VIETNAM ELECTIONS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP67B00446R000400100009-8
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 18
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 21, 2005
• Sequence Number: 9
• Publication Date: August 19, 1966
• Content Type: OPEN

Approved For Release 2005/06/29 : CIA-RDP67B00446R000400100009-8
19126 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE August 19, 1966
contracts between the World Bank and the [International Bank for Reconstruction and years and bear interest at the rate of 6%
purchasers for settlement on October 5, 1966, Development Press Release, July 29, 19661 per annum. Amortization will begin in Au-
January 4, 1967, July 5, 1967 and January 3, ONE-HUNDRED-MILLION-DOLLAR LOAN FOR gust 1969. The loan will be guaranteed by
1968.. EXPRESSWAY IN JAPAN the Government of Japan.
"The First Boston Corporation and Morgan The World Bank has approved a loan
Stanley & Co. are reserving a portion of the equivalent to $100 million to provide adds- [International Bank for Reconstruction and
proposed issue for sale to new United States tional financing for the construction of the Development press release, July 29, 1966]
and Canadian institutional investors in the 883-mile Tokyo-Kobe Expressway in Japan. TWENTY-MILLION-DOLLAR LOAN FOR ELECTRIC
Bank's Bonds. Qualified institutional purl Including this loan, the Bank will have made POWER IN SOUTH AFRICA
chasers who have not purchased World Bank six loans over the past six years totaling $380 The World Bank has approved Bonds since April, 1952, will be allotted g a loan
Bonds from this special reserve. million for the Expressway. It is scheduled equivalent to $20 million to the South Afri-
The Intethationcl Bank for Reconstrlic- for completion over its entire length in can Electricity Supply Commission (ESCOM).
tion and Development an international April 1969 at a total cost equivalent to nearly The loan will assist in financing the foreign
institution, the members of which International
gov- $1.5 billion, exchange costs of a 1,600,000-kilowatt axe e titutis now numbering 103. The Bank The loan was made to the Nihon Doro thermal power plant at Camden, about 160
officially began operations on June 25. 1946 Kodan (Japan Highway Public Corporation), miles east of Johannesburg. The project is
"Its principal purpose is to assist the eco-
nomic development of its member countries
by facilitating the investment of capital for
productive purposes, thereby promoting the
long-range growth of international trade
and the improvement of standards of living.
When private capital is not available on
reasonable terms, the Bank supplements pri-
vate investment by making loans out of Its
own resources of funds borrowed by it."
[International Bank for Reconstruction and
Development, press release, June 28, 1966]
ONE HUNDRED AND SEVENTY-FIVE MILLION
DOLLAR BOND ISSUE
The following announcement is being made
in New York today by The First Boston Cor-
poration and Morgan Stanley & Co.:
"The First Boston Corporation and Morgan
Stanley & Co., as managers of a nationwide
group of underwriters, announce the public
offering of $175,000,000 International Bank
for Reconstruction and Development 5% %.
Twenty-Five Year Bonds of 1966, due July
1, 1991, at 993/4% to yield 5.39%. This is the
first World Bank Bond issue in the United
States since January 1965.
"The Bonds are not callable prior to July
1, 1976. They are redeemable at the option
of the Bank at a redemption price of 1021/2 %
for those redeemed on and after July 1, 1976
to and including June 30, 1981, at 10114 %
thereafter to and including June 30, 1986 and
at 100% thereafter. They are also redeem-
able through operation of the sinking fund,
commencing in 1977, at the principal amount
together with accrued interest.
"The net proceeds to the Bank of the sale
of the Bonds.to the underwriters and under
the contracts for delayed delivery will be
used in the general operations of the Bank.
"The Bonds being offered are not subject
to the interest equalization tax. Further-
more, the 1966 "Guidelines for Non-Bank
Financial Institutions," issued by the Fed-
eral Reserve System in December 1965, place
no restraint on purchases of the Bonds.
Thus no guideline restrictions affect pur-
chases by non-bank financial institutions,
including trust companies or trust depart-
ments of commercial banks.
"In order to cooperate with the Presi-
dent's balance of payments 'program, the
World Bank intends to invest in the United
States the proceeds from the sale of these
Bonds to U.S. investors, so as to eliminate
any effect on the U.S. balance of payments
-until the end of 1967.
"In addition to the initial delivery of the
Bonds, which is expected on July 13, 1966,
Bonds will also be offered fqr sale on a de-
layed delivery basis, through the under-
wtiteis, to certain institutional purchasers.
Delayed delivery sales will be made under
contracts between the World Bank and the
purchasers for settlement on October 5, 1966,
January 4, 1967, July 5, 1967 and January 3,
1968. A spokesman for the underwriters
indicated that perhaps more than half of the
issue would be sold for delayed delivery."
construction, operation and maintenance of gram under which the Commission plans to
many of Japan's toll facilities which include add 3,310,000 kilowatts of generating capacity
highways, tunnels, bridges and ferries. The and 3,200 miles of high-voltage transmission
Tokyo-Kobe Expressway is its largest under- lines to its system during 1966-1970.
taking. The western end of the Expressway, ESCOM is an autonomous statutory cor-
extending 114 miles from Kobe to Nagoya, poration established in 1922. Its operations
has been open to traffic since 1964. are divided into seven undertakings which
The current loan will complement a $75 serve different parts of the country. ESCOM
million loan made in September 1963 for the supplies electricity in bulk to most cities
100-mile section of the Expressway between in South Africa for distribution in their
Tokyo and Shizuoka. The Tokyo-Shizuoka areas, and supplies power directly to mines,
region is Japan's most important center of large Industries and the railroads. Its abil-
commerce and industry, as well as the cen- ity to meet the rapidly rising demand for
ter of the national government. It contains power has been an important factor in the
more than a quarter of the country's buss- economic development of South Africa dur-
nesses, and nearly a third of the country's ing the postwar period. Between 1945 and
total production originates there. The one 1965, ESCOM's installed capacity increased
existing highway traversing the area is more than fivefold, to a total of about
heavily congested and completely inade- 4,600,000 kilowatts. It now generates about
quate to handle the rapidly growing vehicu- 80% of the electricity used in the country.
lar traffic. The number of motor vehicles ESCOM's sales of electricity have increased
throughout Japan as a whole has increased at an average rate of 8.2% per year for the
fivefold in the past 11 years to a total of past decade, and are expected to increase at
8,000,000. The Tokyo-Shizuoka region ac- about the same rate during the next five
counts for nearly half the passenger cars years.
and nearly a quarter of the trucks. At present about four-fifths of the Com-
Major construction work on the Tokyo- mission's power sales are in the inter-
Shizuoka expressway began in 1965 and con- connected system which comprises the Cape
tracts have been let for about half the work. Northern, Rand and Orange Free State and
Construction contracts yet to be awarded on Eastern Transvaal undertakings and serves
the basis of international bidding are valued the principal Industrial and mining areas of
at the equivalent of $120 million. Because South Africa. The new Camden power plant
of the relative priority of the two extreme will be in this system. It is already under
sections. Tokyo-Atsugl and . Yoshiwara- construction and is being built on a new
Shizuoka, work started earlier on these sec- coal field with reserves adequate to supply
tions than on the mountainous middle sec- the station for 40 years at lost cost. The
tion, and they are scheduled to be open to plant will have eight 200,000-kilowatt gen-
traffic in September 1968. The 21-mile sec- erating units, the first of which is scheduled
tion between Tokyo and Atsugi will be six- for completion in October 1966. The other
lane and the remainder of the expressway units are scheduled to follow at intervals of
four-lane. Design speeds range from 75 three to eight months with the final unit
miles per hour in level terrain to 50 miles in expected to be in operation by October 1969.
mountainous areas. The estimated total cost of the Camden
The Tokyo-Kobe Expressway and urban project is equivalent to $176.4 million, of
expressways In Tokyo and Kobe which the which $40.6 million will be in foreign ex-
Bank has also helped to finance are part of change. The Bank loan will cover about half
Japan's Five Year Road Improvement Pro- the foreign exchange requirements. Most of
gram under which the equivalent of $11.4 the remaining costs will be met by ESCOM
billion is to be spent for the construction, from internal cash generation and from bor-
improvement and maintenance of roads by rowings in the South African capital market.
March 1969. Japan's road network, exclud- Contracts for the major items of equipment
ing municipal roads, exceeds 93,750 miles in for the Camden station have been placed on
length, but less than 20% is paved. Most the basis of international competitive bid-
roads are narrow and winding, with little or ding.
no shoulders. Traffic normally operates un- The loan will be for a term of ten years
der congested conditions and, as a conse- and bear interest at the rate of 61/4 % per
quence, vehicle operating costs are high and annum. Amortization will begin on June 1.
accident rates are heavy. The general objec- 1968. The loan will be guaranteed by the
tives of the road program are to double the Re ublic of South Africa.
length of paved roads by 1969, and to increaseA
the expressway network from 52.5 miles in VIETNAM ELECTIONS
1964 to 491 miles in 1969.
The total cost of the Tokyo-Shizuoka see- Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, as
tion of the Expressway is estimated at the we look back on the history of our in-
equivalent of $640 million. The Bank loan, volvement in Vietnam, probably no
together with the earlier loan of $75 million, single U.S. policy decision has been so
will cover about 27% of the total costs. Toll
revenues are expected to pay back the entire significant as that to support President
Investment costs, including interest, in about Diem's refusal to go through with the
22 years. unification elections promised in the
The Bank loan will be for a term of 15 Final Declaration 9f the Geneva Confer-
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;august 19, 1966 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE
the world market to put pressure on the tags keep p the order to eliminate of i any in dol- [From the Wall Street Journal, June 14, 1966]
dollar. nor, if the dollar is devalued, the y immediate ef- ASIAN NATIONS GET LOANS
holders and hoarders of gold are the chief feet on our continuing unfavorable balance WASHINGTON.-Loans totaling $60 million
winners. Moreover, If the South African of payments" He asked the World Bank to to three Asian nations were announced in
define "initially" and "immediate" and be- Washington.
Electric Supply Comrliission-ESCOM- fore July was over, the World Bank had given. The World Bank said it will lend Thailand
t.ssue in the U.S. capital market, that
borrowing would have been subject to the
'[nterest Equalization Tax. By borrowing
from the World Bank at 61/4 percent-
just about at the level of the existing
prime rate here in the United States-
ihis additional cost was avoided.
A. lot less "flexibility" and a lot more
discipline is needed in U.S. dealings with
international lending agencies, if the in-
tegrity of the dollar is to be maintained.
An appropriate question at this point is
"Whither goest thou, Mr. Woods?" I for
one would like to know.
I ask unanimous consent to have
printed in the RECORD In connection with
my remarks some of the comment that I
have encountered, together with some of
the news releases that have come from
the World Bank.
There being no objection, the items re-
wested were ordered to be printed in the
RECORD, US follows:
[From the Evening Star, Aug. 15, 1966]
As JANEWAY VIEWS IT: WORLD BANK ACTION
HURTS
By Eliot Janeway)
Court that follows the election returns. Mr.
Dooley's celebrated quip applies as well to
the sophisticated denizens of Washington's
swank embassy row. Their main job is to
keep a sharp eye on the Yankee dollar. Every
embassy in Washington has long since
alerted Its government to count on dollars
being hard to come by-and not just because
the money policies of the Johnson adminis-
tration have left us strapped for cash for
even our own needs here at home.
The war in Viet Nam-more precisely, the
isolation in which we are fighting it-has
clearly left the country with the belief that
dollars advanced overseas have not come back
as value received. Perhaps they never can:
The suggestion is all the argument that's
needed to cut down on dollar advances. Con-
grass certainly took the suggestion at face
value last month when it voted large slashes
In, the Johnson administration's foreign aid
requests.
Governments in need of dollars-and most
of them are-have been trying to turn up
new .ways of raising them without having to
deal directly with the American government.
The World Bank Is proving to be a pretty
convenient touch for the shrewdest, tough-
est-minded, political dollar-foragers on the
loose in Washington-South Africa, for
example.
CITED SENATOR. SYMINGTON
In June this column cited Sen. STUART
SYMINGTON, Democrat, of Missouri. as author- keep the fact of the World Bank before the balance of payments program, the World
ity for the criticism it leveled against the security dealer profession and the profes- Bank intends to invest in the United States
World Bank for Its sale of $175 million of 25- sional investors." He added, "We hope to be the proceeds from the sale of these Bonds to
year bonds in the New York market. Its in the U.S. market at intervals of not more U.S. investors, so as to eliminate any effect
operations, we warned, were getting in the than one year." on the U.S. balance of payments until the
way of American borrowers in their own mar- The new bonds will mature July 1, 1991, end of 1967.
ket; and its borrowings were aggravating the and won't be callable before July 1, 1976. A "The Bonds will not be callable prior to
overheated conditions which Johnson was sinking fund will begin in 1977 and is de- July 1, 1976, ten years from the date of issue.
exhorting American business to permit to signed to retire 50% of the issue prior to A sinking fund beginning in 1977 will retire
cool off. maturity. 50 percent of the issue prior to maturity.
Adding insult to Injury, the World Bank The World Bank has made $9.5 billion of The bonds will be in fully registered form
was preparing to siphon off scarce dollars, loans since it began operations in June 1946. without coupons.
and send them abroad at the very time when During those 20 years, the bank has sold "In addition to the initial delivery of the
Washington's money policies are shutting off about $5 billion of bonds and notes, of which Bonds, which is expected on July 13, 1966,
financing opportunities to Americans. about $2.8 billion still is outstanding. The Bonds will also be offered for sale on a de-
Senator SYMINGTON, in leveling his objec- bonds are held in more than 40 countries, layed delivery basis, through the under-
tions at this discrimination, noted the World with about 58% of the bonds held by in- writers, to certain institutional purchasers.
Bank's clearly defensive agreement "initially" vestors outside the U.S. Delayed delivery sales will be made under
him his answer. It was more reckless than
even his critical attitude had bargained for.
Africa to finance half the foreign exchange
costs of a power plant.
As a matter of American bargaining in the
national interest to get full value for dol--
lass advanced, the position in which the loam
puts us is as undignified economically as it
is morally. For South Africa is an active par..
ticipant in the international gold speculation
against the dollar; and she is holding gold
hack from the market in order to add to the
pressure on the dollar. This is her right, and
it is to her interest. But it is not to America's
interest to advance South Africa the dollars
to operate while she holds back her gold. It
is our right to hold back our dollars in order
to make her use her gold.
In assessing this use of back-door dollar
outflows, it behooves us to remember that it
would take a crash in America to make South
Afriba's gold worth more. Any move that
weakens the American dollar against South
African gold, is bound to encourage the
speculation against the dollar and to make
it seem plausible.
[From the Wall Street Journal, June 14, 1966]
WORLD BANK SAYS IT WILL OrrEa $175 Mu.-
LION OF ITS 25-YEAR BONDS IN UNITED
STATES JUNE 28 on 29
NEW Yoa:s -The International Bank for
Reconstruction and Development (World
Bank) announced plans for a $175 million
public offering of its 25-year bonds in the
U.S. June 28 or 29.
George D. Woods, president, told a press
conference that in planning the offering the
international agency had agreed with the U.S.
Treasury to initially invest the proceeds in
U.S. Government agency obligations and U .S.
bank deposits to eliminate any immediate
effect on the U.S. balance-of-payments defl.-
cit--the excess of money flowing out of the
U.S. over money flowing in. These invest-
ments will begin maturing after Dec. 3:1,
1967, he added, at which time the money
will be available for the World Bank to
lend to underdeveloped nations.
The offering will be the first by the World
Bank In the U.S. since January 1965, when it
sold $200 million of 25-year 41/Z % bonds. It
will be the bank's 17th U.S. offering; about
$1.6 billion of the previous 16 issues still is
outstanding.
The new issue will be marketed by an un-
derwriting group led by First Boston Corp.
and Morgan Stanley & Co. at a price and
interest rate to be determined June 28. Mr.
Woods said in answer to a question that the
rate "will be a new high for World Bank
borrowing in the U.S."
Mr. Woods said the bonds were being of-
fered at this time, when interest rates gen-
the equivalent of $36 million for highway
construction, repayable at 6% annually over
24 years starting in October 1970.
The Agency for International Develop-
ment, the U.S. foreign-aid agent, said it
will lend South Korea $18.6 million to buy
62 diesel-electric locomotives and a variety
of railway repair equipment. The loan will
be repayable in dollars over 30 years at 2i'/ %,
after a 10-year grace period during which
the rate will be 1%.
The Government's Export-Import Bank
said it will lend Chinese Petroleum Corp.,
owned by the Republic of China, $5.4 million
to buy American equipment and services to
build a naphtha cracking plant on Taiwan.
The loan is repayable at 51/2 % annually over
seven years starting in 1968.
[International Bank for Reconstruction and
Development press release, June 13, 19661
WORLD BANK BOND ISSUE PLANNED
The following news release is being issued
in New York today by The First Boston Cor-
poration and Morgan Stanley & Co.:
"George D. Woods, President of the Inter-
national Bank for Reconstruction and Devel-
opment, announced today that the Bank is
planning to offer In the United States during
the week beginning June 27, 1966, a new
issue of $175,000,000 principal amount of
Twenty-Five Year Bonds due July 1, 1991.
The Bonds, which are non-callable for a pe-
riod of ten years, will be offered through a
nationwide group of underwriters headed by
The First Boston Corporation and Morgan
Stanley & Co. The coupon and price of the
Bonds will be determined just prior to the
offering. This is the first World Bank Bond
issue In the United States since January,
1965.
"In order to enter any capital market, the
Bank, under its Articles of Agreement, must
have the approval of the government con-
cerned. In a letter granting the United
States Government's approval of the forth-
coming issue, Secretary of the Treasury
Fowler stated that the Bank has made an
outstanding contribution to the sound eco-
nomic advance of the less developed coun-
tries. The Secretary said further that he
approves of the proposed borrowing because
the activities of the Bank coincide with the
national interests of the United States in
this area.
"The Bonds to be offered are not subject
to the Interest Equalization Tax. Further-
more, the 1966 'Guidelines for Non-Bank
Financial Institutions,' issued by the Fed-
eral Reserve System in December, 1965, place
no restraint on purchases of World Bank
Bonds. Thus no guideline restrictions affect
purchases by non-bank financial Institutions,
including trust companies or trust depart-
ments of commercial banks.
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August 19, 1.966 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD -SENATE
ence which ended the war in Indochina.
The bitter fruit of that decision has
ripened into a $2 billion a month war be-
ing fought by 375,000 American service-
men with no one in a position to predict
an end to the escalation.
If we are to understand the factors
which motivate the other side in this
frustrating conflict we should take a close
look at the complex history of this re-
gion. The period surrounding the elec-
tions which were to have been held in
1956 are especially important. Cornell
University has just published an excel-
lent study of this subject by Franklin B.
Weinstein entitled "Vietnam's Unheld
Elections."
I ask unanimous consent to have chap-
ter IV, "Why Were Elections Not Held,"
and the epilog, "The Failure To Hold
Elections: Some Implications for the
Present," printed in the RECORD follow-
ing my remarks. I commend the entire
study to my colleagues.
For purposes of comparison, I also ask
unanimous consent to have printed in
the RECORD preceding these excerpts a
statement furnished the Committee on
Foreign Relations by the Department of
State setting forth the Department's po-
sition on this question.
There being no objection, the material
was ordered to be printed in the RECORD,
as follows:
DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
Washington, August 12, 1965.
Mr. NORVILL JONES,
Consultant, Senate Committee on Foreign
Relations.
DEAR MR. JONES: In response to your tele-
phone request to the Department on August
9, I am enclosing material on our position
regarding the provision in the Geneva Ac-
cords for elections.
Please let me know if the Department can
be of further assistance.
Sincerely yours,
DOUGLAS MAcARTHuR T1,
Assistant Secretary for Congressional
Relations.
ELECTIONS IN VIET-NAM
The Final Declaration of the Geneva Con-
ference is the only one of the group of docu-
ments generally referred to as the 1954 Ge-
neva Accords which deals with the question
of elections in Viet-Nam. This Final Dec-
laration says that in July 1956 free elections
would be held to establish democratic insti-
tutions under which the country could be
unified.
The United States representative at the
Geneva Conference, Under Secretary of
State Walter Bedell Smith, presented the
United States position with reference to elec-
tions and reunification in a unilateral dec-
laration to the Conference. After pointing
out that we would view with concern any at-
tempt to disturb the Agreements by force,
the U.S. declaration said that we would ad-
here to our traditional position with respect
to divided countries: reunification through
free elections under United Nations super-
vision. That this is still the American posi-
tion was made plain by President Johnson
on July 28 when he said "we insist and we
will always insist that the people of South
Viet-Nam shall have the right of choice, the
right to shape their own destiny in free elec-
tions in the South, or throughout all Viet-
Nam under international supervision."
The Vietnamese Government also made a
unilateral declaration at the Geneva Confer-
ence in which it expressed its opposition to
the division of Viet-Nam.. President Diem
later made his views known on the subject
of elections when he pointed out that the
Final Declaration of the Conference was very
obscurely worded, but that on one point it
was quite specific: that any elections to be
held were to be free.
The United States and South Vietnamese
position has consistently held that condi-
tions were such in North Viet-Nam that
there could never have been truly free elec-
tions. The general nature of conditions in
North Viet-Nam has never been secret, and
they are perhaps best described by General
Vo Nguyen Giap, present Defense Minister
of North Viet-Nam, who said the following in
October 1956, only three months after the
elections called for in the Conference's Final
Declaration were to have been held:
"We made too many deviations and exe-
cuted too many honest people. We attacked
on too large a front and, seeing enemies
everywhere, resorted to terror, which became
far too wide spread."
"While reorganizing the party, we paid too
much importance to the notion of social class
instead of adhering firmly to political quali-
fications alone. Instead of adhering firmly to
political qualifications alone. Instead of rec-
ognizing education to be the first essential,
we resorted exclusively to organizational
measures such as disciplinary punishments,
expulsion from the party, executions, disso-
lution of party branches and cells. Worse
still, torture came to be regarded as a normal
practice during party reorganization."
Since conditions involving "executions,"
"torture a normal practice," and "terror" are
hardly conducive to the holding of free elec-
tions, the elections mentioned at the Geneva
Conference were never held, and the time
set aside for them went by without notice
being paid to the fact in either North or
South Viet-Nam. If the elections had been
held in 1956, it is evident that in North Viet-
Nam they would have constituted a travesty
of the letter as well as the spirit of the Final
Declaration of the Geneva Conference of 1954.
Elections have of course been held in South
Viet-Nam on several occasions. In 1956, 1959,
and 1963 National Assembly elections were
held, and presidential elections were held in
1956 and 1961. A national referendum in
1955 determined that South Viet-Nam
should be a republic with President Ngo Dinh
Diem as the chief of state. Most recently, on
May 30, 1965, nation-wide elections were held
for provincial and municipal councils. De-
spite obvious risks of Viet Gong retaliation,
there was no shortage of candidates for coun-
cil seats, and 70 % of those registered, or
60% of those eligible, turned out to vote.
IV. WHY WERE ELECTIONS NOT HELD?
The statements of the DRV in the period
following the Geneva Conference provide
evidence that the Viet Minh regime did in
fact contemplate the unification of the
country under their control by means of
`elections. Dong's statement to the final meet-
ing of the Geneva Conference stresses the
importance of peace almost as much as the
need for national unity 16 Ho's statement of
22 July 1954 similarly placed emphasis not
only on the indivisibility of Vietnam but
also on the struggle for peace and democracy,
specifically elections " Nhan Dan reported
the Viet Minh line: "Henceforward, the main
task of our struggle is to consolidate the
peace we have won, faithfully and rapidly
implement the provisions of the armistice
agreement, and go forward to the settlement
sG Radio Moscow, 22 July 1954. See also
Dong's statement broadcast over Radio Pek-
ing, 2 August 1954.
ad New York Times, 26 July 1954, and Facts
and Dates on the Problem of the Reunifica-
tion of Viet-Nam (Hanoi: Foreign Languages
Publishing House, 1956), p. 10.
of political Issues." 11 As the Viet Minh radio
put it on 5 August 1954: "The phase of armed
struggle is now being replaced by the phase of
political struggle." Exhorting the southern
compatriots, the Viet Minh radio warned
against the use of violence: "The political
struggle requires the people in South
Vietnam to maintain a high vigilance. It
demands that our people avoid every provo-
cation and use peaceful measures to win
democratic freedom and ... attainment of
general elections to unify our country." sa
Throughout 1954 and into 1955, the utter-
ances of the DRV leaders continued to reflect
a policy based on political struggle leading to
the 1956 elections. Ho Chi Minh, in a No-
vember interview, was asked whether he
feared that the division of Vietnam could be
as lasting as the partition of Korea and Ger-
many. Ho replied negatively, pointing out
that the "conditions in Vietnam are different
from those in Korea and Germany." He re-
pledged 'the DRV to work "untiringly" for
peaceful reunification as provided in the
Geneva Agreements " In June 1955 Ho again
stressed that Vietnam could not be compared
with Korea and Germany and insisted that
the military demarcation and provisional di-
vision could endure only until the 1956 elec-
tions were held. "Vietnam is a single coun-
try and nothing can prevent the firm will
of its people from achieving its unity." he
added.BO Perhaps the most convincing state-
ments of the DRV's expectation that the
country would indeed be reunified by elec-
tions in 1956 were those made to their sup-
porters. Viet Minh troops native of south
Vietnam who ? were regrouped in the north
were told that they would be returning home
in 1956 after the elections .91 And as the Viet
Minh forces left areas they had ruled for
many years, they advised the inhabitants to
accept life under the State of Vietnam gov-
ernment until the Viet Minh could return
after the reunification elections."
If the DRV's statements revealed a con-
fident expectation and a strong determina-
tion that the country would be reunified by
elections, the Viet Minh demonstrated those
attitudes by more than mere words. The
best evidence that the DRV took the Geneva
Agreements' promise of elections seriously is
the behavior of the Viet Minh during the
ensuing two years .w As Roy Jumper, writing
in late 1956, put it: "The Viet Minh agents
have lain low during the past two years in
South Vietnam. They waited expecting to
win the South through the expected all-
0 Vietnam News Agency dispatch, 25 July
1954.
"Vietnam News Agency dispatch, 28 Sep-
tember 1954.
" Vietnam News Agency dispatch, 10 No-
vember 1954.
"New York Times, 8 June 1955.
91 Philippe Devillers, lecture, Cornell Uni-
versity, 13 December 1965. See also He's
letter to troops coming north. Broadcast over
the Viet Minh radio on 17 September 1954,
Ho's letter said that although the troops re-
grouping in the north were "temporarily far"
from their native villages, they could expect
to "return happily" after the country's
peaceful unification.
83 Reported by Tillman Durdin, New York
Times, 19 May 1955. Additional statements
of the DRV's reliance on peaceful struggle
may be found in New China News Agency
dispatch of 21 September 1954, Vietnam
News Agency dispatches of 5 November 1954
and 28 March 1955, and Voice of Nambo
broadcast of a Nhan Dan editorial on 23 Sep-
tember 1954.
08 See Jean Lacouture, Vietnam: Between
Two Truces (New York: Random House,
1966), p. 52.
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Vietnam elections" 04 Ho Chi Minh's fol-
lowers largely refrained from any effort to
retain a military hold on southern areas
they had controlled for as long as ten years.
The DRV's cooperation in the implementa-
tion of the Geneva Agreements probably
came as a surprise to some 00 It is hard to
imagine that its withdrawal from areas it
had long controlled meant only that the
Viet Minh had become resigned to perma-
nent partition. To suppose that is to ig-
nore, among other things, the force of the
Viet Minh's commitment to national unity.
The Viet Minh forces had fought too long
and hard for national unity under their
leadership for them to give up what they had
won without actually believing they could
regain It. The DRV's actual relinquishing of
territory and its abandonment of violence
must be regarded as solid evidence that the
Viet Minh hoped to unify the country peace-
fully.
The Viet Minh waged an extensive cam-
paign to win votes in the election. In late
September 1954 it was reported that "politi-
cally" the Viet Minh was "working hard in
the South to consolidate its influence." Po-
litical workers "intensified their activity" as
Viet Minh military forces withdrew, and the
Viet Minh was "plainly preparing to win the
national elections scheduled * * * for
1956." 06 During the last three months of
1954, a congress of the Lien Viet (United
National Front) met in Hanoi. A Viet Minh-
dominated organization, the Lien Viet in-
cluded representatives of various political
parties from northern, central, and southern
Vietnam. According to Nhan Dan, the aim
of the congress was to mobilize popular
forces in the struggle for "independence,
peace and unity and democracy." The Lien
Viet's "work for 1955" was said to consist "in
winning support in all levels of the popu-
lation with a view to winning the general
elections for a united Vietnam." 07 In late
December the DRV added four leaders from
south Vietnam to its cabinet in what was
described in the press as a move undertaken
because of its expected impact on "the psy-
chological warfare" south of the 17th parallel
in preparation for the 1956 elections?0 In
March of 1955, it was reported by C. L. Sulz-
berger of the New York Times that Viet Minh
agents were already going through villages
in the south "lining up votes." Their pro-
cedure was to tajse along two photographs,
one of Ho Chi Minh and one of Bao Dal, and
to ask the peasants whom they preferred.
In June 1955 there were reports that the
Viet Minh was working hard to prepare for
elections and had opened an intensive new
campaign to woo the workers and peasants
of the south. Communists had reportedly
secured positions in athletic organizations,
ancestor worship cults, workingmen's groups
and other associations in an effort to win
support for the Viet Minh not only on the
basis of Ho's prestige as a nationalist leader
but also through promises of the economic
advantages communism allegedly would
04 Roy Jumper, "The Communist Challenge
to South Vietnam," Far Eastern Survey, XXV,
no. 11 (November, 1956), 161.
00 For example, some diplomats had doubt-
edthat any considerable movement of refu-
gees out of Communist areas would be per-
mitted. New York Times, 24 July 1954.
Similarly, Joseph and Stewart Alsop had
doubted that the Viet Minh troops would
voluntarily relinquish control of the areas
they held. As the Alsop brothers put it:
"Who can suppose that they [the Viet Minh]
will peacefully march away, abandoning the
territory they now hold?" New York Herald-
Tribune, 23 July 1954.
00 Tillman Durdin in the New York Times,
29 September 1954.
07 New York Times, 13 January 1955.
11 New York Times, 31 December 1950
10 New York Times, 13 March 1955.
bring to the south 100 Meetings, demonstra-
tions and the simple process of making
known the provisions of the Geneva Agree-
ments (considered a subversive activity in
the south) were also part of the Viet Minh
campaign to win the elections101
Still another type of action taken. by the
DRV to promote Vietnam's peaceful reunifi-
cation was Hanoi's proposal on 4 February
1955 that "normal relations" be established
between the two zones. The Communists
declared their willingness to grant all facili-
ties to persons on both sides of the border in
sending mail, carrying out business enter-
prises, and facilitating exchanges of a cul-
tural, scientific, sporting, and social
nature103
Anticipating the approach of the 20 July
1955 deadline set at Geneva for the consulta-
tions on elections, the DRV leaders began to
press specifically to ensure the holding of
those meetings. In April Dong visited New
Delhi and issued a joint statement with
Nehru reaffirming the importance attached
by the two governments to the holding of
reunification elections under the procedure
laid down at Geneva101 On 6 June Dong
declared his government's readiness to begin
the consultations scheduled for the following
month. Dong went on to warn: "Vietnam is
one. The Vietnamese nation is one. No
force can divide them. Whoever tries to par-
tition Vietnam is the enemy of the Viet-
namese people and will surely be defeated." 104
In July Ho went to Peking and Moscow seek-
ing both economic aid and support for the
holding of the consultative conference. His
visits produced joint communiques stressing
the importance of starting the consultative
meetings on time106 On 19 July Premier
Dong, on behalf of himself and President Ho,
sent to President Diem a letter formally pro-
posing that Diem appoint representatives to
attend a consultative conference to discuss
reunification elections as provided in the
Geneva Agreements100
During the preceding year, the Diem gov-
ernment had made no effort to hide its con-
tempt for the Geneva Agreements, but it had
not actually enunciated an official. policy
with regard to its participation in the con-
sultative conference. Although at the start
of 1955 the US was still talking about new
measures to win the 1956 elections, m doubts
about the possibility of holding the elections
were apparent, particularly in dispatches
emanating from Saigon. On 28 February
Radio Saigon suggested that the elections
would not be held because of the absence of
democratic liberties in the north. On 15
March Secretary Dulles argued that it would
be hard to create the conditions for a free
choice In the north.10 By March 1955 it was
100 New York Times, 2 June 1955 and. 8 June
1965.
101 Murti, Vietnam Divided, p. 157. The ex-
tent to which such demonstrations can be
regarded as Viet Minh activities is uncertain,
but in at least one case the demonstrators
were reported to be acting on the exhorta-
tions of Radio Hanoi. New York Times, 4
July 1955.
101 See Facts and Dates, p. 18, and New York
Times, 7 February 1955.
100 Donald Lancaster, The Emancipation of
French Indo-China (London: Oxford Uni-
versity Press, 1961), p. 370.
104 New York Times, 7 June 1955. See also
For the Consultative Conference (Hanoi:
Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1955).
106 Facts and Dates, pp. 24-25.
101 Ibid., p. 26.
tar See, for example, the article in New York
Times, 8 January 1955, reporting U.S. hopes
that a land reform program could "tip the
scales in favor of the West" in the 1956 elec-
tions.
"On The Saigon broadcast and Dulles' speech
are both reported in Vietnam News Agency
dispatch, 15 March 1955.
becoming quite clear that the Diem regime
would probably try to avoid the elections.
As Sulzberger put it, the 1956 elections
"really will never be held.... Nobody likes
to talk about this. But when the time to
admit arrives, a grave crisis must inevitably
develop." 108 At the end of March it was re-
ported that observers in Saigon were express-
ing "open doubt" that such elections ever
would be held 110 In mid-May the State of
Vietnam government, in notes send to
Britain, France and the US, urged a confer-
ence to formulate a common position on the
elections in light of the probability, as seen
in Saigon, that they would not be held111
On 9 June, three days after Dong's announce-
ment that the DRV was ready for consulta-
tions, Saigon's view reportedly. was that any
comment on the DRV statement should come
from France The south, it was asserted, had
no intention of acting on the matter.""
Despite the flow of reports describing
Saigon's unwillingness to participate in. re-
unification elections, there was genuine un-
certainty as to whether Diem would agree to
take part in the consultative conference.
France had been consistent in urging the
State of Vietnam government to prepare for
elections. In March 1955 Premier Edgar
Faure urged Diem to cooperate with the sects
in the hope of winning their support in the
election119 Faure said in April that France
was determined above all to observe strictly
the Geneva Agreements, and he insisted that
there could be no question of annulling or
postponing the 1956 elections114 Faure
warned that there were two pitfalls before
the Diem government-one was losing the
1956 elections and the other was trying to
avoid them115 On the completion of the
withdrawals and transfers of military forces,
representatives of the French High Command
and the Viet Minh army issued a joint state-
ment resolving "to continue to assure their
responsibility In the full implementation of
the provisions of the Geneva Agreement and
of the final declaration ...." Both parties
reaffirmed their determination to "implement
scrupulously" the necessary provisions "in
order to consolidate peace and to achieve the
unity of Vietnam by means of general elec-
tions." 110 The British also felt strongly that
Diem should observe fully the provisions of
the Geneva Agreements. On 13 July, Foreign
Secretary Macmillan declared in Parliament
that Britain would exert all its influence to
ensure the holding of consultations as pro-
vided in the Geneva Agreements 117
The official attitude of the U.S. was am-
biguous. It was generally believed by early
1955 that the U.S. was not Investing heavily
In the buildup of the State of Vietnam merely
to hand it over to the Viet Minh in elections.
On 14 May, however, Faure was reported to
have obtained Dulles' assurance that the U.S.
would back France in seeking to prepare for
the 1956 electionslla In June Sulzberger re-
ported that the "only solid fact" agreed, on
by the U.S., France, and Britain during May's
Indochina negotiations in Paris was "that
the Geneva pledge for all-Vietnam elections
must be carried out." Washington reportedly
was "of the same mind as Paris and Lon-
don ... that every preparation must be
made on the assumption elections will be
100 New York Times, 12 March 1955.
no New York Times, 30 March 1955.
111 New York Times, 20 May 1955.
112 New York Times, 9 June 1955.
nn Ngo Ton Dat, "Geneva Partition and the
Question of Reunification," pp. 363-364.
114 New York Times, 14 April 1955.
111 New York Times, 4 May 1955.
110 Quoted in Cole (ed.), Conflict, p. 208.
This statement was cited by Dong in his 6
June declaration of the DRV's readiness for
consultations.
117 Facts and Dates, p. 24. See also ECDn-
omist, 16 July 1955.
"'New York Times, 14 May 1955.
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August 19, 1966 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE
held." Sulzberger explained that Dulles had
secured reluctant British and French support
for Diem, and "in exchange he concurred that
the promised elections in Vietnam should
faithfully be carried out." According to Sulz-
berger, Diem's reported opposition to elec-
tions put him in disagreement with "the one
point on which the Big'rhree unequivocally
agree." 110 The Times now wrote editorially
of the elections as if they really were expected
to take place:
"The real deadline in Vietnam . Is
July of next year, when a definitive election
is scheduled. That deadline must be
met .... The United States still expects
an election in all of Vietnam and would like
to see that election properly supervised.
Moreover, it would like to see free Vietnam
strong enough and stable enough that it
would offer a reasonable alternative to the
Communist rule in the north. This is the
reason for the present assistance and train-
ing program." 120
Probably in response to growing pres-
sures from the Western powers, Diem began
to move toward accepting elections. On 14
June he told a group of correspondents that
his government was willing to discuss the
question of elections with the DRV. He did
not elaborate that statement, except to say
that "it all depends on the conditions under
which elections are held." A source close
to the premier said that the south would
demand extensive third-party supervision
and detailed procedures for insuring a secret
ballot. He mentioned the grouping of mili-
tary forces in concentration areas so they
could not exercise pressure during the elec-
tions as one of the conditions the - State
of Vietnam was considering. The source
said that the results of any talks between
the two regimes would be submitted to the
soon-to-be-elected National Assembly, which
would have to decide whether the south
would actually participate in the elections.
Tillman Durdin, who reported Diem's remark
and the "source's" amplifying comments,
characterized it as the "first definite indi-
cation that South Vietnam was likely to
engage in discussions" with the DRV con-
cerning procedures for electionsln
As the 20 July deadline neared, it was
expected that Diem would make a statement,
but its contents were kept secret122 The
Economist wrote that Diem seemed likely
to "keep everyone guessing until the last
moment about whether he will send repre-
sentatives to consultations" with the DRV123
On 16 July Diem made known his position in
a radio broadcast to the nation. He stated
that he favored free elections in principle
but could not consider holding them until
the DRV had given him proof of its readi-
ness to place national interests before its
Communist creed. It is "out of the ques-
tion," he.asserted, "for us to consider any
proposal from the Vietminh, if proof is not
given us that they put the superior interests
of the national community above those of
communism; if they do not give up terrorism
and totalitarian methods; if they do not
cease violating their obligations...." Diem
also reasserted that the State of Vietnam did
not consider itself bound by the Geneva
Agreements 124
The British responded on 18 July with a
Foreign Office declaration expressing regret
at Diem's statement and urging that con-
sultation be started as soon as possible?2
"'New York Times, 8 June 1955.
1s0 The above quote is drawn from New York
Times editorials of 20 May 1955 and 29 June
1955. See also New York Times, 26 May 1955.
=New York Times, 15 June 1955.
122 New York Times, 15 July 1955.
us Economist, 16 July 1955.
324 The text of Diem's talk is in Republic
of Vietnam, The Problem of Reunification of
Viet-Nam (Saigon: Ministry of Information,
1958), pp. 30-31.
1e New York Times, 19 July 1955.
Diem's attitude toward elections was dis-
cussed at the Paris conference of Western
foreign ministers to prepare for the Geneva
summit conference. The foreign ministers,
fearing bitter recriminations from the USSR
at Geneva, agreed to do their best to per-
suade Diem to change his mind120 Britain
and France made an effort to convince Diem
that the State of Vietnam's position would
be a strong one if it could demonstrate with
the support of the ICC that free elections
were being blocked by the Viet Minh's failure
to permit adequate supervision. He was as-
sured that the West and the ICC would back
him fully in trying to prevent "Communist
fraudulism or subversion during the election
period." Paris and London sought to clarify
to Diem the difference between holding elec-
tions and simply taking part in the consulta-
tions, which was all that was required at the
moment. They stressed that in talking with
the DRV, Diem would be making no irre-
vocable commitments and would be giving
evidence of his adherence to the Geneva
Agreements.mn At the Geneva summit meet-
ing, the three Western leaders agreed to un-
dertake added efforts to convince Diem to ac-
cept the DRV's invitation, but Eisenhower
and Eden both stressed that their power to
move Diem was limited. On 26 July a West-
ern note was transmitted to Diem 1~
The State of Vietnam, nevertheless, denied
that the Western powers had put any pres-
sure on it to conform to the Geneva Agree-
ments, and insisted that the Western note
had actually been an expression of sympathy
with its position. U.S. State Department
officials affirmed that the note had conveyed
overall approval. of Diem's position, but had
urged that he at least "go through the mo-
tions" of trying to organize free elections.15
The British denied any implication that they
had given approval to Diem's refusal to talk
with the DRV 130 But Western assurances
Could not alter Diem's conviction that by
entering talks with the DRV he would have
committed himself to the elections?n On
9 August Diem formally replied to Dong's
note of 19 July. The State of Vietnam pre-
mier esentially reiterated his position of 18
July, insisting that "nothing constructive
[with respect to elections] will be done as
long as the Communist regime of the North
does not permit each Vietnamese citizen to
enjoy democratic freedoms and the basic
fundamental rights of man." 132
The next day, in a press conference, Secre-
tary Dulles asserted that Diem was correct
in not feeling bound by the Geneva Agree-
ment to hold reunification elections because
his government had not signed the Agree-
ment 122 The British Foreign Office, on the
other hand, was reported "disturbed" by the
Diem statement.'" On 30 August Dulles gave
Diem unequivocal support, stating: "We cer-
tainly agree that conditions are not ripe for
free elections." 186 Thus the US, whose par-
120 Murti, Vietnam Divided, p. 184..
12T Ibid., p. 189.
128 Ibid., p. 185.
12? New York Times, 9 August 1955.
W New York Times, 10 August 1955.
131 New York Times, 23 July 1955.
132 See Ngo Ton Dat, "Geneva Partition and
the Question of Reunification," pp. 389-390.
133 Ibid., p. 390. See also Murti, Vietnam
Divided, p. 186.
124 See the Times (London), 11 August
1955. According to The Times, British offi-
cials were unhappy that Diem seemed
"determined to go on finding excuses for
postponing election talks" with the Viet
Minh. The British had already taken pains
to dissociate themselves from any expres-
sion of support for Diem such as that given
by Dulles. See New York Times, 10 August
1955.
136 Quoted in Ngo Ton Dat, "Geneva Parti-
tion and the Question of Reunification," p.
391.
19120
ticipation in the common Western effort to
persuade Diem to talk with the DRV had
always been unenthusiastic,190 now emerged
in firm official support of his opposition to
elections. In view of the US's heavy eco-
nomic aid to the State of Vietnam and its
fervent backing of Diem in the face of Brit-
ish and French urgings that he be replaced,
the importance to Diem of US backing for
his election stand must have been considera-
ble. Apparently encouraged by Dulles' strong
support, Diem declared bluntly on 21 Sep-
tember that there could be "no question of
a conference, even less of negotiations" with
the DRVl"z
It should be clear that despite the appar-
ent unwillingness of the State of Vietnam
to take any steps toward elections, the DRV
during the first year after Geneva had been
making extensive preparations in anticipa-
tion of the elections and had had at least
some reason to think that Diem might be
forced into accepting them. Even after
Diem's refusal to permit a consultative Con-
ference, the DRV still had cause to hope that
.the elections would be held. The continuing
instability of Diem's position offered a pos-
sibility that more conciliatory elements
might accede to the leadership. And the DRV
probably was conscious of a considerable
amount of international support for its posi-
tion that either the French or the State of
Vietnam, one or the other or both, should be
held responsible for ensuring that the Geneva
Agreements were implemented in the south-
ern zone. Accordingly, the DRV continued
its efforts to prepare for elections and to press
for a consultative conference. Two ap-
proaches were employed: the intensification
of propaganda work in the south and the
appeal for international assistance.
The principal step taken to intensify its
campaign to rally popular support in the
south for reunification elections was the for-
mation in September 1955 of the Vietnam
Fatherland Front, which incorporated the
Lien Viet. The platform of the Fatherland
Front set forth in some detail the DRV's
understanding of how the peaceful reuni-
fication of Vietnam by elections should pro-
ceed. It called, in effect, for a sort of fed-
eration. Through "free, general elections,
organized on the principle of universal, equal
and secret ballot," a unified national assem-
bly was to be chosen. The assembly, which
was to be the highest legislative body of the
state, would elect a central coalition gov-
ernment. The platform emphatically stated
that it was necessary to take into account
differences between the two zones. Thus
there was to be set up in each zone a People's
Council and an administrative body with
wide powers. Those organs would have the
right to promulgate local laws consistent
with the characteristics of the zone con-
cerned and not at variance with common na-
tional laws. Normal economic, cultural and
social relations were to be immediately re-
stored between the two zones. The armed
forces were to be integrated gradually and
through negotiations. Agrarian reform poll-
138 Whereas France and Britain had pub-
licly called for consultations, the US, at least
prior to 22 July, had only expressed "unoffi-
cially" the "hope" that Diem would meet
with the Viet Minh. But the US had not
formally suggested to Diem that he do so.
New York Herald-Tribune, 22 July 1955,
cited in ibid., p. 380. On 23 July, the New
York Times accurately described the US
position as "obscure." The Times had al-
ready, on 21 July, altered its previous line
and given editorial support to Diem's 16 July
stand: "We must not be trapped into a ficti-
tious legalism that can condemn 10,000,000
potentially free persons into slavery.
The agreements do not necessarily have to
be abrogated but they should at least be
scrutinized with the sharpest eye."
127 Lancaster, Emancipation, p. 372.
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19130 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD -- SENATE
ties in the south were expected to differ from
those in the north; in the former region the
government would "requisition-by-purchase"
properties of landlords for distribution to
the peasantry. The platform insisted that
there should be no attempt "by either side
to annex or incorporate the other." 138
The Fatherland Front platform was quickly
made the program of the DRV government.
Dong, in a report to the Fifth Session of the
National Assembly in September 1955, warmly
embraced the platform as the "basis" and
the "method" by which national unity could
be achieved. Dong declared that the Father-
land Front program opened up "a new stage
of complex and difficult political strug-
gle. . . ." Plans to use the Fatherland Front
program as the basis of an extensive cam-
paign to rally support for the consultative
conference were also made clear. The pro-
gram was to be given the most extensive dis-
semination. All political parties, people's
organizations, and "representative person-
alities" in both zones were to establish con-
tact and exchange ideas on the program so
as to create a nationwide movement demand-
ing that the Southern authorities 'gold con-
sultations on elections.'8? Broadcasting over
Radio Hanoi and working through Viet Minh
cadres who had stayed in the south, a min-
her of organized demonstrations were held
to persuade Diem to open consultations with
the DRV 140
A good part of the DRV's propaganda effort
was devoted to attacks on the October 1955
referendum and the March 1956 constituent
assembly elections held in the south. An
effort was made to encourage the populace to
boycott the elections, Strikes were staged,
and demonstrations were held 141 The DRV
denounced the elections as a violation of the
Geneva Agreements and a "farce," insisting
that South Vietnam was not a countryl42
Although the DRV may have had some con-
fidence that strong popular support for the
holding of elections would compel the south-
ern government to cooperate; 48 it is probable
that Hanoi placed more hope in its appeals
for international action to force Diem's com-
pliance with the Geneva Agreements. The
DRV looked to the co-chairmen, especially
the USSR, to put pressure on Diem. Rough-
ly a week after Diem's 9 August refusal to
accept the DRV's invitation to hold con-
sultations, Dong sent a letter to the co-
chairmen reporting the situation and re-
questing that they take "all necessary meas-
ures to ensure ... the immediate convening
of the consultative conference...." Despite
France's disclaimer, in a June note to Hanoi
and the ICC, of any responsibility for bring-
ing the south into consultations with the
north,'" Dong demanded that France and
the State of Vietnam guarantee the imple-
mentation of the agreements146 Nehru also
186 See Viet-Nam Fatherland Front (Hanoi:
Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1956),
pp. 19-22.
Ibid., pp. 11-12, 29, 34-45.
140 Murti, Vietnam Divided, p. 196.
141 See Facts and Dates, pp. 37, 38, 52, 54, 55.
'" Vietnam News Agency dispatch, 1 May
1956.
117 Alex Josey, "Will He Chi Minh Unite
Viet Nam?" Eastern World (London), No-
vember 1955, p. 16, reports that the DRV
leaders were confident that the desire of
nationalists In the south for unity would
eventually force Diem to yield. Josey talked
with Ho, Dong, and General Vo Nguyen Giap,
army chief of staff.
144 New York Times, 21 June 1955. It was
reported in the Economist, 16 July 1955, that
the Viet Minh were in the ironic position of
appealing to the French to leave their troops
in Vietnam to ensure observance of the
Geneva Agreements.
116 Murti, Vietnam Divided, p. 190. Dong's
letter to the co-chairman (text in Cmnd.
2834) produced no results. On 16 Septem-
Approved For
intervened at this point, expressing to Eden
and Molotov the hope that they could induce
Diem to cooperate 1S6 In September Molotov
gave the DRV weak support in a UN speech.
He said he felt "entitled to expect" that steps
would be taken to prevent a "breakdown" of
the consultations and called such steps "es-
sential, if the general elections are to be held
within the prescribed time limit.. " 147 On
31 October Chou En-lal informed the co-
chairmen of his support for the DRVV's Au-
gust letter.148 In November 1955 Dong again
approached Molotov with a request that the
co-chairmen take action, and again the
USSR's response was mild.'40 Molotov called
on the French to inquire about their position
on elections and expressed his concern about
the State of Vietnam's attitude160 He also
met with British Foreign Secretary Macmil-
lan at Geneva. The British, who had stated
in August that they did not believe the State
of Vietnam could continue indefinitely to re-
fuse consultations,la said that they still fa-
vored the elections. Macmillan reportedly
told Molotov that chances for holding the
elections might be better after the Saigon
government elected its constituent assem-
bly.'" On 20 December the co-chairmen re-
ported the delivery of the various messages
they had received to the members of the Ge-
neva Conference and said they would be
"grateful" to receive comments and sugges-
tions.183 By the end of 1955, it is likely that
the DRV's hopes of obtaining action by ap-
pealing to the co-chairmen had been greatly
diminished.
At the end of January 1956 an innovation
was introduced into the DRV's campaign for
international aid in bringing the Diem regime
to discuss elections. In response to the co-
chairmen's December request for suggestions,
Chou En-lai proposed the reconvening of the
1954 Geneva Conference, adding the members
of the ICC.164 On 14 February 1956 the DRV
also proposed a new Geneva Conference in
a note to the co-chairmen.'" A week later
August 19, 1966
the Indian government wrote to the co-
chairmen to express its support of all Initia-
tives aimed at ensuring the fulfillment of
the Geneva Agreements."" On 18 Februray
the Soviet Foreign Ministry delivered a note
to the British embassy, supporting the pro-
posals made by China and the DRV and urg-
ing that the co-chairmen inform the con-
ference members of their common belief
that a new meeting was needed. The British
reply on 9 March suggested that it would be
premature to propose a full conference until
the views of other countries had been clari-
fied, but proposed that the co-chairmen meet
to discuss the situation. On 30 March the
USSR reasserted its support for a new con-
ference but also agreed to meet first with
the British. The tone for the upcoming An-
glo-Soviet meeting was set by a British note
sent to the USSR on 9 April. Restating Lon-
don's belief that the Diem government should
agree to consultations but denying that it
was legally bound to do so, the British note
urged that the maintenance of peace be re-
garded as the "paramount objective."
The meetings that were held in April be-
tween the Soviets and the British produced
what must have been a disappointing re-
sult for the DRV1b7 The co-chairmen showed
more concern about the maintenance of
peace in Vietnam than about the country's
reunification in their message issued on 8
May. They expressed their concern about the
situation and strongly urged the authori-
ties of both Vietnamese governments to en-
sure the implementation of the political
provisions adopted at Geneva. Both govern-
ments were: "Invited to transmit to the
Go-Chairmen as soon as possible, either
jointly or separately, their views about the
time required for the opening of consulta-
tions on the organization of nation-wide
elections in Viet-Nam and the time required
for the holding of elections as a means, of
achieving the unification of Viet-Nam."
But the real concern of the co-chairmen
was apparent in their statement that
e:nd-
p
ber the British Foreign Office announced that ing the holding of election's they attached
the USSR had handed over the DRV's letter - ? t i
t 11
t
to co-?chairman to India. On 20 September
Britian transmitted the letter to the other
members of the Geneva Conference. Facts
and Dates, pp. 34-35.
148 Lancaster, Emancipation, p. 371.. Again
on 7 September Nehru and Krishna Menon
spoke in support of the DRV. Facts and
Dates, p, 33. According to the New York
Times, 27 August 1955, Nehru had .already
held that the State of Vietnam was bound
as a "successor regime." In an aide-mlemoire
sent to the co-chairmen on 14 June 1955,
India had called on Britian and the USSR
to issue a request that the DRV and the
m
grea por ante
o the maintenance of
the cease-fire.'"-
The DRV responded first on 11 May 1956
by dispatching another letter to Diem, citing
the co-chairmen's message and requesting
the start of consultations, but also pledging
to maintain peace?" On 4 June Dong re-
plied to the co-chairmen. He repeated the
DRV's readiness for immediate consultations
and requested that the co-chairmen take the
necessary steps to bring them about. He
also declared that he would again seek a
new Geneva Conference if the southern gov-
ernment maintained its "negative attitude"
to d It ti 1m
r
consu a ons and elections. There
State of Vietnam begin consultations. The wa
aide-rnemoire noted that the French had was, of course, no question as to what
"transferred their sovereign authority" in the Diem's position would be. After winning
south subsequent to the signing of the Ge- his self-proclaimed referendum against Bao
neva Agreements. Thus, asserted the aide- Dal the preceding October and declaring a
Inemoire, the representative authorities to Republic of Vietnam, Diem Insisted that he
whom the election provision applied were the
DRV and, "in virtue of Article 27, the State
of Vietnam which has taken over the civil
administration in South Vietnam from the
French authorities." Text of the aide-
memoire is in Cmnd. 2834.
147 New York Times, 24 September 19155.
'.18 Cmnd. 2834.
149 Lancaster, Emancipation, p. 372.
150 New York Times, 5 November 1955..
101 New York Times, 10 August 1955.
131 New York Times, 15 November 1955.
This view, surprising in light of the DRV's
tendency to see such "separatist" elections
as a major bar to reunification, was also
maintained by New York Times, 5 February
1956. The probable assumption was that a
strengthened Saigon regime, holding a, popu-
lar mandate, might be in a stronger posi-
tion to negotiate with the north.
"' Cmnd. 2834.
lct4 New York Times, 31 January 1956.
Facts and Dates, p. 51.
168 Ibid., p. 52. Nehru strongly supported
the DRV, stressing that since Diem accepted
the benefits of the Geneva Agreements, he
should undertake the responsibilities. See
ibid., p. 53.
1", The letter was hailed as a triumph in
the south. Ibid., pp. 71-72.
158 Texts of the 4arious notes mentioned
above are in Cmnd. 2834. It has been noted
by Ngo Ton Dat, "Geneva Partition and the
Question of Reunification," pp. 404 405, that
the British insistence that elections be held
on time had 'declined after the start of 1956.
He attributes this change to a "desire to
achieve unity of policy" with the US, an ap-
preciation of the progress made by Diem in
establishing order, and apprehension about
the growth of DRV armed strength.
1" Vietnam News Agency dispatch, 12 May
1956; also New York Times, 13 May 1956.
1" Ngo Ton Dat, "Geneva Partition and the
Question of Reunification," pp. 410-411.
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August 19, 1966 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE
now had a popular mandate not to proceed mountcy of the struggle for reunification
with unification elections.161 Diem even through elections. Dong had said in Sep-
told a British correspondent in March that tember 1955 that there could be "no other
lie Aid not want unification until the south alternative" than the holding of the elections
had been strengthened and popular disil- as prescribed in the Geneva Accords 1A0 In
lusionment had weakened the north 1b2 One April 1956 Truong Chinh reaffirmed the pol-
l tional reunification
na
stituent assembly in March was formally to
denounce the Geneva Agreements 162 Thus,
when on 29 May the Diem government an-
swered the co-chairmen's message, it simply
reaffirmed its prior position that "the ab-
sence of all liberty in North Vietnam makes
the question of electoral and pre-election
campaigns practically unattainable for the
moment." 704 Diem received ardent support
from the V.S. in a speech delivered by Walter
S. Robertson, Assistant Secretary of State for
the Far East, before the American Friends of
Vietnam on 1 June"' The 20 July deadline
for elections passed.
Hanoi's willingness to let the 1956 dead-
line pass without incident should not be
taken as a sign that the DRV's interest in
reunification through elections had di-
minished. That Hanoi was still under
heavy pressures to achieve reunification
seems clear enough. The Viet Minh's strong
commitment to national unity through
years of hard fighting against the French
has already been mentioned. Furthermore,
North Vietnam, traditionally a food deficit
area, could not hope to lead a truly inde-
pendence existence. Vietnam is an eco-
nomic unity; the two halves complement
each other. Without access to southern
rice, the DRV leaders faced the prospect of
an uncomfortable dependence on Chinese
food supplies?60 The DRV was under sig-
nificant pressure as well from Viet Minh
troops from the south who had been re-
grouped in the north and told they would
be returning to their homes after the 1956
elections 187 A similar source of embarrass-
ment was the group of Viet Minh cadres who
had stayed behind in the south 108 Cultural
and social pressures for a normalization of
relations with the south were also of some
importance.
There is good evidence that elections were
still the means liy which Hanoi sought to ac-
complish reunification. Throughout the
year following Diem's refusal to hold consul-
tations, DRV leaders had continued to main-
tain in uncompromising terms the para-
icy of working or
through elections. Recognizing the difficul-
ties encountered, Truong Chinh noted that
there were "some people who do not believe
in the correctness of this political program
and of the policy of peaceful reunification
of the country, holding that these are illu-
sory and reformist." But, asserted Truong
Chinh, the recent declarations of the Soviet
Union's Twentieth Party Congress concern-
ing the peaceful transition to socialism had
provided "new reason to be confident" about
the policy of relying on elections 170 In May
Dong referred to the national reunification
effort as "the sacred struggle of the Viet-
namese people in the present historical
phase." He expressed confidence that the
country still could be united through peace-
ful means. 71 In July Ho was asked in an
interview what would happen if no elections
were held. He answered: "In that case, the
Vietnamese people will continue to struggle
with greater energy to have free general
elections held throughout the country, for
such is the most cherished aspiration of the
entire Vietnamese people. .. When the
idea that both Vietnamese governments
might be admitted to the UN was mentioned
to him, he replied negatively, insisting that:
"Vietnam is a whole from the North to the
South. It must be unified. It cannot be cut
in two separate nations any more than the
United States can be cut into two separate
nations." 172
Another sign that the DRV still was sin-
cerely interested in elections is the report
of Hanoi's effort to win Diem's agreement to
elections by offering to postpone them. On a
number of occasions in 1955 and 1956 and
through several intermediaries, the DRV
leaders informed Saigon of their willingness
to postpone the plebiscite and to appeal to a
foreign arbiter?78 If the DRV had viewed
the election provision merely as a propa-
ganda device to embarrass the Diem regime,
it surely would have insisted on Diem's keep-
ing the original date. Hanoi's apparent rea-
sonableness on the subject probably reflected
a hope that Diem would agree to elections
19131
not be ignored. Some observers believed
that the Viet Minh actually was stronger
south of the 17th parallel than in the
north 174 During the two years after Geneva
there was reason to believe that the Viet
Minh's electoral strength in the south re-
mained considerable 176 Thus, an 8 October
1955 Economist article stated:
"The mass of the people in the south fa-
vor the Communist regime in the north, but
for reasons of nationalistic sentiment rather
than because of any doctrinaire attached to
Communism. They have been strengthened
in their allegiance since Geneva by the high-
handed and inept actions of Diem. The kind
of argument one hears is that the choice
lies between an efficient dictatorship in the
north and an inefficient dictatorship in the
south."
The Economist also perceived a significant
swell of support in the south for the holding
of reunification elections:
"Many Vietnamese in the south have been
criticizing Diem for his refusal to meet the
Viet Minh leaders for discussions about the
organization of national elections. There
may well develop a really spontaneous and
massive demonstration by the people of
southern Vietnam to demand elections. Mr.
Diem will then be faced with the choice of
acceding to their demands, and certainly
lose the election, or of opening fire on his
own people and being overthrown by
force." 170
Although by the spring of 1956 Diem had
indeed strengthened his control of the gov-
ernment beyond what most had thought
possible, it is important to remember that
Diem's remarkable achievement in eliminat-
ing his rivals for political power in Saigon
did not mean he had acquired the broad base
of popular support needed for success in a
free election;177 on the contrary, he had done
little to win such support.
Despite the evidence that the DRV was
rightly confident of victory in the elections,
some have maintained that the DRV's will-
ingness to allow the 1956 deadline to pass
without incident suggests that Hanoi had by
then lost real interest in the elections be-
cause of the problems encountered in its land
reform program. This argument ignores
several facts. It was not until the summer
of 1956 that the DRV leaders came to realize
that they were confronted by a severe in-
. York Times, 26 October 195.5. Bao ting himseir ana ennancmg tine LXLv c
Dal had denounced Diem's action in holding chances of ultimately gaining peaceful
the referendum as one which would render reunification.
reunl, cation through nation-wide elections The reason for Hanoi's continued advocacy
impossible. of elections is not hard to understand. The
102 The Times (London), 12 March 1956, DRV originally had favored elections because
cited in Murti, Vietnam Divided, p. 190. it expected to win, and in 1956 it could still
162 New York Times, 9 March 1956. be confident of victory. At the root of that
104 Ngo Ton Dat, "Geneva Partition and the confidence perhaps was the knowledge that
Question of Reunification," pp. 400-1-10. the north's population exceeded that of the
161 Ibid., p. 412. south by two or three million (out of roughly
180 Possible evidence that the DRV leaders 30 million total). But the expectation of a
were unhappy at this prospect is available. DRV victory cannot be explained solely or
In late 1954, the DRV reportedly delayed its even principally in terms of the northern
aid negotiations with China several months majority. Reports of the south's poor pros-
in an effort to work out an arrangement with pects in the election rarely laid the cause at
France. Though an agreement was reached, the lack of a free vote in the north which
French concerns and technicians proved im- would make a Communist victory automatic.
willing to remain in the Communist zone. The strong support for the Viet Minh in the
New York Times, 1 January 1955. Sulzberger south is a crucial factor which simply can-
suggested that Ho, fearful of Chinese domi-
nation, might seek to play off China against
France and to act as a sort of "Communist
Nehru." New York Times, 13 November 1954.
107 New York Heratd-Tribune, 29 August
1958.
308 It should be remembered that the -Ge-
neva Agreements required the regrouping
only of military forces, not of all supporters
of one side or the other. There is no evidence
that the DIE made any effort to encourage
civilians to move north, and, in view of the
Viet Minh's expectation that the country
would be reunified by elections, there was no
reason to do so.
1w Fatherland Front, p. 41. See also Ho's
2 September 1955 speech, ibid., pp. 44-45;
Ho's New Year's Day 1956 appeal for intensi-
fication of the struggle for consultations,
Facts and Dates, p. 47; and Ho's 6 July
speech, Vietnam News Agency dispatch, 6
July 1956.
170 Vietnam News Agency dispatch, 29 April
1956.
171 Vietnam News Agency dispatch, 1 May
1956.
172 Vietnam News Agency dispatch, 12 July
1956.
172 Lacouture, Between Two Truces, p. 68.
china Continues (Stanford: Stanford Uni-
versity Press, 1955), p. 22.
176 On Viet Minh strength in the south
during the first year after Geneva, see New
York Times, 24 October 1954, 23 December
1954, 31 December 1954, 20 May 1955, 8 June
1955, 23 June 1955, 17 July 1955.
17aSee also Eastern World (London), No-
vember,. 1955, p. 11, which reported that
Diem's refusal to consult on elections had
alienated liberal elements in the south who
feared that a failure to meet with the north
would produce a new war. The article also
reported widespread opposition to Diem
among the peasantry, stemming particularly
from Diem's failure to institute land reforms.
177 An editorial in The Times (London), 9
March 1956, summarized Diem's achievement
in this way: "The liberal intellectuals have
been silenced in one way or another; the
gangster organization of the Binh Xuyen
has disintegrated; the Cao Dal General
Nguyen Than Phuong has brought his forces
over, to the Government and deposed his
'pope.' By no means all of the countryside
is firmly administred by the Government in
Saigon. But at any rate organized armed
resistance has been ended.... A year ago
Mr. Diem refused national elections on the
grounds that there was no guarantee of
democratic freedom in the north. If he has
asserted his own power by equally undemo-
cratic methods, it has nevertheless been
asserted."
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CONGRESSIONAL. RECORD -SENATE August 19, 1966
ternal crisis 118 On 17 August Ho admitted
that errors had been made. The Nghe An
peasant uprising, the most spectacular mani-
festation of discontent in the countryside,
did not occur until November. Thus, the
DRV's policy on how to react to the passing
of the July deadline was certainly formu-
lated and probably executed before the grav-
ity of the agrarian problems was known.
Furthermore, while it would be wrong to
minimize the seriousness of the difficulties
faced by the DRV in late 1956, it does not
necessarily follow that Hanoi was signifi-
cantly less willing to hold reunification elec-
tions. Even after the extent of the land re-
form failure became clear, the DRV continued
to seek the co-chairmen's intervention to
force the Diem government to fulfill the
Geneva Agreements, On 15 August Dong
sent a note to the co-chairman approving
the USSR's 21 July proposal that the co-
chairmen recommend that Diem immediately
set a date for consultations and elections.
Dong insisted that Saigon could not continue
to speak of unity while refusing to discuss
elections and renewed his demand that a
new Geneva Conference be convened if Saigon
failed to comply. As a further sign of his
sincerity, Dong pledged that if there was an
agreement to hold elections, all questions
connected with their organization and super-
vision would be submitted to both sides for
mutual agreementl79 And on 22 November,
just days after the Nghe An uprising, the
DRV and China issued a joint communique
condemning the Saigon regime and the US
for prolonging Vietnam's division and de-
manding that the members of the Geneva
Conference take action to ensure the imple-
mentation of the Agreements. Although this
communique probably was primarily an effort
to extract further action from the USSR, it
may also have been issued in the hope that
Britain, then on very bad terms with the
US because of the Suez crisis, might reverse
its earlier stand on the issue of elections In
Vietnam.t
Finally, it should be pointed out that the
north's anticipated margin in the elections
was such that it is hard to imagine that
discontent about the land reforms could have
seriously threatened the DRV with defeat in
the elections. Many of the DRV's problems
stemmed from the country's division, and
one would expect that under those circum-
stances pressure for reunification would in-
crease, not decline. While reunification
would not have solved the land reform prob-
lems, it would have relieved economic and
social pressures 181 thereby removing some of
the causes of tensions in the countryside.
It really is hard to see why the DRV would
have reacted by losing interest in the elec-
tions to problems some of which might have
been at least partly alleviated by reunifica-
t1or3.
The fact remains that the DRV did allow
the election deadline to pass without under-
taking drastic action. Many were surprised
at the restraint shown by the DRV in the
face of the frustration of what it felt were
its legitimate calims. In view of the fact
excuse for making trouble." 182 On 16 July
1955 the Economist asserted:
. no western representative can pos-
sibly advise Diem to refuse to confer with
the Viet Minh. To do so would be to invite
either Communist-inspired civil disturbances
in the South, or, eventually, a military at-
tack which the nationalists would face with-
out allies in the field."
On 21 April 1956, as the deadline ap-
proached, the Economist warned that Diem's
refusal ~o participate in elections "consti-
tutes a provocation to the Viet Minh to
launch a war against the Nationalist
south. . " And the New York Herald-
Tribune, writing after the passing of the
deadline, said: "These [southern Viet Minh]
underground workers had doubtless expected
to play a decisive role in the election that
never came off. Now their only future is
subversion," 188
Though it ultimately did respond to Diem's
"provocation," why did the DRV fail to do so
in 1956? The DRV's failure to renew hos-
tilities undoubtedly reflected at least to some
extent ifs reluctance to engage in another
war without having recovered from. the con-
siderable devastation of the first. But per-
haps more important was the unwillingness
of the Russians or the Chinese to support
such a move. There was, in effect, a basic
conflict of interests between the DRV and
its Communist allies. The Soviets were not
eager to establish the precedent of free elec-
tions in divided countries for fear that the
West would insist on applying the same prin-
ciple to Germany and Korea, where a Com-
munist victory was unlikely. Most Impor-
tant, the Soviets were anxious to avoid a
major war. The SEATO umbrella over Indo-
china and the U.S. government's strong sup-
port for Diem clearly made the consequences
of a DRV attack uncertain; Vietnam appar-
ently was too fax from the USSR's central
interest Lo be worth such a risk. Perhaps
the most striking example of the USSR's
willingness to sacrifice the DRV's interests
for its own was Moscow's 1957 proposal that,
as part of a package deal to include the two
Koreas, both parts of Vietnam should be
admitted to the UN 194
New York Times, 25 July 1954.
New York Herald-Tribune, 29, August
1956. For additional representative state-
ments of the view that the south would either
have to accept the elections or be prepared
for a Viet Minh resumption of violence, see
New York Times, 11 August 1955 (statement
of the Canadian ICC Member) and 8 January
1956.
"'The DRV, which opposed the admission
of both Vietnams to the UN (seep. 41, above) ,
never publicly acknowledged the Soviet pro-
posal. Hanoi vehemently, attacked Saigon's
effort to gain admission alone, arguing that
neither part of the country was qualified for
membership; only a reunified Vietnam could
join.. Hanoi praised the USSR for its veto of
the Saigon effort. See New York Times, 25
January 1157 and 31 January 1957; and Viet-
nam News Agency dispatches of 26 January
throughout the two-year period there was The Boviet proposal was rejected by the UN
an expectation that Diem's failure to allow Special Political Coi tionsee by a vote of 45 to 12 elections might lead the DRV to violence, (with 18 d the 13-power The same cam-
and, many said, such a course on the DRV's mit the mitt t approved the Vietnam motion to a4-vote part could not be considered wholly unjusti- to 8 e Republic abstentions). by a the of 44
fled. Immediately after the Geneva Confer- muntst to (with countries 23 voted against Only the Com-
ence, the New York Times had remarked of Vietnam, while oth the Repudec
that if the scheduled elections did not take Yugoslavia, rf oaAfghanistan, the abstainers us hi i Bolivia,
place, the Viet Minh would have "a good Bunny a, Cambodia, Canada, Bolivia,
da, , Ceylon, Egypt,
in Bernard B. Fall, The Two Viet-Nams Laos, Liberia,India Libya Morocco, Nepal,Jordan
Saudi
(New York: Praeger, 1964), p. 155. Arabia, Sudan, Sweden and Syria. No coun-
178 New York Times, 15 August 1956. try breakdown is available for the vote on the
18? This is suggested by Hinton, Commu- Soviet proposal but it can probably be as-
nist China, pp. 338-339. sumed that four of the 23 abstainers just
181 See p. 39 above, listed joined the 8 Communist countries in
Though the Chinese were more deeply con-
cerned than the Soviets about the future of
the DRV, Vietnam was still much less im-
portant to Peking than other questions, par-
ticularly Taiwan. China, like the USSR, was
in the midst of promoting a policy of peace-
ful coexistence and detente; like Moscow.
Peking was probably unwilling to sacrifice
that policy for the sake of Vietnamese re-
unification, even under Communist auspices.
Furthermore, if Peking's fear of a major war
in Indochina had led Chou En-lai to urge
moderation and compromise on the Viet
Minh at Geneva, that fear of war probably
was at least as great in 1956 as it had been
in 1954. Finally, it is even possible that
Peking preferred a divided Vietnam, keeping
the DRV dependent on China for its food
supply. 115 In any case, however inviting. and
however justifiable an invasion of the south
might have seemed to Hanoi's superior army,
the DRV's economic dependence on its Com-
munist allies, especially China, would. have
been a severe restriction on any plans to
move against the south?89 It is quite likely
that the DRV was wary of involving itself
in a situation in which it might have had to
face both Diem and the U.S. without strong
Chinese or Soviet support; such a situation
would have jeopardized the very existence
of the DRV.
It should be manifest that the DRV had
a very serious interest in holding the! 1956
elections, and that it did all it could, short
of violence, to bring thean about. But some
will still discount the DRV's efforts and argue
that Hanoi never could have permitted free
elections because no Communist state has
ever done so. This argument has been at
the heart of the US and Saigon positions.
It in essence holds that a Communist state
is by definition incapable of ever permitting
a free election.
There is reason to question the validity
of that argument. Apart from the fact that
the Geneva Agreements did not stipulate
any preconditions on which the holding of
elections would depend, it should be recalled
that it was a generally accepted fact that
the Viet Minh held substantial popular sup-
port which would have given it a victory
even in "really free" elections. If a Viet
Minh majority was anticipated by everyone,
even President Eisenhower, is it reasonable
to assume that the DRV would have felt it
necessary to coerce its population or to rig
the election in some way? If Communist
governments have been known to rig elec-
tions, they have also been known to show
considerable tactical flexibility in using what-
ever method seems to promise the greatest
gain at the lowest cost. The simplest way
for the DRV to gain control of all Vietnam
would have been to permit free elections.
To say that the DRV had an Interest in
permitting free elections is not to say that
Communist governments in general would
permit them or even that the DRV would
always allow them, but only that the DRV
might have allowed them in 1956 because it
was confident of victory. To assume that
every Communist state is under some sort
of irrepressible compulsion to rig every elec-
tion seems unwise. While no one really can
support of the DRV. See United Nations
General Assembly Eleventh Session, Official
Records-Special Political Committee, 22nd
Meeting, 30 January 1957, p. 105.
1S The above analysis of Soviet and Chinese
unwillingness to support a DRV renewal of
hostilities is largely drawn from Brian Crozier,
"The International Situation in Indochina,"
Pacific Affairs, XXIX, no. 4 (December, 1956),
311.
1- Ibid., 312-313. For details on the DRV's
economic dependence on her Communist al-
lies, see Brian Crozier, "Indochina: The Un-
finished Struggle," The World Today, 12, no.
1 (January, 1956).
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August 19, 1966 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE 19133
say what the DRV would have done,' it does, "Free candidature: All Vietnamese citizens, possibility apparently was rejected. As the
not seem necessary to assume that the DRV male and female above 21 years old, also with London Times (among others) pointed out,
would have rigged an election it could have the above-mentioned non-restriction clauses, that suppression tion which
erred
,
won honestly just because other Communist have the right to stand for election. tr eistheed in n t96 the north haAccording to already. occurre B. S N. governments, under different circumstances, whe"Free ther from the North or the South, have an Indian member of the ICC, various "mop-
have rigged them. repressive Besides the DRV's good prospects in a free the right to canvass freely throughout the ping a" operations
resistance members
election, it is surely of some relevance that country through conference, leaflets, press, paigns against the DRV responded to Saigon's accusations etc. The Government of the North and the drove them to the jungles and eventually to
by spelling out its own understanding of authorities of the South should ensure the guerilla activity.191 As Sulzberger described the "free elections" in rather more reasonable liberty and the security for all citizens dur- the situation dictatorship 1955, whip coulegi
not
and realistic terms than Diem's insistence tag their activities for elections. was a that the DRV disavow Communism 187 On "Method of Voting: Totally equal, secret expect to overcome the appeal of the Viet
6 June 1955, Pham Van Dong declared at a and direct. In short, the Vietnamese people Minh with "unborn democracy and ineffective
press conference that the DRV "stands for and the Government of the Democratic Re- dictatorshi
shall ensure complete It is notworthy that Diem's hastily ar-
t
nam
free general elections throughout the terri- public of Vie
tory of Vietnam with all the guarantees nee- freedom and democracy to the nationwide ranged referendum between himself and Bao
essary for the preparation, organization and elections (as provided in the Geneva Agree- Dar Barber 155 probably was illegal,
Dal, who had Die
conduct of general elections, in particular, ment) : "
guarantees of freedom of electioneering ac- In his second letter, written on 25 Feb- premier, withdrew his mandate several days
tivities for all political parties, organizations ruary 1956, Ho proposed a method by which before the referendum (the local papers
and individuals." l9a the Western nations could judge which part failed to report that Diem had been dis-
In September 1955 Dong further elaborated of Vietnam really had democratic freedoms. missed) 198 Bao Dal also never agreed to par-
the DRV's understanding of free elections in He offered to permit any number of repre- ticipate in the contest. But the question of
a speech to the Fifth Session of the National sentatives of the southern zone to campaign the election's legality is minor compared to
Assembly discussing the program of the in the north. The DRV would guarantee other problems. The referendum reportedly
Fatherland Front. In Dong's words: their complete security and right to cam- was rigged by the premier's brother, Ngo Dinh
"The basic principles that govern these paign freely and to distribute their electoral Nhu.1B9 Diem received 98.2% of the votes.
general elections are: general free elections propaganda, provided the DRV's representa- The voting procedure itself seems not in the t
voter throughout the country on the principle of tives were allowed to do the same in the bo t off tradition of f s rep c to ing. and put
universal, equal, direct and secret ballot. It south.' t one
Is universal in the sense that all Vietnamese Whether or not the DRV would have lived it in a sealed envelop 400 One wonders what
citizens, including army men and army offl- up to those conditions cannot be known. wasWith done ith the the Mar hf1956 constituent
cers, without distinction of sex, nationality, One can at least say that the conditions
social class, profession, property status, edu- described above were exemplary of a free assembly election, which the State Depart-
cation, religious beliefs, political tendency, election. But the Saigon government and ment praised as relatively "fair," 201 there
length of residence, etc. . shall have the the US refused even to consider the possi- were numerous restrictive provisions. The
right to elect and be elected. It is equal in bility that the DRV could permit a free government kept the right to veto candidates
that every elector shall cast one vote, and election; they argued that the lack of free- of whom it disapproved. Campaign finances,
all votes shall have equal value. It is direct dom in any Communist country made it im- transport, and propaganda were proveded ex-
in that the people will directly elect their possible to hold a free election there. Yet, elusively by the government. By a presi-
deputies to the National Assembly, and not such concern about the absence of prereq- dential decree of 11 January 1956 concen-
through any intermediary. It is secret in uisites for a free election seems not to have tration camps were set up to house families
that the ballot papers are in closed envelopes. deterred the US from postponing free elec- of former Viet Minh supporters and current
All the above-mentioned conditions are to tions in Germany or Korea, where the non- political prisoners. All opposition parties
ensure' that the elections will be entirely Communist part of the country was certain to boycotted the election. Several independ-
free and there can be- no interference, no win19' In effect, the lack of freedom in ents had their candidacy suppressed. Sus-
threat that might prevent their electors from Communist-ruled areas has been raised as petted electoral opponents of the Diem re-
freely expressing their will. a barrier to free elections only in Vietnam, gime were arrested. And once elected, dep-
"As stipulated by article 7 in the Final where the Communists were expected to will, uties were to be immune from arrest only if
.
Declaration of the Geneva Conference, con- and not in divided countries where a Western they refrained from supporting the policies
trol of the elections shall be exercised by victory was anticipated. It is hard to avoid or activities of rebels or Communists 201 An
the International Commission for Supervi- the conclusion that the US was less con- Informative report of the conditions in which
cerned about the conditions of voting than candidates operated in a Republic of Viet-
gion and Control. about the likelihood of an unfavorable out- nam election is provided in an article by
Ho Chi Minh, when asked about safeguards come. Nguyen Tuyet Mai, a candidate in the 1959
for free elections, replied: "This is a calumny Moreover, the unwillingness of the Saigon National Assembly elections. In her words:
by those who do not desire the reunification regime and the US to consider elections under ". . . the essence of South Vietnamese politics
of Vietnam by means of free general elec- such conditions as those proposed by Ho and is as totalitarian as the regime in the North
tions. The Government of the Democratic Dong is, to say the least, ironic in view of which it so strongly decries." 408 As Robert
Republic of Vietnam will guarantee full free- the circumstances that characterized Diem's Shaplen put it, the National Assembly chosen
dom of elections in the North of Vietnam." 190 rule in general and the elections conducted in 1956 and 1959 was a "completely control-
Ho was more specific in two letters he wrote under his aegis in particular. In August led body." 296 Thus, even if one assumes the
to the editor of Nhan Dan. On 17 November 1954 Diem established sedition courts to deal worst about the DRV's promises about elec-
19655, he elaborated his view of free elections: with cases threatening Vietnam's "national toral conditions, it seems questionable
`.'Free elections: All the Vietnamese citi- independence" and "public security," par-
zens, male or female above 18 years old, re- ticularly with respect to acts aimed at "over- 11s The Times (London), 18 August 1955.
gardless of class, nationality, religion, politi- throwing the national government." 198 The 190 Murti, Vietnam Divided, p. 196.
cal affiliation, have the right to participate arrest and imprisonment by the Diem regime 197 New York Times,'12 March 1955.
in the elections, to vote freely for the persons of those who merely advocated free nation- 108 Murti, Vietnam Divided, p. 141.
in whom they have confidence. wide elections-among them the Saigon law- 119 Robert Shaplen, The Lost Revolution
yer, Nguyen Huu Tho, later to become the (New York: Harper, 1965), p. 129. That the
-There was an unofficial report in the leader of the National Front for the Libera- referendum was rigged is also reported by
Saigon vernacular Ngon Luan, 29 July 1955, tion' of South Vietnam-was a significant Bernard B. Fall, "How the French Got Out
which was somewhat more specific than commentary on the credentials of the Saigon of Viet-Nam," in The Viet-Nam Reader, p.
Diem's statements about the north's need to government to pass on whether the DRV was 89. Scigliano, Nation Under Stress, p 23, sug-
put the country's interest ahead of Com- qualified to hold free election. With respect gests that the referendum "recalls elections
munism's, guarantee fundamental freedoms, to freedom of the press, the Saigon gov- in Communist states."
etc.The.repoit listed the characteristics the ernment announced in late August that it 200 New York Times, 24 October 1955. In
DRV must have to prove it was "democratic": was considering the "possibility" of abolish- fact, in a later election the Viet Cong capital-
"political opposition in the Government, 1ng domestic political censorship."2 That ized on this procedure by announcing that
basic freedoms for the people, army and anyone who could not produce an unused
police outside the control of the party, free- 19' Both letters are from Murti, Vietnam ballot picture of Diem the day after the elec-
dorn of the press." Then the UN was to make Divided, pp. 187-188. tion would be punished.
an inspection to determine whether the DRV 192 One such proposal was made on 4 No- 201 New York Times, 11 March 1965.
was democratic. Only at that point could vember 1955. The Western "Big Three" plus 202 The above description of conditions in
elections be organized. 'Quoted in Murti, West Germany jointly proposed the holding the constituent assembly elections is from
Vietnam Divided, pp. 186-187. of a free election in September 1956 to unite Murti, Vietnam Divided, pp. 192-193.
183 Ibid., p. 182. ... the two parts of Germany. New York Times, 203 Nguyen Tuyet Mai, 'Electioneering:
Ise Fatherland Front, pp. 41-42. 5 November 1955. Vietnamese Style," Asian Survey, II, no. 9
180, ietnam News Agency dispatch, 12 July 103 New York Times, 4 August 1954. (November 1962) 11-18.
1956. 191 New York Times, 31 August 1954. 263 Shaplen, Lost Revolution, p. 130.
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X94 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE August 19, 1966
whether the election In the north could really propaganda." 9n The DRV consistently tent and the character of Hanoi's efforts to
have been much less free than that in the blamed Diem's refusals on pressure from his promote reunification after 1956 are, of
south?06 United States backers and, in the face of course, matters of the greatest contro-
talinnlylofiHanospin entionsgit seems unde- 1958 to pledge Its determinat on to until
carry out important ones, it is not necessary to answer
"ntable that the DRV did almost everything more actively its efforts to reunify the coon- them in order to understand Hanoi :'s per-
possible to facilitate the holding of elections. try on the basis of "independence and de- spective on the present situation. What-
From 1954 to 1956, the DRV behaved largely mocracy by peaceful means." 219 ever the nature of Hanoi's involvement in
as one would expect a country sincerely in- It is Important to understand that Hanoi the south and whenever it began, there can
terested in carrying out the Geneva Agree- continued to view reunification as a goal be no denying that eventual DRV efforts to
ments' election provision to act. On the the legitimacy of which was assured by the "support" the "struggle" in the south were
other hand, Diem, clearly conscious that he Geneva Agreements. Inasmuch as Geneva, a direct consequence of Diem's refusal to
-would lose the election, was under heavy had explicitly affirmed the unity of Vietnam. permit the scheduled elections. From the
domestic political pressure completely to and tho non-political character of the de- history of Hanoi's unsuccessful efforts to
eliminate the possibility of elections and thus marcation line, the DRV leaders undoubtedly bring about the holding of the 1958 elec-
'to demonstrate that Communist rule was felt justified in continuing to hold that Viet- tions, some implications can be drawn. about
not "around the corner."' Diem's refusal nam was a single country, the reunification. the DRV's understanding of the present sit-
even to consult probably also reflects a fear of which was essential." Thus, Secretary uation in Vietnam.
that the DRV might have agreed to any rea- Rusk is correct in pointing out that "Hanoi The history of elections sheds some illumi-
sonafile conditions,he. imposed. The conclu- has never made a secret of its designs."21 nation on the DRV's relations with the
lion seems inescapable that the 1956 elections For Hanoi sees reunification not as an in- USSR and China. In a sense, the DRV's
were not held because the Diem government, vidious "design" that should be hidden but frustration in its efforts to achieve national
with important US backing, was more in- as a legitimate national (i.e., encompassing reunification through elections was a result
terested in maintaining itself as a separate, all Vietnam) enterprise bearing the ap- not only of the US's support of Diem but also
anti-Oommnnict government than in risk- proval of all 'present at Geneva." The ex- of the unwillingness of the major Commu-
ing its survival to achieve the national unity
to which all Vietnamese ostensibly were com- 'R1 New York Times, 17 March 1958; see also nist amples a to io stofnt the Gene ao sec ee-
'mit'ted. the nfecof the o Ag
Problem of Reunification, ments. The ineffectiveness of oY Soviet and
and
ITMOGTT --THE FAn,VRE TO HOLD ELECTION: 212 See for example, New York Times, 17 Chinese support cannot have failed to im-
SOME IMPLICATIONS FOR THE PRESENT April 19:18. press on Ho Chi Minh the disadvantages of
With the passing of the J1956 deadline = It should be noted that although the dependence even on fraternal Communist
for elections, Hanoi began July stress 956 that the DRV has continued to insist on the im- countries. Any tendency to view Hanoi
struggle for reunification would be a lon portance of reunification, Hanoi has for some simply as an extension of the Communist
fo s one.- The DRV continued to time maintained that even if the US were to power of Moscow or Peking must be con-
and iardu ts ous on an the election provision withdraw, reunification would not come im- sidered In the light of the DRV's past rela-appeals of the Geneva Agreements, holding both that mediately. Lacouture reports (Between Two tions with its allies. It seems safe to assume
the French (who had withdrawn their High Truces, p. 246) that the DRV leaders had that the DRV's experience has reinforced
Commend in April 1 withdrawn
were their to accept a delay of 10 to 15 years; since Hanoi's disposition to follow a course inde-
Command nt Ap it 956) wee responsible the start of US bombing attacks on the north, pendent of its Communist allies. for made arrangements for officially handing that timetable has probably been compressed US officials have often expressed the view
over that obligation to the ci soraewhat, but even recently (Dec Lap, 14 that Hanoi's failure to respond affirmatively
Saigon govern- October 1965) Hanoi has admitted that re- to Washin ton's
ment and that the Republic of Vietnam was unification must be "gradual." One must g peace overtures prove that
already obligated as a "successor regime." 208 the DRV is not interested in a peaceful
Efforts were made through 1960 to engage the also consider the NLF's coolness toward
Diem government in consultations about early reunification (see Lacouture, Between 21" Some analysts have asserted that the
e g rn June 1957 su wots tout Two Truces, pp. 173, 245-246). The NLF DRV's effort to foster a change in the
, Geneva Conference co-chairmen again oche platform calls for reunification by "stages." southern government's attitude toward
I on xg ev thorn re take steps to fthe apparent lack of enthusiams for reunifi- elections consisted essentially of "propaganda
holding of elects take steps July facilitate 1957, ili March fication also was manifest when the NLF activities" until 1959. (See Scigliano, Na-
holding of le tton July 19Ju and July rch held its first congress in January 1962. It tion Under Stress, p. 137, and New York December andg addressed 58, Js to 1959, urging that mapped out 10 points, and reunification was Times, 2 May 1960.) Others have reported
he agree a the holding notes to of a consultahat not among them. The congress also pro- that the killing of village chiefs in the south
conference to discuss reunification elec- posed the establishment of a neutral zone to began "within a few months" after the pass-
tioxls Y10 The DRV also sought to institute include South Vietnam, Cambodia, and ing of the 1956 election deadline, although
tl least a normalization u rrelations with Lacs. A pamphlet written by two :DRV citi- the murders are attributed to "stay-behind"
the south, which would of felt Hanoi to zens native of the south discussing the NLF Viet Minh, not Infiltrators from the north.
trade for southern rice. D
perm rejected all advocates a "Laotian solution" for South (See Fall, "How the French Got Out," p.
of Hanoi's offers, rice. Diem i them as "false Vietnam. The pamphlet's principal men- 91.) Some very knowledgeable writers have condemning tion of reunification is in a short section argued that the adoption of violent meth-
Which begins by describing the problem as ads by southern Viet Minh supporters came
906 As Marti, Vietnam Divided, p. 188, points "particularly difficult." (See Tran 'Van Giau largely as a response to Saigon's repressive
out, it is noteworthy that despite the enor- and Le Van Chat, The South Viet Nam Liber- campaigns against them, an activity which
mous number of DRV complaints about the ation National Front [Hanoi: Foreign Lan- the Diem government openly undertook as
lack of freedom in the south, Hanoi never guages Publishing House, 1962], pp. 32, 34-35, early as 1954 despite the Geneva Agreements'
made this an issue with reference to the elec- 84 and 87. The pamphlet also contains the prohibition of reprisals against partisans of
tions. This is another sign that the DRV information on the NLF congress.) Irons- either side. Hanoi, that argument con-
Was seeking elections, not a propaganda vic- call ;y, US bombing of the north has had the tinues, feared becoming involved in a major
tory. effect of increasing the NLF's sense of kin- war, but the southerners, subject to Diem's
900 See, for example, New York Times, 17 ship with the DRV. The increase in the repressions, were unwilling to wait indefi-
July 1955, on Diem's awareness that he would NLF"s emphasis on reunification can be seen nitely; thus, in response to southern pres-
lose and on the political pressures leading by compc'oring the above pamphlet with the sures culminating in the March 1960 meeting
him to reject elections, Ellen Hammer, NLF' statement in We Will Win (Hanoi: For- of "former resistance veterans," Hanoi that
"Viet Nam, 1956," Journal of International elgn. Languages Publishing House, 1965), September agreed to endorse the formation
Affairs, X, no. 1 (1956), 35, asserts that the published after the start of the bombing of a National Liberation Front. (For a de-
fear of elections had a "paralyzing effect" on raids. Both Hanoi and the NLF have con- velopment of the view that Saigon's cam-
the Saigon governor, nt. s:stently favored an immediate "normaliza-
907 See, for example, Vietnam News Agency tion" of relations between the zones, which the start off civil war in the Soutthrsee Lled ac to
dispatch, 2 January 1957. would enable the north to tap . southern food ture, Between Two Truces,
248 See Seventh Interim Report of the In- sources again. 11-, and pp. 6ti, V Devil-lers, ternational Commission for Supervision and 211 Speech before the American Society of Divided, p. 1196.' Concerning southern Cp es-
Coantrol, August 1, 1956-April 30, 1957 (Lon- International Law, Washington, :D.C., 23 sures on a reluctant Hanoi, see the Lacouture
don: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1957) April 1965, in State Department Bulletin, and the Devillers citations.) The State
[Cmnd. 335], and Vietnam News Agency dis- LII, no. 1350, p. 698. Hanoi
patch, 10 January 1957. 21c In fact, Hanoi has sometimes seemed sough sought first's
to over viewer of throw course, Diem is
by that encouragrag-
Y00 Economist, 29 June 1957. to betray a sense of embarrassment that it ing its southern followers to terrorize the
am See New York Times, 21 July 1957; Viet- was not doing as much as it should to pro- countryside, and that when this effort failed News A
March
1
58; mote
reu
nifica
ion. See, for V etnam Peace Committee. Five Years of9tl a Hanoi's effort to trationalize the "consolida- sontopple iem, the DRV " by sending Infiltrators to launched
seize E~ the
Implementation of the Geneva Agreements tion of the north" as an integral part of south and set up a puppet Liberation Front
in Vietnam (Hanoi: Foreign Languages Pub- the reunification struggle. Vietnam News to conceal Its aggression. (See the 1961 and
lashing House, 1959), p. 8; and Devillers, Agency dispatches, 31 December 1956 and 1965 white papers on Vietnam published by
"Struggle," 10. 10 January 1957.
the State De art t.
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August 19, 1966 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE
19135
settlement of the war. But the DRV's ex- "... It is a dishonest argument to say that The American Red Cross and the Sal-
perience in attempting to bring about the the southern part of our country is a neigh- vation Army are two organizations that
holding of the 1966 elections suggests that boring country separate from the northern can always be depended on when dis-
there may be other reasons for Hanoi's part. One might as well say that the South- aster strikes. These organizations have
failure to respond to US negotiation offers. ern states of the United States are a country dedicated and trained personnel who are
In Hanoi there Is a considerable reservoir apart from the Northern states ... Vietnam ready to serve at a moments notice.
of skepticism about any proposals emanat- is one, the Vietnamese people are one.. . . The dis rust 1shouldWashington,
north areboundeto ticularlycitizens
not be hard to understand As nd, our people In the daughters
those of eastern Kansas are in-sons and in view of the US role in support of Diem's extend wholehearted support to the patriotic debted to the leadership and personnel
undermining of the 1956 elections. The struggle waged by the people of the south." 2" of these outstanding and humanitarian
DRV's leaders are convinced that the US was While Hanoi's assumptions about US in- organizations for their prompt and effi-
instrumental in Diem's refusal to allow elec- tentions are rertainly open to doubt, it is not cient service following the most destruc-
tions. Their attitude is well represented by so easy to dismiss the DRV's reasons for re- five tornado in the history of our State.
this passage from an article in the army fusing to accept the US interpretation of I ask unanimous consent to print e.
journal Q'uan Doi Nhan Dan: the nature of the war.
"We demand the reunification of our land When the US asks for "some sign that the RECORD the report of the American
because for the last nine years the United North Vietnam is willing to stop its aggres- National Red Cross and the report of the
States itself prevented any negotiation that sion against South Vietnam," it is calling Salvation Army at Topeka, Kans.
would bring about a peaceful reunification upon Hanoi to accept Washington's inter- There being no objection, the reports
of the two parts. Even. now the United pretation of the war. Washington is asking were ordered to be printed in the RECORD,
States still stubbornly considers the south as the DRV implicitly, if not explicitly, to admit as follows'
a `separate country(!)' as it deliberately having committed aggression, when to Hanoi
tries to prolong the division of our coun- it is quite clear that Saigon and Washington REPORT TO SENATOR FRANK CARLSON ON REfi
try." "7 are the guilty parties-guilty of sabotaging CROSS ASSISTANCE TO VICTIMS OF THE EAST-
Can one really be surprised when US offers the unity of Vietnam by refusing to allow ERN KANSAS TORNADOES OF JUNE 8, 1966
bring a sresponse on proposed like this: the 1956 elections treceived mass care in victims
food, shelter
"J "Johnson proto solve the Vietnamese much Hanoi may need and want peace, it is workers
problem by free elections, and he considered unrealistic to expect the DRV to admit, even and first aid: $64,228.
this proposal ... a concession. This is noth- implicitly, that it has been an aggressor, A total of 1,543 families received assistance
Ing new. A free election to reunify Vietnam when the facts of the last decade tell it in food, clothing and other maintenance
is a matter ... clearly specified In the otherwise. (rent, auto repairs, et cetera) : $164,206.
1954 Geneva agreement. This election should It is certainly beyond the province of this Seventy-eight families received assistance
have been carried out nine years ago, but it study to suggest what the US negotiating pa- in the rebuilding or repair of their own home;
was precisely the United States which, sition should be. But several observations fifteen dwellings were rebuilt or replaced;
through the instrumentality of its hench- are possible about the prerequisites for suc- sixty-four were repaired: $118,765.
men, sabotaged the execution of this pro- cessful negotiations. If the US wishes to Four hundred and thirty-two families were
vision . these proposals are deceitful understand and to deal effectively with Its assisted in the replacement and repair of
tricks.". . 2L8 adversary in Vietnam, it must recognize the household furnishings and household appli-
Furthermore, Hanoi's understanding of the reasons for Hanoi's distrust of the US. Only ances: $125,537.
nature of the war makes it very difficult for if the roots and the intensity of Hanoi's One hundred and twenty-one families re-
the DRV to accept US peace offers. The DRV skepticism about US peace overtures are ceived medical and nursing assistance, in-
leaders see Diem's refusal to implement the fully understood by Washington can effective eluding doctor's bills, hospital bills, pros-
election provision and his attempt to create steps be taken to dispel Hanoi's doubts and thetic appliances and prescription medicine:
instead an International boundary at the 17th prepare the way for effective negotiations. $28,535.
parallel as a central cause of the current Furthermore, Hanoi is likely to remain un- Twenty-four families received assistance in
conflict. To the DRV, the goal of reuniflca- receptive to peace proposals which treat the the purchase of tools and equipment to re-
tion appears not as an aggressive design but DRV as an aggressor being forced to the con- establish them in self-employed occupations:
as the legitimate fulfillment of the clear in- ference table by punitive US bombings. Any $7,835.
tention of the Geneva Agreements. Hanoi realistic approach to negotiations in Vietnam In total, 1,600 families received assistance
places considerable weight on the Geneva must give at least some consideration to the In the total amount of $509,106 (subject to
Agreements' explicit assertion that the 17th DRV's efforts to implement the Geneva correction when deferred medical cases have
parallel was not to be construed as a politi- Agreements' election provision and to the been disbursed and all assistance In building
cal boundary. The merit of Hanoi's position manner in which those efforts were frus- and repair is concluded).
on this question has been acknowledged even trated. In addition, 350 families received counsel-
in the West. As the London Times put it in ing and referral assistance. Almost seven
1956: "There is the tacit American insistence thousand welfare inquiries were investigated.
that the Western powers party to the Geneva REPORTS OF AMERICAN NATIONAL Cases in which full medical recovery has
agreement should accept the fait accompli of RED CROSS AND THE SALVATION not been attained, and those in which build-
a divided Vietnam. .. For both France and ARMY ON SERVICES RENDERED ing repairs have not been completed will
Britain it means that the intention of the continue to receive attention as long as Red
KANSAS TORNADO
NT
frustrated AFTER RECE
uired
is re
b
C
.
q
een
ross
agreement will have
Geneva
and a charge of bad faith may be raised." 216 Mr. CARLSON. Mr. President, many
Yet it is precisely on the acceptance of the organizations and individual citizens
notion that the 17th parallel constitutes a outstanding service to the city
legitimate political boundary that the US rendered
interpretation of the war as "North Viet- of Topeka and eastern Kansas following
nam's aggression against South Vietnam" the disastrous tornado which occurred
depends. The State Department's 1965 white on June 8.
paper on Vietnam makes this assertion: In The director of the American National
Vietnam a Communist government has set Red Cross, Mr. Don Byers, has sub-
out deliberately to conquer a sovereign people
in a neighboring state." It is impossible to mitted to me a report of the services
conceive of "aggression" of one state against rendered by that organization to citizens
another, when there is no legal basis for the affected by the tornado in eastern
existence of more than a single state. To Kansas.
the DRV, the idea that South Vietnam is "a Maj. Lewis Forney, Topeka command-
neighb the US oring desire to state" is retain an a foothold absurdity in born Indo- of ing officer of the Salvation Army, has
the US
china 220 Thus Ho stated: also given me a statement of some of the
services rendered by that organization
=7 Quen Doi Nhan Dan, 27 September 1965.
'is Quan Doi Nhan Dan, 23 September 1965.
Si) The Times (London), 9 March 1956.
220 Seethe article by Do Xuan Sang," secre-
tary general of the Vietnam Lawyers Associa-
tion. The "shopworn plea" of Hanoi's "ag-
gression" and refusal to abandon South Viet-
nam, he asserts, "precisely goes counter" to
the basic principles of the Geneva 'Agree-
No. 138-3
following the disaster.
ments. The attempt to build a separate
state in the south is "out-and-out illegal" in
view of the Geneva Agreements. Vietnam
News Agency dispatch, 26 February 1966.
221 Tass dispatch, 9 December 1965, and
Vietnam News Agency dispatch, 8 December
1965.
An estimation of statistics, after 1
1 days'
service, tornado disaster service by t
he Sal-
vation Army at Topeka, Kans. (d
ate of
disaster, June 8, 1966)
FOOD
Emergency grocery orders ----------
726
Meals served (8 locations) 11 days-_
141,000
Cups of coffee and cold drinks ------
700, 000
Sandwiches ----------------------
16,700
Doughnuts and rolls---------------
26, 400
CLOTHING
Garments and bedding------------
185,000
Including sheets and pollow cases-
2,300
Blankets------------------------
925
FURNITURE
Gas stoves, refrigerators, dishes, bed-
room and dining room furniture-
chairs, tables, divans-small ap-
pliances, etc. (This distribution
is in its initial phases and it is an-
ticipated that many more such
items will be issued within the
next 60 to 90 days.) -------------- 200
Gasoline and transportation to fam-
ilies ----------------------------
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19136 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD -- SENATE August 19, 1966
An estimation of statistics, after 11 days'
8erufoe,tornado disaster service by the Sal-
vation Army at Topeka, Kans. (date of
disaster, June 8, 1966)--Continued
PERSONAL SERVICES
Number of families contacted---_-_ 1, 096
Persons temporarily sheltered---__-_ 170
Missing persons inquiries----------- 175
Nursing care----------------------- 37
Grocery orders to individuals and
canned food distribution--_____-_ 726
Gallons of milk-------------------- 162
'T'railer applications taken ---------- 47
Rental referrals--------------------- lb
VOLUNTEER SERVICES
tore Council, the National Legion of (Only first-run advertising can be effectively
Decency, and the Schools Motion :Picture controlled by the distributor.)
Committee. S. The MPAA's Green sheet, summarizing
Mr. President, I shall be very inter- reviews and ratings of various organizations,
eSteci in the outcome of Mr. Valenti's will be sent out by first class mail, Individ-
proposal. I understand that the date of daily p dally papaperssan to the film editor of each
er, and the overall circulation of
September 6, 1966, has been set for a the Sheet will be expanded. Currently,
meeting of the board of the Motion Pic- mailing is third class, and addressee is the
ture Association of America on the sub- paper, not an individual.
ject of voluntary classification of motion 4. The Association (most likely aided by
pictures. Anna Rosenberg Associates p.r. firm) will
I shall follow closely the results of that start a campaign to get all dailies to run
movie-logs, ovie-logs, containing one-line reviews plus
notice of "For Mature Audiences," designa-
I wish Mr
Valenti success in hi
ffo
t
.
s e
r
s. tion where applicable.
"SAC" unit-trained personnel in Many Americans, at all levels of govern- 5. Valenti and others in the industry will
Communications unit (hours)---- 4,800 ment, are keenly interested In his sUg- go out on the stump to "constantly impress
Salvation Army officers serving in ro- gestion. Mr. President I would like to on the public our determination to inform
tation system____________________ 55 request that the news story from Variety, the parent-to insist that the 'For Mature
Citizens of Topeka and the surround-
ing area August 17, 1966, entitled "Classification Audiences' description does not mean sex-
_________ 700 but rather subjects and treatment that par-
Vehicles driven by citizenry for disas- on All Films" be inserted into the body refs ought not to display for their children."
ter work------------------------- 134 of the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD at this (Likely point here is to avoid the pitfall of a
point.
VOLUNTARY CLASSIFICATION OF
MOTION PICTURES BY MOTION
PICTURE ASSOCIATION OF AMER-
ICA
Mrs. SMITH. Mr. President, on
March 25, 1966-nearly 5 months, ago-I
expressed my concern to the Senate over
the marked increase in the use of shame-
ful, perverted themes in motion pictures
being seen by America's small, children.
At that time I proposed a Senate.special
committee be formed to study the merits
of a classification system. In this sys-
tem either an industrywide, or govern-
mental, or industry-government board
would certify domestic and foreign
movies. as to their suitability only for
adults or, on the other hand, for the
entire family. My resolution, Senate
Resolution 242, was subsequently intro-
duced and referred to the Committee on
Commerce.
It was with genuine pleasure therefore
that I read this week that voluntary
classification of motion pictures is .now
close to being adopted as the guiding
principle of the Motion Picture Associa-
tion of America's revised Production
Code.
I wish to offer my sincere congratula-
tions to the new president of the Motion
Picture Association of America, Mr. Jack
There being no objection, the article as with Brits n'sinxiest Picture in Towne )'
was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, Valenti's phrase "inform the parent"' is
as follows: emphasized over and over again in his memo
NEW HOLLYWOOD "ADULT" CODE-CLASSInCA- as the major purpose of the classification
TION ON ALL FILMS system, and as an answer to those who, while
(By Ronald Gold) approving greater emphasis on "adult" mo-
tion picture themes, have lamented the lack
Voluntary classification of motion pic- of proper guides for parents concerned with
tures, an idea long-discussed and long-op- their children's viewin
g. ,
posed by the nation's major film distribu- RESPONSIBILITY CLEAR
tors, Is now close to being adopted as the
guiding principle of the Motion Picture Assn. "In a world grown complex," Valenti told
In a confidential memorandum on the the presidents, "there are still truths which
proposed Code, sent by new MPAA president have not changed. The responsibility for
Jack A. Valenti as "a springboard for discus- telling the public about our product remains
slon," the reasons for such a step are care- clear. And that responsibility must be aimed
fully outlined, and the necessity of the de- at the one person who In actual fact directs
cision Is laid squarely on the line as the only the path of our society: the parent . . .
way to head off Governmental classification, "Therefore, the motion picture maker must
a burgeoning trend in local communities inform the parent about the movie. What-
around the country. ever happens after the parent is informed. is
"If we are to keep the exhibitors with the province of the parent, for no one else
us," Valenti told the company toppers, "we is either authorized or divinely anointed to
must avoid (Government classification) at demand, or order, or even to persuade the
all costs now. We can tell the exhibitors, parent to do something he does not want to
look, we have to do something about adult do. Thus, this Code, rewritten to fit the
movies and this is the sensible way. If you mores and customs of this age, directs its
will cooperate, we can together beat the focus to the parent."
local know-it-ails. But if you don't cooper- WITCH HUNTERS
ate, we will sooner or later have to succumb As Valenti puts it in a section of his memo
to Governmental classification which lays titled "Areas for Rebuttal," one of the chief
the onus right squarely on your back." objections to voluntary classification has
Sept. 6 has been set for a board meeting been that "We will activate local witch-
on the Code revision, but Valenti's memo hunters who will say "If you can classify your
suggests that considerable discussion is still own pictures, we can too-and besides you
required to "define the boundaries beyond don't go far enough. We will add criminal
which responsible filmmakers, voluntarily sanctions by local ordinance." (The exam-
will not go" (see separate story), but it is ple of Dallas, where voluntary ratings led to
understood that the MPAA staff is hoping to state classification is often offered.)
have things ready to go 'by the fall. "Possibly," Valenti answers. "But we stall
is directed toward those citizens genre- Though work on a new Code has been in
ally opposed to outright censorship, who progress for many months (reports on a pro-
have been leaning toward classification bposed draft appeared In er) the matter has been given Variety high l priority
as the lesser of two evils. As the news- by Valenti, particularly since thtie that
paper Variety phrases it: the MPAA appeals board granted "exemp-
A system of voluntary classification, tions" to the 30-year-old present Code: first
Valenti and his associates seem to think, to raw language in Warner Bros. "Who's
can go a I ng way toward convincing these Afraid of Virginia Woolf?" and later to the
people that Government action is unneces- subject of abortion In Paramount's "Alfie."
sary, and that the motion picture industry It is noted that "Woolf" is currently showing
is truly capable of self-regulation. on a "no one under 18 without a parent" ad-
mission policy, and that "Alfie's" ads will
This idea, I might point out, already have "adults only" tag.
has strong support within the United Voluntarily classification system, accord-
States. Several nationally prominent, ing to Valenti's memo, would work as fol-
highly respected groups have long sup- lows:
ported a classification system of one type 1. The distributors, in consultation with
or another for American motion pic- Code administrator Geoffrey Shurlock, will
tune theaters. These groups include the "label each picture that is catalogued not
National Congress of Parents and Teach- for the very young or impressionable middle
youth
ers, the Film Estimate Board of National 2 This designation as "For Mature Audiences."
Organizations, the American Jewish first-run pint and roll run as part Of all
Committee, the Protestant Motion Pic- and point-oft sale materials stfords'thetrailers
aters.
have all the sound legal weaponry on our
side. Ours is voluntary-ours is not censor-
ship. And ours goes to the heart of the
problem-which Is information to the par-
ent. Anything beyond that Is the noxious
hand of corruptible censorship."
What the MPAA 'president seems to be
saying is that the "witch-hunters" will be
around no matter what you do, and they can
be beaten in court. But the direction of the
MPAA thrust Is rather toward those responsi-
ble citizens, generally opposed to censorship,
who have been leaning toward state classi-
fication as the lesser of two evils. A system
of voluntary classification, Valenti and his
associates seem to think, can go a long way
toward convincing these people that Govern.-
ment action Is unnecessary, and that the
motion picture industry is truly capable of
"self-regulation."
TRIBUTE TO SENATOR SIMPSON
Mr. BYRD of Virginia. Mr. President,
one of the most beloved Members of the
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lining the portico, 3,400 exterior lights
to illuminate the 21 acres on which the
palace Is located, teak floors covered with
imported rags, an exterior built with
materials from France-glass doors are
massive, St. Gobain panels.
Why this elaborate and costly palace
Is being built at a time when the very
existence of South Vietnam is in the bal-
ance is a complete mystery. Mr. Fosie
reports that:
No one knows what the elaborate and
expansive building will be used for or when
it will be completed-there are many sug-
gestions on a use for the new palace-muse-
um, a residence for the chief of state, a gov-
ernment office building.
It is perfectly evident, of course, that
the United States is bearing the cost of
this monstrosity. Every item imported
by the Ky government for the palace re-
quires the expenditure of dollars or other
foreign exchange, and in one way or
another the U.S. aid program foots the
bill by providing Ky with its dollar and
foreign exchange requirements. The
entire economy of South Vietnam is, of
course, supported by the U.S. aid pro-
gram. Commodities given to Vietnam
under the aid program are sold by the
Vietnam Government to local importers
and domestic buyers and the sales pro-
ceeds and customs duties are the major
source of funds available to the Viet-
namese to finance its armed forces and
or named to State legislatures, city commis-
sions and judgeships.
Race is only one of many problems still
being solved by the South. Labor shortages
are beginning to crop up, particularly among
skilled workers. Many businessmen feel that
Southern schools still are not turning out
researchers and scientists fast enough to keep
pace with other regions. Traffic jams and
"urban sprawl" are afflicting some cities.
REGION WWII A FUTURE
It's not a uniform picture of change you
find in the South. There's a widening gap
in outlook and growth between cities and
rural areas, where many marginal farmers
remain. Some States are industrializing
more rapidly than others.
Yet you sense a growing power in this part
of the nation and growing confidence that it
is a "region with a future." J. L. Townshend,
assistant vice president of the Southern
Railway System, summed things up this way:
"I've been in the South for 30 years and
I've never seen anything like the boom of the
last five years. Every sign points to unslack-
ening growth as far ahead as you can see."
32 years to our Nation's agriculture.
Mr. Godfrey, Administrator of the Agri-
HORACE DAVID GODFREY - 32
YEARS' SERVICE TO NATION'S
AGRICULTURE
Mr. TALMADGE. Mr. President, it is
my pleasure on this occasion to bring to
the Senate's attention Mr. Horace David
Godfrey's long and devoted service of
cultural Stabilization and Conservation--its programs of economic development
Service, has been an agriculturist for his
entire life, being born and reared on a
farm near Waxhaw in Union County,
N.C.
It has been my privilege to have been
associated with Mr. Godfrey since first
taking my position in the Senate and
being assigned to serve on the Senate
Committee on Agriculture and Forestry.
In our work on the committee, Mr. God-
frey has been of great assistance and
proven himself to be an able, knowledge-
able, and conscientious administrator
whose main concern has been the ad-
vancement of agriculture in America to
the benefit of our farmers.
He brought to the Agricultural Stabili-
zation and Conservation Service many
years of experience by working with the
original Agriculture Adjustment Admin-
istration, the Production and Marketing
Administration, and the Commodity
Stabilization Service. He Is well-
respected by all Georgians who have
worked under his leadership and he has
dealt fairly with all agricultural problems
in my state.
It is my pleasure today to salute Mr.
Godfrey, to commend him for his out-
standing work, and to wish him every
futur uccess.
~I ASTE OF U.S. TAXPAYERS' DOL-
LARS IN SOUTH VIETNAM
Mr. GRUENING. Mr. President, Jack
Fosie reports in today's Washington Post
that while money is lacking to improve
the life of the peasants In Vietnam,
funds are available to construct a huge
200-room palace in downtown Saigon.
It is estimated that the construction
will cost $1.78 million and will contain
such fancy "goodies" as 100 fountains
It is inconceivable to me that a better
use cannot be found for the almost $2
million in U.S.-provided funds than to
build a palace for which no use exists.
If this project serves as a bribe, or if my
friends downtown prefer, as an induce-
ment to Vietnamese Government officials,
wouldn't we be better off If we arranged
for the deposit in some Swiss banks of
the $2 million to the account of Ky and
his associates. This would at least have
the advantage of saving on scarce and
badly needed material for the lagging
program of "revolutionary development"
about which we heard so much a few
months ago. We now hear very little
about this program and how it will be-
come the principal means by which the
Saigon government will "win the hearts
and minds of the Vietnamese people."
There is good reason for the silence
about this program. It simply is not
achieving the much-touted objectives of
improving the lot of the Vietnamese
peasant to the point where he becomes a
strong and active supporter of the Ky
government. Vietcong forces can and do
operate with complete immunity a few
miles outside of Saigon and every other
major city in Vietnam until U.S. forces
are sent in on "search and clear" opera-
tions. Vietcong bases and operations are
still largely protected by the villagers
whose devotion to the Saigon government
has not been secured.
If anything, the situation is deterior-
_ ating. South Vietnamese forces in Tay
Ninh province have been unable, and
`there is some indication that they have
been unwilling, to take on the Vietcong
and large-scale operations by U.S. Army
forces became necessary. In the crucial
Mekong delta area, consideration is now
being given to sending several divisions
of American fightingmen there to do the
job which the South Vietnamese forces
cannot do. This will represent the first
time it has been found necessary to dis-
patch our troops to that area.
The underlying reason for this is read-
ily apparent. In most of the Vietnam
countryside the Vietcong can operate
without fear that their activities will be
disclosed by the villagers. The Ky gov-
ernment does not yet control the al-
legiance of the peasant.
It was precisely to overcome this sit-
uation that the program for so-called
revolutionary development was con-
ceived. Schools, community develop-
ment and agricultural projects were to
be poured into the rural areas to make
manifest the interest of the Saigon gov-
ernment in the welfare of the villager,
to enlist his support of the central gov-
ernment and thereby to lessen his reluc-
tance to provide information on the
Vietcong. Village self-defense and ef-
fective participation of the rural popu-
lation in pacification programs can be
assured, it was argued, only if the peas-
ants who make up the bulk of the popu-
lation in South Vietnam could see tangi-
ble evidence of the interest of the Saigon
government in their welfare. Recently
one of my staff visited Vietnam and spent
some time in the countryside talking to
Vietnamese and American officials. He
reported to me that the new programs
for increasing the living standards in
the villages is making very slow progress.
Wherever he went he was told about the
shortages of construction material and
equipment and the greater efforts that
could be made if needed supplies started
flowing into the countryside.
These shortages have not developed
because the United States has been chary
in providing commodities. The hundreds
of millions of dollars allocated to Viet-
nam have resulted in an unprecedented
flow of commodities to that country.
The docks in Saigon are bursting at the
seams with the mountains of goods that
have been offloaded. Where are these
commodities going, if not to the villages
and hamlets?
A trip through the city of Saigon pro-
vides the answer. A tremendous con-
struction program is evident at every
turn. Hundreds of speculative buildings
have been put up by Vietnamese busi-
nessmen to house American personnel
spurred on by the exorbitant rentals
which U.S. forces pay. Hundreds of new
bars have sprung up, fully and luxurious-
ly equipped, including air conditioning,
with items imported from the United
States through AID financing. The
shops in downtown Saigon are loaded
with every type of luxury item imagin-
able, all brought in under AID financing
or made possible because of AID fi-
nancing.
Mr. Bell, the former Director of AID,
testifying last spring before the Foreign
Relations Committee stated that he
could not imagine that the Saigon black
market was of much consequence since
all the items could be found normally in
the local shops. A walk along the main
shopping' streets in downtown Saigon will
confirm the abundance of luxury items
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Orlando, a new center of electronics and mis-
sile-parts industries.
Companies producing a wide variety of
goods, including chemicals, electric products,
machinery and paper, are coming to Arkan
sea in large numbers. Much the same pat-
tern shows up In Mississippi, with Jackson a
center of activity. Factory output in both
States has increased In the past decade even
faster than in other States in the South,
with the exception of Florida.
A booming area in Virginia is along the
Shenandoah Valley, now attracting many
electronics firms. Companies engaged in re-
search and development are springing up
here, too, as well as in northern Virginia,
just across the Potomac River from Wash-
ington, D.C.
EDUCATION STRESSED
As leaders in the South see it, this region
now is moving out of its "cheap labor"
phase into one in which skilled labor and
technical people are increasingly important.
Reflecting this is a new stress on educa-
tion, particularly at levels above the high
school. Texas, as one example, is spending
237 million dollars on higher education in
the years 1965-66, 56 per cent more than
the outlays of the previous two years.
Enrollment at Southern colleges has in-
creased by 54 per cent in just five years.
Today, the South turns out 16.6 per cent of
the nation's holders of the doctoral degrees,
compared with 9.1 per cent in 1950. Faculty
salaries at Southern universities, on aver-
age, are going up faster than in any other
region, enabling this area to compete on bet-
ter teams for top academic talent.
Springing up all over the South are new re-
search centers, usually built around uni-
versities. In North Carolina, for example,
a research park has grown up in the center
of a "research triangle" embracing Duke Uni-
versity, the University of North Carolina, and
North Carolina State University at Raleigh.
The University of Tennessee, on July 11,
dedicated a 2-million-dollar Space Institute
for study and research in the aerospace sci-
ences.
Perhaps the most striking development in
education is the sharp rise in two-year com-
munity colleges, geared typically to technical
training. More than 30 new community col-
leges were authorized in the South in 1965,
and the pace is picking up.
Already, 60 per cent of all freshman stu-
dents in Florida attend public junior col-
leges. Virginia, Tennessee and Alabama re-
cently joined the list of States setting up
systems of junior oclleges or vocational in-
stitutions. -
MAGNET FOR TALENT
Out of the drive to improve schools, the
South now is getting an increasing number
of technicians, professional men and man-
agerial talent. These college-trained peo-
ple, in turn, are demanding better educa-
tion for their young children.
Says an official of the Southern Regional
Education Board: "The quality of public-
school education Is rising almost everywhere
In the South as States invest more money.
School systems in some of our metropolitan
areas are a match for the best in other parts
of the U.S."
Of equal importance to the South's future
progress, economists say, is the development
of its financial power.
This region, at one time, was considered
a virtual dependency of Northern capital for
its economic growth. Today, banks and other
:Inancial institutions are taking an important
.role In the South's deveolpment as assets
grow-from 30 billions in 1955 to nearly 60
billions now, a rate of growth considerably
greater than that of the rest of the U.S.
C. W. Butler, senior vice president of Union
Planters National Bank In Memphis, says:
"City banks in the South now are financing
more and more of the big projects that re-
quired help from New York and Chicago
banks a few years ago. And country banks
are financing things our city banks used to
finance."
CULTURE, TOO
With this economic and educational up-
grading has come a surge in culture and
recreation.
Big stadiums for sports have been built
in Atlanta, Houston and Memphis. Museums
and centers for the performing arts are also
going up in these and in many other major
cities.
Tourism is becoming big business. Florida,
with more than 3 billions a year in tourist
income, is still the leader. But one State
after another is spending millions to im-
prove and promote beaches, State parks and
historic sites.
Summer and week-end homes line the
man-made lakes in the Tennessee Valley.
Mountain slopes in Tennessee and North
Carolina, with the aid of artificial snow,
have suddenly become skiing centers.
Officials In Virginia expect a 20 per cent
rise in tourist income this year above 1965--
not an unusual rise in the South these days.
Mild weather makes many areas year-round
attractions for vacationers.
MEC'HANI'ZED FARMS
In the South's farming areas, too, the pat-
tern is one of change.
Cattle graze in fields where cotton was
once grown. Production of broilers, dairy
products, fruits and vegetables is rising, as
agriculture diversifies.
Banks are taking the lead, says James
Furniss, a vice president of the Citizens &
Southern National Bank, Atlanta, "in pro-
viding the capital to mechanize agriculture
and turn it into a business, rather than just
a way of life."
Mr. Furniss adds: "Increasingly the South
is building plants to process and package its
own food products, rather than export raw
materials."
Today, the South has become a bread-
basket for the nation second only to the
Midwest,
TREK TO CITIES
What is changing people's outlook more
than anything else is the vast shift from
farmlands to the cities. The South is urban-
izing faster than the nation as a whole. In
1940, it was two-thirds rural. Now about 60
per cent of its people live in urban areas.
Atlanta is cementing its position as busi-
ness, financial and distribution Centel of the
developing Southeast. Since, 1950, its metro-
politan area has nearly doubled in population
to 1.2 million, Employment has grown by
28 per cent in the last five years, one of the
fastest rates for any big city in the U.S.
Stand atop one of Atlanta's new 40-story
skyscrapers and you can see at least 20 new
office buildings, many owned by banks and
insurance companies, under construction or
recently completed in this downtown area.
Hotels, high-rise apartments and department
stores are going up. Visible, too, in the dis-
tance are major expansion projects of the
city's universities.
Other big cities are bidding for their shares
of growth.
Houston, with 1.7 million people, has grown
in population faster than any other Fnajor
city in the South during the 1960s., It is a
center of the petrochemical industry and the
third-busiest port in the nation. In recent
years, research industries have been flooding
the area, in support of the 250-million-dollar
Manned Spacecraft Center.
Dallas, rebuilding its downtown, is a grow-
ing center of trade, finance, education and
culture. Big gains are being made in ap-?
parel merchandising and in output of aero-,
space equipment.
In Memphis, a new civic center rising a
block from the Mississippi highlights a mas-
19147
sive downtown rebuilding program. The city
is In the midst of a 40-million-dollar ex-
pansion of its medical-research complex,
which, its leaders say, will be one of the coun-
try's biggest when finished. Birmingham is
also becoming a major medical center and
is starting to reshape Its downtown.
Jacksonville, already a major center for
distribution, expects even greater demand for
warehouse space once the Cross-Florida Barge
Canal is finished, Also under way is it 100-
million-dollar program to improve Jackson-
ville's port facilities.
BOOM IN AMBITION
Once-quiet towns now are metropolitan
areas, bursting with ambition.
Charlotte now ranks second only to Chi-
cago in volume of long-haul trucking, and
a new interstate highway promises further
growth.
Mobile and Charleston are becoming ma-
jor ports. In Augusta, Ga., a big industrial
complex, built around chemical and wood
products, is rising.
Growth of insurance firms, recording
studios and services to industry is sparking
a boom in Nashville, Tenn. Chemical com-
panies are coming to the area near Rich-
mond, Va., once the capital of the Confed-
eracy and now an expanding distribution
center.
It is In these centers of population that
long-held traditions are losing some of their
grip in the new South. These burgeoning
centers are bringing radical changes in
politics and government once geared to the
rural voter.
People in this region, it's true, still know
the value of a dollar and keep a close eye on
taxes and government spending. Yet the
new cities of the South are loosening purse
strings to build up assets, attract more people
and industry. There is less resistance to
accepting federal funds for education, hos-
pitals, research, urban renewal.
FERMENT IN POLITICS
Politically, the trend toward .a two-party
system is picking up speed. Republican
Party strength is growing in major cities,
built around business leaders and the swell-
ing white-collar class.
In today's South, problems of race rela-
tions seem to be diminishing. Incidents tend
to be isolated, often the work of outsiders,
and less violent than racial outbreaks now
spreading in the North.
White bitterness over racial integration is
still running high in many areas of the
South, particularly small towns and rural
areas. Yet racial barriers are being lowered.
School integration in most major cities is
moving smoothly. All across the South, Ne-
groes are going to college in growing num-
bers. The South's all-Negro colleges, in fact,
are worried over the loss of top students-
and faculty members-to formerly all-white
colleges.
Many hotels, golf courses, other public
accommodations are being desegregated with
little fanfare. An Atlanta businessman
says: "Whites and Negroes eat side by side
in our top restaurants, something you never
saw five years ago."
NEGRO MILLIONAIRES
The South's economic boom, creating
plentiful jobs for Negroes and whites alike,
has blunted a major source of racial friction.
Negroes, meanwhile, are moving up the eco-
nomic ladder. In Atlanta and Memphis, as
examples, Negroes own banks, insurance com-
panies and contracting firms that employ
whites. A number of Negro businessmen
have become millionaires.
The Negro, as a voter, also is moving up.
The number of Negroes registered to vote in
the South has Increased to 2.5 million, from
1.1 million, since 1960, making Negroes a sub-
stantial political force. This is especially so
in the cities, where Negroes have been elected
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August 19, 1966 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE 19149
in local shops, though this has gone hand and nonproductive uses of our commodity
in hand with a flourishing black market assistance will depend on the procedures
conducted on the sidewalks outside AID establishes to carry out the amend-
American military billets. ment and the effectiveness with which
The speculation in AID commodities these procedures are carried out. I have
and their use for nonproductive purposes yet to see convincing evidence that AID
is hardly confined to Saigon, of course. or the State Department is at all con-
Angiang Province has been selected by cerned about this situation.
Vietnamese and U.S. Government of- It is also uncertain, at this time,
ficials for a crash program to establish whether the conferees who are now con-
that the new program of "revolutionary sidering the Foreign Assistance Act, will
development" can make a rapid impact. accept my amendment. In light of the
Ward Just commenting on the progress facts which I have disclosed today I urge
of this high priority program in the my Senate colleagues in the conference
August 13, 1966, Washington Post states to remain adamant in insisting on enact-
that: ment of the amendment.
In Longxuyen, the capital of Angian prov- I ask for unanimous consent that the
ince, there is little excitement over the com- newspaper articles written by Jack Foisie
tug of the Great Society. One might describe and Ward Just be printed in the RECORD.
the attitude as cautious pessimism. The There being no objection, the articles
main topic among businessmen is said to be were ordered to be printed In the RECORD,
the arrival of a contingent from the U.S. as follows:
Navy, for whose benefit licenses are being DIEM PALACE STILL ARUILDING-DEATIr OF
sought to open several new taverns. DICTATOR DIDN'T STOP WORK ON "DREAM
The feverish speculation which has HousE"
been going on using U.S.-financed com- (By Jack Foisie)
modities is graphically indicated by the
following report I have received. One
of the large American contractors in
Vietnam engaged in construction for our
military forces required a small building
to house his administrative staff. He
located a suitable building in downtown
Saigon consisting of about 10 rooms
which had been newly constructed. He
estimated the cost of the building at
about $30,000. The Vietnamese owners
agreed to lease the building to him for
2 years for $80,000, all of which was to
be paid in U.S. dollars in advance at the
time of occupancy. The building was
constructed, of course, with cement and
other building material brought in from
the United States and financed under
our aid program. When the contractor
attempted to negotiate the price he was
told to take it or leave it since the U.S.
military would pay at least that much
for the building.
The contractor also needed some land
to locate his warehouses and he found
about 10 acres of unimproved land about
10 miles outside Saigon near the Bien
Hoa Road. He was offered a 5-year lease
for $1.25 million. Needless to say these
exorbitant charges will be paid by the
United States since the contractor oper-
ates on a cost-plus contract.
Perhaps some of this is inevitable in
wartime when tremendous numbers of
military forces pour into a small, under-
developed country. But is it necessary
for the United States to finance the con-
struction of bars and palaces? Cannot
AID find a better means of allocating the
commodities we bring into the country?
Must the commodity import program be
run by Vietnamese officials working hand
in hand with local commercial importers?
In ordgr to try and remedy this situa-
tion I introduced an amendment to the
Foreign Assistance Act which has been
SS1IGoN.-In the midst of war, when money
is lacking for projects to improve the life of
the peasants, the Vietnamese government
goes on building Ngo Dinh Diem's "dream
house."
That Diem is dead, assassinated almost
three years ago by those who called him a
dictator, seems to make no difference.
No one knows what the elaborate and ex-
pansive building will now be used for or when
it will be completed. But work on the
gigantic palace goes on and is now in its
fourth year, with completion still years away.
Situated in a 21-acre park in downtown
Saigon, the site of the present palace is
almost identical to that of the "old palace."
The original building served as the residence
of the French governor when Vietnam (then
called Indochina) was a colony.
After France was defeated in 1954, the 200-
room establishment became the home of
Diem, who lived in it with his brother Ngo
Dinh Nhu and Nhu's wife, the famous Ma-
dame Nhu. The three ruled Vietnam, but
not without trouble.
In October, 1962, a year before Diem and
the Nhus were overthrown, two Vietnamese
Air Force pilots tried to kill the first family
by bombing the palace.
The family escaped injury but the right
wing of the old palace was badly damaged.
Diem moved out, then asked Vietnamese
architects to submit plans to rebuild the
palace. Ten plans were offered, and he
rejected them all.
Then a prestigious combine, headed by Ngo
Viet Thu, a successful architect in Europe,
produced the design that has provided a
challenge to artisans and an army of laborers.
The new palace has done away with the
gracious columns and arches of the old pal-
ace, which was in the tradition of French
tropical buildings. The new palace is mod-
ern. The only elements that suggest ,the
Orient are the overhanging roof of the pent-
house (from which Diem planned to address
crowds a la Mussolini), the dragons carved
on the auto ramps and some details of dec-
orations.
The main section of the building is as
long as a football field and is rigorously
symmetrical. It has a yellow stucco facade,
accepted by the Senate to require that but whether this is final remains to be seen.
commodities financed by the United "Many changes have occurred in the de-
States under the supporting assistance tailed plans since the death of Diem," said
authorization of the act must be deter- Tran Phi Hung, professor of architecture
mined as maki a contribution toward at the University of Saigon. "Many of the
rooms have lost their reason for being since
the economic development of the country the death of the man for whom they were
receiving the assistance. The success of designed."
the amendment in foreclosing speculative There are many suggestions on a use for
the new palace--a museum, a residence for
the chief of state, a government office build-
ing.
Whoever the tenant, he will have a fancy
place. The palace and its spacious grounds
will be illuminated by more than 3400 ex-
terior lights. It will have its own power
station to protect against a citywide power
failure, which is not unusual.
There will be 100 fountains lining the
portico. There will be an immense ball-
room and several ceremonial rooms only
slightly smaller in size.
The palace will have teak floors covered
with imported rugs, according to present
plans.
The exterior has been built with materials
from France. Glass doors are massive Saint-
Gobian panels. Electrical appliances and
hardware have been shipped from the
United States.
But other rooms will have a Vietnamese
motif, with local woods and Bienhoa's cele-
brated ceramic tiles.
The cost for the entire job is now esti-
mated at $1.78 million.
DELTA PROJECT TESTS DEVELOPMENT THEORY
(By Ward Just)
LONGXUYEN, August 12.-American and
Vietnamese planners are putting their
theories of "revolutionary development" to
the test in the province of Angiang, 130
miles southwest of Saigon in the Mekong
River Delta.
The plan is known bureaucratically as "a
comprehensive program for the rapid social
and economic development of the Angiang
priority area." It is a joint effort of the
U.S. aid mission and the Vietnamese Min-
istry of Revolutionary Development which
began on July 1 and is scheduled for comple-
tion at the end of 1988.
The budget, though the largest allocated
for any Vietnamese province, is not by Amer-
ican measurements large-some 384 million
piastres ($4.8 million) spread over 30 months.
Unlike any other province, the Anglang
priority area has a coordinator in Saigon,
Bert Fraleigh, who is a deputy associate
director of USAID, the aid mission here.
Fraleigh and his Vietnamese counterpart at
the "REVDEV" Ministry in Saigon are sup-
posed to break bottlenecks and insure a
large and steady flow of money.
The conditions for a successful program
are, on paper, perfect, Angiang is rich in soil,
and its roads are plentiful. The people have
the reputation of being hard-working and
the government administration, by Vietna-
mese standards, is effective. But most im-
portant, the province is 95 per cent pacified,
largely because the population is 80 per cent
Hoa Rao, a fiercely anti-Communist sect that
controls the village and hamlet administra-
tions.
The planners hope to move Angiang into
"phase three" of aid, beyond mere develop-
ment into tangible, material progress, in two
and a half years, said an aid representative
here. "We want to be able to bring visitors
from Saigon and neighboring provinces to
show them what can be done by the gov-
ernment when you are working in a secure
area," he said.
By "the government" the aid man meant
the Vietnamese government, through which
the lion's share of the funds are channeled.
The programs are meant to be Vietnamese,
not American, and when the credit comes it
is meant to come to the government.
There was debate, and some criticism, by
the Vietnamese and American experts who
chose Angiang to launch the ambitious pro-
gram, which includes:
A land reform program to free some 75
per cent of the province's farmers from ten-
ancy and make them land owners.
A plan to increase real per capita income
30 per cent in two years.
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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD -SENATE August 19, 1966
Elementary education for all children in
two years, vocational high schools in each
of the province's four districts and an A&M
college.
An improvement In local administration to
promote "honest, inspired" government.
Maintenance and improvement of local
security conditions.
The dissenters argued that there were
many areas in Vietnam which needed aid
more than Angiang, Which is prosperous and
peaceful. The dissidents said, in effect, that
aid to Angiang is aid to the rich.
The advocates, who won the day, argued
the need for a laboratory in which optimum
conditions existed, to demonstrate what
could be accomplished in a secure area. If
this could once be shown, it was felt the ex-
ample would Inspire the leaders of other
provinces and the people of the country.
With the program barely a month old, it
would be idle to speculate on its chances for
success or failure. Surely, if the trick can-
not be done in Angiang it can be done no-
where in Vietnam.
Men in the field declare that 212 new class-
rooms (and 212 teachers to staff them) will
be available by December, and 25,000 rural
homes electrified by April. Secondary crop
planting, to replace the traditional one-year
one-crop planting, should be common at the
end of two years.
In Longxuyen, the capital of Angiang prov-
ince, there is little excitement over the com-
ing of the Great Society. One might describe
the attitude as cautious pessimism. The
main topic among businessmen is said to be
the arrival of a contingent from the U.S.
Navy, for whose benefit licenses are being
sought to open several new taverns.
Americans In the field say enthusiasm
among the district, village and hamlet lead-
ers is varied, usually according to age. Older
administrators tend to regard the programs
with suspicion, the younger ones with hope.
Among the average Vietnamese farmers,
there Is considerable resistance to changing
agricultural methods, But agricultural ad-
visers are confident that once they see a soy-
bean plant three times as large, with a dozen
times as many pods, as the old one, it will not
require lessons in logic to convince the farm-
er that the new ways are better.
Meantime, those whose responsibility it is
to carry out the program are cautiously op-
timistic, as they are supposed to be, and full
of plans for the future and reasons why this
has to succeed.
But they are not unmindful of the diffi-
culties of hustling Southeast Asia.
ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE
FRANKEL SPEAKS OF THE NEED
FOR OUR EDUCATIONAL INSTITU-
TIONS TO MAINTAIN THEIR IN-
TEGRITY AND INDEPENDENCE
Mr. YARBOROUGH. Mr. President,
on August 17 the Assistant Secretary of
State for Educational and Cultural Af-
fairs, the Honorable Charles Frankel,
testified before the Subcommittee on
Education on the International Educa-
tion Act of 1966. He eloquently dis-
cussed one of the important public issues
of the day, an issue that becomes more
immediate as the Federal Government
increases its involvement with educa-
tion-the conflict between Federal aid to
education and academic freedom.
I am a strong supporter of Federal aid
to education. Since 1958 I have been a
cosponsor or active supporter of every
major education bill to pass Congress.
This Federal support is vital. It is nec-
essary to channel a sufficient amount of
funds into education. Education is of
the greatest value to our society, and this
should be reflected through society's
willingness to spend a sufficient amount
of its income on education. The Fed-
eral Government, as the voice of the
people, is a proper vehicle for channeling
these Federal funds.
However, I am also concerned. that our
educational institutions maintain their
freedom. Our teachers and researchers
should be free to seek the truth. They
should be free to voice responsible, rea-
soned criticism of society and of the
Government. There should exist in our
institutions of higher education a climate
of academic freedom, of freedom to ex-
change ideas and to think new and even
daring thoughts. There should be re-
spect for the ideas of others, and an
emphasis upon the search for truth.
Dr. Frankel summarized very well the
issue with which the International Edu-
cation Act presents Congress:
On one side, the colleges and universities
of the country are resources for our society,
and they can be better resources if they
receive Government support. On the other
side, such support must not be permitted to
compromise the integrity and independence
of our educational institutions and should
not turn them aside from their central and
enduring purposes.
I ask unanimous consent that Mr.
Frankel's testimony be printed at ? this
point in the RECORD.
There being no objection, the testi-
mony was ordered to be printed in the
RECORD, as follows:
TESTIMONY OF THE HONORABLE CHARLES
FRANKEL, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE
FOR EDUCATIONAL AND CULTURAI, AFFAIRS,
BEFORE THE SENATE SUBCOMMITTEE ON EDU-
CATION OF THE COMMITTEE ON LABOR AND
PUBLIC WELFARE, AUGUST 17, 1966
Mr. Chairman and members of the Com-
mittee, I am honored to have the opportunity
to appear before you in behalf of the pro-
posed International Education Act of 1966.
I speak as a member of the Administration
and a representative of the Department of
State. But I speak also as one who has
spent most of his working life as a member
of a university faculty, as a teacher and
writer, and as a consultant and representa-
tive of various foundations and scholarly
organizations.
Much of this work has touched on the
fields of international studies and inter-
national relations. It is against the back-
ground of that experience that I come before
you In the belief that the proposed Act
deals with fundamental needs in a funda-
mental way.
There are a number of reasons, to my
mind, why the proposed legislation is im-
portant.
It offers a better chance to American citi-
zens to acquire the education they need to
cope with the facts of international life.
It strengthens the American capacity to
develop, to conduct, and to man informed
and far-sigthed policies in international af-
fairs.
It takes steps that are essential if our Na-
tion Is to join with other nations in a more
intensive effort to educate the people of the
world in habits of mutual understanding
and forbearance.
Finally, it is important because it make
a frontal attack on a fundamental issue in
the relation between government and the
universities, and attempts to deal with this
issue from a long-term rather than a short-
term point of view.
With your permission, I should like to
address myself, first, to the contribution of
this proposed program to the education of
Americans.
Today, the international environment of
the United States does ' not begin at the
oceans' edge, but penetrates almost every
corner of our society. It is revealed in the
news we hear, the coffee we drink, the
movies we see, the political decisions we de-
bate. And precisely because we hear so much
from and about other countries, we need to
have a background of information, a sense
of history and a sense of the day-to-day
context of events, if we are to interpret what
we hear correctly.
Today, an education without an interna-
tional dimension is an inadequate educa-
tion for Americans. We have long since left
the day when foreign policy is a matter for
experts alone. It affects too many people.
It involves too many matters to which not
only expert opinion but the common opinion
of mankind is relevant. It is conducted in
the arena of public debate and under condi-
tions in which the electorate, quite properly,
is the ultimate sovereign and arbiter. Edu-
cation in international realities is thus a
requirement of educational policy, private
or public, local or national.
The legislation you are considering reflects
this view. And it recognizes, I believe, that
education that deserves the name cacnnot
be an effort at selling a single point of view,
official or otherwise.
In strengthening the education of Amer-
icans at home, the American capacity for
foreign affairs will also be advanced. This is
not merely a matter of training specialized
manpower. We need more people with spe-
cial skills, but in addition to their compe-
tence as doctors, teachers, agronomists or
economists, such people must also have a
special eye and a special ear for the differ-
ences in outlook and feeling that mark the
people with whom they must work. And in
addition to specialists who combine techni-
cal skills and international sophistication, we
also need a citizenry that has received, as
part of its general education, an exposure to
the complex facts of the international scene.
In the long run, as the President has ob-
served, a nation's foreign policy can progress
no faster than the curricula of its classrooms.
American schools and colleges have done
much in recent years to improve the study
and teaching of International affairs. But
much more still needs to be done. The In-
ternational Education Act is an effort to meet
this need.
There is a further reason for believing
that the legislation you are considering is of
importance to the United States in its for-
eign relations. This reason is that education
has moved front and center in this nation's
affairs and in every nation's. In the develop-
ing nations, little can be accomplished with-
out the advancement of education. In the
more prosperous industrial nations, educa-
tion is the keystone on which depends these
nations' power to keep up with the accelerat-
ing pace of change. In our own country, as
we have discovered, we must turn to educa-
tion again and again as an indispensable
element in the solution of pressing social
problems.
In short, the role of educational systems in
twentieth century societies is Immense.
Working together, rather than against each
other, these educational systems have as
much power as any human agency to build
an international structure of peace in divers-
ity. The legislation that is before you pro-
poses that we in this country prepare! our-
selves to do our part in such an effort at
international educational cooperation. And
it proposes that we begin - here at home by
educating ourselves better about the needs
and aspirations of others.
The steps it contemplates are, I believe,
measured and modest. They do not assume
that it is America's duty to educate the
world. They do not commit the American
taxpayer to underwriting the goal of univer-
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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - APPENDIX August 19, 1966
EXTENSION OF REMARKS
OF
HON. DONALD RUMSFELD
OF ILLINOIS
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Wednesday, August 17, 1966
Mr. RUMSFELD. Mr. Speaker, black
market operations in Saigon continue to
disrupt the economy of South Vietnam.
The Chicago Daily News of August 12,
1966, carries a report by Raymond R.
Coffey of the Daily News Foreign Service,
which points up the difficulties. Mr.
Coffey's article follows:
CRACKDOWN FLOPS-SAIGON BLACK MARKET
BOOMS
(By Raymond R. Coffey)
SAIGON.-Despite a tough U.S. crackdown,
Saigon's black market still is big business.
And despite Premier Nguyen Cao Ky's sug-
gestions to the contrary, a big part of the
problem appears to be that Vietnamese offi-
cials are largely ignoring the illegal traffic.
Things have reached the point where black
market shelves are now better stocked than
the American post exchanges from which the
merchandise comes.
The PXs are sometimes out of such items
as chewing ' gum and cigaret lighter fluid.
They can, however, always be purchased on
almost any corner in downtown Saigon.
Radios and watches are two other items
PXs can't seem to get enough of. But there
is alway a big selection in the black market
sidewalk stalls.
A quart of good gin costs $1 or $1.10 in the
PXs. In the black market it costs $2.80,
which is less than Americans at home pay.
A pack of cigarets (11 cents in the PX)
costs 40 or 45 plasters (around 25 cents)-
again less than in most U.S. vending ma-
chines.
The black market merchants are even sell-
ing the C-rations U.S. combat troops eat in
the field-an item most Americans would
doubt that you could give away.
There is nothing clandestine about the
black market. There are several blocks of
downtown Saigon where the sidewalks are
filled with illegal merchandise openly dis-
played.
The subject of the black market came up
again when Ky was asked by Vietnamese
reporters what his government was doing
about this illegal traffic, which has a dis-
ruptive effect on the economy.
The premier responded that he had asked
U.S. authorities to tighten their controls
over PX goods that find their way into the
black market.
Actually, the Americans have taken strong
steps-so far as their jurisdiction extends-
to curtail the black market. They can't
arrest Vietnamese, however. And Viet-
namese police appear to close their eyes.
They seldom arrest anyone or confiscate
goods.
V.S. military authorities, on the other
hand, are trying at least to curtail the flow
of PX items into the black market. In July
alone, 37 GIs were arrested for black market
difficult to forge-were issued to all Ameri-
cans and allied personnel who have PX priv-
ileges.
Ration allowances have been reduced-
from six bottles of liquor per month to three,
for example-and more items have been
added to the rationed or "controlled" list.
The V.S. military criminal investigation
unit now receives a copy of the sales slip for
every PX item costing more than $10.
Still there is, admittedly, room for illegal
dealing. A GI, for example, is allowed to
buy three radios, two watches, one TV set,
one typewriter, one electric fan, one movie
projector, one record player.
It is forbidden for GIs to give gifts, from
the PX, of items costing $10 or more. But
many of the most popular items in the black
market-soap, detergents, blankets, towels-
cost less than $10 and control is therefore
difficult.
According to U.S. authorities, most PX
merchandise coming into the black market
comes from two sources-pilferage on the
docks and in warehouses and from GIs paid
to make purchases for black marketeers,
particularly AWOL GIs trying to finance
their absence from duty.
EXTENSION OF REMARKS
OF
HON. A. S. MIKE MONRONEY
OF OKLAHOMA
IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES
Friday, August 19, 1966
Mr. MONRONEY. Mr. President, the
Senate Committee on Agriculture and
Forestry has just completed a week of
hearings on S. 3720, introduced by Sen-
ator JOHN SHERMAN COOPER, of Kentucky,
to provide supplemental financing for
the rural electric and rural telephone
systems. I am a cosponsor of that meas-
ure, which I consider the most important
proposal in many years designed to as-
sure the future of the REA cooperatives
and their continued ability to bring
modern electric service to millions of
rural families.
Senator CooPER, who is a member of
the Subcommittee on Rural Electrifica-
tion and Farm Credit, in charge of this
legislation, appeared as the first witness
before the subcommittee as it opened
its hearings on Monday.
The next day the committee heard
Secretary of Agriculture Freeman and
REA Administrator Clapp, who expressed
their support and endorsed the provisions
of the Cooper bill. They recommended,
however, that the intermediate loan rate
be changed from 3 to 4 percent.
Because Senator COOPER's statement
reviews the progress of REA, and gives
the reasons for the development of this
important proposal, I ask unanimous
consent that his testimony be printed
in the Appendix of the RECORD.
There being no objection, the state-
ment was ordered to be printed in the
RECORD as follows:
STATEMENT OF SENATOR JOHN SHERMAN
COOPER, BEFORE THE SENATE SUBCOMMITTEE
ON RURAL ELECTRIFICATION AND FARM CRED-
IT ON S. 3337 AND S. 3720, REA SUPPLE-
MENTAL .,~!~ FINANCING PLAN, AUGUST 15, 1966
Mr. Chairman and members of the Sub-
committee on Rural Electrification and Farm
Credit, I appreciate very much the oppor-
tunity to appear before the Subcommittee
this morning to present my views in support
of the proposal to provide a method of sup-
plemental financing for the rural electric co-
operatives, as this Subcommittee begins its
consideration of S. 3337 and S. 3720.
Earlier this year, on May 10, Senator BASS
and I introduced S.,3337, to provide supple-
mental financing for the rural electric and
rural telephone systems, in which we were-
joined by 28 other Members of the Sen-
ate.
Since that time, as I stated in the Sens-
ate Friday, the House Committee on Agri-
culture has held hearings on similar bills
designed to accomplish the same purpose,
and during the course of its meetings, the
House Subcommittee on Conservation and
Credit, of which Congressman POAGE is chair-
man, developed a modified bill. The modi-
fication incorporates provisions submitted
or approved by the Rural Electrification Ad-
ministration, which are also acceptable to
the National Rural Electric Cooperative As-
sociation. I believe it would be correct to
say that the modified bill almost wholly
resolves the differences between the earlier
Administration and Poage or Bass-Cooper
bills.
Because it seemed to me that testimony
could be more constructively directed to the
modified bill, which evidently represents a
broad area of agreement at least among the
supoprters of the REA program, I thought
it would be helpful to have the supplemental
REA financing proposal before the Subcom-
mittee in this form. When officials of the
NRECA came to my office and asked that I
consider introducing such a bill in the Sen-
ate, I discussed this suggestion with Senator
TALMADGE, Chairman of this Subcommittee,
and Congressman PoAGE, who agreed that
it could serve to make more productive the
Senate hearings and avoid plowing old
ground.
Therefore, on Friday, I introduced S. 3720
for myself and on behalf of Senator BASS,
who was not able to be in the Senate at
that time. Our bill is the same as the
modified House Committee bill, except that
it maintains the interest rate for intermediate
loans at 3 percent, as provided in S. 3337.
I thought it important to have the bill
printed and formally before this Subcom-
mittee today as hearings begin, and was not
able to be in touch with every Senator who
may be interested in this proposal. How-
ever, Senator BASS and I are glad that 23
other Members of the Senate, all of whom are
among the sponsors of the original bill, S.
3337, are also sponsors of the modified bill,
8.3720.
I
Before discussing the need for Congress to
act by providing a means to supplement the
existing financing of rural electric and rural
telephone systems through annual Federal
appropriations of 2 percent REA loan funds,
I should like to review briefly my own interest
in this subject.
I have supported the REA program since
I first came to the Senate in 1946. Not all
remember those earlier days now, but I recall
standing at night on a hill outside Somerset,
Kentucky, looking down upon the lights of
the town, and noticing that the countryside
was dark-for the farmers and those outside
of town could not get light and power. Since
1935, when the REA was established, it has
become a vital part of the great change that
has come over agriculture and rural life, as
the entire nation has grown and developed.
That growth and development will continue,
as our country continues to change and move
forward.
It has been my pleasure to work with the
officers and directors and members of local
rural electric cooperatives in Kentucky, of
the statewide Kentucky RECC and, from time
to time, with officials of the Rural Electrifica-
tion Administration and the United States
Department of Agriculture. Of course, the
Congress and the Senate annually provide
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August 19, 1966 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - APPENDIX
did, but he had the courage of his convic-
tions. And, proven wrong, he quickly stepped
aside.
As a taxpayer, he was interested in the ex-
penditure of tax dollars-yours and mine.
He fought for the right of the public to know
what was going on within its government
and, denied that right, he spoke out loudly.
More often than not his scathing words gave
rise to public indignation which produced
that which h@ and others wanted.
Steed Stackhouse also was a most humane
man always willing to help the less fortunate
though, more often than not, it was in such
a way that his deeds went unheralded.
He was a man admired and respected by
people of all races. Even his sharpest critics
conceded that he had a will and determina-
tion of iron.
There was no giant too big for him to
tackle and no undertaking too small, if either
involved the welfare of his community and
state. Certainly, the South Carolina penal
system is the better off for the fight for re-
form in which he was embroiled.
He also planted the seeds which, even in a
losing battle, must bear fruit in the issuance
of school bonds for Dillon County. The at-
tention he helped to focus on the matter will
cause administrators to think long and hard
before expending any of those funds.
Dillon and all of South Carolina have lost
an esteemed citizen in M. S. (Steed) Stack-
house, a man of courage and conviction who
never knew the meaning of the word "quit,"
even when personal and crushing tragedy
stalked his life,
We hope that, now, united with his beloved
Mary, he will enjoy peace and tranquility and
an end to the years which must have been
frustrating as he waved the cudgel of right in
the face of apathetic odds. He will be missed
by all of us.
Highway Safety Act of 1966
SPEECH
HON. HAROLD T. JOHNSON
OF CALIFORNIA
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Thursday, August 18, 1966
The House in Committee of the Whole
House on the State of the Union had under
consideration the bill (H.R. 13290) to amend
title 23 of the United States Code to provide
the highway safety research and develop-
ment, certain highway safety programs, a
national driver register, and a highway acci-
dent research and test facility.
Mr. JOHNSON of California. Mr.
Chairman, the question of highway safety
is one that has concerned many of us
in the Nation and especially in my own
great State of California for many years.
California not only is the most populous
State in the Nation but also has one of
the most extensive road and highway
systems of any State in the country.
Tragically this will mean that California
will probably be among the, leaders in
the Nation in the number of tragic deaths
which this country will experience this
year and next. It has been estimated
that 50,000 people alive today, enjoying
their families and following their normal
occupations, will be dead 12 months from
today, all due to tragic accidents. Twen-
ty-four months from today, 100,000 or
more will be gone. In these periods
hundreds of thousands will be injured,
and millions upon millions of dollars'
worth of damage will have been suffered.
I am proud that as a member of the
Public Works Committee I have been. as-
sociated with the continuing effort over
the past few years to do something about
this senseless, wasteful slaughter on the
highways. Chairman JOHN C. KLUCSZYN-
sxl, of the Roads Subcommittee of the
Committee on Public Works, and Chair-
man GEORGE FALLON, of the full com-
mittee, have been leaders in this effort
and their efforts should be commended.
They have fought through the full 2
years of this Congress to establish a re-
sponsible and farsighted program such as
is provided in H.R. 13290, the Highway
Safety Act of 1966.
It saddens me that one of the most
ardent advocates of a wise highway
safety program, the late Representative
John Baldwin, is not with us today to
witness the progress which we have made
In this legislation. John was responsible
for the first step which was taken last
year along these lines. This was a ten-
tative step along the way demanding a
comprehensive transportation planning
program for highway safety to be car-
ried out by State and local government.
Some progress has ben made along these
lines.
I am pleased to say that the State of
California has taken a leading role in
the research efforts, for instance, de-
signed to discover and eliminate the
causes of highway accidents. I call to
your attention specifically as an ex-
ample of the work that is being done in
our Gplden State the citation in the
House report which accompanies this
bill. You will note, on page 16, the ac-
count of the investigation of a skidding
accident on a new highway, Interstate
80, which appearently was the result of
hydroplaning on wet surfaces which
made it impossible to control moving
vehicles. A few shallow grooves in the
surface were all that were needed to
improve driving and eliminate accidents.
If we can discover the causes of accidents
on a single curve in Interstate 80 in the
Sierra Nevada Mountains, then we can
discover the causes of accidents in other
areas of our Nation and eliminate them.
It is essential that the legislation which
the Public Works Committee has recom-
mended and its various aspects includ-
ing assistance to States in developing
and improving highway safety, improv-
ing driver performance, improving pe-
destrian performance, accident report-
ing and reocrds, vehicle inspection and
registration, highway design and main-
tenance, research in traffic control,
emergency services laws, and all the
other programs, move ahead if we are
to reduce the carnage on our highways.
We have made a good beginning, but
let us take the next step. This we are
doing today with the passage by the
House of Representatives of the Highway
Safety Act of 1966.
Chairman FALLON, Chairman KLV-
CzYNSKI, and all the members of the
committee, and especially those on the
A4405
Subcommittee on Roads, must be com-
mended for the progress they have made.
I hope and pray that the action we are
taking here today will reduce greatly
the tragic toll which highway accidents
now are claiming in this Nation.
I am confident that this legislation will
achieve that purpose.
Congress and the Judge
EXTENSION OF REMARKS
OF
HON. HARRY F. BYRD, JR.
OF VIRGINIA
IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES
Friday, August 19, 1966
Mr. BYRD of Virginia. Mr. President,
I ask unanimous consent to have printed
in the Appendix of the RECORD an edi-
torial from the Roanoke, Va., Times of
August 17, 1966, entitled "Congress and
the Judge."
There being no objection, the editorial
was ordered to be printed in the RECORD,
as follows:
CONGRESS AND THE JUDGE
The American Civil Liberties Union oblig-
ingly took up the cause of the Viet Nam war
protesters who raised a hue and cry against
being subpeonaed to testify before the House
Un-American Activities Committee. Their
group includes old hands at the business of
discrediting the country's policy in Viet Nam,
men with experience in the Berkeley, Calif.,
demonstrations.
At the behest of the ACLU, a district judge
in Washington did an unprecedented thing.
He issued a temporary injunction forbidding:
the committee to hold its scheduled hearings..
Those hearings relate to a bill making it a.
criminal offense to interfere with troop move-
ments, disseminate propaganda hurtful to
military morale, or aid a hostile power.
With the committee prepared to defy the
court order as an unwarranted and uncon-
stitutional interference with the prerogatives
of one branch of coordinate government by
another, judges of the Circuit Court of Ap-
peals quickly vacated the lower court's order.
Thus avoided was the prospect of members
of Congress going to jail for contempt.
The protesters raised the complaint of "in-
quisitorial" procedure frequently directed at
the House committee. The call to testify,
they charged, was an effort to suppress free
speech and intimidate others with dissenting
views about the American role in the war.
Nevertheless, the committee, as an agency
of Congress, is well within its prerogative.
Its decision to put the witnesses on the stand
is relevant to a specific and legitimate legis-
lative purpose. If anybody's rights are in
jeopardy or if the inquiry is suspected of be-
ing a wltchhunt, it cannot justify prior re-
straint by a grant of judicial relief.
But the implications of the court order
raise a much bigger issue. If a federal judge
can tell a committee created by Congress
what it may do, it follows that it could also
order Congress itself how to conduct its busi-
ness-when to legislate and not to legislate.
There would be no independent and equal
legislative establishment as provided by the
Constitution. We would have instead legisla-
tion by judicial fiat. The surprising thing is
that a member of the federal bench has
given such an extraordinary interpretation of
our principle of government.
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