revolts are
brewing in other nations to the south. In
all these revolts Communist elements will
be present. Are we to put down every up-
rising because a Communist threat is pres-
ent? Obviously we cannot, even though
some of these uprisings probably will produce
Communist governments. This is why Cas-
tro laughs in his beard. He believes the
political metamorphosis of Latin America is
not manageable on our terms.
But nothing in this realm of human action
Is inevitable; the game is not lost as long
as we act on the assumption that it can
be won. There are Latin societies strong
enough to handle the Communists on their
sown. Others will be galvanized into coun-
teraction by Communist victories or near
victories close by their borders.
Meantime the nonsense arguments should
stop. To say that the United States has
kept the Dominican Republic from enjoying
a free, stable democratic government is non-
sense; we have given them another chance
to find their feet on the long, hard road to
democracy. To say that the real fear in
Latin America is of American gunboat diplo-
macy is nonsense; every literate Latin Amer-
ican knows that American interventions have
always been temporary while communism is
permanent.
It is nonsense to indulge any longer the
self-conscious idea that Latin America's
troubles are the fault of the United States.
Some are; most are the fault of Latin Amer-
ica. Its ways of life are superior to ours in
more than a few respects, but not in respect
to the art of government. In the last cen-
tury and a half there have been in all of
Latin America approximately 3,700 coups,
rebellions, and civil wars.
[From the New York (N.Y.) Journal-
American, May 16, 1965]
nutted without involving overt and direct
acts of interventions In our day this type
of concealed, indirect but carefully calcula-
ted aggression?usually carried out through
the familiar tactics of infiltration, subver-
sion, and the use of proxies?has been de-
veloped by the Communists into a line art.
Indeed, it has become the most favored, as
well as the most effective tool of Communist
foreign policy."
Ambassador Chieh added:
? "Yet this type of aggression has received
no careful consideration in the textbooks of
international law. One of the basic tenets of
international law is the concept of direct
responsibility of states for their international
conduct. In the Communist strategy of pro-
tracted conflict, direct action is more often
than not avoided.
"This being so, it is often difficult to fasten
on the Communist governments the precise
legal blame, even when they have in fact com-
mitted legal aggression.
"The Communist governments do not set
great store by bourgeois international law.
Yet they do not hesitate to turn traditional
judicial concepts to their own advantage.
Now the U.S. action in the Dominican Re-
public was admittedly an act of intervention.
The U.S. Government never concealed this
fact. This intervention, far from being an
aggression, was intended to accomplish the
dual purpose of protecting American lives and
forestalling the Communist takeover of a sis-
ter republic. So the U.S. action was in fact
but a response to Communist intervention
and aggression."
Ambassador Chieh emphasized that if a
sovereign people in a helpless country are
threatened by the Red foe, their right must
be upheld to pick a government that is the
choice of the popular majority.
WORLD IN Focus: INTERVENTION VERSUS
Aaeriossiox
(By Pierre J. Huss)
The Soviet Union, Red China, and Com-
munist Cuba never tire of branding U.S.
military intervention in South Vietnam and
in the Dominican Republic as "naked aggres-
sion." We are so accustomed to hearing this
propaganda smear that we shrug it off. But
the Reds know from the big lie technique
that the oftener you tell a whopper the more
will unconsciously sink into the minds of
those you target as yonr next victim.
To set the record straight, then, what is
Intervention and aggression?especially if
you put it in the light of the large-scale
landing of U.S. Marines in the Dominican
Republic? I ask one of the foremost ex-
erts in U.N. to answer that question, Am-
bassador Liu Chieh of Nationalist China.
I turn this column over to Ambassador
glatelv ,
, "Interyention and aggression are not nec-
essarily synonymous Or interchangeable
words. In recent world history most fin-
grant sots of aggression have been corn-
No. 155-12
"It should be remembered," he said, "that
the right of self-determination can be prop-
erly exercised only in unfettered freedom.
? "In the case of the Dominican Republic,
there was ample evidence that Communist
conspirators attempted to exploit the chaos
and confusion that initially broke out in
Santo Domingo. It would have been a
mockery of the principle of self-determina-
tion if the Dominican people had been left at
the mercy of these Communist adventurers."
[Prom the Washington (D.C.) Daily News,
May 12, 1965]
U.S. DOMINICAN ACTION IS BOOST FOR
VIETNAMESE
(By Ray Cromley)
President Johnson's quick, strong action
in the Dominioan Republic may have a
major effect on morale in Vietnam.
A Vietnamese guerrilla fighter now in town
says privately that "the United States Do-
minican stand is more significant to him
than American raids in North Vietnam."
The northern raids have boosted South
Vietnamese confidence markedly. But there
has still been the nagging fear these bomb-
ings may be part of a U.S. buildup in prepa-
ration for negotiations. There's a strong be-
lied in South Vietnam that negotiations mean
defeat
dent could afford to let Vietnam go down
the drain.
By the same token, this Dominican action
may be discouraging to Hanoi.
The nagging fear among South Vietnamese
officials, military men, hamlet chiefs, police,
and everyone else who has stuck his neck
and his family's neck out in fighting the
Communists, has been that the United States
would pull out despite President Johnson's
assurances to the contrary.
BIG QUESTION
The one question almost every Vietnamese
I saw asked me on my trip through South
Vietnam was, "Will the United States stay if
the war is long and discouraging?"
These men knew a pullout would mean
death for themselves and their families at
the hands of Communists.
This worry about what the United States
would do has not engendered courage. In
some cases, it has meant that local officials
hedged their bets and kept tightly to neu-
trality, straying neither to the Communist
nor Government sides.
The feeling that the United States would
leave accounts in sizable measure for Cam-
bodia's Red China leanings, for Burma's
careful leftist "neutrality," and for the cau-
tiousness of millions of uncommitted people
in southeast Asia.
SOMETHING ELSE
Moving U.S. troops into the Dominican Re-
public, without &hilly shallying, to stop a
Red thrust in that tiny country, is some-
thing else again.
It means to this guerrilla fighter, and to
other Vietnamese he is in contact with, that
President Johnson really means to stop
communism.
Since Laos, they don't believe promises or
speeches.
But if Mr. Johnson is willing to stake U.S.
prestige in the tiny Dominican Republic,
then it's not likely, they reason, the Presi-
oxpEramarcz
Experience in the mainland China and
other Asian wars suggests that when the
people are certain which side will win a war,
they leap to that side in large numbers.
Because of the Korean, mainland China,
and Laos wars, there's a strong feeling in
Asia that the United States is good at
"quickie" fights, but that it wearies in long
struggles. This feeling accounts for the be-
lief in many Asian minds that in the long
run the Reds will win.
The trickle of information from South
Vietnam the past few days seems to indicate
the Dominican action will help convince
some doubters that the war is not in the
Communist bag.
[Prom the Bridgeport (Conn.)" Post, May 4,
196.51
AN ERROR RECTIFIED
It is now clear that the United States
originally underestimated the role of Com-
munists in the Dominican Republic. But
when the error was discovered, it acted
swiftly with armed forces.
That simplified analysis was made in in-
formed diplomatic circles in Washington over
the weekend following the turbulent week of
rioting and shooting in Santo Domingo.
The United States sent nearly 5,000 marines
and airborne troops into the island, solely to
rescue American and other foreign citizens
whose lives were endangered by the rising
anarchy. President Johnson announced that
4,500 additional marines and paratroops were
being sent to the Republic.
Some critics had been arguing that our
military operation was larger than necessary,
and was primarily intended to halt a rebel-
lion which threatened to open the way to
Communist domination of the little nation.
Actually, President Johnson's moves appear
to have been based on both considerations.
In his announcement that more troops were
to be sent to Santo Domingo, President John-
son said their presence was necessary to se-
cure the island against communism, as the
Red uprising had been taken over by Com-
munist conspirators directed from abroad.
This would seem clearly to mean that
Castro and his deadly crews are behind the
anarchy in the Dominican Republic. Law
and order broke down completely when re-
bellious army leaders who started the up-
rising acknowledged they could not control
Approved For Release 2003/10/15 : CIA-RDP67600446R000500110003-2
the elements they had set loose. Tliose elit-
ments were under control of hardcore,Conc
Xannists trained in Cuba and Czechoelovaki I,
and they began deliberate moves to attaCk.
"U.S. nationals and property.
By last midweek more than 50 Conarenualsla
had been identified, actively engaged in arm -
lug and leading toughs and criminals in an
effort to set up a second Communist ba,stio
in this hemisphere.
Pr, *dent Johnsori moved quickly, despite
the knowledge that many Latin Americar
and Europeans would be infuria,ted, by
lateral Yanke,e a?n. reminiscent c4, gun-
boat diplomacy. The President took the aet
tion becauee be feit that at the rrioMent
there Was no other course. It was certainly
better tO bruise, Listili Sensibilities than risl
the deaths of U.S, citizens, and a continue!
trSucl to ,anarcbY u.thicb would, --evcritualif
make another cnba, out of the Dominleal,
Reptiblic.
03/10/15 CIA-RDP67B00446R000500110003-2
ipictRESSIONAL, RECORD SENATE August 23 1965
dead from among their ranks in earlier fight-
_ ing had taught them to keep their eyes on
every roof and doorway before them and
their fingers tight on their triggers. That
way they could often spot the flicker of move-
men When a gunner on the other side pulled
his weapon in or out through a window
? frame or porch or balcony.
What burdened them heavily was plain
, frustration under the surging symphony of
gunfire. It was only a nagging anguish in
the morning really, because the volume of
incoming bullets built higher every hour, and
so we could hope we were going to make an
; attack to suppress the fire. In the noon heat,
when the ,order came to group ourselves in
several protected side streets, we luxuriated
in the knowledge that this was the first step
toward attacking. But then we heard the
battalion colonel acknowledge on his jeep
radio the order, to break up the waiting
groups. e men Were to be sent back to
, -
; their static positions, the same old rooftops
and road blocks and ;balconies where they
had been 'In the first place. Even the sun-
shine dimmed with disappointment.
lino no MA HS LAND
Through the afternoon, the sheer need to
find the guns hitting and wounding among
them drove little teams of troopers to dart
and seep into the back yards of the No Man's
Land they could not cross frontally. By
dusk, their firing had dirninshed the incom-
ing rounds to the point where I was again
able to count the shots I heard (in 2 min-
utes, 62, including grenade blasts). By near-
darkness, a jeep brought us hamburgers and
fresh water only a block behind the forward
positions and we stood around filling our
mouths and canteens without ducking.
But then we tried to go back to the "front."
It was Ruiz Street, and the rebel tank (de-
' Stroyed by 106-millimeter recoilless rifle fire
'after it gunned off Trooper Richard Green's
left leg) was still smoking over the body of
its dead crewman. Here as we ran zig-zag
across the street every one of us drew fire.
("You run like a ballerina?pretty slow, if
you know what I mean," one soldier told me
with amusement and contempt.)
'We can take care of those sniper jokers
from down here," his sergeant reassured us,
settling down on his elbow behind the earth
bank left in the street by the rebels a week
before as they dug out a tank trap.
A VOICE FROM A BALCONY
"Movement behind those parked cars down
there, sarge?I see it," coolly called the voice
of a paratrooper on an overhanging bal-
cony. There were two cars, 200 yards for-
;Ward oi us On the rebel street,
There weren't any more words for a few
minutes but I couldn't have heard them any-
way over the four rifles talking next to me.
Then a lieutenant with his upper arm
tightly bandaged handed me his binoculars.
The body of a man in a yellow shirt, who had
just been hit as he ducked behind the near-
est car, lay on the street.
The sergeant was grumbling that we still
hadn't gotten the other sniper when the lieu-
tenant, running bent over, came to us. He
said, low, "Consolidate across Caracas
Street?those are the orders."
"You mean, pull back the whole block?"
asked the sergeant, rolling onto his other
elbow.
"That's exactly what I mean," replied the
officer, holding his bandaged arm with his
good one as he crouched.
The sergeant swore. I said "It's a lousy
business." He said, "You bet."
"You MUST KNOW THAT YOU HAVE BECOME
LEGEND"?TRACING CASTRO'S BOATMAN BE-
HIND THE REBEL LINES IN DOMINICAN RE-
PUBLIC
VI.,TDER rIEE LN SANTO Domingo; A, W0w44.
REI,ORTER.'S ACCOUN'1I' Or A PAY Of FL.9TizIo
(By Dlekey Chappelle)
Sei`rn)repsINGQ.--- ellind the seeping sand.;
,
bay/ -protecting .,us from the rebel machine 1,
gull?or Was it guns?'somewhere up the lit.
ter.ed street, the paratroop sergeant squinted
at nothing in particular and grunted like lb
chance, "Lousy. It's lousy. The whole louse;
,
.i d4t
Analger,Aicajpecause the, machine
gtili eied then and he raised ,hinoself IL
fecy inches, to lire, back three short, profes-
atonal bu, retie. But I wanted to the' I
heload, lust said the etiost important thinfi_
ahout ,that tileeday ,in Santo Domingo. ?
"Tt Was, as leusy?as _savage, brutal, messy,
dirty?as any _fighting I've seen Americana
_have to do In 20 years
te us for I was on their line_
for 18 hours that day last _week?the stated.
mission of :'peacekeeping" was an unspeak.
able joke. What I saw, them do roof by roof_
arid room by room and house by house wee-
Slinply fight their way through a dozer
blocks of real estate from which people hae
been---,and ?kept right on?trying to kit
them. By the time it was over, the aree
cleared of gUne and gunners was only a few _
latIndred yards larger than it had been at
the ,keginn.p.g. But, the sweaty, terrifying
andhloody business Under the white glare of
the sun had gone on so long that I had tc
make an effOrt to remember, stillness, or the
Sensation of feeling safe. Those were expe-
rience that belonged in another world a very
long way from where I was.
. ;
AS 'run nsx DAWNED a
The sunrise that day had broken on that
other world; we had talked about which out-,
fit , was going home and when and what.
souVetirs lould be, bought and how big the
baby would be, a hoy born the week before
back at Fort Bragg to one of the recon scouts.
in the vanguard of U.S. troops here. One:
of the machinegunners told me he was just
v/riting his dad in Wyoming about "the 13th,
day of quiet on my position" when sud-
denlylt wasn't quiet any more. "I can't re-
illeMyer ,where I left, the, pencil and paper
but In10,Xe Vve fired 40p rounds today so
far, and cyeAttre?aren't done yet," he finished
the story, feeding a new belt into his weapon
on a rooftop.
ror most et the men, it was the, fourth
day of coraloat_cif their lives (they had under-
gone three late In April moving into their
guard positions On the buffer zone between
rebels and , junta forces). It was utterly
unlike , any military tactic they had prac-
ticed; they never had rehearsed what to do
If you were being shot at by "thousands of
rounds p 49.- (the ;official description from
the OAS) and could neither see nor charge _
out toward the places, the bullets were com-
ing from.
But on this day their limited experience
did not seep to bother them. The score of
, (By Dickey Chapelle)
SANTO Domugoo.?"Ten to one?those are
at least the odds against finding him" I
003/10/15 : CIA-RDP67B00446R000500110003-2
thought. Those were the chances against my
locating in the Dominican Republic one man
I'd known briefly 8 years before as a wounded
lighter in Fidel Castro's Cuban -guerrilla
forces.
But there were some clues. One was the
test of President Johnson's statement that
the U.S. Government possessed hard evidence
of Communist leadership in the Dominican
rebel forces.
The second, from a book I'd written, was an
excerpt of my story as a U.S. reporter inside
the Castro army between Thanksgiving and
Christmas, 1958. Marked in the margin was
a passage describing -a wounded, bearded of-
ficer who was "not even a Cuban but a Domi-
nican fighting Batista now so Castro's men
can fight Trujillo later." The wounded man
had been known as "Castro's boatman," pilot
of the ill-fated Gramma when it landed Fidel
and his 80-odd cohorts from Mexico onto the
beaches of Cuba's Oriente Province in 1956.
A CLUE IN THE NEWS
The final clue was a clipping from the Na-
tional Observer, a report that Ramon Pichi-
rilo Mega, a Dominican who had served as
helmsman of the Gramma, was now a secret
rebel troop leader in his native land.
If I did find him, I wondered why he would
confirm publicly his being a flesh-and-blood
link between two Yankee-go-home fighting
foreles, one in Cuba and one in the Dominican
Republic. But certainly there was no harm
in asking. So I came to Santo Domingo.
For a week in the bullet-scarred Caribbean
city my search uncovered nothing. He was
said, to be here, out; in the country, back in
Cuba. He was said to be alive, dead,
wounded, a Red propaganda story, an Amer-
ican propaganda story.
It seemed I was on the right track, though.
The PRD, the Constitutionalist Party of Col.
Francisco Caamana Deno, exuded much of
the; atmosphere I remembered with increas-
ing . vividness from Castro's 26th of July
movement. There were the same unkempt
and youthful hoods swaggering the littered
streets with the same rifles. (This was
literal in regard to the weapons, for many
of the first Ficielistas were armed .with rifles
they called "Santo Domingoes" after their
place of manufacture in the Dominican Re-
public.) There was the same lip-twisted,
sloganeering bitterness against the United
States.
HONEYMOON WITH THE PRESS
Finally, at the rebel headquarters in the
Copillo office building on Conde Street, there
was the same honeymoon with the U.S. press
that the Fidellstas, had once so profitably
enjoyed.
In vain, I heard veteran U.S. reporters who
had covered the Castro story and were now
in Santo Domingo warn their less experi-
enced colleagues how the tactic carbon-
copied other Red efforts. I remembered, too,
the ;extreme to which the Fidelistas carried
their we-have-nothing-to-hide-from-the-free
press policy; they had once confided to my
care, at a time when they knew I was going
back. through Elatista's lines, a map correctly
marked with their full troop deployments.
Would this characteristic phase of candor
existing here and now help my search for
Castro's boatman?
It developed that it would.
While the American reporters daily came
back and forth through the street barriers to
rebel territory for press conferences, they
continued to sleep and live back in the in-
ternational security zone. So, when I told
Rafael Dominguen, erstwhile press secretary
for exiled Juan Bosch and now the chief
liaison from Colonel Caamano to the foreign
press; that I wished to actually live with rebel
fighting men in their zone for a few days, he
seemed ,a little taken aback. But it was
quickly arranged. They could prove the
second step to finding Castro's boatman.
Please tell the truth about Us?only not
our last names," said the three men and a
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August 23, 1965 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD -j SEN20547
girl (the invalid wife of one of them) whose When I averred I liked working with Latins
life and quarters and Meals it had been and Turks because of their authoritarian
agreed that I share. coffee, I knew I'd said the right thing to
AN ATTRACTIVE GROUP please my hosts. I did not try to put into
words my sense of shock that we were going
The quarters were a cool five-room apart- to try to do military work all night on the
ment. on a rebel-zone thoroughfare whose few hundred calories we had just had; be-
original occupants had fled the city when hind the guns facing us I knew American
the shooting started. The food was pitiful, riflemen were at that hour eating three times
but the four yoUng revolutionaries were a as much.
thoroughly attractive crew, though their The coffee brought with it near-convival-
world was not mine. ity. I asked curiously: "If you could, what
Their leader was Raul, who at 19 possessed would you say to our readers?"
not only the face, form, and deep-lashed While Raul was thoughtful. Juan talked:
eyes of a Byron, but even enough talent and ,,We want to say the same as we write on
stick-to-it-iveness to have drafted a book- the walls: "Yanqui?go. OAS--go."
length diary of the bloody fighting. I asked, reservedly, "Do you mean that?"
The latter chapters, of course, were a tome ?We will fight until you go or we are dead,"
of hatred against U.S. military forces. To Rauk?intoned,
him, every suffering of a rebel noncombatant Trying to keep my voice empty of emo-
was fresh proof of Yankee infamy. When I tion, I said, "If we were all to go, you know
said I felt it important for Americans to you would bear certain consequences."
hear his reasoning, and offered to help see "Only one," was Raul's . answer. "Only
that his book manuscript was considered for
one. Then we could fight the junta troops
publication by the same Yankee editor who
again. We had won over them the night
printed my books, he looked quizzical. your Marines landed?if we had been losing,
He objected, "I do not have the money to your Ambassador would never have called for
publish my book. I have never had a job but troops. If we fight them again, we will win
as a clerk." again."
"In America, you do not pay to have a
book published; you are paid," I explained. "How can the few of you in the rebel
"Es verclad? (Is that true?)" he said, and zone win with your rifles over their tanks
stared wonderingly. and planes?" I wanted to know.
"As we won before over the tanks and
"I WONDER IF i'LL BE A WIDOW" planes. The soldiers of the junta do not
Cella, the blond girl-bride member of the want to fight and they will come over to
group, was his wife, a missionary's daugh- our side as they came before you Yankees
ter, born in Cuba. She had spent some time invaded us."
in the United States and spoke English no
It was quiet in the flickering candlelight;
more accented than mine. "Each night when
their view of history?even recent history?
Raul goes out I wonder if I'll be a widow
was not the same as generally believed in the
before the sun comes up. Like Rosa, my
United States. Then I was remembering how
neighbor. Your Marines killed her man, and
8 years ago I had watched Castro's rifle-
she had a miscarriage. Twins. She was like
men vanquish Batista's gunners and pilsots
one dead at first. But now she is combing
because "they did not want to fight."
her hair and putting on lipstick again."
The other white-collar member of our Raul broke in, "What would America do if
? group was sturdy, gentle Juan, 22. He had we won again?"
worked as a bookkeeper in an import agency
closed by the strife. But he wanted to prove
he was an impressionist painter by promising
me one of his paintings as soon as he could
get back to his studio, which was under para-
troop guns, he said. If the fortunes of war
corresponding had allowed, I would have ac-
cepted it too, for he was too pragmatic a
soul to have created a daub.
The real activist among the four was
square-featured, square-shouldered Um-
berto, at 26 the oldest, and by trade a steve-
dore. He joked about how his chocolate-
colored skin made him a less visible target
all of us with
our white faces. Clearly, he mothered the
TWO YEARS IN PRISON
I tried to choose words carefully. "You
can be sure the United States will not cease
to apply whatever measure of control is
needed in the Dominican Republic to make
certain your country does not become an-
other Cuba. You cannot want that to hap-
pen, either."
"We do not know about other countries,"
replied Raul without heat. "But we do know
about our life under the old Trujillo guards
who lead the junta. When other boys were
going to high school, I lived 2 years in prison
because my father had made Trujillo angry.
"
That is why I am a revolutionary.
only if the target is human, armed within 50
yards and moving toward you."
Then I started to take a picture?and the
scene galvanized into shrill Latin hysteria.
A gangling rebel with beagle-like features,
black-rimmed glasses, and a loaded auto-
matic rifle objected volubly to what I was
doing. His colleagues called him Four Eyes,
he called me a perdida Yanqui, and my
friends lost the argument. I made no photo-
graphs in the command post.
A half-dozen of the men and I shortly
went out to an emplacement of sandbags be-
side a roadblock at the corner of Cabral and
Arzobizbomarino Streets, a rifle shot south
of the U.S. paratroop line. In cloud-dimmed
moonlight, I could see that the position had
been chosen professionally and built to the
recommendations of any military manual in
print. Half was roofed with heavy timber
and sheet metal, held in place 14 a double
layer of sandbags; it could have protected
most of us from light artillery and all from
machinegun fire. There were ports for six
riflemen.
We had just settled down to sentry duty
at the post?I was almost dozing as I sat on
a broken concrete block?when three spaced
single shots spun over nearby. An exploding
flare overhead washed us in silver like statues.
Both light and noise seemed to come from
the no man's land beside us. There was no
movement to be seen in the light, but as it
faded, Four Eyes shrilly whispered something
about the perdida Yanqui. I did not think
it was a compliment.
He was interrupted when several black
wraiths soundlessly materialized on the street
before us. Juan challenged, his "Halt" an
octave higher than his speaking voice.
"It is the inspecting party of our senior
officer," Raul whispered to me, and then I
could make out the figures. Even without
Haul's identification, though, I would have
known which was the commander from the
on-balance stance on his wide bulk, and from
the reassuring depth of his chuckle at some-
thing reported to him. Obviously, here was
a man who had spent so many nights in this
kind of tension that it was now his natural
habitat. He murmured a sentence with the
words la Americana.
Juan whispered to me. "The comman-
dants asks if you want to see the most
dangerous place on our lines."
"I do," I whispered back, thinking after-
ward that the words from the marriage cere-
mony were a singularly inappropriate choice
under the circumstances.
"Then follow him." Juan moved me by
on night patrol than were
my shoulder out from behind the sandbags.
The comnaandante's shape moved off with
group, remembering to count ammunition Umberto took a fat steel watch out of his only a sibilance of boot scrape. I was glad
and monitor lights after dark and make sure pocket and interrupted us by pointing to its I was wearing tennis shoes so I could be as
people who were to be on duty in the chill
face; it showed 8:30. He explained that quiet. His silhouette showed no rifle, though
' rebel infantry guard shifts at night were 3 his three aides held theirs unshouldered
Of the night had a warm if ragged sweater
tied around their middles when they went hours long-9 to 12, midnight to 3, 3 o'clock at the ready in their hands.
to 6. If I wanted to observe them all, I was THE FEEL OF FIGHTING
BY A CANDLE'S LIGHT I don't know if there are any words to tell
out. to start with Raul, Juan, and Umberto. They
We ate together for the first time at dusk about the next hours I spent following the
would hand me over to their reliefs.
The men shortly, reported to their coin- commandante, or, for that matter, the nights
that night, and I counted 12 rifle shots-3
sounded very close?during the meal, al-
mand post with a dozen others for arms and I had done the same thing behind a tall
the night's orders. It was a brightly lighted American paratroop leader on the other side
though nobody else paid any attention to
them. The decor of the living room was
back bedroom in another deserted apart- of the line. The modern world of war in
a
kind of beatnik-Sears Roebuck and included ment up the street. Their assignments were darkness, even when the guns are silent or
four ill-matched, once-white garden chairs. given by a., spanking-neat professional young as here, sounding only one shot at a time,
What light we had flickered from a fat candle officer who carried in a glittering X over his still has no true poet. I wonder if Raul
uniformed shoulders two belts of linked ma- someday will find the lines to say meaning-
in a spattered glass set on the swept tile
chinegun cartridges. He had recently been fully how it really is.
floor so we cotdd not be silhouetted in the
wide window facing the neares
lines 150 yards away.
a, lieutenant of the junta forces. The silence weights?hostile, uncaring,
A FEAR OF PICTURES
Celia and Umberto fixed a chipped plate At first, the scene was in low key?just
for each of us in a dark, tiny kitchen. The young men in dark jackets and tennis shoes who wakes afraid of the dark. There is no
Meal consisted. of One egg, Well salted and each taking and loading a rifle. Aside Juan comfort in the familiar feel of rubbled
fried in corn oil from it tin Marked "gift of told me, "Orders are the same?we cannot asphalt under your feet, and you step up dim
the people of the thlted States nOt to be fire from our positions until the perdidos curbs and rises and on faith, only because to
told"; two pIantanos (they look like bananas Yanquis shoot at us." I did not tell him stumble would admit the demons of imagi-
and taste like potatoes) similarly fried, and that only a few days before, I had covered nation across the consciousness.
one small cup of sweet coffee almost thick the nearby paratroops and heard their orders: I fixed my eyes on the moving darkness
enough to pour like sirup. "You will not fire unless fired on and then ahead I knew was the commandante. The
ghostly, only one effort at self-control re-
- - he dark of the sobbing child
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8 Approved For Relea
tessatl.r4nCe of his ,baoad back ,Waa
wart on my face ill the gentle night wind.
We went up a riaing street to the north and.
Were ehallenged ?three time, allnest every 10
yards, by other rebel commandoa. Anothar
single shot spun past very high. I agreed to
niteelf with the "'"--inalinandante's Judgmeit
that where we were heading was the meat
dangerous place. For I recognized it; we wei e
aPPreaching the lines of the 5011th Infantry
of the 6.2d Airborne alongside whose corm-
pany commander, Capt. Bernard Tullius -
tan, T had only a year before watched Sout
Vietnamese infantrymen in combat in tb
' Mekong Delta. More to the point, I'd hee
'erdight with these paratroops here an1
eVa. WOW to?. be utterly alert. I very much
did not,want ta lite, probing around in front
- Of their lines in elarkneas with an armed part
I did Mat hafe' time to finish the thought,
W41.9h, ,Probably was just as well. We ha41
thane to ,atreet_. along Ozama. Rivet
through the heart of Santo Domingo. ?With
an imperioui gesture, the commandant t
motioned Me first, to his side, then au? ;
through a wooden eneek. I could hear tint.
lap, of witvea nude; i; the shack seemed to.
. a
-"dent "t2tvas4a +syrinx"
_
Lkoolt through the window before you-,
y61.1 see' the invasor, "Yanqui before you?
ver? cliase?,''ra voice whispered to me.
(44.i.,..V.ygailde was right. The nearest
, ?bat/a e_earned near enough tc
' qpit:af. Juxe 4 accordin to C this a ernoon for
A-RDP67100446R000500110003-2
SSIQNL lacCV SgNATE liggust 23, 1965
American unit was positioned. But how he Venezuela and Costa Rica and Guatemala
happened to miss all of us at that range, since last I saw you," he nodded.
I never did find out. "Then you must know you have become a
RACK TO THE STARTING POINT kind of legend. You are secret no longer.
With a welcome sense of anticlimax al- Will you not permit me to take your plc-
most flowing over us, we climbed another tum"
rising street that brought us back almost He posed. I shot fast. He raised his hand.
where we'd started. Here the commandante "Now do not say I am a Communist, Ameri-
talked in low but nearly normal tones. cana. If I were truly a Red, / could have
"Do not underestimate us as weak, a good life staying in Cuba. But you see I
Americana," he began. "Even the church am here instead, where I was born."
is on our side. Our bishop gives us the food We walked back to Raul's apartment al-
so we can fight." most without speaking.
I asked where the bishop got the food. I was mulling over a fact with an un-
The comrnandarite said he would come pleasant cutting edge. Upon me now was a
back to get me so I could see for myself as moment of truth that comes uniquely to
soon as it got light. "Will you rest now?" I most professional observers of human con-
flict. My own life had at different times and
asked as he turned to go. He chuckled at my
!question, "I do not sleep, Americana. I places been protected by two groups of armed
' cannot: because the troops facing mine are human beings now committed to mortal
from your country. If they were from the combat against each other.
junta instead of the United States, I could The paratroops so well defending the free-
sleep. But they are American so I will be dona they knew; the rebels as best they could
resisting an oppression they knew?how had
alert all night." And after this gallantry he
was gone. these forces come face to face with loaded
I spent the rest of the hours of darkness weapons?
With the other shifts of the rebel fighters The last chapter came a day later. First,
south of Raul's positions. I watched and from the balcony of Raul and Celia's bor-
, walked as their lines were checked. When rowed apartment I photographed a crowd of
the Bun rose again over the far river bank several thousand who had lined up at dawn
and seemed to balance on the U.S. gun posi- to receive a gift of oil and rice and milk
tion atop a high flour mill over there, the through the U.S. food-for-peace program.
commandants again appear. He wanted me Later, I was to see official reports that five
to photograph the hilltop slum close by the trailer loads, each of 10 tons, had crossed into
paratroop position ------,.w e night of' 'the rebel zone. the previous ft
We oozed back in the daripless a block
,
along the riverfront street. The comman-
dant motioned tp, his side again. One
?this aidea translated. ,
Says; if he were the paratroop cora-
hiriander, he Would not let his enemy come so
did nott4ary anything. We went back an-
'other 14ock, along the, water. Then the cora-
/Wader ne0eired again.
"We think Arneric,in,soldiers are afraid."
/knew I had to mNxe the answer fact, but
1 reinembered to keep it low. "We are all
afraid-a-we and you too?to see your people
beconie like castro's., Americans will fight
anyone to keepthat from happening."
064d, Be the, ceinunattrlante cooly cock
hislaead $2,,onc,,a1cle as Able was repeated in
Sp,anish. tranalatpr, rawly was amused.
"The cOmmandante, wants to know if you
have friends who are mothers ,of Ya-nquis
down here." ,
:
I said yes.
can't you repOrters get them to make
a catopaign writing letters to beg to bring
etr_boYs home before we kill theta? Like
- the American inothers did in Eorea, you
knOW,," ,
t 141, very distinctly, "Probably the press
?adaff do just that. But it is not going to
tlo So." A rifle fired almost beside us. And
at us.
_ _? ?
"We had been a knot.of perhaps five people
standing in the darkneas of the narrow street
eat to t4P,Wfiter., The single shot had come
rOM 89 cicbse tthought I could have put my
'hand over the shocking incandescence of the
nr*Ie. West, too near to have come from
The American line. The bullet had passed
between Ifs beading toward the paratroopers.
Would thet,S. forces answer?
? All of uS Were lying flat on our stomachs
, behind the, nexest .concealtnent?a wooden
but?before I'd finished that thought. The
silence was aba011dte. I disentangled my leg
from a rifle barrel a,a, the commandante
Materialized erect in print of us.
"Bfci-kay," adding in Spanish that
e shot hed come froaa one of his own
entries, trater, I found out why he fired.
e lipard Yinglish. being spoken and
nein we must be an American scout
fiettY from across the river where another
? , gColonel aamano s re- s distribution. In fact, some of it was
? ports to the United Nations, an artillery at that hour being given out to families liv-
_ barrage had killed two noncombatants, ing m the rebel zone by the Catholic charita-
ble agency, Caritas.
PHOTOGRAPHING THE SLUM
? It was a hideous, sprawling slum. I first But at the distribution point I visited, no
photographed on a laundry line a dress and food had been delivered. Instead, the peo-
ple were turned away with the rumor that
newly washed jeans, so torn that I believed,
?ns I was told, that their last wearers had the Yankee invaders had not permitted the
trucks to cross the roadblocks into the rebel
- died in artillery fire. Next I saw half a
7 dozen wide shell holes in the shacks and in- zone.
terviewed a score of survivors, some of them So it was a crowd grumbling against Amer-
bandaged. I came away sure the community ica that receded emptyhanded past the door-
. had been savagely hit but?like the United way to which Celia and I went down to greet
Nations investigators?unable to decide by Raul, Juan, and Umberto as they came
whom. "home" from their sentry duty just after 6
The commandants learned I'd said this
. and, angrily, he mounted a smashed table
before a broken mirror to dig out of the wall
- fragments of a shell that had come through
. the roof and exploded in the living room.
He assured me I'd find the fragments were
from a made-in-U.S.A. round. I agreed but
aenainded him that all sides in the fighting
h? ere possessed arms supplied by the United
States under military aid agreements dating
back to - Trujillo. "You must remember
that," I finished.
"I don't know," he said. "I was not here
then." _
Tior?the-itrst time in the brightening
morning light, I looked squarely into his
face. Was it truly familiar, or was my judg-
- ment suspect after the night's misadven-
ttures? Standing amid the nibbled slum, I
drew a deep breath.
"Were you in Cuba then? I mean, werc
you?Castro's boatman?"
The eyes narrowed and the answer came
by reflex?proudly.
"I was the commander of Fidel's Gramma
and later, in the mountains where you were,
Americana, a leader of a battalion for him."
"Are you Pichirilo?"
"My name is Ramon Pichirilo Mejia."
"Did you remember who I was?"
He looked pityingly at me. "Si ?si,
Americana," he grinned and spoke slowly as
? sif the word! tasted good. "Surely you do not
tlaink I, a leader of soldiers, would permit
someone I did not know into my sector?"
"Are you then well after what happened
to you in Cuba?"
"Well enough to have led people against
heir oppressors in Bolivia and Colttrobi d
Approved For Releas
a all
o'clock. I saw that "Four Eyes" was with
them. He at once addressed me with weary
hostility.
"You see, it is just as I always say. All
Americans are bad. Always."
Juan raised his hand to "Four Eyes." He
seemed offended more at his fellow rebel's
manners than his sentiments, but he said,
"Speak not so to her."
This only sparked "Four Eyes" further. He
said distinctly, "I will speak so. I say, all
Americans are bad. All of them should be
killed!, He looked squarely at me across the
? half dozen feet between us.
The truth is that he was not very fright-
ening, and I simply said mockingly, "I don't
think you mean that. There are 190 million
of us, Chico. You don't even intend to start
with this one?" and I pointed to myself.
"I would like to, only you are a woman
and so--"
The threat was never finished. Moving so
swiftly I don't know from which direction he
came, Commandante Pichirilo suddenly stood
rock steady between us. His face furious, he
thrust me back into the vestibule with one
hand, and "Pour Eyes" out into the street
with the other. When he had seen "Four
Eyes" walk slowly off, he ruefully turned to
me. He said, ''Till we meet again," and
marched off himself without a backward
glance. I left the rebel zone later that morn-
ing.
Several days later, I sat down to write this
story. Someone asked me: "Well, did you
find your villain of the piece?" "I found
the boatman," I said. "But I don't know if
that answers your question. I just don't
know."
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Approved For Release 2003/10/15 : CIA-RDP671300446R0005001
Auilust 23, 1965
CouNeu.. oil SUPPORT PRESIDENT JOHNSON DOMiniCan and Vietnamese Communists a temporary arrangement for occupation pur-
IN 'VIETNAM AND SANTO DOMINGO share the same fundamental purpose to die poses but has continued beca,use c>f MoscoW's
WasmNaroti, D.C., ' credit our country and undermine its power stubborn refusal to permit German reunifi-
May 19, 1965. as the strongest democratic barrier to the cation in freedom. In these 20 years the
The executive council has considered the international Communist drive for world division of Germany has steadily deepened
latest developments in war-ravaged Vietnam domination, and worsened, as has the Soviet intransigence
and in strife-torn Santo Domingo. We have Months ago, the Communist North Viet- in denying the German people the right of
examined the course plusued by President nam Premier, Pham Van Dong, emphasized self-determination.
Johnson to end Communist aggression that the warwagedh forces in South
an a de-
against the South Vietnamese and to prevent Vietnam "attracts the attention of the world.
Communist subversion of the efforts of the especially the peoples in South America. The
Dominican people to return to constitutional struggle of our southern compatriots is as
government. The executive council, acting great a countribution to the people's revolu-
on reports from its own investigators on the tion in the world as the battle of Dien Bien
spot, declares its'unequivocal support of the Phu." The Communist military leader, Gen-
measures, taken to date, by President John- eral Giap, struck the same note when he
son to meet these critical situations, stressed that "South Vietnam is the model
We note with regret the rejection by Mos- of the national liberation movement in our
cow, Peiping, and Hanoi of the repeated of- time. If the special warfare that the U.S.
fers by President Johnson for unconditional imperialists are testing in South Vietnam
discussions of ways and means of securing is overcome, this means that it can be de-
s just peace in Vietnam. We particularly feated everywhere in the world."
deplore their callous opposition to the Presi- Our country can never defeat the Commu-
dent's program for fortifying the foundations nist reactionaries by supporting other reac-
of a lasting peace by improving the living tionaries OT by relying solely on military
? conditions of the long-suffering, impover- means. The building of a strong democracy
ished peoples of this turbulent area. These requires adequate social reforms and a
Communist rulers have even scorned the healthy economy. It is the historic duty of
peace efforts of the 17 nonalined nations, the trade unions to play a decisive part in
The executive council welcomes the strengthening democracy and fostering so-
prompt and energetic measures taken by the cial justice as the firmest barrier to Commu-
President to prevent the Communist at- nist subversion and domination. The ex-
tempt to seize control of the Dominican ecutive council supports President Johnson's
democratic revolutionary movement and to efforts to help in the restoration of constitu.
foist a Castro-type dictatorship on Santo tional democratic government and the pro-
Domingo. Had our Government shown such motion of social reforms and economic prog-
prompt initiative in 1959, Cuba would today ress in Santo Domingo. In this light, our
be a free country and not a Communist Government would be well advised to accord
slave state. full diplomatic recognition only to a consti-
We reject as unfounded in fact the poet- tutionally established Dominican democratic
that the President's Dominician policy IS a Even with the most generous assistance that the free world will not tire in its efforts
to bring about German reunification in
tion taken by Senator Goldwater and others government.
throwback to old line gunboat diplomacy. from our country, it will take much time,
Our Government's initiative is motivated patience and persistence to develop stable freedom.
solely by a determination to safeguard the democratic institutions in South Vietnam Otherwise, Moscow will come to believe
lives of American and other nationals and and Santo Domingo. Serious difficulties in that the West has become accustomed to the
to prevent a dangerous deterioration of the the path of their democratic development are status quo and is prepared to accept it de
Dordinican crisis which could lead to the unavoidable because the Communist menace facto, if not de jure, as permanent. To dis-
establishment of another Communist terror in both countries is continually supported by pel any doubts about the Allied interest in
regime and the slaughter of thousands. In outside powers. In such grave situations, ending the partition of Germany, we should
sharp contrast to the gunboat diplomacy it is the responsibility of our country, which persist in making it continuously and un-
which often supported reactionaries and pro- alone has the will and the power for de- equivocally clear to the Soviets that the
tected private exploitation, President John- ' tarring aggression, to take prompt and timely West will not release them of their oblige-
son has offered to give unstinting economic initiative in the interest of peace and free- tions regarding German reunification and
that it will not consider any detente as gen-
assistance to the Dominican people so that dom. uine and durable as long as the German
they may build a prosperous democracy and problem has not been settled in accordance
strengthen their national independence. with the principle of self-determination.
the people of our country and all Latin in advance if the West does not act in unity
All such efforts will, however, be doomed
The President deserves the full support of
building of effective inter-American peace- and strength. Only if the three Allies are
America in his tireless efforts to hasten the
keeping machinery and achieve collective united and determined will their dealings
with Moscow have a chance of success. '
and assuring the Dominican people of the Unfortunately, the unanimous policy of
responsibility for normalizing the situation
earliest opportunity to elect a government of the three Western Powers has been endan?
their own free choice. The administration's ' gered by President de Gaulle's declared in-
acceptance of the U.N. good offices, alongside tention to "Europeanize" the German ques-
of the OAS, in the Dominican crisis, further tion. The consequence of his claim that the
demonstrates Washington's earnest desire solution of the German problem is a matter
to end the destructive conflict. for Germany's neighbors would be to exclude
Great Britain and, above all, the United
though continents apart, are basically in- States from any future negotiations and de-
The crisis in Vietnam and Santo Domingo,
terrelated: They must be faced in the con- cisions on German reunification. This
text of the entire world crisis. To date, would mean the end of four-power responsi-
Castro has made three attempts to inter- bility and make France and the Soviet Union
the sole arbiters of Germany's fate.
munist dictatorship an the Dominican pee- It is obvious that the absence of America
Vene in Santo Domingo and foist a Cora-
ple. In Santo Domingo, as in Vietnam, our and Britain from the conference table would
country seeks only to thwart a new and most tremendously weaken the Western negotia-
dangerous form of intervention by the fifth tors while the bargaining position of the
columns of Communist imperialism. There Soviet Union would be strengthened. In
are 'differences between the war in Vietnam such a power constellation the cause of a
*rid the tragic struggle in the Dominican Re- free and united any would be in the
before negotiations have begun, y
Nevertheless, there is still a German prob- sions such as recognition of the Oder-Neisse
lem today?a problem that a constant source line. The frontiers of a free and united
of international concern and tension. This Germany should be left to a final peace con-
problem is rooted in the partition of Ger- ference.
CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? SENATE 10003-2,
m549
STATEMENT BY THE AFL-CIO EXECUTIVE ship oh the people. Furthermore, the many that began after the end of the war as
To whatever extent there has e
tente in Soviet relations with the West since
Khrushchev's defeat in the Cuban missile
crisis, the German issue was not affeCted
by it. On the contrary, the attitude of the
Kremlin rulers toward the Federal Republic
has hardened in recent months. Their slan-
derous campaign against Bonn has been in-
tensified. When the Bundestag exercised its
right to meet in West Berlin, the Soviet au-
thorities resorted to irresponsible harass-
ments and rejected all unofficial feelers fox
new negotiations about Germany.
Notwithstanding this adamant posture of
the 'U.S.S.R., it is a matter of great urgency
that the problem of German national unity
in freedom should be reactivated. Since the
Geneva Conference of 1959, no talks on Ger-
many have been held. The United States,
Great Britain and France which, together
with the Soviet Union, have assumed, under
the Potsdam agreement, the responsibility
for German reunification, should take the
initiative and insist on new four-power ne-
gotiations on the German problem. As in
the case of Austria, a permanent four-power
commission should be formed which would
continue to meet until a final peace treaty
had been arrived at with a freely elected all-
German government.
It may be that a new Allied diplomatic ini-
tiative might not accomplish significant
ains But it will, at least, remind Moscow
STATEMENT BY THE AFL-CIO EXECUTIVE
COUNCIL ON GERMANY
WASHINGTON, D.C.,
May 19, 1965.
Twenty years ago this month, Nazi Ger-
many capitulated and World War II ended
in Europe. During the two decades that fol-
lowed its crushing defeat, Germany has
undergone a profound transformation. With
the help, support, and encouragement of the
Western allies, especially the United States,
Germany has become a prosperous country
with a sound economy. What is more, it has
also become a strong and healthy democracy.
In sharp contrast with the political sit-
uation after the First World War, when
chauvinistic, reactionary and radical ele-
ments undermined the Weimar Republic, the
German people have repudiated militarism,
extremism and all expansionist and aggres-
sive designs. They have established a
stable-
parliamentary system and free institutions,
including vigorous trade union movement.
The change had been so complete that
10 years after its utter destruction, the demo-
cratic powers granted Germany, on May 5,
1955, its sovereignty. The German Federal
Republic WaS received into the Western com-
munity and admitted to NATO where it has
b ome a most loyal and reliable member
, public, but it is' the c`onunon factors in the gravest jeopardy.
,..?.two critical -areas Which are of overriding It would be a mistake to offer Moscow, even
corLces-
Importance. Aided, armed, and directed by
Moscow and Peiping, by Hanoi and Havana,
the Communist subversives in both coun-
tries have resorted to all-out military action
for the purpose of imposing their dictator-
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Approved For Releas 2003/10/15 : CIA-RDP671300446R000500110003-2
NGRESSIO,NAL RECQRD STLNA-TE
August 23, 1'965
? ognizing that without a just and sc und
Belittlement of tkie.GerMan question, there can
be no secure peace in Europe, the Executive
Council. of the APL-CIO urges our Gov ern-
'nett to make new effortato bring abo it a
reatimption of talks on Germany. We cern-
Mend the administration for its firmness in
Upholding the principle of four-power re-
sponsibility for German unity. We propose
- that the Allies shemid Intensify their sup sort
of eLYeder al Republic's endeavors tc be
3.,00':-0311 zed throughout the world as the sole
legitimate representative of the eistire ger-
man people. We further urge that our
Government strongly oppose any meanure
which might promote consolidation of the
Odious Ulbricht regime or enhance its inter-
national prestige. Finally, the executive
0014.01 calls upon our Government to con-
trite to defend yigorously the freedom. of
West Berlin, its ,right to maintain close bo ads
WitA the Federal lrie,public, and free acces t to
the city.
'? On the occasion of the 20th anniversary
of the day that brought the most tragic laid
Shameful period in German history to a
close, and on the occasion of the 10th an
.ry of their bconiJg again a sovereign
nitton,-tbe Ari.--pxo Executive Council as
gain tke: German people and particularly 2-3
German free trade union movement, ? at
DGB, of American labor's friendship en.
SOlidarity.
!From tne Inter-American Lahor Bullet In
390 19651 ?
AFL-0I0 Sinvoars JOHNSON Ponscsme
Do
It will take much time, patience, and per-
sistence to develop stable democratic insti-
tutions in South Vietnam and Santo Do-
mingo, the council concluded, adding that
"it is the responsibilty of our country, which
alone has the will and the power for deter-
ring aggression, to take prompt and timely
initiative in the interest of peace and free-
dom."
[From the Inter-American Labor Bulletin,
July 1965]
AFL-CIO FIXFCIITIVE COUNCIL STATEMENT ON
VIETNAM AND SANTO DOMINGO
(Condensed)
The executive council has considered the
latest developments in war-ravaged Vietnam
and in strife-torn Santo Domingo. We have
examined the course pursued by President
Johnson to end Communist aggression
against the South Vietnamese and to prevent
Communist subversion of the efforts of the
Dominican people to return to constitutional
government. The executive council, acting
on reports from its own investigators on the
spot, declares its unequivocal support of the
measures, taken to date, by President John-
son to meet these critical situations.
e The executive council welcomes the prompt
e and energetic measures taken by the Presi-
? dent to prevent the Communist attempt to
seize control of the Dominicat democratic
revolUtionary movement and to foist a
? Castro-type dictatorship on Santo Domingo.
' Had our Government shown such prompt
? initiative in 1959, Cuba would today be a
free country and not a Communist slave
state
We reject as unfounded in fact the posi-
tion taken by Senator Goldwater and others
that the President's Dominican policy is a
throwback to old line gunboat diplomacy.
Our Government's initiative is motivated ?
solely by a determination to safeguard the
lives of American and other nationals and to
prevent a dangerous 'deterioration of the tb
Dominican crisis which could lead to the Al
establishment of another Communist regime
and the slaughter of thousands. In sharp pa
contrast to the gunboat diplomacy which ca
often supported reactionaries and protected co
private exploitation, President Johnson has pe
offered to give unstinting economic assistance an
to the Dominican people so that they may ba
build a prosperous democracy and strengthen an
The AFL-CIO has strongly voiced its "tin-
. equivocal support" of President John s? i's
policies in Vietnam and the Dominican
public and declared that the crises in. times
eOttistrie4 are "interrelated" by the "filth
001U2ans of Coramnaist imperialism."
In a statement issued at its meeting in
Washington, D.C., the federation's executive
contscil assailed as !'unfounded" the positi
-taken by former Senator Barry M. Goldwal er
littd Others that the President's Dominic in
dflcy is a throwback to old-line "gunbcat
diplomacy." The president is neither sup-
porting reactionaries, nor protecting prive te
ekploitation the ceamen said,, but offertig
coo_tirt:Ota4t844Cq to the Dominican peor le
to 1U id prosperous economy and strengti-
en their" independence,
The administration's efforts to termina
e fighting in Santo Domingo, the council
Said, was evidenced, by its acceptance of the
United Nations good ?faces and its efforts
build peacekeeping machinery through the
Organization of American States.
/II its analysis of the two crisis areas, ti
Council said "there are differences between
the war in Vietnam and the tragic struggle
in the Dominican Republic, but it is the con mon factors factors in -gas ,two critical areas which
are of overriding importance. Aided, arme M
and directed by Moscow and Peiping, I y
Hanoi and Havana? the Communist sub-
versives in both countries have resorted to
al-out military action for the purpose cff
imposing their dictatorship on the people"
"The Communist reactionaries" can never
be defeated by supporting other reactionaries
o by relying solely on military means, the
cOuticil declared, The answer is to build
strong democracy on a healthy economy an I
adequate social reforn,ss, the statement sale ,
adding: -
"It is the historic duty of the trade unions
to play a decisive part in strengthening de?
istOcrady and fostering social justice as th )
firmest barrier to Communist subversion
domination,"In the Jporainicat Republic, the bound I
tirted the administration to accord full dip.
10/11atid recognition "only to a constitution-
ally established Dominican democratic goy-
eft/tent. dictatorshi on the people. Furtherm.re, Continent.
p
the Dominican and ,Vietnamese Communists
share the same fundamental purpose: to
discredit our country and undermine its
power as the strongest democratic barrier to
the international Communist drive for world
domination,
Our country can never defeat the Com-
munist reactionaries by supporting other re-
actionaries or by relying solely on military
means. The building of a strong democracy
requires adequate social reforms and a
healthy economy. It is the historic duty of
the trade unions to play a decisive part in
strengthening democracy and fostering social
justice as the firmest barrier to Communist
subversion and domination. The executive
council supports President Johnson's efforts
to help in the restoration of constitutional
democratic government and the promotion
of social reforms and economic progress in
Santo Domingo. In this light, our Govern-
ment would be well advised to accord full
diplomatic recognition only to a constitu-
tionally established Dominican democratic
government.
Even with the most generous assistance
from our country, it will take much time,
patience, and persistence to develop stable
democratic institutions in South Vietnam
and. Santo Domingo. Serious difficulties in
the path of their democratic development
are unavoidable because the Communist
menace in both countries is continually sup-
ported by outside powers. In such grave
situations, it is the responsibility of our
country, which alone has the will and the
power for deterring aggression, to take
prompt and timely initiative in the interest
of peace and freedom.
'rom the Inter-American Labor Bulletin,
July 1, 19651
RIT AND THE CRISIS IN THE DOMINICAN
REPUBLIC
? (The following statement on the crisis in
e Dominican Republic has been issued by
turo Jituregui H., ORIT General Secretary.)
ORIT appeals to wiser reflection on the
rt of the combating forces in the Domini-
fl Republic so as to prevent their actions
:ntinuing to cause victims among the
ople, whose loss of life is already heavy
d material damage enormous, thus setting
ck considerably the already slow economic
d social development of the country.
During the hateful dictatorship of Trujillo,
SIT condemned that regime and collabo-
ted both with trade unions and with other
inocratic elements fighting to re-establish
edom in the Dominican Republic. ORIT
rmly welcomed the electoral victory of
esident Juan Bosch, which brought back
sistitutional government t6 the country.
ter, it deplored the fact that military
tion brought down such a hopeful regime.
ese facts give us the moral authority to
I publicly for a halt in the fratricidal
uggle and appeal to all for calm, so as to
ercome this dramatic crisis.
MIT regrets that the Council of the OAS
not carry out its peacemaking functions
th the speed and energy required. If It
cl done so, it might have avoided a worsen_
of the conflict particularly since the
ta, headed by :Mr. Donald Reid Cabral,
I convened presidential elections for next
tember, which would have again giveli
their national independence.
The President deserves the full support of
the people of our country and all Latin
America in his tireless efforts to hasten the
building of effective inter-American peace-
keeping machinery and achieve collective
responsibility for normalizing the situation
and assuring the Dominican people of the
earliest opportunity to elect a government of
their own free choice. The administration's
acceptance of the U.N. good offices, along-
side of the OAS, in the Dominican crises, fur-
ther demonstrates Washington's earnest de-
sire to end the destructive conflict.
The crises in Vietnam and Santo Domingo,
though continents apart, are basically inter-
related. They must be faced in the context
of the entire world crisis. To date, Castro
has made three attempts to intervene in
Santo Domingo d '
Of
ra
de
fre
WEL
Pr
co
La
all
Th
cal
str
ov
did
svi
ha
ing
nimunist jun
tatorship on the Dominican people. In hae
Santo Domingo, as in Vietnam, our country Sep
seeks only to thwart a new and most dan-
gerous form of intervention by the fifth
columns of Communist imperialism
There are differences between the war in nize that Communist elements have inter-
Vietnam and the tragic struggle in the Do- vened in the conflict and have caused a
minican Republic, but It is the common worsening of the situation by their agitation
factors in the two critical areas which are and terrorist methods and so created chaos
of overriding importance. Aided, armed, and and anarchy, thus making a solution of the
directed by Moscow and Peiping, by Hanoi crisis more difficult. We should unite
and Havana, the Communist subversives in against these elements and fight to overcome
both countries have resorted to cal-out min- them, not only in the Dominican Republic.
tary action for the purpose of imposin their but In
the Dominican Republic a constitutional
government.
It would be obviously foolish not to recog-
?
u n al the countries of the American
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August 23, 1965
It would also be unjust to call the steps
-taken by the United States similar or equiv-
alent to earlier unilateral decisions which
caused so much deterioration in inter-Amer-
ican relations. For this reason, we are con-
fident that U.S. participation, originally
?
inspired by humanitarian motives, will co-
operate with the OAS mission to bring an
end to hostilities and will aid in the work of
reestablishing democratic institutions for
the Dominican people by means of effective
suffrage, the only source of national sov-
ereignty.
With the frankness and responsibility
which always characterizes ORIT in its
statements, we have to point out that the
unilateral action by the armed forces of the
United States in this serious Dominican con-
flict on the one hand has enabled thousands
of persons to be saved and at the same time
under the guidance of the OAS Commission
has contributed to making the hostilities of
civil war less cruel. The intervention by the
United States has provoked a psychological
and doctrinaire reaction corresponding to
the traditional Latin American feeling about
intervention of armed forces of one country
in the internal affairs of another. This could
have been avoided if there had been greater
urgency in the action of the international
intergovernmental organizations concerned, plenary sessions are public. When I spoke
as the situation required. this morning with our colleague Chairman
In safeguard of the basic principles of the of the Committee, it seemed to me appro-
inter-American system, ORIT calls on the priate that this meeting be closed, precisely
OAS: because the report to be presented by Am-
To explain to American opinion its activi- bassador Colombo, in behalf of the Commis-
ties since the moment it became aware of the SIOfl of which he is Chairman, is, precisely,
present crisis in the Dominican Republic; of a confidential nature. This decision by
To give a report in the greatest possible de- the Chair, that this meeting be closed, I am
Armed Forces sure will not be objected to by the Repre-
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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? SENN]. E zu551
Special Committee of the 10th meeting of
consultation of ministers of foreign affairs
of the member states of the Organization. I
respectfully request you to direct that this
report be distributed to the Special Dele-
gates to this Meeting of Consultation. Ac-
cept, Sir, the assurances of my highest con-
sideration. Ricardo M. Colombo, Ambassa-
dor of Argentine, Chairman of the Special
Committee."
First of all, I wish to express to His Ex-
cellency Ambassador Ricardo M. Colombo
and to his distinguished colleagues on the
Committee, Their Excellencies Ambassador
Timer Penna Marinho, of Brazil, Ambassa-
dor Alfredo Vazquez Carrizosa, of Colombia,
Ambassador Carlos Garcia Bauer, of Guate-
mala, and Ambassador Frank Morrice, of
Panama, the deep appreciation of the meet-
ing, and especially of all of their colleagues,
for the magnificent and efficient work they
have done in carrying out the delicate mis-
sion entrusted to them by the Meeting. We
have followed their work with a great deal
of attention and interest, and feel proud of
having appointed them; and we are sure
that the Americas, our people and our gov-
ernments, applaud that work, and this Meet-
ing expresses its appreciation and praise for
it. In accordance with the Regulations,
tail about the a
of the United States in the Dominican Re- sentatives. I am happy that everyone agrees
public; that this meeting should be closed. This that the observations should be taken in
To publish a complete report on the nature will be recorded in the minutes. I recognize account in the new edition that is to be
of the internal and external elements par- the Ambassador of Argentina, His Excellency made of the report. In other words, they
ticipating or engaged in this most disturbing Ricardo Colombo, Chairman of the Special are corrections of form.
Tho+ hmv be good enough Mr GARCIA BAUER. No, Mr. President,
text to the stencil. In the last line on that
page, where it says "guardia de policia min-
ter," the word "mixta" should be added, so
that it will say "una guardia de policia mili-
tar mixta." On page 12, in the next to the
last line from the bottom, where it says "y de
que esta mantendrfa," it should say "y de
que mantendria los contactos." On page 13,
at the end of the second paragraph, it is
necessary to add "En la Altima parte de la
entrevista estuvo presente el General Wessin
y Wessin a solicitud de la ComisiOn" at the
end of the paragraph. And on page 26, in
the second paragraph, where it says "la reso-
lucidn del 30 de abril" it should be "resolu-
clan del 1.? de mayo." [These corrections
were taken into account before the English
text of the document was issued.]
The PRESIDENT. The Chairman asks the
distinguished members of the Committee
whether they accept and consider incorpo-
rated in the next of their valuable report the
observations made by His Excellency the
Ambassador of Guatemala. The Chairman
of the Committee.
The CHAIRMAN OF THE COMMITTEE. I fully
accept them, Mr. President.
The PRESIDENT. Undoubtedly we shall re-
ceive a second edition of this report contain-
ing precisely the amendments already ac-
cepted by the Chairman of the Committee.
Mr. GARCIA BAUER. Mr. President, they are
not things to accept, but rather the question
is that in the report of the Committee these
points were omitted.
The PRESIDENT. That IS just what I was
referring to, that the Chairman of the Com-
mittee has precisely accepted the incorpora-
tion of the omitted matter, the clarifying of
the points. He has accepted, as Chairman of
the Committee, in behalf of all its members,
conflict.
MINUTES OF THE Forman PLENARY SESSION
(CLOSED)
(Document, 46 (Provisional) May 7-8, 1965)
. Chairman: His Excellency Ambassador
Guillermo Sevilla Sacasa, special delegate
from Nicaragua.
Secretary general of the meeting: Dr. Wil-
liam Sanders.
Present: Their Excellencies Alfredo Vaz-
quez Carrizosa (Colombia) , Roque J. TO dice
(Paraguay), Alejandro Magnet (Chile), Ra-
man de Clairmont Duefias (El Salvador),
Rodrigo Jacome M. (Ecuador), Juan Bautista
de Lavalle (Peru) , Ricardo A. Midence (Hon-
duras), Enrique Tejera Paris (Venezuela) ,
Jos?ntonio Bonilla Atiles (Dominican Re-
public), Humberto Calamari G. (Panama),
ILaUl Diez de Medina (Bolivia), Ricardo M.
Colombo (Argentina), Carlos Garcia Bauer
(Guatemala), Rafael de la Colina (Mexico),
Gonzalo 3. Facio (Costa Rica), Emilio N.
Oribe (Uruguay), Ellsworth Bunker (United
States), Fern D. Baguidy (Haiti), Ilmar
Penna Marinho (Brazil).
Also present at the meeting was Mr, San-
tiago Ortiz, assistant secretary general of
the meeting of consultation.
Recording secretary: Jos?. Martinez.
REPORT OF THE COMM)...L-rta.
The PRESIDENT. Your Excellencies, I have
gates that they take the following note with
the honor of opening the 4th plenary sen. gates
to the documents that contains the
sion of the 10th meeting of consultation of
ministers of foreign affairs, which has been report of the Committee that has just been
called for the principal purpose of receiving read, and has also just been distributed,
pardon me. On page 9 there are certain
a confidential report from His Excellency,
Ambassador Ricardo M. Colombo, Repre-
errors that were made in transferring the
sentative of Argentina and Chairinan of the
Special 'Committee that went to the Do- 1 The first report of the Special Committee,
minican Republic, which has prepared a with the corrections indicated below by the
confidential report. Ambassador Colombo Special Delegate of Guatemala and accepted
addressed the following note to me today: by the other members of the Committee, has
"Tour Excellency, I have the honor of been published as Document 47 of the meet-
transmitting to you the first report of the ing.
to present the report referred to in the note -those are not corrections of form, they are
,
I had the honor of receiving this morning, omissions made in copying the report of the
The Ambassador has the floor. committee.
Mr. COLOMBO (the Special Delegate of Ar- The PRESIDENT. Precisely, the Chair was
gentina). Thank you very much, Mr. Presi- mistaken, they are omissions of form, pre-
dent. I should like to make clear, before be- cisely. Gentlemen of the Special Committee,
ginning to read the report, that it begins the report, which has just been read by your
by referring to the very time of our arrival, distinguished Chairman, Ambassador Ricer-
or rather, to our departure from Washington, do M. CoLoanbo, of Argentina, reveals a job
for which reason we do not record here the done that the Chair would describe as ex-
f act, which we do wish to point out, that at traordinary, very worthy of the sense of
the time of our arrival, and in compliance responsibility and the personal capabilities
with a resolution of the Council of the OAS, of the distinguished Ambassadors who make
the Secretary-General of the Organization of up this historic Committee on the inter-
American States, Dr. Mora, was already there American system. Being extraordinary, it is
carrying out his duties, regarding which he a job worthy of our appreciation, of the
will give his own report. appreciation of this Meeting of Consulta-
[Reads the first report of the Special Com- tion and of those of us who are honored to
mittee] 1- call ourselves colleagues of the Ambassadors
Mr. COLOMBO. May the meeting consider who make up the Special Committee. In
the report to have been presented in behalf saying this, I am honored to confirm to you
of the Committee duly appointed. Thank what I said to His Excellency Ambassador
you very much, Mr. President; thank you Ricardo Colombo in the message that I had
very much, gentlemen. the honor to address to him today, which
The PRESIDENT. I take note of what Am- reads:
bassador Colombo has just said, and, clearly, ?The Honorable Ricardo M. Colombo,
we have been most pleased with the report. Chairman of the Committee of the Tenth
Your Excellencies will have noticed its fine Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of
quality. Foreign Affairs:' I sin pleased to express
Mr. GARCIA BAITER (the Special Delegate of to you and to your colleagues on the Corn-
Guatemala.) If the President will allow me, mittee of the Organization of American
I should like to recommend to all the Dele- States established by the Tenth Meeting of
Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Af-
fairs the appreciation of the Meeting for the
prompt and interesting information fur-
nished in your two messages received on
May 3 and 4. The Meeting has taken note
of the messages and hopes that the impor-
tant tasks being undertaken with such dedi-
cation and efficiency may soon be completed
with full success. Accept, Sir, the renewed
assurances of my highest consideration. Se-
villa-Sacasa, President of the 10th meeting."
I have the satisfaction of informing you
regarding a communication the Chair has re-
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52?Approved For Release.2003/10/15 : C1A-14131347B00446R000500110003-2
FONG4SIONAL REcgRar-AgNaz ATAgust 23 1965
calved from His gacelleney Emantiel 10 guished collea the
Fapal atunclo, dean of the diplomatic Corps
fteeredited to the Goversanent of tilt Do-
minican Republic. It reads: .
-"Guillermo Sevilla-Secants President cf the
Tenth meeting of Consultation of JAInUftera
Of Foreign Affaiss"?this conuntualce.ti ma is
di4,ed May 5?"/ thank you with deep emo-
tion ler message Your Excellency sent ills on
behalf, of Tenth, Meeting of Consultatiim of
s of Foreign Affairs. I have siicere
at' that providential assistance by Orga-
n of American States quickly begun
in Santo Domingo by Secretary General alora
and Aappily assumed by Special Coral/144e
Of, 'SV.Mally members headed by Ambatador
OolOnabo will soon achieve for the be: eyed
Dominican natien. the humanitarian laefils
Ot,'Petice and well-being that inspire that
high and noble institution." It is signed
Emanuel Claris?, Papal Nuncio of His
at the beginning that naturally this
ng is of a closed natuge, which ildi-
eates that, at the proper time, a public ple-
nary session shoold be held, in order put Hely
to 't k
gaino e tart of
report and the epLnions expressed res 0.rd-
*Alt. It seems logical for the first step o be
the seeond edition, as call it. of
thIs report, in which the omitted =atter
sea eoriectly mentioned by our colleague :Tom
Guatemala will appear: in order that the
e.rg tee o e Meettag of i7011-
_WI__ %II May take cognizance of the report
then XUbsoit its, decision on it to the
plenary. This is what the Chair has te_ se-
a:Kir% on the matter for the present, but
Jart (Ay, we %me h ld like in this closed rc eet-
the private atmosphere in whic we
0 11,0W. to he aS 'Seine expression by some
gitetinguished Representative on the test of
tHe report, thatvms read by the Ms tinguh had
of the, General Committee. The
r tive of, Mexico, Ambassador dB la
09,0114,. tlas asked, for the firms, and I re log-
nixe s
, Ur. DE LA Cornea (the Special Delegate of
Mexico). First (4 all / wish to express, or
rather join in the comments that you,
Mr,
have made in appreciation and
recognition of the distinguished m?-m-
here -Of the _ Qopunittee we took the lib n'ty
tJa bit, in reeognition of not only this
IN. report they have presented us, but
Mesta tOey doubtlessly have made
mOSI difficult conditions and 'a dth
great efficiency and dignity. Now I w< uld
like to know, Mr. Chairman. whethei_ it
d possible to ask some questii sue,
lal y since we are meeting in execu dye
n, for clearly our governments sumly
ng to want to know the very leer ed
of our diatinguished representat yes
ding some aspects touched on only M-
in this most interesting rep irt,
ttq reservatien, naturally, that perhaps
later seasion, also secret, we could eia ao-
on Kane Other aspects that, for the
moment, escape us. Would that be possi
Mr. President?
The PRESIDENT. I believe the Ulleatior is
? ,
very important. The President attac hes
great importance tcl the question put by the
Anahaseaslor ef the Republic of Mexico re-
garding our taking advantage of this exe
seseisan to ask the distinguished Comm it-
400 elefine questions.
COLcasiteo. I, ask for the floor, arr.
deb:b. ? /
e FaesInesee. ,Yeu have the floor, Mr.
assador? , s
_
Coposseo. The ponunittee is ready to
?ar, insofar as it can, any questions ihe
aebiatives of 'hi`e sister republics of thericm k wish to as its members.
S.WNT. Very well. Is the Ambits la-
ces,satialfleg? Yon have the /leer,
Cox. Thank you, Mr. Cha M-
os the time being I would like to
?Whether it is possible, after having
ned closely to everything our dist la-
Approved For Releas
gue, Representative of Ar- diplomatic representative, feel that, if not
gentina, has told us. I have the perhaps mis- Colonel Francisco Caamafio, whom I do not
taken impression, from the technique as well know to be personally a Communist, there
.as from the quick reading I was giving this are indeed numerous persons on his side
document we just corrected, that there seems that, if they are not members of the Cora-
to have been a certain consensus between the munist Party, are actively in favor of Fidel
opposing sides as to the possible elimination Castro's system of government or political
of the generals. Perhaps I am mistaken, but purposes. There is such a tendency in the
It seems to follow from that reading and opinion of many diplomats I spoke to, and
from this idea that on both sides the colonels I do not mention other countries in order
were more or less disposed to create, let us not to commit countries represented here.
say, a high command, other than the one They are firmly convinced that on that side
that has remained thus far. I wonder
whether it would be possible for you gentle-
men to elaborate on this, or whether you
simply have no ideas on the matter.
The PRESIDENT. Would the Chairman of the
Committee like to respond to the concern of
the Representative of Mexico?
Mr. COLoMBO. With great pleasure. As the
report states, Mr. President, the request to
exclude the seven military men, whose names
I have read in the Committee's report, was a
complaint by the junta led by Colonel Ca-
email? and transmitted by the Committee to
the military junta led by Colonel Benoit
there are many persons, I do not say mem-
bers registered in an officially organized Com-
munist Party, but persons who do have lean-
ings toward a well-known trend is prevalent
in Cuba.
Mr. DE LA COLINA. Thank you, Mr. Ambas-
sador.
The PRESIDENT. Does any member of the
Committee wish to add to the answer re-
quested by the Representative of Mexico?
Is the Representative of Mexico now satisfied
with the information given to him? The
Ambas.sador of Guatemala.
Mr. COL0m130. If the President will allow
The Act of Santo Domingo, furthermore, is me, I do not know what system the President
clearly written, and the stamped signatures may have to gage the kind of questions.
of the parties ratifying it are affixed. I be- The PRESIDENT. Well, your Excellency said
lieve I have responded to the concern of the that he wanted his colleagues to participate
Ambassador of Mexico. in the answers in their, let us say, personal
Mr. DE LA COL1NA. Another point now, if status, in order to distribute the task of
I may.
answering, and, naturally, the President took
The PRESIDENT. With pleasure.
Mr. DE LA COLINA. I Would like to know, if
this is also possible, whether the distin-
guished representatives could give us their
impressions regarding the degree of Com-
munist infiltration in the rebel or constitu-
tional forces, or whatever you want to call
them. For example, there was the reference
to this Frenchman ? ? * who came from
Indochina, and who trains frog men ? ?
etc.; perhaps there is some thought that this
person might have close ties, for example,
with other Communists; or do they have the
impression at least that, in the high com-
mand of that group, the rebel group,- there
Is now definite and significant Communist
leadership. Thank you, Mr. President.
Mr. Conoarao. As for myself, I, as a member
of the Committee, not as Chairman, have no
objection to answering the question by the
Ambassador of Mexico, but as a matter of
procedure for answers, I wish to provide an
opportunity for the Chairman to speak in
general terms in order not to deny the dis-
tinguished members of the Committee their
legitimate right to answer as members of the
Committee, which we all are; that is, I would
not want to be monopolizing the answers be-
cause, without prejudice to a given answer,
we can give another of the members of the
Committee an opportunity to give the reply
that, in his judgment, should be given. Thus,
in order to respect fair treatment and not
find myself in the middle of the violent and
inelegant position of monopolizing the an-
swers?and I ask the members of the Com-
mittee whether cense of thenawant to answer,
mittee whether some of them want to answer,
Then I ask you to give the flood first to Am-
bassador Vazquez Carrizosa, of Colombia.
The PRESIDENT. The Ambassador of Colom-
bia, member of the Special Committee, will
answer the question by the Ambassador of
Mexico.
"Mr; triiiiizOs-A -SPacial.?Delegate of
-
Colombia). Mr. President, the Represents-
tree of Mexico asks what the opinion is.
/ will state mine, because I am not going
to answer on behalf of the Committee, as
to the degree of Communist infiltration on
both sides. Of course, the question must
refer to the command or sector led by Colonel
Francisco Caamafio, because I do not think
it refers to any Communist leanings by Gen-
el y Wessin, Colonel Saladin or
any of his colleagues. With regard to the snipers on both sides. It should be said.
sector led by Colonel Francisco Caamalio, Mr. Ambassador, that you will understand
many diplomats accredited in the Dominican the extent of responsibility of the answers
Republic, and I can include my country's and the depth of the questions, and I would
note of the fact that your Excellency had in-
vited his colleague from Colombia to answer
the question put by the Ambassador of
Mexico. I, by way of courtesy, am asking
your Excellency whether any other col-
leagues would like to express their opinions
on the same question the Ambassador of
Mexico asked. I request your Excellency to
tell me whether any other of his colleagues
would like to ask any questions,
Mr. COLOUR?. I am going to add very little,
Of course, to what the Ambassador of Co-
lombia, with his accustomed brilliance, has
lust said, by saying that this report, affirmed
by a large number of representatives of the
Diplomatic Corps, is public and well known
to any one who cares to make inquiry. But
despite the respect that I owe to the opinion
of the Diplomatic Corps, in order to estab-
lish this in precise terms?for I was con-
owned as much as was the Ambassador with
being able to verify this question?I wanted
to go to the source; and we spoke with the
different men who were in this rebel group-
ing and, a notable thing, from the head of
the revolution, Colonel Caamafio, to some
one known as Minister of the Presidency,
they recognized that they were their great
problem, they explained to a certain extent
briefly the process of the history of the
Dominican Republic, they confessed to us
how. gradually a number of elements were
being incorporated with them whom they
called Communists, and that their problem
was to avoid infiltration for the purpose of
springing a surprise and seizing control.
They said this clearly, and even at one
point?I in the sometime difficult task of
dividing this forrnal nomination of the
chairmanship in which there is no merit
greater than that of any one else, because
perhaps in the other four members there is
much talent for doing what the Chairman
did?I spoke with Colonel Ciaamafio and
flaked him in a friendly way whether he hon-
estly believed that such infiltration existed.
Be confirmed this to me, but he gave me the
impression that he had the courage to face
it. He said to me: "They are not going to
grab the movement, and my concern is that
iri their losing the possibility of control, they
have stayed behind the snipers, today there
are those that do not wish a solution for the
Dominican Republic," and already he put
the political label on a good part of the
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August 23, 1965 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD --- SENATE 20553
like to satisfy your Own concern; but I have The PRESIDENT. The Representative of tion that would be feasible, despite the moral
fulfilled with loyalty by reporting the con- Ecuador, Ambassador Jacome, has requested authority that we represented. We were only
venation to you objectively, telling you that the floor, a very few, as men, as individuals, but
I believe that those who have the answer to Mr. JA0orde (the Special Delegate of Ecua- we bore the weight of the historic tradition
this question is to be found among the ac- dcrr) . I wish to adhere with all sincerity and of the system whose 75th anniversary we
tors, the ,protagonists of this hour who are warmth of the words of the Representative of celebrated, and this inspired all the mem-
living in the Dominican Republic. This is Mexico, praising the selflessness and the ardu- hers of the Committee. From the first man
what / wanted to say now, Mr. Chairman. ous work as well as the spirit of sacrifice with of the rebel band with whom we spoke, Colo-
The PRESIDENT. Very well, Mr. Ambassador. which the Committee performed its func- nel Caamafio, to the first man with whom
Mr. DE LA COLINA. Mr. Ambassador of Co- tions, and for having succeeded, by the time we spoke from the Command of the Military
lombia, I greatly value this reply; I wanted of its departure, in leaving a somewhat more Junta, Colonel Benoit, we found that they
both, but naturally with reference to the favorable situation than the one it found were both weary of the conflict that dark-
reply whereby you explain one more aspect. upon arrival. Now that we are asking for the ened the Americans. We found in both of
Many thanks, Mr. Ambassador. opinions of the distinguished colleagues on them a desire to achieve peace that was equal
The PRESIDENT. Would the Ambassador of the Committee, I would like to know if they to ours.
Guatemala like to say something on the have any impression as to a formula, or if It would be untrue, Mr. President, if I were
question put by the Ambassador of Mexico? there is any desire on the part of the two to say that I found the wish to continue the
Mr. Gaacia BAITER (the Special Delegate factions to bring about peace by transforming fight at this stage of the tragedy in the
of Guatemala) . Mr. Chairman, for the mo- the cease-fire, the truce, into a peace that will Dominican Republic. There was a longing
ment, no; certainly this point was discussed permit the political organization of the Do- for peace and we were caught in the enthusi-
in the Committee; the Committee also had minican Republic and the natural process asm to achieve it. But we were completely
a series of things, and since there is not yet that should be followed in order to have a surprised, Mr. Ambassador, by something
any criterion of the Committee, I do not for constitutionally stable system. It has been more important than this objective which is
the moment wish to present any viewpoint, gratifying to hear this opinion, at least on essentially what we all desire; the two parties
The PRESIDENT, The Ambassador of Bra- one side, that the so-called constitutional said that the solution lay in the inter-
ell. government of Colonel Caamafio is certain American system. Nobody assumed the right
Mr. PENNA MARINHO (the Special Delegate that it can at a given moment control and to impose peace because?and let there be no
of Brazil) . Mr. President, I should like to capture the infiltrators that are determined misunderstanding?the side that wishes to
corroborate the statements made by my col- to block peace, and, in order to take advan-
triumph in Santo Domingo is stabbing the
leagues from Colombia and Argentina and tage of that situation, to continue the chaos sister republic. Both factions understood the
add one more aspect that I believe could that has prevailed in Santo Domingo up to intensity of the tragedy that was unfolding
help to clarify the approach that could be no*. But if that command hopes to keep and in Santo Domingo; both placed their faith
given to the problem. I should like to add, is confident that it can keep control it ianat-
in the inter-American system.
gentlemen, that with the complete collapse ural that whatever the command thinks with During the course of conversations, when
of public authority?since neither the forces regard to the possibility of a formula for all members of the Committee asked them if
of the Government Junta of Benoit, San- stable peace through an understanding with they would be faithful to remaining within
tana, and Saladin nor those of Colonel Caa- ?the others?the present enemies?would be the system, they answered yes; with all their
nia.? were in 'contra of the situation?the very useful and constructive to know because faith. But it was more than that, Mr. Am-
Dominican state practically disappeared as we would then, with a little tenacity, through bassador: it was what Colonel Caamafio said,
a Juridical-political entity, and the coun- friendly, fraternal mediation, have a favor- voluntarily. A newsman asked him, "If your
try became a sort of no man's land. The able prospect of arriving, within a reasonably cause was denounced in the United Nations,
arsenal had been given to the people and an short time, at an understanding between the what would you do?" and he confessed to us
entire disoriented population of adolescents two combatants. This would be the best that he answered that he would in no way
and fanatics was taking up modern auto- guarantee that the Americas, as well as the accept that channel because he was within
tactic arms, in a state of excitation that was Dominican Republic, could have that those the system and the answer had to be found
further exacerbated by constant radio broad- infiltrators and those elements that wish the within the system. For that reason he was
casts of a clearly subversive character. Nei- chaos to continue, would be eliminated and happy to see the committee sent by the OAS.
tiler do I believe that I am, nor does any of hence definitely neutralized. He placed his faith in the Organization of
the members of this Committee believe that I would like to know what opinion the American States to find the solution. And
he is, in a position to state with assurance Committee formed, after it succeeded in talk- when we spoke with Colonel Benoit he gave
that the movement of Colonel Caamafio, lug with the parties in conflict, what impres- us the same affirmation; his faith is in the
inspired by the truly popular figure of for- Mon does it have of the opinion or of the system.
Mar President Bosch, is a clearly Communist formulas or of the hopes they have regarding I believe that in the midst of the agony of
Movement. But one fact is certain; in view a final agreement that may return the situa- the Dominican Republic, this system that
of the real anarchy in which the country tion to normal, among ourselves we have talked so much of
has been engulfed for several days, espe- The PRESIDENT. Would the Committee like strengthening was more alive than ever and
daily the capital city, where bands of snip- to answer the question raised by the Repre- in an hour of testing, in the midst of a
ems have been sacking and killing and obey- sentative of Ecuador? One of the colleagues struggle more fierce than any I remember
trig no one, any organized group that landed on the Committee; the Chairman, Ambassa- within the system, I could see that both sides
on the island could dominate the situation. dor Garcia Bauer, Ambassador Vazquez felt this to be the only possible solution that
For that reason, and our understanding Carrizosa, Ambassador Penne Marinho, the could maintain peace in the Americas. Both
coincides with that of a majority of the dep- Chairman of the Committee, Ambassador took into account the possibility that it was
melons of the chiefs of diplomatic rots- Colombo, in his capacity as Representative of being compromised: they knew that the
aims accredited there, all of the members Argentina? peace of the hemisphere might be endan-
_of the Committee agree in admitting that Mr. COLOMBO. Perhaps this is the question gored if the conflict wasn't soon stopped.
the Caamafio movement, fortunately truly that I shall answer with the greatest Amen-
This, Mr. Ambassador, is what I can tell you,
democratic in its origins, since none of us canist feeling, Mr. Chairman. I cannot deny, with great satisfaction, and I look to the
sincerely believes that Caamafio is a Corn- Mr. Ambassador, gentlemen, that I also, like system for the solution just as all of us are
nrunist, could be rapidly converted into a the Ambassador of Mexico, have confessed to going to look, and you will see that the sys-
Communist insurrection; above all it is seen him that I shared and still share the concern tern will find that solution.
to be heading toward becoming a govern- expressed in his question and that, perhaps, The PRESIDENT. The Representative of
rnent of that kind, susceptible of obtaining it was the question that caused me the great- Guatemala will contribute to the answer that
the support and the assistance of the great est concern. The most urgent problem when the Representative of Ecuador has requested.
Marxist-Leninist powers. Therefore, Mr. we left was not to find ideological banners Mr. GARCIA BAUER. Mr. President, I wish
President, we do not believe that Colonel distinguishing the parties, but to put an to add a few words to what the Ambassador
Caamafio and his closest advisors are corn- end to the conflict that was already becom- of Argentina has said, in reply to the ques-
inunists. Meanwhile, as the entire Caamafio Ing bloody and that could become a blood tion asked by the Ambassador of Ecuador.
movement rests upon a truly popular basis, bath in the Americas. We talked with the I. as a member of the Committee and as Am-
by certain areas escaping from the control two parties and believe me, Mr. Chairman, bassador of Guatemala, confirm the state-
Cr that democratic group of leaders it would I at first had the feeling that law was dead; ments made by the Ambassador of Argentina,
be quite possible for that movement to be it was chaos in the Dominican Republic. as to the faith that the inter-American sys-
diverted from its real origins and to follow We all shared it?all members of the COM- tern can help in solving the problem that, so
the oblique plan of popular -bated move- rnittee, the military advisers, the General unfortunately, is faced in the Dominican
Mutts, which can be easily controlled by Secretariat, our civilian advisers?and when Republic today. Obviously, that country is
clever agents and experts in the art of trans- we arrived we found chaos, such as we had weary of struggle and would like to arrive
forming democratic popular movements into never seen or even imagined. I felt that law at some solution. I, at least, found that
Marxist-Leninist revolutions. Thank you, did not exist, and we all thought there was there certainly is a basic desire to reach an
Pc. Preddent. little hope that they wanted to find a solu- understanding between the parties and over-
, ,
Xo. 156 "---:?.n
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Approved For Releas
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C NGRES410NAL ilEal)13.1) SNATE AlAgust 23, 1965
,
cane present difficulties. We were
prised, for example, when we began conver-
sations with the Rebel Conunander, that j.
colonel was present who was a liaison ofilatr
between the Military Junta of San Is1dr0 944
e Papal Nuncio. And the reafiner
tV14iGh be Was treated, by Colonel Ciaamaitp
8.0 well as the other members of the, ROO
Conine.and, surprised us wa in
giteup'COMpleteldy opposed to the one he reit-
re/66d. We id pot see the hatred thAt
re light have been eknected
' becinausslhhe
Stances. We can. bear witness, therefore, ip
that deference to the treatment that wis
ShOwn, , *is? the l'tfeltel _Commander offer51;1
tajheOoMinittee itself to deliver about 5(4)
' iiionera 'So that it might take charge Of
ena; that is, acts, such as these iridical
9"iv `t)iey `wish to end this situation that is
tifvicling the people of the Dominican Repuls?
, Ile; from' these acts,,end from others that v
'have Seen I have reached the criatelAalort tht
at bottom there is a desire, a keen desire 10
reaChax rde t The question is 10
flnd :the formuslrfCloirng? . rn aking this undei7
at!i,uottrig a reality.
9Pirtosiespstra..(ittIhpersk threeprmeseen-lltaertsiv(ti
itkiaeiti;e rtge;kilittee if ?any of them wishes to joi
reply to
o Ecuador. The Reprt-
e, question raised by the
Repreienta
?
Vplvis. yet; thank you,Mr.
Chaix
a frri_..1.11102 NY, grateful for this reply
f1oh Ii V141y Promising because it has con
rirm_ed the suspicion that every human be.,..?
tag who knows tbe. tragedy of a civil war;
",1,4a4 ;who have stained theirqonlurY with PI004 and caused so
deaths, who have se n so in 111841
r044.1S4Sdedsot4reauni6h B4ering, uwcohusilrnerlow4ghaanvl
efat of longing for peac
periiipa each them feeling remorse for
thivetictert and a nsdothie misfortunes they hay t
eminently human re.
salon that we all know. But I am equalki,
,at,4111d to hear thatbOth parties rest thel
.n ??
Taitn 1 tile inter-Araerican system"but
have riOw seen a report, a report concerning
the:etatement d
tattie ett nt. sthrtla,e by Colonel Caanaafio
at he will not accept tho
Inter-Arae; by the las
1'0501.1,14o aaaLT192",cP Walalished,
av ri,of kniseetiiig of Consultation,
t?,',vnin;4106.aireadi seen that it also seems Via:.
0 and ,is Partisans have no
aCcel5ted tir present state of affairs tho
presence of foreign troops in Sant D
Hence, would not perhaps_ Colonel ? Caoaminianfigoo:..
and in the end
their ideologies ar.3Ltd:=fleTZ.P.t.ge
on 'Ieh they have stoodpreferbarricade.
Of peace to a mis a raiasi?4
think, of
n. of guns? We might:
I a permanent peace mission of tin,
Organization of
'Aineriean States, whiot _
,tr.rxjeyeAke POPe impressions but,
_ seeln
ci,g,? a concrete formula.
1!?Zin_gntni"se,.P.artiss,,together who wish tc..,
ea
opportunity of not feeling
and give them the
eeling pressured by arms
or 'not having the inward auslalCiOnthat
thoee arms are playing the game of theirad
vttr4eris,satriunee4s410Tribshetogoutv,h1ciplmflteeparm, attn_ador,III:z,vferia_talsteur,o(le mmto pul
tired and_
tatiguefl'as "lloIrn
your, tn..?-,-e. you all .0 be, for .01/1 4.414sing
very with., these, questions, : ?Thank you ,
stl:t?221:9111Bilo. Saki something, a little:
n replying to the question
posed by the Ambassador of Me40,9, regard-1
in this concern that, troubles the Ambassa-
dor ofcua or. d Here i? the most important
instance for telling the whole truth, not part
of 1t 43ad I,am going to tell how I saw it..
The and so is the-
e egert?I sal .
desire tp .attain peace, Mr. Ambassador, but
it Is no ,thal I snapect but that I am certain.
that the twAsides in the .struggle are not con-
trolling their inovement, because the cease-
fire vas accented by the fighting groups; but _
an.. uricentrolIable ingredient , conspired
Approved For Release
against the carrying out of the act of Santo
Domingo, an element that history shows
does not find a solution by peaceful means
and that grows larger whenever attempts at
reaching peace are made, because what will
happen, to a great extent, is what happened
to us, in parleying for peace, with an abso-
lute eease-fire by the commands so as to talk
with the peace mission, but we had to parley
for two hours and ahalf under incessant ma-
chine-gun and rifle fire. Who did that?
Colonel Caarnatio? I think not, categorically
no.
It is the sniper ingredient, because in a
town where arms are handed out to civilians,
there can be only two forms of control: either
when the civilians lay down their arms and
surrender, them willingly, or when this is
achieyed 1,3? a force superior to the civilian
force. Let all of you ponder the difficult
task of imaging a peace attempt, in which
we again have the signatures of the two
parties, we have the security zone, and the
incident is being provoked as a factor break-
ing out into a tremendous catastrophe. I
honestly confess that until now I could not
explain how something much worse did not
occur. The provocation of the snipers is
constant. There are among them, no doubt,
the two classes of snipers that there are in
such events: those who grab a gun and con-
tinue using it with a resentment that no
reasoning will lead them to lay it down, and
those who continue using it with the resent-
ment of one who cannot control the revolt.
That is, these are factors that cannot be
controlled by a mission no matter what flag
of peace it carries.
The Ooyernment of Santo Domingo will
not achieve peace until it can be imposed in
a climate where conditions in a peaceful
Santo Domingo exist for the recovery of in-
stitutional normality in the country. Sin-
cerely, Mr. Ambassador, in the choice that
you have given me I sacrifice my wish?
which is equal to yours?to a realistic con-
cept that one can only appreciate, unfortu-
nately, by having been there. We wished,
and we five ambassadors who were on the
MisSiori mentioned it many times to one an-
other, that all of you could have been there,
that not one had been missing, Mr. Presi-
dent. That you could have been at the scene
of events to see what we were seeing. In
the tremendous confusion, in which it is diffi-
cult to find the thread that would open the
knot we were trying to untie, where there is
political and military confusion, economic
disaster, confused people, general anguish,
no one can find the ingredient for guidance.
I believe, Mr. Ambassador, that it is urgent
to seek peace in the Dominican Republic
and to tarry as little as possible in discussion,
because every hour of discussion is an hour
you give to someone who, with good or evil
. intentions, could still pull the trigger that
would prevent the Act of Santo Domingo
from being fulfilled. This is my personal im-
pression.
The PazsmENT. The Representative of
Ecuador has nothing more that he wants
to say? I recognize the Representative of
Uruguay, Ambassador Emilio Oribe.
Mr. Oases (the Special Delegate of Uru-
guay). Mr. President, first of all, I want to
adopt the words of the distinguished Ambas-
sadors who have spoken before me in con-
gratulating the Committee on its work and
expressing the admiration of my delegation
for the way in which they have performed
this first part of their task. And so, our
warmest congratulations to all of them.
Since it is late, Mr. President, I would like to
confine myself to some very specific ques-
tions. The first of the questions is as fol-
lows: for this Meeting of Consultation to be
competent to take measures to bring peace
and to carry forward the work begun, it is
necessary, above all, in the opinion of my
Delegation, to ascertain whether the sttua-
t,ionnthepom4nican Republic is a situation
that can endanger the peace and security of
the hemisphere. This is the requirement of
Article 19 of the Charter for carrying out col-
lective aotion in matters that normally are
within the domestic jurisdiction of the
states. As is known, Article 19 states: "Meas-
ures adopted for the maintenance of peace
and security, in accordance with existing
treaties do not constitute a violation of the
principles set forth in Articles 15 and 17,"
which are those that refer to noninterven-
tion. Hence my Delegation believes that a
pronouncement must be made by this Meet-
ing of Consultation to the effect that the
evEtnts in the Dominican Republic constitute
a situation that endangers the peace and
security of the hemisphere. Departing from
that basis, I should like to ask the Commit-
tee if it is of the opinion that this is the
case, that is to say, that the situation in the
Dominican Republic constitutes a threat to
the peace and security of the hemisphere.
That is the first question.
The second question is as follows, Mr.
President: the first part of the task with
which the Committee was entrusted has been
carried out, 8,nd we all congratulate them.
We have received a very complete report,
Which will be studied by the delegations and
the foreign ministries. There remains, then,
the second part of the Committee's task,
under the letter b,, which reads as follows:
"to carry out an investigation of all aspects
of the situation in the Dominican Republic
that led to the convocation of this Meeting."
Naturally, my Delegation understands very
well that this cannot be done in one after-
noon or one day. However, I should like to
ask simply if the Committee believes that
there is sufficient evidence to issue a report
on this point within a reasonable period of
time. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman,
The PRESMENT. One of the distinguished
members of the Committee would like to
refer to the first question put by the Repre-
sentative of Uruguay. Ambassador Vazquez
Carrizosa, Representative of Colombia.
Mr. VAZQUEZ CARRIZOSA (the Special Dele-
gate of Colombia). Thank you, Mr. Chair-
man. The first question is this: Is the situa-
tion such that it can endanger peace and
security? My reply is yes. Yes, there is a
situation that endangers the peace and secu-
rity. The reasons are very clear. A dis-
turbance or even a guerrilla action in a mem-
ber state where the elements of order and
constituted authorities exist is not the same
as in a state where the absence of the state
Is noted, evaluated, and recorded. What is
to be done, Mr. Delegate, in the absence of
the state? W:hat does the system do when
the state does not; exist? What happens
when blood is running in the streets? What
happens, Mr. Delegate, when an American
country?and I am going to speak quite
frankly so that you may think about this
with all the perspicacity we know you to
have?is, under these conditions, in the
neighborhood of Cuba? Do we sit on the
balcony to watch the end of the tragedy?
Do we all sit down as if we were at a bull-
fight; waiting for the crew to come? What
are we to do, Mr. Delegate? We are in a
struggle against international communism;
and we are in a world, Mr. Delegate, in which
America is not even separated from the other
continents even by the ocean. We form part
of the world and we form part of the condi-
tions existing in the world. The Dominican
Republic, like any other country in the
Americas, is a part of the system, and it is
the system that will suffer from the lack of
a head of state in any of its members. The
matter and the problem cannot be expressed
in juridical terms, in hermeneutics, needed
to fit an act into a lawyer's criterion. The
problem is one of deep political meaning, of
profound significance, of hemisphere impor-
tance much more serious than any of the
other American revolution could be
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August 23, 1965
There have been many revolutions in
America.._ There have been revolutions in
my country; there have been some, I believe,
in yours, and I do not believe that a revolu-
tion in itself justifies the intervention of the
inter-American system. That has not been
my theory; that has not been the theory of
my country. However, the acephalous con-
dition. of the state constitutes a problem that
has occurred on very few occasions. What
are we to do, Mr. Delegate, when, as the
report states, the President of a Junta says:
"I cannot maintain order with respect to the
diplomatic missions"? And what are we to
do, Mr. Delegate, when that Chief presents
a note in which he requests the assistance
of another country and confesses with the
sincerity that we have heard: "Gentlemen
of the Special Committee, have the diplo-
matic representatives asked me for protec-
tion and I did not have the elements with
which to protect them?" That is the answer
to his first question. Now we have the sec-
ond question: What is happening to the
Investigation? It is very clear, Mr. Delegate.
The complex political events, the multi-
tudinous situations are very difficult to in-
vestigate. All of us who have had contact
with problems of criminology know about
mob psychology: everything that is studied
in the classroom, which is very simple, an
investigation of a local event, an individual
event, let us say.
However, when there as mobs, when they
are in the midst of great movements an
investigation can be conducted, investiga-
tions must be carried out. But they are
obviously difficult investigations. I would
spare no effort to support any machinery,
agency, or committee that would carry for-
ward that investigation. It would be very
desirable. But, of dourse, such investiga-
tions of complex events are not very easy,
because many things have happened. Actu-
ally, two or three revolutions have taken
place. There was the first revolt of colonels.
Then there was a revolt of a party; and after
that, a revolution of a whole series of guer-
rilla groups, so that each one May have a
different impression of the same event.
I think that, rather than an investigation
of the past, what is of interest to the Meeting
of Consultation and what is of interest to
America is not the investigation of the past,
but the investigation of the future. It is
the investigation of the future that interests
us. The problem is not to stop to fix re-
sponsibility, to ascertain who began to shoot
first, who entered the National Palace first,
who opened the windows, who got out the
machinegun, who saw, who heard; all that
would be an interminable process that would
fill many pages and maty records of pro-
ceedings. The important thing is not to
look backward, but to look ahead.
The PRESIDENT. The Representative of
Uruguay.
Mr. ORIBE. I thank Ambassador Vazquez
Carrizosa for his remarks. He has told me
just what I wanted to know.
The PRESIDENT. The Ambassador of Brazil.
Mr. PENNA MARINHO (the Special Repre-
sentative of Brazil) . Yes, Mr. President. And
I also Want to say to the Delegatesthat my
reply is also yes. There are two governments,
but each one is weaker than the other, com-
pletely incapable and powerless to control
the situation that prevails in the country.
Peace was made on uncertain terms. The
Act of Santo Domingo is not a definitive
peace; it is a difficult truce, a temporary
armistice that may dissolve at any moment.
Therefore, the Committee suggests, among
th,e measures that in its judgment might be
adopted immediately by the Tenth Meeting
of Consultation, the appointment of a tech-
nical military group in the city of Santo
Dinning? to supervise the cease-fire, as well
as other measures agreed to by the parties
to the Act of Santo Domingo. We must keep
'watch over that peace and create conditions
to prevent the struggle from breaking out
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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? SENATE 20555
again?because it could start again, Mr.
President, at any moment. Thank you.
The PRESIDENT. Does any other member of
the Committee wish to speak on this ques-
tion? The Chairman of the Committee, Am-
bEssador Colombo.
Mr. COLOMBO. The truth is, Mr. Chairman,
that after the words of my distinguished col-
leagues, the Ambassadors of Brazil and Co-
lombia, there is very little that I might be
able to add; but the responsibility in-
volved and the importance of the question, so
ably phrased by the Ambassador of Uruguay,
compel all of us to make clear our position
on this question. When, among the powers
and duties, the duty of investigating was
decided upon, I cannot conceal the fact that
I felt the same as I always feel whenever an
investigating committee is named. General-
ly it investigates nothing; few, indeed, are
the investigating or factfinding committees
which, in the parliamentary life of all of our
countries, show any fruitful jurisprudence in
their results. But this Investigating Com-
mittee did have the possibility of good re-
sults. And that was because it was aimed at
two fundamental objectives that were gov-
erning events in the Dominican Republic.
I understood, first, that the investigation
was to determine the scope of the danger re-
sulting from the events, which are a matter
of concern to the Ambassador of Uruguay.
If this was a situation that did not threaten
the peace, we would verify that immediately.
If the situation was under the control of
groups intent on stirring up tension in the
Americas, in a struggle in the history of
America, which is full of struggle between
brothers, in this incorrigible vocation that is
periodically written into the history of our
countries, that delays the advance of law and
democracy, then we would verify it immedi-
ately; and we have verified it.
This could be the beginning of a struggle
confined to the two well-defined groups. But
the presence of those uncontrollable factors,
which I urge the Ambassadors to analyze in
detail, in the evaluation of facts in order to
reach conclusions, they are going to be
Impressed, as we ourselves were impressed,
without seeing them; they have become more
dangerous than the groups themselves put
together. To my mind, they have become the
element that will determine the fate of what
Is going to be done. If those groups did not
exist, and if those responsible for the strug-
gling movements had not confessed that they
cannot control them, in view of the exist-
ence of a security zone, freely agreed upon
by both parties, with a U.S. military force
that is engaged basically in the process of
keeping custody over the diplomatic zone.
I would also believe, Mr. President, that per-
haps we might be able to delimit the process
and trust that the peace Would not be so
obviously jeopardized as it is in this process;
because in all revolutions, even a small local
One, there is the possibility that there may
be the spark of a process that will affect the
peace of the Americas.
But the dimensions of this situation, with
elements of disturbance on both sides, who
are constantly lashing out against the pro-
tection Offered by the security zone, and in
which, Mr. President?and this struck my
attention?there is still control to prevent
confrontation in a struggle that could tech-
nically be called a military struggle; or in
other words, there is no military confronta-
tion between the defenders of the zone and
the contending groups of the civil struggle.
And that struggle is capable of being un-
loosed, because of the constant harassment
by those who are seeking a way to unloose it.
Hence, Mr. Ambassador, this matter urgently
demands that all of us succeed in finding the
way to resolve this situation; that we find
the way to dispel the undeniable danger that
threatens the peace in this hemisphere, which
is the puropse of our organization. Because
all of these things are important; economic
development, social tranquillity, justice, the
progress of the countries; but all of them are
built on peace; without peace there is no
possibility for the triumph of the inter-
American system. There cannot be the
slightest doubt, Mr. President, that the peace
of the hemisphere is in grave peril.
But with respect to the second part of the
investigation, which is also a matter of
anxiety, we have contributed something in
the time we had to make our investigation;
more than the investigation is the word of
the leaders themselves. This act is a con-
fession, and a partisan confession without
proof, Mr. Ambassador. It is not a matter of
our characterizing the ideology, nobody goes
about trying to do that when, actually, it has
already been characterized by the leaders of
the governments themselves. If necessary,
that should be left to the last. I have said
at previous sessions: my delegation is will-
ing to make and is going to make an ex-
haustive investigation of the facts, in order
to determine the blame according to the
action. We shall do nothing to cover up a
sharing of responsibility. But in the matter
of priorities, investigation has been well
placed by the Ambassador of Uruguay. The
first thing to be investigated was the projec-
tion of the episode, the possibility of its af-
fecting the peace of the hemisphere, the
need for urgent action in case it is proved.
We five members of the committee shared
that opinion when we were there, and we
reaffirm it now. The peace of the hemis-
phere is in such danger, Mr. President, that
If the system does not respond to the call of
both parties to the struggle, I believe that
the peace of the Americas would not be in
danger, that peace will be broken. This ur-
gency is shown by the way we have tried to
answer the concerns of the Ambassador of
Uruguay.
The PRESIDENT. I ask His Excellency the
Ambassador of Guatemala if he would like to
speak on this point.
Mr. GARCIA BAITER. Mr. President, I would
like to add my voice and my opinion to those
of my distinguished colleagues on the Com-
mittee. I shall also reply, rather emphati-
cally, as was done by the Ambassador of
Colombia, that the peace and security are in
danger. As was already said, we in the Com-
mittee often asked ourselves and commented
on the advisability of having all of the mem-
bers of this Meeting visit the Dominican
Republic in order to see, on the scene itself of
the events, the situation prevailing in that
country: in a state of war, when we arrived,
without water, witheut lights, without tele-
phones, without public services. The lobby
of the very hotel where we stayed was a scene
of war?children and women sleeping in the
lobby itself. The Diplomatic Corps, which
met with us, also told us of the serious situ-
ation which they had gone through and were
going through; anarchy ruled; the attacks
that the diplomatic missions themselves had
suffered; the wounded, including the diplo-
matic missions that had given asylum to
wounded persons; and this was something
that went on hour after hOur.
Undoubtedly, peace and security are seri-
ously affected when there is no authority
that is respected, for although there are
those who proclaim that they represent au-
thority in each sector, it may be seen later
that they do not possess it to such a degree
that peace prevails; and although they sign
documents, such as the cease-fire that was
arranged before we arrived, or the Act of
Santo Domingo, which we signed; neverthe-
less, it can be seen that they have no abso-
lute control over the situation when the
spectacle of wounded and dead persons is
seen. We asked how many had died, how
many had been wounded; and I believe that
I can say, as an opinion gathered from per-
sons of whom it can be said, insofar as this is
possible, that they are better informed on the
matter, that at least one thousand five hun-
dred persons have died in Santo Domingo.
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20556 C NGRESSIONAL TtECORD --- SENATE August 23, 1965
And how are the farces distributed? Row .1
the Country? Fighting has taken place so
far only in the city of Santo Domingo itself,
but who can assure us that it will not Spred
throughout the country?
'The rebel command states that they have
Maintained peace there, because they have
not wished to arouse feelings, in the rest pf
the country, and the Military Junta in San
Isidro States that they control the rest of Vue
dotialtry. What is the real situation? T
'Committee did not, have time to travel
through all of the Dominican Republic; but
it is. evident that chaos exists, that the situ-
ation ts deteriorating; it changes from ()le
hong tathe next; that is clear. The day after
.We had an interview, under the fire of sple-
en, as has been said,here?With the ConS14-
tatiOnallet Military Command, the next cir y,
I repeat, the Chief of that Command was
#roeleiimed President of the Republic, Co a-
Stitufiqjual Presiderit;, and the Military Junta
. Situation as they saw it; although we asked
the disputing groups also to explain to the
Committee and to the Meeting what they
considered the truth about the Dominican
Republic, and also asked the governors of the
provinces whom we interviewed to do the
same, and did likewise with everyone ? with
, whom we had an opportunity to talk and
? question; although we sought all of the evi-
dence that ,might serve as a basis for this
Investigation and to enable the Committee
, to offer its conclusions to this Meeting of
Consultation; despite all this, the time was
. very short and we cannot give conclusions
, in the report we have just submitted, not
even if we were to be able to change them a
. little later.
, Points of view have been given and infor-
mation collected, sometimes in personal con-
versations, as mentioned by the Ambassador
. of Argentina with respect to his conversation
with Colonel Caamalio, or in converse-
? tions the members of the Committee had
with various persons on the scene; but we
should also listen to all parties concerned, to
. all who want to say something; and such an
Investigation takes some time. This is the
reply we must give to the Ambassador of
. Uruguay. With respect to this second point,
we have done all that we could within the
short time available, in an attempt to make
? the cease-fire effective for the protection of
? refugees and those who had taken asylum,
and so that food distribution could be un-
dertaken, to bring in food, medicines, etc.,
? that can be distributed with the necessary
? safety. We did a vast amount of work in
? a very short time, but in regard to investiga-
tion, we can say that we have scarcely begun.
And despite the little that was seen, the
Committee has been able to contribute
something in reply to the questions that
? have been asked here.
The PRESIDENT. I understand that the
Representative of Uruguay is very well satis-
fied the thorough manner in which the
Interesting questions put to the members of
the Committee have been answered.
Mr. ORB/E. Of course, Mr. President, I
would like to express my appreciation once
again, and I believe that what has now been
' said here is fundamental; because the con-
viction of the members of the Committee
will surely allow us, through consultation,
to take appropriate measures without getting
Into the problem of intervention
'
The PRESIDENT. I recognize the Special
Delegate of Paraguay, Ambassador Yodice.
Mr. Yawns. Thank you, Mr. President.
' First, I wish to join in the words of apprecia-
tion that have been spoken here to the am-
bassadors who composed our special com-
mittee that traveled to Santo Domingo and
completed the great task of which we are so
proud. I am vett happy that from the .first
time the floor was requested until now we
have had a series of statements from the
distinguished ambassadors on the Commit-
tee, and their statements make my congrat-
ulations even warmer. As the Chairman of
the Committee, the, illustrious Ambassador
of Argentina, Dr. Ricardo Colombo, has said,
this is the nnernent of truth_ailii_the Delega-
tion, of Paraguay is quite pleased with the
. Re-tit:m.0f the members of the Committee.
The Delegation of Paraguay, Mr. President,
is proud of this Committee because it has,
in the first place, effectively carried out the
peacemaking aspect of its mission as fully as
is possible; it is proud of this Committee
because it has justified the confidence of
the Paraguayan Delegation placed in it, in-
asmuch as the distinguished ambassadors
who composed it, whose ability and inter-
American spirit all of us know, as was said
when the committee's membership was ap-
proved, would determine whether or not in-
ternational communism had a part in the
bloody events in the Dominican Republic.
If the distinguished Representative of Mex-
ico had not ratted the question he did on the
DI wiuch we had talked _N al La
Which signed the act of Santo Donainge
, ,
does not now exist, according to reports ar-
riving today through the news agencies. The
teletype has just brought for example, a cable
reading: 'Domingo Imbert, President of the
riene.lriveAgenriner, junta, quickly convenisd
. ,
a prees 6Olaference and called for a peac a??
Making effort to rebuild the country as g
r Store national , unity without discrimint-
on on account of political affiliation." Ike
alde bed .colonel, Cearnafio as a good person
se:-
ji
, e other members of the new Junta ariu.
Igo toStigo, 61 _ years old, a lawyer who:n
some people consider a militant in tlo
l't evolutlonary Party of Juan Bosch; Carlota
drliella Poloraey, 51 years old, governor of
one ,o; 'the provinces under the deposed re-,-
ime of Donald Reid Cabral; Alejandro Sebig
,opo, 41 years old, an engineer; and Colon tl
Reneit?, a member of?,,,,the previous Balite.] y
junta of_ three. imhert did not explain hof
Or tvliY the earlier Junta resigned or how tie
new" one was formed, Although Caainaf. p
could not be foinid, to?,give us a statennenk,
the leader of the. IOVolutiontary Party, Joie
Pranel,scO Pena 66rriez, stated over the rebid
radio that the new group represented ag
linderhantied manenver against the Interests
Of the,Dorninican,people. In the Doininica a
RepUblic we constantly heard rumors, stori( a
that igot to us, to the effect that they wet 5
incit ng to arms over the radio, even during
the cease-fire. ?
The circumstances, prevailing in Sant?
DOnaingo are most difficult, tremendously dif -
fieUlt; lp would be a good thing if the
representatives were to go and see hon
things are developing there and how, in till
report we have submitted, we cannot give Eta;
exact Picture of the, prevailing situatior, ,
which,,I1,a* disturbed us deeply. The situa-
tion _Undoubtedly endangers peace and se._
carity, and not of the Dominican Irtepubli
alone, The representative of Uruguay als )
- referred to the 2tliSa1940 of investigation; am i
Indeed, among the duties entrusted to the
Committee was the ,duty of making an in ?
vestigation of all aspects of the situatior t
existing in the Dominican Republic that lea
to tii,e, palling of the Meeting. But the kind,
of InveStigation that was asked is not onet
that oan, it made in a few hours. The Coin:.
mittee,ba, to give priority to what demander,
priority, and the first thing was to try to
reatore peace and conditions of safety, to
restore things as much as Possible to nor..
Mel, under prevailing conditions, in ordei _
that It .could earry out an investigation such
rie, We .belieVed?,the Meeting of Consultation.
haeirequeete)i. . _ . . .
are in agreement that this. inyestiga- ?
tion ehonid, be ca,rried as far as it is desired;
but in Aiestlort space of time we were there,-
and with_all tile tasks we had; and although
W. aought opiniens and points of view on_
veiripus,?sidt;, Although we asked all mem-
' hen of,the ,iplomatic Corps to give us their
,
views In writing, that is, their views on the
matter, I would have done so. Imight, how-
ever, have put it differently, since I would
not have confined myself to inquiring as to
the possibility of' Communist intervention
in a specific group, but would have extended
the inquiry to all aspects of the serious con-
flict that the Dominican people are under-
going today.
The Government of Paraguay, as I stated
clearly when approval was given to the es-
tablishment of the collective inter-American
force, believed from the beginning that con-
tinental security was at stake, The replies
by the Ambassadors composing the Commit-
tee reporting today on certain questions re-
garding these delicate aspects of the Domini-
can situation have been categorical. My
government was right. Continental security
is threatened. The danger existed, and still
exists, that chaos and anarchy will permit
international communism to transform the
Dominican Republic into another Cuba
With his customary clarity, courage, and en-
ergy, the Ambassador of Colombia, Mr. Al-
fredo Vazquez Carrizosa, has categorically
mentioned the highly political nature of the
problem we are facing. In reply to a ques-
tion of the Ambassador of Uruguay, he has
rightly said that the peace of America is
threatened, that the security of the hemi-
sphere is threatened, and that there is a pos-
sibility that another Cuba, another Com-
munist government in the hemisphere will,
arise out of the chaos and anarchy in the
Dominican Republic.
We are proud of the action of our commit-
tee, because, as the Ambassador of Uruguay
said, it is helping to clarify the problem we
are facing. Paraguay had no doubts when
It voted on the resolution for the establish-
ment ' of the inter-American force. As I
said: "The Government of Paraguay ap-
proves the sending of U.S. forces to the Do-
minican Republic, considering that this does
not imply armed intervention prejudicial to
the right of self-determination of the Do-
minican people, but, on the contrary, that
it is a measure of hemispheric defense
against the intervention of Castro-Commu-
nist forces. The Government of Paraguay is
aware that U.S. armed intervention has been
necessary in view of the urgency of prevent-
ing extracontinental and Cuban forces and
funds from annulling the Dominican peo-
ple's right of self-determination, since it
was evident that it would be difficult for the
inter-Americaa system to act rapidly and
energetically. The Government of Paraguay
reaffirms its support of the proposed estab-
lishxnent of a hemispheric force and will
participate in it if a substantial majority of
the governme:nts of the member states do
likewise." .
Mr. President, if there is anything to re-
gret it is that, for the time being, this valu-
able, clear explanation of the seriousness
of the Dominican problem furnished to us
by our committee is known only to the dele-
gates of this Meeting of Consultation.
Obviously w.e are going to come to a mo-
ment when the enlightened judgment of the
President and of the Delegates, in my opin-
ion, will decide that these vital conclusions
reached by our Committee should be known '
by all of the Americas, by all of the people
of the hemisphere. Because for my Dele-
gation, Mr. President, these conclusions,
which appear in the written report and in
the replies to the questions posed here,
should not be known only by the Delegates;
they should be known by all the people. I
emphasize this point because I am proud
that my Delegation, from the very beginning,
has been concerned and has established a
position with regard to the seriousness of
the conflict, in view of the intervention of
international communism in the Dominican
events.
Once more, I congratulate the members of
our Committee; I am confident that the
conclusions they now bring to us from their
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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? SENATE 20557
trip to Santo Domingo and that they will
continue to bring will greatly help this Meet-
ing of Consultation. The inter-American
system must find the permanent solution re-
ferred to by the distinguished Ambassador
of Ecuador in order to bring about a return
of constitutionality in the sister Dominican
Republic, a return of the reign of representa-
tive democracy and of human rights, and of
all those inalienable principles of sovereign
peoples that motivate the resolutions of this
Meeting of Consultation in dealing with the
Dominican problem. I believe, Mr. Presi-
dent, that with the clarity of the conclu-
sions of the Committee we shall be walking
on firmer ground. The basic conclusion that
I want drawn from this statement I am now
making is that we should act on the basis
of these important conclusions furnished to
us by the Committee; not only the conclu-
sions appearing in the report that has been
distributed, but also those verbally expressed
tonight by the members of the Committee. I
repeat my congratulations to the ambassa-
dors and my confidence that these highly
important conclusions will shortly be brought
to the attention of all the Americas. Many
thanks, Mr. President.
Mr. TEJERA PARIS (the Special Delegate of
Venezuela). Mr. President, I wish to make
a motion.
The PRESIDENT. What is the motion of the
Ambassador of Venezuela?
Mr. TEJTRA PARIS. Mr. President, two days
ago when it was desired to undertake a thor-
ough analysis of the problem, I asked this
distinguished meeting to await the return of
the Committee, so that we might question
it and hear what proved to be an excellent
and highly important report. On behalf
of My government, I wish to express apprecia-
tion for the work that has been done and the
sacrifices that have been made. I now wish
to call attention to the following point:
perhaps this session should devote itself ex-
clusively to questions and answers, so that
by speeding things up we can obtain the in-
formation as precisely as possible, leaving
basic statements and studies of possible
solutions until tomorrow's plenary; other-
wise, we shall have to repeat many of the
things already said here. This is my mo-
tion, Mr. President.
highly important factor in the cease-fire that
has been obtained and that a clear delinea-
tion of this zone and knowledge of it, not
ust by the parties involved but by everyone,
will be very helpful in forming an idea of
what might happen if, as may be feared, this
security zone were violated. If acceptable
to the Committee, I would request, Mr. Presi-
dent, that this plan not only be incorporated
into the Act, but also circulated by the sec-
retariat as soon as possible.
The PRESIDENT. I ask; I imagine that the
Chairman of the Committee wishes to reply
to Ambassador Magnet's question.
Mr. Cc:4,mm?, The Committee, through me,
reports that the map is now being distrib-
uted, and I apologize to the Ambassador of
Chile because it was not attached to the re-
port when this was distributed. The expla-
nation may lie in the undeserved expression
of appreciation for the Committee's work,
on the part of the Ambassador. Material
difficulties prevented distribution, but I now
present the map to the Chair so that, as the
Ambassador of Chile has wisely requested, it
may be distributed as soon as possible, since
It is necessary for the proper information of
the Ambassadors.
The PRESIDENT. The Chair shall proceed
accordingly, Mr. Chairman, Ambassador Co-
lombo.
Mr. MAGNET. I wish to explain that my
words did not imply the slightest criticism
or reproach of the Committee.
Mr. COLOMBO. I wish to make quite clear
that I have not even remotely suspected
such an attitude from one whom I know to
be a gentleman and distinguished ambassa-
dor who honors the inter-American system.
The PRESIDENT. Your second question, Mr.
Ambassador.
Mr. MAGNET. It is more than a question,
Mr. President, to try to achieve some kind of
friendship. I think it is quite clear both
from the text and the context of the report
we have just had the pleasure of hearing,
especially the Act of Santo Domingo?with
which we were already acquainted and which
is contained in the report signed on May 5?
that there is not, nor was there on that date
a constituted government in the Dominican
Republic able to represent the country, but
two parties or conflicting factions. The
committee, with the knowledge it gained
through its on-the-spot activity, and with
its spirit of impartiality, deemed it neces-
sary to hear the two parties or factions in
order to reach some useful result. I would
like to ask the Chairman of the Committee,
through you Mr. President, if the evidence
that has been gathered corresponds to the
truth.
The PRESIDENT. Shall I refer the question
to the Chairman or to the distinguished
members of the Committee?
Mr. Colomso. I think that, in substance,
we have already answered the Ambassador's
question. That is, all of us Committee mem-
bers have confirmed the impression of chaos
that we found in the Dominican Republic,
the complete lack of authority, the existence
of two groups that appeared to be standard-
bearers in the conflict and with whom we felt
impelled to establish immediate contact.
I do not know if this will satisfy the Ambas-
sador, and I wish he would let me know if he
has any doubts that I can clear up.
The PRESIDENT. What does the Ambassador
of Chile have to say?
Mr. MAGNET. It seems to me that what the
Ambassador has said confirms what I?
Mr. COLOMBO. I think it is the same thing,
Mr. Ambassador.
The PRESIDENT. Is there any other ques-
tion? Mr. Ambassador.
Mr. MAGNET. If it is not an imposition on
you or on the meeting, Mr. President, I won-
der if it would be too much to ask the Com-
mittee to tell us how many asylees or refu-
gees still remain in the embassies in Santo
Domingo, if it has been able to obtain this
Information.
The PRESIDENT. Mr. Ambassador, the Chair
entirely agrees with you. It would really be
interesting to devote ourselves to question-
ing the honorable Committee and its distin-
guished members, and the answers that they
give us will be very edifying.
Time goes on, and we must take advantage
of the privacy of this meeting precisely to
present this type of questions and, in this
same confidential setting, to obtain the an-
swers of the distinguished Committee mem-
bers. Naturally, the occasion will come for
us to make detailed statements on behalf of
our governments on the text of the impor-
tant report presented by our colleagues on
the Committee. I offer the floor to the Rep-
resentative of Chile.
Mr. MAGNET (the Special Delegate of Chile) .
Thank you, Mr. President. The opinion that
the President has just expressed so wisely
is in complete accord with what I am about
to say now. Although, for reasons clearly ex-
plained at the time, the Delegation of Chile
abstained from voting for the establishment
of the committee that has now returned to
our midst, I can do no less than corroborate,
briefly but sincerely, the expressions of praise
that the committee has earned. Moreover,
the position taken by my country does not
inhibit me, for everyone's benefit, from ask-
ing some questions that are of interest to my
country, and, as I understand, to the others
as well. In the Act of Santo Domingo, re-
ferred to by the President in his Statement,
mention is made of a security zone in that
city, whose limits would be indicated in a
plan appended to this document. Mr. Presi-
dent, I believe that this security zone Is a
Mr. CoLosiso. The truth is that at this
time, Mr. Ambassador, it is impossible to
answer your question because, fortunately,
the evacuation of asylees has already started.
I have information regarding the asylees at
my embassy: there were 14 who have already
been able to leave. That is, this changes ac-
cording to the help received, food and other,
because the asylees take advantages of arriv-
ing planes in order to arrange their trans-
portation; therefore, at this moment it would
be practically impossible?because of the
time that has elapsed since our arrival?to
say how many asylees have been able to leave
the country. Fourteen have left my embassy.
The PRESIDENT. Is the Ambassador satis-
fied?
Mr. MAGNET. I hope I am not being too in-
sistent, Mr. President, but perhaps with the
testimony of the other members of the Com-
mittee we might obtain an approximate fig-
ure, at least.
The SPECIAL DELEGATE OF BRAZIL. Mr. Am-
bassador of Chile. I wish to inform you that
in the Embassy of Brazil there were thirty-
eight asylees, of which only six wished to
leave the Dominican Republic. The other
thirty-two told us that they would prefer to
await the return of normal conditions in
their country. Therefore, only six asylees in
our embassy left the Dominican Republic.
The PRESIDENT. Does Ambassador Vasquez
Carrizosa wish to contribute anything?
Mr. VASQUEZ Csamoss (the Special Dele-
gate of Colombia). There were about 30
asylees in the Embassy of Colombia in Santo
Domingo, some of whom did not wish to
leave Dominican territory. Many of them,
especially women and children, left on May 5
on the plane that brought in food, medicine
and medical equipment.
The PREIDENT. The Ambassador of Guate-
mala.
Mr. GARCIA BAT/ER. There were 28 asylees at
the Embassy of Guatemala, of whom nine
left. There are now 19 asylees at present
who will be evacuated as soon as possible on
the plane arriving from Guatemala with food
and medicines. The Secretariat has already
been informed of this.
Mr. MAGNET. Mr. President, I wish to leave
on record my gratification and to pay public
tribue to the patriotism of the Dominicans,
since so many of them have chosen not to
abandon their country, in spite of the pre-
vailing chaos.
The PRESIDENT. We give the floor to the
Representative of El Salvador, Ambassador
Clairmont Duefias.
Mr. CLAIRMONT DUEOTAS (the Special Dele-
gate of El Salvador). Thank you Mr. Presi-
dent. I am going to ask a question,
wish at this time to express by government's
appreciation for the excellent work of the
Committee in the face of the tragic events
in the Dominican Republic. Our thanks,
gentlemen. The question is as follows, and
I wish to refer to the distribution of weapons
to the civilian population. I wish to ask the
members of the Committee whether they
then had sufficient time to investigate how
this distribution was made, what was the
source, if it is known, whether distribution
was made indiscriminately or to persons of
any special tendencies, and who were the
originators of this distribution. Thank you
very much.
The PRESIDENT. I refer the question to the
members of the Committee. The Ambassa-
dor of Brazil, if you please.
Mr. PENNA Msammo. Mr. President, I wish
to reply to the question posed by the Am-
bassador of El Salvador, and I do this on
precarious bases, because the information
we received was precarious, and, above all,
contradictory. There was, however, a com-
mon consensus in these replies, that the
arsenal of weapons had been opened, access
to it was given to the population, and that
the civilian population, a part of which was
controlled by Colonel Caamafio, was armed
with automatic weapons considered by sev-
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Approved For Releas
20558
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ONORESSIONAL RECORp S,yNATE ,Aggust 23 1965
?
era authorities we interviewed as the ;bp,st
6.1ad most Modern existing in the Domtlican.
Republic. And we were able to peCel,ain,
When we opened negotiations with the ETeup
led by the Conunander of the Revolutitgwy
GovernMent,I,coionel Caamaflo, We were -Able
tO see various: persons, teenagers, worne:g, all
AIMS d With machineguns, forming fmall
groups In the streets of the neighborhoccis: of
05Ft0'.P0mIngo that were under the control
, , e rebels. And, so there was .a.clist441,1-
' `; Matte of all, the weapons that were
red in the araenal of the 1l,1car1le-
iblIc
?Re-
to the civilian population that sup-
ttect Colonel :Caamailo's group., This is
inforreation, we were able to , gatht _4* by
aile Of the contacts we had with the gen-
ii &files of the Dominican ItertIOSIC.
ESIDENT Ambassador Vazquez Car-
a S yeeial Delegate of Colombia.
111.1ir; VA QuEZCARRIZOSA. I CRILIII0t, Of core,
ve opiniOn on the way in whickthe
eritidiit -Were 4tiibilted, but the truli, is
that Ip the sector Of the city where Colonel
Caarnatio'S cOmmand was located, the ;Sres-
*nee Or weapons, of macliliieguns, was
Ike ,111nd 'Cleari, of an citizens in the streets
ttj all Who ,Were around us, each
ed a., meohlriegun, so the aeap-
Were "4 iiiimprons as the , persons who
Were affihnd us. , Thank you. ,
'The 4?RESIDENT. Does the Arnbaesadcr, of
e ala wish to give any opinion in this
?
P,4WF,S4. ;yes, of course it einid
be seen in the city, as far as we could 'see,
that automate and other weapons weig in
!th.S hands of aganyyoUng civilians, and Teen.
or tv8-44011.' ''NOW? according to informati on I
rtePtved- early8unday morning, April 25,
triariy:yOung civilians were armed with ail:te-
tte weapons from the 16 de Agosto gimp.
4310ESME.i*,TT, The 'Representative Cr. pit
, far. .C4ittadiat DuetiaS.
r. Ota.taidO*r DaSik' as. Ths,n,k, You, 'fel-
oWlIkelegatee. / have a second qUestioti, if
"the'President wl1 permit me. I wislr,
siele, the inembere Of the Committee if
ilalle Peen; foreseen, or, gathered, accor ling
.to, hoe,use , the term, the poeilb aity
'thiitthe eoctor eontrolled by Colonel ra7
athOsivipg weapons supplied by _an-
Other, ,country, ,not the Doininicap. Eel gib-
country, let ne pay, Ctfle,-
-Of'"ii,it, :using the , weapons that they itaire
1liete at this time. -
? NESIDENT. the Representative oi:LP9.7 _
6inb1*, Ambassador Vazquez Cairieosa.
? r. Viizqniz OsBemoss. There is 814 ,a
r?us1on Of niachineguns in the sector of
47. city thatvisited" that .in reality, the
rtation of this item is Unnecessary.
'1154Estr;E:N., Th6, re,presentatiVes
tO 'add someilain_g to the iciify.
serititiive of Venezuela, Amba
elerOari6,1-14the
7s,ria4, pfr. President, I al-jolt:id
like to ask -?.4: ,p2lininittee twO? OtieSti4ns,
th firs precisely about arms. Did the Chin-
iattee of the, existence, ,pr was it 4sle
Verify that there is some eysternof
lie-
or some, Inventory 'whereby, in the
forthcoming peacemaking activities., it cc islci
eCkjlat pest' Of the arms has been ye-,
y:expepence in such matters USIA
eeri .tqt.it isposeible to have a very lsgse
'?t Of the a,rms, given to civilians rettirlOcl,
thin; 13,Y a sUTppieinenia4, house,,:to-
'10*Se peareh they, can be .coiroUed. Ji
,gefieral;:the military are very good buregu-
, Mats; they generally make inventories, ,mel
to the' question. 4 'kik 16 not absurd.
_
4',0-Lkagst9.4ri: FSefer th9, question to
Cpieuibo., ..Chgenian Of , the Cope-
the
04o4t#p? 17esideht, the questipn
_;44sttusgatEdted MbaSaador
a.,Palrc JA14P asked the ,Var.i2na
.groups in Santo, Domingo. All of
?Nere ypy eorry that they could got
deme, riceisrate, pieces of evid,ei
Which would have been very valuable. When
we were about to leave, in connection with
the activities reported on in our dispatch,
our report, the only part on which we ob-
tained a reply that would help allay the
Ambassador's fears was given by the United
States, when the Ambassador of the United
States in Santo Domingo told me that many
of_those who are arriving in the security zone
bring arms with them and turn them in. I
tried to go further into this question to as-
certainthe number of arms. The reply was
not definite. I was told merely that this was
a report that he had received from General
Palmer, who had told the Ambassador of the
United States that they had a certain
amount of arms that were being turned in
by people who were arriving in the zone for
diverse reasons, many of whom were coming
in search of food or medical care and who
were voluntarily turning in their weapons.
This IS the only thing I can say, but I believe
that I have contributed something to allay
yours fears, Mr. Ambassador; nothing more.
Ur. TEJERA PARIS. Thank you very much,
Mr. President. The other question would
be this: I was very favorably impressed and
feel optimistic at the fact that the Com-
mittee.noted among both the Constitution-
alists and the rebels a fervent desire to have
the OAS intervene to seek a solution; and
that even, according to what I think I heard
the Chairman of the Committee say, Colonel
Caamafio himself said that he rejected the
Security Council solution and preferred an
OAS solution, because it belongs to the sys-
tem. Now I should like to ask you this:
Did the Committee explore the possibility,
or did it hear of any methodology of any
special system, for example, the presence of
a high commission of eminent persons or a
high commission of good offices that could
assist In returning the country to consti-
tutional normalcy now? Does the Commit-
tee believe that there would be some possi-
bility that such a solution would be ac-
ceptable to all the bands in conflict? I
understand that now there is another change
In the country.
The PRESIDENT. I refer the question to the
Committee members. Mr. Vazquez Carri-
zoea, please.
Mr. VAZQUEZ CARRIZOSA. it Is still prema-
ture to go into that. Of course, we can find
evidence of contact, points of common ref-
erence, but within an atmosphere of tension
-and anxiety such as surrounded us, it is
difficult right now to think of formulas for
a government that might unite the two
parts, I do not exclude It as a possibility
for the future, but apart from a similar
reference to the Organization of American
States, I think it is impossible for the Com-
mittee (although my colleagues may believe
otherwise) to answer that question more
precisely. No system came into view. The
thing is it was not our job to investigate
political conditions of a new government.
Our Mission, which was precisely set forth
by the resolution of May 1, was to obtain a
cease-fire, guarantees for the departure of
refugees, and safe conditions for the em-
bassies, and also to organize humanitarian
aid. Moreover, the terms of the resolution
of May 1 did not authorize us to enter into
discussions of matters that are the concern
of the .Dotaittican people, and personally,
my theory is that our mission was essentially
to bring about peace?not to prejudge the
will of the Dominicans regarding their own
future; at least, that is my reasoning.
The .PicesiDENr. The floor goes to the Rep-
resentative a Guatemala, member of the
committee, to reply to certain aspects of the
questl9n raised by Mr. TeJtra Paris.
Mr. Gasects 134Vinit. There is no better way
to. answer the question raised by the Ambas-
sador 04 Venezuela than to refer him to the
terms of reference of the May 1 resolution pi
this meeting. The work mentioned by the
Ttepresentative of Venezuela lpt fount:14n
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the terms of reference, and consequently, the
Committee was prohibited from entering into
that area. Undoubtedly, and this we have
already said, there is a desire for under-
standing; there is an evident wish for peace,
since a number of relationships are involved;
there are people, friends of one side and of
the other. The Dean of the Diplomatic Corps
told us of how, through him, splendid acts
of humanitarianism had been performed.
People asked him about their friends ru-
mored to be wounded or dead, and he was
able to give them explanation and set -their
minds at rest. In other words, that atmos-
phere has existed, and if the Ambassador of
'Venezuela,. for example, remembers the cable
that I read earlier, it mentioned one of the
members of this new junta who described
Caamafio as a personal friend, and also men-
tioned a lawyer, whom some think to be a
militant partisan of the revolutionary party
of Juan Bosch. In other words, it shows that
there is a desire for understanding, that that
desire is evident, and, of course, that there
is faith in the inter-American system. How
is that desire to be channeled? How .can the
.GAS help to solve that problem that essen-
tially must be solved by the Dominicans
themselves? That is something that must
be considered at an opportune time by the
system, by the organs of the system. I
.yield the floor to Ambassador Tejera Paris.
The PRESIDENT. The Special Delegate of
Venezuela has the floor.
Mr. TEJERA PARIS. I first want to explain
that my question' was not intended as crit-
icism of the Committee, nor did I think that
It could have wished to go beyond its terms
of reference. I was only referring?perhaps
T did not explain myself clearly?to the idea
proposed informally by the Delegation of
Costa Rica--I don't know if all of you know
about this--for setting up a delegated com-
mittee, a ,committee that, by delegation of
this conference, would go to the Dominican
.Republic for the purpose of carrying out the
second part of the task of reestablishing
peace?that is, the administration of the
mechanics of reestablishing peace and a re-
turn to institutional normality, not the for-
mation of a government and other such mat-
ters. Then I asked myself if such an idea
had already occurred to other countries in
some form or other, since such Ideas are
normal. That was my question. Now, I have
a third one.
The PRESIDENT. The Chairman of the Com-
mittee, Ambassador Colombo, will be so kind
as to answer these questions.
Mr. COLOMBO. I want to say a couple of
words regarding this concern of the distin-
guished Ambassador of Venezuela. I share
the opinion just expressed by Ambassador
Garcia Bauer that our immediate job was to
obtain a prompt peace. Also, we were ob-
sessed with the fact?as undoubtedly every-
one else Was, without exception?that the
solution to the Dominican Republic's polit-
ical problem should be in complete keeping
with the principle of self-determination of
peoples, and that in the last analysis It was
the Dominicans who must determine the
direction of their institutional 'life. For us,
it has been enough to know that they respect
the jurisdiction and authority of the system
and that the system assures the solution.
But, Mr. President, with all respect to the
Ambassador of Venezuela, neither do I think
that this is the time to start discussing these
matters, since, precisely for the reasons given
by the Ambassador earlier, we should con-
centrate on the report and on the questions
and answers from the Ambassadors and the
Committee members respectively.
The PEES/DENT._The Special Delegate of
Venezuela has the floor.
Mr. TEJERA PARIS. I just want some per-
sonal information, as all of us do. And an-
other thing. From my own country's experi-
ence, especially during the dictatorship of
Terez, Jimeiez, Communist hi,WtratIq Is
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? August 29, 1965'
generally chaotic everywhere and tries to
produce chaos in the various factions. Ex-
perience shows us that It is much easier and
more common for Communists to ally them-
selves with elements of the extreme right
than with liberal ones. And so I ask whether
the Committee noted or inquired as to the
presence of agents and provocateurs on the
side of Benoit, Wessin y Wessin, and com-
pany, or whether they investigated the
presence of Communists from the other side,
because some of their action seem?give the
impression of being?provocations rather
than judicious acts.
The PRESIDENT. Would the Chairman of the
' Committee like to say something in this
regard?
Mr. COLOMBO. Thank you, yes. That also
is a very pertinent question, and I think
that we answered it to a certain extent when
we acknowledged the existence of snipers on
both sides. That is, there are snipers every-
where; they are a general disturbing element
throughout the country, although we can-
not attribute to them the particular ideology
mentioned by the Ambassador. But it is done before Conditions return to normal in
apparent that anyone who plays the part of that tragic and torn country. It is quite
a sniper and has escaped the normal corn- obvious, from what the Committee has said,
mand of either of two groups is following that there is today no effective national gov-
his own ideology. That is all, Mr. President. ernment in the Dominican Republic. There
The PRESIDENT. Would Ambassador Penna are contending forces, each in control or
Marinho like to comment on the question perhaps quasi-control in separate areas, but
presented by Ambassador Tejera Paris? Am- no political grouping or faction can lay a
bassador Vasquez Carrizosa? Ambassador well-founded claim to being the government
Bauer? Would you like to, Mr. Ambassador? of the country. I say quasi-control because
Mr. VAsornz CARRIZOSA. Well, I just have we had word from our Embassy in Santo
this thought: if there are snipers in both Domingo today that the palace inside the
parties, why can't they be snipers of the rebel zone, in which 400 people, / believe,
Wessin Communists, or snipers of the Caa- have taken refuge, had been attacked three which would, undoubtedly, be the road to be-
mato rightists, or simply nationalists? times during the day. This may be indeed gin working seriously to bring definitive
The PRESIDENT. Is there any comment on a violation to the cease-fire. peace to Santo Domingo.
these last statements, Mr. Chairman? But it remains, Mr. Chairman, for the The PRESIDENT. Ambassador Facie) wishes
Mr. Cotomno. I should not like to con- DOMITI/Call people, with the help of the OAS to ask another question.
tinue this dialogue because that would lead to which I understand they are looking, from Mr. Facie). Many thanks. No, I am satisfied
us into a maze of conjectures, Mr. Ambas- the words of the Committee, to organize a and, of course, the question did not imply
sador, but I believe, and I will say, that there government and to provide for future con- any criticism whatsoever or any desire that
is a fundamental difference: Colonel Caa- stitutional arrangements of their own choos- they depart from that norm.
mafio's commands recognized the existence ing. It seems to me that it is of the great- The PRESIDENT. Ambassador Vazquez Cern-
of Communist Communist elements that were seeking est importance that the OAS should endeavor zosa, the Special Delegate of Colombia.
C IZOSA The Ambassador of
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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD -- SENATE 20559
The PRESIDENT. Is the Ambassador's speak-
er turned too high?
Mr. BUNKER. Shall I proceed? Well, it
seems to me, Mr. Chairman, that the ques-
tions which have been put by my distin-
guished colleague to the Committee, and the
answers of the members, have shed further
light and have made a very great contribu-
tion toward a greater understanding of the
situation existing in the Dominican Republic;
a contribution so valuable that / think it
should become public knowledge, Mr. Chair-
man. I believe that it was agreed at our
previous meeting that the proceedings of the
private meetings and the records would be-
come public. I trust that that will be so in
this case, because I think the record is ex-
tremely valuable to provide a much wider
public knowledge of the actual conditions in
the Dominican Republic.
The Committee has succeeded in taking
this first step of major importance. It seems
to me that this meeting can now move to
a second major stage of the task, for I think
we can all agree that much remains to be
the establishment of Colonel Caamafio's
group as the titular Constitutional Govern-
ment, nothing more,
Mr. Paolo. Then, you had the opportunity
to discuss with them their claim to be the
only constitutional government of the Do-
minican Republic, because whether or not
this claim can be maintained in either rela-
tive or absolute terms depends on their being
peace through mediation between the two
groups.
The PRESIDENT. The Chair again recognizes
the Ambassador of Argentina.
Mr. CordomBo. Mr. President, replying to
the important question asked by the Ambas-
sador of Costa Rica, I am pleased to tell him
that the Committee delivered the Act pre-
viously to Colonel Caamario for consideration,
in order that he would have the opportunity
of going into the intricacies of its legal im-
plications, because what we wished to achieve
was the first step that would lead all of us to
achieve peace in the Dominican Republic, and
if you read the beginning of the Act of Santo
Domingo, it sets forth what Colonel Caamano
and Colonel Guerra thought of the Act and
the opinion of the parties. I recall simply
that it reads: "The Parties signing below who
declare that they represent, in the capacities
mentioned," that is, in the act of signing
they declared their capacity and as we had no
authority to pass judgment on the titles,
which would have implied a dangerous in-
cursion into a territory that was forbidden to
us, we limited ourselves to record the capac-
ity of each one of the groups and with all
loyalty to say to frankly and without any
legal doubt at the beginning of that Act
to infiltrate and to gain control of his move-
ment?an affirmation that I did not hear,
nor do I believe that any of the members
heard it, from Colonel Benoit.
Mr. TEJERA PAR/S. Maybe they are not so
politically sensitive.
The PRESIDENT. Well, reportedly so, accord-
ing to some opinions.
Mr. TEJERA PAR/S. I thought as much, but
I just wanted to make sure. Thank you very
much, Mr. Ambassador.
The PRESIDENT. OUT thanks to you, MT.
Ambassador. We shall now hear from the
Ambassador of the United States, Mr.
Bunker.
Mr. BUNKER. I would like to express on
behalf of my delegation, and indeed on be-
half of my Government, appreciation and
praise to all of the members of the Com-
mittee of the Meeting, individually and col-
lectively, who, under the brilliant leadership
of my friend and colleague, Ambassador
Colombo, have accomplished so much in so
brief a period, and under, as they have de-
scribed to us, the most difficult and trying
circumstances. We have heard the report of
the Committee this evening, and I am con-
fident that this Meeting will agree with me,
that the Act of Santo Domingo marks an
outstanding achievement in what has been
our priority objective under the terms of the
resolution, an agreement on an effective
cease-fire in the Doininican Republic. As
d
to assist patriotic and outstanding citizens ?
of the Dominican Republic, and I am sure Costa Rica asks whether the constitutional
they can be found, to establish a provisional government invokes the qualification of gov-
government of national unity, which could ernment for the whole country and whether
eventually lead to a permanent representa- it authorizes the presence of another govern-
tive regime through democratic processes. ment.
Mr. Chairman, we must now seek to find Mr. FACTO. No. Naturally it is evident that
paths of peace and to build on the base each one of the parties which proclaims that
which has been established by this act of it is the government aspires to this, but did
Santo Domingo. I want again to express the You, specifically from this contact, reach the
appreciation of my government for the conclusion that Colonel Caamafio was in an
splendid work of this Committee because irreducible position; not to yield. And I ask
they have established, through what they this question because after the signing of the
have done here, really the first and essen- Act of Santo Domingo, Caamafio has insisted
tial base for any further prograss. Thank that he does not accept the participation of
you, Mr. Chairman. an inter-American force and that the solu-
The PRESIDENT. I recognize the Represent- tion is that he is the President, and that he
ative of Uruguay, Ambassador Oribe. be recognized as Constitutional President,
Mr. ORME. Mr. President, I would like to and that he represents legality.
second what the Ambassador of the United Mr. Color/1)3o. First of all, Mr. Ambassador,
States has said with regard to making the I would like to know whether this statement
minutes of this session public. I do this by Colonel Caamafio has been officially corn-
with the understanding, naturally, that they m.unicated.
will be published as is usual; that is, that Mr. FACIO. No, it is a publication.
they will be complete, verbatim minutes. Mr. COLOMBO. That is why I was very sur-
Thank you, Mr. President. prised that Colonel Caamafio transmitted
The PRESIDENT. It is so agreed. Ambassa- that note.
dor Facio, Special Delegate of Costa Rica. Mr. FACIO. No, no, Doctor, it is a statement
Mr. FACTO. First, I would like to join in made in a newspaper.
the congratulations given the disguished Mr. CoLomBo. If we follow the newspapers
? members of the Special Committee for their in this process, Mr. Ambassador.
splendid work. Second the question I am The PRESIDENT. The Representative of Co-
1 bia
Ambassaor Colombo has reported, the Sec-
going to ask is to clarify a concern
retary of State has communicated to the have with respect to the possibility of secur- Mr. VAzounz CARRIZOSA. What the news-
Committee that the United States supports lag an effective peace in the Dominican papers say is one thing and what really hap-
its work in Santo Domingo, and pledges to Republic. I wish to ask the members of the pens is another, but it should be noted that
cooperate fully in the observance of the pro- Committee if they interviewed Col. Caamafio many news items that are published should
VICIOUS of the Act of Santo Domingo. or any members of his group after that band be investigated or it should be known to
Mr. C.67;0mi30. Mr. 15resident,something has was established as what they allege to be the what extent they correspond to what was
gone wrang With the interpreting equipment, Constitutional Government of the Dominican said or to what is done. I can only say the
because I heard the English spoken by the Republic? following: the demarcation of the zone and
Ambassador much more loudly than the Mr. CoLomso. The value of the Act of Santo the existence of a corridor communicating
Spanish interpreter to whom I was listening. Domingo is precisely that it was signed after the San Isidro zone with the center of the
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,
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560, 4-QNGRE$SIONAL RECORD ---, SENATE , . ijugu,st 23, 1965
? aty Were discussed personally with Colonel ent here none can feel the pain that I have Mr. COLOMBO. Mr. President, with deep
dassinaAo. There was even a doubt regard- at what I have heard tonight. Words were feeling the Delegation of Argentina wishes
ing the conditions of the guard in the car- too few to express my appreciation to the to add to the words of the Ambassador of
ridor. An incident had occurred the (Lay members of the Committee. I have just had Brazil concerning the outstanding work of
before---miany incidents occur?regard ng a long-distance telephone conversation, from the Dean of the Diplomatic Corps, that mes-
Slle OMA, patrol that had entered farther ti an Santo Domingo, with Mr. Antonio Imbert, senger of peace in the Dominican Republic.
tWo blOckS tbat on one side and lie and he told me that in a search for possible The only tribute?because everything has
er -wigeseuthOrized by the regulations in solutions the Military Junta had turned 1
eder in esSfeguarel this public road; and
r f?or Arssides maintained that it
gas hitolerable , Viet United States patrols
should go beyond the limits. The military
adviser who accompanied us?he was I he
nnilitary,adviser of the Ambassador of Gua a-
Inala?swho had had the occasion to read
the regulations and the truth regarding the
Ineklent, explained in perfectly fair terns
the trntli of the fact, rectifying Doctor Ar
tides' understanding, but as Doctor Aristicss
insisted, Colonel, Caamafio intervened, with
SOnitis Vigor, to say 'no, this is something e-
*WOO the military and we understand one
=either. I believe that what the military
adviser says is true; I believe that it is a e-
eeptable; I have not ohjectlonZ I am stati
this fact-in case it clears up your doubts.
Tbs,e- l'!RP5IDX1sTT- The Special Delegate of
natesnala, Mr. Gaecia Bauer, s
. Cf4E,OIA BAMII. I only wished to men-
tiesn, with regard to something that has beim
discuSsed before, especially by the Ambass
Cid' of Costa Rica and also with respect to
crose#19/1 that Was asked before, that n
WOOlinSanst 17 Acids g, in which the foursh
taidio-fel,ephone message of the Secreta :y
denqa1 of the ()Apt Doctor Jos?. Mont,
reports?you all ha,ve the document before
fon=that the Military Junta has alreac7
traVeled o Santo Domingo and is install( d
In the National Congress, it states, Centsr
Of the Heroes, then? ,
The, .15it' BiarnEssr. Of the Military Junta
that trev,eled to Santo Domingo? The fifth
.. ready been said?that I can pay under the
power over to a civilian-military junta corn- circumstances, is to repeat here, Mr. Chair-
posed of: Antonio Imbert, president; Julio man, before the entire meeting, his final
Ortigo, Alejandro Seller, Carlos Grisolia words of good-bye to us: Take?he said to
Palone, and Colonel Pedro Benoit. This me?my blessing to the Meeting of Foreign
junta will try to cooperate with the mission Ministers that they may achieve the high
from the Organization of American States to objectives of peace; the peace that, at all
find solutions, which are still premature to costs, must be preserved in this Republic
discuss. He also informed me that the Junta where I hold this apostleship. Nothing more,
has discussed with Dr. Mora the problem of Mr. President.
the radio broadcasts, and it has been proved
that Radio San Isidro has not made any in- The PRESIDENT. Ambassador Vazquez Car-
rizosa, Special Delegate of Colombia, has the
ammatory broadcasts. As to the last at- floor.
fi ts
tack on the National Palace, of which Arnbas- '
sador Bunker spoke, he confirmed to me that Mr. VAZQUEZ CARRIZOSA. Mr. President, it
there are civilian refugees there, is only right to say a few words, as my coi-
1 am not mentioning this as accusation leagues from Brazil and Argentina have al-
but as fact. What interests me most at the ready done, to emphasize the merits of the
moment, since it involves my own responsi- Dean of the Diplomatic Carps, the Papal
bility and that of the government, whichever Nuncio, in the face of such a difficult sane-
it may be, and that of the Dominican peo- tion. There is more; none of our action
ple, is that out of this meeting shall come would have been possible without the advice,
the necessary and imperative declaration without the help of that eminent diplomatic
that what is happening in Santo Domingo representative. And still more, for the fu-
threatens the peace of the hemisphere. Af- ture--for it would be very difficult to think
ter knowing the facts, this is the only justi- about the future of the Dominican Republic
fica,tion this body has for having taken the without speaking of him who so perfectly
steps that it has. I do not propose that this represents the ideal of Pope John XXIII con-
problem be dealt with or discussed tonight cerning the coexistence of men of good will.
because it seems to me that we are all suf- But I have asked for the floor to speak on a
ficiently tired, morally and physically, so time
which may not be appropriate at this
as to be unable to face this problem imrnedi- sime but would be at another. Our report
ately; but I do urge the Tenth Meeting of ends with several recommendations, which I
Consultation as soon as possible to make do not propose to discuss at this session, but
emphatically this decision, so that the fire I do want to point them out, to the Chair
will not be extinguished, not only in the so that at the time and in the, way provided
or ,the_---. , I- Western Hemisphere but in all political quer- for in the regulations or when it is consid-
Ilr, asitclaA3aoss, Yes, the Military Junta tees of the world. I have nothing moreto ered opportune, they may be submitted to
that was in San Isielre. It doesn't say he e say. the Tenth Meeting of Consultation for dis-
Whether it was the, five-man Junta or tbe Mr. PENNA MAR/NHO. Mr. President, before cu.ssion, because they do not deal with po-
three-man Junta, because I don't know if . t Mimi questions, such as those we have dis-
ending this session and to a certain extent
WU done, before the five-man one was es -
taibLiahe,d,. and then, in today's May 7 docu- supplementing the report of the special cam- cussed intensely, but specific points on the
mittee, which has just been submitted by its future organization of activities in the Do-
, pays. as to what is happening
here, the situatien continues to be ver of the greatest urgency, such as supervision
Chairman, Ambassador Ricardo Colombo, i can Republic. They are specific points
s delicate, Since the :cease-flre agreement ly allow me to mention one point that ought
helng enforced, with great difficity. It iss to be brought to the attention of this Meet- of the cease-fire, the appointment of a group
particillarlY affected by radio broadcastsing of Consultation. I wish to refer to the qualified to organize the relief measures for
Every effort 1s being made to stop the Santo
that confuse and ,excite the populatior manuel Clarizio, the Papal Nuncio in Santo the studyand planning of an Inter-
magnificent activities of Monsignor Era- needs,edDotmhinican people and evaluate their
Domingo. He is an exceptional figure, a ver- Its
smeersican Force and the coordination of all
Domingo station froin issuing messages that services. Detailed, careful, and immediate
on a grand scale, with free
excite the people. If this is achieved it tiable Don Camiloconsideration ?of these points seems to me
,
to all political areas of Santo Do-
WOUld prevent a state of violence. entr?in
The
SitMe ls ,true with respect to the San Isidro mingo. With astonishing ease, he leaves the absolutely necessary. Thank you very much.
Radio, Yesterday I went to the two broad ? headquarters of Colonel Caamafio to go to The PRESIDENT. The Special Delegate of
Caning stations and transmitted a message the Government Junta and from there to Guatemala, member of the Committee, has
intended to calm feelings and calling upon the American Embassy. He is a respected the floor.
the I?, onApican, ?people to comply with the friend of Caamafio, as he is of Benoit and Mr. GARCIA BAITER. At this time I only wish
agreernente, in the Act of Santo Domingo. of Ambassador Bennett. They all like him to refer to the tribute that my colleagues,
Nevertheless, Radio Santo Domingo and Ras and they all have the same high regard for the members of the Committee, have already
dio San Isidro continue sending messages him. It is due to his thorough understand- paid to the Papal Nuncio and Dean of the
that aid in inflaming spirits and maintain. ing of things, to his moving spirit of human Diplomatic Corps in Santo Domingo, Monsig-
, ing the situation pf, violence." And this solidarity and to his profound love for the nor Emmanuel Clarlzio, for the great work
smile docunient mentions the asylecis whc Dominican people, that the drama in that that he has performed since this grave con-
have left and gives up-to-the-minute in- country did not assume more terrible propor- flicthegan in the Dominican Republic. The
formation regarding them. This is [moor- tions. I know that the Meeting of Consults- Papal Nuncio was exceptionally kind to the
taut in ,relation to the questions that we tion has already paid just tribute to Mon- Committee, offering it every facility within
wdre asked previously. signor Emmanuel Clarizio, but it never will his power, and it was through his great serv-
The PiEsznewr. Thank you very much. Is be too much to point out, for the eternal ices that the Committee was able to accom-
Ambassador Facio satisfied? gratitude of America, the admirable labor of plish what it did. He was present, tirelessly,
Me. Facto. Thank you very much, this extraordinary prelate in behalf of peace at our interviews with Colonel Caamafices
Ilse PassisoBsill% The Representative of and tranquillity in the troubled Dominican command and with the Military Junta and,
Honduras, Ambassador, Midence. Republic. The Delegation of Brazil, express- because the confidence both parties have in
Mr. Muisiscr. My delegation wishes to join ing sentiments that I know are those of all him, the Act of Santo Domingo was signed.
In the congratulations extended to the Com- of the Special Committee of the Tenth Meet- He always used persuasion to the effect that
?Mittee for its magnificent work under such ing of Consultation, manifests its deep ap- the purposes for which the Organization of
diftletilt circumstances. My Delegation feels predation and above all its admiration for American States was in Dominican territory
4-sui'e that the report that has been presented the continuous and tireless collaboration should be borne in mind. As the Ambassa-
today will be of Immense value to this Tenth rendered by Monsignor Emmanuel Clarizio dor of Brazil has said, the Papal Nuncio was
Meeting of consultation of Ministers of For- Papal Nuncio in Santo Domingo, to the respected in every area, regardless of which
011;1'1'A/etre, . Thank you very much. Special Committee of the Tenth Meeting of authority was in power. He is a person who
? s,,, iss.-ssiss.._ ? ? ? ? Consultation during its stay in the Domini- has the confidence of the different parties
siiesesssnssasos Ambassador Bonilla Atiles,
and through his good offices, because of the
Special Delegate of the Dominican Republic. can Republic. Thank you very much.
Mr. BorssLLA A=Ba Mr. President, Dele- The PRESIDENT. Ambassador Ricardo Co- tee was able to accomplish its task. Hence
. ? great collaboration he rendered, the Commit-
gates: I think that of all the delegates ores- lombo has the floor. , the Committee was moved and felt that its
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Augfist 23, 1965
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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? SENATE
own wishes were fulfilled when, at the Papal
Nunciate in Santo Domingo, we delivered to
the Dean of the Diplomatic Corps the mes-
sage from the President of the Tenth Meet-
ing, Mr. Sevilla Sacasa, notifying him of the
action of this Meeting some days ago con-
cerning Monsignor Clarizio's work.
The PRESIDENT. Ambassador Colombo; Spe-
cial Delegate of Argentina has the floor.
Ur. Cowen?. I only wish to add one re-
mark that seems to be strictly justifiable. In
order to be able to act with the urgency that
the case requires, the five-member Commit-
tee had to move up its return so that the
Tenth Meeting could be as thoroughly in-
formed as possible with all available data, but
we were deeply concerned that before our de-
parture the fundamental problem of the faith
in the system as stated by the two sides in
the struggle would not have been resolved,
and the Committee was the link, at the scene
of action, during the emergency, remaining
in order to be able to carry out the powers
excepted by both parties. It was for this
reason that the Delegate of Panama, in an
act that honors him, and which I cannot
ignore, remained at the center of action, rep-
resenting our mission. In this way, accord-
ing to the conversations we held with the
parties, it would be as though the Committee
were present and together with military ad-
visers and the civilian personnel he could
undertake to solve whatever it might be pos-
sible to solve, to the extent that we are
able?to solve the difficulties arising from
the events that have taken place and that are
taking place in the Dominican Republic, I
want this generous act of the Delegate of
Panama, from a country that has so many
reasons for counting on the tradition of
brotherliness in solving basic problems, to be
recognized at this session. Panama is with
us on the Committee, represented by its dis-
tinguished Delegate. Ambassador Calamari
also wanted to be here, physically, with the
Committee but was not able to do so. I want
to stress this act of the Delegate of Panama
because it Is eminently fair to do so?to take
note of one who has firmly carried the banner
of the inter-American system into the midst
of the fight. Nothing more.
The Parsineerr. We are sure that our col-
league, Ambassador Calamari, must be grati-
fied by the eulogy given by his compatriot
and our dear colleague, Ambassador Frank
leorrice. [Sic]
Ambassador Dies de Medina, Special Dele-
gate of 13olivia, has asked for the floor; and
then Ambassador Tejera Paris, Special Dele-
gate of Venezuela.
Mr. DIEZ DE MEDINA. Mr. Chairman, / have
not asked for the floor to pose any question:
I have no questions to ask. I have only words
of praise?of warm praise and congratula-
tions?for the distinguished members of the
Special Committee of the Tenth Meeting of
Consultation, for the intelligent and devoted
manner in which they carried out the deli-
cate mission entreated to the Committee. I
Only wish, Mr. President, to add my wish
that the minutes of this plenary session
should also include words of congratulation
and appreciation for the task being so suc-
cessfully performed in the Dominican Repub-
lic by Dr. Jos?ntonio Mora, Secretary Gen-
eral of the Organization of American States.
Thank you eery much.
The PRESIDENT. Very well, we shall do so.
Ambassador 'Colombo, the Special Delegate of
Argentina has the floor.
Mr, Coecneeo. The Ambassador of Bolivia
IS quite right in proposing formal recognition
at the fact that the Committee was able to
fulfill its mission because of the brilliant
efforts that were begun by Dr. Jos?. Mora
bee:Abut drieval in the Dominican Republic.
APpr4ciation shttId also be expressed to the
Secretariat, which, although few in number
gave much in efforts and efficiently contrib-
uted to the success of our actions. There-
No. 155-14
fore, I second the Ambassador of Bolivia's
proposal but would like to point out that
we had intended to submit this matter during
the session.
The PRESIDENT. The Ambassador of Bolivia
and the Committee have interpreted the
feelings and thoughts of the Chair and of all
our colleagues very well. Ambassador Tejera
Paris, Special Delegate of Venezuela line the
floor.
Mr. TEJERA PARIS. The Delegate of Bolivia
anticipated what I was thinking and what is
certainly the thought of all of us here. My
Intention was I now confirm it, to ask the
chair to ask this Tenth Meeting of Consulta-
tion to give to the Committee, to the Secre-
tary General, and to the members of the Gm-
eral Secretariat a vote of applause for the
work they have done. The test that the
Committee has passed has been hard both
there and here, and I believe that since this
is a problem that affects the whole security
of the hemisphere, these colleagues deserve
not only our thanks but the thanks of our
governments and of their peoples, and, at
this moment, enthusiastic applause which /
am sure the President will be the first to
begin. [Applause.]
The PRESIDENT. All of us join in the praise
and tribute the Special Committee has given
to the prelate Emmanuel Clarizio, -Papal
Nuncio in the Dominican Republic arid Dean
of the Diplomatic Corps in Santo Domingo.
We share in this with real appreciation, with
affection, as our common duty. Ills services
for the peace of the Americas, his vows and
his blessings we applaud with emotion; with
emotion, I say, which corresponds to the emo-
tion that he experienced when he received
our expression of deep gratitude for his mag-
nificent labor for the peace of the Ameri-
cas and for that people that we all love so
well: the Dominican Republic. This closed
plenary session has been highly Important
We have heard the interesting report of the
Special Committee. We have posed broad
questions; we have obtained splendid and
very clear replies, from which we can ap-
preciate even more the extraordinary task
accomplished by the Committee. Our re-
peated applause and eulogy for it and its
members, all of whom we are honored to call
our colleagues and friends. Unless you think
otherwise a plenary session of the Tenth
Meeting of Consultation should be indicated
to consider the report in the aspects noted by
the Committee, so that the meeting may act
on that report. We have asked questions
and have obtained answers; now comes the
job of considering the report and analyzing
the action to be taken by the Tenth Meeting
of Consultation on the recommendations pro-
posed by the Special Committee and the con-
clusions that It reached.
I ask you only whether tomorrow's plenary
session should be open?/ understand that
it should be. It should be open so that the
public will know everything that we have
said, both with respect to the work of the
Commitee and to the contents of its inter-
esting report. I would call another closed
meeting, if the Committee so wishes, but the
meeting I am going to convoke for a little
later today, should be public and its pur-
pose will be to consider the report of the
Special Committee, discuss it and propose de-
cisions concerning the recommendations it
makes. The delegates have already seen and
have in your briefcases for later reading the
fourth radio-telephone message from our Sec-
retary General, Dr. Mora.3 It is not necessary
to have the Secretary read it, since I am sure
all of you have read it. With respect to the
minutes of this plenary session, I ask you to
take note that you have 21 hours in which
to give the Secretariat your corrections of
3 The complete text of the fourth message
of the Secretary General is published as
Document 17 add. 8.
20561
style. I ask you to take note of that time
period so that the Secretariat can speed up
the final edition of the minutes of the plenary
session.
Mr. Coeceitso. Mr. President, I should like
you to repeat the last part as to the time and
place, according to the Chair's plan, as was
suggested. Please do me the great favor of
repeating it.
The PRESIDENT. Yes, sir. We are going to
adjourn the session and meet again in a few
hours, let's say, perhaps this afternoon. It
will be a plenary session of the Tenth Meet-
ing, public, for the purpose of considering the
report of the Special Committee. To consider
it, analyze it, discuss it, and decide on the
recommendations and conclusions reached by
the Committee. It is assumed that this ses-
sion should be public. The next plenary ses-
sion will not be closed like this one; it will
be public, so that public opinion of the
hemisphere will be informed, but not just of
what is in the report of the Special Commit-
tee, because I am hereby suggesting that the
report should be made public, unless for
some reason the members of the Committee
indicate to the Chair that it should not be
made public but that we ought to wait until
tomorrow's session.
Mr. Coeonsno. Absolutely, Mr. President.
The PRESTDED/T. Therefore, gentlemen, as
of now the report of the Special Committee
is public. Consequently, it can be turned
over to the press and sent to anyone wishing
it. Naturally, if at tomorrow's meeting we
reach conclusions on the suggestions made
by the Committee, we shall feel highly grati-
fied. In any case I think that the time has
come for the Meeting of Consultation to make
concrete statements on the chaotic situation
that seems to grow worse every hour. There-
fore, within 5 or 6 hours, possibly for 4 or 5
o'clock this afternoon, I am going to convoke
the fifth plenary session of the Tenth Meet-
ing of Consultation to meet in this same place
and take up the report of the Committee.
The Representative of Venezuela.
Mr. TEJERA Peels. Mr. President, only to
ask If you would be good enough to include
in the order of business two specific points
that I believe are relevant to the announce-
ment you have just made: first would be
consideration of whether or not the present
situation in the Dominican Republic affects
the security of the hemisphere; second, es-
tablishment and implementation of measures
to help the Dominican people return to full
constitutional democracy.
The PRESIDENT. Very well; it seems to me
there is no objection to discussing these two
points in the public session we shall hold
shortly?the one suggested by the distin-
guished Representative of Uruguay and sup-
ported by the Representative of Venezuela,
and the other just mentioned by the dis-
tinguished Ambassador Tejera Paris. I rec-
ognize the Representative of the Dominican
Republic.
Mr. Boerreee ATILES. Mr. President, I shall
wait until tomorrow to formally present a
draft resolution on my proposal that the
Organ of Consultation declare the situation
in the Dominican Republic to be a threat to
the peace of the hemisphere.
The PRESIDENT. Very well. The Repre-
sentative of Paraguay has requested the floor.
Mr. /deice. I only wish to ask two ques-
tions, Mr. President. I understand, or rather.
I actually heard you mention a decision on
the request of the Delegate of the United
States that the minutes of today's session be
made public. This request was seconded by
the distinguished Representative of Uruguay.
From this I assume, that is, I hope, because
the suggestion is also mine, that it will be
agreed to make public the minutes of this
session.
The PRESIDENT. The chair has so tesolved.
Mr. Wince. I beg your pardon. Thank
you.
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cpNGRESSIONAL RECORD -- SENATE
"DENT. That's quite alright.
YOPIcZ. NM, I have another question
ask of the distinguished Representative of
Costa Rica, arising from an earlier statema
by the AmbeAsador. of Venezuela, because it
fere,ta the Matter of considering rneas36ur 3
ring dernecratic normality to the Di-
n._ Republic, and during this Tenth
eating of Consultation, I don't recall having
ant.41:1 Informal, proposal by the distin-
ida AllabasSader Facio regarding tie
larana
'APilahnient, as the distinguished Ambaia
ader of Guatemala, said, of a committee of
tesmen, or something similar. Therefor:,
to.aSit if Ambassador Paolo chi
_ *nt...nialte such an informal proposal,
canae I, would not. want to fail to inforri
My foreign ministry of something that ha I
been, proposed here. Thank you,
P,RAsh3snr. Thank you. The Delegat
114Ca. . ?
Mr, Representative of Paraguay,
eye,
not yet made any proposal of thii
Sat. , terhaps it can .be clarified in this way
there has been some discussion of a proposal,
but not, one of mine, to put some of the,
renoMMendations of the Committee into ea
?be Very happy to give you e
c,oPt at t.h.P. gad- Of , this session. But tht
,propoSal was not made by Costa Rica; it has
been discussed among several delegations
-
hut is nothing specific.
YOinez. I understand. Thank you. I
telt to know, if it was proposed here.
aIDENX. Ambassador Tejera Paris.
r. Thalle,a,PARia. I Would like to ask the
Oniinittee psi Credentials if it would be pos-
ailal,ato? have a Meeting early tomorrow to
all Our cre,dentiaLs, because it ap-
?ars tler, are certain doubts that should
Clarified in the light of the information
tansmittecl.in the cable that the Ambassa-
oraqtiaa.P9MilliCan Republic reported on a
ago.
XV..?PENT, Ambassador Jacome, the
presentative ,of Ecuador.
J4colla, As Chairman of the Commit-
e onOrede.ntials I can report that I have
Leda ahiseting of the Committee for to-
3:30 p.m. Any representative who
CY'LP(riX cialabt V?al to , himself or to his col-
eag_nes may present his complaints to the
WAIT. ,Oentlemen, we have taken
0,? announcement just made by our
u,e, the _Chairman of the Committee
On Credentials, and it is now the time to ad-
journ the seasion and to announce that the
, fifth plenary session of the Tenth Meeting
Consultation will be, held here this after-
Oon at 4 p.m. The aerie= is adjourned,
_ tprom the Baltimore ,(Md.) Sun, June 9,
, 1964]
...ERzar's Itrzw_os..,Skurq DoNgivco,
.f (Ey Vernon Sherwin)
SAN JUAN.?President Johnson was quite
-right in diapatching troops to the Dominican
'Republic and the administration was
qu
?Wreig'tt,in givingeito the impression that theyoro s
ent
,e Support Gen. Elias Wessin
essx, in tile opinion of Ruh) LOpez-Fre-
,. Lopez is no novice in Latin American
airs in ,eitner their peaceful or violent as-
,114eette,, A Cuban _by birth and a democrat by
lae Itaa forced into exile while still
'0 14, tin:dent 'a the University of Havana for
lata opposition to the dictatorship of
Presi-
dent gerard4 Idachado. Maturity and e d
40Atirs :mgaaldneeDdrinMexcio and the United
4t
LOpez an abler opponent to
achado's..succe r tyrant, Fulgencio Ba-
tista. He became chief money raiser for Fidel
daitio and the revolutionary
the first Secretary of
he tTrealtiry in e revolutionary govern-
an,J4tcre.al gned the post when he sensed
alx
.21v-the regime was taking.
ow in eco
thikii S: hd period of exile at the
age of 53, Dr. Lopez is serving as an economic
advisor to the Puerto Rican Treasury De-
partment.
Dr. Lopez believes the Dominican affair is
the latest, but certainly not the last, mani-
festation of a social revolution underway
throughout Latin America. This movement,
he says, is sparked not by the masses as
might be superficially assumed, but by an
emerging middle class that is opposed to
both the present aristocratic oligarchy and
communism. The masses seek a better lot
wherever it may be found.
The middle-class revolutionists are, he says,
liberal democrats who want no more Batistes,
Trujillos or Perons and would greatly prefer
economic alliance with the United States to
Castro's 6,000-mile supply line to Soviet Rus-
sia.
Had the Marines landed at the Interna-
tional Airport in Santo Domingo rather than
at the Dominican Air Force base held by
General Wessin and been sent from there on
their primary mission of aiding the trapped
U.S. citizens a proper impression of neutral-
ity could have been created, Dr. Lopez be-
lieves.
This would have opened the way for a civil-
ian government of professional and busi-
nessmen and intellectuals of the middle class
with which the United States must ally itself
throughout Latin America, Dr. Lopez says,
if the cold warts to be won.
And this alliance was the policy of Presi-
dent Kennedy, he believes, and is the policy
of President Johnson. Its failure to ma-
terialize he lays to a breakdown in the chain
of communication between State Department
agents in the field and the White House.
The breakdown, Dr. Lopez says, stems from
the tendency of too many American displo-
mats to associate only with the ruling aristo-
crats in Latin America and to ignore the
- rising middle class which has neither the
_ money to join the country club nor the
time to play golf. Yet they are the yeast
In the social ferment.
As for the Sot of intervention itself in the
Dominican Republic, Dr. Lopez says that
there is widespread misconception of the in-
tent and purpose of the Pan American agree-
ment on nonintervention in the internal
affairs of member nations.
The Idea was broached at the Pan Ameri-
can meeting in Montevideo in 1933, he says,
as a proposed protection against economic
intervention, i.e., the dispatching of marines
to protect a defaulted loan and like un-
pleasantries the United States had been
known to engage in. To this President
rtooseyelt readily agreed as a symbol of sin-
berity in his Good Neighbor policy.
"We are now engaged with events that
were unforeseen at that -time," Dr. Lopez
says. "We are at war. A cold war if you
like, but we are faced with an enemy who
Is out to bury us."
In this new situation, he asserts, the
Kontevideo accord on nonintervention does
aot apply.
"The Organization of American States has
4tated that communism is incompatible with
he democratic principles of Latin America.
Irlie United States has a right to intervene
cgainst the Communists?the enemy."
Dr. Lopez believes that Communists were
involved in the Dominican disorders.
"They are everywhere," he says, "and they
s re trained to infiltrate popular movements."
Their number is immaterial, he says, for
51 trained Communists working with an
armed civilian militia would be plenty under
t te chaotic conditions that prevailed early
in the revolt.
Where the United States made a mistake,
Er. Lopez says, was in trying to name them.
Be suspects that someone in the Santo
Domingo Embassy had not done his home-
work and, when pressed for names, reached
is to the files and came up with an old list.
August 23, 1:965
"Why should the United States name
them?" he asks. "The United States was
not on trial."
Castro, ever under the scrutiny of Dr.
Lopez, "played it cool" in the Dominican
affair. Had the marines not landed, he says,
Castro's troops would have.
President Johnson's quick move fore-
stalled action by the Cuban leader, in the
opinion of Dr. Lopez, because Castro feared
that an open confrontation in the Domini-
can Republic would lay him open to attack
on his home grounds.
"We had hoped that he would make this
mistake," he says, "but he didn't."
The present situation in the Dominican
Republic has been complicated by the United
States allowing the impression to be gained
that It backed General Wessin, Dr. Lopez
says.
Be believes that Wessin is still running the
show with Gen. Antonio Imbert Barrera as a
front, rendering any compromise with the
rebel forces of Col. Francisco Caamafio Deno
unlikely.
Dr. LOpez describes Irnbert as an aspirant
to the toga of Trujillo.
"Imbert is a petty business man," he says,
"who was handed an honorary army com-
mission for his part in the plot to assassinate
Trujillo. He promptly donned a uniform,
covered himself with decorations and in-
sisted upon being addressed by his full title.
It is not difficult for even an amateur psy-
chologist to understand that sort of per-
sonality."
Dr. Lopez is well-acquainted with Juan
Bosch, constitutional president of the Re-
public ousted by General Wessin. Bosch
spent many years in Cuba, exiled by Trujillo,
Now both he and Dr. Lopez are exiles in San
Juan.
Dr. Lopez knows Bosch as a scholar, an
honest man and a sincere democrat whose
feet are not on the ground. Without ad-
ministrative experience and lacking in exec-
utive ability, he was inefficient as president,
Dr. Lopez says, and was in some degree
responsible for his own upset.
He criticizes Bosch for unwise remarks
during the first 72 hours of the Dominican
revolt and for not taking an anti-Communist
stand during that period. In the latter
instance, Dr. Lopez says, he forfeited his
responsibility as a democratic leader and
missed an opportunity to influence the
thinking of many Americans and thus help
shape U.S. policy.
With the Wessin-Imbert and Caamafio
forces implacably opposed and Bosch a re-
luctant hero, whither the course of
government?
"It is time," Dr. LOpez says, "that democ-
racy became sophisticated, as sophisticated
as the enemy It faces. Democracy should
become militant and must fight both the
Reds and the right." (The right, that is, as
represented by aristocratic power structures
and military governments.)
Making no claim as to its infallibility, Dr.
LOpez advances this plan of action in the
Dominican Republic:
Maintain the status quo in Santo Do-
mingo, holding rebel and junta forces at bay.
Beat the bushes for liberal ,middle class ci-
vilians-.-mayors of other cities, former mem-
bers of the Bosch regime, professional and
business men?and set up a new government
in Santiago. Give this new group the army
payroll and make Imbert and Cae.mafto come
to Santiago to get it.
Neither would be long in recognizing the
new setup, Dr. LOpez thinks, and a new army
could be formed around a cadre of younger
officers, including military attaches with
first-hand contact with democratic processes
called home for the purpose.
"This might not work," Dr. LOpez admits,
"but I would try it. I don't think the Latin
American combined, force, will become a liv-
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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? SENATE
in.g thing, but it is a good idea for the United
States to work at it so that in the future
they will have a record of having tried.
"The United States must succeed in the
Dominican Republic. It is vital to set a
precedent for future trouble spots which will
surely develop."
REPORTING: TAKING SIDES IN SANTO DOIVITNGO
Covering the war in the Dominican Re-
public has' been a battle in itself. Reporters
have found U.S. officials, both military and
civilian, closemouthed and uncooperative,
when Information has been -given out, it has
often been wrong. When reporters have
taken to the streets for their stories, they
have been shot at by snipers, have hitched
rides with hysterical drivers while bullets
whizzed past. They spend much of their
time helping the wounded to hospitals.
Aggravated by one thing or another, most
at the 160-man press corps has soured on thg
U.S. position and flocked to rebel headquar-
ters, where people seemed anxious to make
their case to reporters. Predisposed to side
with the underdog against a Latin American
Military junta and against U.S. military in-
tervention, many of the correspondents wrote
glowing accounts of their fleeting interviews
with the rebels.
Cabled the New York Herald Tribune's
Barnard Collier: "The U.S. action was meant
to thwart internationally trained Commu-
nists who are fighting alongside the leftist
rebels. Its effect has been to give the Com-
munist world a rallying cry, to create dozens
of Dominican Communist martyrs, and to
turn an increasing number of rebels against
the United States." Said New York Times
man Tad Szulc: "The United States finds
itself identified with a military junta that
Is widely hated, and it may be standing on
the threshold of a violent showdown with
the highly popular rebel movement."
Los Angeles Timestnan Ruben Salazar in-
terviewed a rebel accused by the State De-
partment of being a Communist: "Fiorentino
doesn't look dangerous. He's slight of build
and sports a thin mustache. I went away
wishing we had done something to win him
to oUr side." Wrote Dan Kurzman of the
Washington Post: "Innumerable conversa-
tions have strongly indicated overwhelming
popular support for the rebel regime and a
corresponding anti-American sentiment aris-
ing from U.S. antagonism toward that
regime."
WARY OF CLAIMS
Back in the United States, many editorial-
ists and columnists sided with the men in
the field. Said the New York Times: "Little
awareness has been shown by the United
States that the Dominican people?not just
a handful of Communists?were fighting and
dying for social justice and constitutional-
ism." Even Walter Lippmann, who had sup-
ported the U.S. intervention, hoped for the
success of what he called the "legitimatist
party?that of the Constitutionalists." But
the fact is that Col. Francisco Caamafio
Deno, bass of the sO-called Constitutionalists,
had helped overthrow the Constitutional
President, Juan Bosch, in 1963. And the
Bosch constitution that Caamafio was sup-
posedly supporting forbids any military man
--Caamafio, for example?to hold office.
Not all reporter's, to be sure, were happy
with the rebels. Warned the Herald Trib-
une's Rowland Evans and Robert Novak:
"Adventurers are running the rebel com-
mand, but they maintain only tenuous con-
trol over all their forces. Rebel strongpoints,
particularly in the southeast section of Santo
Domingo, are manned by Communists with
only token allegiance to Caamealo.," And
after spending a week in Santo Domingo,
Netesdayt Marguerite Higgins filed another
,Minority report: "Be wary of all those claims
of widespread sUpport for the rebel Constitu-
tionalists or the loyalist junta. This reporter
has been impressed by the hazards of trying
to diagnose the feelings of a massively illit-
erate nation. Oddly enough, in this topsy-
turvy world, the very deftness with which
Dominicans can switch sides may prove to
be a strong card that the Americans can play
in an effort to bring seemingly irreconciliable
factions together."
NO cman's PLAY
Through it all, U.S. Government spokes-
men were baffled by the antagonism of the
press. Some reporters seemed determined
to become policymakers. The Trib's Collier
complained to U.S. officials that marines were
allowed to shoot back when shot at from
outside the international zone. "He got
quite upset," says one. "He refused to
understand that this is not child's play and
that our men must protect themselves."
Both Collier and Szulc reported last week
that U.S. troops were helping the loyalists
fight the rebels in northern Santo Domingo,
but no other reporters confirmed this story,
and many flatly contradicted it. The New
York Times ran an Air Force picture pur-
portedly showing U.S. troops aiding the junta
last week by arresting rebels. Actually, the
photo was taken 2 weeks ago in the inter-
national zone, where rebels were being
rounded up for suspected sniping. The Trib
ran a similarly slanted photo of a marine
firing his rifle, with a caption that upbraided
him for defending himself.
Among the trump cards in the U.S. Gov-
ernment's hand is a devastating report of
five OAS ambassadors that backs up U.S.
contention that Communists played a sub-
stantial part in the revolution. Yet when
the report was first issued on May 8, not a
single U.S. paper picked it up. Next day
Ellsworth Bunker, U.S. Ambassador to the
OAS, held an hour-long press briefing on the
report, but even that was given scant play
in the press.
Finally, Alaska's Senator ERNEST Cfaume-
MG, one of the most vocal critics of admin-
istration policy in Vietnam, delivered a
furious speech in the Senate: "Unhappily,
the U.S. press has been gravely derelict in
reporting what has transpired in the OAS
with regard to the Dominican crisis. Com-
mentators express doubts regarding the wis-
dom of expanding our mission to prevent a
Communist takeover. Many reports ques-
tion the extent of Communist infiltration.
Yet, to my knowledge, none of the major
wire services, newspapers, or radio-television
systems have taken the trouble to examine
the findings of the OAS investigating team."
LABOR DEPARTMENT ACCEPTS
SUGGESTION TO BROADEN
"TRAINING PROGRAM" REGULA-
TIONS
Mr. JAVITS. Mr. President, I call
attention to the fact that the Labor
Department, at my reqest, has just is-
sued new regulations which very con-
siderably broaden the opportunity for
on-the-job training for employees. I
believe these new regulations will open
up many new opportunities for training.
On August 10, 1965, the Administrator
of the Labor Department's Wage and
Hour Division issued revised regulations
dealing with training programs under
the Fair Labor Standards Act. The
amended regulations, which were
prompted by an inquiry from me on
April 26, 1965, liberalize the conditions
under which an employer may establish
a training program for his employees
without running afoul of the minimum
wage and overtime provisions of the Fair
Labor Standards Act.
20563
The regulations, which appear in title
29 of the Code of Federal Regulations,
define "hours worked" which must be
paid at the minimum wage rate and
counted for overtime purposes. Basi-
cally, the requirements for a training
program which an employer may con-
duct for his employees without counting
the training time as hours worked are:
First, that the program be conducted
outside regular working hours; second,
that attendance be voluntary; third,
that the program not be directely re-
lated to the employee's job; and, fourth,
that the trainee perform no productive
work during training time.
In my letter to the Administrator, I
pointed out that the requirement that
the program not be directly related to
an employee's job had a tendency to
deter employers from instituting bona
fide programs for upgrading of em-
ployees. For example, if an employer
institutes a program for mechanics'
helpers to train them to be full-fledged
mechanics, the program might be re-
lated to the employee's job because it
would help the employee to be a better
mechanics' helper. I also pointed out
to the Administrator that an exception
for this sort of program has always been
included in the regulations under the
Walsh-Healey Public Contracts Act, and
there is no reason why the same excep-
tion should not be made a part of the
broader FLSA regulations.
The Administrator agreed with me,
and a new section 785.29 of the regula-
tions under the FLSA was Issued last
week which included the following:
Where a training course is instituted for
the bona fide purpose of preparing for ad-
vancement through upgrading the employee
to a higher skill, and is not intended to
make the employee more efficient in his
present job, the training is not considered
directly related to the employee's job even
though the course incidentally improves his
skill in doing his regular work.
I would hope that the broader view re-
flected in these new regulations will pro-
vide added incentive for employers to
institute additional training programs to
help meet the ever-present challenge of
automation.
I would also hope that workers and
labor leaders will read this material very
carefully and counsel their employers in
their own States as to how training op-
portunities for workers may now be
broadened.
BETH ISRAEL MEDICAL CENTER?
COBALT THERAPY CENTER EN-
DOWED
Mr. JAVITS. Mr. President, it is clear
to all concerned with the situation that
Congress has taken giant strides in the
field of medical care legislation this ses-
sion. I was proud to be present at the
signing of the recently enacted Social
Security Amendments Act of 1965, pro-
viding medical care assistance to the
aged, as well as at the signing of the
Health Research Facilities Amendment
Act of 1965, providing $280 million for
grants to hospitals and other medical
centers for research and equipment to
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CpINGRESSI9NAL RECOli.1)--- SENATE
assist our struggle to defeat crippling
diseases.
In light of these important activitias
of the Federal Government, activitim
Which I have consistently supported, I
Would like to call attention to the fa 3t
that many private organizations are
making similar progress on their own.
Federal programs are designed to sup-
plement the efforts of private, civic, or
rellitious organizations, where the real
Initiative, management, and responsibil-
ity, raste, end without these organizatior s
ati their response to the needs of their
'unity, little could be aecomplishei
ii this most important field.
One organization of which we are vert
proud In New York, is the Beth Israel
' Medical Center. This particular cente:
has been consistently expanding on it;
OlVillo meet the growing needs of the
area it serves, which is the area in which
/ grew up, the lower East Side a'
,
dn. Israel began as a dispensary it
160, financed by a group of 40 recently
arrived immigrants, who were attempting
to improve the quality of the medical
services, the people in the neighborhood
.r9,,fe4elving. Since then it has main-
ta4ileclap exemplary record of service and
itnprefetnent, so that today it is a mod-
e 'Medical complex with 891 beds. An
patient clinic, named after a long-
tiMe ,friend, the president of the Beth
Israel Board of Truatees, Charles H. SU-
Ver. W4ladded in,1954 and it now handles
oVet,t o(i_cases per year. In 1961, a
IfiOdern ,studezit nurses residence and
-, Medical unit was added, and is now being
cbtVerted into a new school of nursing.
?New staff living quarters were completed
In 1963, and a new 350-bed wing is pres-
ently being constructed.
?But, Deth,lsrael has also expanded in
other ways, It operates the Gouverneur
AmbillatOrY Clinic, in cooperation with
; the New York City Department of Hos-
pital., and has recently been asked to
staff all of the medical services of the
new 200-bed Gouverneur Hospital, pres-
:ently under construction by the city of
New Yerk. ?Further, in 1964 Beth Israel
'Ptirchasecl the Manhattan General Hos-
pital, a major center for the treatment
.a.hd study of problems of narcotic addic-
tion. This addition allowed the hospital
to be redesignated a medical center, corn-
Vete with a wide range of up-to-date
facilities for treatment of a variety of
diseases, In keeping with its new po-
sition f,t mPortance, it plans to open the
Monnt Sinai Medical School in 1968.
With this record of, improvement and
expansion, it might be expected that
those who have assumed the responsibil-
ity for the leadership of the center's
Activitiep would want to relax with a
Proper aMount of pride in their accom-
lisnMents. But this is not the case, for
ey have, centinued their efforts to im-
Prove the services they offer their cora-
ithnity and, indeed, the entire city of
Veykr York,
Cor4rUction of a new cobalt therapy
C'enter te skein in the treatment of can-
e ts now planned. This would provide
retnendous improvement in the qual-
of the treatment the center will be
le to offer, and it is particularly in-
teresting that this boo to New Yorkers
has been made possible almost entirely
by the efforts of one man, an old friend
and schoolmate of mine, from P.S. 20,
Charles Guttman. I think it is an im-
portant tribute to the strength of the
free enterprise system that Charles Gutt-
man could start a life in the public
schools of the Lower East Side of Man-
hattan, become a successful business-
man, and retain his public spiritedness
and interest in his city's welfare to the
extent that he would finance this ther-
apy center, which will cost over a third
of a million dollars. I need not point
out what a great undertaking this is for
a private citizen, and how much of a
sacrifice it represents.
Mr. Guttman's gift once again proves
the utmost importance of private phi-
lanthrophy today, even while we contin-
ue to make progress in bringing the re-
sources of the Nation to bear in the field
of medical care and research. I know
that this new center of modern therapy
will be a lasting monument to his devo-
tion to the people of his city. Today,
I want to add my thanks to that of mil-
lions of New Yorkers, and to wish him
and his family the best of health and
happiness in the efforts to come.
Mr. DODD. Mr. President, I suggest
the absence of a quorum.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The
clerk will call the roll.
The legislative clerk proceeded to call
the roll.
Mr. ELLENDER. Mr. President, I ask
unanimous consent that the order for
the quorum call be rescinded.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. With-
out objection, it is so ordered.
PUBLIC WORKS APPROPRIATIONS,
1966
The Senate resumed the consideration
of the bill (H.R. 9220) making appropria-
tions for certain civil functions admin-
istered by the Department of Defense,
the Panama Canal, certain agencies of
the Department of the Interior, the
Atomic Energy Commission, the St. Law-
rence Seaway Development Corporation,
the Tennessee Valley Authority, and the
Delaware River Basin Commission, for
the fiscal year ending June 30, 1966, and
for other purposes.
Mr. ELLENDER. Mr. President, the
Senate has under consideration this af-
ternoon, H.R. 9220, a bill making appro-
priations for public works which includes
the civil functions of the Department of
Defense, the Panama Canal, the Interior
Department with respect to reclamation
)rojects, the Tennessee Valley Authority,
and the Atomic Energy Commission.
The amount of the bill passed by the
House aggregates $4,241,636,500. The
flenate made a net increase in the sum
E?dopted by the House of $85,952,500.
Therefore, the total in the bill as re-
orted to the Senate is $4,327,589,000.
The amount of the Budget estimates
earisidered by the Senate for fiscal year
1966 is $4,387,616,000.
So the bill are reported to the Senate is
under the Budget estimate by $60,027,000,
aid under the appropriation for 1965 by
$ L41,427,700.
Mr. President, before the Senate for
cc ideration is the bill that deals with
I I
August 23, 1965
moneys appropriated for the civil func-
tions of the Department of Defense, the
Atomic Energy Commission, the TVA,
certain agencies of the Department of the
Interior including the Bureau of Re-
clamation, and the Delaware River Basin
Commission. I am very hopeful that
consideration of the bill can be concluded
this afternoon, so that, as soon as Pos-
sible, we may go to conference with the
House on the disagreeing amendments.
The bill passed the House on June 22
and was referred to the Committee on
Appropriations on June 23. The bill was
reported to the Senate on August 19.
I do not believe it is necessary for me
to give a lengthy explanation of the bill.
The report on it is on the desks of the
Senators, and I believe it quite clearly
sets forth the action of the committee.
Except for two or three items, I be-
lieve the bill is noncontroversial. I ex-
pect that amendments will be offered to
slecrease amounts recommended for cer-
tain public works projects.
At the conclusion of my statement, I
will ask that the committee amendments
be adopted en bloc and that the bill as
thus amended be considered as original
text, so that the Senate will have ample
opportunity to work its will on the bill.
Mr. President, as is customary, the
Subcommittee on Public Works divided
itself into three subcommittees for the
consideration of the pending bill. The
portion of the public works appropriation
bill dealing with the Bureau of Reclama-
tion and the power marketing agencies
of the. Department of the Interior was
handled by my good and able friend, the
distinguished senior Senator from Ari-
zona [Mr. HAYDEN], who is also the chair-
man of the Committee on Appropriations.
The portion of the bill covering the
Atomic Energy Commission and the
Tennessee Valley Authority was handled
by my good friend, the distinguished
senior Senator from Alabama [Mr. Mu].
I handled the portion dealing with the
civil functions of the Department of the
Army, and the Interoceanic Canal Com-
mission.
The hearings on this bill started on
April .6 and continued through July 13,
1965. The subcommittee held 34 ses-
sions for the purpose of taking testimony
and 5 executive sessions for the pur-
pose of marking up the bill. The sub-
committee heard 889 witnesses, which
included representatives of various or-
ganizations; 738 of the witnesses ap-
peared before the subcommittee dealing
with the civil functions of the Depart-
ment of the Array; 121 of the witnesses
appeared before the subcommittee head-
ed by the senior Senator from Arizona
[Mr. HAYDEN]. The remaining 30 wit-
nesses appeared before the subcommittee
headed by the senior Senator from Ala-
bama [Mr. Huai The hearings com-
prise four volumes, which contain 3,868
pages of testimony. Senators have a
complete set of them on their desks. They
constitute the basic information upon
which the subcommittee based its recom-
mendation to the full committee.
Mr. President, with respect to title I,
before marking up the civil functions por-
tion of this bill, we reviewed every proj-
ect that was presented to the subcom-
mittee, budgeted or u.nbudgeted. We
_
ex-
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