VIETNAM

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP67B00446R000400110008-8
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 47
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 20, 2005
• Sequence Number: 8
• Publication Date: September 20, 1966
• Content Type: OPEN

Approve fj epMM IBIA-6EM 0446R000400110008-8 22163
September 20, 1966
that his gross rate shall not be less by more story of how our schools have been grad- Of late, there have been a number of
than $2,200 than the highest gross rate paid ually changed to instruments of the appeals for renewed effort to end the
to any other employee of the Committee: State is a long one indeed. The early Vietnamese conflict via the path of nego-
and (3) with the prior consent of the heads religious leaders in America felt a moral tiations. The Secretary-General of the
of the departments or agencies concerned, obligation to educate their children. United Nations, Mr. U Thant, for exam-
and the Committee on Rules and Adminis- They apparently felt that there was no ple, has been eloquent in his call for a
tration, to utilize the reimbursable services,
information, facilities, and personnel of any harm in appealing to the State, which new perspective. Indeed, the struggle in
of the departments or agencies of the Gov- was then their servant, to assist in com- Vietnam ought to be seen in terms of the
ernment. pelling parents to observe their obliga- enormous and bloody human pain which
SEC. 3. Expenses of the special subcom- tions. is being inflicted on combatants and non-
mittee under this resolution, which shall not There are those who assume that old combatants in that country, rather than
exceed $100,000, shall be paid from the relationships must be terminated simply in the painless and sanitized detachment
approved by h the Senate upon spechcial l because new trends and changes usher in of a football field on which two ideologies
contingent
subcommittee. by the chairman of the spe new relationships and designate new clash. For similar reasons, Pope Paul VI
supoints of emphasis. This is fallacious has
a settlement by negotiations, :ad
reasoning.
ADDRESSES, EDITORIALS, ARTI- Granted our modern schools train the he has coupled an expression of human
CLES, ETC., PRINTED IN THE child physically, emotionally, and so- compassion with a warning to call a halt
APPENDIX cially, as well as intellectually. But this to the rising tide of conflict before it is
On request, and by unanimous consent, does not preclude the preservation of too late to turn back, not only for Viet-
addresses, editorials, articles, etc., were positive moral and religious training nam but also for all of Asia and the en-
ordered to be printed in the Appendix, which at one time characterized all ed- tire world.
ucation in this country. Other informed persons have added
as follow In the early American schools, religion their voices to the deepening concern
8yM Mr. BYRD of Virginia:
Editorial entitled "Airport Congestion," was not merely a part of the curriculum. over the trends of the war. Prominent
printed in the Loudoun Times-Mirror, ," of Religion was the curriculum. Such an among those is Arthur Schlesinger, Jr.,
Leesburg, Va., on September 15, 1966. emphasis, to the neglect of everything a former special assistant to the late
Article entitled "The Effects of Planned, else, would be absurd in our modern President Kennedy and to President
Mass Disobedience of Our Laws," written by public schools. But is it not equally as Johnson. Mr. Schlesinger, writing in the
Hon. Charles E. Whittaker, former Associate absurd to completely eliminate religion New York Times magazine of September
Justice of the U.S. Supreme Court, and pub- from the curriculum? 18, addresses himself to the Vietnam di-
luted in the FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin Some spokesmen today seem to be en- lemma in an article entitled "The Middle 1966. of September
By deavoring to convince us that freedom Way Out in Vietnam." Mr. Schlesinger
Mr. THU gURMOND:
Editorial entitled "Damaged, Document," of religion means freedom from religion. looks back over the years of the Vietna-
written by Editor W. D. Workman, Jr., pub- Some would have use believe that sepa- mese involvement, not in a search for
lished in the State newspaper, in Columbia, ration of church and state means the scapegoats, but rather with the eyes of
B.C., September 17, 1966. abolition of all religion from civic un- the historian and in an honest and frank
dertakings. search for a new approach. He is per-
LIMITATION ON STATEMENTS DUR- Separation of church and state does suaded that it is not in the interest of
not preclude religion, because no state any nation and, perhaps, least of all, in
ING TRANSACTION OF ROUTINE can truly prosper unless its officials are the interest of the United States to ex-
MORNING BUSINESS motivated by religious ideals and pur- tend the war deeper into Asia. But he is
also convinced that it is not possible for abruptly
M MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I posev. _
h rout that rning bus- si- growth of religion, and the religion of to and forget the States to walk whole busiiness.ff He urges,
ask unanimous connection consent
ness limited with rout morning busi-
be e limited to 3 minutes, but that an nation determines the character of its therefore, a new approach which will to these
-
reali exception be made the case the government. only by holding fast to the basic t es eSIn a sentence he cl allslforla new
distinguished Senator r from Kansas s Mir. secured o
NI. tenets of God's word. strategy of deescalation of military ac-
. The
The ACTING PRESIDENT pro teen- We can realize our national ambitions tivity, coupled with political initiatives
South Vietnam which aaimed at
pore. Without objection, it is so ordered. and goals for our schools, our homes, our in in Soi thon et the which are ha region
churches, and for ourselves as individ- wconcil of of
ith a government in Saigon rather than
uals only in loyalty and dedication to the domination of the Saigon govern-
Mr. IN PUBLIC SCHOOLS the religiously oriented ideals upon over the people the the region.
Mr. CARLSON. Mr. President, our which our Nation was founded. tent It is ovessential le of the region. in-
schools here in America, as well as their For our country was truly founded on deed, o any ereasonable ssential of this aprroah that
counterparts in Europe, had their origin belief in God as the giver of man's un- deed, o a renewed effort to initiate ntat
as offsprings of the church. The first alienable rights. It grew to greatness tiations be with whomever edmay be neces-
alt.
schools in America were the fruits of the upon that foundation. "In God we ti fi may n halt.
would to
Protestant revolt in Europe. trust" is a part of our country's past and ti the to latter bring the the actual fighting
to recall the con ctf e points it wou be hwell
U Thant
Many Europeans, unable to realize should be a part of its future. With in
their ideals of life and worship in their such a religious heritage and history, to- has stated are thre which essential for the creation
homelands, came to America, where they day's Americans surely must recognize of "stated ore conducive senti l for the creation
settled and began life anew. Many reli-- the justification of expressions of faith of a confince and conducive to th of ing
gious congregations, most of them em- in od in our many institutions. creating of conditions for a peaceful set-
bracing some form of Protestantism, left tlement of the problem in Vietnam."
Europe and came as groups to America. VIETNAM First. An end to the bombing of North
Naturally, they brought with them their ;
European ideas about religion and the Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, this Vietnam Rof all military ac-
education of their children. These ideas afternoon the United Nations embarks Secontivitiesd d. . Red Reduction Vietnam leading to a
were to give a European background to on the 21st meeting of its General As- ceatie fire S ut sides;
the beginnings of American education. sembly. There are just under 100 mat- Thir- on d. Willingness on all sides to en-
ac-
by was given serious attention ters on the agenda, but one matter which ter bird discussions illngne s on all side are -
by these early religious groups. Their is not listed is Vietnam-a subject in the t in into ithe fighting.
chief aim was to train their young for minds of all the delegates to the United_ tually er
righteous living, as they interpreted it, Nations, a subject in the minds of all There is, in my judgment, nothing in
and to' perpetuate an educated ministry Americans, including the President of the those points which is inconsistent with
for their congregations. United States, and a subject very much, what the President of the United States
The early schools in America were in my opinion, in the minds of the peo- sehas arch indicated he is prepared through do int ae
clearly the instruments of religion. The ples of the world.
Approved For Release 2005/06/29 : CIA-RDP67B00446R000400110008-8
 22164 Approved For Releas@,aAt?PoRARW6NU44%WATE 110008eptember 20, 1966
tions. It would be my hope that U Thant, voluntarily, without being forced or re- prior to the Labor Day recess, the parlia-
now that he has agreed to remain as quired to do so. The deductions are not mentary situation we face in consider-
Secretary General of the United Nations allowed teachers who go back to school ing this legislation is a rather unique
for this session, will go beyond the simple merely to become better teachers or to one. H.R. 9918 was passed in the House
articulation of these three points and improve their station in life or increase over the objections of the leadership of
into specific recommendations to the their salaries. the House District Committee. It is a
parties concerned. In short, Mr. Presi- I believe, Mr. President, that our Gov- much better bill than that committee
dent, I would urge the Secretary Gen- ernment should encourage teachers to reported. It is the only adequate bill
eral to set forth a timetable and a step- act on their own initiative, in the Ameri- considered by either House in this ses-
by-step procedure for the initiation of can free-enterprise way, to improve their sion of Congress to protect the victims
negotiations and request this Nation and status. insolvent uninsured mot.
all others involved in Vietnam to fol- The bill I am introducing will allow of Because the bill was passedtover the
low it. teachers to deduct as business expenses objections of the leadership of the
educational expenses connected in any House committee, the word is out that
COMMITTEE MEETING DURING way with their work. if the Senate amends the bill by so much
COMMITTEE ;SESSION One group particularly hard hit by as changing a comma, and the bill must
SENAT the IRS rulings, Mr. President, are per- go back to the House, it will die there.
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I ask sons preparing themselves for college It will die there not just for this session,
'unanimous consent that the Committee teaching. The national effort to improve but for the indefinite future because the
on Labor and Public Welfare be per- higher education needs all the encour- leadership of the House District Com-
mitted to meet during the session of the agetnent it can get, and this bill would mittee is adamantly opposed to this-leg-
Senate today. help on an individual basis. islation.
Mr. KUCHEL. Mr. President, objec- The bill would eliminate the doubt and So in the debate prior to the Labor
tion has been lodged with the minority confusion that now exists by writing into Day recess, I asked Senators who had
leader. I object. the Internal Revenue Code certain pro- amendments to this legislation to with-
The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tem- visions now left entirely to administra- hold them until we got the bill on the
pore. Objection is heard. tive regulations. No longer would teach- books. For to amend this legislation is
On request of Mr. KUCIEL, and by ers have to live under the threat that not to improve it. It is to kill it.
unanimous consent, the Committee on there might be a technical snip-up in re- For that reason, in the pre-Labor Day
Interior and Insular Affairs was author- porting their income and deductions for recess debate, I volunteered that im-
Ized to meet during the session of the tax purposes, causing them to run afoul mediately upon reconvening next Janu-
.Senate today, of the Internal Revenue -r'
er
N
AMENDMENT OF INTERNAL REV-
ENUE CODE OF 1954, RELATING TO
DEDUCTION OF CERTAIN EX-
PENSES BY TEACHERS
Mr. CURTIS. Mr. President, I am in-
troducing, for appropriate reference, a
bill to correct inequities in rulings by the
Internal Revenue Service regarding tax
.deductions of teachers for educational
expenses.
The mail I am. receiving, Mr. President,
indicates that these rulings have worked
a hardship on many teachers in Nebraska
at a time when. this Nation and its Gov-
ernment profess to be placing new em-
phasis on educational quality.
Teacher, training and preparation are
fundamental requirements of improved
education, far more important than the
bricks and mortar which provide the
place for teaching. This has been true
through the years and it is still true
today.
The Nation is experiencing a critical
teacher shortage this fall from coast to
coast. I have read articles citing statis-
tics placing much of the blame for this
on the Federal Government. We must
take steps to encourage qualified teach-
ers to improve their skills and remain in
the profession, We must encourage
them to work to improve their station in
life and thereby the quality of the edu-
cation provided for our children.
Under the Internal Revenue Service
regulations, money spent for education is
deductible on individual income tax re-
turns if the expenditure is made to main-
tain or improve skills required in the
taxpayer's job, trade or business or if it is
required by the employer as a condition
of retaining the taxpayer's job, salary, or
status.
This has been interpreted by the IRS
to mean that teachers are not entitled to
the deductions if they return to college
N
rce.
o ary, I would, as chairman of the Dis-
longer would they have to be threatened trict of Columbia Subcommittee on
with the loss of their job before they Business and Commerce, hold prompt
could deduct the expenses of furthering hearings and executive consideration of
their education in order to improve the these amendments and report them to
education available to the children they the Senate for action.
teach. When this guarantee proved insufiici-
This bill is offered in the sincere in- ent to the sponsors of the various amend-
terest of improving education and clari- ments to this bill, I volunteered to hold
fying tax deduction policies for teachers
h
i
,
ear
ngs and executive sessions on the
Mr. President, and it should have broad amendments during the pendency of the
support. civil rights debate in order to report
The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tem- them during this session.
pore. The bill will be received and ap- This guarantee also fell short of what
propriately referred. was desired by the proponents of the
The bill (S. 3840) to amend the in- amendments.
ternal Revenue Code of 1954 to allow Now if I understand the proponents
teachers to deduct from gross income the of the amendments accurately, they seek
expenses incurred in pursuing courses essentially four amendments to this bill.
for academic credit and degrees at in- First, they wish to have the uninsured
stitutions of higher education and in- motorist clause, required by H.R. 9918
eluding certain travel, introduced by Mr. to be inserted in every policy of auto-
CURT7.S, was received, read twice by its mobile liability insurance issued in the
title, and referred to the Committee on District of Columbia, carry with it the
Finance.
AMENDMENT OF FIRE AND CASUAL-
TY ACT AND THE MOTOR VEHICLE
SAFETY RD, SPONSIBILITY ACT OF
THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
Mr. TYDINGS. Mr. President, 3
weeks ago, just prior to the Labor Day
recess, the Senate debated H.R. 9918, a
bill to protect the residents of the Dis-
trict of Columbia from insolvent unin-
sured motorists. The Senate was unable
to complete action on the bill at that
time, because we lacked a quorum to do
so. However, I am hopeful that now
the Senate will be able to complete its
action on H.R. 9918.
This is purely a local District of Co-
lumbia bill, but one which it is our duty
to pass as the legislature for the District
of Columbia and one which is essential,
of Congress is going to fulfill its legisla-
tive duty to the District of Columbia to
protect its residents' safety and welfare.
As I explained in the debate on the bill
right of refection on the part of the
policyholder.
Second, they wish to have residents of
the District of Columbia whose cars, un-
der District of Columbia law, are legi-
timately registered and licensed else-
where brought under the protection of
the bill.
Third, they also seek an amendment
to include under the protection of the
act out-of-State pedestrians who are
injured in the District by insolvent unin-
sured motorists who have cars regis-
tered in the District of Columbia,.
Fourth, they wish the bill to specifi-
cally spell out that any State with a
similar fund which provides reciprocity
for District of Columbia residents in-
jured in that State will be entitled to
similiar protection for its citizens when
they are in the District of Columbia.
I have no basic objecion to these
amendments. i think none of them are
likely to jeopardize the solvency of the
uninsured motorist fund created by this
bill. Iowever, as I have so frequently
Approved For Release 2005/06/29 : CIA-RDP67B00446R000400110008-8
 22180
Approved For Release 2005/06/29 : CIA-RDP67B00446R000400110008-8
CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE September 20, 1966
some said, a sleepy town. Today it is a
bustling city with the fastest growth rec-
ord of any city in the Nation, and it Is
the center of America's rocket and space
effort. The Huntsville area, with the
space center and Redstone Arsenal, is a
section which no visitor to Alabama
ought to miss.
Good highways traverse this entire
area. It is a pleasure to drive in Ala-
bama. In many sections along the river
the traveler can see the lakes without
leaving the highway, but I suggest a stop
for a more leisurely view of this Tennes-
see Valley country.
So this is another part of a great
State. I invite you to see it, and to see
all of Alabama. I promise you that you
will enjoy a visit to this State in the
heart of the Deep South.
Mr. INOUYE. Mr. President, the State
of Hawaii has an unusually large number
of VISTA volunteers working in various
communities throughout the United
States.
One of these VISTA volunteers is a
former resident of Kauai, Hawaii, who is
now serving in Fairbanks, Alaska. The
Honolulu Star-Bulletin recently de-
scribed her activities in this community
which is so far from her former home.
I ask unanimous consent that the ar-
ticle be printed in the RECORD.
There being no objection, the article
was ordered to be printed In the RECORD,
as follows:
[From the Honolulu Star-Bulletin,
July 7, 1966]
EX-KAUAIAN VISTA WORKER IN FAIRBANKS-
GETTING USED TO COLD
The sole V.I.S.T.A. worker in Fairbanks,
Alaska, is a former islander-Mrs. Billie
Smith.
Mrs. Smith, a ' widow, used to live on
Kauai.
Since her two sons are in college, she de-
cided to "do something." The "something"
she decided on was joining V.I.S.T.A. (Vol-
unteers in Service to America).
In Fairbanks, Mrs. Smith has a multi-
pronged job of being adviser-big sister-
teacher-pal to young village girls who come
to the city for schooling or to take jobs.
Headquartered at Hospitality House, a
home away from home for these girls, she
helps them to adapt to city living.
VISITS JAILS
In addition, she works with young girls
who began as bar girls, eventually got into
difficulty and landed In jail.
She visits the girls in their cells, brings
them books and helps them to find jobs once
they're released.
Mrs. Smith has been teaching them to sew
and instructing them in nutrition and home-
making skills.
She pointed out that alcoholism, delin-
quency and unwed motherhood are grave
problems in Fairbanks, as they are 'elsewhere.
BUSY AS BEAVER
and lush gardens of Kauai, but noted she's
getting used to Alaska's sub-zero weather
and learning to like moose meat, caribou
steak and "squaw candy" (dried smoked sal-
mon).
Asked whether she gets lonely there,
she replied: "Lonely? I've been so busy I
haven't a chance to think about it."
She hopes to open a dressmaking shop to
provide jobs for some of the girls.
After her year with V.I.S.T.A., she said,
"my sons and I have talked about starting
a home for boys. Sort of a Boys' Town Idea,
If a do, my year with V,I.S.T.A. will be
inlruable."
A MIDDLE WAY OUT OF VIETNAM
Mr. McGOVERN. Mr. President, I had
scarcely finished reading Richard Good-
win's call for a united citizens front
against a wider war in Vietnam when I
came across a most important article
authorized by Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., in
last Sunday's New York Times magazine,
September 18, 1966.
Mr. Schlesinger, like Goodwin, a for-
mer White House assistant to Presidents
Kennedy and Johnson, is one of the Na-
tion's ablest historians. His article pre-
sents a most carefully reasoned case
against the administration's continuous
enlargement of the Vietnam war-fol-
lowed by an appeal for a new effort to
negotiate an end to the fighting.
Writes Mr. Schlesinger:
Are the only alternatives widening the war
or disorderly and humilitiating withdrawal?
Surely, our statesmanship is not yet this
bankrupt. I think a middle course is still
possible if there were the will to pursue it.
And this course must begin with a decision
to stop widening and Americanizing the war.
I believe it is a matter of national con-
cern when two top-level former White
House advisers with the recognized abil-
ity of Richard Goodwin and Arthur
Schlesinger appeal on successive days for
a halt in the growing U.S. Involvement
in Vietnam. These are tough minded,
realistic thinkers who have seen adminis-
tration policy being shaped from the in-
side but who have had the opportunity
in recent months for thoughtful reflec-
tion free from official pressures. I be-
lieve their sobering words of this past
weekend deserve the most careful con-
sideration.
I ask unanimous consent that Mr.
Schlesinger's superb article be printed at
this point in the RECORD.
There being no objection, the article
was order to be printed in the RECORD,
as follows:
[From the New York Times Magazine,
Sept. 1B, 19661
SCHLESINGER SUGGESTS THAT WE RECOVER OUR
COOL AND FOLLOW A MIDDLE WAY OUT OF
VIETNAM
(By Arthur Schlesinger, Jr.)
Why we are in Vietnam is today a ques-
tion of only historical interest. We are
there, for better or for worse, and we must
deal with the situation that exists. Our
national security may not have compelled us
to draw a line across Southeast Asia where
we did, but, having drawn it, we cannot
lightly abandon it. Our stake in South Viet-
nam may have been self-created, but it has
nonetheless become real. Our precipitate
withdrawal now would have ominous re-
verberations throughout Asia. Our commit-
ment of over 300,000 American troops, young
men of exceptional skill and gallantry en-
gaged in cruel and difficult warfare, meas-
ures the magnitude of our national con-
cern.
We have achieved this entanglement, not
after due and deliberate consideration, but
through a series of small decisions. It is
not only idle but unfair to seek out guilty
men. President Eisenhower, after rejecting
American military intervention In 1954, set
In motion the policy of support for Saigon
which resulted, two Presidents later, in
American military intervention in 1965.
Each step in the deepening of the Ameri-
can commitment was reasonably regarded
at the time as the last that would be neces-
sary; yet, in retrospect, each step led only
to the next, until we find ourselves en-
trapped today in that nightmare of Ameri-
can strategists, a land war in Asia,-a war
which no President, including President
Johnson, desired or intended. The Vietnam
story is a tragedy without villains. No
thoughtful American can withhold sym-
pathy as President Johnson ponders the
gloomy choices which lie ahead.
Yet each President, as he makes his
choices, must expect to be accountable for
them. Everything in recent weeks-the
actions of the Administration, the intima-
tions of actions to come, even a certain
harshness in the Presidential rhetoric-sug-
gests that President Johnson has made his
choice, and that his choice is the careful en-
largement of the war. New experiments in
escalation are first denied, then disowned,
then discounted and finally undertaken. As
past medicine fails, all we can apparently
think to do is to increase the dose. In May
the Secretary of the Air Force explained why
we were not going to bomb Hanoi and Hai-
phong; at the end of June we began the
strikes against the oil depots. The demili-
tarized zone between North and South Viet-
nam has been used by North Vietnam units
for years, but suddenly we have begun to
bomb it.
When such steps work no miracles-and
it is safe to predict that escalation will be
no more decisive in the future than it has
been in the past-the demand will arise for
"just one more step." Plenty of room re-
mains for widening the war: the harbors of
North Vietnam, the irrigation dikes, the
steel plants, the factories, the power grid,
the crops, the civilian population, the
Chinese border. The fact that we excluded
such steps yesterday is, alas, no guarantee
that we will not pursue them tomorrow.
And if bombing will not bring Ho Chi Minh
to his knees or stop his support of the Viet-
cong in South Vietnam, there is always the
last resort of invasion. General Ky has al-
ready told us that we must invade North
Vietnam to win the war. In his recent press
conference, the Secretary of State twice de-
clined to rule out this possibility.
The theory, of course, is that widening the
war will shorten it. This theory appeaxs to
be based on three convictions: first, that
the war will be decided in North Vietnam;
second, that the risk of Chinese or Soviet
entry is negligible, and third, that military
"victory" in some sense is possible. Perhaps
these premises are correct, and in another
year or two we may all be saluting the wis-
dom and statesmanship of the American
Government. In so inscrutable a situation,
no one can be confident about his doubt and
disagreement. Nonetheless, to many Amer-
icans these propositions constitute a terribly
shaky basis for action which has already
carried the United States into a ground war
in Asia and which may well carry the world
to the brink of the third world war.
The illusion that the war in South Viet-
nam can be decided in North Vietnam is evi-
dently a result of listening too long to our
own propaganda. Our Government has In-
sisted so often that the war in Vietnam is
a clear-cut case of aggression across fron-
tiers that it has come to believe itself that
the war was started in Hanoi and can be
stopped there. "The war," the Secretary of
State has solemnly assured us, "is clearly an
`armed attack; cynically and systematically
mounted by the Hanoi regime against the
people of South Vietnam."
Yet the-best evidence is that the war began
as an insurrection within South Vietnam
which, as it has gathered momentum, has
attracted increasing support and direction
Approved For Release 2005/06/29 : CIA-RDP67B00446R000400110008-8
 September p ~~ For Re ~NGRES ZONAL RECORD -SENATE 400110008-8
States it lacked the stabilizing force of erting political power through a variety of
tradition, probably because it was largely the devices-stopping troop trains, massive
product of an academic gold rush. As the demonstrations open-ended toward illegal-
university in the last decade burgeoned in ity, and the more staid political primaries.
size, with new departments, new centers, and And, of course, the university is in the
new institutes, there came forward a whole strange position of being the "staging
new academic generation, shaped in the post- area" for all these actions. Two demonstra-
World War 11 period, with values which re- tions, of October 15 and Noverriber 20,
flected that age of mobility and achievable though in large part composed of non-stu-
wealth. The new university was virtually dents, assembled and marched from the
ahistorical, with few roots in the past; in university grounds. Public criticism indeed
the social sciences especially there was no moved the chancellor to an agreement with
sense of a continuity with the work of prede- the Berkeley authorities that he would
cessors. Departments were riven by severe henceforta deny the university grounds to
conflicts of generations, of personalities and illegal parades. This constituted a welcome
politics-certainly nothing new in academic departure from the unrestricted Faculty
life. But perhaps only on a campus which Resolution of December 8. The faculty
had lost sight of scholarly dignity
..
honor and `---____. _
,
bj
iso
e
f
..p
d
s o
ugly corn-
petitiveness and naked hostility have re-
squnded so shockingly.
Berkeley, indeed, is the first "political uni-
versity" in the United States. This is a de-
velopment of the highest significance. For
the first time the intellectual class of the
United States is undertaking to enter politics
directly, and to offer to the electorate,
through the agency of faculty-student ac-
tivists, something akin to an Intellectuals'
Party. During the spring of 1966 in Berkeley,
almost all faculty-student activism con-
verged around the candidacy in the Democra-
tic congressional primary of Robert Scheer,
who, running on a platform of militant op-
position to the Vietnam war, nearly defeated
the liberal incumbent; he carried Berkeley
by 14,625 votes to 12,165, but lost in the
district as a whole, receiving 28,751 votes
against the victor's 35,270. Robert Scheer is
a typical product of the Berkeley student
movement, In 1961, while a graduate student
in economics, he was an editor and founder
of a magazine of the New Left, Root and
Branch.
"The college left," he wrote at that time in
a vocabulary which had ugly connotations,
"consists of a few thousand cultural freaks.
Its membership is weighted heavily to New
22179
has scarcely shown itself to possess the char-
acter which its pretensions would require.
The twentieth century has shown how the
intellectual class can become a primary force
for an assault on democratic institutions,
and we may yet witness this phenomenon in
America disguised under such slogans as
"participatory democracy." Bernard Shaw
remarks that the most tragic thing in the
world is a man of genius who is not also a
man of character. This in a sense has been
the collective tragedy of Berkeley.
INVITATION TO VISIT THE QUAD
CITIES AREA OF ALABAMA AND
THE TENNESSEE VALI.RV
straightforward discussion with the stu- .. ` nrcauvitir~. Mr. President,
dents of the inadequacies of December 3, some weeks ago I mentioned the Helen
Rather, it rendered a continuing obeisance Keller home at Tuscumbia, Ala., as one
R the resolution, continuing providing of the attractions which tourists ought
a basis for students' charges of "bad faith." to see in a tour of the Deep South caun-
A great institution like Berkeley has, how- try. I repeat the invitation to see Ivy
ever, tremendous resources for recovery of Green, where Helen Keller began the
integrity. It is likely that the moderate training which overcame handicaps and
studentry will eventually assert itself and set an example for people everywhere,
terminate the hegemony of the non-students but I would like to enlarge the invitation
on Sproul Plaza,. The non-students them-
selves are an unpredictable segment; both include the whole Quad City area
Berkeley might cease to be the fashion, and b sides of the Tennessee River at
at
the guerrilla warriors would go elsewhere. Muscle Shoals.
Yet ;meanwhile the possibility remains of I was reminded of this a few days ago
troubled days. The virus of violence is strong when I crossed and recrossed the bridge
in Berkeley; in the spring the headquarters between Florence and Sheffield and
of the V.D.C. near the university was bombed looked at the palisades along the Ten-
and shattered beyond repair. To be sure, the nessee, a magnificent sheer cliff rising
V.D.C. Itself included many who advocated hundreds of feet above the waters of
or justified the rise of terrorism. But it was
remarkable how little concern was shown by the river. This is beautiful country, but
the Berkeley community. it is more than that.
In the last reckoning the problem of This is the place which inspired TVA,
Berkeley is the problem of the American a model of regional resource develop-
intellectual class itself, its sudden power, rnent for the entire world. This is the
affluence, influence, and immaturity. Here place at which the dangerous and
was the largest aggregation of intellectual treacherous Muscle Shoals in former
force in the United States, yet its dealings nays sto
d
ppe
f
o
cur by a congeries of slogans, fantasies, rleftiss. 'Tennessee River. It is the site of Wil-
in -
ture, personality, or choice, they are gener- A whole group of vaguely conformist ;leftists son Dam, initial dam in the TVA corn-
ally impervious to the normal rewards and were now enjoying a vicarious ideological Alex of dams and powerhouses. This
concerns. of American society." Because the ding in the form of the New Student Left. dam now has one of the highest single-
intellectuals were alienated from society, he A cult of youth swept over faculty activists; lift locks in the world. Wilson Dam is
wrote,
writers tthey s c hung eto the university----"the heworld we somehow youth's idealism over faculty a great tourist attraction.
univers t a a, ,., .. .,,.h__ __ . _ activists; somehow youth's i Coen _-__
-
"
hell out of us."
Scheer was pro-Castro, anti-John Ken-
nedy, and mildly pornopolitical. His studies
came to grief. He grew a shaggy, Castro-
like beard, and went to work as a salesman
for the famed literary center, City Lights
Bookshop, in San Francisco. Subsequently,
the System, through the Center for the
Study of Democratic Institutions, published
_a paper by him on Vietnam. He spoke at
teach-ins, and according to V.D.C. spokes-
men, during the mass demonstration in the
Berkeley streets on the night of October 15
supported the breaching of the Oakland po-
lice formation. He had been using for some
time the rhetoric of a seizure of power by
the Oakland poor. Then he became a candi-
date for Congress. He trimmed his beard so
that he looked like a New England whaling
captain, and began to wear a bourgeois
jacket, as befitted a well-groomed congres-
,sional candidate. Student and faculty acti-
vists gave time and money to the Scheer
campaign. They availed themselves of all
techniques, from exhaustive precinct work
to demagogy and sexagogy. One day they
brought a leading San Francisco go-go danc-
er to the Lower Plaza to lure the students
into politics. She danced for the multitude,
but embarrassed her sponsors by telling a
reporter that she didn't know who Robert
Scheer was.
The New Intellectual class in Berkeley is
feeling its way toward a technique for ex-
ur yan:icuiar instances. One could not help i'vru env151onea a 75-mile-long 1ridU5-
rememberinl; that German professors to the trial city, a vision which has come to
nineteen thirties had apologized for their pass in the Huntsville-Decatur-Quad
Nazi students in precisely this way, with Cities complex of great industrial
precisely this faith in the redeeming sincerity plants-chemicals, shipbuilding, syn-
ca of
h. One also remembered the ?uteri- textiles, aluminum,
out thetic fibers, milli
ng
n y fellow-traveling professors of the thirties and the new electronic space industries.
who had underwritten the idealistic Com- Between the industries the wide Tennes-
munist commitment of their students; the
Berkeley Faculty Activists were their living see River lakes behind the dams offer
replicas, using the same words, expressions, wildlife refuge areas, boat-launching
and arguments. Many professors were par- ramps, State parks, good motels, and
ticularly affected by accusations of hypocriti.. many recreational opportunities. I rec-
tal inactivisin, especially when such charges ommend this entire area of the State.
came from their students. The intellectual
is as susceptible to fashions as any other part realized for Decatur, dozen Ford idea has been
of the community, and intellectual fashions tho river, dozen or more miles atrng
are insidious in a way others are not. To fall , with handsome industrial
behind the vanguard is a kind of spiritual buildings rising along the banks of the
death for the intellectual. Thus the old men Tennessee River. An interesting land-
and the middle-aged men in Berkeley were mark here is the old State bank, built al-
curiously adrift, and failed to supply that most a century and a half ago, a simple
balancing principle, that measure of exile- but handsome Greek building. A short
rience, which was the duty of their years. distance from Decatur, on the north side
In this sense, the problem of Berkeley is of the liver, is Mooresville, one of Ala.-
the Problem of the American intellectual bama's oldest towns. It is famous for
class. As it grows in power and numbers, its fine antebellum homes.
wooed alike by the government, foundations,
the publishing world, industry, and the uni- On
the river there are the great;
versities, it demands for itself the privileges lakes ex extending past Guntersville and
and prerogatives of a third chamber of gov- Scottsboro to the Tennesse line, but be-
ernrnent. It demands that governmental offi- fore one gets to this water playground
cials be especially accountable to it as the area, there is Huntsville-my home-
guardians of intellect and, knowledge. Yet it town-which I remember as a small and.
Approved For Release 2005/06/29 : CIA-RDP67BOO446ROO0400110008-8
 Approved For Release 2005/06/228g IA- 0446R000400110008-8 22181
September .20, 1966 CONGRESSIONAL RECOi notion that strategic bombing
the north. Even today the North Viet- processes of escalation in Southeast Asia be- notion can stop guer-l, conclud-
runs
rillas
to fuse nuclear had it last wintery on to experience.
the authority of the
contrar namese regulars in South Vietnam amount fore tI we are given the security right
to only a fraction of the total enemy force ing Presi- Secretary of State, that despite the entry of
(and to an even smaller fraction of the Amer- weapons, we can guarantee victory."
ican army ienialtprescription of General mdent olar Kennedy After a sat glumly rubbing an moment someone said, "Mr. ViNorth et amecontinues regulars in
foil a
genial
follow the
d bomb North Vietnam back to the President, perhaps you would have the gen- operation.
LeMay and g
Malayan
Ke nedy grunted and dismissed the successful Brit shoeffort against planned the
Stone Ae-and
To reduce would this iwaroto on in eral the tory. explain
, who South Vietnam. the
simplification of a wicked regime molesting meeting. Later he said, "Since he couldn't guerrillas and later served as head of the of a
on,
has its neighbors, and to suppose that it can be thinkto prany further rt es alation, he would British advisory the mission in S oe must opm-that suded eiv the wicked regime,
find out. bombing tooGen,. saa-te "in the same element" as ries." Counterinsurgency, thwriteseir is
t only the political What is hard to purpose
surely to misconceive no
but even n the isconhe military not
character of the prob- It Maxwell Taylor, "The objective of our air like trying to deal with a tomcat in an alley.
As campaign is to change the will of the enemy It Is no good inserting a large, fierce dog.
lem
enter, for these the will be less be les'assurances than that China totally will satisfy- leadership." Secretary McNamara, on the The dog may not find the tomcat; if he does,
big to thoose wwhhose memory stretches back to o other hand, has said, "We never believed that the tomcat will escape up a tree; and the dog
the Korean War. General MacArthur, an- bombing would destroy North Vietnam's will then chase the female cats. The answer
other one of those military experts on Ori- will." Whatever the theory, the results would is to put in a fiercer tomcat."
ental psychology, when asked by President appear to support Secretary McNamara. The Alas, we have no fiercer tomcat. The coun-
Truman on Wake Island in October 1950, northern strategy, instead of driving Hanoi terinsurgency effort in Vietnam has lan-
what the chances were of Chinese interven- to the conference table, seems to have hard- guished, while our bombers roam over that
tion, replied, "Very little. . .Now that he ened the will of the regime, convinced it that hapless country, dumping more tonnage of
have bases for our Air Force in Korea, if the its life is at stake, brought it closer to China explosives each month than we were iChinese tried to get down to Pyongyang, and solidified the people of North Vietnam in per month on all Europe and Africa during
there would the its support. the Second World War. Just the other day
the greatest slaughter." decision ion Such
reasoning lay y behind d th (the As- "There is no indication," General West- our bombs killed or injured more than 100
sistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Af- moreland said the other day, "that the re- cvillans in a hamlet in the Mekong Delta-two fairs at that time Secretary State today) solve bombing has h d toons numbering perhaps, men1eweregthere.
to send nd American n troops across the 38th
Parallel despite warnings from Peking that precisely the effect that the analyses of the Even if the Vietcong had still been around,
this would provoke a Chinese response. In a United States Strategic Bombing Survey after which they weren't, would the military gain
few weeks, China was actively in the war, the Second World War would have forecast. have outweighed the human and political
and, while there was the greatest slaughter, Under Secretary of State George Ball was a loss? Charles Mohr writes in The Times:
director of that survey; this may well be why "Almost every provincial hospital in Viet-
itwas not notably of the Chinese. he has been reported so unenthusiastic about nam is crowded with civilian victims of the
nese have There eeno little question
o en thte the Char the air assault on the North. war. Some American doctors and other offi-r in Vietnam. They great pdo not assion want to put the wa their r And, far from stopping infiltration across cials in the field say the majority are the
nuclear plants in hazard; and, in any the 17th Parallel, bombing, if our own sta- victims of American air power and South
nanp In has typically and, been n case, tistics are to be believed, has stimulated it. Vietnamese artillery."
pound foreign f polemical l f ferocity ba trim- ,It is perfectly clear," Secretary McNamara The trouble is that we are fighting one
ek g practical are no has said, "that the North Vietnamese have war, with our B-Ei2's and our naval guns and
pound of polemical ferocity and
drudt ju Bud the leaders t Peking Mce as continued to increase their support of the our napalm, and the Vietcong are fighting
er as devoted students e. They as Vietcong despite the increase in our ef- another, with their machine guns and am-
doubt
sur Ameri can Secretary of State. They be- fort.... What has happened is that the bushes and forays in the dark. "If we can
lure that appeasement are out ury them; they g- North Vietnamese have continually increased get the Vietcong to stand up and fight, we
ge s ; and, however invites further ag- the amount of resources, men and material will blast him," General Westmoreland has
ate some a owcerr deep their al survival that they have been willing to devote to plaintively said; and when they occasionally
will some point nt concern for national survival their objective." rise to the surface and try to fight our kind
wmake ill that fight. Nor can we easily match this infiltration of war, we do blast them. But the fact that Prob- When wilt that are point be confronted reached? a direct by enlari ng our own forces-from 300,000, they then slide back into the shadows does
ably they are by through direct Y g
threat t to to their frontier, either tfor example, to 500,000 or 750,000. The ratio not mean that we are on the verge of some
bombing or through an American decision of superiority preferred by the Pentagon in final military triumph. It means simply that
to cross the 17th Parallel and Invade North guerrilla war is 10 to 1, which means that we are driving them underground-where
Vietnam. If a Communist regime barely es- every time we send in 100,000 more men the they renew themselves and where our large,
tablished in Peking could take a decision to enemy has only to send in 10,000 or so, and fierce dog cannot follow.
intervene against the only atomic power in we are all even again. Reinforcement has Saigon officials have been reporting that
the world in 1950, why does anyone suppose not created a margin of American superior- Vietcong morale is declining as long as I can
that a much stronger regime should flinch ity; all it has dons is to lift the stalemate to remember; these reports need not be taken
from that decision in 1966? Indeed, given the a higher and more explosive level. Indeed, seriously now. I know of no convincing
present discord in Peking, war may seem the there is reason to suppose that, in its own evidence that the Vietcong lack the political
best way to renew revolutionary discipline, manner, the enemy can match our every and emotional commitment to keep fighting
stop the brawling and unite the nation. step of escalation up to the point of nuclear underground for another 20 years.
war. Our strategy in Vietnam is rather like try-
weed a garden with a bulldozer. We
It is true that the Chinese entry into the In
g to
Korean War had at least to the passive sup- U.S. News & World Report says in its issue
War
port of the Soviet Union; but it would be of Aug. 22: "It's clear now to military men: occasionally dig up some weeds, but we dig
risky today to rely on the Sino-Soviet split bombing will not win in Vietnam." This is up most of the turf, too. The effect of our
to save us from everything, including Soviet a dispiriting item. Why had our military policy is to pulverize the political and in-
aid to China in case of war with the United leaders not long ago freed themselves from stitutional fabric which alone can give' a
States or even direct Soviet entry into the the illusion of the omnipotence of air power, South Vietnamese state that hope of inde-
war in Vietnam. For the Soviet Union is al- so cherished by civilians who think wars can pendent survival which is our presumed war
ready extensively involved in Vietnam-more be won on the cheap? The Korean war, as aim. Our method, in other words, defeats
so in a sense than the Chinese-and it would Gen. Matthew B. Ridgway has said, "taught our goal. Indeed, the most likely beneficiary
be foolish to suppose that, given Moscow's that it is impossible to interdict the supply of the smashed social structure of South
competition with Peking for the leadership route of an Asian army by airpower alone. Vietnam will be Communism. "My feeling,"
of the Communist world, Russia could afford We had complete air mastery over North Gen. Wallace Greene, commandant of the
to stand by and allow Communist North Korea, and we clobbered Chinese supply Marine Corp, has wisely said, "is that you
Vietnam or Communist China to be destroyed columns unmercifully. . . . But we did not could kill every Vietcong and North Viet-
by the American imperialists. halt their offensive nor materially diminish namese in South Vietnam and still lose the
As for the third premise (that military its strength." If air power was not decisive wax. Unless s we can ma eta success of the
"victory" is in some sense possible) : The in Korea, where the warfare was conventional civic-action program, we not going
Joint Chiefs of Staff, of course, by definition and the terrain relatively open and compact, obtain the devotion objcti objectives have eset." are at
argue for military solutions. They are the how could anyone suppose that it would be Much d
into the programs of recant
most fervent apostles of "one more step." decisive against guerrillas threading their present going
That is their business, and no one should be way through the hills and jungles of sttr g tiothe enemy cans ice re precarious
much
im-
surprised that generals behave like generals. Vietnam2 avert
The fault lies not with those who give this The bombing illusion applies, of course, to of South Vietnam with such app
advice but those who take it. Once, early South as well as to North Vietnam. Tacti- munity; and so long as genuine programs of
social
the Saigon Government and of large land-
the an of the Administration, the then cal eratons-has in its place; the of
Chairman of e Joint Chiefs outlined the ground op '
For Release 2005/06/29 : CIA-RDP67B00446R000400110008-8
Approved
 22182 Approved For Relea 2005/06/29: CIA-RDP67B00446R000400110008-8
gJNGRESSIONAL RECORD -SENATE September 20, 1966
holders. In any case, as claimants on our How have we managed to imprison our- The only way to reconcile these figures is
resources, these programs of pacification are selves in this series of dilemmas? One rea- to conclude that the Vietcong have picked
hopelessly outclassed by the programs of son surely is that we have somehow lost our up from 30,000 to 50,000 local recruits In this
destruction. Surely, the United States with understanding of the uses of power. Under- Period. Since this seems unlikely-especially
all Its ingenuity, could have figured out a standing of power Implies above all precision in view of our confidence in the decline of
better way to combat guerrilla warfare than In Its application. We have moved away Vietcong morale-a safer guess is to ques-
the physical obliteration of the nation in from the subtle strategy of "flexible re- tion the wonderful precision of the statistics.
which it is taking place. If this is our best spouse" under which the level of American Even the rather vital problem of how many
idea of "protecting" a country against "wars force was graduated to meet the level of North Vietnamese troops are in South Viet-
of national liberation," what other country, enemy threat. The triumph of this dis- nam is swathed in mystery. The Times re-
seeing the devastation we have wrought in criminate employment of power was, of ported on Aug. 7: "About 40,000 North Viet-
Vietnam, will wish American protection? course, the Cuban missile crisis (where the namese troops are believed by allied intelli-
At the same time, our concentration on Joint Chiefs, as usual, urged an air assault 'gene to be In the South." According to an
Vietnam is exacting a frightful cost in other on the missile bases). But President John- Associated Press dispatch from Saigon
areas of national concern. In domestic son, for all his formidable abilities, has shown printed in The Christian Science Monitor of
policy, with Vietnam gulping down a billion no knack for discrimination in his use of Aug. 15: "The South Vietnamese Govern-
and a half dollars a month, everything is power. His technique Is to try and over- ment says 102,500 North Vietnamese combat
grinding to a stop. Lyndon Johnson was on whelm his adversary-as in the Dominican troops and support battalions have infil-
his way to a place in history as a great Presi- Republic and Vietnam-by piling on all trated into South Vietnam.
dent for his vision of a Great Society; but forms of power without regard to the nature "These figures are far in excess of United
the Great Society is now, except for token of the threat.
gestures, dead. The fight for equal o States intelligence estimates, Vn pus the
g pportu- Given this weakness for the indiscriminate maximum number o of North h Vietnamese in
nity for the Negro, the war against poverty, use of power, it is easy to see why the appli- the South at about 54,000."
the struggle to save the cities, the improve- cation of force in Vietnam has been sur- But General Westmoreland told his Texas
ment of our schools--all must be starved for rendered to the workings of what an acute press conference on Aug. 14 that the enemy
the sake of Vietnam. And war brings ugly observer of the Johnson foreign policy, force Included "about 110,000 main-force
side-effects: inflation; frustration; angry Philip Geyelin, calls "the escalation' ma- North Vietnamese regular army troops."
protest: attack on dissenters on the ground chine." This machine is, in effect, the mo- Perhaps these statements are all reconcilable,
that they cheer the enemy (an attack often mentum in the decision-making system but an apparent discrepancy of this magni-
mounted by men who led the dissent dur- which keeps enlarging the war "for reasons tude on a question of such importance raises
Ing the Korean war) ; premonitions of Mc- only marginally related to military need." a twinge of doubt.
Carthyism, The very size and weight of the American
battle-
We also pay a cost abroad. Our allies military resence generate unceasing pres- orderr statistics. is our ignorance We havefialways lacked
naturally draw away as they see us heading cures to satisfy military demands. These genuine down the road toward war with China. may be demands to try out new weapons; political and cultural p r r boblems insight into the
Vietnam,
When we began to bomb the oil depots, the London Sunday Telegraph recently ran more we press all le s Into a
James Reston wrote: "There is now not a an informative article comparing the Viet- and they framework theworseboff we are.
single major nation in the world that sup- nam war to the Spanish Civil War as a mill- mflitar
ports Mr. Johnson's latest adventure in tary testing ground and laboratory. The Adally sinfn Informed was sya-
Hanoi and Haiphong." . Or they tematiclly misinformed by senior American
As nations seek to may be cries for "one more step," springing officials In Saigon in 1962-63 regarding the
disengage themselves from the impending in part from suppressed rage over the fact progress of the war, the popularity of Diem,
conflict, the quasi-neutralism of leaders like that, with military power sufficient to blow the effectiveness of the "strategic hamlet"
de Gaulle gains new plausibility. up the world, we still cannot compel guer- program and other vital matters. It was not
any realistic assessment, Western Eur- rilla bands in black pajamas to submit to that these offs ials were deliberately deceiv-
ope and Latin America are far more signifi- our will. Whatever the reason, Sir Robert ing their President; it was that they had
Cant to American security than South Asia; Thompson has noted of the American theory deceived themselves first. Ordinary citizens
yet the Vietnam obsession has stultified our of the war: "There was a constant tendency restricted to reading the American press
policy and weakened our position in both in Vietnam to mount large-scale operations, were better informed in 1963 than officials
these vital areas. The war has clouded the which had little purpose or prospect of sue- who took top-secret cables seriously.
hope, once mildly promising, of progress to- cess, merely to Indicate that something The fact is that our Government just
ward a detente with the Soviet Union. It aggressive was being done." doesn't know a lot of things it pretends to
has helped block agreements to end under- The Administration has freely admitted
know. not that It
nuclear testing and to stop the that such operations, like the bombing of not know know It is them, m, for the facts discreditable are elus sive an ve and
spread of nuclear weapons. It has ydf are ed
precipf- the North, are designed in part to prop up the judgments incredibly difficult. But it is
tated the decision of U Thant to resign as the morale of the Saigon Government. And surely inexcusable that It should pretend to
Secretary General of the United Nations and the impression is growing now that they are know things it does not-and that it should
condemns the U.N. Itself to a time of declin- also in part undertaken in order to smother pass its own ignorance on to the American
Ing influence. doubts about the war in the United States people as certitude. And it is even less
Our rejection of the views of our friends and to reverse anti-Administration tenden- excusable that It should commit the nation
and allies-our conviction, as Paul If. Smith ties in the polls. Americans have become to a policy involving the greatest dangers on
has put It, "that we alone are qualified to be curiously insensitive to the use of military a foundation so vague and precarious,
judge, jury and executioner"-ignores Madi- operations for domestic political. purposes. So new we are set on the course of widen-
son's solemn warning in the 63rd Federalist: A quarter-century ago President Roosevelt Ing the war-even at the cost of multiplying
"An attention t o the judgment of other postponed the North African invasion so that American casualties in Vietnam and deepen-
nations is Important to every government It would not take place before the midterm ing American troubles at home and abroad;
for jwo reasons: the one is that Independ- elections of 1942; but today observers in even at the risk of miring our nation in a
ently of the merits of any particular plan Washington, without evidence of shock, pre- hopeless and endless conflict on the main-
or measure, it is desirable, on various ac- diet a new venture In escalation before the! land of Asia beyond the effective employ-
counts, that It should appear to other na- midterm elections of 1966. ment of our national power and beyond the
tions as the offspring of a wise and honor- The triumph of the escalation machine range of our primary interests; even at the
able policy; the second Is that In doubtful has been assisted by the faultiness of the risk of nuclear war.
cases, particularly where the national coun- information on which our decisions are Why does the Administration feel that
cils may be warped by some strong passion based. Nothing is phonier than the spurious these costs must be paid and these risks run?
or momentary interest, the presumed or exactitude of our statistics about the Viet- Hovering behind our is a larger idea-
known opinion of the impartial world may policy
y nam war. No doubt a computerized military the the idea that the war in Vietnam is not just
be the best guide that can be followed. establishment demands numbers; but the a local conflict between Vietnamese but a
What has not America lost by her want of "body count" of dead Vietcong, for example,
character with foreign nations; and how fateful test of wills between China and the
many errors and follies would she not have includes heaven knows how many innocent United States.
avoided, if the justice and riot not have bystand^rs and could hardly be more un- Our political and rhetorical escalation of
prop Y reliable. The figures on enemy strength are the war has been almost as perilous as our
measures had, in every instance, been pre- totally baffling, at least to the ordinary citi- military escalation. President Kennedy's
Viously tried by the light in which they zen relying on the daily newspaper. The effort was to pull Laos out of the context of
would probably appear to the unbaised part Times on Aug. 10 described "the latest Intel- great-power conflict and reduce the Laotian
Of mankind." ligence reports" in Saigon as saying, that the
The Administration has called the critics number of enemy troops in South Vietnam Kcivil hr war a
v at rational a In 19ions. As he fund
of Its Vietnam policy "neo-isolationists." had Increased 52,000 since Jan. 1 to a total not I portant enough to entangle two great
But surely the real neo-isolationists are of 282,000. Yet, "according to official fig- nations. President Johnson, on the other
those who }lave Isolated the United States ures," the enemy had suffered 31,!571 killed hand, has systematically inflated the signifi-
from Its allies and raised the tattered In action. In this period, and the infiltration cance of the war in Vietnam. "We have tried
standard, last flourished 15 years ago by estimate ranged from 35,000 as "definite" to to make it clear over and over again," as the
Douglas MacArthur, of "going it alone." 54,000 as "possible."
. Secretary of State has put it, "that although
Approved For Release 2005/06/29 : CIA-RDP67B00446R000400110008-8
 , -IO/NAL RECORD 67SSENATE000400110008-8
September ,20,A1966 ed For COT &`
Hanoi is the prime actor in this situation,
that it is the policy of Peking that has great-
ly stimulated Hanoi.. . . It is Ho Chi Minh's
war. Maybe it is Mao Tse-tung's war."
"In the forties and fifties," President John-
son has said, "we took our stand in Europe
to protect the freedom of those threatened by
aggression. Now the center of attention has
shifted to another part of the world where
aggression is on the march. Our stand must
be as firm as ever." Given this view, it is
presumably necessary to pay the greatest
costs and run the greatest risks-or else in-
vite the greatest defeat.
Given this view, too, there is no reason not
to Americanize the war. President Kennedy
did not believe that the war in Vietnam
could succeeed as a war of white men against
Asians. It could not be won, he said a few
weeks before his death, "unless the people
[of South Vietnam] support the effort....
We can help them, we can give them equip-
ment, we can send our men out there as ad-
visers, but they have to win it, the people of
Vietnam." We have now junked this doc-
trine. Instead, we have enlarged our mili-
,tary presence until it Is the only thing that
matters in South Vietnam, and we plan now
to make it still larger; we have summoned
the Saigon leaders, like tribal chieftains on
a retainer, to a conference in an American
state; we crowd the streets of Saigon with
American generals (58 at last count) and
visiting stateside dignitaries. In short, we
have seized every opportunity to make clear
to the world that this is an American war-
and, in doing this, we have surely gone far
to make the war unwinnable.
The proposition that our real enemy in
Vietnam is China is basic to the policy of
widening the war. It is the vital element in
the Administration case. Yet the proof our
leaders have adduced for this proposition has
been exceedingly sketchy and almost per-
functory. It has been proof by ideology and
proof by analogy. It has not been proof by
reasoned argument or by concrete illustra-
tion.
The proof by ideology has relied on the syl-
logism that the Vietcong, North Vietnam and
China are all Communist states and there-
fore mush be part of the same conspiracy,
and that, since the Vietcong are the weakest
of the three, they must therefore be the
spearhead of a coordinated Chinese plan of
expansion. The Department of State, in
spite of what has struck most people as a
rather evident fragmentation of the Commu-
nist world, has hated to abandon the cozy old
cliches about a centralized Communist con-
spiracy aimed at monolithic world revolu-
tion.
As late as May 9, 1965, after half a dozen
years of public Russo-Chinese quarreling,
Thomas C. Mann, then No. 3 man in the de-
partment, could talk about "instruments of
Sino-Soviet power" and "orders from the
Sino-Soviet military bloc." As late as Jan.
28, 1966, the Secretary of State could still
run on about "their world revolution," and
again, on Feb. 18, about "the Communists"
and their "larger design." While the depart-
ment may have accepted the reality of the
Russo-Chinese schism by September, 1966,
the predominant tone is still to regard Asian
Communism as a homogenous system of ag-
gression. The premise of our policy has been
that the Vietcong equal Hanoi and Hanoi
equals Peking.
Obviously, the Vietcong, Hanoi and Peking
have interests in common and strong ideolo-
gical affinities. Obviously, Peking would re-
joice in a Hanoi-Vietcong victory. But they
also have divergent interests and purposes-
and the divergencies may prove in the end to
be stronger than the affinities. Recent de-
velopments In North Korea are instructive. If
any country was bound to Peking by ties of
gratitude, it was North Korea, which was pre-
served as an independent state by Chinese
intervention 15 years ago. If any country
today is at the mercy of Peking, it is again
North Korea. When North Korea now de-
clares in vigorous language its independence
of China, does anyone suppose that North
Vietnam, imbued with historic mistrust of
China and led by that veteran Russian agent
Ho Chi Minh, would have been more slavish
in its attitude toward Peking?
The other part of the Administration case
has been proof by analogy, especially the
good old Munich analogy. "I'm not the vil-
lage idiot," the Secretary of State recently
confided to Stewart Alsop. "I know Hitler
was an Austrian and Mao is a Chinese....
But what is common between the two situa-
tions is the phenomenon of aggression." The
Vietnam war, President Johnson recently told
the American Legion, "is meant to be the
opening salvo in a series of bombardments
or, as they are called in Peking, 'wars of lib-
eration.' " If this technique works this week
in Vietnam, the Administration suggests, it
will be tried next week in Uganda and Peru.
But, if it is defeated in Vietnam, the Chi-
nese will know that we will not let It succeed
elsewhere.
"What happens in South Vietnam," the
President cried at Omaha, "will determine-
yes, it will determine-whether ambitious
and aggressive nations can use guerrilla war-
fare to conquer their weaker neighbors."
The Secretary of State even described an
exhortation made last year by the Chinese
Defense Minister, Marshal Lin Piao, as a
blueprint for world conquest comparable to
Hitler's "Mein Kampf."
One thing is sure about the Vietnam
riddle: it will not be solved by bad his-
torical analogies. It seems a trifle forced,
for example, to equate a civil war in what
was for hundreds of years the entity of Viet-
nam (Marshal Ky, after all, is a North Viet-
namese himself) with Hitler's invasion of
Austria and Czechoslovakia across old and
well-established lines of national division;
even the village idiot might grasp that differ-
ence.
When President Eisenhower invoked the
Munich analogy in 1954 in an effort to in-
volve the British in Indochina, Prime Minis-
ter Churchill, a pretty close student of
Munich in his day, was unmoved. The Chi-
nese have neither the overwhelmingly mili-
tary power nor the timetable of aggression
nor, apparently, the pent-up mania for in-
stant expansion which would justify the
Hitler parallel. As for the Lin Piao docu-
ment, the Rand Corporation, which evidently
read it with more care than the State De-
partment bothered to do, concluded that, far
from being Mao's "Mein Kampf," it was a
message to the Vietcong that they could win
"only if they rely primarily on their own
resources and their own revolutionary spirit,"
and that it revealed "the lack, rather than
the extent, of Peking's past and present con-
trol over Hanoi's actions."
In any case, guerrilla warfare is not a
tactic to be mechanically applied by central
headquarters to faraway countries. More
than any other form of warfare, It is de-
pendent on conditions and opportunities
within the countries themselves. Whether
there are wars of national liberation in
Uganda and Peru will depend, not on what
happens in Vietnam, but on what happens
in Uganda and Peru.
One can agree that the containment of
China will be a major problem for the next
generation. But this does not mean that
we must re-enact in Asia in the sixties the
exact drama of Europe in the forties and
fifties. The record thus far suggests that
the force most likely to contain Chinese ex-
pansionism In Asia (and Africa, too) will
be not Western Intervention but local na-
tionalism. Sometimes local nationalism may
can on Western support-but not always.
Countries like Burma and Cambodia preserve
their autonomy without American assistance.
The Africans have dealt with the Chinese on
their own. The two heaviest blows recently
suffered by Peking--the destruction of the
Communist party in Indonesia and the decla-
ration of independence by North Korea-took
place without benefit of American patronage
or rhetoric.
In an unpredictable decades ahead, the
most effective bulwark against "internation-
al" Communism in some circumstances may
well be national Communism. A rational
policy of containing China could have recog-
nized that a Communist Vietnam under Ho
might be a better instrument of containment
than a shaky Saigon regime led by right-
wing mandarins or air force generals. Had
Ho taken over all Vietnam in 1954, he might
today be enlisting Soviet support to strength-
en his resistance to Chinese pressure-and
this situation, however appalling for the
people of South Vietnam, would obviously be
better for the United States than the one
in which we are floundering today. And
now, alas, it may be almost too late: the
whole thrust of United States policy since
1954, and more than ever since the bombing
of the North began, has been not to pry
Peking and Hanoi apart but to drive them
together.
Is there no way out? Are the only alter-
natives widening the war or disorderly and
humiliating withdrawal? Surely, our states-
manship is not yet this bankrupt. I think
a middle course is still possible if there were
the will to pursue it. And this course must
begin with a decision to stop widening and
Americanizing the war-to limit our forces,
actions, goals and rhetoric. Instead of
bombing more places, sending in more
troops, proclaiming ever more ardently that
the fate of civilization will be settled in
Vietnam, let us recover our cool and try to
see the situation as it is: a horrid civil war
in which Communist guerrillas, enthusias-
tically aided and now substantially directed
from Hanoi, are trying to establish a Com-
munist despotism in South Vietnam, not for
the Chinese but for themselves. Let us un-
derstand that the ultimate problem here is
not military but political. Let us adapt the
means we employ to the end we seek.
Obviously, military action plays an indis-
pensable role in the search for a political
solution. Hanoi and the Vietcong will not
negotiate so long as they think they can
win. Since stalemate is a self-evident pre-
condition to negotiation, we must have
enough American armed force in South Viet-
nam to leave no doubt in the minds of our
adversaries that they cannot hope for vic-
tory. They must also have no illusion about
the prospect of an American withdrawal.
The object of the serious opposition to the
Johnson policy is to bring about not an
American defeat but a negotiated settle-
ment.
Therefore, holding the line in South Viet-
nam Is essential. Surely, we already have
enough American troops, firepower and in-
stallations in South Vietnam to make it clear
that we cannot be beaten unless we choose
to scuttle and run, which will not happen.
The opponents of this strategy talk as if a
holding action would put our forces under
siege and relinquish all initiative to the
enemy. This need not, of course, be so. It
is possible to slow down a war without stand-
ing still; and, if our present generals can't
figure out how to do this, then let us get
generals who can. Generals Ridgway and
Gavin could doubtless suggest some names.
Moreover, there is a South Vietnamese army
of some 600,000 men which can take all the
initiative it wants. And if we are told thzt
the South Vietnamese are unwilling or un-
able to fight the Vietcong, then we must
wonder all the more about the political side
of the war.
The object of our military policy, as ob-
servers like Henry Kissinger and James Mac-
Gregor Burns have proposed, should be the
creation and stabilization of secure areas
Approved For Release 2005/06/29 : CIA-RDP67B00446R000400110008-8
 '22184
Approved For Release 2005/06/29 : CIA-RDP67B00446R0004001 009p8-
CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE September 20, 1966
where the South Vietnamese might them-
selves undertake social and institutional
development. Our resources should go, in
the Vietnam jargon, more to clear-and-hold
than to search-and-destroy (especially when
search-and-destroy more often means search-
and-drive-underground). We should get rid
of those "one-star generals who," in the words
of Sir Robert Thompson, "regard their tour
in Vietnam as an opportunity to indulge in
a year's big-game shooting from their heli-
copter howdahs at Government expense."
At the same time we should induce the
Saigon Government to institute generous
amnesty provisions of the kind which worked
so well in the Philippines. And we should
further increase the incentive to come over
by persuading the South Vietnamese to aban-
don the torture of prisoners-a practice not
only horrible in itself but superbly calculated
to make the enemy fight to the bitter end.
In the meantime we must end our own
shameful collaboration with this barbarism
and stop turning Vietcong prisoners over to
the South Vietnamese when we know that
torture is probable.
As for bombing the North, let us taper
this off as prudently as we can. Bombing is
not likely to deter Hanoi any more in the
future than It has in the past; and, given
its limited military effect, the Administra-
tion's desire to gratify the Saigon Govern-
ment and the American voter is surely not
important enough to justify the risks of
indefinite escalation. Moreover, so long as
the bombing continues there is no chance of
serious negotiation. Nor does the failure of
the 37-day pause of last winter to produce
a settlement refute this. Thirty-seven days
were hardly enough to persuade our allies
that we honestly wanted negotiation; so
brief an interlude left no time for them
to move on to the tricky job of persuading
Hanoi. For Hanoi has substantial reasons
for mistrusting negotiation-quite apart
from Chinese pressure or its own hopes of
victory. Ho has entered into negotiation
with the West twice in the past-in 1946--47
and again in 1954-and each time, in his
view, he lost at the conference table things
he thought he had won on the battlefield.
For all our official talk about our readiness
to go anywhere, talk to anyone, etc., it can-
not be said that the Administration has pur-
sued negotiation with a fraction of the zeal,
imagination and perseverance with which
it has pursued war. Indeed, some Ameri-
can scholars who have studied the matter
believe that on a number of occasions when
pressure for negotiation was mounting we
have, for whatever reason, stepped up the
war.
Nor can it be said that the Administration
has laid fairly before the American people
the occasional signals, however faint, which
have come from Hanoi-as in the early win-
ter of 1965, when U Thant's mediation
reached the point of selecting the hotel In
Rangoon where talks might take place, until
we killed the idea by beginning the bombing
of the North. Nor, for all our declarations
about "unconditional" negotiations, have we
refrained from setting conditions-such as,
for example, that we won't talk to the Viet-
cong unless they come to the conference
table disguised as North Vietnamese.
Though the Vietcong constitute the great
bulk of the enemy force, they have been
escalation without considerable inner up-
heaval. The issue in the United States in the
months to come will be whether President
Johnson's leadership is sufficiently resilient
and forbearing to permit a change in the
direction of policy and arrest what is coming
increasingly to seem an accelerating drift
toward a great and unnecessary catastrophe.
TRAFFIC IN FIREARMS
Mr. DODD. Mr. President, for 6 years,
now, I have been investigating the very
serious traffic in firearms sold through
the interstate malls and delivered to
juveniles, criminals, addicts, and others.
I have had proposed legislation pend-
ing before Congress for more than 3
years. Each attempt to pass a stronger
gun-control law has been stymied by gun
lobbyists, misled sportsmen, and spokes-
men representing that portion of the gun
industry which wants no further legisla-
tion whatsoever.
Although representing only a minority,
these opponents have repeatedly demon-
strated their effectiveness. No new gun
law has been passed, and the present bill,
S. 1592, which I introduced as a part of
the President's crime bill package, has
been stalled for weeks in the Committee
on the Judiciary.
During these same years, a number of
public opinion polls have been conducted
by professional, respected opinion takers
on the question of stronger and more ef-
fective gun laws.
I have yet to see one of these polls
register less than 70 percent of the public
in favor of new laws to reduce effectively
the flow of deadly weapons into the
hands of potential troublemakers. I
might add that in each of these polls the
questions were based on proposals going
far beyond any legislation under serious
consideration, such as the registration of
all guns and the fingerprinting of gun
owners. Even so, 70 percent or more fa-
vored more effective controls.
A poll published in the Washington
Post of September 14, 1966, finally drops
below this 70-percent mark.
In this Gallup po11, based on a question
which suggests that the legislation now
before the Senate would require a record
to be made of the gun and the name of
the purchaser, only 68 percent of the
nongun owning public favored stronger
controls.
However, that same poll shows that 56
percent of the gun owners themselves
favor such a strong law and would vote
for its enactment.
I wonder what effect this revelation
will have on the small army of self-styled
spokesmen for the 20 million American
hunters and gun owners who say they
want no gun law at all.
Mr. President, I ask unanimous con-
sent that the Gallup poll be printed at
.
p
given little reason to think we will nego-
than ever after de Gualle left Algeria, the this point in the RECORD.
tiate about anything except their uncon- Soviet Union suffered no lasting damage from There being no objection, the article
ditional surrender. pulling its nuclear missiles out of Cuba. was ordered to be printed in the RECORD,
It is hard to see why we should not follow And thepolicy of de-escalation recommended as follows:
the precedent of Laos, when we admitted the here is, of courses something a good deal [From the Washington (D.C.) Post, Sept. 14,
Pathet Lao to the peace talks, and offer the less than withdrawal. 1966]
De-esealatiori could work if there were the THE GALLUP POLL: GUN OWNERS THEMSELVES
*See "The Politics of Escalation in Viet- will to pursue it . . . This Is the hard ques- FAVOR CURBS
Dam," by Franz Schurmann, Peter Dale tion. The Administration, disposed to the
Scott and Reginald Zelnik of the University indiscriminate use. of power, enmeshed in the PRINCETON, N.J., September 13.-Few is-
of California; to be published in October by grinding cogs of the escalation machine, com- sues spark such heated reactions as gun con-
Fawcett Books (paperback) and Beacon mitted to the thesis that China is the enemy trols, and few issues are so widely misunder-
Press (hardcover). In Vietnam, obviously could not turn to de- stood.
Vietcong the prospect of a say in the future
political life of South Vietnam-conditioned
on their laying down their arms, opening up
their territories and abiding by the ground
rules of free elections. Nor is there reason
to see why we have been so reluctant again to
follow the Laos model and declare neutrali-
zation, under international guarantee, our
long-run objective for Vietnam. An imag-
inative diplomacy would long since have dis-
cussed the ways and means of such neutrali-
zation with Russia, France, Britain and other
interested countries. Unsatisfactory as the
situation in Laos may be today, it is still in-
comparably better than the situation in
South Vietnam.
On the other hand, negotiation is not an
exclusive, or even primary, American respon-
sibility. Along with a military stalemate, the
other precondition of a diplomats settlement
is surely a civilian government in Saigon.
Marshal Ky is one of those Frankenstein's
monsters we delight in creating in our
"client" countries, very much like the
egregious General Phoumi Nosavan, who
single-handedly blocked a settlement in Laos
for two years. Like Phoumi, Ky evidently
feels that Washington has committed itself
irrevocably to him-and why should he not
after the laying on of hands at Honolulu?-
and that, whatever he does, we cannot afford
to abandon him.
Robert.Shaplen, in the August 20 issue of
The New Yorker, reported from Saigon that
the atmosphere there "is being compared to
the miasma that surrounded Diem and his
tyrannical brother Ngo Dinh Nhu" and that
"many Vietnamese believe that the Ameri-
cans, having embraced Ky so wholeheartedly
and supported him so long, are just as re-
sponsible as his Government for the recent
repressive acts."
I am sure that President Johnson did not
intend to turn over American policy and
honor in Vietnam to Marshal Ky's gimcrack,
bullyboy, get-rich-quick regime. The time is
bound to come when Ky must learn the facts
of life, as General Phoumi eventually and
painfully learned them.
But why wait? In our whole time in Viet-
nam, there has never been a Government in
Saigon which had the active loyalty of the
countryside. It might be an agreeable experi-
ment to encourage one to come into exist-
ence. Instead of Identifying American in-
terests with Ky and rebuffing the broader
political impulses in South Vietnam, we
should long since have welcomed a move-
ment toward a civilian regime representing
the significant political forces of the country
and capable both of rallying the army and
carrying forward programs of social reform.
We should give such a Government all pos-
sible assistance in rebuilding and modern-
izing the political and institutional struc-
tures of South Vietnam. And if it should
favor the neutralization of its country, if it
should seek negotiation with the Vietcong,
even if it should release us from our commit-
ment to stay in Vietnam, we should not think
that the world is coming to an end.
It is not too late to begin the deescalation
of the war; nor would the reduction of our
military effort damage our International in-
fluence. "'T'here is more respect to be won
in the opinion of this world," George Kerman
has written, "by a resolute and courageous
liquidation of unsound positions than. by the
most stubborn pursuit of extravagant or un-
" France was stronger
romising objectives
Approved For Release 2005/06/29 : CIA-RDP67B00446R000400110008-8
 22186
Approved For Fed,: 6~BQB
plash purposes contrary to the intent of
Congress inevitably created a great political
storm. The President and the Secretary
finally got the message and last month they
started doing some fast backpedaling. The
USDA launched a massive public relations
effort to win back the support of the farmer.
but as one farm expert has noted, "the Ad-
ministration really is in a corner. It keeps
telling the farmer that it is his friend. But
the farmer is still skeptical."
The reaction of farmers and ranchers is
clear.
What was the reaction in Congress?
I can assure you that it was vigorous and
-Intense. Except possibly for Vietnam and
Inflation, I don't think any other single issue
has been subjected to as much debate as this
one. Both Democrats and Republicans have
taken part, and the debate has been almost
entirely highly critical of the Administra-
tion's actions.
Let me cite a couple examples. The Con-
gressional reaction to the cattlehide export
embargo was so intense that the Commerce
Department ultimately has to retreat, ac-
knowledge that it had been wrong, and
restore a portion of the cutback. In regard
to this particular episode, i remember the
day that Bill House dropped by my office
after he had attended the hide hearings
ltural committee.
i
cu
_
held by the House agr
Bill told me that the Secretary of Commerce noted economically, socially, and pOlItIca'-,, gress resolu
opp John Connor got such a dressing down by Dby a w giant etroit Chicago, and cities Los such as Angeles. e Thirty- that inethe viewoof such an eents xper enced
of at m Hate of a hirdaWorldrWar,within the fu -
the committee that he almost felt sorry for U him. Now Bill was exaggerating, , of course, five percent of the entire population
because I am sure he could not really feel the 25 metropolises with populations very sorry for Mr. Connor. However, the least one million. The point made by many of us who
treatment that Connor and other Adminis- The danger presented is that in the mak- have for over 21/2 years have advocated
tration officials received is indicative of the ing of national policies, the needs and prob-
Congressional reaction to the export em- lems of agriculture, and non-metropolitan a changed position for the United States
bargo. I played a part. areas as well, will be ignored. In some in- with tihesiVie n When the direct
Another example of Congressional attitude stances this might be unintentional and States "goes antithesis of is olaalone. it is isolating United
it-
toward the Administration's efforts to roll simply the result of unfamiliarity and lack of from the other nations in the wrid.
sult of In to pocases litical calcmight be ulation. the self In When the United States says to the
back farm prices is the resolution recently
re
of Congress that the Acimmiscraw-"
be prohibited from further arbitrary actions Thus, in assessing agriculture's long range far to hold down farm prices which, as you future, I would first emphasize that
face h-
know, are still considerably below parity. ers and ranchers have simply got
Now an equally important question is fact that they Nare ow beco a minority this small
what has been the reaction of the general is small minority. If to have any significant political influence,
public. the members must be politically informed
Specifically, has all the Administration and active and above all they must be united
talk about food prices and inflation aroused in their common purpose.
significant anti-farm sentiment among the one of the reasons why organized labor in
oosumers? this country has been politically successful is
There is no doubt that it has caused a that when the union spokesmen come to
well agreed in
rett
as
y
Washington, they are p
certain amount of damage. However,
far as I can tell from sampling city news- what they are going to ask Congress to enact that the administration-rather than its
papers and from conversations with my or oppose. But, unfortunately, when agri- critics-is not assuming an isolationist
Senate colleagues from urbanized states, it culture comes to Washington, it too often posture before the entire world.
is my impression that while the Administra- speaks with many different and often sharply I ask unanimous entire world. the edi-
tion's actions certainly created opposition voices. Given the extent of dis-consent that among farmers and ranchers, their actions unity among agriculture organizations, it is torial entitled "Who Are the Isolation-
won few friends among urban voters and a wonder that agriculture is as well off to- ists"? in the September 12, 1966, issue of
opinion leaders. ' day as it is. Complete unity is neither pos- The Nation be printed at the conclusion
One of the reasons for this is that reason- sible nor desirable, but the tensions and con- of my remarks.
Bible newspaper editors and urban political flicts among agricultural organizations and There being no objection, the editorial
leaders know that farm prices have not been spokesmen is a luxury that cannot be afford- was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, and rancher a significant cause of the current inflation. ed it organizratios andrleaders musts tae as follows:
But there is another reason why the Adman- WHO ARE THE ISOLATIONISTS?
the urban actions elicited little support from heed of the changing national political cli= Santayana's oft-quoted saying that those
the urban areas. This is simply that a great mate and make a greater effort to find
number of people were appalled at the way common ground and coordinated action, who do not remember the past are doomed
the Administration has carried out these In addition to the need for greater unity, to repeat it needs a corollary: those who
actions. For example, the cattlehide inci- I would also suggest that farmers and ranch- misread the past are even more inexorably
dent was spotted by fair observers as an ers and all the individuals and groups whose doomed to reiterate ancient errors. The
irresponsible and heavy-handed affair. own economic welfare is so closely tied to Johnson Administration's favorite stereo-
the general ream fort to work to g ether than has been thercasef- e de-escalation iniVietnam wi hethe app asers
By in large then, I of view would
Munich
part
agriculture's point he Admin
how then to few actmonthions by tha's been irather en n the businessmen and workers in ithecularlythouof at history can be distorted by politicians who e
co raging. However, the fact that the Ad- sands of towns and cities across the country only use for the past is to justify their mIS-
thep
ministration made the decision to take these whose welfare and interests are so closely deeds s in in the present. A related inversion of
rena current (Senator critics War of H Amer-
tions f has` potentially dangerous , Implica- There tied agriculture. I think there is rea pry the truth is lumping
tions for the future of agriculture. There tential here for for strengthening g rural Amer- scan foreign policy (Senator FpI,BRIGHT, for been
mad were taken few efforts in this dire tion in the past tionists, some of whom were pro-German,
the p is ca se the question Administration these actions
because dministrat tration made the judg- pro-Fascist or both.
mint that at they would gain more political there must be many more in the future. some F
Approved For Release 2005/06/29 : CIA-RDP67B00446R000400110008-8
votes than they lost. The fact that it ap-
parently has not turned out this way is due
to a certain extent to the manner in which
these actions were taken.
But regardless of how they were handled,
the fact remains that they were taken. In
trying to explain why these decisions were
made, I have heard a lot of people say that
they are due to the fact that the Adminis-
tration is against the farmer. Now this is
a simple and easy answer, but I believe that
it is a dangerously naive one. I shall defend
the Administraton against the charge that
it is deliberately anti-farmer for the simple
reason that both the President and the Sec-
retary are experienced enough in politics to
know that you don't make political hay by
being anti-anybody except for extremist
groups of both the right and the left.
Thus, the question is not whether the
Administration is against the farmer but
whether he really is for him. When the
political chips are down is this Administra-
tion really prepared to stand up and do right
by agriculture?
In this lies the most crucial question mark
about agriculture's future. It is too early to
answer with certainty. However, one thing
is absolutely clear; the national political
climate is changing dramatically and at a
faster pace than many of us realize. The
ARE THE REAL ISOLATION-
ISTS?
GRUENING. Mr. President, in an
ex ent article in the New York Times
Mag zine for September 18, 1966, Mr.
Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., famed historian
and former adviser to President Kennedy
and President Johnson, had this to say
h
"
whic
about the label "neoisolationists
some seek to append to those who would
speak out against the United States fur-
ther enmeshing itself in a senseless, un-
declared and costly war in Vietnam:
The Administration has called the critics
of its Vietnam policy "noeisolationists." But
surely the real neoisolationists are those who
have isolated the United States from its allies
and raised the tattered standard, , last
Mac-
flourished 15 years ago by Douglas
Arthur, on going it alone.
A similar theme is developed in the
leading editorial in The Nation for Sep-
tember 12, 1966, under the title "Who Are
the Isolationists"? in Which it is stated:
In essential respects it is the Johnson Ad-
ministration that is isolationist. Its op-
ponents would favor a constructive foreign
policy. Their opposition is to a policy of ag-
____ _d ..noes and hard-
and escalate and further escalate our
military actions in Vietnam-take it or
leave it-it is not acting in concert with
other nations but rather is isolating itself
from all other nations.
The so-called nonisolationist says:
form alliances and act together with
your allies. In Vietnam we are in viola-
tion of our pledges to other nations under
the Charter of the United Nations, under
the Geneva accords, and, under 4 the
 September 20, 1ORRroved F1rM&jg&0 06/29 : CORDDP SENATE R000400110008-8
Some of the opposition to the registration
of guns comes from those who think that
this would mean banning all guns. Actu-
ally, the law proposed would not prohibit a
person from owning a gun-either for sport
or protection-but would require that a rec-
ord be made of the name of the gun pur-
chaser. The purpose of such a law would be
to keep guns out of the hands of persons with
a criminal record, the mentally disturbed
and others unqualified to handle weapons.
The mood of the public for nearly three
decades has been to impose controls on the
sale and possession of weapons.
The survey questions and findings:
"Would you favor or oppose a law which
would require a person to obtain a police
permit before he or she could buy a gun?"
[In percent]
All Gun
persons owners
Yes ------------------------ 68 66
No ----------- 29 41
No opinion----------------- 3 3
Those who favor such a law:
1. Too many people get guns who are ir-
responsible, mentally ill, retarded, trigger
happy, criminals.
2. It would save lives.
3. It's too easy to get guns.
4. It would be a help to the police.
5. It would keep guns out of the hands of
teenagers.
Reasons of those who oppose such a law:
1. Such a law would take away the individ-
ual's rights.
2. Such a law wouldn't work-people
would still get guns if they wanted to.
3. People need guns for protection.
"Which of those three plans would you
prefer for the use of guns by persons under
the age of 18-forbid their use completely,
;put restrictions on their use, or continue as
at present with few regulations?"
In percent]
AP Gun
persons owners
Forbid use------------------ 27 17
Restrictions on use---------- 55 59
Continue as at present------ 15 22
No opinion----------------- 3 a
22185
the growing volume of criticism of recent throughout agriculture. At about this time
Administration actions has come from both the increase in beef imports and his uncon-
parties. vincing efforft to- explain them brought- the
The truth of the matter Is that just as we cattlemen down on his neck.
need a non-political foreign policy we also Because of growing pressure from farmers
need agricultural bi-partisanship. and ranchers and with Congress in firm op-
The other day a rural North Dakota news- position, Mr. Freeman was forced to abandon
paper editor expressed this idea. He noted many of his policies and proposals, several of
that there were a lot of strong Democrats and which I believe were not only ill-conceived
Republicans in his area and that they take but-to a degree--dangerous.
their politics seriously. But the editor After these rebuffs, the Administration in
stated, "When a neighbor is in trouble parti- cooperation with Congress and the majority
sanship ends and we all pitch in. When one Of the farm organizations put together a pro- -
of us is attacked all of us are attacked . . . gram in 1965 which no one found entirely sat-
be the attackers-elements, beast, man or isfactory but which the majority, I believe,
government." And so after reviewing some thought to be a reasonably satisfactory tem-
of the highlights of the Administration's porary compromise. Because of this and be-
"war on farm prices" the editor closed by cause there were signs of slight improvement
saying "We've been attacked, partisanship in the agricultural economic picture the rela-
thus has ended, we've closed ranks and are tions between the Administration and the
fighting baa.k." country's agricultural interests had improved
Let me digress for one further word of ex- considerably by the fall of 1965.
planation or definition. Should I hereafter However, between January and June of this
use the word politics or political, once again year this situatlesm was completely reversed.
I do not do so in a partisan sense. But a pc- The first signs of trouble appeared, when
litical attitude is an expression of democracy, the Administration? in announcing its pro-
is a manifestation of the attitude and the posed budget, recommended that major cuts
will of the people and it is in that meaning should be made in federal funds to agricul-
that the word is used, tune research and extension programs and
Thus, let me make note that during the to the school milk and lunch programs,
past two months there has been considerable During this same time, the Department of
talk In the press about political unrest among Agriculture began to quietly dump millions
farmers and ranchers. It is this rural unrest of bushels of government-owned corn and
to which I now direct my attention. Yet I wheat stocks on the open market. An action,
shall not describe the adverse economic ef- by the way, which Secretary Freeman only
fects of recent administration actions or why two months earlier had stated would not be
such government action has been unjustified.. taken. As a result of these two develop-
Your knowledge concerning your own i t memo
exes
is greater than mine and it is not necessary
for me to go over the arguments you have
formed for yourselves or heard from others.
I want to approach the events of the past
few months from a somewhat different per.
spective. I want to briefly describe the ac-?
tions which generated the current agricul??
tural political discontent. I should like to
explore with you why the Administration
took these actions; what the political con-
sequences may be and finally to attempt to
evaluate not only where we are but where we
are going in American agriculture.
First, I think some historic background is.
necessary in order to keep matters in proper
order.
ginning to develop. And this rv~l` vas
was
brought to a high May when
the Department of Commerce a.nnounced
that It was imposing Stringent restrictions
on the export of cattlehides. The uproar
over this incident was loud-but I will refer
to this mater later on.
It was also during March, April and May
that the Secretary and other top Administra-
tion officials were talking a great deal about
food prices and inflation. Gardner Ackley,
Chairman of the Council of Economic Ad-
visors, revealed that the massive dumping of
corn was intended to encourage pork produc-
tion which would in turn bring down pork
prices. The Defense Department announced
that it was cutting back on its purchases of
pork and leather and was substituting mar-
garine for butter. Also it became known
during this period that the Administration
was increasing the import quotas on such
products as sugar and cheese.
Now the clear implication that emerged
from all the public and off-the-record fi+a+u_
CURRENT AGRICULTURAL POLICY-- Certainly the present Secretary of Agricul-
S4PEECH DELIVERED BY SENATOR tore is no stranger to controversy. in fact,
SPERSON if we look back. over the past several decades
one gets the impression that this is an in-
Mr. SIMPSON. Mr. President, a evitable occupational hazard of being the
speech Mr. delivered by the distinguished Secretary of Agriculture. As one astute poll-
junior Senator from Kansas [Mr. PEAR- mysteries which esr once stated: surroouu "Among the many
HON] to the natinna.l hrand ~,,,,,,o?+a.,. mysnd the government of
h
ld
o
o-_e r
want to be Secretary Lyon
describes the actions of the administra tion was trying to blame the inflation
- of Agriculture." Indeed, the very mention of farm prices. And the picture that emerged
t:on which have generated the current the name of Charles Brannon, Truman's Sea- from the various actions-such as the cattle-
agricultural political discontent. retary of Agriculture still generates heated hide- embargo, the dumping of corn and so
The speech explores why the admire- debate in many circles. forth was that the Administration was ac-
istration took these actions, what the Po- The trials and tribulations of Ezra Taft tively pushing a policy of attempting to
1]ticai consequences may be, and finally Benson were endless and harrowing. But I freeze or roll back farm prices.
suppose that if Benson proved nothing else The Administration got so carried away
attempts to evaluate not only where we he, at least, demonstrated an enormous ca- with this whole food-price inflation pro-
are, but also where we are going in Amer- pacity for sticking it out under intense poli- gram that President Johnson claimed that
loan agriculture. tical pressures.
he had instructed Mrs. Johnson to purchase
Mr. President, I ask unanimous con- Orville Freeman entered the office under a cheaper cuts of beef and expressed the hope
sent that this speech be printed at this cloud of doubt due to the fact that he was that housewives across the country would do
almost totally lacking in agricultural exper- the same.
fence. However, it is to Mr. Freeman's credit All this was finally capped off when Secre-
There being no objection, the speech that during his first year In office he helped tarp Freeman was reported as having ex-
was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, to improve the image of agriculture which pressed pleasure over the recent downturn in
as follows: had become somewhat tarnished in the minds farm prices and as having predicted with
Si,EEcn DELIVERED BY SENATOR JAMES B. PEAR- of the urban public and particularly the big considerable satisfaction that future de-
SON TO THE NATIONAL BRAND (ES B. PEAR- city press. Freeman launched a successful creases would be forthcoming.
JULY 16, E68 public'
ublic relations effort which stressed the Well, I don't have to tell you that farm
great successes and achievements of agricul- prices have not been a significant factor in
These comments are Laing to be critical of ture rather than its failures and problems. the current inflation. The error of the Ad-
the Administration, of the agricultural policy He first began to get in real political hot ministration's policy on the inflation's cause
of President Johnson and Secretary Freeman. water with his proposals for stringent and plus the fact that It was exercising price
Yet this is not to say that this shall be a mandatory controls which he indicated he control without legal authority-and-was in
partisan political speech. I emphasize that would, like to ultimately see extended fact manipulating existing laws to accom-
No. 159-4
Approved For Release 2005/06/29 : CIA-RDP67B00446R000400110008-8
 In essential respects it is the Johnson Ad-
ministration that is isolationist. Its oP-
ponents would favor a constructive foreign
policy. Their opposition is to a policy of
aggression that has alienated allies and hard-
ened the resolution of opponents-policy
that, in the view of such an experienced ob-
server as U Thant, carries within it the ful-
minate of a third World War.
Mr. Johnson and his aides give lip service
to the United Nations while undercutting it
at every turn. This is de facto isola-
tionism-the sacrifice of international order
to domestic political advantage. The reason
U Thant is reluctant to accept another term
as Secretary-General is the ambivalence
which President Johnson, Secretary Rusk
and Ambassador Goldberg have exhibited
time and again in their relations with him.
Why should he remain in an office in which
he is powerless to restrain the continuing
American probing of supposed Soviet and
Chinese impotence to give significant aid to
North Vietnam and the National Liberation
Front? If it should turn out to be based
on a miscalculation, this experimentation
threatens to bring on a 'disastrous show-
down-disastrous because the circumstances
will permit neither a compromise between
the belligerents nor retreat of either from
hardened positions.
The headlines show the accelerating prog-
ress toward this kind of confrontation, as in
"Strategists. See Need in Vietnam for 600,000
GIs" (The 'New York Times, August 29), and
in the same issue "Moscow Training Fliers for
Hanoi." The correspondent reports on ar-
ticles in three leading Soviet newspapers,
stating that at least one detachment of Viet-
namese pilots have completed a combat fly-
ing course under the direction of "Soviet
battle veterans" and have returned to North
Vietnam, while another group Is under in-
struction. Inexperienced Vietnamese pilots
in MIG-17s are not much of a menace to
American fliers, but now there are sugges-
tions that the Soviet Union may supply
MIG-21s or the "all-weather" MIG-23s.
Should the Vietnamese prove unequal to
the difficulties of their mission, rather than
allow a sister Communist state to be de-
stroyed the Russians may send their own
pilots into combat. According to Donald
Grant, the staff correspondent of the St.
Louis Post-.Dispatch at the UN, U Thant was
told in Moscow recently that Russian pilots
would be sent to fly MIG-21s in Vietnam,
and Russian crews would man the Russian-
built surface-to-air missile sites which, by
whomever manned heretofore, have made a
dismal showing against U.S. aircraft. Thant
is said to have repeated this to Under Sec-
retary of State George Ball and Sen. ROBERT
F. KENNEDY, and presumably Secretary Rusk
has been Informed. But, Grant writes, UN
diplomats "see no signs that Thant's view
will have any real impact on U.S. policy."
A familiar story.
Suppose, however, that the worst does
not come to the worst, and a lethal con-
frontation between the two great powers is
providentially avoided. This would not in-
could discharge effectively, such as deter-
rence of nuclear war and economic assist-
ance to countries politically and industrially
qualified. That kind of internationalism the
critics of the Administration could and
would support. It is Johnson's ventures
abroad in search of monsters to destroy that
the critics condemn and that Johnson him-
self, were he to reflect, could see leading
SARATOGA PERFORMING ARTS
CENTER IN NEW YORK STATE-A
SUMMER CULTURAL ATTRACTION
Mr. KENNEDY of New York. Mr.
President, I would like to call attention
to the conclusion of a successful first
season of the Saratoga Performing Arts
Center.
During this season more than 85,000
people visited Saratoga Springs to attend
21 performances of the New York City
Ballet. An additional 83,000 visitors at-
tended the 14 concerts of the Philadel-
phia Symphony Orchestra. These at-
tendance figures reflect the enthusiastic
public response to the programs offered
by the Center.
In commenting on the quality of the
programs at the Center, Mr. Paul Hume
remarked in the Washington Post of
July 31:
The happy fact is that a superlative com-
bination of excellences has come together at
Saratoga ... one of the world's greatest ballet
companies and one of the world's finest sym-
phony orchestras ... At a single stroke the
Saratoga Performing Arts Center has placed
Saratoga in the very top circle of summer
music centers.
The Saratoga Performing Arts Center
provides a unique setting for the per-
formance of these programs. The am-
phitheater at the center was designed
and engineered with Imagination and
competence by Architect John MacFay-
den and acoustical consultant Paul Vene-
klasen. It seats 5,100 and Is placed in a
graceful natural locale which permits the
seating of almost 2,000 more on the sur-
rounding lawn.
Hotel, dining, and other refreshment
facilities are within walking distance, at
the nearby Gideon Putnam State Reser-
vation.
The arts center adds a new dimension
to .the many attractions of Saratoga
Springs, the renowned racetrack, the
National Racing Museum, the spas, the
Yaddo Gardens, swimming pools, and a
series of golf courses for every player.
The center's performances make a visit
to Saratoga that much more enjoyable.
The Saratoga area is also interesting
from a historical standpoint. Nearly
22187
of this historic area. I look forward to
its growth as a national summer cultural
center. I call the center to the atten-
tion of my colleagues as one of the new
attractions that makes upstate New
York an outstanding place to visit and
enjoy.
POWER PROJECT
Mrs. SMITH. Mr. President, because
of the very considerable opposition in
the House of Representatives to the
Dickey-Lincoln School Power Project-
because the House Appropriations Com-
mittee has cut the President's proposed
budget on the item by one-third from the
requested $1,200,000 for fiscal year 1968-
because the House Appropriations Com-
mittee placed a delaying restriction
even on these reduced funds by impos-
ing the restriction and condition of an-
other study on this project-and because
the House will vote on this project to-
morrow, I deem it appropriate and ur-
gent to place before the Congress the
high points of the testimony given to-
day by the Army Engineers before the.
Senate Appropriations Subcommittee on
Public Works this morning.
These very pertinent points were made
in the statement of General Leber and in
answer to questions asked by myself and
the chairman of the subcommittee, the
senior Senator from Louisiana. Army
Engineers witnesses testified that:
First. There was no need for further
study and investigation of the project
for it had been studied several times,
citing studies in 1953, 1956, 1959, 1963,
and 1965;
Second. That these studies had clearly
established that the project met all three
tests of comparability, financial feasibil-
ity, and favorable benefit-cost ratio;
Third. That the benefit-cost ratio was
a very favorable 1.9-to-1 ratio-in other
words, annually the benefits will be twice
as great as the cost of the project;
Fourth. That the Army Engineers had
a capability of $2 million of work on the
project in fiscal 1967 even though the
President had asked for only $1,200,000
and the House Appropriations Commit-
tee had cut the amount down to only
$800,000;
Fifth. That the action of the House
Appropriations Committee would delay
the. action program on the project on
the project by at least 1 year; and
Sixth. That the status of the treaty
negotiations was that while all the
details had been worked out, the treaty
had not yet been ratified because of
change in personnel handling the treaty,
but was about to be ratified.
validate the predictions of a war lasting a is the Saratoga battlefield and museum
decade or longer which have been coming where the tide of the Revolutionary War
from both sides. Ten years? One can hardly was turned by the defeat of Gen. John
In-
conceive of Johnson's predatory brand of in- Burgoyne, who was attempting to cap-
ternationalism williw win a for even speedy half
victory- that ture the capital at Albany and cut the
period. Either it t will
a happy ending which few competent ob- colonies in two. Saratoga lay along the
servers expect-or he may have difficulty "road to empire"-the Hudson River-
convincing a majority of the voters in 1968, Champlain waterway. Along this route
a fact of which Mr. Johnson is keenly aware. the French, British, Indians and Colon-
Alastair Buchan's comments on the John- ists warred for nearly 100 years to settle
son gamble in the London Observer are the destiny of the continent, and their
worth noting in this connection. Precisely fortresses and battlegrounds may still be
because' our commitments are so far-flung seen today.
(and, to date, so unsuccessful) while do- I join my fellow citizens of New York
mastic difficulties continue to mount,
Buchan sees a coning reversion to those In- in saluting the Saratoga Performing Arts
terational obligations that the United States Center. It reflects the vigor and vitality
PROTESTANT CLERGYMEN OPPOSE
ADMISSION OF RED CHINA TO U.N.
Mr. DODD. Mr. President, an adver-
tisement appeared in yesterday's New
York Times and Washington Post carry-
ing the results of a nationwide poll of
Protestant ministers concerning the
question of admission of Communist
China to the United Nations.
This poll and the story behind it is of
significant interest, and I wish to briefly
Approved For Release 2005/06/29 CIA-RDP67B00446R000400110008-8
 Approved For Release 2005/06/29 : CIA-RDP67B00446R00040011000'8-8 ""
22188 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD,--'SENATE September 20, 1966
discuss the reason for this poll, and the There being no objection, the material ing the United Nations; 2.9% were in favor,
nature of its conclusions. was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, the balance did not reply; 71.4% were op-
On 'F'ebruary 22, 1966, the General as follows: posed to diplomatic recognition of the Pei-
Board of the National Council of [Press release from the Clergymen's regime; 25.8% were in favor, the bal-
enc gymen's Emer- ante did not reply. This great reaffirmation
Churches adopted a resolution calling for gency Committee chairman; on China, Re Daniel A. of support of present United States policy
the admission of Communist China to Poling, toward Communist China was made in site
the United Nations and granting of U.S. executive secretary) p
of the tremendous and continuing cam-
diplomatic recognition to the Chinese NATIONWIDE POLL OF PROTESTANT CLERGYMEN paigns advocating appeasement of Red China
Communist regime. These resolutions INDICATES 71.4% OPPOSED TO U.N. ADMIS- which have been leveled at American clergy-
were adopted by a nearly unanimous SION OF RED CHINA OR U.S. RECOGNITION men.
OF I EIPING-NATIONAL PROTESTANT CLERGY- "The results of this poll should set the
vote. MEN'S COMMITTEE ON CHINA ORGANIZED record straight. Those church bodies or of-
As a result of these resolutions and NEW Yoax, N.Y., August 31, 1966.-Rev- ficials who make take a differing point of
other statements by individual church- erend Daniel A. Poling, Chaplain of the inter- view have every right to do so. However,
men, the impression has been created faith memorial Chapel of the Four Chaplains it is now clear that they speak only for them-
that the majority of American clergy- and Chairman of the Board of Christian selves and not for the Protestant com-
men support both Communist China's Herald magazine, today announced the re- munity."
suits of a nationwide poll which indicated Dr. Poling went on to announce the orga-
admission to the United Nations and its that 71.4% of American Protestant clergy- nization of the Clergymen's Emergency
recognition by the United States. De- men polled were opposed to the admission of Committee on China by saying: "Well-
nominations belonging to the National Red China to the U.N. or American diplo- financed and well-publicized pressures for
Council of Churches have a total of more nlatic recognition of Peiping. The same poll appeasement of Red China still continue.
than 40 million members. Despite any showed that 93.7% of American.. Protestant It is therefore vital that clergymen be kept
disclaimers, the political impact of such clergymen were opposed to the ". . . expulsion informed of the true facts-without illusion
resolutions is to encourage the Impres- of the Republic of China from the U.N. In or wishful thinking-so that the will of the
sion that these sentiments are held b Order to satisfy Communist Chinese condi- majority will not be overcome by a small
the great majority sentiments
Protestant church tions for joining." minority through default. For this reason,
Dr. Poling also announced the formation the ad hoc Clergymen's Emergency Commit-
members and clergymen. of the Clergymen's Emergency Committee on tee on China has been formed-to provide
As the advertisement in yesterday's China to ". . ., provide factual information factual information and material on Red
New York Times points out, the 30,000 and material on Red China to American China to American clergymen and, whenever
replies to a nationwide poll of protestant clergymen and, whenever necessary, to artic- necessary, to articulate the sentiments of the
clergymen demonstrates that-Contrary ulate the sentiments of the majority on the majority on the questions of concern.
to the impression conveyed by the Na- question of concern." "We call on clergymen of all faiths to join
In his statement announcing the results with us in this emergency movement. We
tional Council of Churches resolution- of the poll, Dr. Poling said: "On February call on the American people of all faiths
the overwhelming majority of Protestant 22, 1966, the General Board of the National to support this movement. We have a trans-
ministers oppose the admission of Red Council of Churches, meeting in at. Louis, cendent moral and spiritual responsibility:
China to the U.N. adopted a resolution calling for the admis- to the young Americans who are daily giving
The poll was conducted by the Rever- sion of Communist China to the United Na- their lives in Vietnam in the struggle for
tions and the granting of United States freedom against a ruthless Communist en-
end Daniel A. Poling, Chaplain of the In- diplomatic recognition of the Peiping regime. emy; to the enslaved Chinese people who
terfaith Memorial Chapel of the Four "This widely-publicized resolution-and have no place to look for hope but to us;
Chaplains in Philadelphia, and chairman similar statements from some other church to the hundreds of millions more who live
of the board of Christian Herald maga- bodies--leas caused dismay in nations in Communist darkness throughout the
zine. The results indicated that 71.4 throughout the world who stand in firm world; and to the basic security and safety
percent of American Protestant clergy- opposition against Communist aggression of our beloved country."
men polled were opposed to the admis- and enslavement and who look to the The Reverend David C. Head has been
sion of Communist China to the United United States as the leader in this crucial appointed Executive Secretary of the new
Nations or American recognition of that world struggle. Particularly tragic Is the Committee which will have its national head-
effect on the morale of young Americans quarters at 342 Madison Avenue in New York
government. The same poll showed that battling Communism in Vietnam. If their City. Rev. Head served with the American
93.7 percent of American Protestant own churches and church leaders favor ac- Baptist Convention and was former pastor
clergymen were opposed to the "expul- commodation with totalitarian, atheistic and of the Grace Baptist Church in Brooklyn,
sion of the Republic of China from the predatory Communism, should they give New York. He was Vice President, Public
United Nations in order to satisfy Com- their lives in resisting it? Relations & Development of The King's Col-
munist Chinese conditions for joining." "In the belief that these resolutions and lege, Briarcliff Manor, New York and served
Commenting on what. these results statements do not represent the American as the Director of their National Freedom
mean, Dr. Poling stated: Protestant community-and that the great Education Center.
This reaffirmation of support of majority of Protestant clergymen are one For further information contact: Rev.
great pres- with their fellow Americans in opposing David C. Head, Telephone: [phone].
eat United States policy toward Communist steps which would Co any Because The New York Times gave a lead
China was made in spite of the tremendous fis help strengthen individual ul story position and almost a whole page to
and continuing campaigns advocating ap- American can na Protestant undertook 198 academic experts on China," Includin
peasement of Red China which have been testtanttc ant clergymen to o poll gymen on this his- g
tone question. a high school teacher, and an assistant leveled at American clergymen. The results fessor of library science, but gave gave only six
only six
of this poll should set the record straight. "A master list of Protestant clergymen inches to the following poll of 30,000 clergy-
Those church bodies or officials who may from every state of the Union was obtained men, we are paying for this space to bring
take a different point of view have every through the Dunhill International List Co. the story to the American public.
right to do so. However, it Is now clear that of New York City, and 65% of these were 71.4% of American Protestant Clergymen
they speak only for themselves and not for selected at random and mailed a form con- polled vote "No" to the admission of Com-
the Protestant community. taining three questions: are you in favor of munist China to the United Nations, to
the admission of Communist China to the United States diplomatic recognition of Pei-
Following the poll, a clergymen's United Nations at this time?; are you in ping.
Emergency Committee on China was favor of the expulsion of the Republic of 93.7% of American Protestant Clergymen
formed. The committee is backed by China from the United Nations in order to polled vote "No" to satisfying Red China's
Reverend Poling, Dr. Walter Judd, and satisfy Communist Chinese conditions for primary condition for joining the United
a number of other religious leaders, and joining?; are you in favor of the United Nations; the expulsion of the Republic of
it will combat the ideas concerning China States granting diplomatic recognition to China.
which has Communist China at this time? Nearly 30,- On February 22, 1966, the General Board of
Council of beChurches. en adopted by the National 000 clergymen mailed their completed i'orms the National Council of Churches, meeting
back to Philadelphia. The services of John in St. Louis, adopted a resolution calling for
I wish to share with my colleagues the Felix Associates in New York were employed the admission of Communist China to the
results of this poll, together with the to make an independent tabulation of the United Nations and the granting of United
text of an advertisement which is results. States diplomatic recognition to the Peiping
planned for use in a number of major "The `No's' were overwhelming. Of those regime.
newspapers. responding: 72.9% were opposed to the ad- This widely-publicized resolution-and
mission of Communist China to the United similar statements from other church
I request unanimous consent for the m Nations; 25.6% were in favor, the balance bodies-has caused dismay in nations
insertion of this material at this point did not reply; 93.7% were opposed to meet- throughout the world who stand in firm op-
in the RECORD. ing the basic Red Chinese condition for join- position against Communist aggression and
Approved For Release 2005/06/29 : CIA-RDP67B00446R000400110008-8
 ------ ---
22216 C
Our boys in Vietnam need boots, shoes, election mandate in 1964 against a wider Thee ns and months when we forget them.
There are times when dissenters give aid and
and footwear of all sorts. I hope that we war? If so, what are we to say of our comfort to the enemy and times when they
will not have to go scurrying around the fast spreading involvement since 1964? are acting in the greatest of our traditions.
world to buy this footwear from Japan, There are questions that have been We have been reassured about efforts to reach
Italy, and other nations. We ought to brilliantly considered by Mr. Richard a peaceful settlement when there is no plan
insure that this footwear will continue Goodwin, former White House assistant or program for settlement in existence. We numerical to be manufactured right here in the to Presidents Kennedy and Johnson in a are given endless statistics
which only masks wit fact that they
precision
United States of America. historic speech given at Washington's
I hope that we do not begin to bargain Statler Hotel, September 17. Mr. Good- are based on inadequate information, or
away, as I said before, the birthright of win, now associated with Wesleyan Uni- guesses, or even wishful thinking. For exam-
ple, if we take the numbers of enemy we are
the American worker so that he will versity, and the author of a highly dis- supposed to be killing, add to that the defec-
wake up and find that there is no job for cussed book on Vietnam, "Triumph or tors, along with a number of wounded much
him in our factories manufacturing Tragedy," is one of the Nation's most less than our
are wiping out oundedy killed,
peacetime goods rather than bullets and brilliant young men. we North Vietnamese force every virtually t. en-
atomic bombs. His words are well worth considering.
truly makes their continued resistanceone of
Mr. President, I suggest the absence of He has now called Americans of every the marvels of the world. Unless the figures
a quorum. persuasion to unite on the rile proposition we are wrong, which of course they are. We are
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The accepted 2 years ago: "We seek no wider told the bombing is terribly costly to North
clerk will call the roll. war." He advocates a national commit- Vietnam. Yet the Increase in Soviet and
The legislative clerk proceeded to call tee of citizens opposed to any further Chinese aid, since the bombing, is far greater,
the roll. escalation of the war. In describing the in economic terms, than the loss through
Mr. HRUSKA. Mr. President, I ask purposes of such a committee, he said: bombing. Except in human life, the North
Vietnamese are showing a profit * * ?.
unanimous consent that the order for the It will not be aimed at withdrawal or even et predicted h almost every disengaged
quorum call be rescinded. a lessening of the war in the South; although expert, from General al Ridgway t George
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without individuals who oppose escalation may also Kennan; and as taught by the whole history
objection, it is so ordered. hold those views. Thus it will be open to all of aerial warfare, that bombing has neither
groups who oppose escalation in the North brought the enemy to his knees or to the
ON regardless of their position on other issues, council table. It has not destroyed his ca-
NO WIDER WAR and will be open to the millions of Americans pacity to make war, or seriously slowed down
who belong to no group but who share this either infiltration or the flow of supplies. At
Mr. McGOVERN. Mr. President, for basic belief and apprehension. Such a com- each step it was claimed the bombing would
many months some of us in the Senate mittee can provide a constant flow of objec- make a decisive difference. Yet it has made
have expressed concern over the deepen- tive information about Vietnam. It can keep hardly any difference at all. In fact, the
vigil over official statements and ask the hard tempo of conflict has increased.
The official statements justifying the
ing the Vietnam war of American of forces at questions which might help separate wishful
the Vietnam war. The expression of that thinking from facts. It will neither be Hanoi-Haiphong raids bore partial witness
concern has veep varied, unorganized, against the Administration nor for it, neither to the futility of bombing. We were told the
and sporadic. At times it has been timid with any political party or opposed to it, raids were necessary because infiltration had
and faltering. But it has for the most neither liberal nor conservative. Its sole increased enormously; an official admission
part represented the thoughtful ques- aim will be to mobilize and inform the Amer- of the fallute of one of the most intensive
tions and doubts of Americans deeply ican people in order to increase the invisible bombing campaigns in world history. Despite
troubled by our Vietnam policy. weight of what I believe to be the American thousands upon thousands of raid more men
I believe that history will vindicate majority in the deliberations and inner coun- and supplies are flowing South and the
cils of government. Its purpose is to help routes of infiltration have been widened and
those who have warned against the the President and others in government by improved. Despite the bombing, or perhaps
course our Government is following in providing a counter pressure against those because of it, all signs indicate the North
southeast Asia-especially since early who urge a more militant course; a pressure Vietnamese will to fight has stiffened and
1965. Even in a great democracy such for which those in government should be the possibilities of negotiation have dimmed.
as ours, however, dissent is difficult and grateful since it will help them pursue the Despite the bombing, or because of it, North
sometimes ineffective in competing with course of wise restraint. Vietnam has become increasingly dependent
the din of battle and the avalanche of Mr. Goodwin's proposal for the forma- upon Russia and China. Despite the bomb-
official pronouncements. tion of a national committee opposed to ing, or because of it there has been a vastly
increased supply of aid to North Vietnam
In 1964 the American people over- any further widening of American null- by Russia and China and a deepening world
whelmingly 'endorsed the position of tart' operations against North Vietnam communist commitment to this war.
President Johnson who said: "We seek would seem to make sense. I hope such In short the bombing has been a failure,
no wider war." Those who called for the a committee will be established. Those and may turn out to be a disaster.
bombing of North Vietnam, aerial inter- of us who question the wisdom of the war Fourth. To those who are afraid of
diction of the jungle trails, defoliation, in the South have all the more reason to dissent and courageous criticism
and a sharp U.S. troop buildup were oppose its escalation in the North. honest in time df war last it give noouragtment
rejected as irresponsible and trigger These are some of the observations ad- in the enemy, leMr. st Goodwin ive a courage:
happy. vaned by Mr. Goodwin: Of Gene the enemy glad answe
see our
But for the past 2 years, we have been First. He believes that the Vietnamese disiou But our concern is with see our . Am
widening the war in virtually every con- war is "the most dangerous conflict since not Hanoi. Our concern is with those mil-
ceivable manner. Our bombing planes the end of World War II." lions of our own people, and with future
are now hitting daily in both North and Second. He believes that our fast- generations, who will themselves be glad to
South Vietnam with a force equal to our spreading commitment in Vietnam "has see that there were men who struggled to
World War II bombardment of Germany reduced discussions about domestic prevent needless devastation and thus added
and Japan. We have 400,000 men in America to academic discourse," and to the strength and the glory of the United
southeast Asia and that number is grow- States.
"has swallowed up the New Frontier and
ing. the Great Society" while "eroding our It is in that American tradition that
Where are we heading in Vietnam? position throughout the world." Mr. Goodwin speaks as have earlier war-
Has the bombing worked? Are we mov- Third. He believes that "there has time dissenters including Abraham Lin-
ing toward an endless war in Asia involv- never been such intense and widespread coin who could not remain silent when
ing eventually the Chinese and the Rus- deception and confusion as that which his conscience told him that the cam-
sians? Have we been given all the facts surrounds this war." paign against Mexico was wrong.
about the nature of our commitment and The continual downpour of contradiction, I hope that every Member of Congress,
the alleged efforts to reach a settlement misstatements, and kaleidoscopically shifting every Government official and many
with the other side? What is the sir- attitudes has been so torrential that it has American citizens will read Mr. Good-
nificance of reports this weekend that almost numbed the capacity to separate win's thoughtful analysis of where we are
American forces are now engaged in a truth from conjecture or falsehood. At one heading in the Vietnam war.
combat role in Thailand? Does this time we are told that there is no military
that his
mean we are typ setting the stage for an- There are months when we talk abouteneours. I ask unanimous consent go- address be printed at this point:
other Vietnam--type war? Was there an an
Approved For Release 2005/06/29 : CIA-RDP67B00446R000400110008-8
 September ;26~~I966 v~ `yCONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE wv vvvv v 22215
circumstances this is not the time to con- ous concern to me and to the State of Rhode American manufacturers. It is simply be-
sider such a drastic change in the method Island. The purpose of. this hearing is to cause of the high standard of living we have
of assessing duty on rubber footwear. determine the probable effects of a proposed acquired in this country. The basis of that
Now the Commission is considering change in the method of assessing import high standard is our high wage level. Rub-
also whether or not rubber footwear duty on rubber footwear, and of a further ber footwear requires a greater ratio of labor
reduction in the rate of duty on such foot- in production than most industries. Wages
.should be included in the Geneva tariff wear. The first part of your inquiry involves represent between 45 and 50 per cent of mill
negotiations. I do not believe that the the elimination of the American Selling Price door costs in the United States. A high ratio
industry is in a position where it can method of assessing duty on imported rub- of labor is needed also to make competitive
withstand any further reduction in du- ber-soled fabric footwear and the substitu- rubber footwear abroad. But the big differ-
tie~ on competitive imports.
tion of a straight 58 percent ad valorem rate. ence is in what we pay labor in this country
Foreign manufacturers have already The second phase is directed to a determina- and what they pay in foreign countries.
Captured a mane acture share have the do- tiori of whether or not this type of footwear It is essential that we preserve our high
should be put on the GATT bargaining table standard of living. It is essential that we
mestic market. Our finericali industry where it would be subject to a duty cut of up protect the jobs of American workers. Under
has long lost its export market. We can to 50 percent, pursuant to the provisions of the present import duties on rubber foot-
no longer compete abroad-not because the Trade Expansion Act of 1962. wear, the impact of imports has been severe.
of any lack of enterprise on the part of I appreciate this opportunity to submit to One manufacturer of rubber footwear in my
American manufacturers but simply be- you my views on these points, and to explain State has closed its doors-the Goodyear
cause of American labor's high standard my deep interest in your investigation. We Footwear Corporation. There have been
of se have in my State two of the major xnanufac- losses of jobs in other companies. Details
living. turers of rubber footwear, Bristol Manufac- on this were iven to
The basis of this high standard of liv- g your Commission by
ing, of course, is our high wage level. beriCompany. toThe latter has plants in both rubber fotwartmanufacturersnat the hear-
Rubber footwear requires a greater ratio Providence and Woonsocket. Its rubber foot- ings you held June 8 on your proposed con-
of labor in production than most in- wear producing facilities are located in version from the American Selling Price.
dustries. Wages represent between 45 Woonsocket. With the difficulties the American rubber
and 50 percent of the cost of production These companies are vital to the Rhode footwear industry has been having with ex-
Of rubber footwear percent of iri the Unlted Mates. Island economy. In both Bristol and Woon- panding imports for the past decade, it hard-
It is true that a hint ratio to labor s. socket, they are the largest employers and ly seems necessary to comment on a proposal
the largest taxpayers. It seems to me that to subject the industry to further reductions
needed overseas to produce rubber foot- it is important to keep in mind during your in its tariff protection.
wear but the big difference is in the way deliberations whether or not the rubber foot- But for the record, let me say that this
we pay labor in this country. wear industry and the general economy industry needs more-not less--tariff pro-
I believe that it is essential that we would be adversely affected by either of the tection. I urge you to recommend that rub-
preserve our high standard of living. We two proposed changes in tariff treatment on ber footwear not be considered for any fur-
must protect the jobs of our American imported rubber footwear. ther tariff reductions at the GATT confer-
workers. Under the present import du- Through a provision of the Tariff Act of ences.
1930, the ties on rubber footwear the impact of assessing duty IwasnapSelling plied to Price
imported method
rub- Mr. PELL. Mr. President, will the
imports has been immense. ber footwear in 1933. This action followed Senator yield?
We have already lost one manufacturer an investigation by your Commission into Mr. PASTORE. I yield.
in Rhode Island-the Goodyear Footwear the costs of production in this industry as Mr. PELL. Mr. President, I congratu-
Coxp.-and there have been losses of jobs well as in the exporting countries. It was late and commend my senior colleague is Co in other companies. The details have time that the differentia sm e nd ocats of that on his leadership-just as he has already
been provided to the Tariff Commission duction, chiefly labor costs, were so wide that displayed it with respect to the question
by spokesmen for the labor unions. a duty increase to the fullest extent then of textile imports-in seeking to stem the
We have only to scan the witness list permitted under the law, 50 per cent, would flood of foreign footwear, which can, un-
at the Tariff Commission hearings to not be adequate to allow the American manu- less braked, wash out two of the most
understand the problem. Representa- facturers to compete on a fair basis in their important companies in our State of
tives of the American footwear industry home market with products from abroad. Rhode Island.
and American labor testified as did rep- Those costs of production and wage differ- Mr. PASTORE. Mr. President, I wish
resentatives of their foreign competition. and entials
the produce se nnthe 1 adingue: port ng to say we are developing a certain ra-
Let us this once resolve the question countries are as great today--possibly great- tionale in this Country that some of our
in favor of the American worker. er--than they were at the time of this Com- American industry is dispensable. And
I hope that the Tariff Commission and mission's investigation. Under these condi- some of our foreign friends ought to
Governor Herter, and all those responsi- tions, there appears to be no justification for know better, but that is the argument
ble for making the decision, will consider revoking the policy you recommended more that they make. We have to understand
very long and very deeply the interests than 30 years ago. that, bit by bit, they are chewing away at
of our American workers. There is no I am greatly concerned that in the pro- our American economy.
man, in my opinion, who should under- to an. posed ad valorem conversion
of from 58 per cent, American the doSellingmeessttic c It is true that we are the most affluent
stand this problem better than Governor manufacturers may lose some of the protec- society in the world. It is true that we
Herter, who used to be the Governor of tion Congress meant for them to have. The probably have the largest gross national
the State of Massachusetts. I would manufacturers feel they will. They are not product of any country in the world.
hope that in our desire and our intent to satisfied that in its study of this matter the But the fact still remains that we have
obtain an agreement with GATT, we do Commission took the proper base, or a broad our share of poverty. We have our share
not bargain away the birthright of the enough base, in averaging the applicable of unemployment, although we have the
American worker. Further, d largest employment rate today the proposed rate was based on in the
I urge the Tariff Commission and Gov- new procedures of the Treasury Department, history of the country.
ernor Herter to retain the American sell- which, by the Department's admission, have But we must take into account that
Ing price method of valuation and to re- resulted in a reduction of 35 per cent in the we are fighting a war in Vietnam, and
move rubber footwear from any consid- effective duties collected. Congress has be- many of our workers are manufacturing
eration for further tariff reductions, fore it now several identical bills seeking to the implements of war while some of our
Mr. President, I submitted a statement reverse the Treasury action, With the at- friends all over the world are manufac-
to the Tariff Commission, and I ask mospnere so beclouded, it hardly is the time consider such a drastic turing refrigerators, televisions, and
unanimous consent that that statement method change in the radios-peacetime commodities.
be printed in the RECORD at this point, There is more clarity on the second ques- The time will come, and I hope that
as a part of my remarks. tion--whether rubber footwear could be ne- the time will come soon, when we have
There being no objection, the state- gotiated for tariff cuts in Geneva. peace in the world. At that time, our
ment was ordered to be printed in the This industry is in no position to with- workers will have to be engaged in the
RECORD, as follows: stand a further reduction in duties on com- manufacture of peacetime commodities.
ptitive imports.
ST;TEMENT OF SENATOR JOHN O. PASTORE, Importers already have taken over A. ,pie- We might wake up to find that some of
The American industry has long lost its ex- pearea.
1966 port niaxket and can no lon That
Mr. Chairman, your Commission under abroad. ____ _ in no sense due to ack .. stay. It is now happening to the foot-
nsider
anon today a matter which is of sera- ent
i
co
erpr
se or intelligence on the part of the wear industry.
Approved For Release 2005/06/29 : CIA-RDP67B00446R000400110008-8
 Approved For Release 2005/06/29 : CIA-RDP67B00446R000400110008-8
September 20, 1966 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE 22217
There being no objection, the address
was ordered to be printed in the RECORD,
as follows:
SPEECH BY RICHARD N. GOODWIN AT THE NA-
TIONAL BOARD MEETING OF AMERrCANB FOR
DEMOCRATIC ACTION, STATLER-HILTON HOTEL,
WASHINGTON, D.C., SEPTEMBER 17, 1966
This is a time when labels are unfashion-
able. Men hesitate to call themselves liberals
or conservatives or radicals, fearing the com-
plexity of their views will be swallowed up in
some formal catechism of belief. Yet groups
like this one are drawn together by a shared
body of beliefs and values, and by common
reactions to the sins and shortcomings of
their society. They differ on many particu-
lar issues; but they do agree on the wisdom
of a general direction and the urgency of
certain purposes. In this sense, even in non-
ideological America, there are radicals and
rightists, liberals and conservatives. In this
sense the Americans for Democratic Action
is the spearhead of American liberalism.
It can look back on a record of achieve-
ment unmatched in American political orga-
nization. It has elected dozens of members
to high office, many of its early programs are
now law, and its once theoretical notions are
the daily staple of bureaucracy.
It is easy to blunt, answer, and even ignore
the criticism of liberalism which is largely
a reflex action from past battles. The ease
of such refutation, however, should not be
permitted to obscure real defects. If there
is reason for doubt it is not that today's
liberals are too progressive, but that they are
often not progressive enough: not that they
are radical but that they are sometimes mired
in outworn outlooks and programs; not
that they are impractical but they have occa-
sionally let practical necessities override
faithfulness to ideals and values. We have
discovered the perverse principle that defeat
can breed strength while victory often erodes
will and creates intoxication with success.
Success is the disease of American society, a
disease which strikes impartially at business-
men, politicians, movie stars and intellectuals
alike,
It is especially virulent when it attacks the
politically concerned and passionate, making
them more anxious to enact bad programs
than fight for a good one, elect a mediocrity
than lose with distinction, support a sym-
pathetic office holder even when he is wrong,
simply because he is sympathetic. We do not
advocate a policy of defeatism or even
political suicide. We are politicians and the
object of politics Is the acquisition and use of
power. Pragmatism, the code word of today's
liberalism, is a useful tool to carry you for-
ward, remove obstacles, and solve problems.
But it does not tell you where to go. Beliefs
tell you. Values tell you. Common goals tell
you. Once that distinction is obscured it is
easy to forget where you are going and even
who you are.
Let me give a few tentative thoughts about
today's redefinition of liberal goals before
proceeding to the principal obstacle to all
those goals: the war in Vietnam.
Liberal thought in America has always
been a confederation of diverse beliefs. But
there have been certain, discernible, central
strands in the fabric of the past thirty years.
One is the once revolutionary idea that the
national government has a direct respon-
sibility for the welfare of the people: For
their well-being as individuals-older cit-
izens, poor or Negro-and for the general
health of the economy. Another is the belief
that private power Must be compelled to act
in the public interest, that through regula-
tion America must be made safe for capital-
ism.
Those were the subject of wonderful, pas-
sionate engagements, but they are largely
won, They have become the truisms of
American political life, although there are
No. 159-8
many important skirmishes to be fought and
the specter of Hooverism occasionally looms
over the horizon only to be brushed casually
away by a slightly surprised electorate.
It is this victory of important principle,
and the changes it has helped bring the na-
tion, which makes it necessary to rethink
most of the old political beliefs and slogans
as this organization, and others, have been
doing.
At one time to be a liberal meant to be
for federal action against states' rights.
Particularly in civil rights this is still a vital
question. Yet our major effort now is to
find new ways to help states and local gov-
ernment assume responsibilities and bur-
dens; and it was a Democratic liberal, not a
Republican conservative, who proposed to
turn over federal revenue to state govern-
ment.
At one time to be a liberal meant to auto-
matically favor the cause of labor over busi-
ness. Yet the Chamber of Commerce is more
willing to trade with China than the AFL-
CIO; unions are often more concerned with
protecting the established order than busi-
nessmen; and it was the liberals who helped
pass laws against racketeering in labor.
Even the most ardent liberal will prefer the
activities of Tom Watson of IBM to those of
Jimmy Hoffa.
At one time to be a liberal was to oppose
big business. Yet it was the Administration
of John Kennedy, not Eisenhower, that
proposed and passed measures for business
expansion to the benefit of all of us.
At one time to be a liberal was to fight for
the principle that collective action did not
diminish individual freedom. While we still
go through the motions, the battle is over,
for freedom has been enlarged as collective
action widened. Rather we are now increas-
ingly concerned about coercion from the
center.
These old battle cries are largely a victim
of success and of profound changes in Amer-
ican society. They were built on the as-
sumption that rising wealth fairly shared
was the key to the American dream. Of
course, that dream has not yet come true
for the chronically poor or the Negro. Still,
in terms of the old values, most Americans
have achieved greatly. They are well-fed,
live in decent houses, own television sets,
drive 94 million automobiles, and debate not
whether but where to take a vacation. Yet
even at the moment of victory for so many
we know that shared prosperity is not
enough. Modern man, with all his wealth
and comfort, is oppressed by forces which
menace and confine the quality of his life.
Increasingly American thinkers are dis-
covering, describing, and attacking these
forces. It is the responsibility of politics
to translate this emerging awareness Into
political action.
The ancient desire to stretch one's talents
to the limit of ability and desire now enters
a world whose instruments grow In complex-
ity, where understanding is more difficult as
the possibilities of all encompassing knowl-
edge disappear, and where leisure threatens
many with boredom and futility. It is not
enough to train -people, we must do so
through an educational system of a quality
and daring of innovation past all our old ob-
jectives.
Even with knowledge and understanding
at his command, however, man alone is not
man fulfilled. He must be sustained and
strengthened by the world around him, and
by those with whom he lives and works.
He will not find that strength in cities
scarred by slums, encircled by suburbs which
sprawl recklessly across the countryside;
where movement is dif cult, beauty rare, life
itself more impersonal and security imperiled
by the lawless.
And even beyond education and the de-
terioration of our environment modern
America assaults the deepest values of our
civilization, those worlds within a world
where each man can find meaning and dig-
nity and warmth: family and neighborhood,
community and the dignity of work.
Family ties grow weaker as the gap be-
tween the generations widens. The com-
munity disappears as the streets of our cities
rush in upon each other. Work, once the
principal support of self-respect, becomes
more and more mechanical, each man a re-
placeable componency in an abstract task.
Ahead lies the most terrible danger of all: a
nation of strangers; each separate from his
fellows, remote from his labors, detached
from participation in the great enterprise of
American life.
Underneath there is a single, overwhelm-
ing cause for the discontent which runs
like a dark thread through the silver fabric
of American life. It is cause and conse-
quence of all the rest. It is the fear of the
individual human being that he has become
meaningless in the great human enterprise.
Decisions of peace and war, life and death,
are made by a handful of men beyond his
reach. Cities and factories grow and spread
seemingly powered by a force beyond the
control of man.
Science describes our world, and life itself,
in terms far beyond the reach of ordinary
understanding. Computers and marvelous
machines seem to make man unnecessary in
the oldest stronghold of all, his work.
This is the motive power, the fueling force,
behind the new right and the new left.
They want to matter. And so do we all.
To glimpse the shortcomings of American
life, to feel the weight of dark and obscure
forces, even to illuminate with investiga-
tion and thought the wrongs of American
life, it is not enough for any group dedicated
to political action. That requires we trans-
late passion, engagement, and a sense of in-
justice into concrete action; as individual
groups, and through political institutions.
Many of the proposals which fill liberal jour-
nals and meeting chambers are little more
than logical extensions of old ideas and proc-
esses, The guaranteed annual wage, the or-
ganization of farm workers, national health
insurance, and many other ideas, can stand
on their own merits but they hardly repre-
sent a radical departure from our past. Most
of the causes which engage us deeply-from
civil rights to the war against poverty-flow
from the historic drive to open the blessings
of society to all people.
I do not pretend to have the answers or
a dramatic new approach but it seems to
me that certain guidelines are emerging
which may help show the way.
First, is to devote more of our resources
to common needs; from schools and play-
grounds to blighted cities and poisoned air.
History has proved that rising national
wealth does not resolve social problems.
Present experience proves that the old
method of handing out federal grants will
not rebuild a city or clean up pollution. The
problems of the city, for example, are not
simply problems of welfare or income. They
demand technical skill, a network of sub-
sidies and regulation, planning and engi-
neering. More and more we will, have to
turn problems over to technicians, equip
them with authority, and provide the funds
to do the job. People are far more con-
cerned with progress, with getting the job
done, than they are with the ideology of
change. The technician-politician-the man
who regardless of party can resolve complex
problems-is the man of the future.
Secondly, we will have to reshape the his-
toric relationships of our federal structure
so not to be completely dependent on Wash-
ington for comfort, help and skill. The
problems are far too huge and varied to be
solved from the top. Moreover, to attempt
It is to strip people in communities and
Approved For Release 2005/06/29 : CIA-RDP67B00446R000400110008-8
 22218
Approved For Release 2005/06/29 : CIA-RDP67B00446R000400110008-8
CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE September 20, 1966
states of the chance to share In the solution
of the great problems of society. It is essen-
tial to our spiritual health to develop struc-
tures which give people a chance to share
in the American enterprise. It is essential
to our national progress that we tap the
enormous resources of mind and energy which
lie unused, ignored and unwanted through-
out America.
This means decentralization of govern-
ment action; a decentralization which will
take many forms and whose evolution is a
challenge to our genius for political crea-
tion. Variety will be the hallmark of such
a system, but I believe the basic pattern will
be federal funds and guidelines with respon-
sibility for action left to the community.
For example, perhaps the best approach to
the problem of our cities can be drawn from
the theoretical patterns of foreign aid. The
federal government would require the city
to develop a master plan of development
embracing basic services, housing and all
the comppnents of community life; provid-
Ing federal funds on a large scale to carry
the plan forward. As another example I
have proposed turning a large part of the
foreign aid program over to the states, in-
volving communities and citizens directly
In our relationship with the underdeveloped
continents.
Even then individuals will have to fight
City Hall; but it is far easier than fighting
the White House.
We are worlds away from the old debate
about federal power and big government.
For underneath the rhetoric that was a de-
bate whether we should tackle social and
economic problems at all; or whether we
should leave them to the impersonal work-
ings of an unregulated society. Today de-
centralization assumes that many problems
will yield to directed human intelligence;
the question is how best to enlist the en-
ergies of Americans in that task. I have
no doubt that citizen participation is the
future direction of liberalism. It will per-
mit is to do a better job with our society.
It will allow our people to share the life
of the nation; to contribute, to work, to be
needed and to be heard. It is a key to sal-
vation from the separation and human frus-
tration which are a poisoning and unneces-
sary by-product of our civilization.
Thirdly, we who have often looked to
Washington for protection of human rights
must increase our guard against the coercive
society. It is the nature of power to resent
opposition to its exercise. That resentment
Is multiplied as power grows. When those
who have such power are also convinced of
the wisdom and beneficence of their views
that freedom is In. danger. The worst threat
to liberty comes not from those who simply
seek their own aggrandisement, but from
those who seek the good of others, identify-
Ing opposition to their desires with harm to
the nation. Already wiretapping, bugging,
and manifold invasions of privacy are grow-
Ing, I believe, far beyond the present knowl-
edge of any of us. There are laws in Con-
gress to give the Secretary of State arbitrary
power to limit the travel of Americans. It
has even been proposed that we draft all
Americans-not simply to meet an imme-
diate threat to our securiey-but as a matter
of course. All of these have In common the
frightening belief that individual action and
freedom should be limited for the good of
the state? according to some officeholders'
view of what that good requires. That is the
cause to enlist our energies, to bring us
shouting into the streets against any who
claim the right to tell us where to go, or
listen to our private conversations, or pre-
.scribe how we must serve our society. The
coercive society is no less obnoxious when
coercion is masked in benevolence.
These are tentative steps toward redefini-
tions of difficult and shifting goals; but they
are charged with a traditional faith in the
capacity to reshape our society more to the
needs of man.
There is, however, another Issue which
has reduced discussions about domestic
America to academic discourse, Which has
swallowed up the New Frontier and Great
Society, and which is eroding our position
throughout the world. That issue is, of
course, the war in Vietnam.
The Vietnamese war is, I believe, the
most dangerous conflict since the end of
World War II: more dangerous than Berlin
or even Korea. In those confrontations the
danger was clear and sensibly appraised.
The stakes were fairly obvious to both sides.
Objectives were carefully limited; and power
ultimately became the handmaiden of rea-
son and final accommodation. In Vietnam,
on the other hand, the dangers are con-
fused and unclear. Objectives are expressed
in vague generalities which open to endless
vistas. Moreover, from other cold war con-
frosttations there evolved a set of tacit un-
derstandings designed to limit conflict even
while it was being waged. That, for ex-
ample, Is the real meaning; of the no-
sanctuary policy carefully observed, we
should remember, by both sides. Today
those understandings are in grave danger of
being swept away, and with them our most
important protections against enlarging con-
flict.
The air is charged with rhetoric. We are
buried in statements and speeches about
negotiation and peace, the defense of free-
dom and the dangers of communism, the
desire to protect the helpless and com-
passion for the dying. Much of it is im-
portant and sincere and well-meaning. Some
is intended to deceive. Some is deliberate
lie and distortion. But the important thing
is not what we are saying, but what we are
doing; not what is being discussed, but
what, is happening.
And what is happening is not confusing
or unclear or contradictory at all. It is
not masked in obscurity or buried in secret
archives. It stands in clear, vivid and
towering relief against the landscape of con-
flict. The war is getting larger. Every
month there are more men in combat, more
bombs falling, greater expenditures, deeper
conunitments. It is the steady inexorable
course of this conflict since its beginning.
We have gone to the United Nations' and
the war has grown larger. We have offered
funds for development and talked of social
reform; and the war has grown larger. We
have predicted victory and called for com-
promise; and the war has grown larger.
There is therefore, little escape from the
conclusion that it will grow larger still.
Nor is this steady pattern the consequence
of inexorable historical forces. It flows from
the decisions of particular men in particular
places-in Washington and Hanoi, in Saigon
and in the jungle headquarters of the Viet-
cong. It is in part a product of communist
hope and drive for victory; but it is partly
our decision too. And we must suppose those
same decisions will continue to be made.
Nor is this, as we are sometimes told, be-
cause there is no alternative. There are
dozens of alternatives. There are enclave
programs, and programs to hold the centers
of population. There are suggestions that
we rely on pacification of the countryside
rather than the destruction of the Vietcong.
There are proposals to limit the bombing or
to end it. There are proposals for negotia-
tions, complete with all the specifics of pos-
sible agreement. The fact is the air is full
of alternatives. They have simply been re-
jected in favor of another course; the present
course. And we must also suppose they will
continue to be rejected.
All prophecy is an exercise in probability.
With that caution let us try to strip the
argument of its necessary passion and discuss
the probabilities which are compelled by the
awesome logic of the course of events in
Vietnam. Passion is important; it lies at the
root of war and of hatred of war. Nor do I
lack personal feeling; for only the strongest
of feelings could impel me to discuss a sub-
ject with which I was so recently connected
in so intimate a way. Yet we can perhaps
now meet more productively on the common
ground of reason. Rarely has there been
greater need for such unity among men of
good will.
In other places I have set forth my personal
views on the conduct of the war in South
Vietnam: The belief that we have an im-
portant stake in Southeast Asia, and that we
must continue the battle in the South-al-
though differently than we are now doing-
until a political settlement is reached. And
I have, like many others, discussed alterna-
tive routes to these objectives. Today, how-
ever, I would like to talk about the lengthen-
ing shadow of the war in the North; for in
that war are the swiftly germinating seeds
of the most grave danger.
In this, as in so many aspects of the war,
much of the information which feeds judg-
ment is deeply obscured. Of course, in times
of armed conflict facts are often elusive and
much information, of necessity, cannot be
revealed. By Its nature war is hostile to
truth. Yet with full allowance for neces-
sary uncertainties I believe there has never
been such intense and widespread deception
and confusion as that which surrounds this
war. The continual downpour of contradic-
tion, misstatements, and kaleidoscopically
shifting attitudes has been so torrential that
it has almost numbed the capacity to sep-
arate truth from conjecture or falsehood.
At one time we are told there is no mili-
tary solution, and then that victory can be
ours.
There are months when we talk about ne-
gotiations and months when we forget them.
There are times when dissenters give aid
and comfort to the enemy and times when
they are acting in the greatest of our tradi-
tions.
We have been reassured about efforts to
reach a peaceful settlement when there is no
plan or program for settlement in existence.
We are given endless statistics with a nu-
merical precision which only masks the fact
they are based on inadequate information,
or guesses, or even wishful thinking. For
example, if we take the numbers of enemy
we are supposed to be killing, add to that
the defectors, along with a number of
wounded much less than our own ratio of
wounded to killed, we find we are wiping out
virtually the entire North Vietnamese force
every year. This truly makes their con-
tinued resistance one of the marvels of the
world. Unless the figures are wrong, which
of course they are.
We are told the bombing is terribly costly
to North Vietnam. Yet the Increase in So-
viet and Chinese aid, since the bombing, is
far greater, in economic terms, than the loss
through bombing. Except in human life,
the North Vietnamese are showing a profit.
At the time of the Hanoi-Haiphong bomb-
ings last June we were told that in the first
six months of 1968 enemy truck movement
had doubled, the infiltration of supplies was
up 150%, and infiltrated personnel increased
120%. However, the fact is we do not know,
except in the most vague and general way,
how much supplies are being brought in or
how many men. They move at night, some-
times on trails we have not yet discovered,
and the best intelligence gives only the most
vague picture. We could not only be wrong,
but enormously wrong. The swiftness with
which we change our estimates helps show
that seeming exactness conceals large uncer-
tainties.
The statements which followed the Hanoi-
Haiphong bombings are an illuminating ex-
ample of this process in action.
It was said the raids would destroy a large
proportion of North Vietnam's fuel capacity
and this would help paralyze--or at least
Approved For Release 2005/06/29 : CIA-RDP67B00446R000400110008-8
 September 20, 1966 CONGPESSIONAL KE("KL) -,5 rXlz ----
slow down-the process of infiltration. Yet per such capacity rests on the entire sociiet t at only believe
b neflcentsanthe d un erwe are ain fortu e , power these raids had been anticipated, alternative and ntsa cities whole themciety; se themselves must factories,
be brought can bar the way. This is not a belief born
have P of personal fear. After all, we, or most of
techniques of providing fuel had been
veloped, and the raids were destined to have tumbling down. us, will continue to work and prosper, hold
little
little if any effect on the North Vietnamese All of this is possible despite the fact that meetings and make speeches, unless all of
capacity to make war. And this was clear each future escalation will probably have the our civilization is swallowed up. Even then
at the time we bombed. effect of oprevious escalations. it
wider war, lessen the chances enough will survive for the race to evolve
We were told, in an inside story in the the dangers and perhaps create something finer. It Is'
New York Times, that the bombings would of a negotiated settlement, drain away effort and
prove to Hanoi it could not count on its which should be concentrated in the South, rather anal sus a , belief always be born tter of a able fallible reason describe our
allies. The fact is that aid was stepped up further alienate our allies, and have little atu ysis that s bet our action which seeks
as we anticipated it would be. damaging effect on the enemy's ability or in the acts of our past and the attitudes
Within a few days a high official said fresh will to fight. of our present a guide for our future.
intelligence showed that Hanoi was now We are sometimes asked what else we can I do not wish however, to come with a
plunged in gloom, weary of war, and suffused do. I believe there are other things to do. counsel of despair. The surest guarantee of
with a sense of hopelessness, presumably at The war can be fought more effectively in the misfortune is resignation. Therefore, we
least in part as a result of the raids. Yet, South. The search for a settlement can be make what effort we can. There
there was no substantial intelligence of this given greater direction and brilliance. We m meust enormous all differences among the critics
kind. We have heard little about it since, can prepare ourselves, if necessary, to accept of the war. There are those who believe we
And recent information indicates that the a long ground war of attrition leading ulti- have no interest in Vietnam or even in all of
opposite was the case-the enemy's will was mately to a political settlement. But that is have There are those who wish us to with-
strengthened. not the question. If the bombing cannot win draw. There are fierce debates over the
The truth is that this major and spectacu- the war, if it does not work; and above all if hof the war, the nature of its partic-
lar escalation in the war had had little it carries tremendous political and military history st the goals of our enemies. There are ipants, measurable effect on the enemy's capacity risks, then it should not be increased, either those, like myself, who believe we should
or morale, and most of those who looked out of frustration with the war or with the carry on the war in the South while intensi-
at the matter seriously in advance of the polls. fying, modifying and sharpening the search
bombing knew it would probably be ineffec- For the greatest danger of this course- for peaceful compromise tied to some meas-
tive, the course of escalation-is not only in the ures of de-escalation in the North. Yet our
Yet despite confusion and misstatement, extent of devastation and death, or the dam- danger is so grave that those who fear the
despite the enormous difficulty of grasping age it does to the hope of peaceful solu- future even more than they distrust the
the realities on which policy must be based, lion, but the fact that each step of the way past-a group which encompasses, I believe,
I believe canh r ill onl escalation increases in vast proportion the danger of the majority of the American people-must
of the war waar r in the e N Nortthwill only bring us a huge and bloody conflict. If North Viet- seek some common ground rather than
farther from settlement and closer to serious am is devastated then all reason for re- dissipating energies in exploring the varieties
danger of a huge and devastating conflict. straint or compromise is gone. The fight of dissent. Without sacrificing individual
We began the campaign of bombing in the is no longer a war for the South but a strug- views we must also shape a unified stand,
North as a result of- the enormous and un- gle for survival calling their still largely a focal point of belief and action which can
resolved difficulties of winning the real war, uncommitted armies and people into battle. unite all who apprehend coming dangers.
the war in the South. Nor can China stand by and see its ally de- Only in this way can we create a voice strong
As predicted a almost Revery idgway disengaged stroyed. I do not believe China wants to enough to be heard across the country,
expert, from General Ridgway to George fight the United States, at least not yet; bringing together men of diverse beliefs,
Kennon; and as taught by the whole history but it cannot stand by while we destroy adding strength to the views of those in gov-
of aerial warfare, that bombing has neither North Vietnam. To do so would forfeit all ernment who share this apprehension. It
brought the enemy to his knees or to the its claim to moral and political leadership must also be a clear and direct stand; one
council table. It has not destroyed his ca- of militant communism. They would then that fires response in those millions of our
pacity to make war, or seriously slowed down be truly a paper dragon, stoking the fires fellow citizens who glimpse through com-
either infiltration or the flow of supplies. At of revolution only when Chinese blood and plexity, discord and obscurity the vision of
each step it was claimed the bombing would land was not at stake. something dark and dangerous.
make a decisive difference. Yet it has made Nor is China's entrance likely to be sit- I believe there is such a position. It is
hardly any difference at all. In fact, the nalled by a huge and dramatic sweep of simply the victorious slogan of the Democra-
% offical has statements jusas.ustifying armies across the frontier. It is far more tic Party in 1964. It is: No wider war. It is
The official the likely that increasing destruction in the to oppose any expansion of the bombing. It
Hanoi-Haiphong raids bore partial witness North will stimulate or compel the Chinese is to speak and work against all who would
to the futility of bombing. We were told to accelerate the nature and kind of their enlarge the war in the North.
the raids were necessary because infiltration assistance. Perhaps Chinese pilots will be- Such a stand will not end the war in South
had increased enormously; an official admis- gin to fly air defense over Hanoi. The cum- Vietnam. It may even prolong it. It will
sion of the failure of one of the most in- her of Chinese troops in North Vietnam may not fully answer the deep objections, feelings
tensive bombing campaigns in world history. be greatly increased. Chinese anti-aircraft and fears of many in this room or across the
Despite thousands upon thousands of raids crews may be placed throughout the coun- country. But it can crystallize the inartic-
more men and supplies are flowing South try. Thus, step by step, China acting in ulate objections of many. It may well in-
and the routes of infiltration have been response to seeming necessities, may become crease the weight and impact of the forces of
widened and improved. Despite the bomb- involved in a war it did not fully contem- restraint. Most importantly it strikes at the
ing, or perhaps because of it, all signs indi- plate, much as we have. And there are many most ominous menace to the lives of millions
cate the North Vietnamese will to fight has signs that this process has already begun. and the peace of the world. Such a rallying
stiffened and the possibilities of negotiation This is the most likely and grave route to cry requires compromise, the willingness to
have dimmed. Despite the bombing, or be- enlarging conflict. And if China does enter seek less than is desired; but that is the
cause of it, North Vietnam has become in- we must bomb them, for certainly we will basic necessity of those who seek not self in-
creasingly dependent upon Russia and China. not permit them sanctuaries or, if it comes dulgence but to shape the course of this
Despite the bombing, or because of it there to that, engage their armies solely in the nation.
has been a vastly increased supply of aid jungles of Southeast Asia. And lastly is the To be most effective this position will re-
to North Vietnam by Russia and China and Soviet Union, forced to choose between China quire more than speeches and resolutions. It
a deepening world communist commitment and America. will need structure and purpose. I suggest
to this war. None of this is certain. An entirely dif- this organization work with other groups and
In short the bombing has been a failure, ferent course is possible. Yet the danger of individuals to form a national committee
and may turn out to be a disaster. such a chain of events grows by immeasura- against widening of the war. It will not be
Yet we once again hear voices calling for ble strides each time we enlarge the war in aimed at withdrawal or even a lessening of
further escalation; just as each previous time the North: and if past is prologue we will the war in the South; although individuals
that the bombing has failed we have been continue that enlargement. Yet the fan- who oppose escalation may also hold those ps who told that more bombing is necessary and new tastic fact, the truth that challenges belief, views. Thus it willn the open to all grou regardless of
goals are articulated. First it was said we is that this is being done although virtual- oppose escalation North
the millionsother ofissues,
Americans will
and 8msome of the en- their en in the St to open position
wanted ostop Infiltration. would
gged military remains a few
persuade the North Vietamese to come to who
the Council table. Then we would punish Department-virtually no one in the Admin- belong to no group but who share this
them and force them to surrender. Now men istration or out-who believes that increased basic belief and apprehension. Such a
We are taking llikthe e- provide a constant flow of
about Vietnam. It c
are talking inexor- war in South Vietnam. decisive
pacity to make war. And so we move an
ably up the ladder of failure toward widening ly and mounting risks in pursuit of an keep vigil over official statements and ask the
stru will neither
devastation.
of enemy capacity, if ever adopted, hope; a course which rg defies reason chimerical i x- wishful thinking from faaccts.t It help
be against the Administration nor for it,
will be the most vaguely ambitious of all, perience alike.
Approved For Release 2005/06/29 : CIA-RDP67B00446R000400110008-8
 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE
Soptember 20, 19667
neither with any political party or opposed to It is not our privilege, but our duty as enue Service in that ruling was the re-
it, neither liberal nor conservative. Its sole patriots, to write, to speak, to organize, to suit of an intensive task-force study of
elm. will be to mobilize and inform the Amer- oppose any President and any party and
scan people in order to increase the invisible any policy at any time which we believe the applicable ldec including all of the
weight of what I believe to be the American threatens the grandeur of this nation and Supreme Court decisions on the subject.
majority in the deliberations and inner coun- the well-being of its people, This is such a Recently, the procedures followed, and
cils of government. Its purpose is to help the tune. And in so doing we will fulfill the the multitude of factors considered by
President and others in government by pro- most solemn duty of free Men in a free the Service in arriving at its conclusion,
viding a counter pressure against those who country: to fight to the limit of legal sane- has been fully and ably explained be-
urge a more militant course; a pressure for tion and the most spacious possibilities of fore the Antitrust and Monopoly Sub-ch those
government
shoul
our
constitut
the s ulisince it w 1 help them pursue the course and great essi ofaltheirfreedoms
country ras they~be- committee by Mr. Mortimer Caplin,
of wise restraint, lieve it to be. who was Commissioner of Internal Rev-
Although I believe deeply in this proposal The arguments of this speech have been enue when the Service was considering
I do not wish to give the argument a cer- practical ones founded, to the limits of my this problem.
tainty I do not have. The most important capacity and knowledge, upon the concrete Mr. Caplin, who is now engaged in the
fact of all, the unkown which transcends all and specific realities and dangers of our pres- private practice of law here in Wash-
debate, are the thoughts and intentions of ent situation. But there is more than that ington, testified before the Antitrust
our adversaries and their allies. Yet skepti- in the liberal faith. American liberalism Subcommittee on July 29, 1966, in con-
clam born of Imperfect knowledge cannot be has many faces. It pursues divergent paths
permitted to dull the passion with which we to varied and sometimes conflicting goals. nection with the subcommittee's consid-
pursue convictions or the fervor of our dis- It cannot be captured in an epigram or sum- eration of a bill which its proponents
sent, For we must light against fulfillment marized in a simple statement of belief. say would restrict the deductibility of
of Yeats' prophecy which foresaw destruction Part of it, however, is simply and naively treble damage payments (S. 2479). In
if the time should come when "the best lack a belief in belief. It is the idealistic, vision- my opinion, Mr. Caplin's testimony dem-
all conviction, and the worst are full of pas- ary and impractical faith that action and onstrates the soundness of the present
sionate intensity." policy and politics must rest on the ancient
Some have called upon us to mute or stifle and rooted values of the American Service
people. treble allows a tax de-
patriotism and the It still believes that for a nation to be great,
dissent in the name of peoplt, dctin for treble damage ghat his tents, testiand
national interest. It Is an argument which to serve its own people and to command I ask unanimous Consent, that -
mOnatr9usly misconceives the nature and the respect and trust of others, it must not mony be printed in the REcoian at the
process and the greatest strength of Ameri- only do something but stand for something. Conclusion of my remarks.
can democracy. It denies the germinal as- It must represent in speech and act the ideals The PRESIDING OFFICER, Without
sumption of our freedom: that each individ- of its society and civilization.
ual not only can but must judgethe wisdom Some part of the conflict in Vietnam may objection, it is ordered.
of his leaders, (How marvelously that prin- have been unavoidable, some is the result of (See exhibit 1.) re-
ciple has strengthened this country-never well-intentioned error, but some must surely Mr. HRUSKA
Mr. President, in ke
more dramatically than in the postwar pe- flow from the fact we have bent belief to yard to this s subject, I Would like to make
riod when others have buried contending the demands of those who call themselves two points. The first is that, in my
views under the ordalned wisdom of the state, realists or tough minded. opinion the Service
position thus allowing received error to breed weak- It is not realistic or hard-headed to solve rect interpretation of presnt law. Be-
ness and even defeat. The examples are le- problems and invest money and use power cause the ruling does reflect present law,
gion. The virgin lands settlement and the unguided by ultimate aims and values. It
Great Leap Forward failed because experi- is thoughtless folly. For it ignores the reali LionWhic- we swhicd wrecognize pr that any le ucti-ded ment was made into unchallengeable law; ties of human faith and passion and desire; which would e damage p payments theymerts would s wowld
while we began to catch up in space, mod- forces ultimately more powerful than all the bility of treble damage
ernized and increased, our defenses, and calculations of economists and generals. Our constitute a change of present law; it
started the Alliance for Progress because strength is in our spirit and our faith. If cannot be passed off as a clarification
what began as dissent became national pur- we neglect this we may empty our treasuries, of original congressional intent made
pose). Of course the enemy is glad to see assemble our armies and pour forth the necessary by an erroneous administra-
.our divisions. But? our concern is with wonders of our science, but we will act in tive interpretation. I think we should
America not Hanoi, Our concern is with vain and we will build for others,
those millions of our own people, and with It is easy to be tough when toughness proceed slowly before we change pres-
future generations, who will themselves be means coercing' the weak or rewarding the ent law,
glad to see that there, were men who strug- strong; and when men of power and influence My second point is that, in addition to
gled to prevent needless devastation and thus stand ready to applaud. It is far harder to changing present law, legislation to dis-
added to the strength and the glory of the hold to principle, speaking, if necessary, alone allow a deduction would have a harsh
United States, against the multitude, allowing others to effect. It would result in the violator
Among the greatest names in our history make their own mistakes, enduring the frus- paying six times his after-tax
were men who did not hesitate to assault tration of long and inconclusive struggles, gain,
the acts and policies of government when and standing firm for ideals even when the which is the same as the wronged party's
they felt the good of the nation was at bring danger. But it is the true y path of after-tax injury. Thus, if the violator
stake: Jefferson at .a time when the in- courage. It is the only path of wisdom. is taxed on his gain but disallowed a de-
tegrity of the new nation was still in doubt, And it is the sure path of effective service duction for the damage payments, he
Lincoln during the Mexican war, Roosevelt to the United States of America. will end up paying six times the out-of-
in the midst of national depression, John pocket damages incurred by the wronged
F. Kennedy among cold war defeats and
ACiE PAYMENTS """' ` "`?`? ? 2?a++~eu uy ?vir.
American leader assaulted our policy in Viet- Caplin in a colloquy which followed his
nam, saying "The United States is in clear Mi'. HRUSKA. Mr. President, if a formal statement and can be demon-
danger of being left naked and alone in a person violates our antitrust laws, he strated by a simple example.
hostile world . . . It is apparent only that may have to pay treble damages in phi- Before giving that example, Mr. Pres-
American foreign policy has never in all vate lawsuits under section 4 of the Clay- ident, I observe that the treble damage
its history suffered such a stu ing reversal.
All ton Act to the persons wronged by such statute was passed at a time when income
What is American policy Indochina? of us have listened to the dismal themes violation. A certain amount of concern tax was not a factor. Certainly it was
of reversal and confusions and alarms and has been generated lately over the de- not a factor such as that which we have
excursions which have emerged from Wash- ductibility of these treble damage pay- now, inasmuch as the bracket for cor-
ington ... We have been caught bluffing by ments for Federal income tax purposes. porate profit is in the neighborhood of
our enemies. Our friends and allies are The purpose of my remarks today is to approximately 50 percent for corpora-
frightened and wondering, as we do, where place the tax status of these payments in tions.
we are headed , . The picture of our country proper perspective.
needlessly weakened in the world today is so Assume that a corporate seller receives
painful that we should turn our eyes from About 2 years ago, the Internal Rev- an extra $100 because of a price-fixing
abroad and look homeward." enue Service ruled that amounts paid as conspiracy. Its gain, and the other
It is in this same spirit of concern for treble damages under section 4 of the party's damage, after taxes is $50. If the
our country that we should, conduct our Clayton Act are deductible as ordinary seller has to pay $300 in treble damages,
dissent as, on that day, did Lyndon B. John- and necessary business expenses. The that is, three times the overcharge, with-
son then leader of the minority party, position adopted by the Internal Rev- out being able to take a deduction, it will
Approved For Release 2005/06/29 CIA-RDP67B00446R000400110008-8
 22276
Approved For Release 2005/06/29 : CIA-RDP67B00446R0004001 00 8-gg
CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - HOUSE Sep ember 20, 1966
of scientific sophistication. Dr. Schubert
said that all concerned with the program
-at American University were in complete
agreement that George Eliopoulos should
have this award because he made a dis-
tinct contribution in a very important
area of radiation research.
Mr. Speaker, Springfield Technical
High School has produced many out-
standing students. George Eliopoulos is
a splendid example of the brilliant stu-
dents at Springfield's Technical High
School. He is a straight A student and
is particularly strong in the fields of
mathematics and science, which he in-
tends to pursue as his career. Speaking
on behalf of the people of the Second
Congressional District of Massachusetts,
I wish to commend George Eliopoulos
and Springfield Technical High School
for achieving this high honor and dis-
tinction.
he has exercised so arbitrarily in the
past. I shall do this not because of any
particular affinity for those who are be-
latedly coming to the forefront and be-
latedly getting disturbed about the ap-
parent excesses of our chairman. I will
not do this because of any personal opin-
ions Chairman POWELL might properly
have about "black power or racial con-
cepts which affect education and labor.
I will certainly not do this because he
is a Negro. I for one will vote to strip
him of all powers as the chairman, or
for any partial limitations on his power,
because on the merits I believe they have
been exercised in such a manner as to
bring discredit to the entire House of
Representatives.
Later today I will again address the
House and place in the RECORD many of
the reasons I have for taking this action.
For now, I merely want to announce that,
as one Member, I will vote to take Mr.
POWELL's committee chairman's power
away.
THE HONORABLE SAM GIBBONS
(Mr. OLSON of Minnesota asked and
was given permission to address the
House for 1 minute and to revise and
extend his remarks.)
Mr. OLSON of Minnesota. Mr.
Speaker, recently one of our distin-
guished colleagues was verbally accosted
by another Member and referred to as a
"jerk."
SAM GIBBONS' record speaks for itself
and does not need my defense. His rec-
ord of devotion to duty and responsibil-
ity, as a Members of this body, adequate-
ly reflect SAM GIBBONS' character.
Most people in public life are familiar
with the tactic of vilification and abuse
and surely Members of this House can
recognize these tactics for what they are.
I rise because, as I feel a responsibil-
ity to uphold the integrity of my Govern-
ment and my office back home, I am even
more aware of this responsibility here
in this House.
I do not believe any Member of Con-
gress with a record like that of SAM
GIBBONS should be attacked without our
rising to his defense. I have taken part
in the defense of other Members of this
body when they were irresponsibly at-
tacked.
An attempt to make civil rights a
question as far as SAM GIBBONS' record is
concerned is irresponsible. During the
debate in July of 1966 " on the Civil
Rights Act of 1966, the RECORD will show
that SAM GIBBONS was voting and pres-
ent for the entire debate on that Civil
Rights Act which lasted for over 2 weeks.
Congress is largely responsible for po-
licing the activities of its own Members.
This can only be achieved if we resolve
our differences without demeaning the
character of this body or its individual
Members.
THE POWER OF TITE CHAIRMAN OF
THE COMMITTEE ON EDUCATION
AND LABOR "
(Mr. ASHBROOIK ` asked and was
given permission to-address the House
for 1 minute.)
Mr. ASHBROOK. Mr. Speaker, I for
one will vote to strip ADAM CLAYTON
POWELL, chairman of the Committee on
Education and Labor, of the powers that
FOREIGN AID PROGRAM
(Mr. HALL asked and was given per-
mission to revise and extend his remarks
at this point in the RECORD.)
Mr. HALL. Mr. Speaker, I certainly
commend the Members of the House Ap-
propriations Committee for its action in
reducing the administration's foreign
aid request by almost $300 million. A
review of the committee's report never-
theless convinced me that this Bill still
contains a lot of fat which ought to be
trimmed, considering the present state
of our economy.
In view of inflationary pressures af-
fecting our own economy and the present
availability of over $16 billion in unex-
pended foreign aid funds, the Congress
might well consider making no new for-
eign aid appropriations this year. Ob-
viously funds for Vietnam for military
and economical assistance should be ex-
cluded from any further cut for the sit-
uation there is entirely different and
Approximately 43 percent of the total
number of projects initiated in the
Africa region alone, were started with-
out prior justification to Congress.
I questioned the propriety of furnish-
ing budget support for some of the less
developed countries at the same time
that our own Federal budget is being
financed on a deficit basis. The fact is,
that we are borrowing money at some of
the highest interest rates In history in
order to give it away or loan it at much
to i4cr rates.
NO WIDER WAR
mission to revise and extend his remarks
at this point in the RECORD and to in-
clude extraneous matter.)
Mr. RYAN. Mr. Speaker, yesterday I
pointed out that there have been a num-
ber of provocative recent pronounce-
ments on Vietnam. Unhappily, they
have emanated not from the administra-
tion, but from the university community,
where many former members of the ad-
ministration reside.
One of the most sensible recent com-
mentaries on the war is the speech which
Richard N. Goodwin, former assistant to
President Kennedy and President John-
son, made to the national board of the
Americans for Democratic Action on
Saturday, September 17.
Perhaps the most noteworthy of Good-
win's comments-which ranged from do-
mestic to foreign affairs-was his sug-
gestion that concerned citizens form a
committee to oppose further escalation
of the war. He points out that the slo-
gan of such a group could be the slogan
of the Democratic Party in the 1964
campaign: "No wider war."
I hope that Goodwin's remarks will be
read by as wide an audience as they de-
serve. His speech follows:
SPEECH BY RICHARD N. GOODWIN AT THE NA-
TIONAL BOARD MEETING OF AMERICANS FOR
DEMOCRATIC ACTION, STATLER-HILTON Bo-
TEL, WASHINGTON, D.C., SEPTEMBER 17, 1966
the urgency is obvious. This is a time when labels are unfashion-
The committee report shows that for- able. Men hesitate to call themselves lib-
erals or conservatives or radicals, fearing the
eign aid would suffer very little even if complexity of their views will be swallowed
no new funds were approved this year. up in some formal catechism of belief. Yet
A further reduction would be the most groups like this one are drawn together by
effective step we could take to reduce a shared body of beliefs and values, and by
the gold outflow and imbalance of pay- common reactions to the sins and shortcom-
ments. ings of their society. They differ on many
The AID program since 1945 has cost particular issues; but they do agree on the
wisdom of a general direction and the ur-
American taxpayers over $100 billion. gency of certain purposes. In this sense,
While effectively managed foreign as- even in non-ideological America, there are
sistance can, and has played a decisive radicals and rightists, liberals and conserva-
role in maintaining free world strength, tives. In this sense the Americans for Demo-
it has grown like "Topsy," to the point cratic Action is the spearhead of American
where 95 countries and 5 territories will liberalism.
receive some form of U.S. assistance. It can look back on a record of achieve-
Surely the strain on our economy at the ment unmatched in American political orga-
present time justifies a more prudent nization. It has elected dozens of members
look at the foreign aid program. to high office, many of its early programs are
now law, and its once theoretical notions are
Many public works projects in our own the daily staple of bureaucracy.
country are subject to closer scrutiny It is easy to blunt, answer, and even ignore
and supervision, then similar projects in the criticism of liberalism which is largely a
the foreign aid program. reflex action from past battles. The ease of
A total of 61 AID projects costing over such refutation, however, should not be per-
mitted to defes.
$63 million were initiated this year with- reason for r obsc doubture it is real not d teahatns If there is
reason today's liberals
out prior justification by the Congress. are too progressive, but that they are often
We don't allow that kind of leeway for not progressive enough: not that they are
similar projects at home, whether It be radical but that they are sometimes mired
for highways or reservoirs. In outworn outlooks and programs; not that
Approved For Release 2005/06/29 : CIA-RDP67B00446R000400110008-8
 Approved For Release 2005/06/29 :CIA-RDP67B00446R000400110008-8
House of Representatives
The House met at 12 o'clock noon.
The Chaplain, Rev. Edward G. Latch,
D.D., offered the following prayer:
Great is our Lord and of great power:
His understanding is infinite.-Psalm
147: 5.
0 God, our Father, who dost reveal
Thyself in numberless ways, deepen
within us this day the sense of Thy pres-
ence as we wait upon Thee in prayer.
Strengthen us by Thy spirit that no dan-
ger may overwhelm us, no difficulty may
overcome us, no distress may overburden
us, and no discouragement may cause us
to turn aside from walking with Thee.
May Thy grace sustain us in our labor,
Thy hand uphold us when we fall, Thy
joy make our hearts glad, and Thy pres-
ence give us courage to face the experi-
ences of this hour unashamed and un-
afraid. Help us to grow in strength, in
understanding, in never-ending good
will; and may we ever commit our lives
to goals great enough for freemen. In
the Master's name we pray. Amen.
THE JOURNAL
The Journal of the proceedings of yes-
terday was read and approved.
TUESDAY, SEPTEMBER 20, 1966
ILR?. 13284. An act to redefine eligibility for H.R. 15750. An act to amend further the
membership in AMVETS (American Veterans Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended,
of World War II). and for other purposes.
On September 16, 1966:
H.R.399. An act to provide adjustments in
order to make uniform the estate acquired GEORGE M. ELIOPOULOS, SPRING-
for the Vega Dam and Reservoir, Collbran
tary of the Interior to reconvey-mineral in- SENIOR, RECEIVES NATIONAL
terests in certain lands; SPACE CLUB AWARD
H.R. 791). An act to rename a lock of the
Cross-Florida Barge Canal the "R. N. Ilert (Mr. BOLAND asked and was given
Dosh Lock"; permission to address the House for 1
H.R. 2349. An act for the relief of Robert minute and to revise and extend his re-
Dean Ward; marks.)
H.R.3078. An act for the relief of Lourdes Mr. BOLAND. Mr. Speaker, I just
S. (Delotavo) Matzke and Yusef Ali Chou- came from the National Press Club where
man; I had the honor and pleasure of meeting
H.R.4861. An act to direct the Secretary and being with a constituent of mine,
of the Interior to convey certain lands in George M. Eliopoulos, of 17 Beaumont
Boulder County, Colo to F. Stover; Terrace, Springfield, Mass., a senior at
H.R. 6306. An act for r the relief of lessees of a certain tract of land in Logtown, Miss.; Springfield Technical High School, who
H.R. 7141. An act for the relief of Ronald was honored by the National Space Club
Whelan; and received the Chemistry Award.
H.R. 7446. An act for the relief of certain The National Space Club, formerly the
civilian employees and former civilian em- National Rocket Club, honored six high
p'ioyees of the Department of the Navy at the school students who participated in the
Norfolk Naval Shipyard, Portsmouth, Va.; seventh summer research program from
H.R.7671. An act for the relief of Sophia
Soliwoda; June 20 through August 11. The Ameri-
H.R. 8000. An act to amend the Ship Mort- can University and the Joint Board of
gage Act, 1920, relating to fees for certifi- Science Education are the sponsors. The
cation of certain documents, and for other program is conducted by American Uni-
purposes; versity and is funded by the National Sci-
H.R.8989
An act to
romot
h
l
.
p
e
ea
th and ence Foundation, the National Space
MESSAGES FROM THE safety in metal and nonmetallic mineral in-
PRESIDENT dustries, and for other purposes; Club, the Goddard Space Flight Center.
th
e Washington Academy of Sciences,
H.R.10990. An act for the relief of Maj,
Sundry messages in writing from the Alan D10990. , U.S. Army; and the Washington Junior Academy of
President of the United States were com- Science.
municated to tby Mr. . Geisler, H.R. 11038. An act for the relief of Mrs.
who also Geis Edna S. Bettendorf; Mr. Speaker, over 115 high school stu-
one secretaries, W
informed
the of of his House s that to the on e the House o following al
dates the H.R. 1295-0. An act for the relief of Kaz- dents participated. Students worked in
President approved and signed bills the imierz (Casimer) Krzykowski; and research laboratories and participated in
_,_Pact T to provide for regul,~- actua^> researchaprojects under the direc-
House of the following titles: t;H?Ri4 13558. An
H.R.2270. An act for the relief of the bia, including the examination, licensure, ter,-National Institutes of H alth,tNaval
Moapa Valley Water Co., of Logandale, Nev.; registration of certified public accountants, Medical Research Institute, Walter Reed
H.R. 3999. An act to provide the same life and for other purposes. Army Institute of Research, National Bu-
tenure and retirement rights for judges here- On September 17, 1966:
after appointed to the U.S. District Court for
George-
H.R town of StandardC College o Melpar, Inc., George,
the District of Puerto Rico as the judges atown nd of . 4075. An act for the relief , of John F. and University, College of Observatory,
Reagan, Jr.;
all other U.S. district courts now have; others.
H.R. 4665. An act relating to the income H.R. 6606. An act for the relief of Li Tsu Students experiences this past tax treatment of exploration expenditures in (Nako) Chen; summer
the case of mining; and H.R. 1127:1. An act for the relief of certain revealed a sense of job responsibility for
H.R. 15858. An act to amend section 6 of individuals employed by the Department of the first time with working scientists and
the District of Columbia Redevelopment Act Defense at the Granite City Defense Depot, an insight into career opportunities.
of 1945, to authorize early land acquisition Granite City, Ill.; Many high school students learned to
for the purpose of acquiring a site for a re- H.R. 11844. An act for the relief of Marna operate a variety of complex instruments
placement of Shaw Junior High School. Giuseppina Innalfo Feole; and that the student seldom sees in high
On September 13, 1966: H.R. 14514. An act for the relief of Vernon school or college laboratories, thus af-
H.R. 12328. An act to extend for 3 years the M. Nichols. fording an opportunity to work with
period during which certain extracts suitable On September 19,1666: unique research projects at an early age.
for tanning may be imported free of duty; H.R. 8058. An act to amend section 4 of the Mr. Speaker, George Eliopoulos did his
and
H.R. 12461, . An act to continue for atempo- District of Columbia Income and Franchise research work at the Walter Reed Army
Tax Act of 1947; of ,' and his subject
rary period the existing suspension of duty H.R. 1066. An act to amend section 11-- was a asea Factor in the Toxicity
certain Istle.
On September 14, 1968; 1701 of the District of Columbia Code to in.. of Certain Radiation Protecting Drugs."
H.R. 3671. An act for the relief of Jose- crease the retirement salaries of certain re" Dr. Leo Schubert, chairman of the
phine Ann Beliizia; tired judges;
1 .R. 11087. An act to amend the District of Chemistry Department at American Uni-
H.R. 10656. An act for the relief of Kim- Columbia Income and Franchise Tax Act of versity, who was the summer program
berly Ann Yang; 1947, as amended, and the District of Colum- director, said that George Elio
H.R. 11347. An act for the relief of Maria bia Business Corporation Act, as amended,. search preceptor wrote up a most ponies' iw-
Anna Piotrowski, formerly Czeslawa Merck; with respect to certain foreign corporations; ing comment on the level of the Spring-
and and field Technical High School senior's level
22275
Approved For Release 2005/06/29 : CIA-RDP67B00446R000400110008-8
 Approved For. Release 2005/06/29 :CIA-RDP67B00446R000400110008-8 22277
September 20, 1966 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - HOUSE
they are impractical but they have Deco- These old battle cries are largely a victim the proposals which fill liberal journals and
slonally let practical necessities override of success and of profound changes in Amer- meeting chambers are little more than logs'
faithfulness to ideals and values. We have loan society. They were built on the as- cal extensions of old ideas and processes.
discovered the perverse principle that defeat sumption that rising wealth fairly shared The guaranteed annual wage, the organiza-
can breed strength while victory often erodes was the key to the American dream. Of tion of farm workers, national health in-
will and creates intoxication with success, course, that dream has not yet come true for surance, and many other ideas, can stand on
Success is the disease of American society, a the chronically poor or the Negro. Still, In their own merits but they hardly represent
disease which strikes impartially at business. terms of the old values, most Americans have a radical departure from our past. Most of
men, politicians, movie stars and intellec- achieved greatly. They are well-fed, live in the causes which engage us deeply-from
tuals alike. It is especially virulent when it decent houses, own television sets, drive 90 civil rights to the war against poverty-flow
attacks the politically concerned and pas- million automobiles, and debate not whether from the historic drive to open the blessings
sionate, making them more anxious to enact but where to take a vacation. Yet even at of society to all people.
bad programs than fight for a good one, elect the moment of victory for so many we know I do not pretend to, have the answers or a
a mediocrity than lose with distinction, sup- that shared prosperity is not enough. Mod- dramatic new approach but it seems to me
port a sympathetic office holder even when he ern man, with all his wealth and comfort, is that certain guidelines are emerging which
is wrong, simply because he is sympathetic. oppressed by forces which menace and con- may elpstow the w more of our resources
We do not advocate a policy of defeatism or fine the quality of his life. i devote
even political suicide. We are politicians and Increasingly American thinkers are dis- to common needs; from schools and play-
the object of politics is the acquisition and covering, describing, and attacking these grounds to blighted cities and poisoned air.
use of power. Pragmatism, the code word forces. It is the responsibility of politics to History has proved that rising national
of today's liberalism, is a useful tool to carry translate this emerging awareness into present does notce resol
provesve that proble old
you forward, remove obstacles, and solve political action.
will
problems. But it does not tell you where to The ancient desire to stretch one's talents method of handing our federal grants The
go. Beliefs tell you. Values tell you. Com- to the limit of ability and desire now enters not rebuild a city or clean up pollution.
mon goals tell you. Once that distinction is a world whose instruments grow In com- problems of the city, for example, are not
obscured it is easy to forget where you are plexity, where understanding is more din- simply problems of welfare or income. They
going and even who you are. cult as the possiblitles of all encompassing demand technical skill, a network of sub-
Let me give a few tentative thoughts about knowledge disappear, and where leisure sidies and regulation, planning and engi-
today's redefinition of liberal goals before threatens many with boredom and futility. neering. More and more we will have to
proceeding to the principal obstacle to all It is not enough to train people, we must turn problems over to technicians, egiup
those goals: the war in Vietnam. do so through an educational system of a them with authority, and provide the funds
Liberal thought in America has always quality and daring of innovation past all our to do the job. People are far tmore he jonc r ne,
getting
been a confederation of diverse beliefs. But old objectives. with progress,
there have been certain, discernible, central Even with knowledge and understanding than they are with the ideology of change.
strands in the fabric of the past thirty years. at his command, however, man alone is not The technician-politician-the man who re-
One is the once revolutionary idea that the man fulfilled. He must be sustained and gardless of party can resolve complex prob-
national government has a direct responsibil- strengthened by the world around him, and lems-is the man of the future.
Ity for the welfare of the people: For their by those with whom he lives and works. Secondly, we will have to reshape the his-
well-being as Individuals-older citizens, He will not find that strength in cities toric relationships of our federal structure
poor or Negro-and for the general health of scarred by slums, encircled by suburbs which so not to be completely dependent on Wash-
the economy. Another is the belief that pri- sprawl recklessly across the countryside; ington for comfort, help and skill. The
vate power must be compelled to act in the where movement is difficult, beauty rare, life problems are far too huge and varied to be
t
public interest, that through regulation itself more impersonal and security im- solved from strip people top. inM oreov r , to attem
and
America must be made safe for capitalism. perilled by the lawless. Is to ptop
Those were the subject of wonderful, pas- And even beyond education and the de- states of the chance to share in the solution
sionate engagements, but they are largely terioration of our environment modern of the great problems of society. It is essen-
won. They have become the truisms of America assaults the deepest values of our tial to our spiritual health to develop struc-
American political life, although there are civilization, those worlds within a world tures which give people a chance to share
many important skirmishes to be fought and where each can find meaning and dignity in the American enterprise. It is essential
the specter of Hooverism occasionally looms and warmth: family and neighborhood, com- to our national progress that we tap the
over the horizon only to be brushed casually munity and the dignity of work. enormous resources of mind and energy
away by a slightly surprised electorate. Family ties grow weaker as the gap be- which lie unused, ignored and unwanted
It is this victory of important principle, tween the generations widens. The corn- throughout America.
munity disappears as the streets of our cities This means decentralization of govern-
and o which the makes itakes it has necessary helped bring the ins- s- rush in upon each other. Work, once the ment action; a decentralization which will
most political n slogans oprincipal support of self-respect; becomes take many forms and whose evolution is a
as this s the old pe, and beliefs others, and have e been n more and more mechanical, each man a re- challenge to our genius for political creation.
as organization, and componency in an abstract task. Variety will be the hallmark of such a sys-
doing. Ahead lies the 'most terrible danger of all: tem, but I believe the basic pattern will be
At one time to be a liberal meant to be for a nation of strangers; each separate from his federal funds and guidelines with responsi-
federal action against states' rights. Par- fellows, remote from his labors, detached bility for action left to the community. For
ticularly in civil rights this is still a vital from participation in the great enterprise example, perhaps the best approach to the
question. Yet our major effort now is to find of American life. problem of our cities can be drawn from the
new ways to help states and local govern- Underneath there Is a single, overwhelming theoretical patterns of foreign aid. The fed-
ment assume responsibilities and burdens; cause for the discontent which runs like a eral government would require the city to
and it was a Democratic liberal, not a Re- dark thread through the silver fabric of develop a maVer plan of development em-
publican conservative, who proposed to turn American life. It is cause and consequence bracing basic services, housing and all the
over federal revenue to state government. of all the rest. It is the fear of the indi- components of community life; providing
At one time to be a liberal meant to auto- vidual human being that he has become federal funds on a large scale to carry the
matically favor the cause of labor over buss- meaningless in the great human enterprise. plan forward. As another example I have
ness. Yet the Chamber of Commerce is more Decisions of peace and war, life and death, proposed turning a large part of the foreign
willing to trade with China than the AFL are made by a handful of men beyond his aid program over to the states, involving
CIO; unions are often more concerned with reach. Cities and factories grow and spread communities and citizens directly in our
protecting the established order than busi- seemingly powered by a force beyond the con- relationship with the underdeveloped con-
nessmen; and it was the liberals who helped trol of man. Science describes our world, tinents.
pass laws against racketeering in labor. and life itself, in terms far beyond the reach Even then individuals will have to fight
Even the most ardent liberal will prefer the of ordinary understanding. Computers and City Hall; but it is far easier than fighting
activities of Tom Watson of IBM to those of marvelous machines seem to make man un- the White House.
Jimmy Hoffa. necessary in the oldest stronghold of all, his We are worlds away from the old debate
At one time to be a liberal was to oppose work. about federal power and big government.
big business. Yet it was the Administration This is the motive power, the fueling force, For underneath the rhetoric that was a de-
of John Kennedy, not Eisenhower, that pro- behind the new right and the new left. bate whether we should tackle social and
posed and passed measures for business ex- They want to matter. And so do we all. economic problems at all; or whether we
panion to the benefit of all of us. To glimpse the shortcomings of American should leave them to the impersonal working
At one time to be a liberal was to fight for life, to feel the weight of dark and obscure of an unregulated society. Today, decen-
the principle that collective action did not forces, even to illuminate with investigation tralization assumes that many problems will
diminish individual freedom. While we still and thought the wrongs of American life, is yield to directed human intelligence; the
go through the motions, that battle is over, not enough for any group dedicated to politi- question is how best to enlist the energies of
for freedom has been enlarged as collective cal action. That requires we translate pas- Americans in that task. I have no doubt
action widened. Rather we' are nowincreas sion, engagement, and a sense of injustice that citizen participation is the future direc-
ingly concerned about coercion from the into concrete action; as individual groups, tion of liberalism. It will permit us to do
center, and through political institutions. Many of a better job with our society. It will allow
Approved For Release 2005/06/29 : CIA-RDP67B00446R000400110008-8
 22278 ^rr. --- V~ ? CONGRESSIONAL RECORD- HOUSE' ?vvvwv ? ? vevv e
September 20, 1966
our people to share the life of the nation; The war is getting larger. Every month there no plan or program for settlement in exist-
to contribute, to work, to be needed and to are more men in combat, more bombs falling, ence.
be heard. It is a key to salvation from the greater expenditures, deeper commitments. We are given endless statistics with a nu-
separation and human frustration which are it is the steady inexorable course of this merical precision which only masks the fact
a poisoning and unnecessary by-product of conflict since its beginning. We have gone they are based on inadequate information,
our civilization. to the United Nations and the war has or guesses, or even wishful thinking. For
Thirdly,_we who have often looked to grown larger. We have offered funds for example, if we take the numbers of enemy
Washington for protection of human rights development and talked of social reforms; we are supposed to be killing, add to that the
must increase our guard against the coercive and the war has grown larger. We have defectors, along with a number of wounded
society. It is the nature of power to resent predicted victory and called for compro- -much less than our own ratio of wounded
opposition to its exercise. That resentment mise; and the war has grown larger. to killed, we find we are wiping out virtually
is multiplied as power grows. When those There is therefore, little escape from the the entire North Vietnamese force every
who have such power are also convinced of conclusion that it will grow larger still.
the wisdom and beneficence Of their views Nor is this stead s ear. This truly makes their of the world.
re-
y t forces. It flows consequence
then freedom is in danger. The worst threat of inexorable historical
from Unless the figures are wrong, wie of course
to liberty comes not from those who simply the decisions of particular men in particular they are.
seek their own aggrandizement, but from places-in Washington and Hanoi, in Saigon We are told the bombing is terribly costly
those who seek the good of others, identifying and in the jungle headquarters of the Viet- to North Vietnam. Yet the Increase in So-
opposition to their desires with harm to the tong. It is in part a product of communist viet and Chinese aid, since the bombing, is
nation. Already wiretapping, bugging, and hope and drive for victory; but it is partly far greater, in economic terms, than the loss
manifold invasions of privacy are growing, our decision too. And we must suppose those through bombing. Except in human life,
I believe, far beyond the present knowledge same decisions will continue to be made. the North Vietnamese are showing a profit.
of any of us. There are laws in Congress to Nor is this, as we are sometimes told, be- At the time of the Hanoi-Haiphong bomb-
give the Secretary of State arbitrary power cause there is no alternative. There are ings last June we were told that in the first
to limit the travel of Americans. It has even dozens of alternatives. There are enclave six months of 1966 enemy truck movement
been proposed that we draft all Americans- programs, and programs to hold the centers had doubled the infiltration of supplies was
not simply to meet an immediate threat to of population. There are suggestions that we up 150%, and infiltrated personnel increased
our security-but as a matter of course. All rely on pacification of the countryside rather 120%. However, the fact is we do not know,
of these have in common the frightening be- than the destruction of the Vietcong. There except in the most vague and general way,
lief that individual action and freedom are proposals to limit the bombing or to end how much supplies are being brought in or
should be limited for the good of the state, it. There are proposals for negotiations, coin- how many men. They move at night, some-
according to some officeholder's view of what plete with all the specifics of possible agree- times on trails we have not yet discovered,
that good requires. That is the cause to en- ment. The fact is the air is full of altern.a- and the best intelligence gives only the most
list our energies, to bring us shouting into tives. They have simply been rejected in vague picture. We could not only be wrong,
the streets against any who claim the right favor of another course; the present course. but enormously wrong. The swiftness with
to tell us where to go, or listen to our private And wemust also suppose they will continue which we change our estimates helps show
conversations, or prescribe how we must serve to be rejected.
our society. The coercive society is no less All prophecy is an exercise in- probability. that seeming exactness conceals large uncer-
our when coercion is masked in With that caution let us try to strip the argu- taThees.
benevolence. ment of its necessary passion and discuss the Haiphong bombi The statements are followed the Hg ex-
These are tentative steps toward redeflni- probabilities which are compelled by the awe- ngs are an nluminating e-
tions of difficult and shifting goals; but they some logic of the course of events in Vietnam. It ample was this the process ai s action.
are charged with a traditional faith in the Passion is important; it lies at the root of war proportion aid of North raids
Vh Vietwould nam tnam's fu s fuel a acity
capacity to reshape our society more to the and of hatred of war. Nor do I lack personal pel cpcisy
needs of man. feeling; for only the strongest of feelings and this would help paf Infiltration. at at least
Y slow
hen down-the is Yet
There is, however, another issue which has could impel me to discuss a subject with process '
reduced discussions about domestic America which I was so recently connected In so in- techniques these raids of had provviniding ant fuel had,
to dev l-
hadad, been devel-
to academic discourse, which has swallowed timate a way. Yet we can perhaps now meet e-
up the New Frontier and Great Society, and more productively on the common ground of oped? and the raids were destined to have
which is eroding our position throughout the reason. Rarely has there been greater need little if any effect on the North Vietnamese
The Vietnamese war is, I believe, the most views on the conduct of the war in Soui;iz We were told, in an inside story in the New
dangerous conflict since the end of World Vietnam: The belief that we have an im- York Times, that the bombings would prove
War II: more dangerous than Berlin or even portent stake in Southeast Asia, and that we to Hanoi it could not count on its allies. The
Korea. In those confrontations the danger must continue the battle in the South-al- fact is that aid was stepped up as we antici-
was clear and sensibly appraised. The stakes though differently than we are now doing-- pated it would be.
were fairly obvious to both sides. Objectives until a political settlement is reached. And Within a few days a high official said fresh
were carefully limited; and power ultimately I have, like many others, discussed alterna- intelligence showed that Hanoi was now
became the handmaiden of reason and final tive routes to these objectives. Today, how- plunged in gloom, weary of war, and suffused
accommodation. In Vietnam, on the other ever, l would like to talk about the length- with a sense of hopelessness, presumably at
hand, the dangers are confused and unclear. ening shadow of the war in the North; for in least in part as a result of the raids. Yet,
Objectives are expressed in confused
vague that war are the swiftly germinating seeds of there was no substantial intelligence of this
generali- the most grave danger. kind. We have heard little about it since.
ties which open to endless vistas. Moreover, In this, as in so many aspects And recent information indicates that the
from other cold war confrontations there much of the Y information pech a the war, evolved a set of tacit understandings de- which feeds es opposite was the case-the enemy's will was
signed to limit conflict even while it was ment is deeply obscured. Of course, in times strengthened.
being waged. That, for example, is the real of armed conflict facts are often elusive and The truth is that this major and spectacu-
meaning of the no-sanctuary policy carefully much information, of necessity, cannot be lar escalation in the war had had little meas-
observed, we should remember, by both sides, revealed. By its nature war is hostile to urable effect on the enemy's capacity or mor-
Today tunderstandings are in grave truth. -Yet with full allowance for neces- ale, and most of those who looked at the
Today those h being swept away, and with them sary uncertainties I believe there has never matter seriously in advance of the bombing
our mimportant being sprotections ns with em been such intense and widespread deception knew it would probably be ineffective.
o r most
conflict, and confusion as that which surrounds this Yet despite confusion and misstatement, en- The air conflict. charged with rhetoric. We are war. The continual downpour of contra- despite the enormous difficulty of grasping
buried in statements and speeches about diction, misstatements, and kaleidoscopic- ,tire realities on which policy must be based,
negotiation and peace, the defense of free- ally shifting attitudes has been so torrential I believe we can know that further escalation
dom and the dangers of communism, the de- that it has almost numbed the capacity to of the war in the North will only bring us
sire to protect the helpless and compassion separate truth from conjecture or falsehood. farther from settlement and closer to serious
for the dying. Much of it is important At one time we are told there is no mill- danger of a huge and devastating conflict.
and sincere and well-meaning. Some is in- tare solution, and then that victory can be We began the campaign of bombing in the
tended to deceive. Some is deliberate lie ours. Nave d a result oo the enormous and war,
and distortion. But the important thing There are months when we talk about solved difficulties of winning the real war,
is not what we are saying, but what we are negotiations and months when we forget the war in the South.
doing; not what is being discussed, but what them. As predicted by almost 'every disengaged
General
is happening. There are times when dissenters give aid Hermaaexpert, from as
taught idgway of George
And what is happening is not confusing and comfort to the enemy and times when of aerial l and as warfare, omthe whole eithther
or unclear or contradictory at all. It is not they are acting la the , that bombing has ne
g greatest of our tra?? brought the enemy to his knees or to the
masked in obscurity or buried in secret ditions. council table. It has not destroyed his capac-
archives. It stands in clear, vivid and tower- We have been reassured about - efforts to ity to make war, or seriously slowed down
ing relief against the landscape of conflict, reach a peaceful settlement when there is either infiltration or the flow of supplies. At
Approved For Release 2005/06/29 : CIA-RDP67B00446R000400110008-8
 September 20, 1966 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - HOUSE
22279
and dangerous, the vision of something
and each step. it was claimed the bombing would revolution only when Chinese blood and dard
make a decisive difference. Yet it has made land was not at stake.
hardly any difference at all. In fact, the Nor is China's entrance likely to be sig- I believe there is such a position. It Is
tempo of conflict has increased. nalled by a huge and dramatic sweep of simply the victorious slogan of the Demo-
The official statements justifying the armies across the frontier, It is far more cratic Party in 1964. It is: No wider war.
Hanoi-Haiphong raids bore partial witness likely that increasing destruction in the It is to oppose any expansion of the bombing.
to the futility of bombing. We were told the North will stimulate or compel the Chinese It is to speak and work against all who
raids were necessary because infiltration had to accelerate the nature and kind of their would enlarge the war in the North.
increased enormously; an official admission assistance. Perhaps Chinese pilots will be- Such a stand will not end the war in South
of the failure of one of the most intensive gin to fly air defenses over Hanoi. The num- Vietnam. It may even prolong it. It will
bombing campaigns in world history. De- ber of Chinese troops in North Vietnam may not fully answer the deep objections, feelings
spite thousands upon thousands of raids be greatly increased. Chinese anti-aircraft and fears of many in this room or across the
more men and supplies are flowing South crews may be placed throughout the country. country. But it can crystallize the inar-
and the routes of infiltration have been wid- Thus, step by step, China acting in response ticulate objections of many. It may well In-
ened and improved. Despite the bombing, or to seeming necessities, may become involved crease the weight and impact of the forces r
strikes perhaps because of it, all signs indicate the in a war it did not full contemplate, much at restraint. oMost immena etltoiths lives
North Vietnamese will to fight has stiffened we have. And there are many signs that this
and the possibilities of negotiation have process has already begun. This is the most of millions and the peace of the world. Such mise, the
will dimmed. Despite the bombing, or because likely and grave route to enlarging conflict. a rallying to seek less an ispro desired; but that
of it, North Vietnam has become increasingly And if China does enter we must bomb them, gne i basic seek le necessity a those who seek not
dependent upon Russia and China. Despite for certainly we will not permit them sanctu- is the bombing, or because of it there has been aries or, if it comes to that, engage their self indulgence but to shape the course of
a vastly increased supply of aid to North armies solely in the jungles of Southeast This o be most effective this position will re-
Vietnam by Russia and China and a deepen- Asia. And lastly is the Soviet Union, forced wire more than speeches and resolutions.
ing world communist commitment to this to choose between China and America. qt will need structure and purpose. I sug-
war None of this is certain. An entirely dif-
In short the bombing has been a failure, ferent course is possible. Yet the danger of gest this organization work with other groups
and may turn out to be a disaster. such a chain of events grows by immeasur- and individuals to form a national com-
Yet we once again hear voices calling for able strides each time we enlarge the war in mittee against widening of the war. It will
further escalation; just as each previous time the North: and if past is prologue we will not be aimed at withdrawal ox even a lessen-
that the bombing has failed we have been continue that enlargement. Yet the fan- ing of the war in the South; although indi-
told that more bombing is necessary and new tastic fact, the truth that challenges belief, viduals who oppose escalation may also hold
goals are articulated. First it was said we is that this is being done although virtually those views. Thus it will be open to all
wanted to stop infiltration. Next, we would no one remains beside some of the engaged groups who oppose escalation in the North
persuade the North Vietnamese to come to military and a few men in the State Depart- regardless of their position on other issues,
the Council table. Then we would punish went-virtually no one in the Administra- and will be open to the millions of Amer-
them and force them to surrender. Now men tion or out-who believes that increased scans who belong to no group but who share
are talking of the need to destroy their bombing will have a decisive effect on the war this basic belief and apprehension. Such a
capacity to make war. And so we move in- in South Vietnam. We are taking likely and committee can provide a constant flow of
exorably up the ladder of failure toward mounting risks in pursuit of an elusive, ob- objective information about Vietnam. It
widening devastation. And the latest goal, scure, marginal, and chimerical hope; a can keep vigil over official statements hand t the destruction of enemy capacity, if ever course which defies reason and experience ask askara the
te hard
wishful es estt oionsns which fame. It l
adopted, will be the most vaguely ambitious alike. neither be against the Adminicrstion nor
of all. For such capacity rests on the entire Yet I believe this is the way we are go- for hther against
any inistl party or olit society; and that whole society; factories, ing; that only beneficent and uncertain for- for it, nei ei it, neither any pol nor coor
dams, power plants, cities themselves must tune can bar the way. This is not a belief tive. Its sole aim will be to mobilize and
be brought tumbling down. born s, personal fear. After all, we, or most inform the American people in order to in-
Al1 of this is possible despite the fact of us, will continue to work and prosper,
that each future escalation will probably hold meetings and make speeches, unless all crease to be the the American invisible weight majority of in the what I believe
belira-
have the effect of previous escalations. It of our civilization is swallowed up. Even tions and inner councils of government. Its
will increase the dangers of wider war, lessen then enough will survive for the race to purpose is to help the President and others in
the chances of a negotiated settlement, evolve and perhaps create something finer. government by providing a counter pressure
drain away effort which should be concen- It is rather a belief born of a fallible reason against those who urge a more militant
trated In the South, further alienate our and analysis, always better able to describe course; a pressure for which those in gov-
allies, and have little damaging effect on our situation than guide our action, which
the enemy's ability will to fight. seeks in the acts of our past and the atti- pursue ernment should be grateful since it will help
We are sometimes s asked what else we tudes of our present a guide for our future, them Although I the believe course deeply 1y in wise this proprestraint.
I do not wish however, to come with a proposal
I do not wish to give th argument a cer-
can do. I believe there are other things to counsel of despair. The surest guarantee of
do. The war can be fought more effectively misfortune is resignation. Therefore, we tainty I do not have. The most important
in the South. The search for a settlement must all make what effort we can. There fact of' all, the unknown which transcends
can be given greater direction and brit- are enormous differences among the critics all debate, are the thoughts and intentions
liance. We can prepare ourselves, if neces- of the war. There are those who believe we of our adversaries and their allies. Yet
eery, to accept a long ground war of at- have no interest in Vietnam or even in all skepticism born of imperfect knowledge
trition leading ultimately to a political set- of Asia. There are those who wish us to cannot be permitted to dull the passion with
tlement. But that is not the question. If withdraw. There are fierce debates over the which we pursue convictions or the fervor
the bombing cannot win the war, if it does history of the war, the nature of its partici- of our dissent. For we must fight against
not work; and above all if it carries tre- pants, the goals of our enemies. There are fulfillment of Yeats' prophecy which fore-
mendous political and military risks, then those, like myself, who believe we should saw destruction if the time should come
it should not be increased, either out of carry on the war in the South while intensi- when "the best lack all conviction, and the
frustration with the war or with the polls. fying, modifying and sharpening the search worst are full of passionate intensity."
For the greatest danger of this course- for peaceful compromise tied to some meas- Some have called upon us to mute or stifle
the course of escalation-is not only in the ures of de-escalation in the North. Yet our dissent in the name of patriotism and the
extent of devastation and death, or the danger is so grave that those who fear the national interest. It is an argument which
damage it does to the hope of peaceful solu- future even more than they distrust the monstrously misconceives the nature and
tion, but the fact that each step of the past-a group which encompasses, I believe, process and the greatest strength of Amer-
way increases in vast proportion the dan- the majority of the American people-must ican democracy. It denies the germinal as-
ger of a huge and bloody conflict. If North seek some common ground rather than dis- sumption of our freedom: that . each indi-
Vietnam is devastated then all reason for sipating energies in exploring the varieties vidual not only can but must judge the
restraint or compromise is gone. The fight of dissent. Without sacrificing individual wisdom of his leaders. (How marvelously
is no longer a war for the South but a views we must also shape a unified stand, that principle has strengthened this coun-
struggle for survival calling their still largely a focal point of belief and action which can try-never more dramatically than in the
uncommitted armies and people into battle. unite all who apprehend coming dangers. postwar period when others have buried
Nor can China stand by and see its ally Only in this way can we create a voice strong contending views under the ordained wisdom
destroyed. I do not believe China wants to enough to be heard across the country, bring- of the state, thus allowing received error to
fight the United States, at least not yet; ing together men of diverse beliefs, adding bread weakness and even defeat. The ex-
but it cannot stand by while we destroy strength to the views of those in government amples are legion. The virgin lands settle-
North Vietnam. To do so would forfeit all who share this apprehension. It must also ment and the Great Leap Forward failed be-
its claim to moral and political leadership be a clear and direct stand; one that fires cause experiment was made into unchal-
of militant communism. They would then response in those millions of our fellow citi- lengeable law; while we began to catch up
be truly a paper dragon, stoking the fires of zens who glimpse through complexity, dis- in space, modernized and increased our de-
Approved For Release 2005/06/29 : CIA-RDP67B00446R000400110008-8
 22280
Approved For Release 2005/06/29 : CIA-RDP67B00446R000400110008-8 '7
CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - HOUSE September 20, 1966
fenses, and started the Alliance for Progress
because what began as dissent became na-
tional purpose.) Of course the enemy is
glad to see our divisions. But our concern
is with America not Hanoi. Our concern is
with those millions of our own people, and
with future generations, who will themselves
be glad to see that there were men who
struggled to prevent needless devastation
and thus added to the strength and the glory
of the United States.
Among the greatest names in our history
were men who did not hesitate to assault
the acts and policies of government when
they felt the good of the nation was at stake:
Jefferson at a time when the integrity of
the new nation was still in doubt, Lincoln
during the Mexican war, Roosevelt, in the
midst of national depression, John F. Ken-
nedy among cold war defeats and danger.
Only a dozen years ago, In 1954, another
American leader assaulted our policy in Viet-
nam, saying "The United States is in clear
danger of being left naked and alone in a
hostile world ... It is apparent only that
American foreign policy has never in all its
history suffered such a stunning reversal.
What Is American policy in Indochina? All
of us have listened to the dismal themes of
reversal and confusions and alarms and ex-
cursions which have emerged from Washing-
ton . . . We have been caught bluffing by
our enemies. Our friends and allies are
frightened and wondering, as we do, where
we are headed ... The picture of our coun-
try needlessly weakened in the world today
is so painful that we should turn our eyes
from abroad and look homewards."
It is in this same spirit of concern for our
country that we should conduct our dissent
as, on that day, did Lyndon B. Johnson then
leader of the minority party.
It is not our privilege, but our duty as
patriots, to write, to speak, to organize, to
oppose any President and any party and any
policy at any time which we believe threatens
the grandeur of this nation and the well-
being of its people. This is such a time.
And in so doing we will fulfill the most
solemn duty of free men in a free country:
to fight to the limit of legal sanction and the
most spacious possibilities of our constitu-
tional freedoms for the safety and greatness
of their country as they believe it to be.
The arguments of this speech have been
practical ones founded, to the limits of my
capacity and knowledge, upon the concrete
and specific realities and dangers of our pres-
ent situation. But there is more than that
In the liberal faith. American. liberalism
has many faces. It pursues divergent paths
to varied and sometimes conflicting goals.
It cannot be captured in an epigram or sum-
marized in a simple statement of belief.
Part of it however is sim 1 and I
calculations of economists and generals. Our
strength is in our spirit and our faith. If
we neglect this we may empty our treas-
uries, assemble our armies and pour forth
the wonders of our science, but we will act in
vain and we will build for others.
It is easy to be tough when toughness
means coercing the weak or rewarding the
strong; and when men of power and influ-
ence stand ready to applaud. It is far harder
to hold to principle, speaking, if necessary,
alone against the multitude, allowing others
to make their own mistakes, enduring the
frustration of long and inconclusive strug-
gles, and standing firm for ideals even when
they bring danger. But it is the true path
of courage. It is the only path of wisdom.
And it is the sure path of effective service
to the United States of America.
CORRECTION OF THE RECORD
Mr. RYAN. Mr. Speaker, I ask unani-
mous consent that the permanent bound
CONGRESSIONAL RECORD be corrected as
follows: Page 21988 of the RECORD for
September 19, 1966, 4th paragraph, the
figure 70,300 should be changed to read
"approximately 30,000." Also, on page
21988, 7th paragraph of the 3d column,
delete the words "must return to their
native country" and add: "must go to
another country" in order to gain perma-
nent residence.
The SPEAKER. Is there objection to
the request of the gentleman from New
York?
There was no objection.
CORRECTION OF RECORD
Mr. RYAN. Mr. Speaker, I ask unani-
mous consent that the permanent bound
CONGRESSIONAL RECORD be corrected as
follows: Page 20849 of the RECORD for
September 6, 3d paragraph of my re-
marks, last word of paragraph should
read "bay" instead of "basin."
The SPEAKER. Is there objection to
the request of the gentleman from New
York?
There was
TENTH ANNUAL REPORT ON THE
TRADE AGREEMENTS PROGRAM--
MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT
OF THE UNITED STATES (H.
DOC. NO. 499)
belief in belief. It is the idealistic vision- The SPEAKER. The Chair lays be-
ary and impractical faith that action and fore the House the following message
policy and politics must rest on the ancient from the President of the United States.
and rooted values of the American people. Mr. HALL. Mr. Speaker, I make the
It still believes that for a nation to be great, point of order that a quorum is not
to serve its own people and to command the present. I believe the Members should
respect and trust of others, it must not only hear the. President's message.
So something but stand for something. it The SPEAKER. Will the
must represent in speech and act the ideals from Missouri withhold gentleman
of its society and civilization. his request for
Some part of the conflict in Vietnam may a minute?
have been unavoidable, some is the result of Mr. HALL. Mr. Speaker, I ask unani-
well-intentioned error, but some must surely moos consent to withdraw the request.
flow from the fact we have bent belief to the The SPEAKER. Without objection, it
demands of those who call themselves realists is so ordered.
or tough minded.
Problems and invest money and use power The SPEAKER laid before the House
unguided by ultimate aims and values. It the following message from the Presi-
is thoughtless folly. For it ignores the real- dent of the United States, which was read
Ities of human faith and passion and desire; and, together with the accompanying
forces ultimately more powerful than all the papers, referred to the Committee on
Ways and Means and ordered to be
printed with illustrations:
To the Congress of the United States:
This is the 10th annual report on the
trade agreements program, as required
by section 402(a) of the Trade Ekpan-
sion Act of 1962. It covers calendar year
1965.
World trade in 1965 surpassed all pre-
vious levels, enriching the lives of peoples
around the globe. Record levels of U.S.
foreign trade contributed greatly to this
advance, and the American people shared
fully in its benefits.
However, the successes of 1965 also
served to dramatize the vast unrealized
potential of the world market and the
importance of moving forward with the
Kennedy round of tariff negotiations, the
great multilateral endeavor to generate
more rapid growth in trade. Recently,
the pace of these talks has intensified.
The major participants have shown re-
newed determination to conclude an
agreement. The United States will con-
tinue to exert every effort to assure that
these negotiations yield extensive reduc-
tions in restraints on trade in all classes.
of goods, including agricultural products.
The steady growth and freer flow of
world trade are essential to full pros-
perity at home, economic growth and
stability in the industrialized countries,
and progress in the developing world.
We shall do everything in our power to
build In future years on the substantial
progress in these directions achieved in
1965.
LYNDON B. JOHNSON.
THE WHITE HOUSE, September 20, 1966.
THIRTEENTH ANNUAL REPORT OF
THE CORREGIDOR-BATAAN ME-
MORIAL COMMISSION-MESSAGE
FROM THE PRESIDENT OF THE
UNITED STATES (H. DOC. NO. 498)
The SPEAKER laid before the House
the following message from the President
of the United States; which was read
and, together with the accompanying
papers, referred to the Committee on
Foreign Affairs and ordered to be
printed:
To the Congress of the United States
Pursuant to the provisions of Public
Law 193, 83d Congress, as amended, I
hereby transmit for the information of
the Congress of the United States the
13th Annual Report of the Corregidor-
Bataan Memorial Commission for the fis-
cal year ended June 30, 1966.
LYNDON B. JOHNSON.
THE WHITE HOUSE, September 20,1966.
CALL OF THE HOUSE
Mr. YATES. Mr. Speaker, I make the
point of order that a quorum is not
present.
The SPEAKER. Evidently a quorum
is not present.
A call of the House was ordered.
The Clerk called the roll, and the fol-
lowing Members failed to answer to their
names:
Approved For Release 2005/06/29 : CIA-RDP67B00446R000400110008-8
 Approved For Release 2005/06/29 : CIA-RD 67 00446R000400110008-8
RESSIONAL RECORD -
G
September 20, 1966 CON
mined by the Secretary of the Interior. Such by those who offer no solution nor give
payment shall be considered as full satin- alternatives.
faction of all claims of the United States The walls of this Chamber normally
That is what this
for any acts by or on be-
.
ith debate
d
y
n
u
L
o W
ec
h
against C. A.
half of C. A. Lundy upon such land. Chamber is for. That is what democracy BANGKOK.-optimism is cheap here, and
"SE t. a In for eand becai convn eyance ya c not is for. That is what the political liberty thus to be regarded with some suspicion. 2. C. A. does tlect n apply vand section 1, all claims of It is hard to go along with the experienced
of the land provided g of free men is for. and philosophical diplomat who says that
Lundy for But in time of war, it is the perennial we are on the verge of an enormous victory
the United States s against C C. . A. all
any acts by or on behalf of C. A. Lundy upon policy of this Nation to stand behind the w South Asia, but these factors are v least in at
such land shall be deemed to be waived upon fighting men of this Nation. That policy well worth examining:
the relinquishment by C. A. Lundy of all has now been breached by the appear- Japan is returning to South Asia as the
claims to such land." ante of an openly partisan attack on this beneficent provider of capital and know-how,
her drive to the south 20 years
The committee amendment was agreed asNation's sist in the defense gof freecho choice in was during the
to.
consider herself a
The bill was ordered to be engrossed Vietnam. ago.
and read a third time, was read the third This document presents itself as a Australipart of lia a has and begun thus a to cocansi r h se its
time, and passed. chronicle of recent history. general development.
The title was amended so as to read: But it is a curious chronicle indeed. Indonesia has turned away from Chinese
"A bill to authorize the Secretary of the It is carefully selective. Communist influence.
Interior to convey certain lands in It is not history as history happened. While the war in Viet Nam is yet far from
Plumas County, California, to C. A. It is history as history is edited, and won, the shape of a new independent order
Lundy, and for other purposes." manipulated-and even omitted-in there at some date not in the distant future
A motion to reconsider was laid on the order to serve Republican campaign can be visualized.
has, with U.S. help, created a
table. strategy. Thailand
against the expansion of
The SPEAKER. That concludes the This pamphlet attacks-and it attacks western Communism.
call of the Private Calendar. [ vigorously. it doW.nfpp es attack the Burma's attitude under Ne Win has faced
d
1 It attacks the President of the Unite
The Philippines, Korea and Taiwan, with
VIETNAM AND ALL ASIA States for carrying out his responsi- Japan, are cooperating in development plans
(Mr. BOGGS asked and was given bilities as Commander in Chief, and ideas yet to be translated into action but
permission to address the House for 1 What is even more disappointing, it highly promising.
minute, to revise and extend his attacks the President of the United Unlike NATO, the SEATO organization is
remarks, and to include extraneous States for carrying out the very resolu- expanding its activities in cooperative health,
matter.) tion that these same men voted for in the educational, and cultural work, as well as in Ton
headquearte s is gong pphere.g The e
r solution, these SEATary coo
new Mr. BOGGS. Mr. columnist, Speaker, n, pub- G By the terms of that ion
day the e columnistt, Richard Wilson, S, pub- are even projects going forward on the Me-
which an article in the Evening Star in same men charged the President to take kong River for its ultimate development as which he recounted the plus factors in whatever actions he deemed necessary to k Asian TVA.
the war in Vietnam. Mr. Wilson is not protect American interests in southeast ao exist and they
particularly sympathetic with this ad- Asia. These obably favorable attributable factors mostly to a singly
ministration, but his column points out That resolution was clear and unmis- factor-the massive and growing American
intervention in South Vi Nam. most
developments nil that the world, and taIt was discussed; it was debated; and important factor in this einter enti ne aside
the makes the point that had not taken n
men who now affix their names to from the exercise of power that I
generally understood to be for lthe pur- overwhelmingly passed. Cam, the whole
now be a under nder it was
the stand that e we area mhave ight now t taken
Communist control. this so-called white paper voted for that pose of creating stability, and when that
stability is created the Americans will go
He points out developments in Indo- resolution. home. "We know that you are not here
nesia, Burma, Thailand, and all that area But where in this white paper in that forever," says a prominent Thai official.
involving many hundreds of millions of fact mentioned? Behind us, when we can go home, we will
people who seek freedom. Where is there any discussion of that leave immense shipping, transportation, and
This morning in the Washington Post resolution whatsoever? military facilities costing many billions, as
there was published another article, this This pamphlet pretends to be history. we left behind us many billions in Europe
time talking about a so-called white But why is this particular bit of history for the successful creation of stability there.
paper issued by some organ of the Re- omitted? What is not commonly realized is that a
publican Party, I presume to serve as a It is the most crucial item of the recent year ago we faced possible collapse in South
piece of Republican campaign strategy history of this conflict in Asia; for it is Viet Nam and if that had happened we could
in the upcoming election. This pam- the very mandate that the Congress of have bid goodby to any vestige of influence
the United States gave to the Com- in Asia. Today the military situation has
phlet offers no solutions. In reading it all mander in Chief to do whatever was vastly improved, although there is hard
I could find is that it attacks the Pres- fighting ahead, and the whole political cli-
ident of the United States for carrying necessary to protect our national interest mate of Asia has improved with it.
out his responsibilities as Commander in that beleaguered part of the world. The proposal for an Asian conference to
in Chief of our Armed Forces. The men who drafted this pamphlet devise a settlement for the problem in Viet
It makes no mention of the fact that ask many questions. But they give us no Nam is important. While it is true that
answers. such a conference could bring to bear no
Members of the remember party ected They raise many objections. But they more than moral weight, it would serve to
in this body, I remember correctly, illustrate that the nations of South Asia
unanimously for the resolution on the give us no solutions. could agree on a settlement Peking would
Gulf of Tonkin just a year or so ago. They make many attacks. But they probably not accept. Thus the disparity
The resolution was clear and unmis- offer us no alternatives. of interest witth the Peking government
t&keable, but there is no mention of Indeed, perhaps the authors of this would be dramatized further.
that. pamphlet are to be congratulated on a It would be a wise man who, after a brief
I believe, Mr. Speaker, it behooves all magnificent piece of campaign strategy. observation in South Asia, could weigh the
of us to defend and help thousands of For what they seem to be saying is this: validity of all the foregoing factors, but one
conclusion comes out strong and clear: The
Americans who are fighting for this here are the problems of the war-now stand we are making in Viet Nam has changed
country in Vietnam, fighting for - the go out on the stump and recount these the whole outlook in this part of the world.
freedom of free men everywhere in the problems-and give any answer that you It is not the wrong war in the wrong place,
world. I do not believe what is happen- think your particular constituency may but it is a war at a time and place which
ing in Vietnam should -lie the subject of want to hear. can have a decisive effect on the future of 200
partisan political attacks, particularly The Wilson article follows: million people and our relation to them.
HOUSE 22293
[From the Evening Star, Sept. 19,
19661
THE WAR AND THE PLUS FACTORS IN
SOUTH
ASIA
(By Richard Wilson)
Approved For Release 2005/06/29 : CIA-RDP67B00446R000400110008-8
 6GG~4 ' ' CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - HOUSE September\b, 1966
HOUSE GOP PAMPHLET HITS L,B.J,'S of the President's policy in Vietnam on REPUBLICAN WHITE PAPER HITS
VIET POLICY, both sides of the.,aisle by Democrats and L.B.J.'S VIETNAM POLICY
(Mr. MAHON asked and was given per- The e news e nestory ory follows: (Mr. EDMONDSON asked and was
mission to address the House for 1 :
HOUSE GOP PAMPHLET HITS LBJ's given permission to address the House
minute and to revise and extend his VIET POLICY for 1 minute and to revise and extend
remarks,) d his remarks.)
Mr. MAHON. Mr, Speaker, I was dis- (By Richard L. Lyons) Mr. EDMONDSON. Mr. Speaker,
turbed and disappointed when I read in House Republicans issued a 36-page cam- like my colleagues who
paign document on Vietnam yesterday, pin- preceded me, it
this morning's paper a front-page story ning Cull responsibility on President John- was my thought, when an overwhelming
entitled, "House GOP Pamphlet Hits son for the big American troop involvement majority on both sides of the aisle passed
L.B.J.'s Viet Policy." I shall insert the there. the Gulf of Tonkin resolution in 1964,
news story in the RECORD. I had thought An updating of a 1965 White Paper issued that our policy in South Vietnam had
that the war was nonpartisan and that by the House Republican Conference's Com- passed out of the realm of partisan poli-
this had been more or less established by rnittec on Planning and Research, the pam- tics.
our vote been the Gulf of Tonkin resolution phiet charges the Administration with de- Now we have, in the resolution which
in 1964 and confirmed by votes on de- ceiving the American people on the facts of has just been referred to, a piece of very
Vietnam and with pursuing zigzag policies
fense bills and in various statements and which hold no promise for a satisfactory obvious campaign political propaganda,
positions since. end to the conflict. which contributes practically nothing of
If it be true, as the story says-and I "The urgent immediate question," said the a constructive nature to the situation
have not had an opportunity to peruse GOP document, "is how to end this war more that confronts us in Vietnam.
the report in full and complete detail-- speedily and at smaller cost while safe- The authors of the pamphlet that has
that the only positive suggestion made is guarding the independence and freedom of been issued say that they want a shorter
that we have a blue ribbon committee ap- South Vietnam." war. Is there anybody in this Hall today
pointed to study the situation and tell Other than proposing creation of a blue who does not want a shorter war? Is
ribbon committee consider basic policies,
us: what to do, this is most unfortunate the statement made e no suggestions ns on n what t there any American who does not
want a
because it could only be interpreted as a to do--thus leaving members free to go shorter war today? They say they want
vote of "no confidence" in our elected either way depending upon the climate of fewer casualties. Is there anybody in
Officials in the legislative and executive their districts. Purpose of the document, this Hall who does not want fewer casual-
branches who are supposed to speak for said GOP leaders, was to recite history, in ties in South Vietnam?
the American people, We cannot abdi- hopes that a "clear perspective of the past They say they want peace. Is there
,cate our responsibility. helps toward making right decisions in the any American who does not want peace
In other words, few, if any future." .
, COriStrUC- The report contains charts showing that today~
tive suggestions are offered. The so- American casualties have climbed from zero I say to you, Mr. Speaker, what we
called white paper was issued, I note, by to over 20,000 under Democrats, and that need is not a restatement of these com-
a "committee on planning and re- American troops in Vietnam have increased monly held goals. What we need are
search." I must say that the paper ap- from 16,000 to 300,000 under President John- practical alternatives to the narrow
pears to give evidence of research. It is son, while the Vietcong strength has in- choices which now confront us in Viet-
fairly liberally footnoted. But a plan ,,to creased by a similar amount. nam.' If the leadership of the opposi-
erid this war more speedily and at smaller Republicans said the Johnson adminis- t ration's policy Vietnam tion can give us such alternatives the
cost" or any other planning is not so tamn and subject to abrupt has changebeen" its abts ob- whole Nation will be in their debt, but if
evident-indeed, it is made most notable ,-
jectives "clouded" and its minimum peace they can do nothing more than carp at
by its absence. terms "obscure." our Commander in Chief and our Secre-
So this white paper seems most unfor- It quoted the President and other top of- tary of Defense without offering any
tunate. Coming at this time, it can only flcials as saying or suggesting at various constructive ideas or alternatives, then
be interpreted as an effort to throw this times that the American objective in Viet- the Republic is not well served--nor is
nam was victory, stalemate, independence
war into partisan politics
.
for South Vietnam and a coalition govern- the cause of freedom in Asia.
Last year, the Republican white paper ment. V
on Vietnam-by the same committee it
quoted Secretary of Defense Robert Mc- PAMPHLET PUT OUT BY REPUBLI-
that issued today's-report-stated: Namara's optimistic statements from 1961 to
The nation, by the President's admission, 1963 saying military operations were going CAN COMMITTEE ON PLANNING
Isnow engaged in a war. All Americans well and his 1965 statement that "we have AND RESEARCH
must support whatever action, is needed to stopped losing."
put a stop to Communist aggression and to It criticized President Johnson's "cam- (Mr. HOLIFIELD asked and was given
make safe the freedom and independence of paign oratory" of 1964 when he opposed permission to address the House for 1
South Vietnam. carrying the war north and said "we are not minute and to revise and extend his re-
about to send American boys 9,000 or 10,000 marks.)
Now, the new Republican white paper miles away from home to do what Asian boys Mr. HOLIFIELD. Mr. Speaker, I, too,
says: ought to be doing for themselves." ' read the article in the Washington Post,
The urgent immediate question facing the Now, 2 years later, said the Republicans, and I have had occasion to look at the
nation is how to end. tills. war more speedily there are as many American troops in Viet-
and at smaller cost while safeguarding the nam as ever were in Korea. pamphlet put out by the Republican
Independence and freedom of South Viet- Republicans accused the Administration of committee on planning and research.
nam. "studied deception" in failing to tell the I know we will all note the charts in
American people "the truth about the mile- the back pages. The first one, of course,
It would appear that emphasis is now tart' situation in Vietnam, about the mission refers to U.S. combat casualties in Viet-
placed on ending the war "more speedily of American troops, about casualties, about nam, showing casualties since 1961 of
and at smaller cost" rather than on sup- peace feelers." more than 20,000
'Cheir only good word for President John- people- Some 3,218
Port of "whatever action is needed to put son was that his policies have prevented a deaths and 19,976 wounded.
a sop to Communist aggression." It Communist takeover of South Vietnam. Then this chart shows the growth of
would be most unfortunate indeed if the But they completely disassociated the GOP military personnel in Vietnam, showing
apparent shift should lead our oppo- from the step-by-step escalation that has put it has gone up to around 300,000.
rents in the war to believe that one of 300,000 American troops there.
the two major political parties of the The commitment of American troops, said I have been on this floor a number of
United States no longer supports "what- the Republicans, was the decision of Presi- times when I have heard members of the
ever action is needed to stop Communist dent
the SEATO or Johnson. It was not forced upon him minority party say that we should have
aggression." i am sure that this was not ente ea upon by antearrlier adm any a effort in Vietnam. ristragtion" making ga stronger effort. Of couVlseato
intended, but I am. concerned about No mention was made of the Gulf of Ton- make a stronger effort we must have
what our opponents might conclude, kin resolution of 1964 by which Congress more men involved. And if we are going
I believe that any partisanship in the with no Republican defections backed the to match the involved. h of the opposition
war will be resented in Vietnam by the Presicienc in whatever actions he deemed nec-
men who slosh through the rice paddies essary to protect American interests in we are going to have more casualties.
Southeast Asia. In the context of that and fight and hazard their lives for their m nt this meant helping defend South Viet- a very believe this
political fforti to bring is
country. I want to bespeak the support nam from a Communist takeover. ~ matter which is of great concern to all
Approved For Release 2005/06/29 : CIA-RDP67B00446R000400110008-8
 Approved For Release 2005/06/29 : CIA-RDP67B00446R000400110008-8
September 20, 1966 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - HOUSE
the people of the United States-the
casualties which have occurred in all of
our districts, including my own-into
the arena of partisan politics. I say that
this type of attack upon the policy of
the United States is a pretty weak at-
tack. It offers no alternative except a
blue ribbon committee.
We had about 75 or 80 blue ribbon
committees during the regime of Presi-
dent Eisenhower, and they studied every
subject to death.
The war over there is not going to be
fought by a blue ribbon committee. It
is going to be fought by men, by Ameri-
can soldiers and allied soldiers who are
willing to go in and fight and to lose their
lives, if necessary, to stop the onrushing
tide of communism and to protect free-
dom and liberty in the world. There is
no place for a blue ribbon committee in
Vietnam. f A I;
HISTORICAL RECORD OF POSITION
IN VIETNAM
(Mr. GOODELL asked and was given
permission to address the House for 1
minute and to revise and extend his re-
marks.)
Mr. GOODELL. Mr. Speaker, I am
surprised and I must say amazed by the
comments of my colleagues with refer-
ence to this paper. All I can say is that
at least one of the gentlemen who pre-
ceded me admitted he had not read the
paper yet. I would say the comments
indicate that none of these Members
have read this paper. I believe they
should read it.
We issued a scholarly white paper in
August of 1965, which detailed step by
step the progression of involvement in
southeast Asia. This is an updating of
that paper.
If the gentlemen have facts to disagree
with, with reference to the historical rec-
ord that is recited in this paper, name
them and come forward, but do not come
up and accuse us of making a partisan
document, when we have presented a
scholarly paper that recites the commit-
ments which have been made, the de-
teriorating situation that has existed, and
the failure to give the ?American people
the full story as to our commitments.
This is the purpose of the paper-to
give a perspective to the American peo-
ple and the Congress of the United States
as to where we stand today, so that we
can make realistic decisions as to what
the alternatives are for the future. This
white paper does not make partisan rec-
ommendations or oversimplify serious is-
sues. That is exactly why we make no
specific recommendations for the future.
We present it as a scholarly docu ent
showing the perspective of our position
(Mr. PEPPER asked and was given
permission to address the House for 1
minute.)
Mr. PEPPER. Mr. Speaker, we are all
Americans and however we may differ
about the best way to serve our country,
all of us are conscientious in the dis-
charge of our patriotic duty as we see it.
However, today it would seem to me that
the critical nature of the crisis which we
face makes it necessary that all of us not
only consider the sincerity of our utter-
ances but how they may be interpreted
by those who are the enemies of our
country and of democracy and freedom in
the world today.
I am sure that the opposing party, the
Republican Party, under no circum-
stances could embrace the idea or the
thought of giving encouragement to
Hanoi to withhold any disposition to-
ward conciliation that might bring this
terrible war to an end. However, the
question is, Will Hanoi interpret the Re-
publican document as presenting the
issue of whether the country supports the
President in continuing the Vietnam war
until an honorable peace may be ob-
tained as an issue that is to be decided in
the coming election between the two
major political parties of the United
States? Will that pamphlet and such
utterances and such declarations give
encouragement to Hanoi, no matter that
it is not intended by the authors of it, to
withhold any disposition to negotiate
and thus let more Americans be killed
perhaps between now and the time after
the election? What is more logical than
that such a document can give, however
it may not be intended by the authors,
encouragement to those on the other side
that maybe, at long last, if they will hold
out, the American people will repudiate
our President and our policy and then
they will win their evil end with t e
help of the people of the United State?
REPUBLICAN RESEARCH AND MAN-
NING COMMITTEE PAPER
(Mr. LAIRD asked and was given per-
mission to address the House for 1 min-
ute.)
Mr. LAIRD. Mr. Speaker, I rise in
support of the white paper published
by the research and planning committee
of the Republican conference, under the
leadership of the gentleman from New
York [Mr. GOODELL]. This scholarly
paper is nothing more and nothing less
than a factual account of the involve-
ment of the United States of America
in Vietnam. I think it ill behooves the
gentleman from Louisiana [Mr. Bocos]
and the gentleman from Texas [Mr.
MAHON], on the other side of the aisle,
to quarrel with this document which is
documented and footnoted as to every
statement. The gentleman from Texas
criticizes and in the next breath admits
he has never read the document. I re-
mind these two gentlemen that it has not
been the minority party in this House of
Representatives that has given aid and
comfort to the enemy as far as the war in
Vietnam Is concerned; it has been the
Democratic majority in this Congress
both in the other body and here that have
caused the North Vietnamese and the
Communists to question the credibility
and the intent of the United States of
America In the prosecution of this war.
We have given the President of the
United States support on our side of the
aisle because our country is involved and
because the flag of the United States is
involved. We have put our country
above party. But the division which
exists in the Democratic Party has pro
22295
longed the war in Vietnam. The divi-
sion, the deep division, within the Demo-
cratic Party in this Congress has proven
beyond a question of a doubt that this
party does not deserve leadership today
as it cannot unite its members behind the
President of the United States. This
paper, my friends, does not do anything
to withdraw the support of the minority
party to defend against Communist ag-
gression any place in the world. I urge
all of you: Read this report. And I cau-
tion the Members on the other side of
the aisle about throwing stones at our
house when you have such a divided
house on your side of the aisle.
Mr. Speaker, the American people are
a people that would do anything to bring
about a lasting peace in the world. Yet,
there is no question that American serv-
icemen are fighting and dying again in
a far-off place and many of our citizens
are not sure why. Our objectives in Viet-
nam-long-term and short-range-have
never been clearly spelled out by our
President. His spokesmen-from Vice
President to press secretary, from Secre-
tary of State to Secretary of Defense-
have issued conflicting statements of
what our purpose is, of what our pros-
pects are, of what our accomplishments
have been.
Mr. Speaker, ours is a nation at war
and for the first time in memory and
probably in history, our President ap-
pears unable to unite his own party-
much less the country-behind the war
effort. This in itself is an underlying
cause of the Communists' refusal to ne-
gotiate. So long as they believe that our
country is torn by internal dissension,
they will continue to hope that this dis-
sension eventually will cause the United
States to dishonor its commitment in
Vietnam. As long as this belief persists,
the possibility of a negotiated settlement
will remain remote.
This is an issue in 1966. It was not
made an issue by Republicans and it
needs no assist from Republicans to re-
main an issue. It is, after all, a fact of
life that a political party in power that
cannot by its leadership rally its own
people behind the country's cause in time
of war cannot expect, does not deserve,
and probably will not receive a vote of
confidence from a majority of the Ameri-
can people of whatever political persua-
sion.
I repeat, this is not an issue created
by Republicans. In fact, Republicans
have gone the extra step in supporting
our fighting forces In Vietnam-for to
do otherwise in our view would con-
tribute to a prolongation of the war and
the possibility of a miscalculation on the
part of the enemy.
It remains, however, an issue to a ma-
jority of Americans and a legitimate one.
It is legitimate because those who seek
political power and the mantle of leader-
ship must, when they obtain it, demon-
strate to those who have bestowed it
the ability to use it wisely and well. The
conduct of the war in Vietnam will be
judged by the American people in these
terms. If the people find the present
leadership lacking, they will register this
finding at the polls.
Perhaps the greatest concern in the
minds and hearts of Americans about
Approved For Release 2005/06/29 : CIA-RDP67B00446R000400110008-8
 22296 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD -HOUSE September 20, 1966
the war in Vietnam Is one that has not sential to unity of purpose in this country President than they were upon building
been articulated very often or very well and respect in Peking and Hanoi. the foundations for a lasting peace.
but that can be seen in the general mood Mr. Speaker, I believe that it is high Wilson said then, in a memorable
of uneasiness that exists on this issue. time that the administration made a prophecy uttered in Colorado, that an-
In my view, that uneasiness has to do serious effort to more clearly present to other and more catastrophic war would
with the question: What have we learned all the American people the facts so that come within the period of another 20 or
in' Vietnam? What policy have we the a will be deep conviction and com- 25 year.. if that policy of putting partisan-
evolved from our years of invlovement in mit ent in this country based upon ship above peace were followed. Still
Vietnam that will find us prepared to f x mental understanding. they would not lit
n
t
e. And, Mr. Speak-
t
Latin preve
his America, kind in of war Africa? in What policy Thailand s n
,his in er, his Prophetic utterances came true.
have we evolved that will enable us to REPUBLICAN WHITE PAPER Parworld affairs, following
cope with such "wars of national libera- (Mr. HAYS asked and was World War I
given per- Inevitable as made World War II as
setting o the sun. Th
tion" in a fashion that will not lead to mission to address the House for 1 min- world again was p
lungedf into the dark-
such a drain on our country's men and ute, to revise and extend his remarks, ness of war, cities were bombed, brave
material? and to include extraneous matter.) men died, and babies cried at breasts
is this drift and the drain on Ameri- Mr. HAYS. Mr. Speaker, someone that oozed blood instead of milk. And
ca's manpower and resources ~h at has said they were shocked and surprised that was the hollow victory of partisan-
been the hallmark of our policy in Viet- at this reported white paper. I was ship.
nam the prospect for future "wars of neither. It runs true to form. It is Mr. Speaker, we have tried assiduously
national liberation"? exactly what they did during the Korean since then to develop a bipartisan policy
Or have our leaders been attempting war, except their timing is a little bad and a bipartisan spirit. We have en-
to fashion new policies that will work this time. deavored to cultivate a spirit that parti-
better both in preventing aggression and Mr. Speaker, the gentleman from Wis- sanship must stop at the water's edge.
maintaining peace? consin [Mr. LID] can stand up and talk May this not be undone in a moment of
These questions, these concerns, this about the deep division in the Demo- thoughtlessness for the mere sake of
uneasiness are in the minds of a great cratic ranks. imagined
many Americans and they have not. been Mr. and co advantage
satisfactorally answered for the Ameri- . Speaker, it is not very deep. It is The days and contributions of Senator
can people. a minority-a very small minority-of Arthur Vandenberg should not be for-
Mr. Speaker, the white paper on Viet- the Democrats who talk this way. gotten. I say to my Republican friends.
nam Mr. Speaker, I feel that it is too bad He supported the Berlin airlift, the
published by the research and that my friend the gentleman from Greek and Turkish aid programs, the
planning committee of the Republican Wisconsin [Mr. LAIRD] and others could NATO alliance. He sought no expedient
conference has attempted to set forth notresist the political opportunity to join advantage through sniping at the Presi-
the historical record of our Involvement these dissident Democrats at this late dent. I ask them to remember the works
in Vietnam for the American people. It date, just before the election. of Christian Herter, another distin-
has attempted to discharge one of the Mr. Speaker, I do not need any white guished Republican who, in our moment
vital roles of a "loyal opposition": to paper to tell me who got us involved in of national need, offered "constructive
elicit from the administration in power a Vietnam. I remember his name very help instead of carping criticism." Do
clear definition of our short-term aims well. It was John Foster Dulles, a part not sacrifice his example now upon the
and long-term objectives in southeast of his program of containment and mas- altar of expediency.
Asia. sive retaliation, if you please. During the administration of President
Mr. Speaker, I commend the Republi- But I am oin to say this to you: I
can white paper on Vietnam to all of my did not going
criticize g him Eisenhower, le Democrats in Congress
colleagues a both sides of the aisle and then and I am not did not scuttle his efforts abroad by ex-
co as American citizens a a factual, to second-guess him now, like you amples of disunity at home. We gave
tohall A and compens a a Republicans are doing. him the backing he needed as Chief Ex-
ment chow this Nation~ involved ecutive and spokesman for our Nation.
in Vietnam. `\ 1 PARTISAN INTERESTS IN NATIONAL We backed him on NATO and SEATO, on
e
i
-.+ qu
s
on our reso-
DEBATE ON THE WAR IN VIETNAM (Mr. WRIGHT asked and was given lute unity. We passed by overwhelming
(Mr. REID of New York asked and was permission to address the House for 1 margins resolutions of support for his
given permission to address the House minute, to revise and extend his re- efforts in the Formosan Straits and in
giv 1 minute.) marks, and to include extraneous mat- the Middle East.
Mr. REID of New York. Mr. Ster.) Mr. Speaker, I remember very well,
I Mr. RREID that k. are having Speaker, eak a Mr. WRIGHT. Mr. Speaker, it is al- only a few years back, in 1910, another
brief debate on the war we Vietnam. It ways to be regretted when partisan election year when Mr. Eisenhower was
h this as been too long the war in in House, interest on either side of the aisle takes President of the United States. We
b
precedence over national interest. Par- had then pending on the floor of the
and it is entirely proper that more should titularly is this so when the matter at House a legislative matter in which the
take place at this time, even though issue is claiming the blood of American President was interested. That bill was
briefly. The clear point that is before servicemen abroad. designed to back him up right here in
us, I think, is the need for candor and the This has happened on various occa- the Western Hemisphere. He had in-
need for the absence of guile with re- sions, not only to our shame but to our vited the nations of the hemisphere to
gard to taking to the American people all national sorrow. Surely we should have construct here in Wai'iington a perma-
of the facts .that they should know learned from experience by now. World nent headquarters site for the Pan
short of national security. The clear War I was fought, so Woodrow Wilson American Health organization.
fact of the matter is that there has been believed and said, to make the world safe I was trying to think of something to
lack of clarity on the part of the for democracy. He said it was to be a say to prevent that bill from being: re-
administration. war to end wars. The fruits of that jected on the floor of the House because
Mr. Speaker, the American people do victory were utterly thrown away by I did not want the President of the
not have a full understanding of where blind political partisanship, stark and United States to be embarrassed. And
we are headed, what our prospects are, selfish, and the seeds of another war I said at the time, if we were flying over
or what our minimum terms are for an were sown.
honorable heats
When President the ocean in an aircraft and you may not
Mr. Speaker, unless there is conviction this country from the Wilson
labors of the peace have have been the picked the one pilot, and person may uld ally based on knowledge of the facts-not treaty, he encountered a climate of cold have chosen, man mog us would
just a partial or surface consensus here political ca no man among would
partisanship. A little land of pour our water ter or sand in the gasoline tank
at home-we will lack that understand- willful men in the U.S. Senate were just to embarrass the pilot.
ing and commitment in depth that is es- more intent, upon embarrassing the The analogy is good. I think, today,
Approved For Release 2005/06/29 : CIA-RDP67B00446R000400110008-8
 22376
Approved For DP HOUSE 6R0004Pe 1000,8-8
ep ember .20, 1966
accused of a number of violations of
House Rules. Why are they not investi-
gated? It is rumored that Mr. POWELL'S
wife gave him a power of attorney to
sign checks. Is this true? A House rule
apparently makes it illegal for Mrs.
Powell to be paid for work in Puerto Rico.
Why does the Democratic leadership not
do something about this? Are the so-
called reformers not saying "Let us not
investigate charges against Mr. POWELL,
let us just dethrone him and sweep the
whole mess under the carpet"?
Third, and most important of all, Why
are we not talking about real reform?
Why do we not consider electing com-
mittee chairmen from the top three rank-
ing members of the majority? Why do
we not forbid hiring of relatives-many
of us, including myself, have bills in-
troduced on this subject which are be-
fore committee but we cannot get a
hearing-or why do we not at least forbid
the hiring of wives of Congressmen?
Mr. Speaker, it would appear that some
Democratic members of the committee
want to deal With their political prob-
lem, which is Mr. POWELL, rather than
deal with the real problem of adopting
stringent rules of ethics for Members of
Congress. With perhaps a few excep-
tions, Members of Congress are ethical
and honest. We are all being discredited
but not just by the actions of one man.
We are being tainted, and rightly so I
believe, by our unwillingness to enforce
the highest ethical standards on all of
our Members. The blame for this must
necessarily be placed at the door of the
Democratic majority which has the clear
duty to act and has refused to.
There is a decided possibility that
things are getting too hot on the other
side of the aisle so our Thursday morn-
ing vote will be put aside or this mo-
tion will not be offered. The Democratic
leadership should cooperate with this
move by Education and Labor Commit-
tee Democrats. Were this effort, half-
hearted though it is, to fizzle now the
American people would once again be
confronted with the callous disregard of
the Congress for doing the right thing.
This must necessarily reflect on the
Democratic leadership of this body.
Time and time again we see examples of
laws and standards which are rigidly ap-
plied to the general public but then are
not equally applied to Members of Con-
gress. If the Democrats do not follow
through on this proposal they will most
certainly be enhancing the growing feel-
ing in America for disrespect of law and
order. All too many people have reason
to believe that the old advice to a Con-
gressman that "to get along you must
go along" rules our conduct here. For-
tunately, we do not have to "go along"
and I for one will not, even if it means
joining those who may have been re-
luctant or negligent in the past or may
have curious motives now.
I am confident Republicans will join
any movement for true reform. Several
weeks ago our minority leader called for
a full investigation of the allegations
against Mr. POWELL.` Many are hesitant
to join the reluctant reformers who have
soiled hands themselves in terms of pro-
tecting minority rights. They seem to be
saying, "Let's not investigate facts.
That might involve other Members of
Congress and require modernizing of
House rules generally. Let's just punish
POWELL. He's vulnerable." Because
"black power" has been mentioned by
these so-called reformers, they have un-
fortunately mixed racism with reform
that should include all Members of the
House. Yet after all of these arguments
have been made, we still have one clear
duty-strip Congressman POWELL of e
power which, on the merits, he has 1st
the right to exercise by his own ac1Tig s
THE UNITED STATES AND THE WAR
IN VIETNAM
The SPEAKER pro tempore. Under
previous order of the House, the gentle-
man from New York [Mr. GOODELL] is
recognized for 60 minutes.
Mr. GOODELL. Mr. Speaker, on Au-
gust 25, 1965, the planning and research
committee of the House Republican
conference issued a white paper on
Vietnam. At that time I said the pur-
pose of the report was to present a clear
perspective on the past in order that
right decisions might be made in the
future.
More than 12 months have passed.
The Vietnam conflict has now become
the third largest war in U.S. history.
Again, in order to keep the perspective
clear, an updated version of last year's
study is being issued today. It is enti-
tled "The United States and the War in
Vietnam." It is factual and scholarly.
I have requested that the report, along
with statements made by the gentleman
from Michigan [Mr. FORD], the gentle-
man from Wisconsin [Mr. LAIRD], and
myself at this morning's press confer-
ence, be inserted in the RECORD at this
point.
The material follows:
[Congress of the United States, Republican
Conference, House of Representatives]
THE UNITED STATES AND THE WAR IN VIETNAM
Committee on Planning and Research:
CHARLES E. GOODELL (New York), chairman;
CATHERINE MAY (Washington), THOMAS B.
CURTIS (Missouri), GLENARD P. LIPSCOMB
(California), ROBERT H. MICHEL (Illinois),
ROBERT T. STAFFORD (Vermont), SAMUEL L.
DEVINE (Ohio), WILLIAM E. (BILL) BROCK
(Tennessee).
Chairman: MELVIN R. LAIRD (Wisconsin).
Vice Chairman: WILLIAM C. CRAMER (Flor-
ida).
Secretary: RICHARD H. POFF (Virginia).
Chairman, Republican Congressional Cam-
paign Committee: BOB WILSON (California).
Ranking Republican, Rules Committee:
H. ALLEN SMITH (California).
Minority Leader: GERALD R. FORD (Michi-
gan).
Minority Whip: LES ARENns (Illinois).
Chairman, Republican Policy Committee:
JOHN J. RHODES (Arizona).
Chairman, Committee on Planning and
Research: CHARLES E. GOODELL (New York).
Research Director: William B. Prender-
One year ago the Committee on Planning
and Research of the Republican Conference
of the House of Representatives issued a
study entitled "Vietnam: Some Neglected
Aspects of the Historical Record."
This revised and updated edition of the
study has been prepared to take account of
the drastic change in the role of the United
States in the conflict in the past year. It is
being issued at the time when the size of the
American troop commitment to Vietnam has
reached the maximum level of American
troop strength committed in Korea in the
1950's, when the war in Vietnam is on the
verge of becoming the third biggest war in
our nation's history, and as the flames of war
are spreading ominously Into Thailand.
The study has been revised to take into
account these significant developments as
well as the Administration's revision during
the past year of its explanation of American
involvement in Vietnam, emphasizing the
SEATO Agreement as the reason for its pres-
ent actions in Vietnam.
The purpose of this new edition is the
same as that of the original report-to show
how the nation arrived at the present crisis
and to evaluate past policy. A clear perspec-
tive on the past helps toward making the
right decisions in the future.
GERALD R. FORD,
Minority Leader.
MELVIN R. LAIRD,
Chairman, Republican Conference.
CHARLES E. GOODELL,
Chairman, Committee on Planning and
Research.
SEPTEMBER 20, 1966.
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
The involvement of the United States In
Vietnam after World War II began with the
decision of the Truman Administration to
provide economic and military aid in May
1950.1
A fragile peace was brought to Vietnam by
the Geneva Agreements of 1954, partitioning
Vietnam into a Communist North and a non-
Communist South. Contrary to most expec-
tations, South Vietnam survived. Indeed,
with generous aid from the United States, it
achieved what the late President John F.
Kennedy called a near miracle between 1954
and 1960. Secretary McNamara spoke of the
history of South Vietnam in this period as a
"success story."
When President Eisenhower left office,
there was no crisis in South Vietnam. There
were problems, arising particularly from a
renewal of sporadic guerrilla activity by the
Vietcong. The dimensions of the problems
then compared with the present situation
can be gauged from these facts:
1. In 1960, there were fewer than 700
American military personnel stationed in
South Vietnam to train South Vietnamese;
today (late August 1966) 300,000 American
troops are there to fight.
2. In 1960, there were 5,000-6,000 Vietcong
regulars in South Vietnam; today 282,000
enemy troops are there .2
3. In 1960, no Americans had been killed
in combat; as of August 20, 1966, 4,832 have
been killed and almost 27,000 have been
wounded, taken prisoner or are missing.
4. In 1960, and in 1962, more than 80 per
cent of the land area of South Vietnam was
under the control of the South Vietnamese
Government; today it is about 30 per cent
or less.
5. In 1960, the cost of aiding South Viet-
nam to the United States was $250 million-
72 per cent of it economic aid; as of the
'The State Department has issued three
useful documents on Vietnam:
"A Threat to Peace" (Dept. of State Publi-
cation 7308, December 1961) referred to here-
in as "A Threat"; "Aggression from the
North" (Dept. of State Publication 7839,
February 1961) referred to herein as "Ag-
gression"; "Why Vietnam" (August 1965).
A handy compilation of speeches and docu-
ments has been prepared by the Senate Com-
mittee on Foreign Relations, "Background
Information Relating to Southeast Asia and
Vietnam" (2d Revised Edition, March 1966)
herein referred to as "Background."
2 Vietcong strength in 1960 extrapolated
from figures given in "A Threat," pp. 9-10.
Present strength reported by Department of
Defense, New.York Times, August 10, 1966.
Approved For Release 2005/06/29 : CIA-RDP67B00446R000400110008-8
 Approved For Release 2005/06/29: CIA-RDP67B00446R000400110008-8
September 20, 1966 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD -- HOUSE
in Korea and who are continuing to give
their lives in Vietnam to repel Commu-
nist aggression. It would represent an
overwhelming diplomatic victory for the
Communist' regime and would result In a
label of legitimacy for an outlaw govern-
ment.
Let us make no mistake about it. If
Red China is rewarded for its crimes
against humanity by receiving recogni-
tion in the U.N., it will further impose its
obstreperous demands with respect to
expelling th representatives of the Gov-
ernment of the Republic of China from
the U.N. In addition, such action will
forever destroy the hopes of the Chinese
people that their nation. can be liberated
from the Communist oppressors.
I am aware that the foreign aid appro-
priations bill contains a separate provi-
sion reaffirming the position of Congress
that the United States will continue to
oppose the seating of Red China in the
U.N. But, we must go further than reit-
erating this position. We should by sep-
arate action spotlight this feature of the
bill by adopting a resolution that would
put this body unqualifiedly on record as
opposing any move to give membership to
Red China in the U.N.
In this regard I am today introducing
a resolution setting forth the reasons
why we should fight any move to seat
Red China, and I would like to invite
my colleagues to introduce comparable
resolutions. Our colleague in the Sen-
ate, the senior Senator from South Caro-
lina, is also introducing such a resolution
today.
The position of Congress should be
unalterable in this matter, Since 1951,
Congress has passed on some 20 occasions
various resolutions opposing the admis-
sion of Communist China to the United
Nations, and yet there are some who ar-
gue that these resolutions are no longer
in effect. Let us remove all doubt as to
the intent of Congress regarding this
matter. We have an obligation to the
freedom-loving people of this Nation and
to our allies who have stood by us in
opposing the admission of Red China to
support this resolution with unremitting
firmness.
TRUTH IN LENDING
The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr.
OISEN of Montana). Under previous
order of the House, the gentleman from
New 'stork [Mr, HALPERN] is recognized
for 10 minutes.
Mr. HALPERN. Mr. Speaker, it is
lamentable that the Congress has not
yet enacted legislation to protect bor-
rowers pf money from misleading and
inadequate disclosure of credit terms.
For several years now, I have been
privileged to cosponsor the so-called
truth-in-lending bill, pioneered by Sen-
ator PAUL DOUGLAS, of Illinois.
This legislation is urgently needed to
protect consumers against loan sharks
and conscious or unwitting deception in
credit transactions. The basic purpose
is to require that anyone who lends
money or extends credit must supply the
consumer with two essential facts: a
statement of the total finance charge in
dollars and cents, and secondly, a state-
ment of the true annual rate of interest
on the unpaid balance of the loan.
The object of the bill 1s to provide all
borrowers, and all those who buy on an
installment plan, with a full accounting
of the terms of the obligation, in dollar-
and-cents language. Too often, we find
that buyers are confronted with confus
ing sets of finance charges which are all
but impossible to comprehend. The
Senate has collected volumes of testi-
mony pointing to the need for accurate
and intelligible disclosure of credit
charges on time buying.
The Department of Defense, in May of
this year, issued a directive which, in ef-
fect, applies the bill's disclosure require-
ments to all commercial credit enter-
prises located on military bases.
The Department also stated that the
military services would no longer be re-
sponsible in assisting in the collection of
servicemen's debts unless the loan com-
panies concerned complied with the di-
rective.
Today interest rates have soared, to
such an extent that the homebuilding
industry is in acute distress. Interest
rate policy inevitably affects the 'indi-
vidual borrower eventually, as well as
those who buy on credit.
However, consumer debt continues to
rise. July figures show that outstanding
consumer credit rose to an alltime high
of $90.7 billion, compared to $87 billion
last April. The trend will continue up-
ward, although money is very tight, and
this situation underlines the urgency of
providing effective safeguards against
loan sharks and misleading installment
terms.
Certainly the House should move to
consider this important legislation. It
is time that Congress acted to protect all
consumers by insuring that they be sup-
plied. with a full accounting of all in-
terest charges when borrowing money or
buying on an installment plan.
REPRESENTATIVE ASHBROOK TO
SUPPORT DRIVE TO STRIP CHAIR-
MAN POWELL OF POWERS
The SPEAKER pro tempore. Under
previous order of the House, the gen-
tieman from Ohio [Mr. AsHSROOK] is
Mr. ASHBROOK. Mr. Speaker, I for
one will vote to strip Chairman ADAM
CLAYTON POWELL of the powers he has
so arbitrarily misused in the past. I will
do this not because of any particular
affinity for those who are belatedly com-
ing to the forefront in this battle and be-
latedly getting disturbed about the ap-
parent excesses of our committee chair-
man. I will not do this because he flouts
the legal order of New York courts. I
will not do this because of any personal
opinions Chairman POWELL might prop-
erly :have about "black power" or racial
concepts which affect education and
labor. I most certainly will not do it be-
cause he is a Negro.
I for one will vote to strip him. of all
powers or for any partial limitations on
his powers because, on the merits, he
has exercised them in such a manner as
to bring discredit on the entire House of
Representatives. Time and time again,
as I have pointed out before, Mr. POWELL
merely states that he is doing what every
other Member of Congress does and he
will not be a second-class Congressman.
To sully our reputations along with his
is to do great harm to the legislative
branch of our Federal Government. I
will vote for restricting his powers be-
cause, on the merits, I believe the
seniority system should not be so blind
as to accommodate the flagrant excesses
and abuses of our chairman which are
of record and which I have repeatedly
pointed out since 1961.
It is argued by some that the Powell
problem is peculiarly the problem and
burden of the Democratic Party. This
is partially true. Were there a Repub-
lican dominated Congress, Mr. POWELL
would be minority leader and probably
spend even more time in Puerto Rico or
away from these Halls. This would be
the obvious answer to the. Powell prob-
lem. The people can ultimately accom-
plish this reform but it does not divest
us of the immediate responsibilities we
have.
Credibility to the argument that this
is a problem of Democratic Party house-
cleaning is given by their 1965 actions.
The Democrats did not hesitate to strip
Representative JOHN BELL WILLIAMS Of
his seniority last year because of Mr.
WILLIAMS' support of the 1964 Republi-
can presidential candidate. Again, we
see a curious double standard. Mr.
POWELL supported President Eisenhower
in 1956 and his actions since that time
have surely brought more injury to
their party than did Mr. WILLIAMS' ef-
forts on behalf of Mr. Goldwater.
Yet, he is also our problem and Repub-
licans cannot shirk from their respon-
sibilities merely because the Democrats
choose to shun theirs. The record of the
Congress has been one of majority party
indifference to this type of questionable
conduct. Will they now add Mr. POWELL
to this same list of glaring omissions in
their clear duty to the American people
to act? Several points should be con-
sidered carefully by the Congress and the
American people.
First, among the so-called reformers
who are now out to get Mr. POWELL are
those who have out-Powelled POWELL in
gaveling down Republicans who want
fair and open hearings on vital national
questions. They are the same people
who stood by while Mr. POWELL used his
position to accomplish an ungentlemanly
discourtesy to one of our distinguished
Members of the fairer sex, Representa-
tive EDITH GREEN. In the heat of debate
last year he moved to close debate "right
now" while she was on her feet and
seeking to be recognized to speak against
portions of the bill over which he was
the floor leader. They stood by then,
smiling, and they have stood by through
all of the sins of omission and commis-
sion in the past until now they sound an
uncertain trumpet to rally an army to
overthrow a tyrant. Their unexplained
tardiness in rising to duty in the past
detracts from any luster that might be
due them for now making this effort
which is entirely in order and urgently
needed.
Second, our chairman has been openly
Approved For Release 2005/06/29 : CIA-RDP67B00446R000400110008-8
 September 20, 1966 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - H S
22377
et Minh spring of 1966, it was more than $13 billion studied deception strikes at the vitals of the fonist rces et Minhfective addit on, l V fete areas
on an annual basis, of which less than 3 per system of popular government. were in cent was economic aid .3 The result of President Johnson's policies south of the 17th parallel-the central high-
6. In 1960, 2,000 South Vietnamese civilians in Vietnam, according to leading administra- lands and the tip of the Camau Peninsula,
were killed or kidnapped by the Viet Cong; tion spokesmen, has been a stalemate with the southernmost part of the country.
in 1965, 14,673 were the victims of a similar neither victory nor a satisfactory peace in II. THE EISENHOWER ADMINISTRATION
fate .4 prospect. Secretary McNamara, usually the president Eisenhower continued the pro-
7. In 1960, the physical volume of exports optimist, assesses the present situation in gram of military and economic aid to France
from South Vietnam (a good barometer of the words, "We have stopped losing the war," and the Associated States of Indochina at
economic activity) had dropped to 46 per and David Bell, until recently AID Director, levels set by the previous administration un-
cent of the 1960 level of exports .5 says there has not been "significant progress t11 the fall of 1953 s In September 1953,
President Truman and President E91sen- for the last 3 or 4 years" in establishing increased aid of $385 million through 1954
hower sent American military personnel to security and economic progress in the areas was promised by the United States after two
Vietnam solely as advisors. During the Ken- in which the Vietcong exercise some modifications of French policy had been de-
nedy Administration, American airmen be- influence. tided on-both of them measures designed to
gan to participate in combat. In 1965, Amer- I. THE TRUMAN ADMINISTRATION avert impending disaster.
lean ground forces began to fight. This The involvement of the United States in Under the twin pressures of military re-
commitment of American troops to combat the struggle in Vietnam that followed World verses in Indochina and the prodding of the
was the decision of President Johnson. it War II dates from the Truman Administra- United States, France agreed on July 3, 1953,
was not forced upon him by the SEATO tion. It began with a decision announced to take steps "to complete the independence
Treaty or by any other obligation entered by Secretary Acheson on May 8, 1950, to and sovereignty of the Associated States * * *
into by an earlier administration. Under the send "economic and military equipment to within the French Union." Although France,
Johnson Administration, American forces the Associated States of Indochina and to in 1949, by the Elysee Agreement had con-
have begun to assume the major tart of the France in order to assist them in restoring ferred a measure of self-government on the
burden of fighting the Communists in Viet- stability and permitting these states to Associated States of Vietnam, Laos, and Cam-
nam. pursue their peaceful and democratic bodia, for too ilttle was given Seto satisfy the
The policy of the current Administration development."
has been uncertain and subject to abrupt The decision to aid the French in Vietnam hailing the belated French decision of July
change. The Objective of the United States was taken after the fall of China to the Com- 1953, said, "The peoples of these countries
in Vietnam has become clouded. By propos- munists when the Truman administration needed something of their own for which to
ing the Geneva Agreements as a basis for moved tardily to apply aa policy of contain- aght." la here wa hod that th w war, even
peace and by refusing to reveal its attitude ment to some parts e clea of the
toward the proposed coalition government Aid to Vietnam under that policy implied appearance of colonialism and would no
including Communists for South Vietnam, no commitment to put more than arms and longer seem to Asiatics to be an effort by
the Administration leaves dangerously ob- equipment and dollars into the conflict. This France to hold on to her possessions.
scure the minimum peace terms which it was clear from the authoritative statement The second significant decision was incor-
will insist on. Is it willing to accept n Viet- of the Truman administration's Asiatic policy porated in the Navarre plan-a plan of ag-
nam the knd of settlement reached after given by Secretary Acheson on January 12, gressive military action with increased
World War II for the satellite states of East- 1950. The mild and equivocal warning which French and native forces.
ern Europe and In 1962 for Laos? Mr. Acheson gave to the Asiatic aggressors in With these two conditions realized-a
To what degree miscalculation on the part that speech drew a line in the Pacific Ocean promise of independence for Indochina and
of the enemy brought about the present war, marking the outermost limits of the defense the decision to intensify the military effort-
no one can be sure. Miscalculation must perimeter of the United States. The islands the Eisenhower administration increased
have been encouraged by the failure to match east of that line were said to be vital to the American assistance.
words with deeds throughout the Geneva security of this country and, Mr. Acheson After the conclusion of the Korean armis-
negotiations of 1961-62 over Laos, by the Implied, would be defended by the United tice on July 27, 1953, keeping the Chinese
withdrawal of support from the Diem regime, states by force. The Asiatic mainland, in- Communists from active military participa-
by the 1964 campaign oratory of President eluding Indochina (and Korea) lay beyond tion in Indochina became one of the con-
Johnson promising that American boys the defense perimeter where, according to cerns of American policymakers. On the day
would not be sent to do the job that Asian Secretary Acheson, an attack should be met of the armistice, the 16 members of the
boys should do. by action of the United Nations .6 United Nations that had helped to defend
The Administration has consistently held Although the policy enunciated in January South Korea issued a joint warning against
off needed military action until the situation was reversed in Korea 6 months later by the Chinese Communist action in southeast ommitment
mber 2,
Septe
n
forces
erican
Secret deterioration. SourVietnam reached a state acute the Truman administrat on neverico siidered warned that such aggression in a Indochina
he eco-
noic powerIt has as failed to t
nomic power of the nation in the he conflict. providing manpower in Indochina. In fact, "could not occur without grave consequences
The Administration has not told the it twice rebuffed appeals from the French for which might not be confined to Indo-11
American people the truth about the a pledge of air and naval support in the event china."
military situation in Vietnam, about the that the Chinese Communist provided man- In the spring of 1954, as the French sit-
mission of American troops, about war costs, power for the conflict in Indochina, In uation became desperate, the Eisenhower
about casualties, about peace feelers. This response to such appeals, the Government of administration sought to persuade other na-
the United States said only that Chinese tions with interests in southeast Asia to en-
Communist aggression in southeast Asia gage in a joint undertaking to stave off col-
"Background," p. 289. Determining the "would require the most urgent and earnest lapse. On April 4, President Eisenhower
cost of the war in Vietnam involves difficult consideration by the United Nations" sent a letter to Winston Churchill suggesting
accounting problems. In using the figure of involvement In a costly war in Korea did "united action" on the part of the United
more than $13 billion, we rely on Secretary not, however, prevent the Truman adminis- States, England, France, the Associated
McNamara's estimate of May 11, 1966 that. tration from supplying substantial aid to save States, Australia, New Zealand, Thailand, and
"the incremental costs of the war are on the Indochina from Communist conquest. Ap- the Philippines. "The coalition," Mr. Eisen-
order of $12 billion a year at the present proximately $375 million of military and hower wrote "must be strong and must be
time," and that military aid to South Viet- economic assistance was channeled to south- willing to join the fight if necessary."
nam amounts to "about $795 million in the east Asia by the American taxpayer through If the forces of the United States were sent
current fiscal year." (Senate Foreign Rela- fiscal year 1963. to southeast Asia, the President made it clear
tions C, p. tee, Hearings, Foreign Assist- In August of 1950, an American military that they would wprincipallly told purposes
than ground
ante 1966, p. 672.) Economic aid to South assistance advisory group of 35 personnel was other
Vietnam came to $590 million
1966. McNamara's estimate is iclosen the sent to Indochina to advise on the use of ill, "I do not envisage the need of any ap-
American equipment. preciable ground forces on your or our part."
$13.7 billion estimate of military costs by the situation of Shortly thereafter, in a letter to General
expert accountants outside the Defense De- Despite this assistance, Gruenther at NATO, President Eisenhower
partment. (William Bowen, "The Vietnam the French and their native forces continued reaffirmed his intention to avoid commitment
War: A Cost Accounting," Fortune, April to deteriorate. When President Truman left of American forces to ground warfare, writ-
1966.) This article predicts a cost of $19.3 the White House, all of Vietnam above the ing, "Additional ground forces should come
billion annually when American forces in 17th parallel except Hanoi, a narrow corridor from Asiatic and European troops already in
Vietnam increase to 400,000. connecting to a coastal strip around Hal- the region." 12
and a part of the northeastern T'ai
n
,,
* "A Threat," p. 13; Senate Foreign Rela- ,,,-
tions Committee, Hearings Supplemental Highlands were under control of the Commu-
Foreign Assistance, January 28-February 6,
1968, p. 128.
International Monetary Fund, Interna-
tional Financial Statistics, Vol. XIX, no. 8
(August 1966), p. 308.
No. 159-28
A Department of State Bulletin, January
-23 and March 27, 1950.
I New York Times, September 14, 195-1;
January 14, January 29, 1952.
8 "Background," p. 34.
9 New York Times, July 18, 1953.
1? New York Times, August 8, 1953.
n New York Times, September 3, 1953.
12 Eisenhower, "Mandate for Change,"
(1963) pp. 346, 347, 353.
Approved For.Release 2005/06/29 : CIA-RDP67B00446R000400110008-8
 22378
Approved For Release 2005/06/29 CIA-RDP,67B00446R00040011000&8
CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - HOUSE September
On June 11, 1954, Secretary Dulles, in a If anything, the territorial settlement
speech delivered at Los Angeles, detailed reached at Geneva was better than the non-
the conditions under which the United Communist nations deserved on the basis of
States would have considered additional help the exiting military situation.
to the French: (1) a request for assistance Vietnam, north of the 17th parallel, had
from the states fighting the Communists; already been almost totally occupied by the
(2) clear assurance (from France) of com- Viet Minh forces. The treaty provisions
plete independence to Laos, Cambodia, and formalized this conquest, but they also re-
Vietnam; (3) an indication of concern and quired the Viet Minh to withdraw from South
support on the part of the United Nations; Vietnam, vast areas of which were under
(4) assurance of collective action by other their control. Some 80,000 to 90,000 Viet
nations along with the United States; and Minh troops were moved out of South Viet-
(5) a guarantee that France would not with- nom in the execution of the agreement''
draw from the conflict once a further corn- Perhaps 5,000 to 6,000 melted into the c1-
mitment was extended by others. vilian population and remained in violation
the last two conditions laid down by of the Geneva Agreement 1J
Secretary Dulles were the decisive obstacles The territorial arrangements contained in
to the formulation of any plan for interven- the agreements were, on their face, tempo-
tion, Negotiations to bring about the for- racy. North and South Vietnam were os-
mation of a coalition of nations to support tensibly established for primarily military
the French failed because England was un- reasons as zones for the orderly liquidation
willing to participate and because France of hostilities and the beginning of peaceful
was unwilling to continue a fight which
rec onsrucon.
tti
.had cost more than 140,000 French casual-
The
en
G
e a "on'e' ence of 1954 not in any way be interpreted as constituting
In these circumstances the Geneva con- a political or territorial boundary." The
ference opened. On May 6-the eve of the conference declaration envisaged the reunifi-
negotiations on Indochina and of the fall cation of Vietnam, providing for the selection
of Dien Bien Phu-Lyndon B. Johnson, of a government for the entire country by
Harry S. Truman, and other leading Demo- free general elections to be held in 1956.
crats issued ill-timed statements condemn- Similarly, the assignment of two north-
ing administration policy in Southeast Asia eastern provinces of Laos as sanctuaries for
on vague grounds. The New York Times on troops of the Communist Pathet Lao not
May 7, under the headline, "Democrats Open wishing to be demobilized was, by the terms
All-Out Assault on Administration Foreign of the agreement, temporary- "pending a
Policy," reported: political settlement."
"An all-out Democratic attack on the The United States did not sign any of the
Eisenhower administration's foreign policy, three treaties concluded at Geneva nor the
the first such attack since the President took conference declaration. Nor did South
office, was opened tonight. Vietnam.
"The effect was to put the administration At Geneva the United States issued a uni-
on dual notice (1) that the bipartisanship lateral declaration pledging not to use force
of the last 16 months was breaking up and to disturb the agreements and warning that
(2) that the congressional Democrats could renewed aggression in violation of the agree-
not be counted upon for unquestioning ments would be viewed as a threat to inter-
general support in the field of world affairs." national peace and security. At the same
The article quoted Mr. Johnson as saying: time President Eisenhower announced that
"It is apparent only that American foreign steps would be taken to establish collective
policy has never in all its history suffered defense against communist aggression in
such?-Et stunning reversal. southeast Asia.
"W,g have been caught bluffing by our ene- The attitude of the U.S. Government
mien. Our friends and allies are frightened toward Geneva was summarized by the Presi-
and wondering, as we do, where we are dent, "7.'he agreement contains features
headed. which we do not like, but a great deal de-
We stand in clear danger of being left pends on how they work in practice." 16
naked and alone 'in a hostile world." The chief flaw of the Geneva settlement
Despite this effort by the loyal opposition lay in provisions relating to the Interna-
to pull the rug out from under the Eisen- tional Control Commissions, set up to super-
power administration as the critical Geneva vise the execution of the agreements. The
Conference opened, the United States at- Commissions, composed of representatives of
tempted to salvage what, could be saved, Canada, India, and Poland, could act only
Representatives of nine governments as- by unanimous vote in cases involving viola-
sembled at Geneva to ring down the curtain tions of the territory covered by the agree-
on the French empire in Asia--Great Bri- meats. A veto in the hands of a Commu-
tain, the Soviet Union, France, Communist nist representative was an instrument for
China, the United States, the Democratic sabotage.
Republic of Vietnam (north), the State of Reaction to Geneva
Vietnam (south), Cambodia, and Laos. The negotiations at Geneva produced a
Three similar armistice agreements. were flood of criticism of the Eisenhower admin-
concluded relating to Vietnam, Laos, and istration':. foreign policy.
Cambodia, and a declaraPlon was issued. Yet all of the critics flatly opposed the
Besides stipulations on the cessation of only step which remained to undo the Com-
hostilities and pledges against resumption, mun:ist conquest in Indochina-the commit-
the armistice agreements provided for with- ment of American troops to a long and
drawal of foreign troops and prohibited Laos, costly war. General Ridgway estimated
Cambodia, and the two parts of Vietnam that 5 to 10 American combat divisions would
from joining any military alliance or grant- have been required at the outset to win
ing military bases to foreign powers. , such a war .11
The Geneva Agreements in. effect recognized Critic MIKE MANSFIELD said, "Almost all
as Communist territory Vietnam north of the opinions converged on one point: The United
17th parallel and two provinces in north- States should not b
---
i
.:'0, 1966
"No, I was never in favor of intervention
and I am. opposed to it now. I think it would
be suicidal. I believe the worst thing that
could happen to the United States would be
to have our forces intervene in Indochina
and then bog down in the jungles there." is
Senator John F. Kennedy said:
"I am ,:rankly of the belief that no amount
of American military assistance in Indochina
can conquer an enemy which is everywhere
and at the same time nowhere, an. enemy of
the people which has the sympathy and
covert support of the people * * *. I do
not think Indochina can be saved unless the
other Asiatic nations * * * are willing to
take their fair part in the struggle * 41 *.
For the United States to intervene unilater-
ally and to send troops into the most difficult
terrain in the world, with the Chinese able
to pour in unlimited manpower, would mean
that we would face a situation which would
be more difficult than even that encountered
in Korea. It seems to me it would be a, hope-
less situation." 10
Senator Estes Kefauver had this to say:
"But if the decision is to be made to inter-
vene, I say this Nation needs more than the
help of Great Britain, of Australia, of New
Zealand, and of France. It must have the
moral and physical support, in addition to
the Philippines and Thailand, of Burma, In-
donesia, Ceylon, Pakistan, and if not the
help, at least the understanding of India." '
Senator HuBERT HUMPHREY said, "We have
had our bluff called two or three times in the
last month. We have been defeated at
Geneva." Somewhat illogically, since he op-
posed military intervention by the United
States, Senator HUMPHREY attributed the de-
feat at Geneva to cuts made by the :Eisen-
hower administration in the defense budget.-'1
The critics were not in agreement on the
basis for their attacks on the administration.
Adlai Stevenson thought the United States
was too rigid and inflexible in negotiations.-1
MIKE MANSFIELD thought the United States
should not have negotiated at all but should
have stayed away from the Geneva Con-
ference,23 ignoring the fact that such pro-
visions as that permitting Vietnamese who
wished to escape Communist control to move
to South Vietnam were the result of the bar-
gaining effort of the representatives of this
Nation.
Finally, the critics undermined their case
by conceding that the war in Indochina was
lost because of French colonialism and not
because of anything the United States did
or failed to do. Adlal Stevenson made the
point when he declared, "Had France 11 * *
granted genuine independence in orderly,
sincere stages to Vietnam, there very likely
would have been no war in Indochina."
The disputed election of 1956
The final declaration issued at Geneva in
1954 (subscribed to by neither the United
States nor South Vietnam) called for free
elections to unify all of Vietnam in 1956
.
Recently Senator FuLBRIGHT and others have
deplored the fact that the election was not
held.
At Geneva the representatives of what was
to be South Vietnam "vainly protested
against the partition of the country and
against the principle of general elections
being agreed upon when more than half of
the voters would be north of the 17th par-
allel. It vainly asked that the whole terri-
tory and population be placed under the
me nvo
ved alone in
11 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD, loc. cit. and p.
eastern Laos--Phongsaly and Sam-Neua. a shooting war in Indochina." At another 10007.
Presenting the agreements to the French time. he said: "CONGRESSIONAL RECORD, April 6, 1954, p.
Parliament, Premier Mendes-France char- 4673.
acterized them as "cruel because they sane- 14 "Aggression," p. 26. 2' CONGRESSIONAL RECORD, June 9, 1954, p.
tion cruel facts." They reflected, he declared, ]' Bernard B. Fall, "How the French Got 7919.
"losses already suffered or made Inevitable by Out of Vietnam," New York Times Magazine, 21 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD, June 16, 1954, p.
the military situation," 13 May 5, 1965, .p. 113. 8342.
1 "Background," p. 68. 22 New York Times, October 17, 1954.
ia, New York Times, July 23, 1954. 9999, ONGRESSIONAL RECORD, July 8, 1954, p. 23 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD, July 8, 1954, p.
v997.
Approved For Release 2005/06/29 : CIA-RDP67B00446R000400110008-8
 Approved For Release 2005/06/29 : CIA-RDP67B00446R000400110008-8
September 20, 1966 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - HOUSE
control of the United Nations until the re-
establishment of peace and security would
permit the holding of really free general
elections." 22
The reasons for the refusal of South Viet-
nam to acquiesce in the holding of the elec-
tion were stated by Prime Minister Diem on
July 16,1955:
"We did not sign the Geneva agreements.
We are not bound in any way by these agree-.
ments entered into against the will of the
Vietnamese people.. Our policy is a policy of
peace, but nothing will divert us from our
goal: the unity of our country-a unity in
freedom and not in slavery.
"We do not reject the principle of elec-
tions as a peaceful and democratic means
to achieve unity. But elections can be one
of the foundations of true democracy only
on the condition that they are absolutely
free. And we shall be skeptical about the
possibility of achieving the conditions of
free elections in the north under the regime
of oppression carried on by the Vietminh." 25
There was clearly no legal obligation on
the Government of South Vietnam to abide
by the terms of the final declaration. The
position of South Vietnam on this point
was sustained by the United Kingdom, one
of the co-chairmen of the Geneva Conference,
in the following statement:
"Her Majesty's government has always re-
garded it as desirable that these elections
should be held and has advised the Gov-
ernment of the Republic of Vietnam to en-
ter into consultations with the Vietminh
authorities in order to insure that all the
necessary conditions obtained for a free ex-
pression of the national will as a preliminary
to holding free general elections by secret
ballot. Nevertheless, Her Majesty's govern-
ment does not agree that (South Vietnam)
'is legally obliged to follow the course: * * *
It may be recalled that at the final ses-
sion of the Geneva Conference on Indo-
china * * * the Vietnamese Government
formally protested 'against the hasty con-
clusions of the Armistice Agreements by.the
French and Vietminh high commands only'
* * * and 'against `the fact that the French
high command was pleased to take the right,
without a preliminary agreement of the dele-
gation of (South Vietnam), to set the date
of future elections.' Among the staunchest opponents of the
holding of the 1956 election was Senator
John F. Kennedy, of Massachusetts. He is-
sued "a plea that the United States never
give its approval to the early nationwide elec-
tions called for by the Geneva Agreement of
1954. Neither the United States nor free
Vietnam was a party to that agreement-
and neither the United States nor free Viet-
nam is ever going to be a party to an elec-
tion obviously stacked and subverted in ad-
vance, urged upon us by those who have al-
ready broken their own pledges under the
agreement they now seek to enforce." 27
Even Hans Morgenthau spoke against ac-
tion to carry out the provisions of the Geneva
declaration relating to elections:
"Free elections are very subtle instruments
which require a dedication to certain moral
values and the existence of certain moral
conditions which are by no means prevalent
throughout the world, and certainly not
prevalent in either North or South Viet-
nam;" 28
`11 "Vietnam at the Crossroads of Asia," Em-
bassy of Vietnam, Washington, D.C. (1960)
p. 17.
25Francis J. Corley, "Vietnam Since Ge-
neva," Thought, vol. 33, No. 131 (winter
1958-59),p.564.
.29 "Vietnam and the Geneva Agreements,"
London, May 1956, p. 9.
27 "A Symposium on America's Stake in
Vietnam," American Friends of Vietnam, New
York, 1956.
23 Ibid.
Conditions in South Vietnam, 1954-60
As South Vietnam began its existence, the
prospects for its survival were minimal. In-
dependence was thrust upon a people with-
out political experience and without political
leadership. It had no sense of nationhood.
It had no industry. And, by the Geneva
declaration, it seemed doomed to being swal-
lowed up by the Communist rulers of North
Vietnam in 2 years.
Some of the difficulties facing the newly
selected Prime Minister Ngo Dinh Diem were
outlined by one observer in these words:
"The circumstances under which the man
came to power were unbelievable. He faced
the opposition of the Communists * * * he
also had to deal with the open hostility of
French miiltary men and the remnants of
the French colonial service, who regarded
him as anti-French, and who expected him to
last only a few weeks at the most. Then, as
a consequence of a provision of the Geneva
accords, authorizing free movement between
the north and south zones for a limited pe-
riod, more than 850,000 refugees came into
South Vietnam from the Communist North
Vietnam during the next 300 days, to be
fed, clothed, and housed. In addition, he
found that his 'full powers, civil and mili-
tary,' an extraordinary grant which Bao Dal
had conceded him as a condition of his ac-
ceptance of office, existed principally on
paper." 2?
Yet when the Eisenhower administration
left office, South Vietnam had a stable and
established government.
Senator John F. Kennedy called the devel-
opment "a near miracle." In his book,
"Strategy of Peace," published in 1960, he
said:
"In what everyone thought was the hour of
total Communist triumph, we saw a near
miracle take place ... Today that brave lit-
tle state (South Vietnam) is working in free
and friendly association with the United
States, whose economic and military aid has,
in conditions of independence, proved ef-
fective." '0
Senator MIKE MANSFIELD, on February 26,
1960, reported as chairman of the Subcom-
mittee on State Department Organization
and Public Affairs of the Senate Committee
on Foreign Relations:
"By any measure Vietnam has made great
progress under President Ngo Dinh Diem in
the improvement of internal security, in the
creation of the forms and institutions of
popularly responsible government where be-
fore few existed, and in the advancement of
the welfare of the people of Vietnam. The
V.S. aid program has been an important fac-
tor in that progress. It is still an important
factor." 31
The State Department's white paper of De-
cember 1961, "A Threat to the Peace," con-
tains the following analysis of progress in
South Vietnam:
"The years 1956 to 1960 produced some-
thing close to an economic miracle in South
Vietnam. Food production rose an average
of 7 percent a year and prewar levels were
achieved and passed. While per capita food
production in the north was 10 percent lower
in 1960 than it had been in 1956, it was 20
percent higher in the south. The output of
textiles in the south jumped in only 1 year
from 68 million meters (in 1958) to 83 mil-
lion meters. - Sugar production in the same
1-year span increased more than 100 percent,
from 25,000 metric tons to 58,000 metric tons.
"Despite the vastly larger industrial plant
inherited by the north when Vietnam was
partitioned, gross national product is con-
2? Wesley R. Fishel, "Free Vietnam Since
Geneva," Yale Review (autumn 1959), p.
70.
"Strategy of Peace," pp. 61-62. -
31 U.S. Aid Program in Vietnam, report of
the Subcommittee on State Department Or-
ganization and Public Affairs, Senate Foreign
Relations Committee, February 26, 1960, p. L
22379
siderably larger in the south. In 1960 it was
estimated at $110 per person in the south and
$70 in the north. Foreigners who have visited
both north and south testify to the higher
living standards and much greater availabil-
ity of consumer goods in the latter.
"The record of South Vietnam in these re-
cent years is written in services and in im-
proved welfare as well as in cold economic in-
dexes. A massive resettlement. program ef-
fectively integrated the 900,000 refugees from
the north into the economic and social fabric
of the south. An agrarian reform program
was designed to give 300,000 tenant farmers
a chance to buy the land they work for a
modest price. Under the Government's agri-
cultural credit program aimed at freeing the
farmers from the hands of usurers, loans to
peasant families increased fivefold between
1957 and 1959.
"Thousands of new schoolrooms were built
and the elementary school population in
South Vietnam increased from 400,000 In
1956 to 1,500,000 in 1960. A rural health
program installed simple dispensaries in half
of South Vietnam's 6,000 villages and ham-
lets. An elaborate malaria eradication pro-
gram was launched to rid Vietnam of its
most important infectious disease. Doctors
and nurses went into training in South
Vietnam and abroad to serve their people's
health needs.
"This is a part, a very small part, of the
setting against which the Viet Cong launched
their campaign of armed action, subversion,
and terror against South Vietnam. It is a
record of progress over a few brief years
equaled by few young countries." 82
Secretary McNamara added his testimony
on March 26, 1964:
"The United States * * * provided help-
largely economic.
"On the basis of this assistance and the
brave, sustained efforts of the Vietnamese
people, the 5 years from 1954 to 1959 gave
concrete evidence that South Vietnam was
becoming a success story. By the end of this
period, 140,000 landless peasant families had
been given land under an agrarian reform
program; the transportation system had
been almost entirely rebuilt; rice production
had, reached the prewar annual average of
3.5 million metric tons-and leaped to over
5 million in 1960; rubber production had
exceeded prewar totals; and construction was
underway on several medium-size manufac-
turing plants, thus beginning the develop-
ment of a base for industrial growth.
"In addition to such economic progress,
school enrollments had tripled, the number
of primary school teachers had increased
from 30,000 to 90,000, and almost 3,000 med-
ical aid stations and maternity clinics had
been established throughout the country.
And the South Vietnamese Government had
gone far toward creating an effective appa-
ratus for the administration of the nation.
A National Institute of Administration had
been established with our technical and fi-
nancial assistance-a center for the training
of a new generation of civil servants oriented
toward careers of public service as opposed
to the colonial concept of public rule." 38
The progress which, by all this testimony,
was made in South Vietnam between 1955
and 1960, was due in no small part to the
assistance of the United States.
Without the support of the United States,
South Vietnam would have been stillborn.
During fiscal years 1955 through 1961, $2.3
billion-63 percent of it for economic pur-
poses-was provided by the Eisenhower
administration. Technical assistance was
given on a large scale to increase and di-
versify the output of the country's economy
and to spur the achievement of far-reaching
social reforms, notably in the fields of edu-
cation and diffusion of land ownership.
22 "A Threat," pp. 5-6.
33 Department of State Bulletin, April 13,
1964, pp. 563-564.
Approved For Release 2005/06/29 : CIA-RDP67B00446R000400110008-8
 Approved For Release 2005/06/29: CIA-RDP67B00446R000400110008-8
22380 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - HOUSE September 20, 1966
But a viable Vietnam also required security
from outside aggression and from terrorism
and guerrilla activities within the country.
To increase security, the Eisenhower admin-
istration proceeded promptly to form a
regional defense organization, the Southeast
Asia Treaty Organization, and to bring South
Vietnam, as well as Laos and Cambodia,
within its protective cover.
Specifically to meet the threat of infiltra-
tion from North Vietnam and the depreda-
tions of guerrillas in the South, the United
States provided military equipment and
training to the forces of South Vietnam.
' There' can be no question that only the
help of the United States made possible the
survival of South Vietnam. Without it,
everything south of the 17th parallel would
have fallen to the Communists a decade ago.
No commitment of troops by Eisenhower
There is no merit in President Johnson's
repeated explanation of the Nation's present
military involvement in Vietnam as the re-
sult of President Eisenhower's letter of Octo-
ber 1, 1954, to Prime Minister Diem. The
letter, as Secretary McNamara admitted on
March 26, 1964, was in response to a request
for "economic assistance." 11 It promised
'American help for the resettlement of re-
fugees from North Vietnam and an explora-
tion of "ways and means to permit our aid
? ? ! to make. a greater contribution to the
welfare and stability of the Government
of Vietnam." * ? *_In the even such
aid were Supplied," President Eisenhower
wrote, the United States would expect
"assurances .as.to'the standards of. per-
formance." The purpose of this conditional
offer, he said, was "? " * to assist the
Government of Vietnam in developing and
maintaining a strong, viable state, capable
of resisting attempted subversion or aggres-
sion through military means." This was the
extent of the commitment made fu this
letter."'
More recently, the administration has de-
emphasized the Eisenhower letter to Diem
and has argued that the present military
Involvement in Vietnam results from the
Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty
signed at Manila on September 8, 1964.
This Treaty contained no advance commit-
ment to send American troops to fight in
Southeast Asia. It carefully avoided the
kind of automatic response to aggression
embodied in the NATO, agreement, sum-
marized in the principle, "An attack upon
one is an attack upon all."
Section 1 of Article IV of the SEATO Agree-
ment reads:
"1. Each Party recognizes that aggression
by means of armed attack in the treaty area
against any of the Parties or against any
State or territory which the Parties by unani-
mous agreement may hereafter designate,
would endanger its own peace and safety,
and agrees that it will in that event act to
meet the common danger in accordance with
its constitutional processes."
Secretary Dulles, testifying before the Sen-
ate Foreign Relations Committee on the
SEATO Treaty, declared,
"The agreement of each of the parties to
act to meet the common danger 'in accord-
ance with its constitutional processes' leaves
to the judgment of each country the type of
action to be taken in the event an armed
attack occurs."
Further, Mr. Dulles said, the treaty "does
not attempt to get into the difficult question
as to precisely how we act ." ae
In the Senate debate on ratification of the
SEATO agreement, on February 1, 1955, Sen-
ator H. Alexander Smith, a delegate to the
Manila Conference who signed the agreement
on behalf of the United.States, clearly ex-
plained the nature of the commitment in
these words,
"Some of the participants came to Manila
with the intention of establishing an organi-
zation modeled on the lines of the North At-
lantic Treaty arrangements. That would
have been a compulsory arrangement for our
military participation in case of any attack.
Such an organization might have required
the commitment of American ground forces
to the Asian mainland. We carefully avoided
any possible implication regarding an ar-
rangement of that kind.
"We have no purpose of following any such
policy as that of having our forces involved
in a ground war.
"Under this treaty, each party recognizes
that an armed attack on any country within
the treaty area would endanger its own
peace and safety. Each party, therefore,
agrees to act to meet the common danger in
accordance with its constitutional processes.
That means, by implication, that if any such
emergency as is contemplated by the treaty
should arise in that area it will be brought
before the Congress by the President and
the administration, and will be considered
under our constitutional processes. We are
not committed to the principle of NATO,
namely, that an attack on one is an attack
on all, calling for immediate military action
without further consideration by Congress.
"For ourselves, the arrangement means
that we will have avoided the impracticable
overcommitment which would have been in-
volved if we attempted to place American
ground forces around the perimeter of the
area of potential Chinese ingress into south-
east Asia. Nothing in this treaty calls for
the use of American ground forces In that
fashion." 37
One academic authority, W. McMahon
Ball, has written, "The treaty does not oblige
the 'United States either legally or morally to
take any course in Southeast Asia than the
course it might be expected to take if the
treaty did not exist." sa
Article IV of the Southeast Asia Collective
Defense Treaty clearly reserves to each signa-
tory the right to determine the nature of its
response to armed aggression and does not
obligate any signatory to use its armed
forces to deal with the aggressor.
Recognizing this fact, the Kennedy ad-
ministration did not use American forces to
repel Communist aggression in Laos. The
legal commitment of the United States to
Laos was the same as its commitment to
Vietnam. Both of these countries of south-
east Asia were brought under the protection
of SEATO.
Lyndon Johnson as Vice President made
it clear in 1961 that the United States had
not up to that time made a commitment
that obligated it to employ its military forces
in Southeast Asia. In a memorandum to
President Kennedy dated May 23, 1961, right
after his return from a tour of Asia, Johnson
wrote:
"The fundamental decision required of the
United Stactes-and time is of the greatest im-
portance--is whether we are to attempt to
meet the challenge of Communist expansion
now in Southeast Asia by a major effort in
support of the forces of freedom in the area
or throw in the towel. This decision must
be made in a full realization of the very heavy
and continuing costs involved in terms of
Sion of whether we commit major U.S. forces
to the area or cut our losses and withdraw
should our efforts fail. We must remain mas-
ter of this decision." '"'
Finally, General Maxwell Taylor in testi-
mony before the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee on February 17, 1966, demolished
the argument that the Eisenhower adminis-
tration made any commitment to employ
American troops in combat in Southeast
Asia:
Senator HICKENLOOPER. "Now, up until
the end of the Eisenhower administration,
we had only about 750 military personnel in
South Veitnam, did we not?"
General TAYLOR. "It was very small, Some-
thing like that."
Senator HICKENLOOPER: "I think that is
within 25 or 30 of the number, either way,
and they were entirely devoted to giving
technical advice on training to the South
Vietnamese troops."
General Taylor. "That is correct."
Senator HICKENLOOPER: "To your knowl-
edge, did we have any commitment or agree-
ment with the South Vietnamese up to that
time that we would put in active field mili-
tary forces to conduct a war along with
them?"
General Taylor: "No, sir. Very clearly we
made no such commitment. We didn't want
such a commitment. This was the last thing
we had in mind." (Emphasis added)
Senator HICKENLOOPER: "When was the
commitment made for us to actively partici-
pate in the military operations of the war as
American personnel?"
General Taylor: "-Insofar as the use of
our combat ground forces are concerned,
that took place, of course, only in the spring
of 1965." 40
The New York Times of August 19, 1965,
correctly stated the case when it said, "The
shift from military assistance and combat
advice to direct participation by American
combat troops in the Vietnamese war has
... been a unilateral American decision
... by President Johnson."
The beginning of the Communist offensive
Although the Government of South 'Viet-
nam never established unchallenged author-
ity in the entire countryside, a period of
relative peace and stability extended from
1955 to 1959. Late in the latter year the
tempo of guerrilla attacks began to assume
significant proportions.
During 1960 the armed forces of the Viet-
cong began to increase from the level of
3,000 at the beginning of the year. During
this year the Vietcong assassinated or kid-
napped more than 2,000 civilians. Acts of
terrorism were directed particularly against
local officials in rural areas to leave the coun-
tryside leaderless.
The signal from North Vietnam for in-
tensification of the conflict came on Sep-
tember 10, 1960, at the Third Congress of
the Communist Party of North Vietnam with
a call for the liberation of the south from
the "rule of the U.S. imperialists and their
henchmen." In December the National
Front for Liberation of South Vietnam was
formed by Hanoi.
III. THE KENNEDY ADMINISTRATION
The Democratic administration which took
office in January of 1961 was confronted not
only with problems in South Vietnam but
with far more acute difficulties in the neigh-
boring nation of Laos. In Vietnam sporadic
guerrilla attacks were going on. In Laos,
84 Ibid.
H "Background," pp. 75-78.
67 Hearings before Senate Committee on
Foreign Relations, concerning southeast
Asia Collective Defense Treaty, 83d Congress,
2d Session, November 11, 1954, Part I, p. 4.
be made with the knowledge that at some
point we may be faced with the further deci-
39 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD, February 1, 1955,
p. 1053.
""A Political Peexamination. of SEATO,"
International Organization (winter 1958), p.
20.
~ Johnson memorandum appears in Wil-
liam S. White's "The Professional: Lyndon
B. Johnson" (1964), p. 243.
40 Hearings before Senate Committee: on
Foreign Relations concerning Supplemental
Foreign Assistance bill (S. 2793), 89th Con-
gress, 2d Session, February 17, 1966, Part I,
p. 450.
Approved For Release 2005/06/29 : CIA-RDP67B00446R000400110008-8
 September 20, 1966 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - HOUSE 22381
Communist Pathet Lao forces were engaged of ? the 1954 Geneva Agreement) proclaimed The importance of Laos arises less from its
in a full-scale offensive that threatened the the neutrality of Laos, required the with- military significance, however, than from the
government of Premier Boun Oum. drawal of foreign troops, established a con- fact that it tested the resoluteness of the
Laos trol commission composed of Poland, India, Government of the United States. When the
and Canada, but it showed no trace of the administration retreated repeatedly from its
Recognizing seriousness of the altos- addressed principles laid down by Secretary Rusk when announced positions in the case of Laos,
drdyeseed nnedy ad the Conference opened. Each member of the the Communists might well have concluded
tion in
tion in Laos, the os, President in Kennedy
news conference
himself to this subject
on March 15, 1961. The President said: Control Commission was to possess the power that the United States would in time back
"Recent attacks by rebel forces indicate to veto any decision except a decision to Ini- down in South Vietnam.
bate an investigation. Averell Harriman drew a distinction be-
that a small minority backed by personnel Six months before the Geneva Agreement tween the two nations, pointing out that
and supplies from outside is seeking to pre- of 1962 was signed, the State Department Laos was landlocked and could be defended
vent the establishment of a neutral and in- issued an anguished complaint about the only by ground forces. "In Vietnam, on the
dependent country (of Laos). We are de- failure of the Control Commission in Viet- other hand,. he said in a statement that has
termined to support the government and the nam to function in dealing with 1,200 inci- an ironic ring today, "a decision to assist
people of Laos in resisting this attempt." 41 dents of alleged Communist violations of the the Republic of Vietnam to defend itself
, against the sort of attack being waged in
On March 23 the President warned, * * if
there a sa a peaceful solution, there must 1954 Nevertheless, agreement. Harriman called the that country would not involve the deploy-
is to be .
be a cessation of the present armed attacks 1962 agreement "a good agreement-better ment of U.S. combat forces and would not
by externally supported Communists * * * ? than I thought we would work out." 55 require the occupation of foreign territory
No one should doubt our resolution on this Mr. Harriman's appraisal makes interesting by the United States or other Western
point * * * all members of SEATO have un- reading in the light of the following remarks forces." 48
dertaken special treaty ? responsibilities by Secretary Rusk two years later on June 14, Vietnam
toward an aggression in Laos." 42 1964: In May of 1961 Vice President Johnson was
Sixteen months later the Government of "What happened? The non-Communist sent to Vietnam. There he lavished praise
the United States acquiesced in a settlement nations complied with the agreements. on Prime Minister Diem, comparing his host
which terminated any responsibility which North Vietnam and its Pathet Lao puppets to Washington, Jackson, Wilson, Franklin D.
the SEATO powers had toward Laos and im- did not. We promptly withdrew our 600-man Roosevelt, and Winston Churchill. He as-
posed on that country a coalition government military aid mission. North Vietnam kept sured Diem that the United States was with
including Communist representation. Ac- several thousand troops and military techni- him all the way."40
ceptance of this settlement by the govern- cians in Laos. North Vietnamese cadres are The result of the Vice President's trip was
ment of Laos recognized by the United States the backbone of almost every Pathet Lao bat- a substantial increase in American aid for
was brought about by suspension of Amer- talion. This was, and is, of course, a major military, economic, and social purposes.
moan aid. violation of the Geneva accords. American manpower, the Vice President re-
Although American spokesmen said that "Later, North Vietnam sent additional ported, was not needed.
the United States would not negotiate on the forces back into Laos-some of them in orga- The Vice President's trip to Vietnam was
subject of Laos until a cease-fire was in effect, nized battalions--a second major violation. the first of several by important adminis-
on May 16, 1961, Secretary Rusk appeared at "The North Vietnamese have continued to tration figures. It set a pattern which was
the opening of the Geneva Conference ready use, and improve, the corridor through Laos to be followed without variation by the
to negotiate. A cease-fire had, it is true, been to reinforce and supply the Vietcong in South others-a rash of optimistic statements on
proclaimed on May 3 but the Communists Vietnam-a third major violation, the status and future prospects of the mili-
kept on fighting. How spurious the an- "The Communists have continued to ship tary struggle and an extension of American
pounced cessation of hostilities was can be arms into Laos as well as through it-another involvement either in the form of aid or
judged from the fact that the United States major violation. manpower or both.
on May 30 submitted to the conferees at "The Pathet Lao and the North Vietnamese The year 1961 saw the development of the
Geneva a list of 38 Communist breaches of Communists have compounded these inter- conflict in Vietnam from covert guerrilla ac-
the cease-fire agreement. Throughout the national felonies by denials that they were tion to open, if still small-scale, war. In that
14 months of the Geneva Conference, viola- committing them. year for the first time the Vietcong com-
tions continued On May 7, 1982, the Pathet "But there was another major violation mitted forces of battalion size to combat.
Lao captured the city of Nam The, after a which they could not deny. They barred For the first time they launched an attack on
d the May 12, ocupation. the Comf of freedom of access to the areas under their a community as important as a provincial
of 4 By siege t forces complete
monist in a 0-m e bcontrol, both to the Lao Government and to capital. The infiltration of Communist
the cease-fire Laos e a that compelled ampr advance the beyond ey United the International Control Commission. The troops from the north, facilitated by unchal-
t cease-fire send that personnel to Royal Lao Government, on the other hand, lenged Communist control of eastern Laos,
States sd 5,0 f military reat" to opened the areas under its control to access increased. By the end of 1961, the state
Thailand d because o of the "grave e threat"
not only by the ICC but by all Lao factions. Department estimated that between 8,000
that country.
The United States continued to negotiate "The Communists repeatedly fired at per- and 12,000 regular Vietcong troops were in
South Vietnam-at least double the number
at Geneva. It no longer even protested viola- sonnel and aricraft on legitimate missions present there 1 year earlier. The United
bons of the cease-fire. under the authority of the Royal Lao Gov- States doubled its forces of military advisers
At the outset of the Geneva Conference on ernment. They even fired on ICC helicop- in South Vietnam from fewer than 700 sta-
May 17, 1961, Secretary Rusk said that the ters. They repeatedly violated the cease- boned there when President Eisenhower left
United States would insist on "effective con- fire agreement. And this spring they office to 1,364.
trols, effectively applied to maintain a gen- launched an assault on the neutralist forces In the period 1961 to 1963 the number of
uinely independent Laos." As a "yardstick of General Kong Le, driving them off the American troops in South Vietnam grew from
which will influence the attitude of the Plaine des Jarres, where they had been since 1,364 to 18,575. The amount of aid, military
United States toward the work of this con- early 1961. and economic, was increased substantially,
ference," he laid down flue principles dealing "This, in bare summary, is the Communist although the exact figures for military aid
with the operation of the body which would record of aggression, bad faith, and deception are classified after fiscal year 1962.
In the late summer and fall of 1963, the
supervise the execution of the agreement.48 in Laos." 46
They were inspired by unhappy experience Laos today is ripe for picking by the Com- internal crisis in South Vietnam arising from
with the international control commissions munists whenever they choose to use the conflict between the Diem regime and the
established to police the Geneva agreements force necessary to take over the entire coun- Buddhists produced a deterioration of the
of 1954. - try. military situation and a decision by the U.S.
In summary, Secretary Rusk's principles Communist control of large areas of Laos Government to encourage a change of horses.
boiled down to these: that no member of the has had a direct bearing on military opera- American aid was cut back. Official state-
supervisory'-Commission should possess a veto tions in South Vietnam. The State Depart- ments indicating lack of confidence in the
power by which it might prevent the execu- ment noted that Laos "provides not only a Diem government and calling for a change
tion of decisions of the majority of the com- route into South Vietnam but also a safe of personnel and policy were issued. Diem
mission and that the commission must enjoy haven from which Vietcong units operate." was removed in a military coup and was as-
full freedom of action and of movement It also asserted that "the pace of infiltration sassinated along with his brother Ngo Dinh
throughout the territory in which it was to of officers and men has jumped markedly Nhu.
function. since Pathet Lao victories in Laos have as- There is general agreement now that the
The Declaration and Protocol on Neutrality sured a relatively safe corridor through that coup of November 1963 led to chaos in South
in Laos, signed July 21, 1962 (the anniversary country into western South Vietnam." n Vietnam and resulted in substantial Viet-
cong gains.
41 "Public Papers of the Presidents, John F.
Kennedy," 1961, p. 185. 44 "A Threat," p. 24.
42 Ibid., p. 214. Washington Post, July 25, 1962. ss "What We Are Doing in Southeast Asia,"
4s "Documents on American Foreign Rela- Le Department of State Bulletin, July 6, New York Times Magazine, May 27, 1962, p.
tions 1961," Council on Foreign Relations, 1964, pp. 4-5. 544? Saigon Times, May 11-14,1961.
1961.
1982, pp. 311-318. 47 "A Threat," p. 10. y
Approved FtrRe.lease 2005/06/29 CIA-RDP67B00446R000400110008-8
 22382
Approved For Release 2005/06/29 : CIA-RDP67B00446R000400110008-8
CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - HOUSE September 20, 1966
Strangely, the setbacks that occurred at
the end of 1963 and the beginning of 1964
began only, 1 month after Secretary, McNa-
mara and General Taylor returned from
South Vietnam with an optimistic report.
So strong was their optimism that an imme-
diate reduction of the American force In
South Vietnam by 1,000 men was announced
and the prediction was made that virtually
all American troops would be withdrawn by
the end of 1965.
The text of the White House announce-
ment of October 2, 1963, follows:
"Major U.S. assistance in support of this
military effort is needed only until the in-
aurgency has been suppressed or until the
national security forces of the Government
of South Vietnam are capable of Suppressing
it. Secretary McNamara and General Taylor
reported their judgment that the major
part of the U.S. military task can be com-
pleted by the end of 1965, although there
may be a continuing requirement for a lim-
ited number of U.S. training personnel.
They reported that by the end of this year,
the U.S. program for training Vietnamese
should have progressed to the point where
1,000 U.S. military personnel assigned to
South Vietnam can be withdrawn," 11
IV. THE JOHNSON ADMINISTRATION
During the administration of President
Johnson the United States has become a
full-fledged combatant in a conflict that is
becoming bigger than the Korean War.
President Johnson has raised American
troop strength in Vietnam from 16,000 at the
end of 1963 to Approximately 300,000 in late
Today at least 85,000 other American serv-
ice personnel are offshore or in bases in
nearby countries supporting the military ef-
fort in Vietnam, making total troop strength
in the area approximately 385,000.
Reliable estimates indicate that the na-
tton's forces in Vietnam will increase to be-
tween 375,000 and 400,000 by the end of 1966
and will continue growing thereafter,
The maximum number of American
ground forces at any time in Korea in the
last Asiatic war In which this country was
involved was 302,483.
Thus far In 1966, American casualties are
running at a rate of 35,000 a year-still be-
low the annual rate of 46,000 in the Korean
War.
More and more, under President Johnson,
the United States has assumed the major
responsibility for the war despite the Pres-
ident's pledge not to commit American
troops. In Akron, Ohio, on October 21, 1964,
Mr. Johnson promised ". . . we are not. about
to send American boys nine or ten thousand
miles away from home to dq what Asian boys
ought to be doing for themselves." I"
Since President Johnson assumed his pres-
ent office, the fringes of the war have spread
in Laos and Into Thailand.
Sporadic ground fighting goes on in Laos
as Communist forces push toward Thailand
where 25,000 American servicemen are sta-
tioned, most of whom are engaged in air op-
erations in Laos and North Vietnam.
Thailand has been subject over the past
the extended Laotian border, and the South, 28, 1965, the President said "our goal .
along the short border with Malaysia. [is] . . . to convince the Communists that
The more ominous Communist activity is we cannot be defeated by force of arms." s
carried on in the Northeast by Pathet Lao In more specific terms, the President on
from Laos and infiltrators from North Viet- April 20, 1964, expressed willingness to ac-
nam.. They seek support not only among cept "any settlement which assures the in-
the ten million peasants in the area, for dependence of South Vietnam and its free-
whom Lao rather than Thai is the predomi- dom to seek help for its protection." "' His
nant language, but also from among 40,000 speech of April 7, 1965, at Johns Hopkins
North Vietnamese refugees who migrated University seemed to discard the freedom of
across Laos in the early 1950's to escape the South Vietnam to seek help for it protection,
war with the French. for on that occasion the President defined
Besides the commitment of a large force the objective in contradictory terms as "an
to ground warfare, the Johnson administra- independent South Vietnam-securely guar-
tion has escalated the activity of the Air anteed and able to shape its own relation-
Force, In February 1965 it began sustained ships to all others-free from outside inter-
bombing of large areas of North Vietnam. ference-tied to no alliance-a military base
In late June 1966 it began to attack oil stor- for no other country."' Clearly South, Viet-
age facil':ties in areas around Hanoi and Hai- nam would not have freedom to shape its
phong which had been off limits to American relationship to other countries if it were
bombers before that time. barred from ties with alliances or from pro-
Along with intensification and expansion viding a military base to another country.
of its military activity, the Johnson admin- Experience suggests that without an ally
istration has taken extraordinary steps to South Vietnam would not be securely guar_
bring bout negotiations to end the fighting. anteed.
In March 1965 the President announced On July 28, 1965, the President seemed to
willingness to enter unconditional negotia- discard the independence of South Vietnam
tions, reversing the policy proclaimed by as an objective. Declaring that the "pur-
Secretary Rusk two weeks earlier barring poses" of the 1954 Geneva agreements "are
negotiations until Hanoi showed readiness still our own," he asserted that "the people
to cease aggression 5" of South Vietnam shall have the right to
The Johnson administration suspended shape their own destiny in free elections-
bombing of North Vietnam for 6 days in May in the South or throughout all Vietnam
of 1965 and again for 37 days from Decem- under international supervision." 5"
ber 24, 1965 to January 31, 1966 With a Again, in January 1966, the State Depart-
flamboyance rarely used in diplomacy, it ment, outlining American peace terms In
then unleased a "peace offensive," sending Fourteen Points, called the Geneva Agree-
several emissaries on a whirlwind tour of ments "an adequate basis for peace in
non-Communist world capitals to advertise Southeast Asia." There is room for doubt
the administration's desire for peace, It has that a third Geneva Agreement would suc-
blessed the efforts of other nations and of ceed in bringing peace when two such agree-
public and private intermediaries to bring ments have failed.
about a conference to discuss peace. As the The point here, however, is that to propose
bombing of North Vietnam was resumed, it a third Geneva Agreement is to water down
turned tc the Security Council of the United the announced objective in Vietnam. The
Nations on January 31, 1966, requesting that Geneva Agreement of 1954 did not provide
it call a conference. for "an independent South Vietnam," which
The administration has dangled a carrot President Johnson earlier declared to be the
before the enemy by offering "a billion dollar objective of his policy. It envisaged the
American investment" for the regional de- unification of North and South Vietnam and
velopment of Southeast Asia, Including the its effect, through an election which, in the
development of the Mekong Rivera plan words of John F. Kennedy, would have been
similar, except for the cost, to one proposed "stacked and subverted in advance," would
by the Eisenhower administration 10 years have been Communist control of all of
earlier. At the Honolulu Conference of Feb- Vietnam.
rpary 1966, the administration pledged Amer- The call for a return to the Geneva Agree-
lean aid in creating a new social and eco- ments raises the disquieting possibility that
nomic order in South Vietnam-a pledge the present administration is ready to accept
which Vice President HUMPHREY expanded in Vietnam the type of election which the
into "realizing the dream of the great society United States rejected a decade ago.
in the great area of Asia." ,, Further, the arrangements for supervising
While promising lavish use of American the execution of the Geneva Agreements of
economic resources for Asian development, 1954 and 1962 do not meet the standards
the administration has been strangely un- set by the President that South Vietnam
willing to use American economic power in must be "securely guaranteed." A super-
support of America's fighting men. It has visory commission including a Communist
moved slowly to restrict the trade of North member armed with the power to veto deci-
Vietnam with other nations, to end the use slons of the majority will never provide a
of free world shipping to North Vietnam, and secure guarantee.
to prevent the scandalous diversion of a sub- In early 1966 .the objective of the adminis-
stantial part of Its own economic aid into tration in Vietnam became murkier. Sena-
illicit and hostile hands in South Vietnam. for ROBERT KENNEDY then proposed a settle-
Deescalation of the objective of the United ment of the war which would admit the
States Viet Gong to "a share of power and respon-
sibilit
" i
y
n South Vietnam. This proposal
year to small-scale but growing Communist As the military effort of the United States in effect looked toward settling the problem
infiltration and subversion. In the words in Vienam has burgeoned and as peace offen- of Vietnam as the problems of Poland, Ru-
of a top U.S. official on the scene, it "could saves have waxed and waned, the pronounce- mania, Bulgaria, and Czechoslovakia were
be another Vietnam." ?' The subversion, ments of President Johnson defining the ob- settled after World War II and as the prob-
which increasingly takes the terroristic form jective of the United States have been lem of Laos was settled in 1962.
used in Vietnam-murder of village officials, progressively watered down. Although HUDERT HUMPHRE- denounced
school teachers, and police-is confined On December 31, 1963, the President, in a the Kennedy proposal as ". . . putting a fox
mainly to two areas-the Northeast, along letter to Gen. Duong Van Minh, said the in the chicken coop ... an arsonist in a fire
objective was "achieving victory."" On July department," President Johnson refused to
"" "Background," p. 110.
rs "Public Papers of the Presidents, Lyndon Rusk, News Conference, February 25, "e "Weekly Compilation of Presidential Doc-
B. Johnson," 1963-64, Vol. II, p. 1391. 1965, Department of State Bulletin, Vol..LII, uments," August 2, 1965, Vol. I, No. 1, p. 15,
Baltimore Sun, August 8, 1966. The No. 1342, March 15, 1965, p. 370. "9 "Public Papers of the Presidents, Lyndon
American official quoted was Tracy S. Park, 54 New York Times, April 20, 1966. B. Johnson," 1963-64, Vol. I, p. 498.
Director, U.S. Operations Mission in Thai- 61 "Public Papers of the Presidents, Lyndon ""Background," p. 207.
land. B. Johnson," 1963-64, Vol. I, p. 106. "" "Background," p. 241.
Approved For Release 2005/06/29 : CIA-RDP67B00446R000400110008-8
 ,;eptemner zu, lioo
endorse his Vice President's stand, and
White House Press Secretary Moyers declined
to rule out as unacceptable the inclusion of
Vietcong in a South Vietnamese government
selected at a peace conference 00
If placing Communists in a South Viet-
namese government as part of a peace settle-
ment is acceptable to the President-as it is
to many influential members of his party,
all the fighting in Vietnam-all the sacri-
flces-all the bloodshed-make no sense.
The silence of the President on the issue
in the Humphrey-Kennedy disagreement
suggests abandonment of the objectives
stated by Secretary Rusk on January 21, 1966,
"the government of South Vietnam is a
matter which should be determined by the
people of South Vietnam themselves. We
ourselves have supported and continue to
suport the idea of free elections in which the
South Vietnamese people can make these
decisions rather than have these decisions
made for them by imposition from the out-
side." 01
MISCALCULATION
The President has told the Nation, "This is
really war."
. To what degree miscalculation on the part
of the enemy has brought about this state of
affairs, no one can be sure. It is clear, how-
ever, that many of the words and deeds of
the past few years could only have encour-
aged underestimation of the constancy and
firmness of the Nation in the pursuant of its
foreign goals.
. The whole handling of the problem of Laos
could have no result other than the conclu-
sion that the United States would not match
its words with deeds,
The administration said that it would not
permit aggression against Laos to succeed,
btu it did.
The administration said that it would not
begin negotiating about Laos until a cease-
fire had been put into effect, but it did. ,
The administration indicated that it would
not accept a peace settlement in Laos which
granted a veto to any member of the Com-
mission established to supervise the peace,
but it did.
Miscalculation was the natural result of
the withdrawal of American backing for the
Diem government. For the United States
had pledged its support to Diem "all the
way," in Lyndon Johnson's phrase in 1961.
Abrupt reversal of policy leading to the over-
throw of the leader whom the Government of
the United States had been ardently sup-
porting and whose downfall was a major
Vietcong objective could appear only as evi-
dence of weakening of the resolve of this
Nation. Whether the error was the commit-
ment to support Diem "all the way" or con-
nivance in Diem's downfall, the net effect
was to cast doubt on the value and dura-
bility of a pledge of support by the United
States.
Miscalculation was encouraged by Presi-
dent Johnson's campaign oratory of 1964.
In order to make his opponent appear reck-
less and trigger happy, the President in sev-
eral statements set limits to American par-
ticipation in the Vietnamese conflict which
were to be exceeded after the election.
Philip L. Geyelin, foreign affairs expert of
the Wall Street Journal, summarized the
President's campaign theme in these words,
. It was not his [Johnson's] commitment
to Vietnam, it was Dwight Eisenhower's;
while he intended to honor it, he also intend-
ed to avoid a, deeper U.S. involvement in the
fighting." 62
60 Presidential News Conference of Feb. 26,
1966, New York Times, Feb. 27. Moyers com-
ment: New York Times, Feb. 23, 1966, pp. 1,
12.
81 Rusk News Conference, Department of
State Bulletin, February 7, 1966, Vol. LIV,
No. 1389, p. 190.
6? Geyelin, Philip L., "Lyndon B. Johnson
and the World." New York 1966, p. 195.
For example, on August 12, 1964, the Presi-
dent said:
,,some others are eager to enlarge the con-
flict. They call upon us to supply American
boys to do the job that Asian boys should
do." 0?
Again, on August 29, the President de-
clared:
"I have had advice to load our planes
with bombs and to drop them on certain
areas that I think would enlarge the war,
and result in our committing a good -many
American boys to fighting a war that I think
ought to be fought by the boys of Asia to
help protect their own land. And for that
reason, I haven't chosen to enlarge the
war." 04
On September 25, the President said,
"There are those that say you ought to
go north and drop bombs, to try to wipe out
the supply lines, and they think that would
escalate the war. We don't want our Ameri-
can boys to do the fighting for Asian boys.
We don't want to get involved in a nation
with 700 million people and get tied down
in a land war in Asia." 611
On September 28, the President said,
"Some of our people--Mr. Nixon, Mr.
Rockefeller, Mr. Scranton, and Mr. Gold-
water-have all, at some time or other, sug-
gested the possible wisdom of going north in
Viet-Nam.
We are not going north and we are
not going south; we are going to continue
to try to get them to save their own freedom
with their own men, with our leadership,
and our officer direction, and such equip-
ment as we can furnish them." 00
On October 21, the President said,
"We are not about to send American boys
9 or 10,000 miles away frolft home to do what
Asian boys ought to be doing for them-
selves." ??
Two days before the 1964 election, as
though to put the President's campaign
promises to the acid test, the Vietcong di-
rectly attacked the U.S. airbase in Bien Hoa,
wounding 76 and de-
ans
i
A
y
,
mer
c
killing five
stroying several aircraft. This was a more information, public opinion cannot wisely
serious challenge than the attack in Tonkin guide and restrain public policy.
Gulf, which caused no American losses but The examples of lack of candor about
which was met by an aerial attack on North Vietnam are legion.
Vietnam. This time, however, there was no The administration, for example, has con-
response from the United States. sistently concealed difficulties and dangers
the failure of the United States to with optimistic pronouncements and pre-
respond to the Bien Hoa provocation," dictions.
Philip Geyelin wrote, "coming on the heels Consider such statements as the following
of a conciliatory Vietnam line in the cam- by Secretary McNamara:
paign, in which Lyndon Johnson plainly "Actions taken there [in Vietnam] have
made manifest his profound disinclination proved effective and will prove more effective
to widen the war, must certainly have en- as time goes on." (Jan. 17, 19.62.)
couraged Hanoi and Peking in the belief that "Progress in the last 8 to 10 weeks has been
Tonkin had been a special case, and that U.S. great. The Government has asked only for
installations could be attacked with im- logistical support. Nothing but progress
punity." 08 and hopeful indications of further progress
"Perhaps," Secretary Rusk was quoted in in the future." (May 12, 1962.)
the New York Times as saying, "the Com- "Our military assistance to Vietnam is
munist world misunderstod our Presidential paying off. I continue to be encouraged.
campaign." 0? Perhaps, indeed, it did. Per- There are many signs indicating progress."
haps the Communist world expected the (July 25, 1962.)
President's policy after the election to con- "There is a new feeling of confidence that
form to his campaign speeches. victory is possible in South Vietnam."
One respected White House correspondent (Jan. 31, 1963.)
Charles Roberts of Newsweek, has written, "The major part of the U.S. military task
The President . told me in May can be completed by the end of 1965, al-
1965, that he had made the decision to bomb though there may be continuing require
[North Vietnam] . . . four months before ment for a limited number of U.S. training
Pleiku." TO The time of decision, then, would personnel." (Oct. 2, 1963.).
b 1I'eve that
a
t
60 "Public Papers of the Presidents, Lyndon
B. Johnson," 1963-64, Vol. II, p. 952.
'? Ibid., p. 1022.
6G Ibid., p. 1126.
08 Ibid., p. 1164.
64 Ibid., p. 1391.
oR Geyelin, Philip L., "Lyndon B. Johnson
and the World." New York 1966, pp. 200, 201.
60 Henry F., Graff, "How Johnson Makes
Foreign Policy," New York Times Magazine,
July 4, 1965, p. 16.
40 Roberts' "LBJ's Inner Circle," New York
1965, p. 21.
have been October 1964 at the height of the
Presidential campaign.
Whether the decision to strike at the North
was made then or not, it is clear that
throughout the campaign South Vietnam
was perilously close to collapse. The Presi-
dent must have known, even as he offered as-
surances of no further involvement that
South Vietnam would go down the drain un-
less the military effort of the United States
was drastically augmented.
Describing the campaign, Philip Geyelin
has written, "What developed was a deadly
race against time; increasingly the question
agonizing the war-planners in Washington
and Saigon was whether South Vietnam
could be kept from crumbling without a
much more vigorous U.S. effort before No-
vember 3."
"Meanwhile, there were clear signs of grow-
ing anxiety, if not at the highest official level,
at least at the lower working levels of the
government; the experts could read the signs
in the increased political shambles in Saigon,
in the increased rate of infiltration, in the
tide of war that was running unmistakably
against the South Vietnamese. 'It is going
to be close,' said one of the State Depart-
ment's most reliable authorities as the U.S.
election day approached.""
It is impossible to measure the cost of the
President's deceptive campaign oratory of
1964 and the postponement until after the
election of a step-up in the military activity
of the United States in Vietnam. How many
American casualties and how much expendi-
ture of American economic resources might
have been avoided by telling the truth in
1964 and by earlier use of American air power
against important military targets will never
be known.
Lack of candor on the part of the
administration
The lack of candor of the administration
encourages the enemy to miscalculate. It
also misleads and confuses the American
public. Thus it strikes at the vitals of our
stem of government, for, without reliable
s
o
"We have every reason
[U.S. military] plans will be successful in
'1964." (Dec. 12, 1963.)
"With these further measures, we felt that
a start could be made in reducing the num-
ber of U.S. military personnel in Vietnam as
their training missions were completed. Ac-
cordingly, we announced that about 1,000
men were to be withdrawn by the end of
1963, and expressed the hope that the major
part of the U.S. military task could be com-
71 Philip L. Geyelin, "Lyndon B. Johnson
and the World." New York 1966, pp. 193, 198.
Approved For Release 2005/06/29 : CIA-RDP67B00446R000400110008-8
 22384
CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - HOUSE September 20, 1966
plated by the end of 1965, although we recog- reduced the total of Viet Cong wounded "This reduction In military activity is cus-
nized that there might be a continuing re- claimed since 1961 in the Vietnam war. The tomary under conditions of political dis
quirement for a limited number of U.S. enemy casualty claim was cut by about half, order. It has happened every other time we
advisory personnel." (Jan. 30, 1964.) lie asserted. have had political disorders.""
"We are confident these plans point the Representative PIKE said the figure of There has been an inexplicable lack of
Way to victory." (March 1964.) 72 365,000 wounded was replaced with one of candor about peace feelers. On May 7, 1965,
It would be tedious to detail the facts that 182,000 in figures given the House Armed President Johnson said:
showed how remote each of these pronounce- Services Committee at a secret briefing. He "For months now we have waited for a
ments was from grim reality. Two examples said the lower figure was "slipped in" be- sign, a signal, even a whisper, but our offer
Will suffice. cause, apparently, the old one was growing so of unconditional discussions has fallen on
Secretary Rusk declared ir}_the course of a large as to be unrealistic.70 unreceptive ears. Not a sound has been
visit to Vietnam on April 20, 1964, that things On April 4, 1966, President Johnson gave heard. Not a signal has been sighted." 8
were showing "steady improvement" The the startling figure of 50,000 as the number Again on July 13, 1965 the President de-
headline in the New York Times 2 days later of enemy dead in Vietnam since the be- dared:
read, "Reds inflict heaviest toll on South ginning of the year A? It is impossible to "I must say that candor compels me to tell
Vietnam Army." It had been the bloodiest reconcile this figure with Defense Depart- you that there has not been the slightest in-
w0ek of the war, the Times reported, with meet estimates of changes in enemy dication that the other side is interested in
1000 Vi
t
m
e
na
,-
ese Government and 23 Ameri
can casualties.
n November 29, 1965, Secretary Mc-
Namara said "we have stopped losing the
war." 78 Yet, during the period when, ac-
cording to the Secretary, we were losing the
war, he made statements acclaiming "prog-
ress" and exuding optimism on no less than
14 separate occasions.
Neither the Congress nor the public has
been accurately and fully informed about
the Nation's involvement in Vietnam, Amer-
ican military personnel were called advisers
long after they became combatants.
As American ground forces were introduced
into Vietnam, the Nation was told that their
"primary mission ... Is to secure and safe-
gutrd important installations like the air-
base at Da Nang . . .1, Secretary McNamara
added assurances that "they should not
tangle with the Vietcong." 72
The President announced on Yuly 28, 1965
that the movement of 125,000 American
troops to Vietnam did "not imply any change
in policy whatever."
S8
The able Saigon correspondent of the Los
Angeles Times, Jack Foisie wrote:
"Although the decision to commit large-
scale American combat units in Vietnam is
apparent, and is obvious to the enemy
through the buildup of logistical bases on the
central coast, authorities in Washington try
to pretend that we really are not committed
to land warfare in Asia, to casualties as
large or larger than suffered during the
Korean War." 77
There has been a lack of candor about the
casualties in Vietnam. The figures fed to
the public by the Administration contradict
Department reported there were 271,000 although the U.S. has made some dozen sep-
enemy troops In Vietnam, up 41,000 from arate attempts to bring them about." N6
January 1. If the President's figure on But in November, 1965, the respected re-
deaths is accepted, the. enemy's strength on porter Eric Sevareid in a Look magazine
July 1 could have been achieved if the article 87 recalled an interview with the late
enemy added 15,000 men a month to its Adlai Stevenson on August 12, two days be-
forces and if not a single enemy Soldier died fore his death in London. Ambasador Steven-
in the second quarter of 1966. Secretary son told Sevareid that U.N. General Secretary
McNamara, however, has testified that the U Thant bad secured the agreement of North
enemy is capable of adding no more than Vietnamese authorities to meet with a repre-
9000 troops a month to its forces in South sentative of the United States in Rangoon in
Vietnam 8i late 1964. After the election, Sevareld wrote,
A correspondent of the Washington Post, U Thant renewed the offer, and this time it
Howard Margolis, after surveying casualty was Secretary McNamara who reportedly ve-
figures released by the administration, con- toed it.
eluded: The greatest shortage which the Viet-
"The impression all this leaves Is that the namese war has so far produced is a short-
publicly released statistics are more a se- age of candor and accuracy and purpose.
lection of numbers intended to paint a RESULTS OF THE JOHNSON ADMINISTRATION'S
picture that supports whatever the official EFFORTS
view is at the moment than a realistic in- The measurable result of 300,000 American
dicatlon of how things are going." 1?2 troops, 30,000 American casualties, and sev-
There has been a lack of candor about eral billion American dollars since 1961 in
the cos, of the war in Vietnam. In 1965 and Vietnam is a stalemate.
again in 1966 the Administration's initial The administration's own assessment of
request for defense appropriations was based the result is expressed in such phrases as
on outdated estimates of military needs. "We have stopped losing the war" and "Our
Congress, in January of 1966, thus had to forces and these of our allies will not be de-
.appropriate an additional $13 billion needed feated by the Communists in Vietnam."
for defense in fiscal year 1966. As it acted. . The amount of territory controlled by Sai-
on defense appropriations for fiscal 1967, in- gon today is far less than it was when Diem
formed Members of the Congress predicted was overthrown. No marked progress has
a supplementary request for $5 to $15 billion. been made in extending the control of the
In defense funds in January 1967-after Saigon government in the past two years.
the 1966 election. Estimates of the percentage of land area of
When State Department spokesmen as- South Vietnam under government control
serted that the widespread civil disorders in given in 1966 by Members of Congress with
South Vietnam following the Honolulu Con- access to classified information range from
Terence had no effect on military operations, 20 to 40 per cent.
they were less than candid. The shrinka
e in
t
g
con
rol of the population
Vietnamese casualties since 1960 ,that was 50 How false this war is clear from the omi- is apparent in the turnout in the two most
per cent higher than the figure General nous statistics released two days after such a recent national elections, 6,300,000 voted in
Wheeler gave 1 month earlier. It is hard to statement was made 8"-statistics indicating 1963 under the Diem regime, 4,200,000 are
believe that casualties in 1 month in 1965 that American troops sustained more than reported to have cast ballots in the election
increased so dramatically.- twice as many casualties during the preced- of September 11, 1966 for the Constituent
On May 5, 1966, Representative OTIS PIKE, brig weal: as did the South Vietnamese. Assembly. The official estimate claims that
Democrat of New York, charged that the Secretary McNamara on April 20, 1966, gave 54 per cent of the population is under control
Department of Defense had "surreptitiously" the Senate Foreign Relations Committee an of the Ky government 88
ar
isl
f th
a
o
ppaoe military situation during
Enemy forces, despite reports of heavy
the civil disturbances that flatly contra- casualties, have increased in South Vietnam
72 McNamara's statements were reported in dicted that of the State Department. The at a rate of one half that of the American
the New York Times on the dates indicated Secretary of Defense testified: r
78 Hearings of House Committee on Foreign "The military operations have been at a enemy forces grew by 52,000; American forces Affairs lower level because of the political disorders by 100,000. In August 1966, the Defense
De- I, the last approximately 2 weeks . . . the partment estimates put enemy forces at 282,-
1968, Part II, March 30, 1966, p. 313. number of Vietcong killed is oft 40%, the 000 or 177 combat battalions-far in excess
71Whlte House statement, "Background number of Vietcong killed per week last week of the prediction Secretary McNamara made
Information Relating to Southeast Asia and was 600, it averaged a thousand and five for on March 3, 1966, when he said that 155
Vietnam" (first revision, June 16, 1965) Sen- the first three months of the year. The enemy battalions "could be in South Viet-
ate Committee on Foreign Relations, p. 230. number of weapons lost by Vietnamese for- nam by the end of 1966." 89
Wall Street Journal, June 17, 1965. ces, the number of weapons captured is also
7? "President's News lt...,,f
,. of Jul
?
erenc
y 28
ha
ang on Post, July 29, 1965.
77 Los Angeles Times, July 25, 1965.
'Rusk speech, American Foreign Service
Association, Washington, D.C., June 23,
1965-"From 1961 to the present " ^ *
South Vietnamese armed forces have lost
some 25,000 dead and 51,000 wounded"
Wheeler speech, San Francisco, May 7, 1965,
"More than 50,000 South Vietnamese soldiers
have been killed or wounded in battle since
1960."
Approved For Release 2005/06/29 : CIA-ROP67B00446R000400110008-8
7#' Washington Post, May 6, 1966.
8