VIETNAM: SOME NEGLECTED ASPECTS OF THE HISTORICAL RECORD

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP67B00446R000500100012-3
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 42
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 27, 2003
• Sequence Number: 12
• Publication Date: August 25, 1965
• Content Type: PREL

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REPUBLICAN COMMITTEE ON PLI
For Release:
11:00 A.M., Wednesday
August 25, 1964'
A White Paper:
VIETNAM: SOME NEGLECTED ASPECTS
OF THE HISTORICAL RECORD
142 CANNON BUILDING
PHONE [phone]
Members of the Committee on
Planning and Research
Catherine May (Wash.)
Thomas B. Curtis (Mo.)
Glenard P. Lipscomb (Cal.)
Robert H. Michel (Ill.)
Robert T. Stafford (Vt.)
Samuel L. Devine (Ohio)
William E. (Bill) Brock (Tenn.)
This paper is being issued by the Republican Committee on Planning and
Research of the House of Representatives to recall facts which, while well
known to specialists, have become obscured or forgotten in the mind of the
public.
In the serious crisis in which the United States is now involved, support
of the objective of stopping Communist aggression and safeguarding the
freedom and independence of South Vietnam is the duty of all responsible
people. Support of the President, who alone can lead the nation to this
objective, is a duty as long as the President holds to the objective and
uses the means needed to attain it.
Support does not preclude examination of history to see how the nation
arrived at the present crisis and to evaluate past policy. That is the
function of this report. A clear perspective on the past is a first requisite
to making the right decisions in the future.
(Note: Because of an error in pagination, there is no Page 26
in this reprt.)
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SUP~".~ARY AND CONCLUSIONS
The involvement of the United States in Vietnam after World War II
began with the decision of the Truman Administration to provide economic
and military aid in Hay 1950.
A fragile peace was brought to Vietnam by the Geneva Agreements of
1954, partitioning Vietnam into a Communist north and a non-Communist
south. Contrary to most expectations, South Vietnam survived. Indeed,
with generous aid from the United States, it achieved what the late
President John F. Kennedy called "a near miracle" between 1954 and 1960.
Secretary McNamara spoke of the history of South Vietnam in this period
as "a success story,"
When President Eisenhower left office, there was no crisis in
South Vietnam. There were problems arising, particularly from a renewal
of sporadic guerilla activity by the Viet Cong. The dimensions of the
problems then compared with the present situation can be gauged from
these facts:
(1) In 1960, there were fewer than 700 American military personnel
stationed in South Vietnam to train South Vietnamese; today,
125,000 troops are there or on their way there to fight.
(2) In 1960, there were 5000-6000 Viet Cong regulars in South
Vietnam; today there are 70,000 regulars and 100,000 other
Viet Cong troops.
(3) In 1960, the cost of aiding South Vietnam to the United States
was $250 million - 72 per cent of it economic aid; As of
April 26, 1965, it was 1.5 billion dollars on an annual basis,
of which 25 per cent was economic aid.
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(4) In 1960, 2000 South Vietnamese were killed or kidnapped by
the Viet Cong; in 1964, 11,349 were the victims of a
similar fate.
(5) In 1960, exports from South Vietnam (a good barometer of
economic activity) amounted to $86 million; in 1964,
C exports had dropped to $48 million.
(6) In 1960, and in 1962, more than 80 per cent of the land area
of South Vietnam was under the control of the South Vietnamese
government; today, it is 30 per cent or less.
(7) In 1960, two Americans had been killed by Viet Cong action;
as of Augustl9, 1965, 561 have been killed and more than
3000 have been wounded, taken prisoner, or are missing.
The policy of the Democratic Administration has too often been
uncertain, providing a basis for miscalculation by the Communists.
Policy has been altered abruptly. Conflicting statements have been
issued. Deeds have not matched words. Among the specific features of
policy subject to this criticism have been the whole handling of the
problem of Laos, the reversal of the position of the United States toward
the Diem regime, the cover-up of the gravity of the desperate dangers of
the situation in Vietnam, President Johnson's campaign oratory of 1964,
and the progressive dilution of official statements of the Nation's
objective in Vietnam. The most generous recognition of the need for
flexibility and change of policy in some circumstances cannot justify
making a habit of inconstancy.
Both because it invites miscalculation and because it confuses the
American public, the Administration's lack of candor about the situation
in Vietnam and about its own plans and actions is regrettable.
There should be no doubt that the American people will support the
Administration in the actions needed to establish the freedom and the
security of South Vietnam. There will be greater national unity when the
Administration abandons the defects of substance and style noted in this
report.
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I. THE TRUMAN ADMINISTRATION
The involvement of the United States in the struggle in Vietnam
that followed World War II dates from the Truman Administration. It
began with a decision announced by Secretary Acheson on May 8, 1950
to send "economic and military equipment to the Associated States of
Indochina and to France in order to assist them in restoring stability
and permitting these states to pursue their peaceful and democratic
development.,,
The decision to aid the French in Vietnam was taken as part of a
tardy and somewhat inconsistent policy of containment which the Truman
Administration put together after the fall of China to the Communists.
Aid to Vietnam under that policy implied no commitment to put
more than arms and equipment and dollars into the conflict. This was
clear.from the authoritative statement of the Truman Administration's
Asiatic policy given by Secretary Acheson on January 12, 1950. The
mild and equivocal warning which Mr. Acheson gave to the Asiatic ag-
gressors in that speech drew a line in the Pacific 0-.can marking the
outermost limits of the "defense perimeter" of the United States. The
islands east of that line were said to be vital to the security of
this country and, Mr. Acheson implied, would be defended by the
United States by force. The Asiatic mainland, including Indochina
(and Korea) lay beyond the defense perimeter where, according to Sec-
retary Acheson, an attack should be met by action of the United
Nations.
Although the policy enunciated in January was reversed in Korea
six months later by the commitment of American forces in "
warfare, the Truman Administration never considered providing manpower
in Indochina. In fact, it twice rebuffed appeals from the French for
a pledge of air and naval support in the event that the Chinese Com-
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munists provided manpower for the conflict in Indochina. In response
to such appeals, the Government of the United States said only that
Chinese Communist aggression in Southeast Asia "would require the
most urgen and earnest consideration by the United Nations."
Involvement in a costly war in Korea did not, however, prevent
the Truman Administration from supplying substantial aid to save
Indochina from Communist conquest. Approximately $375 million of
military and economic assistance was channeled to Southeast Asia by
the American taxpayer through fiscal year 1953.
In August of 1950, an American Military Assistance Advisory
Group of 35 personnel was sent to Indochina to advise on the use of
American equipment. Despite this assistance, the situation of the
French and their native forces continued to deteriorate. When
President Truman left the White House, all of Vietnam above the
17th parallel except Hanoi, a narrow corridor connecting to a coastal
strip around Haiphong and a part of the northeastern T'ai Highlands
was under control of the Communist Viet Minh. In addition, Viet Minh
forces were in effective control of large areas south of the 17th
parallel - the central highlands and the tip of the camau peninsula,
the southermost part of the country.
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II, THE EISENHOWER ADMINISTRATION
President Eisenhower continued the program of military and economic
aid to France and the Associated States of Indochina at levels set by
the previous Administration until the fall of 1953. In September 1953,
increased aid of $385 million through 1954 was promised by the United
States after two modifications of French policy had been decided on -
both of them measures designed to avert impending disaster.
Under the twin pressures of military reverses in Indochina and the
prodding of the United States, France agreed on July 3, 1953, to take
steps "to complete the independence and sovereignty of the Associated
States ... within the French Union." Although France, in 1949, by the
Elysee Agreement had conferred a measure of self-government on the
Associated States of Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia, too little was given
to satisfy the thirst for independence. Secretary Dulles, hailing the
belated French decision of July 1953, said, "...the peoples of these
countries needed something of their own for which to fight." There was
hope that the war, even at this late date, could be cleansed of the
appearance of colonialism and would no longer seem to Asiatics to be an
effort by France to hold on to her Asiatic possessions.
The second significant decision was incorporated in the Navarre Plan -
a plan of aggressive military action with increased French and native
forces.
With these two conditions realized - a promise of independence for
Indochina and the decision to intensify the military effort - the
Eisenhower Administration increased American assistance.
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4.
After the conclusion of the Korean armistice on July 27, 1953, keeping
the Chinese Communists from active military participation in Indochina became
one of the concerns of American policymakers. On the day of the armistice,
the sixteen members of the United Nations that had helped to defend South Korea
issued a joint warning against Chinese Communist action in Southeast Asia. On
September 2, Secretary Dulles warned that such aggression in Indochina "could not
occur without grave consequences which might not be confined to Indochina."
In the Spring of 1954, as the French situation became desperate, the
Eisenhower Administration sought to persuade other nations with interests in
Southeast Asia to engage in a joint undertaking to stave off collapse. On
April 4, President Eisenhower sent a letter to Winston Churchill suggesting
"united action" on the part of the United States, England, France, the Associated
States, Australia, New Zealand, Thailand, and the Philippines. "...The coalition,"
Mr. Eisenhower wrote, "must be strong and must be willing to join the fight if
necessary."
If the forces of the United States were sent to Southeast Asia, the President
made it clear that they would go principally for purposes other than ground war-
fare. He told Churchill, "I do not envisage the need of any appreciable ground
forces on your or our part...'- Shortly thereafter, in a letter to General
Gruenther at NATO, President Eisenhower reaffirmed his intention to avoid
commitment of American forces to ground warfare, writing, "Additional ground
forces should come from Asiatic and European troops already in the region.,'
On June 11, 1954, Secretary Dulles, in a speech delivered at Los Angeles,
detailed the conditions under which the United States would consider additional
help to the French: (1) a request for assistance from the states fighting the
Communists; (2) clear assurance (from France) of complete independence to Laos,
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Cambodia, and Vietnam; (3) an indication of concern and support on the
part of the United Nations; (4) assurance of collective action by other
nations along with the United States; and (5) a guarantee that France
would not withdraw from the conflict once a further commitment was
extended by others.
The last two conditions laid down by Secretary Dulles were the
decisive obstacles to the formulation of any plan for intervention.
Negotiations to bring about the formation of a coalition of nations to
support the French failed because England was unwilling to participate and
becauseFrance was unwilling to continue a fight which had gone on for eight
years and had cost more than 140,000 French casualties.
THE GENEVA CONFERENCE OF 1954
In these circumstances the Geneva ConfevQnce opened. On May 6 - the
eve of the negotiations on Indochina and of the fall o# n;.or Rjen Phu -
Lyndon B. Johnson, Harry S. Truman, and other leading Democrats issued
ill-timed statements condemning Administration policy in Southeast Asia on
vague grounds. The New York Times of May 7, under the headline, "DEMOCRATS
OPEN ALL-OUT ASSAULT ON ADMINISTRATION FOREIGN POLICY," reported:
'An all-out Democratic attack on the Eisenhower Administration's
foreign policy, the first such attack since the President took
office, was opened tonight.
The effect was to put the Administration on dual notice
(1) that the bipartisanship of the last sixteen months was
breaking up and (2) that the Congressional Democrats could
not be counted upon for unquestioning general support in
the field of world affairs.
The article quoted Mr. Johnson as saying:
It is apparent only that American foreign policy has never
in all its history suffered such a stunning reversal.
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:We have been caught bluffing by our enemies. Our friends
and allies are frightened and wondering, as we do, where
we are headed.
We stand in clear danger of being left naked and alone in
a hostile world.",
Despite this effort by the loyal opposition to pull the rug out from
under the Eisenhower Administration as the critical Geneva Conference opened,
the United States attempted to salvage what could be saved.
Representatives of nine governments assembled at Geneva to ring down
the curtain on the French empire in Asia - Great Britain, the Soviet Union,
France, Communist China, the United States, the Democratic Republic of Vietnam
(north), The State of Vietnam (south), Cambodia, and Laos. Three similar
armistice agreements were concluded relating to Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia,
and a declaration was issued.
Besides stipulations on the cessation of hostilities and pledges against
resumption, the armistice agreements provided for withdrawal of foreign troops
and prohibited Laos, Cambodia, and the two parts of Vietnam from joining any
military alliance or granting military bases to foreign powers.
The Geneva Agreements in effect recognized as Communist territory Vietnam
north of the 17th parallel and two provinces in northeastern Laos - Phongsaly
and Sam-Neua.
Presenting the Agreements to the French Parliament, Premier Mendes France
characterized them as "cruel because they sanction cruel facts." They
reflected, he declared, "losses already suffered or made inevitable by the
military situation."
If anything, the territorial settlement reached at Geneva was better than
the non-Communist nations deserved on the basis of the existing military
situation.
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7.
Vietnam north of the 17th parallel had already been almost totally occupied by
the Viet Minh forces. The treaty provisions formalized this conquest, but they
also required the Viet llinh to withdraw from South Vietnam,vast areas of which
were under their control. Some 80,000 - S0,000 Viet Ninh troops were moved out
of South Vietnam in the execution of the agreement. Perhaps 5,000-6,000 melted
into the civilian population and remained in violation of the Geneva Agreement.
The territorial arrangements contdned in the agreements were, on their face,
temporary. North and South Vietnam, like North and South Korea, were ostensibly
established for primarily military reasons as zones for the orderly liquidation
of hostilities and the beginning of peaceful reconstruction.
The armistice agreement relating to Vietnam reads that the 17th parallel
"should not in any way be interpreted as constituting a political or territorial
boundary." The Conference declaration envisaged the reunification of Vietnam,
providing for the selection of a government for the entire country by `free general
elections" to be held in 1956.
Similarly, the assignment of two northeastern provinces of Laos as sanctuaries
for troops of the Communist Pathet Lao not wishing to be demobilized was, by the
terms of the agreement, temporary - "pending a political settlement."
The United States did not sign any of the three treaties concluded at
Geneva nor the Conference declaration. For did South Vietnam.
At Geneva the United States issued a unilateral declaration pledging not to
use force to disturb the agreements and warning that renewed aggression in
violation of the agreements would be viewed as a threat to international peace
and security. At the same time President Eisenhower announced that steps would
be taken to establish collective defense against Communist aggression in South-
east Asia.
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The attitude of the United States government toward Geneva was summarized
by the President, "The agreement contains features which we do not like, but a
great deal depends on how they work in practice."
The chief flaw of the Geneva settlement lay in provisions relating to the
International Control Commissions, set up to supervise the execution of the
agreements. The Commissions, composed of representatives of Canada, India, and
Poland, could act only by unanimous vote in cases involving violations o: the
territory covered by the agreements. A veto in the hands of a Communist repre-
se;.tative was an instrument for sabotaging the execution of the agreements.
Reaction to Geneva
The negotiations at Geneva produced a flood of criticism of the Eisenhower
Administration's foreign policy,
Yet all of the critics flatly opposed the only step which remained to undo
the Communist conquest in Indochina - the commitment of American troops to a
long and costly war. General Ridgeway estimated that 5 to 10 American combat
divisions would have been required "at the outset" to win such a war.
Critic Mike iansfield said, "...almost all opinions converged on one point:
The United States should not become involved alone in a shooting war in Indochina."
At another time, he said:
"No, I was never in favor of intervention and I am opposed
to it now. I think it would be suicidal. I believe the
worst thing that could ha=pen to the U.S. would be to have
our forces intervene in Indochina and then bog down in the
jungles there ...`1
Senator John F. Kennedy said:
I am frankly of the belief that no amount of American military
assistance in Indochina can conquer an enemy which is everywhere
and at the same time nowhere, an enemy of the people which has
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the sympathy and covert support of the .)eople.... I do not think
Indochina can be saved unless the other Asiatic nations... are willing
to take their fair mart in the struggle.... For the United States
to intervene unilaterally and to send troops into the most
difficult terrain in the world, with the Chinese able to pour
in unlimited manpower, would mean that we would face a situation
which would be more difficult than even that encountered in
Korea. It seems to me it would be a hopeless situation.
Senator Estes Kefauver had this to say;
But if the decision is to be made to intervene, I say this
nation needs more than the help of Great Britain, of
Australia, of New Zealand, and of France. It must have
the moral and physical support, in addition to the Philippines and
Thailand, of Burma, Indonesia, Ceylon, Pakistan, and, if
not the help, at least the understanding of India.
Senator Hubert Humphrey said, "We have had our bluff called two or three
times in the last month. We have been defeated at Geneva." Somewhat illogic-
ally, since he opposed military intervention by the United States, Senator
Humphrey attributed the "defeat" at Geneva to cuts made by the Eisenhower
Administration in the defense budget.
The critics were not in agreement on the basis for their attacks on the
Administration. Adlai Stevenson thought the United States was too rigid and
inflenible in negotiations. idike Mansfield thought the United States should
not have negotiated at all but should have stayed away from the Geneva Conference,
ignoring the fact that such provisions, as that permitting Vietnamese who wished
to escape Communist control to move to South Vietnam, were the result of the
bargaining effort of the representatives of this nation.
Finally, the critics undermined their case by conceding that the war in
Indochina was lost because of French colonialism and not because of anything
the United States did or failed to do. Adlai Stevenson made the point when he
declared, "Had France...granted genuine independence in orderly, sincere stages
to Vietnam, there very likely would have been no war in Indochina..."
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The Disputed Election of 1955
The Final Declaration issued at Geneva in 1954 (subscribed to by neither
the United States nor South Vietnam) called for free elections to unify all of
Vietnam in 1956. Recently Senator Fulbright and others have deplored the fact
that the election was not held.
At Geneva the representatives of what was to be South Vietnam
vainly protested against the partition of the country and
against the principle of general elections being agreed
upon when more than half of the voters would be north of
the seventeenth parallel. It vainly asked that the whole
territory and population be placed under the control of
the United Nations until the reestablishment of peace
and security would permit the holding of really free
general elections.
The reasons for the refusal of South Vietnam to acquiesce in the holding
of the election were stated by Prime Minister Diem on July 16, 1955:
We did not sign the Geneva Agreements. We are not bound
in any way by these agreements entered into against the
will of the Vietnamese people. Our policy is a policy of
peace, but nothing will divert us from our goal: the unity of
our country -- a unity in freedom and not in slavery...
We do not reject the principle of elections as a peaceful
and democratic means to achieve unity. But elections can
be one of the foundations of true democracy only on the
condition that they are absolutely free. And we shall be
skeptical about the possibility of achieving the conditions
of free elections in the North under the regime of oppression
carried on by the Viet Minh...
There was clearly no legal obligation on the government of South Vietnam
to abide by the terms of the Final Declaration. The position of South Vietnam
on this point was sustained by the United Kingdom, one of the c0-chairmen of
the Geneva Conference in the following statement:
Her Majesty's government has always regarded it as desirable
that these elections should be held and has advised the
Government of the Republic of Vietnam to enter into consultations
with the Viet Minh authorities in order to ensure that all the
necessary conditions obtained for a free expression of the
national will as a preliminary to holding free general elections
by secret ballot. Nevertheless, Her Flajesty's government does not
agree that (South Vietnam) is ler, lly obliged to follow the
course....It may be recalled that at the final s ii ff hh
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Geneva Conference on Indo-China...the Vietnamese government
formally protested 'against the hasty conclusion of the
Armistice Agreements by the French and Viet i?Iinh High
Commands only'...and 'against the fact that the French High
Command was pleased to take the right, without a preliminary
agreement of the delegation of (South Vietnam) to set the
date of future elections.
Among the staunchest opponents of the holding of the 1056 election was
Senator John F. Kennedy of Massachusetts. He issued:
...a plea that the United States never give its approval to
the early nationwide elections called for by the Geneva
Agreement of 1954. Neither the United States nor Free
Vietnam was a party to that agreement - and neither the
United States nor Free Vietnam is ever going to be a
party to an election obviously stacked and subverted in
advance, urged upon us by those who have already broken
their own pledges under the agreement they now seek to
enforce.
Even Hans 1iorgenthau spoke against action to carry out the provisions of
the Geneva Declaration relating to elections:
Free elections are very subtle instruments which require
a dedication to certain moral values and the existence
of certain moral conditions which are by no means
prevalent throughout the world, and certainly not preva-
lent in either ilorth or South Vietnam.
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12.
Conditions in South Vietnam 1954 - 1960
As South Vietnam began its existence, the prospects for its sur-
vival were minimal. Independence was thrust upon a people without po-
litical experience and without pol-
itical leadership. It had no sense of nationhood. It had no industry.
And, by the Geneva declaration, it seemed doomed to being swallowed up
by the Communist rulers of North Vietnam in two years.
Some of the difficulties facing the newly selected Prime Minister
Ngo Dinh Diem were outlined by one observer in these words,
The circumstances under which the man came to power
were unbelievable. He faced the opposition of the
Communists... he also had to deal with the open
hostility of French military men and the remnants of
the French colonial service, who regarded him as
anti-French, and who expected him to last only a few
weeks at the most. Then, as a consequence of a
provision of the Geneva Accords, authorizing free
movement between the north and south zones for a limited
period, more than 850,000 refugees came into South
Vietnam from the Communist North Vietnam during the next
300 days, to be fed, clothed, and housed. In addition,
he found that his 'full powers, civil and military,' an
extraodinary grant which Bao Dai had conceded him as a
condition of his acceptance of office, existed principally
on paper.
Yet when the Eisenhower Administration left office, South Viet-
nam had a stable and established government.
Senator John F. Kennedy called the development "a near miracle."
In his book, Strategy of Peace, published in 1960, he said:
... in what everyone thought was the hour of total
Communist triumph, we saw a near miracle take place...
Today that brave little state /-South Vietnam _/ is
working in free and friendly association with the
United States, whose economic and military aid has,
in conditions of independence, proved effective.
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Senator Mike Mansfield; on February 26, 1960, reported as Chairman
of the Subcommittee on State Department Organization and Public Affairs
of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations:
By any measure Vietnam has made great progress under
President Ngo Dinh Diem in the improvement of internal
security, in the creation of the forms and institutions
of popularly responsible government where before few
existed, and in the advancement of the welfare of the
people of Vietnam. The U.S. aid program has been an
important factor in that progress. It is still an imp-
ortant factor.
The State Department's White Paper of December 1961, A Threat
to the Peace, contains the following analysis of progress in South
Vietnam:
The years 1956 to 1960 produced something close to an
economic miracle in South Vietnam. Food production rose
an average of 7 percent a year and prewar levels were
achieved and passed. While per capita food production
in the North was 10 percent lower in 1960 than it had
been in 1956, it was 20 percent higher in the South.
The output of textiles in the South jumped in only one
year from 68 million meters (in 1958) to 83 million
meters. Sugar production in the same one-year span
increased more than 100 percent, from 25,900 metric
tons to 58,000 metric tons.
Despite the vastly larger industrial plant inherited by
the North when Vietnam was partitioned, gross national
product is considerably larger in the South. In 1960
it was estimated at $110 per person in the South and $70
in the North. Foreigners who have visited both North
and South testify to the higher living standards and
much greater availability of consumer goods in the
latter.
The record of South Vietnam in these recent years is
written in services and in improved welfare as well as
in cold economic indices. A massive resettlement prog-
ram effectively integrated the 900,000 refugees from
the North into the economic and social fabric of the
South. An agrarian reform program was designed to give
300,000 tenant farmers a chance to buy the land they
work for a modest price. Under the Government's agric-
ultural credit program aimed at freeing the farmers from
the hands of usurers, loans to peasant families increased
fivefold between 1957 and 1959.
Thousands of new schoolrooms were built and the elementary
school population in South Vietnam increased from 400,000
in 1956 to 1,500,000 in 1960. A rural health program
installed simple dispensaries in half of South Vietnam's
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6,000 villages and hamlets. An elaborate malaria eradi-
cation program was launced to rid Vietnam of its most
important infectious disease. Doctors and nurses went
into training in South Vietnam and abroad to serve their
people's health needs.
This is a part, a very small part, of the setting against
which the Viet Cong launched their campaign of armed action,
subversion, and terror against South Vietnam. It is a record
of progress over a few brief years equalled by vew young
countries.
Secretary McNamara added his testimony on March 26, 1964:
The U.S....provided help - largely economic.
On the basis of this assistance and the brave, sustained
efforts of the South Vietnamese people, the 5 years from
1954 to 1959 gave concrete evidence that South Vietnam
was becoming a success story. By the end of this period,
140,000 landless peasant families had been given land
under an agrarian reform program; the transportation
system had been almost entirely rebuilt; rice production
had reached the pre-war annual average of 3.5 million
metric tons - and leaped to over 5 million in 1960;
rubber production had exceeded prewar totals; and construction
was under way on several medium-size manufacturing plants,
thus beginning the development of a base for industrial
growth.
In addition to such economic progress, school enrollments
had tripled, the number of primary school teachers had
increased from 30,000 to 90,000, and almost 3,000 medical aid
stations and maternity clinics had been established through-
out the country. And the South Vietnamese Government had
gone far toward creating an effective apparatus for the
administration of the nation. A National Institute of
Administration had been established with our technical
and financial assistance - a center for the training of a
new generation of civil servants oriented toward careers
of public service as opposed to the colonial concept of
public rule.
The progress which; by all this testimony; was made in South Vietnam
between 1955 and 1960, was due in no small part to the assistance of the
United States.,
Without the support of the United States, South Vietnam would have
been stillborn. During fiscal years 1955 through 1961, 2.3 billion dollars
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- 63 per cent of it for economic purposes - was provided by the Eisenhower
Administration. Technical assistance was given on a large scale to
increase and diversify the output of the country's economy and to spur
the achievement of far-reaching social reforms, notably in the fields of
education and diffusion of land ownership.
But a viable South Vietnam also required security from outside
aggression and from terrorism and guerilla activities within the country.
To increase security, the Eisenhower Administration proceeded promptly to
form a regional defense organization, the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization,
and to bring South Vietnam, as well as Laos and Cambodia, within its
protective cover.
Specifically to meet the threat of infiltration from North Vietnam
and the depredations of guerillas in the South, the United States provided
military equipment and training to the forces of South Vietnam.
There can be no question that only the help of the United States made
possible the survival of South Vietnam. Without it, everything south of
the 17th parallel, would have fallen to the Communists a decade ago.
NO COMMITMENT OF TROOPS BY EISENHOWER
There is no merit in President Johnson's repeated explanation of the
nation's present military involvement in Vietnam as the result of
President Eisenhower's letter of October 23, 1954 to Prime Minister Diem.
This letter, as Secretary McNamara admitted on March 26, 1964, was in
response to a request for "economic assistance." It promised American help
for the resettlement of refugees from North Vietnam and an exploration of
"ways and means to permit our aid...to make a greater contribution to the
welfare and stability of the Government of Vietnam." "...in the event
such aid were supplied," President Eisenhower wrote, the United States
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would expect "assurances as to the standards of performance." The purpose
of this conditional offer, he said,was "...to assist the Government of
Vietnam in developing and maintaining a strong, viable state, capable of
resisting attempted subversion or aggression through military means."
This was the extent of the commitment made in this letter.
Any legal obligation which the United States might have to use its
military force in defense of South Vietnam would result from the Southeast
Asia Collective Defense Treaty signed at Manila on September 8, 1954.
The framers of this Treaty deliberately rejected the kind of automatic
commitment incorporated in the NATO agreement summarized in the principle
"an attack upon one is an attack upon all," requiring a military response
by all parties to aggression against any signatory.
Article IV of the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty clearly
reserves to each signatory the right to determine the nature of its response
to armed aggression and does not commit in advance any signatory to use its
armed forces to deal with the aggressor.
Recognizing this fact, the Kennedy Administration did not use American
forces to repel Communist aggression in Laos. The legal commitment of the
United States to South Vietnam is the same as its commitment to Laos.
Both of these countries of Southeast Asia were brought under the protection
of SEATO.
The New York Times of August 19, 1965 correctly stated the case when
it said, "The shift from military assistance and combat advice to direct
participation by American combat troops in the Vietnamese war has...been a
unilateral American decision...by President Johnson."
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17.
THE BEGINNIIIGS OF THE C01 WUNIST 0 'FENS?VE
Although the government of South Vietnam never established
unchallenged authority in the entire countryside, a period of relative
peace and stability extended from 1955 to 1959. Late in the ]a tter
year the tempo of guerrilla attacks began to assume significant pro-
portions.
During 1960 the armed forces of the Viet Cong began to increase
from the level of 3000 at the beginnin g of the year. During this
year the Viet Cong assassinated or kidnapped more than 2000 people --
military and civilian. Acts of terrorism were directed particularly
against local officials in rural areas to leave the countryside leader-
less.
The signal from North Vietnam for intensification of the conflict
came on September 10, 1960 at. the Third Congress of the Communist
Party of North Vietnam with a call for the liberation of the south
from the "rule of the U.S. imperialists and their henchmen." In
December the National Front for Liberation of South.Vietnam was formed
by Hanoi.
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III. THE KENNEDY ADMINISTRATION
The Democratic Administration which took office in January of 1961
was confronted not only with problems in South Vietnam but with far more
acute difficulties in the neighboring nation of Laos. In Vietnam sporadic
guerilla attacks were going on. In Laos, Communist Pathet Lao forces were
engaged in a full-scale offensive that threatened the government of Premier
Boun Oum.
Laos
Recognizing the seriousness of the situation in Laos, President Kennedy
addressed himself to this subject in a news conference on March 15, 1961.
The President said:
...recent attacks by rebel forces indicate that a small minority
backed by personnel and supplies from outside is seeking to
prevent the establishment of a neutral and independent country
(of Laos). We are determined to support the government and the
people of Laos in resisting this attempt.
On March 23 the President warned, "...if there is to be a peaceful
solution, there must be a cessation of the present armed attacks by externally
supported Communists... No one should doubt our resolution on this point...
all members of SEATO have undertaken special treaty responsibilities towards
an aggression in Laos."
Sixteen months later the government of the United States acquiesced in
a settlement which terminated any responsibility which the SEATO powers had
toward Laos and imposed on that country a coalition government including
Communist representation. Acceptance of this settlement by the government of
Laos which enjoyed recognition by the United States was brought about by
suspension of American aid.
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Although Government spokesmen said that the United
States would not negotiate on the subject of Laos until a
cease-fire was in effect, on May 16, 1961 Secretary Rusk
appeared at the opening of the Geneva Conference ready to
negotiate. A cease-fire had, it is true, been proclaimed on
May 3, but the Communists kept on fighting. How spurious
the announced cessation of hostilities was can be judged
from the fact that the United States on May 30 submitted
to the conferees at Geneva a list of 38 Communist breaches
of the cease-fire agreement. Throughout the fourteen months
of the Geneva Conference, violations continued. On May 7.
1962, the Pathet Lao captured the city of Nam Tha after a
siege of four months. By May 12, the Communist forces
completed the occupation of Northwest Laos in a 100-mile
advance beyond the cease-fire line that compelled the United
States to send 5000 military personnel to Thailand because
of the "grave threat" to that country.
The United States continued to negotiate at Geneva.
It no longer even protested violations of the cease-fire.
At the outset of the Geneva Conference on May 17, 1961,
Secretary Rusk said that the United States would insist on
"effective controls, effectively applied to maintain a
genuinely independent Laos." As a "yardstick which will
influence the attitude of the United States toward the
work of this conference", he laid down five principles deal-
ing with the operation of the body which would supervise
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20.
the execution of the agreement. They were inspired by
unhappy experience with the international control commis-
sions established to police the Geneva Agreements of 1954.
In summary, Secretary Rusk's principles boiled down
to these: that no member of the supervisory commission
-should possess a veto power by which it might prevent the
execution of decisions of the majority of the commission
and that the commission must enjoy full freedom of action
and of movement throughout the territory in which it was to
function.
The Declaration and Protocol on Neutrality in Laos,
signed July 21, 1962 (the anniversary of the 19514 Geneva
Agreement) proclaimed the neutrality of Laos, required the
withdrawal of foreign troops, established a control commission
composed of Poland, India, and Canada, but it showed no trace
of the principles laid down by Secretary Rusk when the Con-
ference opened. Each member of the Control Commission was
to possess the power to veto any decision except a decision
to initiate an investigation.
Six months before the Geneva Agreement of 1962 was
signed, the State Department issued an anguished complaint
about the failure of the Control Commission in Vietnam to
function in dealing with 1200 incidents of alleged Communist
violation of the 1954 Agreement.
Nevertheless, Avero 11 Harriman called the 1962 Agree-
ment "a good agreement - better than I thought we would
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work out."
Mr. Harriman's appraisal makes interesting reading in
the light of the following remarks of Secretary Rusk two
years later on June 14, 1964:
What happened? The non-Communist nations com-
plied with the agreements. North Vietnam and
its Pathet Lao puppets dllnot. We promptly
withdrew our 600-man military aid mission.
North Vietnam kept several thousand troops and
military technicians in Laos. North Vietnamese
cadres are the backbone of almost every Pathet
Lao battalion. This was, and is, of course, a
major violation of the Geneva accords.
Later, North Vietnam sent additional forces
back into Laos - some of them in organized
battalions- a second major violation.
The North Vietnamese have continued to use, and
improve, the corridor through Laos to reinforce
and supply the Viet Cong in South Vietnam -
a third major violation.
The Communists have continued to ship arms into
Laos as well as through it - another major
violation.
The Pathet Lao and the North Vietnamese Com-
munists have compounded these international
felonies by denials that they were committing
them.
But there was another major violation which
they could not deny. They barred freedom of
access to the areas under their control, both
to the Lao Government and to the International
Control Commission. The Royal Lao Government,
on the other hand, opened the areas under its
control to access not only by the ICC but by
all Lao factions.
The Communists repeatedly fired at personnel
and aircraft on legitimate missions under the
authority of the Royal Lao Government. They
even fired on ICC helicopters. They repeatedly
violated the cease-fire agreement. And this
spring they launched an assault on the neutral-
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the Plaine des Jarres, where they had been
since early 1961.
This, in bare summary, is the Communist record of
aggression, bad faith, and deception in Laos.
Laos today is ripe for picking by the Communists whenever they
choose to use the force necessary to take over the entire country.
Communist control of large areas of Laos has had a direct bearing
on military operations in South Vietnam. The State Department noted
that Laos "provides not only a route into South Vietnam but also a
safe haven from which Viet Cong units operate." It also asserted that
"The pace of infiltration of officers and men has jumped markedly
since Pathet Lao victories in Laos have assured a relatively safe
corridor through that country into western South Vietnam.
The importance of Laos arises less from its military significance,
however, than from the fact that it tested the resoluteness of the
government of the United States. When the Administration retreated
repeatedly from its announced positions in the case of Laos, the
Communists might well have concluded that the United States would in
time back down in South Vietnam.
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23.
Averell Harriman drew a distinction between the two nations,
pointing out that Laos was land-locked and could be defended only
by ground forces. "In Vietnam, on the other hand," he said in a state-
ment that has an ironic ring today,
a decision to assist the Republic of Vietnam to defend
itself against the sort of attack being waged in that
country would not involve the deployment of United
States combat forces and would not require the occupa-
tion of foreign territory by United States or other
Western forces.
VIETNAM
In May of 1961 Vice President Johnson was sent to Vietnam.
There he lavished praise on Prime Minister Diem, comparing his host
to Washington, Jackson, Wilson, Franklin D. Roosevelt, and Winston Churchill.
He assured Diem that the United States was with him "all the way."
The result of the Vice President's trip was a substantial increase
in American aid for military, economic, and social purposes. American
manpower, the Vice President reported, was not needed.
The Vice President's trip to Vietnam was the first of several
by important Administration figures. It set a pattern which was to be
followed without variation by the others - a rash of optimistic statements
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on the status and future prospects of the military struggle and an
extension of American involvement either in the form of aid or
manpower or both.
The year 1961 saw the development of the conflict in Vietnam from
covert guerilla action to open, if still small-scale, war. In that
year for the first time the Viet Cong committed forces of battalion
size to combat. For the first time they launched an attack on a
community as important as a provincial capital. The infiltration of
Communist troops from the north, facilitated by unchallenged Communist
control of eastern Laos, increased. By the end of 1961, the State
Department estimated that between 8,000 and 12,000 regular Viet Cong
troops were in South Vietnam - at least double the number present
there one year earlier. The United States doubled its forces of
military advisors in South Vietnam from fewer than 700 stationed there
when President Eisenhower left office to 1,364.
In the period 1961 to 1963 the number of American troops in
South Vietnam grew from 1,364 to 16,575. The amount of aid, military
and economic, was increased substantially, although the exact figures
for military aid are classified after fiscal year 1962.
In the late summer and fall of 1963, the internal crisis in South
Vietnam arising from conflict between the Diem regime and the Buddhists
produced a deterioration of the military situation and a decision by the
United States government to encourage a change of horses. American aid
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25.
was cut back. Official statements indicating lack of confidence
in the Diem government and calling for a change of personnel and
policy were issued. Diem was removed in a military coup and was
assassinated along with his brother Nhu.
There is general agreement now that the coup of November 1963
led to chaos in South Vietnam and resulted in substantial Viet Cong
gains.
Strangely, the setbacks that occurred at the end of 1963 and the
beginning of 1964 began only one month after Secretary McNamara and
General Taylor returned from South Vietnam with an optimistic report.
So strong was their optimism that an immediate reduction of the American
force in South Vietnam by 1000 men was announced and the prediction
was made that virtually all American troops would be withdrawn by the
end of 1965.
The text of the White House announcement of October 2, 1963 follows:
Major U.S. assistance in support of this military
effort is needed only until the insurgency has
been supporessed or until the national security
forces of the Government of South Vietnam are
capable of suppressing it. Secretary McNamara
and General Taylor reported their judgment that
the major part of the U.S. military task can be
completed by the end of 1965, although there may
be a continuing requirement for a limited number
of U.S. training personnel. They reported that by
the end of this year, the U.S. program for training
Vietnamese should have progressed to the point
where 1,000 U.S. military personnel assigned to
South Vietnam can be withdrawn.
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IV. THE JOHNSON ADMINISTRATION
The Administration of Lyndon Johnson has greatly increased the
involvement of American military forces, raising the number of troops
from 16,000 to 125,000 with further increases anticipated. In February
of 1965, it began bombing targets in North Vietnam. In spite of protes-
tations to the contrary, it is changing the nature of American participation
in the war by committing substantial numbers of American troop units to
ground combat with the Viet Cong.
At the same time the Johnson Administration has taken extraordinary
steps to bring about negotiations to end the fighting. It has announced
its willingness to enter unconditional negotiations. It suspended bombing
of North Vietnam for six days. It has blessed the efforts of other nations
and of public and private intermediaries to bring about a conference to
discuss peace. It has offered "a billion dollar American investment" for
the regional development of
Southeast Asia including the development of the Mekong River - a plan
similar to one proposed by the Eisenhower Administration ten years ago.
DE-ESCALATION OF THE OBJECTIVE OF THE UNITED STATES
As the military effort of the United States in Vietnam has burgeoned,
the pronouncements of President Johnson defining the objective of the
United States have been progressively watered down.
On December 31, 1963, the President, in a letter to General Duong
Van Minh, said the objective was "achieving victory." On July 200, 1965,
the President said our goal....is/...to convince the Communists that we
cannot be defeated by force of arms."
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In more specific terms, the President on April 20, 1964 expressed
willingness to accept "any settlement which assures the independence of
South Vietnam and its freedom to seek help for its protection." His speech
of April 7, 1965 at Johns Hopkins University seemed to discard the freedom
of South Vietnam to seek help for its protection, for on that occasion the
President defined the objective in contradictory terms as "an independent
South Vietnam - securely guaranteed and able to shape its own relationships
to all others - free from outside interference - tied to no alliance - a
military base for no other countr." Clearly South Vietnam would not have
freedom to shape its relationship to other countries if it were barred
from ties with alliances or from providing a military base to another country.
Experience suggests that without an ally South Vietnam would not be securely
guaranteed.
Finally, on July 28, 1965 the President seemed to discard the
independence of South Vietnam as an objective. Declaring that the "purposes"
of the 1954 Geneva Agreements "are still our own," he asserted that "the
people of South Vietnam shall have the right to shape their own destiny in
free elections - in the South or throughout all Vietnam under international
supervision..." This raises the disquieting possibility of accepting now
in Vietnam the type of election which the United States rejected a decade
ago - an election which, in the words of John F. Kennedy, would be "stacked
and subverted in advance...."
.MISCALCULATION
The President now tells the nation, "This is really war."
To what degree miscalculation on the part of the enemy has brought
about this state of affairs, no one can be sure. It is clear, however,
that many of the words and deeds of the past four years could only have
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encouraged underestimation of the constancy and firmness of the nation
in the pursuit of its foreign policy goals.
The whole handling of the problem of Laos could have no result other
than the conclusion that the United States would not match its words with
deeds.
The Administration said that it would not permit aggression against
Laos to succeed, but it did.
The Administration said that it would not begin negotiating about Laos
until a cease-fire had been put into effect, but it did.
The Administration indicated that it would not accept a peace settle-
ment in Laos which granted a veto to any member of the Commission established
to supervise the peace, but it did.
Miscalculation was the natural result of the withdrawal of American
backing for the Diem government. For the United States had pledged its
support to Diem "all the way," in Lyndon Johnson's phrase in 1961. Abrupt
reversal of policy leading to the overthrow of the leader whom the govern-
ment of the United States had been ardently supporting and whose downfall
was a major Viet Cong objective could appear only as evidence of weakening
of the resolve of this nation. Whether the error was the commitment to
support Diem "all the way" or connivance in Diem's downfall, the net
effect was to cast doubt on the value and durability of a pledge of support
by the United States.
Miscalculation was encouraged by President Johnson's campaign oratory
of 1964. In order to make his opponent appear reckless and trigger-happy,
the President in several statements set limits to American participation in
the Vietnamese conflict. For example, on August 12, 1964, he said:
Some others are eager to enlarge the conflict. They call
upon us to supply American boys to do the job that Asian
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Again, on August 29, the President declared:
I have had advice to load our planes with bombs and to
drop them on certain areas that I think would enlarge
the war, and result in our committing a good many American
voys to fighting a war that I think ought to be fought
by the boys of Asia to help protect their own land. And
for that reason, I haven't chosen to enlarge the war.
In Hanoi and Peiping all this could be interpreted only as an assurance
that they need not fear fuller use of the power of the United States in
Vietnam beyond the type of assistance provided to the South Vietnamese in
the summer of 1964.
"Perhaps," Secretary Rusk was quoted in the New York Times as saying,
"the Communist world misunderstood our Presidential campaign." Perhaps,
indeed, it did. But whose fault was that?
Miscalculation is encouraged by threats that are not followed up by
appropriate action.
Such was the case when President Johnson on February 21, 1964 said,
"Those engaged in external direction and supply Lin Vietnam/ would do
well to remember that this type of aggression is a deeply dangerous game."
This remark was advertsied as a major foreign policy declaration by White
House aides who called the words "dangerous game" highly significant. The
impression was given to the press that the President was suggesting a
strike at North Vietnam. But nothing happened. The Communists did not
slow down, and the Administration did noting to demonstrate the danger in
their game.
In June of 1964 at Honolulu, Secretary Rusk asked newsmen to report
that the U.S. commitment to Vietnam was unlimited, comparable with West
Berlin. President Johnson declared, "If a nation is to keep its freedom,
it must be prepared to risk war. When necessary, we will take that risk."
These threats were followed up by the campaign oratory which set limits to
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the American commitment by appearing to rule out action against North
Vietnam and any extension of the American role in combat.
LACK OF CANDOR ON THE PART OF THE ADMINISTRATION
Miscalculation is encouraged - and the American people are confused.-
when the Administration glosses over a messy situation with optimistic
pronouncements and predictions.
Consider such statements as the following:
Lyndon B. Johnson
We do not have Lra-problem in7 Laos. (Feb. 11, 1964)
Robert S. McNamara
Actions taken there have proved effective and will prove
more effective as time goes on. (Jan. 17, 1962)
Progress in the last eight to ten weeks has been great...
The government has asked only for logistical support...
Nothing but progress and hopeful indications of further
progress in the future. (May 12, 1962)
Our military assistance to Vietnam is paying off. I
continue to be encouraged. There are many signs indi-
cating progress. (July 25, 1962)
There is a "new feeling of confidence" that victory is
possible in South Vietnam..., (Jan. 31, 1963)
The major part of the United States military task can
be completed by the end of 1965, although there may
be continuing requirment for a limited number of
United States training personnel... (Oct. 2, 1963)
We have every reason to believe that /U.S. military/
plans will be successful in 1964. (Dec. 12, 1963)
With these further measures, we felt that a start
could be made in reducing the number of United States
military personnel in Vietnam as their training
missions were completed. Accordingly, we announced
that about 1,000 men were to be withdrawn by the end
of 1963, and expressed the hope that the major part
of the United States military task could be completed
by the end of 1965, although we recognized that there
might be a continuing requirement for a limited number
of United States advisory personnel. (Jan. 30, 1964)
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We are confident these plans point the way to victory.
(Har. 1964)
It would be tedious to detail the facts that showed how remote each of
these pronouncements was from grim reality. One example will suffice.
Secretary Rusk declared in the course of a visit to Vietnam on April 20, 1964,
that things were showing "steady improvment." The headline in the New York
Times two days later read, "REDS INFLICT HEAVIEST TOLL ON SOUTH VIETNAM
AF14Y." It had been the bloodiest week of the war, the Times reported, with
1,000 Vietnamese Government and 23 American casualties.
Now once again, the public is being told by the White House that there
is reason for "cautious optimism."
Neither the Congress nor the public is being accurately and fully
informed about the nation's involvement in Vietnam. American military
personnel were called advisers long after they became combatants. Today
their "primary mission", the nation is told, "is to secure and safeguard
important military installations like the air base at Da Nang..."
The President announced on Jmly 28 that the stationing of 125,000
American troops in Vietnam did "not imply any change in policy whatever."
Yet, Secretary McNamara testified on August 4, 1965, "The principal
role of U.S. ground combat forces will be to supplement this reserve
/of the South Vietnamese Army/ in support of the front line forces of the
South Vietnamese Army."
The able Saigon correspondent of the Los Angeles Times, Jack Foisie,
has written:
Although the decision to commit large-scale American
combat units in Vietnam is apparent, and is obvious
to the enemy through the buildup of logistical bases
on the central coast, authoriries in Washington try
to pretend that we really are not committed to land
warfare in Asia, to casualties as large or larger than
suffered during the Korean war. (L.A. Times July 25, 1965)
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As the military effort of the United States was stepped up, adequate
funds for its support were not requested of the Congress. Now an attempt
to hid the cost is made by asking for added funds in two installments - one
now, the other in January of 1966.
The figures that are fed to the press and the public by the Administra-
tion contradict each other and surpass belief. In June of 1965, Secretary
Rusk gave a figure for South Vietnamese casualties since 1960 that was 50
per cent higher than the figure General Wheeler gave one month earlier. It
is hard to believe that casualties in one month in 1965 increased so drama-
tically. It is hard, too, to accept estimates of Viet Cong combat deaths
which indicate that 23 to 25 per cent of the estimated Viet Cong military
strength was wiped out in each of two successive recent years.
The astute correspondent of the Washington Post, Howard Margolies, after
surveying casualty figures released by the Administration, concludes:
The impression all this leaves is that the publicly
released statistics are more a selection of numbers
intended to paint a picture that supports whatever
the official view is at the moment than a realistic
indication of how things are going.
The greatest shortage which the Vietnamese war has so far produced is
a shortage of candor and accuracy.
The nation, by the President's admission, is now engaged in a war. All
Americans must support whatever action is needed to put a stop to Communist
aggression and to make safe the freedom and independence of South Vietnam.
Criticism of Administration actions, when well-founded, is not incon-
sistent with support of this objective nor of the methods needed to attain it.
Indeed, such criticism can help in the attainment of the nation's objective
without unnecessary loss or delay.
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 AREA'' UNDER. COMMUNIST CONTROL /A/ VIETNAM
b)
Comnwnist China
/NUOCN/NA
ls~ SETTLEMENT
Approved For Release 2003/11/04: CIA-RDP67B00446R000500100012-3
 Approved For Release 2003/11/04: CIA-RDP67B00446R000500100012-3
us COMBAT
CASUAL TIES
IN V/ElA/AM
DEATHS
WOUNDED
1961
I
I
1962
31
74
1963
77
411
1964
142
1,038
1965
30Q
11391
aso1paq 9
.. ~ wounded
deaths
~E- As of August 9,19b5
Approved For Release 2003/11/04: CIA-RDP67B00446R000500100012-3
 Approved For Release 2003/11/04: CIA-RDP67B00446R000500100012-3
COMMUNIST CONTROLLED
AREAS IN SOUTH
VIET NAM
THE MAPS SHOWING
AREAS OF VIET LONG
CONTROL IN 1964 AND
1q65 ARE CLASSIFIED
AS CONFIDENTIAL BY
THE OEPARTMENTOF
OFFENSE. THEY
SNOW SUBSTANTIAL
INCREASES IN THE
AREAS UNDER VIET
LONG CONTROL.
Approved For Release 2003/11/04: CIA-RDP67B00446R000500100012-3
 Approved For Release 2003/11/04: CIA-RDP67B00446R000500100012-3
Approved For Release 2003/11/04: CIA-RDP67B00446R000500100012-3