VIETNAM

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP67B00446R000400100011-5
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 14
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 21, 2005
• Sequence Number: 11
• Publication Date: August 17, 1966
• Content Type: OPEN

A-1350
r
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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - APPENDIX August
Occupying a $68,000 Indian-owned plant
building and aided by a $232,000 loan from
the Crow Tribe, the firm makes battery charg-
ers for cordless electric toothbrushes and an
electronic device for disinfectant units. A
third product-a battery charger. for cordless
electric knives-will be manufactured later
this month. By year's end, Indian employees
are expected to reach 80, all trained under
a contract between the company and the Bu-
reau.
The plant has only one non-Indian em-
ployee, the manager. He says that tardiness
and absenteeism are lower than in any man-
ufacturing plant with which he had been
associated. Under his direction, several In-
dians are being readied for supervisory posi-
tions over jobs that are rated as electrical
assembler, mechanical assembler, inspector,
and tester.
Varying degrees of skill are required. One
item in production involves 19 separate hand
operations, assignments in which the patient
and careful Crows are particularly adept.
The new industry, U.S. Automatics, Inc.,
came into being last November through a
$300,000 investment by the Crow Tribe. This
was approved by the tribal Industrial De-
velopment Commission and the Bureau of
Indian Affairs. The new building occupied
by .the industry is leased to the company.
At the outset, some Crows were skeptical
of the industrial undertaking in view of
heavy tribal investment in developing the Big
Horn Recreation Area for- tourism. This
area, near the scene of Custer's Last Stand, is
,noted for. the annual outdoor drama staged
by the Crows in reenacting the famous battle
against the 7th Cavalry.
On the drawing boards at the Crow Reser-
vation are plans for an industrial park where
the new plant building is located. The Eco-
nomic Development Administration has ap-
proved a tribal request for a $241,000 grant
for this purpose. The Crows will contribute
an additional $60,00q to develop a 40-acre
tract with all necessary accommodations,
from natural gas to loading and unloading
ramps. Construction may start next month.
Sixth Anniversary of Gabon's
Independence
HON. ADAM C. POWELL
OF NEW YORK
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Wednesday, August 17, 1966
Mr. POWELL. Mr. Speaker, today the
people of Gabon celebrate their sixth
year of independence, and I wish to take
this opportunity to extend my warmest
greetings to His Excellency Leon Mba,
President of Gabon; and to His Excel-
lency Louis Owanga, Gabon's Ambas-
sador to the United States.
The Government of Gabon has been
making impressive strides in the im-
provement of the nation. Possessing one
of the best educational systems in equa-
torial Africa, 85 percent of the school-
age children are in school.
The economy of this former French
colony has, been based primarily on ex-
ports of WQod, Gabon is the world's
principal exporter of okoume, a soft wood
.which is particularly suitable for ply-
wood. Besides wood, Gabon has been ex-
porting iron, oil and manganese. Of spe-
cial importance are the manganese de-
posits at Moanda-believed to be the
world's largest.
In the hope of alleviating the shortage
of manpower, the government has waged
an extensive battle against endemic dis-
eases. The government has been diligent
in its efforts to provide needed transpor-
tation and communication facilities for,
country. There are over 3,000 miles of
roads and railroads being constructed in
an attempt to further exploit the nation's
mineral resources in the interior.
Gabon has been a member of the
United Nations since 1960 and is also a
member of the African and Malagasy
Union, a larger grouping of twelve
French-speaking nations.
So we see that Gabon is a small nation
well on its way to taking its place among
the more developed nations in Africa.
Relations between Gabon and the United
States have been friendly in the past, and
I am sure will remain cordial in the fu-
ture. It is a pleasure to extend my best
wishes to the people of Gabon on their
sixth anniversary of independence.
SPEECH
OF
HON. RAY J. MADDEN
OF INDIANA
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Monday, August 15, 1966
Mr. MADDEN. Mr. Speaker, our Na-
tional Capitol is again honored by being
selected as the host city for the 44th
Supreme Convention of the Older of
AHEPA and its auxiliary organizations.
This great national fraternal order' of
Greek American citizens has made a
major contribution over the years not
only to its own members and the. Greek
community but also through its coopera-
tion with civic, educational, and chari-
table projects beneficial to citizens of our
local communities, State and Nation.
The organization's charitable work has
been outstanding alld has continued for
almost a half century. It has rendered
a great service to immigrants of Greek
descent in enabling them to become es-
tablished and obtain educational advan-
tages so as to better enjoy the freedoms
and opportunities that this land of
liberty extends to all its citizens regard-
less of race or religion.
AHEPA has been in the forefront in its
aid and contribution toward aiding dis-
aster victims regardless of nationality.
This activity is not limited to the United
States but extends throughout the world.
The AHEPA organization has been in-
strumental in promoting friendships and
close ties not only with Americans and
their countrymen in their native land but
with people in many other nations.
AHEPA and its members have coop-
erated in a major way in all our patriotic
endeavors: the promotion of loyalty, par-
ticipation in drives to eliminate poverty,
and other political, social, and civic ac-
tivities.
I wish to join along with other friend's
of the Order of AHEPA in wishing them
many years of continued activity in their
efforts toward peace, self-government,
and freedom for all nations throughout
.the globe.
Vietnam
EXTENSION OF REMARKS
HON. GLENARD P. LIPSCOMB
OF CALIFORNIA
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Wednesday, August 17, 1966
Mr. LIPSCOMB. Mr. Speaker, under
leave to extend my remarks, I submit for
inclusion in the RECORD a column by Jack
Foisie from the August 12, 1966, issue of
the Los Angeles Times.
Mr. Foisie, longtime Times Saigon bu-
reau chief who is now home on leave,
presents his observation about behind
the scene activities with regard to reports
that a manpower buildup is needed in
Vietnam.
The column follows:
THE ROSE-TINTED VIETNAM VIEW
(By Jack Foisie)
The Johnson Administration seems deter-
mined to keep the public looking at the Viet-
nam war through rose-tinted glasses.
With Congressional elections coming up
in November, neither the man in the White
House, nor his Secretary of Defense, wants
to read that the war, if progressing at all, is
moving at a snail's pace in terms of long-
range objectives.
Or that, with the present troop levels, the
war cannot possibly be won in eight years.
Or even with more than double the 300,000
Americans presently in Vietnam, the war
cannot be won within five years.
So when a rash of stories were cabled out
of Saigon to this effect early this week, a
"Pentagon spokesman" denied that there was
any such thinking among the generals.
The denial was artful. He said neither the
Defense Department nor the Joint Chiefs of
Staff has any studies which reach those pes-
simistic conclusions.
Maybe, it was suggested the following day,
some of the individual services have made
studies which are glum on progress in Viet-
nam. But they really aren't high level
enough to count for much.
At his Tuesday press conference, President
Johnson said: "We have not been able to find
any of those reports in the government here."
It is more than coincidence that numerous
reporters in Saigon, including The Times'
William Tuohy, produced very similar stories
at the same time. This is a sure tipoff that
the stories were products of a "background"
briefing for correspondents by someone high
in the American military. He was willing
to talk frankly if he wouldn't be quoted.
This may sound like a sneaky way of doing
business, but "background without attribu-
tion" has been for years a device used by
the administration for getting across a par-
ticular point of view without being held
responsible for the thinking. And the mili-
tary in Saigon was merely employing the
same method.
Reporters don't enjoy being "used" in
such fashion. But particularly during times
of diplomatic crisis, the backgrounder ap-
pears to be a defensible practice, and a means
of informing the readers of some facts-of-life
which would never be revealed by authorities
on an attributable basis.
The mystifying thing about the current
Saigon "backgrounder" Is that the informa-
tion coming out of it was slapped down by
the Pentagon.
Although not always is there complete
agreement between the generals in the field
and those In the Pentagon, there is seldom
lack of coordination between them.
Particularly on how to use the press to
their best advantage, there is tight control
by Assistant Defense Secretary Arthur Syl-
vester.
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August 17, 1966
'Questionnaire
CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - APPENDIX
EXTENSION OF REMARKS
OF
HON. KEN W. DYAL
OF CALIFORNIA
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Wednesday, August 17, 1966
Mr. DYAL. Mr. Speaker, In May I
mailed an opinion questionnaire to my
cranstituents in the 33d Congressional
District, of California. Today I wish
to thank the 10,836 persons who were
sufficiently concerned'to take the time
to complete and return this question-
r.,aire.
The responses were immediate and
enthusiastic. I am very gratified with
the number of persons who elaborated
their views, either with notes on the
questionnaire or with letters. It has
been both enlightening and helpful to
hear from so many good citizens.
This questionnaire was not printed
at Government expense. It was mailed
to postal patrons to obtain a cross-sec-
tion of opinion on important, current
Issues.
As I insert the results of this question-
naire in the RECORD, for my colleagues
and the Nation to see, I wish to mention
that the 33d Congressional District com-
prises all of San Bernardino County.
In area, it is the largest county in the
United States, with 20,160 square miles,
and a population of more than 670,000.
This second fastest growing county in
California is extremely diverse, with
mountains, desert, and valleys combin-
ang spectacular scenery, yet we have
large cities as well as agriculture, in-
dustry, and fine tourist attractions. My
congressional district is as diversified
as the United States itself, in many
ways, and our people's opinions are
'worth noting.
Mr. Speaker, I insert, at this point,
the tabulation of my questionnaire re-
sponses :
[Answers in percent]
4. If Congress determines that additional
funds are needed for fiscal 1967, how should
they be raised? (Indicate first, second, and
third preference.)
Increase corporate income taxes------- 35.9
Increase personal income taxes -------- 21.9
,Increase excise taxes__________________ 33.1
Increase borrowing___________________ 9.1
5. Interest rates: The Banking and Cur-
rency Committee of the House of Represen-
tatives may consider legislation to make the
Federal Reserve Board more responsive to the
fiscal and monetary policies established by
the administration. Renewed interest in this
program has been sparked by the Board's
recent decision to increase interest rates in
opposition to the position of the President
and his economic advisors. Would you favor
such a change?
Yes ------------------------------------ 29.6
No ----------------- ------------------- 50.4
No opinion ------- ------------------- 20.0
6. Do you believe changes are needed in our
foreign assistance program?
Yes --------------------------------- 97,6
No ----------------------------------- .8
No opinion --------------------------- 1.6
If yes, please indicate what changes are
needed:
Increase military aid__________________ 1.2
Increase economic aid________________ 5.0
Decrease military aid_________________ 21.1
Decrease economic aid________________ 20.5
Be more selective in nations receiving
aid -------------------------------- 44.7
Cut off all aid ------------------------ 7.5
7. Do you feel that Federal expenditures
for space exploration should: (Check one.)
Be increased ------------------------- 13.3
Be reduced -------------------------- 40.2
Remain the same -------------------- 46.5
8. Do you favor greater Federal effort (in-
cluding higher costs) to control air and
water pollution?
Yes ----------------------------------- 73.0
No ------------------------------------ 23.8
No opinion .--------------------------- 3.2
9. Do you favor Federal control over aspects
of the unemployment compensation system.
now handled by the States, removing the,
requirement that employers be taxed accord-
ing to their employment record?
Yes ------------------------------------ 15.8
1. What do you think the United States
should do in Vietnam? (Check one.,)
Expand the war, including the use of
nuclear weapons___________________ 10.3
and the war b conventional means
y
No ------------------------------------ 68.5
No opinion .-------------------------- 15.53
10. Do you favor legislation to require sell-?
p
Without using nuclear weapons---- 28.3 ers to give accurate estimates of total Inter-
Continue current policy of military est charges to purchasers (truth in lending) ?
support --------------------------- 15.8 Yes---------------------- -- 92.4
Withdraw our military troops imme-
diately--------------- --- No No------------------------------------ 6.1
Other ------------------------------- 29.0 No opinion--------------------------- 9
2. Do you favor negotiations for peace In 11. Do you favor legislation regulating
Vietnam? packaging and labeling of consumer goods
Yes -------------------- ------------- 70.3 (truth in packaging)?
No ---------------------------------- 26.2 Yes---------------------------------- 91.6
No opinion--------------------------- 3.5 No-------------------------------------- 6.:3
8. If Congress determines that we must No opinion___________________________ 2.1
reduce spending, in what areas do you think 12. Please check what you favor doing with
cuts should be made? (Indicate first, sec- the following programs in the war on poverty.
ond, and third preference.)
Project Headstarl.:
Agricultural subsidies--------------- 21.5 Increasing --------------------------- 34.7
Thespaceprogram -------------------- 13.6 Reducing ---------------------------- 31.8
Defense spending ---------------------- 5. 0
War on poverty ------------------------ 20.0 Keeping same______________________ 33.5 Veterans' benefits ---------------------- 4.0 Domestic Peace Corps:
.Foreign 'aid -------------------------- 31.9 Increasing----. -------- -------------- 22.9
Public works programs (including con- Reducing --------------------------- 46. 5
struction of dams and highways) ___ 4.0 Keeping same______________________ 30. 6
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Job Corps:
Increasing --------------------------- 33.0
Reducing --------------------------- 38.1
Keeping same---------------------- 28.9
Neighborhood Youth Corps:
Increasing-------------------------- 35.7
Reducing--------------------------- 36.3
Keeping same---------------------- 28.0
Work-study grants for college students:
Increasing-------------------------- 48.8
Reducing--------------------------- 21.8
Keeping _________ 29.4
Special small business loans_ :
Increasing-------------------------- 44.4
Reducing--------------------------- 20.7
Keeping same_______ _____________ 24.9
13. Do you believe the war on poverty will
decrease our welfare load in:
1 year ------------------------------- 1.9
5 years ----------------------------- 13.0
10 years ---------------------------- 17.1
Never ------------------------------- 68.0
14. Do you favor legislation extending Fed-
eral safety standards to the manufacture of
automobiles?
Yes --------------------------------- 61.1
No ---------------------------------- 29.0
No opinion-------------------------- 4.9
15. Do you favor uniform traffic laws
throughout the United States to avoid traf-
fic accidents?
Yes --------------------------------- 85.7
No ---------------------------------- 11.6
No opinion --------------------------- 2.7
16. Do you favor having your Congress-
man poll you for your views on important
issues facing the Congress?
Yes --------------------------------- 97.2
No ----------------------------------- 1.4
No opinion -------------------------- 1.4
EXTENSION OF REMARKS
HON. JAMES F. BATTIN
OF MONTANA
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Wednesday, August 17, 1966
Mr. BATTIN. Mr. Speaker, in my
State of Montana, American Indians on
seven reservations are making admirable
efforts to better their economic plight,
raise their standard of living, educate
and train their youth for job opportuni-
ties, and participate in all citizen activi-
ties.
The following release by the Bureau of
Indian. Affairs illustrates the success of
one tribe in attracting industry, furnish-
ing and training their own people in the
skills necessary for staffing and operating
an industry which will undoubtedly at-
tract other industry and offer more em-
ployment opportunities. I have unani-
mous consent to include the release in
-the Appendix of the CONGRESSIONAL
RECORD :
NEW COMPANY ON MONTANA'S CROW RESER-
VATION To DOUBLE EMPLOYMENT
A new company that began operating only
a few months ago on the Crow Indian Res-
ervation near Hardin, Mont., plans doubling
its working free in a few months to capital-
ize on the exceptional skill of Indian em-
ployees, the Department of the Interior's Bu-
reau of Indian Affairs reports.
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- -ENDIX-- - - - - - - - - - - -
- - -- -APP-
August 17, 19 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD--
The high-speed communication channels
between Washington and Saigon are used
during the quiet periods to fill in the press
agents at either end. A press conference by
Defense Secretary Robert S. McNamara is
filed to the Saigon military "for your infor-
mation and guidance." And a transcript or
summary of every 5 o'clock "press briefing"
in Saigon goes to the Pentagon molders of
public opinion.
It is highly unlikely that whoever gave
the Saigon correspondents the "back-
grounder" on needing more troops in Vietnam
did so on his own hook, without approval
from his bosses in the Pentagon. The gen-
eral in Saigon may even have known that the
Pentagon would issue an oblique denial of the
need for more troops.
It seems to be one more illustration of
how the administration prefers to "accli-
mate" the public before putting into effect
steps to increase our commitment in Vietnam.
A Good Industrial Neighbor
EXTENSION OF REMARKS
OF
HQN. ROBERT H. MICHEL
OF ILLINOIS
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Wednesday, August 17, 1966
'Mr. MICHEL. Mr. Speaker, I have
unanimous consent to insert in the REC-
onn this editorial that appeared in the
Peoria Journal Star on August 11, 1966,
entitled "A Good Industrial Neighbor."
A GOOD INDUSTRIAL NEIGHBOR
When Jones & Laughlin announced their
plans for a mammoth steel complex at Hen-
nepin, one of the first questions and earliest
answers was to the effect that they would
NOT pollute the river.
Indeed their announcement stated that
they would "put the water back In" in a bit
better condition than it was when they "took
it out."
Well, that's the kind of an announcement
you expect, and then you wait and see if
they are just saying what almost has to be
said, or if they really mean it.
It seems clear already that J&L really
means it.
Among the earliest activities in that huge
construction and development task, we
promptly discover, are very extensive works
and plans for the disposal of damaging
wastes.
These include extraordinary things such
as burial beneath, the ground at unbelievable
depths where such wastes will not only be
far below the river bed, and below the top
soil, but below water tables or any conceiv-
able strata affecting life on the surface.
Industry is desirable for the work it pro-
vides,.the stimulus it provides for all sorts
of economic activity, and, above all, for the
things it manufacturers to the use, advant-
age and convenience of human beings.
But for a community, those industries that
perform those functions in, such a way as to
help its own locale be cleaner, healthier,
and more attractive is most desirable of all.
We are clearly fortunate, and doubly for-
tunate, in the character of our new neighbor
to the north,
Their responsibility to produce steel that
will serve mankind in a thousand ways is
matched by a responsibility to serve directly
as a "good neighbor" at the plant site-and
J&L is displaying its possession this dual
responsibility.
By setting such a standard they also make
themselves an example for other industries,
and the downriver surge of industrial devel-
opment is off on the right foot.
That Is surely good news for all of us in'
this area.
Fly Now, Pay Later
HON. JAMES B. UTT
OF CALIFORNIA
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Wednesday, August 17, 1966
Mr. UTT. Mr. Speaker, on August 15
I issued a statement to the press con-
cerning the airlines strike in which I de-
tailed my views on the subject of con-
gressional action in this matter. I now
note that the Daily Times-Advocate in
Escondido, Calif., published an editorial
on the same subject on August 10. Since
this editorial is in agreement with the
statement Ijssued I would like to insert
in the Ra_CORD both the editorial, entitled
"Fly Now, Pay Later" and my August 15
statement :
[From the Escondido (Calif.) Daily Times-
Advocate, Aug. 10, 19661
FLY Now, PAY LATER
If the House follows the Senate's lead on
a bill to force machinists back to work, the
country may fly now and pay later.
It will pay by bringing compulsory arbi-
tration and federal settlement of labor dis-
putes just that much closer. If that's the
price, it's too high for us.
Turning to Washington for the answer on
labor deadlocks would end collective bar-
gaining in major industries. The unions
don't want this. Management doesn't want
it, even though the air lines applaud and see
no danger in the bill now before Congress.
The Senate has passed a measure which
would make the striking machinists go back
to their jobs with five major air carriers for
a maximum of 180 days while negotiations
continue. Representatives in the House are
considering a similar bill.
Legislative expedience seldom produces
good law. The issues of union power and
freedom of management decision in feder-
ally regulated transportation are proper
concerns of Congress. But they should be
debated at leisure and with an eye on the
long view, not brushed aside in a hasty ef-
fort to end a temporary crisis.
Questions arise. What happens after the
180-day cooling period if both sides are still
cool to a settlement? Does Congress again
act, this time empowering the Administra-
tion to dictate terms? What happens during
the 180 days? Are the air lines going to
get their money's worth from disgruntled
"forced" labor?
An answer to this last one has been sug-
gested by P. L. Siemilier, president of the
International Association of Machinists.
"Union members who return to work will be
extra careful in everything they do," he
says, "for they will not want to shoulder
the blame for any accidents that might hap-
pen after the strike. Extra care takes extra
time . After so many weeks on the picket
line, union members will be tired after eight
hours._ In many instances they will not want
to work overtime."
Translating Mr. Siemiller's euphemisms, a
work slowdown and other obstructionism is
promised.
We can't blame the machinists too much.
Their present wage of $3.23 per hour, while
ahead of the $2.70 average rate for all man-
ufacturing industries, is below that of sev-
A4351
eral comparable trades. Although they are
warned to keep to the President's guide
lines on rate raises, they have seen other
unions ignore the guide lines without so
much as a wrist slap from the White House.
Not only has the President looked away
at this overstepping of guide lines, he has
campaigned for a new minimum wage far
beyond them, has failed to curb domestic
spending, failed to raise taxes and generally
failed to check the inflation he ostensibly
deplores.
To get back to the air lines strike. Though
it has caused marked public inconvenience,
it has by no means brought public catas-
trophe. Railroads and busses are running,
40 per cent of air travel continues uninter-
rupted.
It is still better for Americans to be in-
convenienced, for air lines to lose revenue
and for union members to lose wages than
to invite federal settlement of a major labor
dispute. Perhaps the day is inevitable when
this will happen, but if we can forestall it,
we should.
[Press release of Congressman JAMES B. UTT,
Aug. 15, 19661
Congressman JAMES B. UTT (R-Calif.) to-
day announced that he would oppose enact-
ment of any bill that would cripple the
system of collective bargaining in connec-
tion with the current airline strike. .
In a statement released today, Represent-
ative UTT warned that enactment of pro-
posed legislation would set a precedent that
would result in Congress being forced to
resolve all major labor disputes. The text
of Congressman UTT'S statement follows:
I am opposed to the enactment of any
bill that would cripple the system of collec-
tive bargaining and infringe upon the rights
of individual union members.
It should be understood that my rating
with the AFL-CIO is a big fat "Zero", and
that I have never had any support from
labor unions. Nor have I asked for it. I
am a strong supporter of the open shop
provided for under the Right-to-Work Laws,
and, therefore, I am a constant target of
the Big Labor Barons. According to their
specious reasoning, I should be among the
first to want to punish labor for this un-
called-for disruption in amajor transport
industry of America.
I do not believe that the pending legisla-
tion ordering the unions back to work is a
proper function of either the Administration
or the Congress. A law to force the machi-
nists back to work might be temporarily
expedient, but it would not resolve the prob-
lem in the long run. On the contrary, it
would have the effect of completely destroy-
ing free and open collective bargaining.
The interest of the public must be pro-
tected against labor monopoly, but that pro-
tection can only come from a complete over-
haul of our existing labor laws and would
include the placing of big labor under the
provisions of the Sherman Anti-Trust Act.
The breakdown in present strike negotia-
tions was caused by the rigid misconception
of the President's so-called "guidelines"
which are completely unrealistic.
In the current labor bargaining, there was
a reasonable demand by the airline mechanics
which would elevate their status to a higher
plateau in the entire aviation field. They
want recognition as an important segment
of that industry. It is their job to service
the planes under all conditions and to make
them safe for flying. This is but one echelon
below the responsibilities of the pilots who fly
the aircraft and yet, I am told, the mechanics
pay scale Is less than that of a New York
City garbage collector.
The President and his advisors refused to
recognize this all-important prestige point.
This fouled up the negotiations and the Pres-
ident, having failed utterly to bring about a
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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - APPENDIX August 17, 1966
settlement, tossed the whole mess into the
lap of the Congress.
There are a dozen labor contracts expiring
next year and they are all big ones. If Con-
gress sets this dangerous precedent, it will
find itself resolving every labor dispute that
arises; it will find itself a legislative National
Labor Relations Board; and It will have no
time left over to fulfill its constitutional
duties.
Let it be clearly understood that both labor
and management will be quick to take ad-
vantage of the precedent that would be set,
should the proposed legislation become law.
One party or the other would always be
tempted to "hold out" just a little bit longer
if they knew that sooner or later the Presi-
dent or the Congress would step In.
The President failed to recognize that his
absurd guidelines had been completely sabo-
taged before he went to conference, although
that fact was known by all of the labor lead-
ers, most of the Members of Congress and
much of the public. While the airline strike
has been in progress, the West Coast Mari-
time Union negotiated a five-year contract
with the shippers on the basis of an 8% an-
nual increase, or a total of 40% over a five-
year period. The shippers were happy to sign
this contract because In return the unions
gave up some obsolete work rules so that in-
creased efficiency will increase productivity
commensurate with the increase in wages.
If the.President and the Congress would
make it clear that they will not intervene in Asian peace conference on Vietnam.
matter, thus permitting free collective bar-
gaining, the planes would be flying almost as
soon as they could get them off the ground.
But, as long as the two parties to the dispute
feel that they can shunt the responsibility
for a settlement off on the Government, the
Welcome and Continued Success
SPEECH
or
HON. JAMES HARVEY
or MICHIGAN
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Monday, August 15, 1966
Mr. HARVEY of Michigan. Mr.
Speaker, I join with many other Mem-
bers of the House of Representatives in
welcoming to our Nation's Capital many
representatives of the Order of AHEPA,
currently conducting their 44th supreme
convention.
It is with particular pleasure that I
greet four outstanding citizens from my
own hometown of Saginaw, Mich., who
are participating in the AHEPA conven-
tion. They are Tom Demetriou, a senior
at Wayne State University Law School
in Detroit; Christ A. Anagnost and
Achilles J. "Kelly" Tarachas, two out-
standing young attorneys in Saginaw;
and John Tarachas, pharmaceutical
representative. They represent the Sagi-
naw Valley Chapter No. 216.
The objects and purposes of this fra-
ternal order of some 46,000 Greek-Ameri-
cans clearly illustrates its dedication to
the promotion of good citizenship and
educated, Informed government; to the
appreciation of Hellenic culture; and to
good fellowship and good moral conduct.
I have always; been particularly im-
pressed by the number one object and
purpose of the AHEPA. It is, and I
quote:
To promote and encourage loyalty of its
members to the country of which they are
citizens.
AHEPA's contributions to worthy and
charitable causes; citizenship; civic par-
ticipation; sports; and international. re-
lations have been widely hailed and
rightfully so.
I wish all members of the Order of the
AHEPA continued success and good
health.
Peking Exposes Itself
EXTENSION OF REMARKS
OF
HON. WILLIAM T. MURPHY
OF ILLINOIS
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Wednesday, August 17, 1966
Mr. MURPHY of Illinois. Mr. Speak-
er, there really should be no doubt as to
Red China's designs on the rest of Asia.
Peking itself has once again exposed
the Communist's expansionist aims in re-
jecting Thailand's proposal of an all-
China's genuine objectives in an edi-
torial saying that although Peking wants
U.S. troops out of Vietnam, its goal is
not peace but a clear-cut Communist
victory.
We may collect the benefits of China's
action, however, the newspaper suggests.
Since the proposed conference would
have included uncommitted nations,
Peking's charge that it would serve "U.S.
policies of aggression" should strike all
but out-and-out Communists asp ridicu-
lous.
By inserting this editorial in the REC-
ORD, I hope to call attention once more to
the actual motives of the Communists in
Asia.
The editorial follows:
PEKING HANGS UP AGAIN
Red China has made It plain it will have
no part of a proposed all-Asian peace confer-
ence on Viet Nam. The parley was suggested
by Thailand at a meeting of the Assn. of
Southeast Asia in Bangkok. Word of the pro-
posal had scarcely been made public when
Peking blasted it as another "peace talks
fraud" inspired by the United States. With-
out Red Chinese participation such a parley
would have little meaning.
At this time Peking has nothing to gain in
going alone with the "Peace for Asia Com-
mittee" proposed by Thailand. China's ex-
pansionist aims in Asia are hardly peaceful,
and the military phase of the Viet Nam, war,
having now turned in favor of the allied
forces, 'would allow Peking little or no bar-
gaining leeway. Though it wants American
troops and planes out of Viet Nam, its goal
is not peace but a clearcut Communist
victory.
North Viet Nam, inevitably, followed
Peking's lead and rejected the plan.
It may be, however, that the West will
emerge as a net beneficiary of the proposal
and its outcome.
While the projected conference would have
included Asian nations basically friendly to
the, United States, it also would have had as
participants some of the "neutral" or "un-
committed" countries that tend to lean more
to the East than to the West. To suggest, as
Peking did, that such a parley might serve
the "U.S. policies of aggression and war in
Asia" should strike all but the out-and-out
Communist countries as ridiculous in the face
of China's own aggressive record.
When Peking speaks of peace in Asia, it
means peace on Its own terms-imposition
of Red Chinese hegemony over the con-
tinent. In rejecting the Thailand plan it has
made this clearer than ever to a bigger.-than.-
ever Asian audience.
The Smear Boys Crank Up Again
EXTENSION OF REMARKS
OF
HON. PHILLIP BURTON
OF CALIFORNIA
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Wednesday, August 17, 1966
Mr. BURTON of California. Mr.
Speaker, the San Francisco Chronicle re-
cently ran an editorial entitled "The
Smear Boys Crank Up Again."
This thoughtful editorial by the San
Francisco Chronicle, which has the
largest daily circulation in northern
California, warrants our reading and
consideration:
THE SMEAR BOYS CRANK UP AGAIN
A catch-all bill to punish American citi.-
zens who send blood, medical aid or any
"thing" to a "hostile foreign power" has
been drummed up by the House Un-_Aincri.-
can Activities Committee as a pretext for
holding hearings beginning tomorrow in
Washington. Nine anti-Vietnam activists
from the Bay Area have been subpoenaed,
some of whom are reported to be looking for-
ward to the publicity exposure.
The Berkeley Vietnam Day Committee's
former chairman, Jerry Rubin, has rented a
uniform of the American Revolutionary War
period in which he says he intends to ap-
pear. He probably will be lucky to escape
arrest for impersonating General Washing-
ton, but he is an odds-on bet to make the
Tuesday evening news telecasts, and that is
what seems to matter.
This planned keynote performance on the
witnesses' side is preposterous enough, but
the objective of the Un-American Commit-
tee is a danger to the freedom to dissent and
a transparent effort to smear the protest
movement against the Vietnam war.
Blood collections were taken on the Stan-
ford and other Bay Area campuses last
spring for shipment to North Vietnam and
the Viet Cong. The bill before the commit-
tee, by Representative JOE PooL of Texas,
would punish such an act with 20 years irn-
prisonment. Under present Federal law,
criminal penalties can be invoked against
citizens providing "tangible assistance" to a
hostile power or group only after Congress
formally declared war, The Vietnam war is
undeclared.
Another section of the Pool bill is more
justifiable. It would establish the same
penalty for obstructing or interfering with
a troop train or other movement of the
armed forces. In our opinion such a measure
has validity without regard to whether the
country is in a declared or undeclared war.
The only mystery surrounding it is why It
comes up before the Un-American Commit-
tee, instead of the Armed Services or the
Judiciary Committee, where jurisdiction over
offenses against the military properly be-
longs.
The Un-American Committee should have
been abolished long ago, and might have been
had it not been for the actions of various
activists-Communists and others-who have
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ator' from South Dakota [Mr. MCGOVERN] within the President's budget, as we have Among the questions I would like to
on his offering of this amendment and done here. The McGovern amendment, see if my good friend from Mississippi
his excellent statement explaining the as I understand it, is designed to affirm can answer is, What information, of a
amendment. that right. But it reinforces the Con- nonconfidential nature, do the Armed
Mr.1'rv4dent, I support the McGovern gress determination that the projects Services Committee and the Appropria-
mendinent. the Congress has added to the budget be tions Committee have with respect to the
The Commander in Chief of' 3 Armed advanced without increasing the overall actual number of men presently in Viet-
Forces, President Johnson, within the spending total. nam, broken down into Army, Navy, Ma-
past month asked Congress to take a Mr. CLARK. Mr. President, I should rine Corps, and Air Force?
good, hard look at appropriations meas- like to express my gratitude to the Sen- What information of a nonconfidential
ures and to out funds from these meas- ator from Mississippi [Mr. STENNIS] for nature do those committees have with
ures wherever possible. In fact, many being willing to stay here in order that respect to the present intentions of the
members of the Appropriations Commit- I might develop with him a few questions Defense. Department and the Joint
tee have been visited by high Government which occurred to me in connection with Chiefs of Staff to increase the present
officials urging exactly the kind of cut the pending bill. components?
the McGovern amendment provides. As we know, this is an enormous bill, , Is it the intention of the Joint Chiefs,
These officials proposed that if Con- which runs just under $60 billion. The the Secretary of Defense, and the Presi-
gres decides to increase the budget of way the bill is set up is traditional, and, dent to build up to the level of 400,000
an agency in any respect, it make a cor- to my way of thinking, is uninforma- troops?
responding overall reduction in the re- tive. Is it the intention of the Johnson ad-
mander of the agency budget. This One of the most important questions ministration to increase bombing and
administration suggestion makes emi- which I think should be brought to the tactical .air support in proportion to the
neat good sense. This is what the Mc- floor of the Senate-and I note the Sen- buildup of the ground forces?
Govern amendment does. ator from Oregon [Mr. MORSE] is in the And what can they tell us in terms of
The bill before us appropriates for our Chamber-is, How much of this money expected casualties, American boys who
defense effort approximately half of the is ticketed for Vietnam? will be killed, American boys who will be
funds requested of Congress this year. I wonder if the Senator from Missis- wounded, as a result of the implications
The Committee on Appropriations, espe- sippi would be able to enlighten me in of passing the pending bill?
dally the senior Senator from Georgia any area at all with respect to that ques- I believe this is an important area of
[Mr. RUSSELL], and I may add also the tion- inquiry.
distinguished Senator from Mississippi Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, may I I ask unanimous consent that the
[Mr. STENNIS],'who is the other Senator Interrupt the Senator to say that if he Fortune magazine article which I re-
with great knowledge of defense matters, will give me a few more minutes to get ferred to be printed in the RECORD at this
has done a good job in slicing more than some material together, I shall try to point in my remarks.
.$400 million from the House-passed ver- answer him. There being no objection, the article
sion of the bill. However, the bill still Mr. CLARK. If the Senator will in- was ordered to be printed in the RECORD,
eontains $525,519,000 above the Presi- dicate to me when he is ready, I shall as follows:
dent's budget. The McGovern amend- be glad to yield to him. [From Fortune magazine, April 19661
anent would cut virtually this amount and Mr. STENNIS. I thank the Senator. THE VLETNtu WAR: A COST ACCOUNTING
thus enable Senators to heed our Com- Mr. CLARK. In that connection, (By William Bowen)
wander in Chief's admonition to hold had occasion to scan an article which (The cost analysis for this article was car-
down Federal spending. appeared in Fortune magazine in the ried out by a team consisting of, in addition
The McGovern amendment makes cuts April 1966 issue entitled "The Vietnam to Mr. Bowen: Alan Greenspan, president of
in the Defense Department appropria- 'War: A Cost Accounting," by William Townsend-Greenspan & Co., consultants; P.
'tious bill in the right places: procure- Bowen. This, to my way of thinking, is Bernard Nortman, independent economic
nient, research, development, test, and a very careful and scholarly analysis of consultant; Sanford S. Parker, chief of
evaluation. These are the areas, in- the cost of the Vietnamese war based on FORTuNE's economic staff; and research as-
eluding plant and equipment and hard- information made available to Mr. sociate Karin Cocuzzi.
(The Vietnam war is peculiarly expensive,
ware expenditures, the very type of Bowen. He starts out by saying, at the far more so than is generally thought. Costs
spending that contribute to inflationary head of the article: are running above $13 billion a year, and are
pressures on the economy, the very type The Vietnam war is peculiarly expensive, headed up. Fortune's figures suggest that
of spending that President Johnson has far more so than is generally thought. Costs we're in for bigger defense budgets-and new
urged corporate heads to forgo. are running above $13 billion a year, and economic strains.)
Furthermore, these cuts are less than are headed up. Fortune's figures suggest What happens in the U.S. economy over
percent of the total in this bill, and only that we're in for bigger defense budgets- the next year or two, what happens to de-
1 2.2 percent of the procurement and re- and new economic strains. mand and production and prices and taxes,
will to a large extent depend upon the cost
search funds in the bill-small enough And then it states : of the Vietnam war. If anyone inside the
amounts to be absorbed within the over- The cost analysis for this article was Pentagon knows the current cost, he is not
all defense budget, especially with the carried out by a team consisting of, in addi- telling, nor, of course, is anyone there tell-
leadership and wisdom Secretary of De- tion to Mr. Bowen: Alan Greenspan, presi- ing about costs associated with future oper-
fense McNamara has shown in econo- dent of Townsend-Greenspan & Co., con- ations. Accordingly, Fortune has under-
mizing with the Nation's defense dollar. sultants; P. Bernard Nortman, independent taken on its own to figure out the cost-
When Secretary of Defense McNamara economic consultant; Sanford S. Parker, present and prospective-of the Vietnam
chief of Fortune's economic staff; and re- war. It is already costing a lot more than
appeared before the Joint Economic search associate Karin Cocuzzi. almost anybody outside the Pentagon
Committee a few years ago, he told me, heart of the article I believe is imagines.
in reply to my question, that a competent The At present, with about 235,000 U.S. service-
administrator should be able to save up contained in this paragraph: men in South Vietnam, the U.S. costs are
to 3 percent in a budget of this size with- General William C. Westmoreland, the running at a yearly rate of more than $13
out an adverse effect on the efficiency of U.S. commander in Vietnam, has reportedly billion. Costs, it should be observed at once,
the operation. requested a buildup to 400,000 by the end cannot be translated mechanically into ex-
of December- penditures; a drawdown on inventories in-
This amendment puts the Secretary to Remember, the article appeared in volves a cost, but may not involve an ex-
the test 'An-- this regard, but gives him penditure for quite some time. Still, if the
leeway. It makes no cuts in 60 percent April- war continues at only the present rate
of the budget. It provides only a 2.2- With that many U.S. servicemen in South through fiscal 1967 (the year beginning next
the cost of the war would run to July 1), the resulting Defense Department
tnam
Vi
,
e
cent cut in
percent reduction, not a 3-per
the more than X23.6 billion allocated to $21 billion a year-even more if bombing and expenditures will probably exceed the $10
th develop- tactical air support increased in proportion 'billion or so that the hefty 1967 defense
procurement More ment and research and to the buildup on the ground. At any such ? budget officially allows for the Vietnam war,
meat. leye}_the Vietnam war would bring on eco- But the war, it appears, will get bigger.
r'lnahy, Congress has every right to ap- nomic strains beyond what most economists U.S. Senators who know what Defense De-
p rlate funds for items not included appear to foresee " * *. partment witnesses say in closed congres-
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 Approved For Release 2005/06/29 : CIA-RDP67B00446R000400100011-5
August 17, 1966 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE 18W3
On page 19, line 8, delete "$3,992,300,000"
and insert in lieu thereof "$3,904,469,400."
On page 20, line 4, delete "$1,189,500,000"
and insert in lieu thereof "$1,163,831,000."
On page 21, line 3, delete "$2,122,600,000+'
and insert In lieu thereof "$2,075,902,800."
On page 21, line 19, delete "$51,300,000"
and insert in lieu thereof "$50,171,400."
On page 22, line 9, delete "$1,528,700,000"
and insert in lieu thereof "$1,495,068,600."
Ox; page 22, lines 18 and 19, delete "$1,758,-
600,000" and insert in lieu thereof "$1,719,-
910,800."
On page 23, lines 6 and 7, delete "$3,112,-
600,000" and insert in lieu thereof "$3,044,-
122,800."
On page 24, line 1, delete "$459,059,000"
and Insert in lieu thereof "$448,959,702."
On page 25, line 2, delete "$125,000,000"
and insert in lieu thereof "$122,250,000."
Mr. McGOVERN. Mr. President, I
suggest the absence of a quorum.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The
clerk will call the roll.
The assistant legislative clerk pro-
ceeded to call the roll.
Mr. LONG of Louisiana. Mr. Presi-
dent, I ask unanimous consent that the
order for the quorum call be rescinded.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without
objection, it is so ordered.
Mr. McGOVERN. Mr. President, the
amendment which I have pending at the
desk is on behalf of myself and Senators
CLARK, NELSON, PROXMIRE, and YOUNG Of
Ohio. It is an amendment to H.R. 15941,
the Department of Defense appropriation
bill, 1967.
Mr. President, ] ask unanimous con-
sent that the name of the Senator from
Michigan [Mr. HART] be added as a co-
sponsor to the amendment.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without
objection, it is so ordered.
Mr. McGOVERN. Mr. President, the
pending bill provides for a military ex-
penditure of $58,189,872,000 during fiscal
year 1967. This figure is $525,519,000
more than requested by the administra-
tion in the 1967 budget estimates. While
this represents a desirable modest reduc-
tion in the action recently taken by the
House which approved a bill containing
nearly a billion dollars more than the
administration deemed essential to meet
legitimate defense needs, I am firmly
convinced that additional cuts are neces-
sary in order to avoid wasteful and
needless military spending. My amend-
ment would reduce the procurement and
the research and development titles of
the bill by 2.2 percent for a total reduc-
tion of $522.5 million-a modest reduc-
tion that would bring the bill in line
with the administration's budget request.
America ought to have a defense force
which is second to none, and fully ade-
quate to meet any reasonable need.
However, I believe that the pending bill
goes well beyond legitimate defense and
security needs. The many millions of
dollars which have been added over and
above Defense Department requests will
not add to our security but, more likely,
will weaken our total national strength.
These added expenditures will strain an
already heated economy, add to infla-
tionary pressures, increase the tax bur-
den, and waste valuable human and ma-
terial resources that are needed else-
where. Military waste weakens a nation
as much or more than waste in nonmili-
tary programs.
The Defense Department already has
carryover funds in excess of $42 billion.
The bill as reported to the Senate would
add an additional $58.2 billion, repre-
senting a total in excess of $100 billion
for military spending. The figure to be
appropriated in the pending bill repre-
sents more than the combined cost of
the total Federal budgets of the New
Deal period from 1933 through 1940.
Coming at a time of great economic
stress and strain, I do not believe we can
justify the expenditure of some $525 mil-
lion more than our leading defense
officials have told us will cover our legiti-
mate defense and security needs. Wast-
ing money on unneeded military items
does not strengthen the nation; it diverts
skilled manpower and brains from other
national needs and strains our economy
and our taxpayers. We owe it to our men
who are sacrificing so much in Vietnam
to protect the economy of this nation
against such waste so that the postwar
world will be a time of opportunity for
them--not a time of economic distress
marked by excessive debt and tax bur-
dens.
I think we tend to forget that the de-
fense of a great nation depends not only
upon the quality of its arms, important
as that is, but also on the quality of its
economic, political, and moral fabric. I
deeply regret that even the most ardent
economizers-men who vote with zeal to
cut funds for education, conservation
and health.-are so quick to shout "Aye"
for more billions for arms. It seems to
me that by saving a modest amount of
highly questionable military spending for
more constructive investments, we will
produce a stronger and more effective
America, improve the quality of our lives,
and strengthen the foundations of peace.
It would be ironic, indeed, if our sol-
diers returned from pacifying Vietnam
to discover that they had not yet pacified
Chicago.
The bill before the Senate contains
many millions of dollars for questionable
military gadgets and weaponry not re-
quested by the Government. One of the
most dubious expenditures in this bill is
that of $153.$ million for preproduction
activities for the Nike X antiballistic
missile system. This system may well
cost in excess of $30 billion. Our very
able Secretary of Defense has said that
the construction of an antiballistic mis-
sile system such as this would not `'add
measurably to our safety." Both the
Secretary of Defense and the Chairman
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff agree that
it would be worthless unless it were ac-
companied by a complete fallout shelter
program, the cost of which might even-
tually reach $100 billion. Congress has
given no indication of authorizing such a
shelter program.
The enormity of such costs is stagger-
Ing and the benefits of the system are
highly questionable. Furthermore, it
would doubtless aggravate the arms race
and further weaken the economy. I in-
tend to join other of my colleagues in an
efforts to strike the Nike X funds from
this bill-except those reserved for fur--
ther evaluation-although I want to
make it clear that this is not the purpose
of my amendment which the Senate now
has under consideration.
The amendment which I offer is a very
simple one. It proposes a 2.2-percent
reduction in each of the 14 items in-
cluded in titles III-procurement-and
IV-research and development-of the
bill. These are the two military arms
sections of the bill. The total reduction
proposed in my amendment Is $522.5
million, or nearly the amount which has
been added by the Senate committee
over the 1967 budget requests.
This amendment does not require the
Secretary of Defense to cut out any of
the particular items which have been
added by the Senate. It reduces the bill
to the size suggested by the administra-
tion and gives the Secretary of Defense
the authority he needs to cut out a little
of the fat in our gigantic Pentagon em-
pire-the empire which former Presi-
dent Eisenhower referred to in concerned
terms as the growing military-industrial
complex. President Johnson has urged
private industry to avoid new, nonessen-
tial expenditures for capital plant equip-
ment. I do not believe that the Congress
should do any less in the field of non-
essential military spending.
Of course, it is well known to all Sen-
ators that the President has objected in
concerned" terms to the tendency of
Congress to add on expenditures above
the amount requested by the adminis-
tration, because it is adding undue in-
flationary pressures to the economy
which actually jeopardize our security
and make it more difficult to meet our
commitments at home and abroad,
Moreover, the effect of my amendment
is a limited one. The House has already
passed a bill providing nearly a billion
dollars more than requested in the ad-
ministration budget. By adopting my
amendment which brings the bill down
approximately to the level requested in
the budget, the Senate will merely be
setting the stage for a conference leading
probably to an appropriation about half
a billion dollars in excess of the budget
request. While this result would still
be a matter of regret to me, and still
above the amounts suggested by the De-
fense Department, it is a practical fact
which ought to be taken into account by
the Senate as it votes on this amend-
ment.
Let me say to those Senators who be-
lieve that the Appropriations Committee
is exactly right in the amount of funds
it has recommended, that the practical
way to achieve that figure in final con-
gressional action is to adopt my amend-
ment before the bill goes to conference.
In conclusion, Mr. President, I believe
that the pending amendment is sound
from every point of view. In the Inter-
est of sensible economy and wise defense
planning I urge the Senate to approve it.
Let me just say, before I yield the floor,
the Senator from Wisconsin [Mr. PROx-
MIRE] is a member of the Appropriations
Committee and is an expert on these
matters and has given great thought to
ways in which needless spending can be
eliminated from many aspects of our
Government programs. He has been
most helpful in guiding my own thinking
on this amendment and in helping to
shape it.
Mr. PROXMIRE. Mr. President, I
want to commend the distinguished Sen-
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 August 17, 1966 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE
signal hearings have predicted a U.S. build-
up to 400,000 men, or more. General Wil-
liam C. Westmoreland, the U.S. commander
in Vietnam, has reportedly requested a
buildup to 400,000 by the end of Decem-
ber. With that many U.S. servicemen in
-South Vietnam, the cost of the war would
run to $21 billion a year-even more if
bombing and tactical air support increased
in proportion to the buildup on the ground.
At any such level the Vietnam war would
bring on economic strains beyond what most
economists appears to foresee, and beyond
what makers of public policy appear to be
anticipating. The strains would surely add
to the pressure for higher taxes.
In Its Vietnam cost accounting, Fortune
had considerable help from outside econo-
mists, but no access to classified data. The
basic sources were public documents-fed-
eral budgets, Defense Department publica-
tions, transcripts of congressional hearings.
Defense Department officials interviewed
were persistently wary of discussing the
costs of the war, although the department
proved willing to provide some missing bits
of factual information that would otherwise
have been' unobtainable. It turned out
that some costs-of ammunition, for exam-
ple-could be easily calculated from pub-
lished Defense Department figures. But
getting at slime other costs required elab-
orate calculations, and still others could
only be estimated. Estimates and assump-
tions were in all cases conservative. The re-
sults, set forth by category below, repre-
sent what Is probably the first serious effort
outside the Defense Department to analyze
the costs of the war.
The purpose of the undertaking was not
to make a case against (or for) the fiscal
'1967 defense budget, but to provide a basis
for looking beyond the budget and assessing
the potential economic effects of the war.
In wartime no defense budget can sensibly
be viewed as a hard forecast of defense
spending. Actual expenditures during the
fiscal year will be determined by unfolding
events that no budgeter can foresee months
in advance. So far as the economy is con-
cerned, then, what counts is not budget
projections but Defense Department orders
and expenditures.
The costs and expenditures resulting from
a war do not match up in the short run.
They rise and decline in different trajec-
tories. In the early phases of any war, the
Defense Department can hold down ex-
penditures by drawing upon existing forces
and supplies, just as a business firm can
temporarily reduce cash outlays by letting
inventories dwindle, or a family can cut
next month's grocery bill by eating up the
contents of the pantry. Later on in the
war, expenditures catch up with costs. It
must be kept in mind that "expenditures,"
as used here, means incremental expendi-
tures-those that would not be required if
it were not for the war.
An idea of the movements of costs and
expenditures and defense orders, and their
changing economic effects, can be gathered
from the following budgetary-economic
scenario of a medium-sized war-i.e., a war
mot very different from the one in Vietnam.
A WAR IN FIVE ACTS
Act I: It looks like a small war, and it
requires only smallish incremental expendi-
tures, The forces sent overseas are members
of the existing defense establishment, and
the Defense Department would have had to
pay, feed, and otherwise provide for them if
they were doing peacetime duties in Georgia
4nstead of ,fighting guerrillas in a tropical
republic. The weapons, ammunition, and
equipment come from existing stocks. The
extra expenses (hostile-fire pay, transporta-
tion) can be temporarily absorbed in the im-
mensity of the defense budget, and the Ad-
ministration does not have to ask Congress
for supplemental appropriations to finance
the war. It is being financed, in effect,
through "reduced readiness"-that is, the
U.S. has fewer trained men and smaller stocks
of war materiel to deploy or use in any other
contingencies.
Act II: The struggle has expanded, and
the armed forces need extra inflows of men
and materiel to compensate for the unex-
pectedly large outflows to the war zone. The
Pentagon places contracts for additional
arms, ammunition, equipment; it expands
draft calls and recruitment efforts. The Ad-
ministration asks Congress for supplemental
appropriations. War expenditures are still
only moderate, but with defense orders in-
creasing and inflationary expectations begin-
ning to stir, the war is already having notice-
able effects upon the economy.
Act III: The U.S. buildup on the war zone
has continued. The Administration has
asked Congress for large supplemental appro-
priations. Spending still lags behind costs,
but it is rising fast-the recruits in training
have to be paid, and so do the additional
civilians hired. The war's economic effects,
moreover, are expansionary out of all pro-
portion to the actual increases in defense
spending: the surge in defense orders has in-
creased demand for skilled workers, materials,
components, and credit in advance of deliver-
ies and payments. To some extent, the De-
fense Department's materiel buildup is being
temporarily financed by the funds that con-
tractors and subcontractors borrow from
.banks against future payments from the U.S.
Treasury.
Act IV : The U.S. military buildup in the
war zone tops out. Defense production con-
tinues to rise, but the rate of rise is much
less rapid than in Act III, and the expansion-
ary economic force exerted by the war begins
to wane. Deliveries of arms, ammunition,
and equipment rolling into military depots
more than match the chew-up of materiel in
the war, and so some replenishment of in-
ventories takes place. Men are moving out
of training and into operating units faster
than forces are being sent overseas, and so
there is a net buildup of trained, deployable
military forces in the U.S. Expenditures
catch up with costs.
Act V: The war ends. The drop-off in
contract awards and the collapse of infla-
tionary expectations reverberate throughout
the economy. Far from falling steeply, ex-
penditures continue to rise a bit before
entering into a gradual decline: the incom-
ing deliveries must be paid for, and the
men brought into the armed forces must be
provided for until they are mustered out.
With deliveries no longer partly offset by
wartime chew-up, inventories fill rapidly, and
begin to overflow. During the period of re-
adjustment, military manpower and military
inventories exceed normal peacetime require-
ments. Expenditures for this excess readi-
ness largely make up for the expenditures
-deferred through reduced readiness in the
early phases of the war.
In January, 1965, the Vietnam war was
still in Act I, and to all appearances nobody
in the Administration expected an Act II.
The President's budget message declared
that, with the "gains already scheduled,"
U.S. military forces would "be adequate to
their tasks for years to come." The new
budget projected a decrease in defense spend-
ing in fiscal 1966, and a decline in total uni-
formed personnel, Major General D. L.
Crow, then controller of the Air Force, sub-
sequently testified at a congressional hear-
ing that "the guidelines for the prepara-
tion of the budget as they pertain to Viet-
nam were actually a carry-forward of the
guidelines that were used in the preparation
of the 1965 budget, and they did not antici-
pate increased activity, per se, in Vietnam."
IT'S NOW ACT III
Not until last May was it entirely evident
that Act II had begun, but there were inti-
mations earlier. In January, 1965, after de-
clining for four consecutive quarters, the
Federal Reserve Board index of "defense
equipment" production turned upward, be-
ginning the precipitous climb depicted at the
bottom of the page opposite. In February
the U.S. began bombing targets in North
Vietnam. In March the decline in Army
uniformed personnel came to a halt, though
the downtrend continued for a while in the
other services. In April the U.S. buildup
in Vietnam accelerated. In May the Admin-
istration asked for, and Congress quickly
voted, a supplemental fiscal 1965 appropri-
ation of $700 million. In June the decline
in total uniformed military personnel turned
into a steep rise.
The Vietnam war is now well along in
Act III of the budgetary-economic scenario.
Since that $700-million request in May, 1965,
the Administration has asked for $14 bil-
lion in supplemental war appropriations.
Soaring orders for ammunition and uni-
forms have contributed to shortages of cop-
per and textiles for civilian use. So far, how-
ever, the costs of the war have been large-
ly channeled into reduced readiness. The
war reserve of "combat consumables" has
been drawn down. New equipment and spare
parts that otherwise would have gone to
units elsewhere have been diverted to Viet-
nam-Iroquois helicopters, for example, that
would have gone to the Seventh Army in
Germany. Fixed-wing aircraft to replace
losses in Vietnam have been ordered, but not
yet fully delivered and paid for. The war
has required only moderate incremental ex-
penditure (that must be understood, how-
ever, to mean "moderate" as war expenditures
go-a few billion dollars). But as deliveries
roll in and the armed forces expand, ex-
penditures will begin to catch up with the
war's far from moderate costs.
In numbers of U.S, servicemen deployed,
the Vietnam war is not as big as the Ko-
rean war at its peak. But costs per man run
much higher than they did in the Korean
war. The pay that servicemen get has gone
up more than 40 percent since then. Some
materiel costs have risen very steeply since
Korea. The F-86D fighters in Korea cost
about $340,000 each; the F-4C's in South
Vietnam coat nearly six times as much. Am-
munition use per combat soldier is very
much higher than in the Korean war. The
M-14 rifle fires up to 150 rounds per min-
ute, and ten rounds per minute at a sus-
tained rate. The M-16, carried by some Spe-
cial Forces troops, can use up ammunition
at a full-automatic rate of 750 rounds per
minute. The M-79 grenade launcher fires
grenades as if they were bullets.
The nature of the war contributes to mak-
Ing it peculiarly expensive. for its size. Tech-
nologically sophisticated military forces,
magnificently equipped to kill and destroy,
are inefficiently employed against meager or
elusive targets. In Korea, there were visible
masses of enemy forces to shoot at, and the
U.S. superiority in weapons could be exerted
efficiently; in Vietnam the enemy hits and
runs, moves under cover of darkness or foli-
age. With their abundant firepower, the
superb U.S. fighting men in South Vietnam
clobber the Vietcong in shooting encounters,
but the U.S. forces run up huge costs-in
troop supplies, fuel, helicopter mainte-
nance-just trying to find some guerrillas
that they can shoot at.
FIRING INTO A CONTINENT
There is an almost profligate disparity be-
tween the huge quantities of U.S. bullets and
bombs poured from the air upon targets in
Vietnam and the military and economic dam-
age the bullets and bombs do, In the aggre-
gate. In North Vietnam the U.S. has de-
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barred itself from attacking economically times seems a bit arbitrary. Some clothing $4,700. That makes another $1,175,000,000,
valuable targets-such as port facilities and is funded under personnel and some under bringing total personnel costs to $2,725,000,-
manufacturing plants. From bases in Thai- Operation and maintenance; ordinary repair 000.
land, F-105's fly over North Vietnam and parts are funded under O. and M., aircraft KEEPING THEM FLYING
drop their mighty payloads on or near roads, "spares" under procurement. Operation and maintenance. This category
rail lines, ferry facilities, bridges. The costs INSIDE AND OUTSIDE THE THEATRE is even more capacious than its name sug-
to the enemy of repairing the damage are Military personnel. As noted, the fiscal gests. It includes everything that does not
picayune compared to the costs to the U.S. 1966 defense budget, submitted in January, fall into other categories-recruitment,
of doing the damage. In South Vietnam the 1965, projected a moderate decline in total training, medical care, repairs, operation of
guerrillas seldom present concentrated tar- uniformed military personnel ("active supply depots, transport of goods, and, in
gets. Machine guns mounted on helicopters forces"), from about 2,663,000 at that time the official expression, "care of the dead." A
and on A-47's (elderly C--47's, modified and to 2,640,000 as of June 30, 1966. Actually, great many of those additional civilians hired
fitted with three guns) fire streams of but- the decline proceeded so briskly that the by the Defense Department in the last several
lets into expanses of jungle and brush that total got down to 2,641,000 in May, 1955. months are working in O. and M.
are believed to conceal Vietcong guerrillas. Since then the Defense Department has an- In fiscal 1965, O. and M. for the entire
The thought of an A-47 firing up to 18,060 noun.ced lans to increase military
rounds per minute into treetops brings to p personnel armed forces averaged out to $4,630 per nnan.
mind that bizarre image in Joseph Conrad's to 2?987,000 by next June 30, and to add on For 500,000 men that would come to $2,315,-
Heart,of Darkness, of the French warship off another 106,000 by June 30, 1967; by the 000,000. But the Vietnam war entails ex-
the African coast: "There wasn't even a shed latter date, the total would be 452.000 above traordinary O. and M. expenses. Planes there
there, and she was shelling the bush . . , the May, 1965, low point. In addition the fly a lot more hours per month than they
department is expanding the civilian payroll normally do, and the extra O, and M. in-
B-firing into a continent." by about 100,000 during fiscal 1966, and volved in keeping them flying runs at a rate
52's, operating at a cost of more than .many of these civilians will take over work of more than $200 million a year. Extra
$1,300 per hour per plane, fly a ten-hour previously done by servicemen, freeing them repair and maintenance are required to keep
round trip from Guam to South Vietnam to for other duties. vehicles moving and equipment working. An
strike at an enemy that has no large installa- It might appear that these figures could enormous logistic flow must be cod with-
tions or encampments visible from the air. p -
The B-52'a have been fitted with extra racks serve as a basis for calculating the person- more than 700,000 tons a month. The ship-
nel costs attributable to the Vietnam war, ping costs to Vietnam amount to $225 million
that increase their payloads to more than But it is impossible, without knowing the at a yearly rate. Combat clothing gets ripped
sixty 750-pound bombs, about $30,000 worth Defense Department's classified plans and up in the bush, deteriorates rapidly in the
of bombs per plane. "The bomb tonnage assumptions, to relate the announced per- moist tropical heat. And, of course, extra
that is resulting is literally unbelievable," sonnel increases to any particular force level medical care per man is needed in a tro i
said Secretary McNamara at a Senate hear- in South Vietnam. And to have any mean- cal war. When all the extra O. and M. costs
lssacst Januar he saidal Our s later, consumption at a mg' Statements about the costs of the Viet- involved are added together, the total, by a
nam war must be related to specified force conservative reckoning, comes to $1 billion.
in .February of air-delivered munitions levels. Here we are trying to get the cost of That brings the over-all O. and M. costs to
alone in South Vietnam was two and a half the war at a particular level-200,000 U.S. $3,315,000,000.
times the average monthly rate in the three servicemen in South Vietnam. For this Procurement, i.e., materiel costs. As
years of the Korean war." But much of that reckoning, the war personnel costs may be reckoned here, these are taken to be the
"literally unbelievable" bomb tonnage merely taken as the combined personnel costs of (1) chew-up in the war zone rather than the ad-
smashes trees and blasts craters in the earth. the 200,000 men in Vietnam, (2) the periph- ditional procurement resulting from the war.
Only a rich nation can afford to wage war eral supporting forces in Southeast Asia, Ammunition and aircraft losses together ac-
at ratios so very adverse. But the U.S. is a and (3) the required backup forces. The count for more than 75 percent of materiel
rich nation. If there is a great disparity be- Dofense Department defines personnel costs costs, and for both categories the costs can
tween the bomb power dropped and the eco- as pay and allowances, subsistence (chow), be calculated with some statistical precision.
nomic value of the targets, there is also a personal clothing (the "clothing bag" issued McNamara reported last January that 1U.&
great disparity between the wealth and power to each recruit), plus certain other expenses. ground forces in South Vietnam, including
of the,U.S. and of the enemy. The cost of Average personnel costs in the armed forces Army and Marine helicopter units, were "con-
the bombs is small in relation to the G.N.P. run to $5,100 per man per year, but the men . suming ammunition at the rate of about $100
of the U.S., and the damage they do is some- in South Vietnam get "hostile-fire pay" of million per month," and that U.S. air forces
times substantial in relation to the G.N.P. of $65 a month, and other war costs boost the were using up "air munitions" (mostly
North Vietnam, or to the resources available average to about $6,200. So, 200,000 men at bombs) at a rate of about $110 million per
to the Vietcong. But the costs of winning $6,200' or $1,240,000,000 a year. month. That works out to a combined rate
are going to, be unpleasantly large. The peripheral supporting forces-mainly of $2.5 billion a year. At that time there
The official position of the Defense Depart- aboard Seventh Fleet ships and at bases in were about 190,000 U.S. servicemen in South
ment is that it does not know what the costs Thailand--numbered at least 50,000 last win- Vietnam, so for the calculation of costs at
of the war are, and that it does not even try ter, when the U.S. force level in South Viet- the 200,000-man level, the figure has to be
to compute them. As a Pentagon official put nam reached 200,000. That's 50,000 men at adjusted upward a bit, to $2,650,000,000.
it: "We have no intention of cost-account- $6,200 a year, or $310 million. In testifying at congressional hearings,
fag the war in Vietnam. Our business is to Each thousand U.S, servicemen stationed McNamara and other Defense Department
support the conflict there. Our business is overseas under non-war conditions have on witnesses furnished numerous bits of in-
not cost accounting. We have no estimates the average about 600 other servicemen back- formation about U.S. aircraft operations in
of costs. It's not practical to say the war Ing them up: trainees, transients, men serv- the Vietnam war, including losses in 1965
has cost x dollars to date." ing in supply units or performing various and numbers of sorties over various periods
The Defense Department argues that the auxiliary functions. But it takes far more (one flight by one plane counts as one sortie).
war costs are commingled with those of a than 600 men to back up a thousand men Sorties per month increased dramatically
military establishment that existed before deployed in South Vietnam. Additional sup- during 1965, and despite low loss rates per
the U.S. troop buildup in South Vietnam ply men are required%to keep the huge quan- 1,000 sorties, losses added up to large num-
began. And that, of course, is true. Still, a titles of arms, ammunition, equipment, and bers over the course of the year: 275 fixed
meaningful total can be arrived at by an- Supplies moving into the theatre of war. The wing aircraft lost as a result of "hostile ac-
alyzing and adding up the various war men serving there are rotated home after a tion" alone, and 177 helicopters lost, 76 as
costs, regardless of whether they trans- one-year tour (a three-year - tour is normal a result of "hostile action," 101 in accidental
late immediately into added expenditures. for U.S. forces in Western Europe), and addi- crashes and other mishaps, Assuming con-
One way or another, we may assume, all tional trainees are needed to support the ro- tinuaticin of 1965 ratios between sorties and
costs will result in either added expendi- tation. Extra backup men are needed, also, losses, , estimated annual attrition at a 200,-
tures or reduced readiness, and in the reck- to make up for the erosion resulting from 000-man force level works out, in rounded
oning of the costs it does not matter which, deaths, severe injuries, and tropical ailments. figures, like this: ,
or when, or how. In the course of a month, large numbers of 475 fixed-wing tactical planes,
Fortune's first objective was to arrive at an men spend some days or weeks in transit to at $1,800,000--------------- $855, 000, 000
approximation of annual costs at the early- or from South Vietnam. And additional men 165 other fixed-wing planes
1966 level of 200,000 U.S. servicemen in in training require additional men to train (transport, observation), at
South Vietnam. The results of that analy- them. With all the additions, it works out $200,000 ------------------- 33, 000, 000
sis can serve, in turn, as a basis for calculat- that there is a ratio of one to one, or 1,000 320 helicopters, at $250,0000__ 80, 000, 000
ing coats at higher levels of buildup. In to 1,000, between servicemen in the theatre -
what follows, costs are divided into standard of war and servicemen outside the theatre Total------------------ 968, 000, 000
oategories-military personnel, Operation but assignable to the war as elements of cost. A figure for aircraft spares was arrived at
and maintenance, and procurement-that For the 250,000 men in Vietnam and vicin- by first calculating total flying costs of the
the Defense Department uses in its budget- ity, then, there will be 250,000 others else- aircraft operations (information on average
ing. To outsiders, the department's assign- where. Since some of these are new recruits flying costs per hour for various types of mi.li-
ment of expenses to these categories some- the average personnel cost is taken to be only tary aircraft is available). That came to
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August 17, 1966 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE
?soo million a year.` Spares represent, on
average, 20 percent of flying costs, which
comes to $160 million. With the addition of
a minimal $25 million to allow for spares re-
-quired to repair planes hit by enemy fire, the
total for aircraft spares comes to $185 mil-
lion.
Little information is available about ma-
tkriel chew-up, apart from ammunition and
aircraft.. In the' absence of direct evidence,
however, Defense Department procurement
orders provide a basis for rough estimates.
It is assumed-and this is a bit of a leap-
that the annual attrition of weapons, ve-
hicles, and equipment is equivalent to one-
third of the increase in procurement orders
In those categories (as measured by the in-
crease in prime contract awards from the
second half of 1964 to the second half of
1965), From that procedure emerges a round
figure of $600 million for attrition of hard
goods other than aircraft, ammunition, and
ships (in effect, ship losses are assumed to
be zero). That brings total procurement to
$4.4 billion.
The three categories together-military
personnel, O. and M., procurement-add up
to $10,440,000,000. That is the approximate
annual cost of the U.S. operations in the
Vietnam war at the 200,000-man level reach-
ed early this year. To that figure must be
added support for South Vietnamese mili-
tary forces. For fiscal 1967, military assist-
ance to South Vietnam will be included in
the defense budget. Counting supplemen-
tal requests, total military aid to South Viet-
nam comes to more than $1 billion in the
current fiscal year. In the early 1960's, mili-
tary aid to South Vietnam ran to something
like $100 million a year; the $900-million dif-
ference can be considered a Vietnam war
cost. In addition, the U.S. pays $50 million
to help support South Korean forces in
South Vietnam.
Much of the $1.4 billion that Congress has
appropriated in fiscal 1966 for military con-
struction in Southeast Asia has to be count-
ed as part of the Vietnam war'eost. Accord-
ing to Secretary McNamara's testimony at a
Senate hearing, all of the contemplated con-
struction `is associated with the operations
In South Vietnam. Some of the facilities
may have military value to the U.S. after the
war is over, but it seems reasonable to sup-
pose that at least $1 billion of the planned
construction would not have been under-
taken had it not been for the war. If that
is spread over two years, construction adds
$500 million a year to the cost of the war.
That brings the grand total to $11.9 billion
a year. This figure does not allow for an
important deferred cost, depreciation of
equipment. Since the Defense Department
does not pay taxes or operate in terms of
profit and loss, the business-accounting con-
cept Of depreciation is hard to apply, but the
wearing out of equipment is a reality wheth-
er it is cost-accounted or not. This wear-
out is a separate cost from the additional
maintenance and repair required to keep
planes and ground equipment operating in
the Vietnam war. Tactical planes and Mili-
tary Airlift Command planes involved in the
war are flying 60 percent more hours per
month than they normally do in peacetime,
and even with extra maintenance their use-
ful lives are being shortened. The conse-
quences will show up in future defense budg-
ets.
In addittion, the war imposes substantial
nonmilitary costs that are not included in
the $11.9 billion (or in the other war-cost
figures that follow). U.S. economic aid to
South Vietnam, for example, leaped from
$269 million in fiscal 1965 to $621 million in
the current year.
MORE MEN FOR PATROL, SEARCH, PURSUIT, ATTACK
The $11.9 billion may, be taken as the an-
nual military cost of sustaining the war with
$00,000 U.S. servicemen iii south Vietnam-
the level reached' around February 1. Given
that yardstick, it is a relatively simple mat-
ter to cost out the present level (about 235,-
000 in South Vietnam). It can be assumed
that costs have increased since February in
direct proportion to the buildup, except that
construction costs and military aid to South
Vietnam remain unchanged. So calculated,
the current cost works out, at an annual rate,
to $13.7 billion-the "more than $13 billion"
mentioned at the beginning of this article.
Efforts to project costs at very much higher
levels of buildup run into some uncertainties.
Costs at the 400,000-man level-the level
General Westmoreland is reportedly aiming
for by the end of this year-would not be
double those at 200,000. For one thing, the
expansion of U.S. forces will itself tend to
alter the character of the war. Indeed, it has
already. The widening U.S. superiority in
firepower forced the enemy to cut down on
direct assaults by battalions and regiments
and revert pretty much to guerrilla warfare.
As the number of G.L's in South Vietnam
increases, the forces needed to guard the
coastal enclaves will not have to increase pro-
portionately, so a larger percentage of the
total combat-battalion strength will be avail-
able for patrol, search, pursuit, and attack
operations. Some costs, as a result, will in-
crease faster than the number of U.S. service-
men in South Vietnam-e.g., Fortune has as-
sumed a 5 percent increase in the rates of
ground and helicopter ammunition use per
100,000 men.
But in some respects costs would not nearly
double as we built up to 400,000. The exist-
ing construction plans, for example, provide
for port facilities, roads, and installations
beyond current requirements. Costs of sup-
porting South Vietnamese forces would not
double either-South Vietnam's military and
paramilitary forces already number about
'600,000 men, and an increase of even 50 per-
cent could not be squeezed out of a total
population of 16 million. (An increase to
670,000 has been announced, however, and
some upgrading of the military equipment
and supplies furnished by the U.S. will un-
doubtedly occur.) Bombing and tactical air
support operations would probably not dou-
ble either: lack of runways would prevent
that large an expansion.
In Fortune's calculation it was assumed
that the 100 percent increase in U.S. service-
men in South Vietnam, from 200,000 to 400,-
000, would be accompanied by these less than
proportionate increases: 50 percent in bomb-
ing and tactical air-support operations; 10
percent a year in construction costs; 15 per-
cent in military aid to South Vietnam.
On these exceedingly conservative assump-
tions, the costs at 400,000 come to the re-
sounding total of $21 billion a year.
To calculate Vietnam war costs during fis-
cal 1967 it is necessary to make some assump-
tions about the pace of the buildup. For-
tune assumed that U.S. forces in South Viet-
nam would increase to 250,000 men by this
June 30, expand steadily to reach 400,000 as
of December 31, and then remain at that
level. On this basis the prospective Vietnam
war costs during fiscal 1967 work out to $19.3
billion.
USED-UP OPTIONS
The $58.3-billion defense budget for fiscal
1967 includes, by official reckoning, $10.3
billion in expenditures resulting from the
Vietnam war. With a buildup. to 400,000 in
fiscal 1967, war expenditures during the year
would greatly exceed this figure, but would
,not necessarily boost total defense spending
as much as $9 billion. For one thing, Secre-
tary McNamara can cut somewhat further
than he already has into programs not di-
rectly connected with the war.
. But not very far; McNamara's options for
deferring expenditures in fiscal 1967 have
been pretty well used up..The 1967 defense
budget shows a total of $1.5 billion in cut-
backs in military construction, strategic-
missile procurement, and other non-Vietnam
18907
programs. In view of McNamara's econo-
mizing in recent years, there cannot be much
leeway left for deferrals. The Secretary him-
self said not long ago that in shaping the
1967 budget he had deferred "whatever can
be safely deferred," which suggests that there
is no leeway any more.
He has also largely used up the Options for
restraining expenditures by drawing down
inventories and reducing trained forces out-
side the war theatre. McNamara has vigor-
ously insisted that "we have a great reservoir
of resources," and he is undoubtedly right
about that, especially if "a great reservoir"
is interpreted to include the potential capac-
ity of the U.S. economy to produce military
goods. But he has overstated his case by
arguing, in effect, that the Vietnam war has
not reduced readiness at all ("... far from
overextending ourselves, we have actually
strengthened our military position").
Counting peripheral supporting forces, the
U.S. now has about 300,000 men deployed in
the Vietnam war theatre, and (in keeping
with that one-to-one ratio) another 300,000
men are committed to backing them up.
That makes 600,000 men unavailable for
other contingencies. Since the low point in
May, 1965, U.S. military manpower has in-
creased by approximately 400,000 (this figure
allows for substitution of civilians for uni-
formed personnel), and a lot of those 400,000
are men still in training. It would be re-
markable indeed if all this had somehow
"strengthened our military position."
Nor is there much left to draw down in
military inventories. As shown in the middle
row of charts on page 121, Defense Depart-
ment expenditures for procurement declined
sharply in fiscal 1965-by $3.5 billion, in fact.
This decline in procurement apparently con-
tributed to the Army shortages (of repair
parts, communication equipment, helicop-
ters, and trucks, among other things) discov-
ered early last year by investigators of the
U.S. Senate's Preparedness Investigating
Subcommittee, headed by Mississippi's Sen-
ator JOHN STENNis. Pentagon witnesses tried
to explain that the "shortages" were mere
routine gaps between reality and ideal tables
of equipment. But at one point South Caro-
lina's Senator STRoM THURMOND pinned down
two Pentagon generals in this exchange:
"Senator THURMOND. You have not denied
those shortages, have you, General Abrams
"General ABRAMS. No.
"Senator THURMOND. And you have not,
General.
"General CHESAREX. No.
"Senator THURMOND. You do admit the
shortages?
"General CHESAREN. Yes, sir."
The combination of rising Vietnam re-
quirements and thin, declining inventories
led last year to surges in military production
and orders far beyond what can be inferred
from the of lcial estimates of expenditures
attributable to the Vietnam war. In the
second half of calendar 1965, Defense De-
partment prime contract awards ran $3.3
billion ahead of the corresponding period
of 1964-$6.6 billion at an annual rate. In
contrast, the Defense Department estimates
fiscal 1966 expenditures for the Vietnam war
at only $4.6 billion. Anyone trying to catch
an intimation of things to come might do
well to keep an eye on orders, rather than
expenditure estimates. Orders are for real:
if you want the stuff delivered in time,
you've got to Order it in time. But ex-
penditure estimates are not binding upon
anybody.
TRYING TO AVOID THE PILE-UP AT THE END
Since they are not for real, budgetary ex-
penditure estimates are an exceedingly un-
reliable guide to the future. A better guide
can be found in requests for appropriations.
For the fiscal years 1966 and 1967 combined,
the Defense Department has estimated Viet-
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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD --SENATE August 17, 1966
nam war expenditures at $15 billion, but
for the same two fiscal years the department
has already requested approximately $23 bil-
lion In Vietnam war appropriations.
Big as they look, however, these requests
for war appropriations will almost certainly
be added to long before the end of fiscal
1967. That probability can be inferred
from on-the-record statements by Secretary
McNamara and other Defense Department
witnesses at congressional hearings.
The Defense Department has based its
requests for war appropriations not upon it
forecast of what will actually happen in the
Vietnam war, but upon what a Pentagon of-
ficial calls "calculated requirements." In
calculating the "requirement" for any pro-
curement item, the department considered
the lead time--how far ahead you have to
order the item to have it when you need it.
For complex or precisely tooled military
hardware, lead times may run to a year or
more, and for such Items--particularly air-
craft and aircraft spares--the department
allowed fully for expected losses and use-up
to the end of fiscal 1967. But for items with
shorter lead times, requirements were cal-
culated tightly, on the assumption that
later on they could be revised and McNa-
mara could ask for supplemental appro-
priations.
Supplemental appropriations have come to
be viewed as natural in wartime. And
McNamara's policy of asking for funds "at
the last possible moment," as he puts it,
has its merits. By following that policy he
hopes to avoid "over-buying" and any pile-
up of surplus materiel at the end of the war.
(When the Korean war ended, the military
establishment had billions of dollars worth
of excess goods in stock or an order.) But
the policy Implies that the Defense Depart-
ment will have to ask for more funds before
the end of fiscal 1967 unless there is some
unexpected abatement in the war.
Of necessity, the 1967 defense budget was
constructed upon working assumptions about
how big the war will get and how long it will
last, and given all the uncertainties, these
cannot be expected to coincide with the
.realities. In estimating expenditures and ap-
propriations for fiscal 1967, the Defense De-
partment assumed that U.S. "combat opera-
tions" in Vietnam will not continue beyond
June 30, 1967. In keeping with that assump-
tion, the 1967 budget does not provide funds
for orders of aircraft or other military goods
to replace combat losses after that date.
Here again the assumption implies that the
Defense Department will need supplemental
appropriations in fiscal 1967 if the war con-
tinues at even the present rate.
McNamara has not said in public what
U.S. force level in South Vietnam is allowed
for in the 1967 budget, and the explanations
he has offered at congressional hearings have
been deleted by Pentagon censors. But at
a Senate hearing in January, General John P.
McConnell, the Air Force chief of staff, indi-
cated that, for the Air Force at least, the
appropriations requested so far allow for little
or no expansion of the war beyond the 200,-
000-man level. Said McConnell In reply to a
question concerning the adequacy of the
funds requested: "We don't have any prob-
lem if the war continues at about the same
rate as now, Mr. Chairman."
These budgeting assumptions expressed
and implied by McNamara and other Penta
gon witnesses lead to a strong inference: by
next January, if the war continues unabated
until then at even the present rate, the De-
fense Department will have to ask for sup-
plemental appropriations for long-lead-time
items required in fiscal 1969 and shorter-
lead-time items required in the last months
of fiscal 1967. Some months before next
January, indeed, perhaps this summer, the
department will have to begin ordering very-
long-lead-time items in anticipation of fiscal
1968 combat losses.
MOIINTINC ASTONISHMENT AT THE BAD NEWS
It follows that if the U.S. buildup in South
Vietnam proceeds to a much higher level,
the supplemental requests will run into many
billions before the end of fiscal 1967. And
since the military establishment will have to
procure a lot of additional equipment and
supplies and bring in a lot of additional
men, defense expenditures will rise billions of
dollars above the estimate submitted last
January.
So the 1967 budget barely begins to suggest
the level of Vietnam war spending that prob-
ably lies ahead. The budget is not mislead-
ing once its rather sophisticated underlying
assumptions are understood; but the as-
sumptions are not widely understood, and
the Administration has not made much of
an effort, to see that they are. There Is likely
to be mounting astonishment this year and
next as the bad news about the war's costs
and the implied message about taxes and in-
flation sink in. It's a good bet that Ameri-
cans will still consider the war worth win-
ning. There is no reason for them not to
know its cost.
Mr. MORSE. Mr. President, will the
Senator yield?
Mr. CLARK. I am glad to yield to the
Senator from Oregon.
Mr. MORSE. I am so glad the Senator
from Pennsylvania is asking these ques-
tions and asking them of a reliable
source, a member of the committee, be-
cause I am sure the Senator from Mis-
sissippi [Mr. STENNIS] will tell us every-
thing he is privileged to tell us with re-
gard to the matter.
But I think the Senator's questions are
very pertinent on the pending bill.
I shall not vote for the pending bill.
I shall not vote for any bill that appro-
priates one single dollar to continue this
war, because I happen to believe that I
have a trust to exercise the check of the
purse strings upon a President who does
not send us a recommendation for a
declaration of war, and therefore, in my
judgment, continues to act completely
outside the Constitution. Although at
the present time strong public opinion
would seem to support it, the people in
the general public who are supporting
it do not have the trust that I have to
sit in the Senate and maintain an oath
to uphold the Constitution.
I think when we start exercising the
check of the purse strings, we will then
force this President to get back within
the framework of the Constitution, and
we will-stop the slaughter of these men
in South Vietnam, which in my judg-
ment we cannot possibly justify.
But that represents honest differences
of opinion among us as to what our posi-
tions should be, and I think the Senator
from Pennsylvania is performing a very
much needed service this afternoon by
asking these questions.
Mr. CLARK. I thank the Senator
from Oregon.
I wonder if the Senator from Missis-
sippi is now prepared to respond to my
question.
Mr. STENNIS. Yes.
Mr. CLARK. Would the Senator pre-
fer for me to restate the question?
Mr. STENNIS. I wish the Senator
would restate his question, please.
Mr. CLARK. Primarily what I am
searching for is what the Senator can
tell me is the cost, direct and indirect,
of the Vietnamese war in terms of this
bill. We have the bill broken down, as
I said a moment ago, in traditional terms,
so much for military personnel, so much
for equipment, and the like, which does
not provide much information; and I
wonder whether, in the course of the
hearings before the Committee on Armed
Services and the Appropriations Com-
mittee, there was any testimony of a non-
classified nature which would enable
Senators to have at least a rough idea, as
to how much of this money would go
into Vietnam.
In that connection, I should say to the
Senator that while he was engaged in
conference with his staff assistant, I put
into the RECORD an article which ap-
peared in Fortune magazine in April. of
this year, which suggests-and I quote
the critical portion:
General William C. Westmoreland, the U.S.
commander in Vietnam, has. reportedly re-
quested a buildup to 400,000 by the end of
December. With that many U.S. servicemen
in South Vietnam, the cost of the war would
run to $21 billion a year-even more if bomb-
ing and tactical air support increased in pro-
portion to the buildup on the ground.
Mr. STENNIS. I think the Senator
has asked a very fine question. It is one
that I have pursued, to some extent, in
the hearings. Of course, the figures
change from month to month, and it is
virtually impossible to fully identify all
the figures in the bill that would apply
to the Vietnam war.
The reason for that is obvious: Many
of the costs that are going on, that are
directly connected with the war, are
nevertheless items that we would have
to spend if we were not over there. Those
costs represent such items as expended
material that would be used at home;, or'
in training, and a number of other items.
But in this bill, the very best that the
clerk can identify it-and he is excel-
lent; he has been doing this for years-
there are in the bill now items identifia-
ble as being directly for the South Viet-
nam operation, certainly, amounting to
$8.8 billion.
Expressed in expenditures from appro-
priations in this bill and the military
construction bill the identifiable total is
$10.3 billion.
That is a figure that is definitely
identifiable, and that is a rockbottom
figure. We know that that is correct.
Other items could be added, and there
would be some debate as to whether they
should be or not; and perhaps the Penta-
gon would deny that they should.
But I think this figure I have given of
$10.3 billion, including the sum for mili-
tary construction, would be agreed to by
even the most conservative people.
Mr. CLARK. I thank the Senator for
his candid answer. Would it be fair to
say that the figure the Senator has given
me is the direct cost of Vietnam, ex-
clusive of what must be very large in-
direct costs?
Mr. STENNIS. I think that is correct.
I would put it this way: We feel that in
this bill there is that much, directly
identifiable, that would not be expended
if it were not for the war in Vietnam.
That is not enough, though, to run the
operation for 12 months. As the Senator
understands, there will be it supple-
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August 17, 1966 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD -SENATE
mental request on top of the figures I
have mentioned.
Mr. CLARK. That interests me. Did
the Senator obtain any indication which
he can reveal, from either the Secretary
of Defense or the Joint Chiefs of Staff,
as to how much the supplemental appro-
priation will call for, or was that one of
those things where we have to wait and
see what happens?
Mr. STENNIS. The Joint Chiefs can-
not give us figures like that. They do not
keep up with that part. They have that
general information, but the Secretary of
Defense, or his comptroller would have
to provide the figures.
I asked the Secretary of Defense, when
he was last before the subcommittee, if
he would give us a very loose, general
estimate, that he would not be bound by
in any way, and we would understand it
was the loosest kind of an estimate, as to
what he thought the supplemental re-
quest would be for this fiscal year; and
he respectfully declined to undertake in
any way to give us such a figure.
I pointed out then, I think, that our
committee, in our thinking, was at least
entitled to some kind of an estimate,
although I knew that he should not be
held to it.
But he does not know what will be the
results of air battles,or how many planes
will be shot down, for instance. They
gave us estimates and give the public
estimates as to how much they are going
to save by ammunition that they are not
going to have to buy. But we cannot get
any figure here, even for our own think-
ing. I would feel better if they would
just tell the Senator from Georgia and
the Senator from Massachusetts what
they thought it might be.
I do not mind giving the Senator the
benefit of my ideas. The chairman of
the committee, the senior Senator from
Georgia [Mr. RUSSELL] has recently said
that, in his opinion, the cost is approx-
imately $1.5 billion to $2 billion a month.
Mr. CLARK. That is without any
further buildup.
Mr. STENNIS. The Senator is cor-
rect. That is at the present level. I
think that estimate is low enough based'
upon what I know about it. However, it
is an estimate.
Mr. CLARK. Mr. President, can the
Senator tell me the total number of men
in the Army, Navy, and Marine force
now engaged in Vietnamese operations?
Mr. STENNIS. I do' not have a
breakdown on the number of men in
each service. However, on the mainland
of southeast Asia there are now over
300,000 men. Most of those are Army
personnel. It is generally estimated
that at least 50,000 additional men, in-
cluding those in the Navy and the
Air Force, are in the area. That goes
to make up the force that is actually
present.
Mr. CLARK. Mr. President, would
that include the B-52's based on Guam
and the supporting crews?
Mr. STENNIS. The Senator is cor-
rect. That includes the Navy, the Air
Force, a nd all the other members 'of the
service, wherever they are, in the theater
of general operations.
Mr. CLARK. Mr. President, does the
Senator have any ideas as to whether
the administration contemplates in-
creasing that force in the foreseeable
future?
Mr. STENNIS. The Senator is fa-
miliar with the announcements that
have already been made. There is some
buildup going on. We are having addi-
tional calls for the draft.
I intend to give the Senator the direct
facts. I am one of those who believe
that we are involved in a situation in
which we must move and move faster
and harder than we have been doing or
are doing. We must hit them with suf-
ficient force.
I think the Senator is entitled to the
facts. I think the people are entitled to
the facts as far as the facts may be dis-
closed, consistent with security.
There will be a buildup. I believe that
it will run approximately 400,000 men by
January 1. That is my estimate. I do
not know whether that figure is con-
tained in the magazine articles or not.
However, I am satisfied that the figure
will be approximately that.
I made that statement almost a year
ago. I was not a prophet. I do feel that
a buildup is necessary and that it will be
perhaps above that figure.
Mr. CLARK. I remember the state-
ment being made at the time. Very few
were willing to believe the statement. We
thought the Senator was being extrava-
gant in his suggestion. However, the
Senator has turned out to be exactly cor-
rect.
In view of what the Senator has said,
would he agree with the estimate con-
tained in the Fortune magazine article,
considering the level at which the Sen-
ator has testified we are now operating,
and the increase which the Senator be-
lieves will be taking place, that a figure
of $21 billion a year for the cost of the
Vietnamese operation is not far out of
line.
Mr. STENNIS. I believe that would be
approximately correct. However, I shall
come back to that.
The chairman of the House Appropri-
ations Committee has made a public
statement to the effect that he thought
the supplemental bill at the first of the
year would be approximately $10 billion.
Mr. CLARK. And that would be
largely for Vietnam; would it not?
Mr. STENNIS. The Senator is cor-
rect. That would be $10 billion more
for the war. That would be the re-
quested amount to be added to this $10.3
billion contained in the bill.
I think frankly that is certainly low
enough. I believe there will be a mini-
mum of $8 billion to $10 billion in the
supplemental bill. I would not be sur-
prised if it would be more than that
amount. That would be added to the
$10.3 billion in these bills. So, I think
that $21 billion-plus would be a reason-
able estimate. However, it is purely an
estimate.
I have no inside information that I am
not disclosing.
I believe that the big question con-
cerns how far we should go in building
up the Army beyond its present size and
18909
strength. As I said this afternoon in
debate, the question concerns a man-
power problem. It is going to increase,
and I think personally that we will have
to have a further buildup of the Army.
I would not try to estimate how much.
Mr. CLARK. Mr. President, I realize
that the Senator is under the necessity of
leaving the Chamber very shortly. I do
not intend to detain him. However, I
wonder if the Senator would agree with
these statements from the Fortune
magazine article which I had printed in
the RECORD. The first statement reads:
Each thousand U.S. servicemen stationed
overseas under non-war conditions have on
the average about 600 other servicemen back-
ing them up: trainees, transients, men serv-
ing in supply units or performing various
auxiliary functions. But it takes far more
than 600 men to back up a thousand men
deployed in South Vietnam.
Then he gives the reason. He then
says, referring to last April:
For the 250,000 men in Vietnam and
vicinity, then, there will be 250,000 others
elsewhere. Since some of these are new re-
cruits, the average personnel cost is taken
to be only $4,700. That makes another
$1,175,000,000, bringing total personnel costs
to $2,725,000,000.
Would the Senator agree that this
backup situation, as I have read it, is
accurate?
Mr. STENNIS. I would rather not try
to put any figures of mine against those
figures. The backup requirement in
Vietnam is very heavy.
Mr. CLARK. It is a good deal heavier
than it is in Europe, is it not?
Mr. STENNIS. The Senator is cor-
rect. That is due to several obvious
factors. There is approximately 9,000
miles distance involved in one situation
and 3,000 miles involved in the other.
Mr. CLARK. In addition to that, the
men in Vietnam are engaged in a shoot-
ing war and that must run up the cost.
Mr. STENNIS. The Senator is cor-
rect. The cost is very much different
if it is viewed in that light. I was think-
ing in terms of the distance involved.
The backup requirements involved in the
kind of battles they engage in and every-
thing involved in the entire situation is
very heavy.
Mr. CLARK. Mr. President, as the
Senator knows, enormous sums are being
spent to bolster and hold up the South
Vietnamese economy. The AID expendi-
ture involves a very significant figure.
The pacification program, if we are ever
going to hold the territory long enough
to try to pacify it, would also add addi-
tional hundreds of millions of dollars at
least to the amount we are talking
about.
Mr. STENNIS. I do not discount the
effectiveness of these local troops in-
volved there. They are doing some very
fine work, and they are very effective
soldiers because of the equipment that
we have with which to train them.
Mr. CLARK. I have no doubt of that.
I did not intend to question that.
Mr. STENNIS. I thought that we
ought to mention that our tremendous
backup is in spite of the fact that they
are doing a good job.
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18910 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE
Mr. CLARK. Of course, we are pay-
ing them.
Mr. STENNIS. We are supplying and
carrying most of the money load. The
Senator is correct.
Mr. CLARK. That is what is called
defense support, because their economy
would collapse unless we directly or in-
directly assisted them.
Mr. STENNIS. The Senator is cor-
rect. We are carrying most of the
money load.
Mr. CLARK. Mr. President, the Sec-
retary of Defense was quoted the other
day as saying that he expects to lose 580
aircraft in air warfare over Vietnam this
year. I believe he said-and the Senator
will correct me if I am wrong-that the
average cost of the aircraft was $1,200,-
000.
I noted In a Philadelphia paper the
other day that last week an entire
squadron of 25 F-105's were shot down
or otherwise made inoperable over North
Vietnam.
Did the Secretary of Defense give that
type of information to the committee?
Mr. STENNIS. Yes. I shall be glad
to read to the Senator directly from the
Secretary's testimony, which is on page
701, part 2, of the hearings before the
Senate Subcommittee of the Committee
on Appropriations. This testimony was
given on August 1, so it is a very recent
statement.
Senator Your;_ I assume that will be a
money loss of between $400 and $500 million.
They were talking losses of planes.
Secretary McNAMMtA. The losses per year
are running around 400. If we continue at
our present rates, in fiscal year 1967, attack
aircraft losses will run around 580 more in
total than in fiscal year 1966. Those air-
planes are worth roughly $2 million apiece.
Mr. CLARK. May I correct the REC-
ORD? I said $1.2 million. I am sure the
Senator is correct. I will make that
roughly $2 million each.
Mr. STENNIS. Yes.
Continuing with answer of Secretary
McNamara :
So that it Is about $1.2 billion. I would
think it terms of aircraft -losses per year at
the present rate.
Mr. CLARK. I thank the Senator.
Did the Secretary or any of the Joint
Chiefs give the committee any indica-
tion or any rule of thumb by which they
can determine how many American boys
will be killed or wounded for every air-
craft that is destroyed?
Mr. STENNIS. No; we do not have
any calculation like that.
These estimates on the planes are
based upon the type of bombing that we
are doing and the experience of the -cas-
ualties there in planes. But there is no
estimate about the men.
Mr. CLARK. I have asked the De-
fense Department to furnish me with
the experience to date In terms of casual-
ties for aircraft shot down. Within a
rather wide range of possible error, and
taking into account the fact that many
of these aircraft, such as the B-52's, have
multiple crews, and also taking Into ac-
count the fact that a number of the pilots
are saved even though the aircraft is shot
down, it appears to run somewhere in the
nature of one and a half casualties for
every aircraft shot down. Would that
surprise the Senator?
Mr. STENNIS. On the B-52's, first,
the Senator knows that we have lost so
few. As I recall, we have lost only one
or two of the B-52's.
Mr. CLARK. What is the present
crew of a B-52?
Mr. STL+TNNIS. Four men compose
the normal crew of a B-52,
Mr. CLARK. How about these fighter
aircraft-
Mr. STENTIIS. One or two, depend-
ing on the type of aircraft. I do not
believe the average loss there is one and a
half per range shot down, but I do not
have any figures on that. If the Defense
Department says that is it, as far as I
know, that sounds high enough.
Mr. CLAT'K. What is the situation
with respect to helicopters?
Mr. STEM NIS. They usually have a
full crew of 3, and casualties on those
would not overage as high as with the
fighter craft. However, I do not have
any figures in mind. A great number
of those men were saved-greater than
the situation with respect to the planes.
Mr. CLARK. My final question-and
I apologize for detaining the Senator.
Mr. STENNTS. That is all right.
Mr. CLARK. Is it not true that the
major air casualties have been sustained
through the bombing in the north and
not in the b,)mving in the south? Now,
there may be a qualification with respect
to helicopters, but in terms of fighter
and bomber aircraft, is that not correct?
Mr. STENNIS. That is not true with
respect to the helicopters. Barring ac-
cidents, most of the losses elsewhere are
around these fortified areas; and these
losses picked up, the Senator will notice,
when we went into these new target
areas, and they are defended well.
Mr. CLARK. I thank the Senator
very much for his indulgence in staying
here, and wish to say that there is no
necessity for him to stay any longer.
Mr. STENNIS. That is all right. If
the Senator has any more questions I
can answer, I shall be glad to do so.
Mr. CLARK. I am most grateful to the
Senator for his courtesy.
Mr. President, I had the opportunity
not long ago to have breakfast with a
perfectly splendid young Navy pilot who
had recently returned from Vietnam,
where he had flown a great many mis-
sions. He was most articulate, obviously
a wonderful American boy; and on the
occasion when I talked to him, he was
well chaperoned by, I believe, two three-
star Marine generals, three admirals and
vice admirals and an Under Secretary of
the Navy. He handled himself extremely
well, but ,I am sure he did not say any-
thing that they were not prepared to
have him say.
The net result of what he told several
Congressmen and myself was that the
missions which he had flown over South
Vietnam were really pretty much milk
runs, where the danger of being injured
or killed or shot down was pretty slight;
but that when they went over North
Vietnam, that was something else again.
He said that as they got below 4,000 feet,
it looked as if every tree had a machine-
gun and automatic rifles in it. He said
that the North Vietnamese are pretty
good marksmen. If the American planes
go above 4,000 feet, they are in danger
of being hit by one of the Russian mis-
siles. The pilots say a little prayer every
time they go up there, and hope that
they will come back safely.
Mr. President, I have many more com-
ments to make, and I wish to state for
the RECORD that I have no objection to
a vote taking place on the McGovern
amendment at an hour tomorrow which
will be convenient for most Senators.
However, as I have told the majority
whip, I am under compulsion to preside
at the meeting of the Subcommittee on
Poverty, to mark up the administration's
very important poverty amendments,
which will meet at 9:30 tomorrow.
I cannot in good conscience agree to
any vote on the McGovern amendment or
on my own amendment, which will follow
it, before, let us say, 12:15. I hope that
the majority leader will be back tomor-
row, and if he is not, that the majority
whip will take into account the necessity
for advancing this important legislation.
However, if there is an effort made to
force a vote before 12:15, I will be reluc-
tantly required-and it will be very re-
luctantly-to exercise such rights as I
have, even at the expense of the poverty
hearing, which I hope I will not be forced
to exercise, to prevent such a vote.
I would certainly like to cooperate in
getting a vote on the McGovern amend-
ment shortly after noon and having the
debate on my own amendment, not to ex-
tend, under the unanimous-consent
agreement, for more than an hour. So,
with any luck, I would be hopeful of co-
operating and getting this bill disposed
of by 2 o'clock tomorrow afternoon.
I may say, in all good humor and
slightly in a lighter vein, that in my 10
years in the Senate I have learned from
colleagues of my dear and good friend,
the majority whip, who come from the
same section of the country that he
comes from, one or two of the tricks or
privileges, shall we say, of individual
Senators. I shall say no more, but only
hope that my comments will be read in
the RECORD tomorrow, before drastic
plans are made for getting this vote
through before noon tomorrow.
Mr. President, finally I wish to state
for the RECORD my strong support of the
amendment of the Senator from South
Dakota [Mr. MCGOVERN] and to express
my belief that he has made a most
cogent and persuasive argument in sup-
port of the amendment which he has of-
fered.
TRANSACTION OF ROUTINE
BUSINESS
Mr. CLARK. Mr. President, I have
been asked to request unanimous con-
sent, since there was no period for the
transaction of routine morning business
today, that it be in order to lay before
the Senate messages and communica-
tions, receive bills for introduction and
refer them, and to print various routine
matters In the RECORD.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without
objection, it is so ordered.
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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE August 17, 1966
Srsx's curve ball which derailed Home Rule ographer of President Kennedy, calls for the specific. We agreed, when requested so
without such an up and down vote: creation of an economically viable "core" area to do, to help defend them from aggres-
We are confident that Home Rule will win in South Viet Nam, gradual reduction in sion, presumably, of course, the same
on a conference report rollcall in the House military operations and increased economic of aggression which might if the President gives this vote the same 'aid; a "silent armistice," he says, could lead type possibly
support he gave the discharge petition last to a cease fire. In Look magazine for Aug. 9 be directed against our country.
year. Even without any increase in Repub- Hans Morgenthau and Arthur Schlesinger We have before us the largest military
lican support, there are sufficient Democrats Jr. outline peace procedures. bill in our history, but it could have been
who voted with Srsx to carry the Conference Then there are the standing four-point $15 or $20 billion larger had the com-
report for Home Rule. Our count shows suf- proposal of UN Secretary General U Thant mittee included everything that the mili-
ficient votes to win this battle-but only if and the official position of the United States tary experts thought that they needed or
the President, gives Home Rule priority as represented in its 14 points. There is, in could profitably use and it should be
backing. short, no lack of working proposals, some. clearly understood that the $58 billion
In a message to the D.C. Democratic Cen- perhaps impractical, on which the Adminis-
tral Committee at its pre-election rally on tration may draw. The Administration plus of the pending bill will by no means
November 1, 1964, the President said: "The ought to be stimulating discussion of peace take care of what will certainly be an ac-
number one priority for the District of Co- proposals, rather than, at times, seeming to celerated war effort in southeast Asia.
lumbia is home rule. Local self-government be preparing the ground for more escalation. Undoubtedly, there will be a supple-
Is the very basis of democracy. Our platform It is wrong to say there is no practical plan mental bill for that war effort ranging
pledges home rule ... Ibelieve In home rule, for a negotiated peace, and It is wrong to be- from $10 to $15 billion, depending upon
and I pledge you here and now the best sieve that Hanoi will not respond to peace the rate at which our efforts to win that
efforts of the nextAdministration to provide overtures.. If the North Viet Namese were war may be accelerated. And, in addi-
local self-government for the District of convinced the United States wanted peace
Columbia!' The residents of the District ac- more than escalation we think there would tion to what is contained in the present
cepted the President's pledge and did their be a different attitude in Hanoi. Why not military bill for foreign military aid, we
part in response to that pledge; they sup- turn the national attention to discussion of will soon have a foreign assistance bill
ported the President by an 85% vote. We peace proposals, and then take concrete steps which will contain a very substantial
respectfully and confidently ask the Presi- to prove our sincerity. amount of military assistance for our
dent to redeem his pledge now. With the foreign allies.
President's active help, this battle will be 1 Mr. MORSE. I think it is important , One of our most scholarly Presidents
ui ULie rcecoun, oeeauSe Lase acunnnsura- that by precept and example we could
tion's spokesmen continue to misrepre- Induce enough nations of the world to
' sent the position of those of us who are
adopt our form of representative democ-
Mr. MORSE. Mr. President, I ask
unanimous consent to have printed in opposed to this war by saying we have no racy to prevent future wars. Therefore,
the RECORD, an editorial entitled "Pro- counterproposal. Of course, we have when urging our Nation in 1917 to come
grams for Peace," published in the St. had counterproposals. We have offered to the help of France and Great Britain
Louis Post-Dispatch for August 15, 1966. them in this historic debate time and against the aggression of a German em-
time again, for more than 3 years.
There being no objection, the editorial Others in the country have offered coun- phras , coined the frequently repeated
was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, terproposals. The St. Louis Post-Dis- democracy." d" make Since the then, safe for
follows: -i-1, i. ?fa,'ir fhr', i? +1,. rAi+-i.1 +, , we have a Sec-
talk of the possibility of invading the North PRESERVATION OF CONSTITUTION- ferred to as brush wars. In a gigantic
have seemingly given way to an attitude of AL LIBERTY effort to physically rehabilitate first our
receptivity toward negotiations, and we fer- allies and then every other nation that
vently hope this signals a trend. Even U.S.- Mr. ROBERTSON. Mr, President, on asked for financial aid, we have loaned
sponsored Premier Ky of South Viet Nam the assumption that we would be able to and given away at least $117 billion and
has more or less reversed his July position on finish the Defense appropriations bill in are planning a continuation of that aid
the need.for an invasion as an alternative 1 day, as we have so frequently done program for the foreseeable future. Yet
to a war of five to 16 years duration. in the past, I scheduled for this after- we are no closer to making the world safe
The Instructions given by President John-
son to Ambassador at Large W. Averell Har- noon a brief comment on the so-called for democracy than we were in the days
riman to explore every indication that Hanoi open housing provision of the Senate of. Woodrow Wilson. We can, of course,
might be seeking peace are a favorable de- civil rights bill, and having sent on yes- .temporarily protect an ally from Com-
velopment, though in this connection it is terday to Virginia papers a synopsis of munist invasion as we did a few years
regrettable that Cambodia has cancelled Mr. my prepared remarks, it is now too late ago in South Korea, but we have had to
Harriman's scheduled visit to that, country. for me to cancel the plan to deliver them, keep two Army divisions there ever since,
Also, the posibility is reported from the
United Nations that the General Assembly " While I have seldom, during the dis- and so far we have been unable to induce
which meets next month may demand an end cussion of an appropriation bill, dis- the voters of South Korea to adopt our
of the bombing of North Viet Nam and a cussed issues that were not germane, I form of representative democracy.
start on negotiations. -can truthfully say that what I propose to Through blood, sweat, and tears, we can
Mr. Harriman has been directed to devote say about title IV of the Senate civil ultimately protect South Vietnam from
full time to his assignment and presumably rights bill is not wholly unrelated to the the present threat of Communist control.
will study recent proposals for bringing the pending discussion of how `much we But, will that make South Vietnam safe
adversaries together. One of these has been
proposed by the Foreign Minister of should spend on the defense of our own for democracy?
Thailand,
Thanat Khorasan, who suggested an Asian country; on a war in which we are en- I respectfully suggest that the only
?'peace for Asia committee` to arrange a con- gaged in southeast Asia, and on the de- way in which the type of military power
. Terence on Viet Nam. French President De fense from aggression of allies and we now possess will ever make the world
Gaulle has a plan. There have been several friends in many foreign countries. The safe for democracy is to protect people
other peace plans proposed recently, in fact civil rights theme I propose to discuss is who inherently prefer to be free long
a quite sufficient number to counter a fre- the preservation of constitutional liberty. enough from Communist invasion to
quent Administration statement that no one Certainly, the primary propcsed a practical program. y purpose of a mili- give them a chance to be convinced that
!One plan that Mr. Harriman might well tary establishment to protect us from the reason we are the freest as well as the
consider seriously is set forth in the August invasion is to preserve constitutional most prosperous people'in the world is
Issue of Harper's magazine by Anthony Eden, liberty because as the world is now con- ? because of the kind of government that
the marl of Avon and former British Prime stituted, we have no reasonable fear of we have.
.Minister, who was co-chairman of the 1954 attack from any source except from the Nineteen days before the Continental
Geneva conference on Viet Nam. Mr. Eden type of a former Communist leader who Congress adopted our Declaration of In-
'.advances, a 12-point program, starting with once said of the free world: "We will
;the Geneva agreements as it framework and dependence, the people Virginia,
Including a cease-fire and guarantees of neu- ,destroy you." through their representatives es assembled
trality for the Indochina states. The military commitments that we in Williamsburg, adopted a Bill of Rights
In the same issue of this magazine James "have made to NATO; to SEATO and the drafted by George Mason which indi-
MacGregor Burns, political scientist and bi- 1~ortF1lnerican Alliance is not quite so cated the kind of government that Vir-
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 Approved For Release 2005/06/29: CIA-RDP67B00446R000400100011-5
August 17, 1966 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE
.Johnson appointed me to the airlines dis-
pute Emergency Board was because of my
experiences over the years in connection
with the application of the Railway Labor
Act.
2. In your article, you state, "When Morse's
outspoken oratory goes so far as to threaten
impeachment, Johnson rewards him with
new powers."
Your reference to my threatening Presi-
dent Johnson with impeachment is com-
pletely inaccurate. I have never threatened
President Johnson with impeachment. I
think I know what you had in mind, but
your recollection was faulty. In a speech
in the Senate on August 3, 1965, and again
,in another speech on August 4, 1965, I
pointed out that when I went about the
country, I ran into talk by some people sug-
gesting impeachment of the President.
However, I left no room for doubt in my
statements in the Senate that there were
no grounds whatsoever for any talk about
impeachment. In fact, in one of the
speeches, r said that such talk was nonsense.
I have never proposed that President
Johnson be impeached. To the contrary, I
have answered all mail or all statements
made to me about impeachment by making
perfectly clear that there is no basis what-
soever under the impeachment procedures
of the Constitution for impeaching the
President.
I am enclosing in this letter tear sheets
from the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD, containing
some of those statements.
3, In your aracle, you state, "The summer
season for labor contract termination and
for strikes co'encides with the annual fight
Senator MoRse leads against the Foreign Aid
Bill." The article, then continues with lan-
guage which I interpret to mean that you
had concluded that the President appointed
me as Chairman of the airlines dispute
Emergency Board in order to divert my atten-
tion from the foreign aid bill.
First, let me say that I am satisfied that
there isn't the slightest basis in fact for
that inference. In the second place, the
record is clear that I have continued to
work just as hard this year as I have in the
past in opposition to the foreign aid bill.
I offered amendment after amendment in
the Foreign Relations Committee. I voted
against the Committee's final draft of the
foreign aid bill as It was reported to the
Senate. I spoke against the foreign aid bill
in the Senate. I sought to amend it. I
voted against it at the time of final passage.
At the present time, I am a member of the
Senate Conference Committee on the foreign
aid bill. The progress of the Conference
satisfies me that I will not be able to vote
for the Conference Report in the Conference
Committee, nor will I be able to vote for it
on the floor of the Senate,
4. Although your article does not say so
directly, I think some readers may imply
from it that the work I have been doing
for President Johnson In the field of labor
disputes has diverted me from speaking out
against the Administration's war in Viet-
nam. Of course, as the record shows, such
Is not the case. As the index to the Con-
gressional Record will show, since my ap-
pointment to the airlines dispute Emergency
Board on April 21, I spoke on the floor of
the Senate in opposition to the war In Viet-
nam on the following dates: April 25, May
0, May 16, May 27, June 2, June 21, June 23,
June 29, July 11, July 15, July 18, July 26,
and August 12.
Likewise, I have made speeches in criti-
cism of our foreign policy in Vietnam in
various places in the country as follows:
April 22: Albany, New York; April 28-
Santa Rosa, California;
April 31 Portland, Oregon; June 7-New
Bedford, Massachusetts;
June 10: Salt Lake City, Utah; June 18-
Chicago, Illinois;
June 19: El Paso, Texas; June 29-Pough-
keepsie, New York;
June 30: Chicago, Illinois; July 20-Wash-
ington, D.C.;
On August 6, I was in New Haven, Con-
necticut, where I spoke at a rally for the
New England-New York Conference for New
Politics. On the platform with me were
thirteen candidates running for the House
of Representatives and the U.S. Senate who
Include in their campaign platforms pro-
posals for de-escalating the war in Vietnam
and seeking an honorable peace through ex-
isting peacekeeping procedures provided in
International law. Among the States rep-
resented by these candidates were Maine,
New Hampshire, Massachussetts, Connecti-
cut, New York and New Jersey. I am en-
closing a copy of the speech that I gave at
that political rally.
Between now and January 1, I already
have accepted invitations to speak at public
meetings in various parts of the United
States, at which I shall set forth my views
in opposition to the administration's foreign
policy in Asia.
I am sending you these observations in
regard to your article, because I feel that I
owe it to you to set the record straight re-
garding my relationships with President
Johnson as I know them to be. Also, because
of my respect and high regard for you, I
thought I owed it to you to try to clarify
the misunderstanding that you seem to have
concerning the reasons that President John-
son has given me the labor assignments that
he has given to me.
Others have commented from time to time
concerning their surprise that President
Johnson and I have worked together on labor
dispute problems in view of our differences
over the war in Vietnam. I reply to them
by saying that it has been my observation
that President Johnson, both when he was
Majority Leader in the Senate, and now in
the White House, is what we call in American
politics a professional when It comes to work-
ing with people with whom he agrees on
some issues, although he may disagree with
them on others. I think he shares my view
that those of us in public life should be
highly professional in our relationships with
each other by never letting our differences
on any issue prevent us from working to-
gether on other issues.
I think my relationship with President
Johnson has been the same in this regard as
the relationship between two lawyers. On
one day, they can be on the same side of a
case and work together on it, but on the next
day, they can be an opposite sides and oppose
each other with respect to the issues in a
case but never permit personal differences
to develop between them simply because
they do not share the same point of view on
the substantive matters involved.
I hope that the next time you are in Wash-
ington, you will have breakfast or lunch with
me as I would like to visit with you.
With best wishes,
Sincerely yours,
WAYNE MORSE.
Mr. McCLELLAN. Mr. President, I
yield to the Senator from Virginia [Mr.
ROBERTSON], and then to the Senator
from Missouri.
HOME RULE FOR THE DISTRICT OF
COLUMBIA
Mr. MORSE. Mr. President, Mr.
Joseph L. Rauh, Jr., chairman of the
Democratic Central Committee of the
District of Columbia, held a press con-
ference today, and at that conference
he Issued a press release on the need for
home rule,.in which he again called upon
the White House to give support to a pro-
18887
posal which I shall introduce in the Sen-
ate before adjournment as a rider to
the higher education bill, which would
seek to have a direct vote on home rule
before we adjourn, in both Houses of
Congress.
I ask unanimous consent that Mr.
Rauh's press release be printed In the
RECORD.
There being no objection, the press
release was ordered to be printed in the
RECORD, as follows:
STATEMENT BY JOSEPH L. RAUH, JR., CHAIR-
MAN, DEMOCRATIC CENTRAL COMMITTEE
The struggle for Home Rule for the Dis-
trict of Columbia will be won or lost within
the next sixty days. If the 89th Congress-
the most liberal of this generation-adjourns
without enacting Home Rule, it may well be
years before self-government comes to the
District.
The failure to enact Home Rule can only
bring further disillusionment and discon-
tent to our city. Already a large segment of
the District's population has nothing but
contempt for the leadership of the business
community which has blocked Home Rule;
soon this deep alienation from the business
community will accelerate and spread to
other segments of the city.
I refuse to predict riots; such predictions
are too often self-fulfilling. But I do warn
of an ever-increasing breakdown in the pub-
lic dialogue by which cities are normally
governed and ever-increasing tensions and
hostilities defiling and defacing the District
of Columbia as the Capital of the Free World.
With no outlet for dissatisfaction and dis-
content through the political processes of
self-government, tensions in our city can
only accelerate to and past the danger point.
Already we have seen abundant evidence
that, as the normal methods of political
dialogue and discussion of issues fail, boy-
cotts and confrontations begin to appear as
the only means of making oneself heard. As
discussion and peaceful protest fail to obtain
results, alternative means of achieving rec-
ognition for a point of view will become ever
more flamboyant, violent and dangerous.
What is in store for us without Home Rule
is an ever-escalating guerrilla warfare.
Our situation in the District is like one
speaking to a foreigner. As one cannot make
himself understood, he raises his voice with
consequence resentment on both sides.
So, as the residents of the Districts cannot
make themselves understood by their rulers
and accomplish what they believe is needed
for themselves and their families, so they,
too, will raise their voices and escalate their
actions until they are finally heard. As the
President said last August 26th: "The clock
Is ticking, time is moving."
But this calamity of tension and hostility
and guerrilla warfare does not have to hap-
pen. Home Rule can be enacted before Con-
gress adjourns. Senator WAYNE MORSE will
offer a mayor-city council-delegate amend-
ment to the Higher Education bill. This
amendment can go through the Senate
promptly and easily if it has the public sup-
port of the Administration; with Adminis-
tration support the Higher Education bill can
be reported to the floor of the Senate next
week and the Morse amendment adopted be-
fore Labor Day. Sixty-three Senators voted
for an even stronger bill last July; MORSE'S
proposal, removes two controversial aspects-
the automatic Federal appropriation and
partisan elections-and should pass the Sen-
ate this time by an even larger majority.
After conference with the House Commit-
tee on Labor and Education (which Is pro-
Home Rule), the matter will go to the floor
of the House. This will be an up and down
vote on Home Rule. Every up and down vote
last year was won by the supporters of Home
Rule. The only loss was on Congressman
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