CONGRESSIONAL RECORD --- HOUSE, CHINA AND VIETNAM

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP67B00446R000400080017-2
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 28
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 29, 2005
• Sequence Number: 17
• Publication Date: June 6, 1966
• Content Type: OPEN

11718
CONGRESSIONAL RECORD- HOUSE June 6, 1966
portion of the savings is being channeled di-
rectly from the saver to the borrower through
the capital markets rather than through fi-
nancial intermediaries.
Since the mid-1950's, commercial banks
have been filling an increasing proportion of
the nation's credit requirements, after hav-
ing lagged behind other savings institutions
in the immediate postwar period. However,
so far this year, commercial banks have met
only about one-fourth of the nation's financ-
ing needs compared to 40 percent in 1965.
Indeed, the major savings institutions have
had to compete for a less rapidly growing sav-
ings pie. Adapting to a slower rate of sav-
ings inflow is not an easy task, particularly
if operations have been geared to a large
continuing inflow.
The adjustment process, however, has been
eased by a concomitant slowdown in demand
in certain sectors of the economy and by the
restraining effects of a tighter monetary pol-
icy. This is an opportunity to strengthen
portfolios, to reassess short- and long-run
factors, and to match activity more closely
to supply and demand factors currently op-
erative in the market. For financial insti-
tutions such as savings banks and savings
and loan associations the adjustment proc-
ess is slow because of the long-term nature
of their investments. Liquidity needs and
commitment policies may have to be reevalu-
ated in light of the future prospects for
housing and construction and for savings.
This reevaluation process is equally bene-
ficial for our commercial lending institutions.
The role of the large negotiable time certifi-
cate of deposit-and, more recently, the re-
lated small-denomination savings instru-
ments-might be usefully reexamined by
every bank to determine whether undue de-
pendence is being placed on these instru-
ments for deposit growth and whether li-
quidity requirements might need to be
strengthened for these deposits. The com-
petition for these interest-sensitive funds,
moreover, has become so intense that it
might be questioned whether there is any
net gain to the bank in deposit volume or
only higher interest costs. The banking sys-
tem as a whole may be only stimulating more
frequent shifting of funds or an upward
ratcheting of the rate structure rather than
attracting additional savings.
Higher interest costs in turn have placed
pressure on bank profit margins. Over the
longer run, profitability is a major determi-
nant of the types of activities in which a
bank engages. Attention may be focused
on growth in the very short-run but only at
a bank's peril can it ignore profit considera-
tions over the long run.
Similar considerations are relevant in a
bank's lending operations. The present
strong upward pressures on the nation's re-
sources call for restraint on the part of both
lenders and borrowers.
The financial sector now has reached an
especially significant' milepost-from this
point forward a high degree of statesman-
ship, responsibility, imagination and re-
straint is required. We have reached the
point where adjustments must be made to
circumstances that have evolved gradually-
over the whole postwar period in some cases
and during the present economic expansion
in others. Operations cannot be blindly pre-
dicated on continuation of the previous high
rates of growth in savings inflow or in the
demands for credit.
All of our'major financial institutions have
responded well to the challenge of directing
the nation's savings into productive use and
of meeting the nation's credit needs. But as
savings flows decline or as particular credit
needs are satisfied, it is equally the responsi-
bility of our banks and savings institutions
to adjust to the changed situation. Adjust-
ment to a slower growth rate or to shifting
demands in the economy is a much more
difficult assignment, than adjustment to
rapid expansion, but it is an assignment
whose successful completion is essential to
the fundamental health of our financial
system.
The past six months have emphasized
another facet of our financial mechanism-
the essential interrelationship of all our
financial markets. The increase in the Fed-
eral Reserve discount rate and in the interest
rate 'ceilings last December was designed to
impose a measure of monetary restraint on
the burgeoning economy and at the same
time give banks somewhat greater flexibility
in attracting deposits to accommodate strong
loan demands. By raising the ceiling to 51/2
percent, however, a 11/12 percent differential
was opened up between the rate paid on pass-
book savings accounts and the rate on other
time deposits. Although rates were not ex-
pected to move to the ceiling, they in fact
rose rapidly as banks competed for funds.
The size of the differential provided a very
strong inducement for banks to develop new
instruments to attract funds.
Banks have responded since December to
the higher permissible rate structure with
innovations in the types of deposit facilities
offered to the saver, such as savings or invest-
ment certificates and savings bonds. Both
the Federal Reserve and the FDIC are cur-
rently conducting surveys of banks under
their supervision to find out more about
these new savings instruments and how
savers have reacted to them. From these
surveys we hope to obtain a better insight
into bank responses to changes in interest
rate ceilings.
A second result of the December increase
was an acceleration in the movement of
funds between different types of deposits, be-
tween banks, and also between different types
of financial institutions. The success of
banks in attracting a larger proportion of
new savings has had a dampening effect on
other savings institutions. To a yet unde-
termined extent, moreover, banks may have
drawn interest-sensitive funds out of these
financial hn*mediaries-although other
competitive investment outlets doubtless
contributed to the slower growth in savings
at these nonbank financial institutions.
Within the. banking system, in addition,
larger banks found themselves competing
against smaller banks.
These interactions resulting from action
in one sector illustrate the close interrela-
tionship of financial institutions in today's
markets and demonstrate the difficulties of
foretelling with accuracy financial responses
in a financial market as complex as ours.
The practically impossible task of separat-
ing and isolating one sector of the financial
markets from another suggests strongly that,
to the extent that regulation and super-
vision are needed, they should be applicable
to all sectors of the market.
The ability of banks to compete success-
fully today against specialized thrift insti-
tutions is attributable largely to the fact
that banks are multi-purpose institutions.
Through their broader investment opportu-
nities and their ability to provide a wise
variety of financial services, banks are in a
relatively strong position to attract cus-
tomers. The advantage that banks hold over
other financial intermediaries thus cannot
be eliminated simply by rate equality. This
conclusion leads in turn to the very inter-
esting question of the future of special-
purpose institutions.
The development of the future could very
well be the evolution of single-purpose insti-
tutions toward a multi-purpose operation as
financial markets become increasingly inte-
grated. The constantly growing and diversi-
fied credit needs of our economy may push
u& steadily toward this concept of "one-
stop" banking. From a financial system with
savings institutions at one end of the spec-
trum and commercial banks at the other,
we may see a "merging toward the center"
as our financial institutions adjust to chang-
ing circumstances. In the process we may
also achieve a more efficient allocation of our
financial resources without the sacrifice of
private initiative and enterprise.
As recent experience amply demonstrates,
our financial structure is constantly chang-
ing and adapting. New patterns in the flow
of savings have emerged and new techniques
are in use. Problems have arisen as a con-
sequence of these recent developments. It is
the responsibility, however, of the super-
visory authorities to facilitate the necessary
adjustments during transition periods with
as little friction and disturbance to the mar-
ket as possible. Whatever actions are
taken-whether affecting rates, instruments,
or even institutions-should be taken with
caution because of possible unforeseen and
unfortunate repercussions. The geographi-
cal diversity of our nation heightens this
possibility. Serious imbalances or .prolonga-
tion of the adjustment period also could
result from an incorrect course of action.
The impact of any particular action, more-
over, could vary with the circumstances in
which it is undertaken. Consequently, the
supervisory authorities must be accorded
maximum flexibility in this area to tailor
their actions to the particular situation.
Packaged prescriptions might well be unsuit-
able-and also highly inflexible.
The lack of a neatly packaged solution
should not be equated with inability to find
a solution. In many cases, an approach more
easily adapted to particular circumstances
or selective in its impact may be preferable.
Although our financial institutions are
generally strong, there are always a few
trouble spots. It is for this reason that the
Corporation is currently strongly supporting
the proposed legislation for cease-and-desist
authority against unsafe and unsound prac-
tices of banks and savings and loan associa-
tions and for authority to remove directors
or officers of institutions whose actions may
weaken the portion of the institution, its.
depositors, or shareholders. The bill now
pending in Congress would reinforce and
widen the range of existing remedies for
correcting unlawful, unsound, or irregular
practices that are unfortunately still found
from time to time. It permits the super-
visory authorities to take action quickly and
effectively short of more drastic action such
as a takeover or termination of deposit in-
surance, which are the alternatives now
available to us. The bill also provides pro-
tection of the rights of any institution, its
officers, directors, and others involved.
In closing, I would like to summarize
briefly what we are learning from the dia-
logue in the finincial community today.
First, adaptability and flexibility of all our
financial institutions to changing circum-
stances-whether on the supply aide or on
the demand side-are essential for the con-
tinued strength of our financial system. Sec-
ondly, any action affecting one sector of our
financial markets has an impact on all other
sectors; our financial markets cannot be
compartmentalized. Thirdly, the complex
ties between all sectors of the financial mar-
kets argue for across-the-board regulation, if
regulation is needed. Fourthly, the advan-
tage that a multi-purpose financial insti-
tution has over a single-purpose institution
tends to lead us to the conclusion that a
greater diversification of powers within an
institution may be the development of the
future. Finally, the supervisory authorities
must remain alert to these developments and
be prepared to aid the adjustment process.
It is an Important responsibility that we do
n9t take lightly.
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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - HOUSE
densely populated sector of Indochina
while Laos is the largest least populated
country in the area and has the least
capacity to defend itself." Laos is deeply
divided, ethnically and politically. Com-
munist forces now control about one-
half of Laos.
Cambodia is also sparsely populated
and is in a vulnerable strategic position.
To use her main waterway to the sea, it
is necessary to pass through South Viet-
nam on the Mekong River. The Mekong
Delta is open to attack from routes which
can be commanded from Noth Vietnam
and Laos. Thus, it Is' essential to the
security of Cambodia that South Viet-
nam and Laos are in friendly hands.
If Indochina fell to the Communists,
it is quite possible that Thailand would
divorce herself from Western defense
arrangements and try to reach an accom-
modation with China. Historically,
Thailand has adopted this flexible posi-
tion of being willing to cooperate with
the region's dominant power, whether
that should be Great Britain, France,
Japan, the United States, or China. This
stance would be forced upon Thailand
because of her strategic vulnerability.
The bulk of the Lao people live in Thai-
land, which has much reason to fear a
Vietnamese-Lao combination. The in-
stability of northeast Thailand is fur-
ther increased by the presence of 50,000
to 80,000 pro-Communist refugees from
Vietnam who have settled there since
World War II. It is clear that China
has designs on Thailand, for the Chinese
have designated Thailand as the next
area ripe for a war of national libera-
tion, and have even established a free
Tfiai movement from the Thai ethnic
groups living in southern China.
Burma, already beset by rebellious fac-
tions, would be another prime target.
Rebel groups continue to operate in
northern Malaya. Singapore has often
been described as a hotbed of Commu-
nist activity. Indonesia is beset by in-
ternal difficulties and has great prob-
lems in maintaining the allegiapee of
her outer islands. There is a strong in-
surrectionist movement on one of the
Philippines' main islands of Mindanao.
Thus, the removal of U.S. power could
bring on a wider war as China and North
Vietnam attempted to dominate the re-
gion. A threat to Burma would involve
the vital interests of India, for World
War II demonstrated that the country
in control of Burma can easily launch
attacks on India. World War II also
showed that the security of Australia
and New Zealand depends upon a stable
situation in southeast Asia. Britain is
pledged to defend Malaysia and could
become drawn into a wider struggle.
In addition, American disengagement
would cause friends and enemies alike
to question seriously the credibility of
any U.S. military deterrent.
CHINA'S INTENTIONS
These, then, are the stakes involved
in defending South Vietnam-trade
routes, economic resources, the dangers
of a Vietnam united under the Commu-
nists, the weakensses of the surrounding
states, the need for a credible deterrent
against China, and the dangers of a wider
war. But there are still those who argue
that China has only peaceful intentions
in the region and would not try to im-
pose economic or political control. But
this does not explain why China supplies
the so-called wars of national liberation,
or why she has formed the free Thai in-
surrectionary movement.
It is very difficult to assess the inten-
tions of a rising power because each gain
brings new objectives within reach.
Thus, although China may have peaceful
intentions now, an American withdrawal
could change those intentions. Cer-
tainly, the experiences of Germany
should 'bring second thoughts to the
minds of those who disclaim the aggres-
sive intentions of a rising power, with
the belief that she is entitled to be the
regional leader, in the midst of a number
of weaker states.
Of course, the only certain way to
determine China's intentions would be
to withdraw, but this course is fraught
with too many dangers. It would be too
easy for China to invade the area and
present the world with a fait accompli in
a short period of time. And World War
II demonstrated that it is extremely dif-
ficult to dislodge an, Invading force from
the area once it has become entrenched,
even with superiority in firepower and
control of air and water.
Through economic development and
peaceful change, the United States hopes
to see eventually a number of progres-
sive, independent, and viable states in
southeast Asia, able to stand on their
own feet. 'Is this possible? It is, ac-
cording to the examples in Greece, Ma-
laya, the Philippines, and South Korea,
where Communist revolutionary move-
ments, supported from outside, were
finally defeated. Today, the United
States and her allies are thankful that
decisions were made to stand firm in
these former areas, even though the out-
look was often bleak. These examples
lend added support to the view that
the defense of South Vietnam is worth
the effort. The United States should not
reconcile herself to being condemned by
history as the country which allowed the
200 million people and vast natural re-
sources of' southeast Asia to be con-
trolled by powers which have pledged
themselves to our destruction.
International politics usually con-
front a state with opportunities not to
do the greatest good, but to do the least
evil. It is better to limit the war to Viet-
nam now than to court the incalculable
dangers that would stem from a wider
war.
ADDRESS BY HON. K. A. RANDALL
(Mr. ASHLEY (at the request of Mr.
CALLAN) was granted permission to ex-
tend his remarks at this point in the
RECORD and to include extraneous mat-
ter.)
Mr. ASHLEY. Mr. Speaker, all of us
are aware of the restrictions of credit
which have generated recent intensifica-
tion of competition among financial in-
stitutions for savings. Because this is a
topic of very real importance and
priority consideration, I am pleased to
insert in the RECORD the following re-
marks of Mr. K. A. Randall, Chairman,
rederal Deposit Insurance corporation,
11717
at the annual convention of the Ameri-
can Institute of Banking at San Diego,
Calif., on June 3,1966:
REMARKS BY X. A. RANDALL, CHAIRMAN, FED-
ERAL DEPOSIT INSURANCE CORPORATION, BE-
FORE THE ANNUAL CONVENTION OF THE
AMERICAN INSTITUTE OF BANKING AT SAN
DIEGO, CALIF., ON JUNE 3, 1966
Last month, the House Banking and Cur-
rency Committee opened hearings on two
bills designed to impose restrictions on com-
mercial bank time deposits-one prohibits
the issuance of certificates of deposit and
other bank obligations and the other bars
banks from accepting time deposits in
amounts less than $15,000. In the course of
the hearings, additional proposals were ad-
vanced to place a uniform interest rate on
all types of time and savings deposits and
borrowings of banks and to permit higher
rate ceilings on large deposits.
These proposals have been generated by
the recent intensification of competition
among financial institutions for savings,
coupled with continued high levels of eco-
nomic activity. It is not my intention today,
however, to comment directly on these
specific proposals. I want to concentrate
instead of some of the major issues and
problems that have been illuminated by the
proposed legislation and the current situa-
tion in the financial markets. These are the
issues and problems that will be with us
in the years to come-in one form or an-
other. An understanding of their nature
and their implications is therefore essential.
I am particularly pleased to be able to
speak to an audience such as this today be-
cause you are the ones who, in the future,
will have to face and solve problems similar
to those posed by the current vigorous com-
petition for savings. Most of the managerial
talent for the banking industry will be
drawn from your ranks. Your ability and
resourcefulness in coping with the problems
of the future will be a crucial factor in pre-
serving the strength and viability of our
financial institutions.
The current economic situation is charac-
terized by high and still rising levels of
economic activity, close to full employment
of our plant and manpower resources, and
strong upward pressures on interest rates
and on the demand for credit. Our inter-
national commitments at the same time in-
ject an element of uncertainty into the eco-
nomic outlook. The financial markets re-
flect the interaction of all these forces, which
may be intensified this month by record
corporate tax payments due at mid-month
and by expectations of the savings and loan
industry that withdrawals from share ac-
counts after the dividend payment period
at the end of the month may exceed the
inflow of new savings.
Although pressures in the financial mark-
ets may be severe this month, generally
speaking the major segments of the financial
community-the commercial banks, the sav-
ings banks, and the savings and loan asaocia-
tions-are strong and well able to withstand
these short-run pressures. Furthermore, you
may be confident that the various super-
visory authorities are also prepared to pro-
vide whatever assistance that may be neces-
sary with every means at their disposal.
The present conjuncture of circumstances,
nevertheless, provides several good illus-
trations of problems we may expect in the
future. One of the major factors in the cur-
rent situation is the strong competition
among financial institutions for funds to
meet the demand for business financing, for
consumer credit, and for mortgage financing.
This competition is taking place against a
relative shrinkage in the volume of new sav-
ings. In the first quarter of this year, for
example, saving as a percent of disposable
personal income totaled only 5.0 percent
compared to 5.6 percent in the last quarter
of 1965. At the same time, a larger pro-
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 Mr. DADDARIO. Mr. Speaker, will Mr. Speaker, I do believe that this was
the gentleman yield? a tremendous accomplishment and it
Mr. PIRNIE. I will be very happy to came about through the members of the
yield. delegation working closely together and
Mr. DADDARIO. Mr. Speaker, as I because the gentleman from New York
have sat here listening to the gentleman [Mr. PIRNIE] showed a high degre-, of
from New York [Mr. PIRNIE] and two of leadership under most difficult circum-
my colleagues, the gentleman from Ills- stances.
nots [Mr. DERWINSKII and the gentleman Mr. PIRNIE. Mr. Speaker, I thank
from Indiana [Mr. ADAIR] and I am sure my colleague and wish to call the atten-
the gentleman from Illinois [Mr. Mc- tion of the Members of the House to the
CLORY] will participate in this discussion, fact that the gentleman from Connecti-
a point has been made that cannot be too cut [Mr. DADDARIO] worked very effec-
often said that the gentleman from New tively as a member of the delegation, and
York in the well [Mr. PIRNIE] has now as an outstanding member of this partic-
on two occasions stepped into the breach ular committee. It was his tact, his re-
which has come about because the chair- sourcefulness and his very evident sin-
man of the delegation, in this instance, cerity that helped to supply the persua-
the Senator from Georgia [Mr. TAL- sion necessary to resolve the, differences
MADGE] was unable to participate. This which he has described.
is a great test of leadership to have such Further, Mr. Speaker, we can be very,
an important responsibility thrust upon very proud that the gentleman from
one without prior notification. Connecticut [Mr. DADDARIO] has been se-
Mr. Speaker, I would like to say that lected as the member of this delegation
it was very heartening to see the gentle- whom we hope to advance to the Execu-
man from New York handle this emer- tive Committee of the Interparliamen-
gency, to quickly take up the reins, and tary Union at the next session.
to effectively participate in conferences Mr. JONES of Missouri. Mr. Speak-
With those who establish the agenda and er, will the gentleman yield?
those who are attempting in some way to Mr. PIRNIE. Mr. Speaker, I am
cut through complications which so happy to yield to a distinguished mem-
quickly develop, especially during times ber of our delegation, the gentleman
of crisis such as is represented by the' from Missouri [Mr. JONES].
problem of Vietnam which as the gentle- Mr. JONES of Missouri. Mr. Speak-
man from Indiana [Mr. ADAIR] said, er, I do not believe I can add anything
pushes itself into every discussion even to the expressions which have been made
when the agenda did not warrant the in- by my colleague, the gentleman from
elusion and discussion of this particular Connecticut [Mr. DADDARIO], in compli-
issue. So, Mr. Speaker, we all must real- menting the gentleman from New York
ize that the gentleman from New York [Mr. PIRNIE] for the diplomatic way in
[Mr. PIRNIE] did an outstanding job and which he presided and for the influ-
that he should be commended for it most ence which he was able to wield over the
highly. Conference that was held.
Mr. Speaker, one of the developments I think all of us, as has been indicated
of this meeting which I believe to be of by the gentleman from Connecticut [Mr.
outstanding importance was that when DADDARIO], were pleasently surprised by
we arrived there was a heated feeling, I the satisfactory manner in which all
believe, against the U.S. delegation be- of the questions were resolved. I think it
cause of the situation in Vietnam. speaks very highly for the chairman who
But as the conference moved on and did such a magnificent job at the last
as we had the opportunity to talk to moment when he was called upon with-
other members of the delegations from out any previous notice that he would
the other 50 or so countries which were have to assume the leadership of the
participating, and as we struggled with a delegation, just as he had done on one
resolution in a committee upon which I other previous occasion. We were ex-
had the good fortune to' serve with the tremely proud of the way in which he
gentleman from New York [Mr. PIRNIE], handled it.
we saw this effort push to the point where I Just want to add my remarks to those
the resolution was finally hammered out that have been made here by the other
and where it was brought before the con- delegates who were in attendance at the
ference, then one delegation after an= Conference and to concur in their state-
other spoke in favor, excepting for the ment and say that I am proud of the
Soviet bloc which in most instances spoke position that we were able to maintain
against it saying that they would vote in there and proud of the dignity with
the negative. Finally when the Russian which we conducted our tasks and Of the
delegate spoke for his delegation he re- final accomplishments of the Conference.
vealed that he would not vote in the (Mr. JONES of Missouri asked and was
negative but would abstain. Then, when given permission to revise and extend his
the vote finally took place, all of the So- _ remarks.)
viet bloc did in fact abstain, following Mr. PIRNIE. I thank the distin-
the leadership of the Soviet delegate. guished gentleman from Missouri. I
Therefore, Mr. Speaker, this resolution would just like to point out that the
was In fact passed without any negative gentleman from Missouri speaks from
vote against the position of that resolu- a background of experience, and demon-
tion, turning completely about the atti- strated dedication to the purposes of the
tude of heat which had originally been Interparliamentary Union.
evident as the conference opened. Mr. Speaker, I am sure we are all ap-
No. 92-10
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preciative of the efforts which the gen-
tleman from Missouri [Mr. JONES] and
the gentleman from Texas [Mr. POAGE]
put forth to portray the potential and
the attitude of our country in fields re-
lated to the economic life of the world
and our international responsibilities.
They are very vigorous efforts which
commanded the respect of those in at-
tendance.
Again, Mr. Speaker, I want to thank
the gentleman from Missouri again for
his very. kind remarks.
Mr. McCLORY. Mr. Speaker, will the
gentleman yield?
Mr. PIRNIE. I am happy to yield to
the gentleman.
Mr. McCLORY. Mr. Speaker, I want
to add my commendation for the very
expert job that the gentleman from New
York performed as chairman of our U.S.
delegation to the Interparliamentary
Union Conference in Canberra.
As we know, the spring conference of
the IPU is intended primarily as a pre-
paratory meeting for the fall or plenary
session of this organization. Yet, we did
find that there were a number of issues
that had to be decided at this spring
meeting.
The delegation it seemed to me to a
man performed its work most capably.
I think it should be brought out to the
Members of the House that there is a
great deal of preparatory work prior to
this Conference and we are fortunate to
have the assistance of the distinguished
executive secretary of our organization,
Dr. George Galloway and of the staff of
the Library of Congress and other aids
that we are able to receive from the De-
partment of State and elsewhere so as to
better equip ourselves to contend with
the problems that we encounter at these
international meetings.
It seems to me quite definitely as other
Members have said that we dealt effect-
tively with the various Issues and, the
various problems that we encountered
and saw to it that they were resolved
favorably to our Nation.
Again I wish to stress to all the Mem-
bers of the House that I cannot help but
feel that there should be a greater under-
standing of the benefits that are derived
from our participation in these Inter-
parliamentary Union meetings as emis-
saries of our Nation and as representa-
tives of our U.S. Congress. These meet-
ings with parliamentarians from the
other countries, provide an excellent op-
portunity for promoting good interna-
tional relations and sound public
relations for our country. I believe this
opportunity is used in a most effective
way..
I have sensed in the course of my
brief experience as a delegate to the
Interparliamentary Union Conference
the development of warm and friendly
attitudes on the part of a number of
other delegates as a result of contacts
that we have individually made and as
a result of working together with the
parliamentarians from other countries.
This strikes me as being of extreme
significance.
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 11716
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Comparisons have been made between pieasauu aria Duuuvoolua.
the Interparliamentary Union and the very high standard of Government serv- has been found. There has never been
United Nations. I know that at each ice, and we are indebted to them for any tin discovered in the United States.
of these meetings that we attend the many helpful acts and courtesies. Like- Japan, with her scarcity of raw mate-
fact is brought to the -attention of the wise Ambassador Powell and his staff rials, is heavily dependent upon the
membership that we are elected repre- made our brief stop in New Zealand a products of southeast Asia.
sentatives of the people who are speak- most rewarding experience. May I also LESSONS OF WORLD WAR n
l g one to the other, handling and pay tribute to our own staff which ably World War II pointed out the eco-
resolving issues considered by the Inter- supported all phases of the undertaking. nomic importance of southeast Asia to
parliamentary Union to be vital to our Mr. MATHIAS. Mr. Speaker, will the United States and Japan and the
common good. gentleman yield? strategic importance of Vietnam. Eco-
nomically, is a point of great significance, Mr. PIRNIE. I am happy to yield to n mica ly, a major Japanese motive dur-
it seems to me. Of course, there is a cer- the gentleman from Maryland. ing World War II was to gain control
tain amount of liaison between the Inter- Mr. MATHIAS. Mr. Speaker, I just of the area's natural resources. This
parliamentary Union and the United Na- want to express my personal appreciation was the idea behind Japan's greater T is
tions and agencies of the United Nations, to the gentleman for his leadership in wwas the idea behind Japan's Steate East
gaining spher
foothold r Vietnam,
and I think this is as it should be. the work of the Interparliamentary Asian coprosperity
Again I would like to mention that one Union, and to stress, what I believe is afte first a in
Japan was able to overrun all the rest
of my own impressions, at least, and I am the very general concensus, the import- southeast Asian-Cambodia, Laos,
sure of other members of the delegation ance of this work in the whole under- Thailand, Burma, Malaya, Indonesia,
as well, was the very cordial, the very pinnings of international understanding. and the Philippines--in Burma, Malaya, months with
close relationship which exists between I certainly share with the gentleman the and the the f Austral
was extremely difficult to remove them,
the people of the United States, which the gentlewoman from New York who became
was brought out particularly at this has taken such an important part in this due to the difficult junge terrain and
meeting. I think a great many of us work. poorly developed communc terrain and
understood and appreciated this warmth (Mr. MATHIAS asked and was given oo eloped os, the WADe-
esd themselves to Western
and
a long and
of feeling and these close ties that exist permission to revise and extend his re- spite mmh these
between the people of our Nation and the marks.) costly struggle the to to a Japanese
people of Australia-a most significant Mr. PIRNIE. Mr. Speaker, I thank costly tr in southeast nt.
much southeast
fact to have in mind. I might say that my colleague. I know how interested he hegemony
manpower
nuclear manpower
the general public attitude in Australia, has been in the work of the Interpar- Possessing than Japan, as muwell ch r greater
particularly toward our involvement in liamentary Union. He has followed its China might be tempted t tea the
southeast Asia, was one which evidenced problems and its accomplishments. His statee
strong support and strong cooperation. participation is welcomed, and I hope saame thing southeast Asia Japan did, were if the eived weak states
This in itself was heartening. the opportunity will be presented where sio de support. China could send thou-
I am proud indeed to have been a part he can serve actively in this important sands 'of troops into the Indochinese
p Of the etIaraUni dUnion onon e Meet the Inter- v Mr. MATHIAS. I thank the gentle- Peninsula almost overnight. From this
Bra, and pay in Can- position, enjoying the same strategic ad-,
the and I wish to pay tribute to in all of this I man. would close my remarks by vantage Japan had, she could overrun
th members who participated pat thanking the rest of the area in a few months.
servicegn Once in military control, the Chinese
loyal the
meeti, active knowledgeable only way in n iwhi thch they hey per - and ton foragain faithful and member
known could control the trade and natural
formed, but also lecompliment the this }'mportant mission. resources of the area by arrangements
group on the very splendid results which similar to those instituted by the U.S.S.R.
were achieved. CHINA AND VIETNAM in Eastern Europe after World War II.
out to that thank the o ehbsergen- - The SPEAKER pro tempore. Under The measures could include joint-stock
companies, Chinese managers for ports
tlemanMr. , and nd PI I point t wish
vations he has made with respect to per- previous order of the House, the gen- and industries, and perhaps even pits
sonal contacts are' thoughts that he has tleman from Wyoming [Mr. RONCALIOI, mantling some industries and pfor trevenort-
consistently put into practice. I do not is recognized for 15 minutes. mne behind the Chinese r tns Th-
control e ara border. re-
think there was my member of the dele- Mr. RONCALIO. Mr. Speaker, the t ion
nion could control determine whose ohre-
advantage gation who was more faithful in taking American commitment in Vietnam is ul- on in
advantage of the- opportunites for timately based upon the probabilities of would pass through the area's narrow
friendly exchange with the members of certain action by China if we should would pass added motivation fChina
re-
the other delegations. I have been proud withdraw. It is of utmost importance st aits. t southeast Asia's on for o C na
t with the outside world is that
to include in the report his very able to assess how China might act in the lations
remarks as he participated so actively event of American disengagement and China cannot compete with the more
in the work of the Parliamentary and how this Chinese reaction would affect efficient Japanese on a fmarket.
Judicial Committee. I know our col- our vital interests. DOMINO o a free ee
leagues will be pleased also to know that South Vietnam is seen as the key to What are probabilities that the the
former colleague Katharine St. George, the security of all of southeast Asia. The Commr powers wcome to omie
with her usual charm and skill, partici- United States has long had vital inter- o the re pow s would ul manner d the
pated very effectively in the conference. ests in southeast Asia for reasons of n in this if
It was a great pleasure to see with what trade and communications, since its sea United Sttes withdrew? there After be m r-
warmth she was welcomed by the mem- lanes control an important part of world ican disengagement, there would
from con-
bers of the other delegations, because we shipping, and because of the area's nat- to nn stopa the
South No h Vietnam, Laos, and con-
recall that, during the last Congress, she ural resources. Southeast Asia exports per- qhe bodia. rNorth Vietnamese o anionis
served as the head of the delegation and about 91 percent of the hemp, to the south and west continued fm
did a magnificent job; we are happy that cent of the natural rubber, 76 percent of as until it was halted continued the
t
it is possible for her to continue this the copra and coconut oil, 68 percent of about about 800 a by the abo participation. 11 the tin, and 68 percent of the rice that imposition Funtil 100 years ago. ench colonialism the Japanese tut
I would like to close by paying tribute enter into the world trade. These ma-
to the Government of Australia and all terials and others from the area are of vaded rencht the area tdu ing Wor d l War IT, was
neve of its representatives who welcomed us strategic importance to the United Frenc in the north and the northern
with such obvious generous friendliness States and her allies. Although many
and hospitality. Members of our Em- uses of natural rubber have been taken drive to the south and west began once attempte bassy, under our very able Ambassador, over by synthetics, the natural product more.
drive until chin defeat d to arrest
Edward Clark, who made us so welcome still makes up about 30 percent of rub-
and did everything to make our visit ber consumption and there are some phu in 1954. North Vietnam is the most
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June 6, 1966
pp Co &ifgiff& WGJB -%WR'f 11761 -Communist tried to the specifications of the system comply with Chmethod of ina and North i Vietnam can expand, a - y seizenpowertin Indonesia last party And the
the standards set forth by the State de- most by proxy, by promoting a so-called ensuing bloodbath of revenge against Com-
parment of health. "people's war" of so-called "national libera- munism has made the Vietnam war seem mild
Mr. President, with the adoption of tion." by comparison. Indonesia was a deadly blow
effective standards and procedures by the And what we are trying to do in Vietnam to Peking's strategy in Southeast Asia; the
State department of health, and the sub- is to demonstrate that changes in Asia- largest Communist party in the non-Commu-
sequent preparation and adoption of local and elsewhere in the world-are not to be nist world lies destroyed. We now see Indo-
sewerage facilities plans, this new Penn- precipitated by "outside" force, Some of us nesia negotiating an end to its military con-
sylvania act can provide new safeguards have forgotten rather quickly that it was fr ntati n with Malaysia. have drawn a lesson
to assure that our communities are look- not South Vietnam that set out to absorb Other Asia countries
ing well ahead to make certain that their North Vietnam, but rather the other way from China's failures in Africa and the Far
citizens will get an adequate supply of round. What's at stake for the U.S. in Viet- East, and the American commitment in Viet-
nam is not freedom and democracy for nam has helped to convince them that
safe water, and at the same time will not South Vietnam, though this might become China's brand of Communism is not neces-
be creating conditions in the handling of a happy by-product. The key point at issue sarily the wave of the future. Indeed, there
their wastes that will constitute a threat is whether the U.S. can successfully resist is a world of difference between what some
to the health, economy, and well being of and subdue a war of "liberation." Similarly, Asian leaders say publicly and what they
their neighboring communities. I com- what's at stake for China is whether it can concede privately. One of India's highest
mend this new program to study ands prove that the balance of power in the world government officials told me that "if you give
adaptation by all the other State. ' 1J can be changed by tunneling under the nu- up in Vietnam we will most probably have
clear stalemate of the major powers. Pe- to double our military presence in the
" No sooner said than he added,
king's chosen instruments are North Viet- Himalayas.
"but for the record I will go on saying you
t Con
Vi
d th
g.
e
e
nam an
THE SITUATION IN VIETNAM" Countering a foreign-sponsored "people's must get out of Vietnam."
Burma is another case in point. In Ran-
Mr. MCGEE. Mr. President, there war"is a terribly complex business. Such a recently, Liu Shao-chi, the Chinese
have been in recent days several telling conflict usually carries a minimum of risks googoin of state, could not get Burmese leaders,
articles published which do much to for the sponsor. It always is made to look not noted for their pro-American senti-
clear up the public understanding of the like a revolution of rising expectations against ments, to sign a joint declaration condemn-
the forces of retrogression backed by the U.S. ing the U.S. for its actions in Vietnam.
situation in Vietnam-past, present and American intervention is hard to justify be- and its veteran leaders of the
future, insofar as we can view the prob- cause the lineup is so confusing, deliberately For March China--Vietnam veteran
the ceacial test of
of
abilities of future events. Among these so, and the people's grievances irrefutable. Long Mao's theories-
heo It is also t h c u big chance
articles are two of particular note, writ- When Senator RUSSELL says, "we should go to wreck America's entire position in Asia.
ten by Senior Editor Arnaud de Borch- in there, win and get out," one cannot help If we hold our ground and Communist ex-
grave, of Newsweek, and by Joseph Alsop but feel that he and millions of others have pansion is blocked-as it was in Malaya-
in the Saturday Evening Post. not yet understood what Vietnam is all about. the Chinese will have suffered another ma-
Both Mr. de Borchgrave's "A Dissent It is not that type of war. Classical wars jot foreign-policy setback. The dogmas will
From the Dissenters" and Mr. Alsop's with classical victories will probably never be shattered once and for all and we may
"Why We Can Win in Vietnam" stand be seen again. The Communists are in for at last look forward to change in Peking.
the long haul. And we should be, too. The If we give in, what incentive will there
as persuasive statements on why we are other side will not abandon new methods of be for China to change? We would probably
involved in Indochina and what we have conquest until we have proved them un- have to start all over again two or three years
accomplished, as well as what we hope- workable. hence, perhaps in Thailand, which is neither
fully can yet achieve. I ask unanimous In power politics-and that is still the a better time nor a better place.
consent that these articles be printed in name of the game-lines must be drawn Policymakers in China and North Vietnam
a .u rr ?+ a.4 .. ?.,~? o a +.h,,t tra US domestic front
the RECORD., them, who else in the Western world today will eventually crack. They have seen
There being objection, n, in the the RECORD, , articles would-or could? The alternative, it seems thousands parade in front of the White
were. ordered to to be to me, is an isolationist Fortress America. House, some of them waiving the Viet Cong
as follows: What the U.S. Is doing in Asia is no different, colors. They know that the Republicans
[From Newsweek, June 6, 19661 in basic principles, from what the U.S. helped are already mobilizing to make an issue of
A DISSENT FROM THE DISSENTERS the Europeans achieve during the past two the war. They can see mounting criticism
(By Arnaud de Borchgrave, senior editor) decades: a line was drawn and Russia was against a growing commitment in a war that
contained and has now-in the words of Americans are told can only end in stale-
-Once again "gut" questions are Konrad Adenauer-"joined the ranks of those mate. They have read in The New York
being, asked about the American commit- nations seeking peace in the world." Times that "there is broad agreement about
ment in Vietnam. Last week, Newsweek How long will it take to contain China, Vietnam in the U.S. . namely that the
views after Emmet John Hughes gave his coax her out of her largely self-imposed ISO- country wants out, and its representatives
Senior a vArt u Vietnam. This wale, lation, and nudge her into more constructive in Washington know it and agree, but it
Senior Editor Arnaud de rave, also endeavors? It could be another ten years or must be an honorable out." They also see
recently in Vietnam, dissents sents from the more. But evidence is accumulating that it the slippage in President Johnson's Vietnam
dissenters.) might be shorter. I doubt whether Mao "ratings." And they have just heard Repre-
"Vietnam is not important to us," Pro- would be so obsessed with the need to pre- sentative MENDEL RIVERS, the influential
lessor John Kenneth Galbraith said re- vent the next generation from becoming chairman of the House Armed Services Com-
cently. "It is not a bastion of freedom, her "Khrushchevite revisionists" if it were not mittee, say: "We may have to make a
is it a testing place of democracy." already happening. In an attack on "anti- decision damn soon" about whether to pull
The slogans about why the U.S. is in Viet- party elements," China's army newspaper out altogether. Peking, which goes on de-
democrac, making South Vietnam safe for has warned that unless they are defeated, it picting the United States as being on the
democracy-and arguments about the slo- might be "perhaps only several years or a verge of despair, undoubtedly believes that
gans have contributed mightily to mass con- decade .before acounter-revolutionary in another year or two U.S. public-opinion
fusion at home and abroad. The rhetoric restoration on a national scale inevitably pressure to get out will have grown to the
tends to obscure both the -fundamental in- occurred." point where it won't care whether the "out"
terest and the fundamental issue. world is run is "honorable" or not.
The fundamental interest, quite simply, is No other government in the Vietnam has been publicly debated' for
by such an old group of men. The average months. I have just toured college cam-
m contain erialismexpansion of Chinese Com- age of the Politburo is 68; of the much larger pules around the U.S. Besides the notion
Br ezi Imperialism. 'As s Professor Zbi one Central Committee, 61. And the next gen- shared by only a minuscule fraction of stu-
's of Columbia articulated one of eration is already asking question, if only
the
the U.S. .Ss basic foreign policy goals, it is "to dents and faculty, that we should simply get
establish international conditions which in the innermost recesses of their subcon- back into our boats and planes and pull out,
channel the revolutionary changes taking scious, questions about a seemingly inter- no alternatives were even suggested. Most
place in many societies toward constructive minable series of foreign policy reverses that seem to realize there is little chance of peace
ventures, and prevent the process of mod- stretch from the Congo to Indonesia. talks until there is a change of heart on the
ernization and development from being Two years after Premier Chou En-lai toured other side.
forcibly taken over by Communist elites Black Africa as a liberating hero, one black Time is not necessarily on China's side.
supported by militant Communist states em- African country after another is expelling The more China advances scientifically and
ploying the strategy of 'national liberation Chinese operatives and/or severing relations economically, the greater the schism between
wars'." with Peking. die-hard dogmatists and those who have to
The fundamental issue is whether we Captured documents have now produced get on with the job of running a huge coun-
can find an effective answer to this new the evidence that it was on instructions from try efficiently and coming to terms with the
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 11762 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD -SENATE June 6, 1966
modern world. The passing of the revolu- the people. This Is basically a healthy de- controlling the provincial capitals and a good
tionary mystique will mean the new genera- velopment. The Buddhists (about 80 per- many villages, with the V.C. second govern-
tion will have to open the window, just as cent of the population) are indeed an in- ment controlling a good many other villages,
Russia did. digenous movement. They have no love for and with troops of both sides in the field
`Therapy for Peking's present almost para- the West in general and the U.S. in par- everywhere. By that time, there was a Viet
nold state of mind," writes Harvard's John ticular-but they have no use for Peking or Cong provincial battalion of about 500 men
K. Falrbank "must follow the usual lines of Hanoi either. Their leaders have said over operating in each of Vietnam's 43 provinces.
therapy: it must lead the rulers of China and over again that no Communist party in There was a Viet Cong district company of
gradually into different channels of experi- Asia can live in harmony with other political about 150 men operating in each of at least
ence until by degrees they reshape their plc- parties. The last thing they want is for 250 of the administrative districts into which
ture of the world and their place in it." the U.S. to leave or stop fighting the Viet the provinces are subdivided. And in each
The claim Is often made that there is no Cong until they are sure of a secure, inde- of several thousand V.C.-controlled villages
practical alternative to the eventual takeover pendent, Internationally guaranteed future. and hamlets, there was a Viet Cong guerrilla
of South Vietnam by the Vietnamese Com- The Buddhists would like to become the band of 20 or 30 men to maintain local
mu.nists; that the NLF is truly a national nucleus for a popular majority that might discipline and to harass friends of the estab-
movement in tune with the aspirations of serve as the basis for an honorable settle- lished government in neighboring villages
the people; that we are still losing ground ment. And when and if negotiations do get and hamlets. All these V.C. soldiers-about
militarily; and that the South Vietnamese underway with the Viet Cong, their only high 50,000 in the local forces and 110,000 in the
don't want us. Such misrepresentations get card is America's presence. Anti-American- guerrilla bands, or approximately 160,000 men
bandied around as "fact" by prominent mem- ism, therefore, is worrisome, not alarming. in all-had to be paid and armed and kept
bers of the intellectual community. The big question in my mind is whether supplied with ammunition and much other
If Communism is so popular, why has the the American people will have the patience, materiel, and all but the minority of strictly
Viet Cong felt it necessary to assassinate the staying power and the far-sightedness part-time guerrillas had to be provided with
more than 20,000 local officials? Three lead- not to hand China's present leaders some- rations as well. Salaries and rations also had
ers of the National Students Association of thing they could misconstrue aC a victory to be found for tends of thousands of 'Viet
America have returned from Vietnam report- after an unbroken line of setbacks at home Cong in essentially civilian occupations,
ing they found no sympathy for the NLF and abroad. During this holding and wait- ranging upward from humble couriers. and
among Vietnamese students. If the NLF is ing period, we could do a lot' worse than tax collectors, through secret policemen and
the embodiment of national aspirations and heed the President's appeal to "come to_ the personnel of the medical services, to the
its victory inevitable, how does one explain, gethe.r as a people and as nation" to sup- awe-inspiring members of the Communist
as Buddhist leaders never tire of pointing port the government's policy. Party's central committee for South Vietnam
out, that no one of prominence has joined in their remote jungle lair near the Cam-
the cause? If the NJ.F is indigenous to the [From the Saturday Evening Post] bodian border.
South, how does one explain that it was WHY WE CAN WIN IN VIETNAM government was
In addition, this second
created and is now controlled by Le Duan, deeply engaged in a big and costly pro r
after Ho Chi Minh the most powerful Com- (By Joseph Alsop) of milita g for
munist leader in Hanoi? In Vietnam, great numbers of Americans guerrilla war, public works. Mao se- ungsa afor
nd
If we are not doing immeasurably better are now committed to a war which very few his remarkable Vietnam Communist pupil,
militarily, how does one explain that Com- _ Americans even begin to understand. Most Gen. Vo Nguyen Giap, lay down an absolute
munist defectors for the first are now disclos- of us, of course, have a fair understanding of requirements for guerrilla main bases in
ing their unit locations and enabling U.S. the issues our troops are fighting for, but only areas immune to penetration by hostile
forces to go in and hit them when they least a tiny minority understand the war itself. troops. The mountainous jungle-covered
expect it? Or that defectors, until the recent This has struck me with increasing force and swampy tracts of South Vietnam pro-
political crisis slowed up military operations, after every one of my more recent visits to vide splendid terrain for many such main-
were running at the rate of 35,000 Vietnam-and i have been there 16 times base areas. But barracks, hospitals and
a year (up from 5,000 in 1964 and 1)1,000 in since 1953. People talk about other matters numerous other facilities had to be secretly
1965) ? O that both prisoners and defectors, such as the chops and changes of politics in built within these fastnesses. Wherever the
taken In idely scattered parts of the coun- Saigon, where the Communists might man- ground was suitable, the main bases also
try, say they are physically exhausted, always age an eventual victory--although I do not had to be fortified by an almost inconceivably
on the move, with no campfires allowed at think they will. No one ever mentions the antlike program of digging and tunneling;
night, little food and haphazard supplies? fairly desperate combat problems that now and although corvde labor from V.C.-con-
Or that a recent survey taken among 500 face the Viet Cong. No one analyzes the trolled villages was used for this purpose, the
prisoners showed that only 30 percent be- present strategy of our brilliant field coin- hundreds, even thousands of men in the
lieved in a VC victory against 70 percent a mander in Vietnam, Gen. William C. West- corv8es at least had to be given rations while
year ago? moreland. No one refers in any way to what away from home. Finally, all the main bases .
Little noted in the U.S. press earlier this is currently happening on the battlefield. had to be prestocked with medical supplies,
year was growing evidence of indecision in Yet the battlefield is where our own best ammunition and food. This was an enor-
Hanoi. An article by Defense Minister Cren- hope of victory lies. mous undertaking In itself. A single under-
eral Giap revealed considerable bewilderment The whole pattern of the fighting, as it ground cache found last year, for Instance,
over what he called the new factor of limit- happens, is still determined by an almost contained no less than 2,000 tons of rice.
less American power which he concedes, in successful gamble that the Communists made Since the cache was In a huge hole ap-
retrospect, thwarted the Viet Cong of im- to win the war last year. Hence we must proachable only by a.narrow tunnel, all this
minent victory last year. American accelera- backtrack a bit at the outset in order to see rice had evidently been carried in on men's
tion of the conflict, he warned, has "con- the timing, the nature and the risks of this backs, bagful by bagful.
fronted the Vietnamese people with a very enormous Viet Cong gamble, to make what Early in 1963, moreover, the first main
serious situation and the urgent task of happened reasonably comprehensible. forces-their nature will be explained in a
mobilizing and consolidating all the people to Many normally well-informed persons still moment-had begun to be mobilized in the
fight on." Giap also admitted that victory believe that a Communist guerrilla move- main-base areas. Therefore, long before
over the United States was a long way off ment like the Viet Cong is something spun- Diem was assassinated in November, 1963,
when the North Vietnam general wrote that taneous-halfway, let us say, between a the Viet Cong leaders had to meet a pretty
"Americans have great military potential, are misguided patriotic society and a nation- Imposing total budget. Their clandestine
extremely stubborn, cruel and cunning and wide game of cops-and-robbers. From their second government then controlled no more
know how to draw lessons quickly ~from ex- first obscure guerrilla origins, however, the than about four million of the total South
perience to contrive even fiercer fight- Viet Cong have been a second government of Vietnamese population of 17 million. Few
lag methods." South Vietnam, and they still are. Further- legally established governments of countries
Politically, however, the pessimists claim more-and here Is the important point- having only four million people manage to
we are back to square one. They argue that this clandestine Communist second govern- keep more than 160,000 men under arms at
the coming elections are disaster incarnate, ment has all the fiscal, economic, manpower all times, even if their soldiers are paid the
as inherently absurd as an Ionesco play, and and other problems that plague any normal merest pittance, as are the soldiers of the
that they will be followed by a neutralist government. Since this is also a government Viet Cong.
government that will go through the mo- at war, the V.Q. second government's biggest Such was the position when the Diem
tions of proclaiming its anti-Communism problem is naturally to recruit, equip and regime was brought down by an army coup,
and at the same time thank the U.S. for its maintain its armed forces. This has always and almost the entire structure of govern-
services while making clear they are no been the biggest problem, and Its difficulties ment control abruptly came to pieces, for a
longer required. caused the Viet Cong gamble already men- while, In almost every province. The Viet
I personally we the rapid political evolu- tioned, which was decided on in late 1963 Cong were thus enabled to surge forward
tion as a drive to reassert Vietnamese sov- after the coup d'etat against South Viet- everywhere, and this led to the decision to
ereignty. Premier Ky and his fellow gen- namese President Ngo Dinh Diem. begin organizing main forces on a really big
erals (and some U.S. advisers), quite unwit- South Vietnam in the summer of 1963 was scale.
tingly, have helped the various religious a country in which every province had its Like everything else the Viet Cong had
groups to surface as the true spokesmen for own civil war, with the Saigon government done up to that time, the move to organize
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June 6 1966
. 11763
t
the main forces was strictly in accordance Hanoi. The northern Communist govern- rule of Mao Tse-tung: Popular support of
with the rule books of Chairman Mao and ment had also provided large quantities of the guerrilla movement must never be en-
Gen. Giap. Main forces (the classification is military equipment and had secretly sent dangered until the final victory. But the
Mao Tse-tung's) bear little resemblance to further tens of thousands of cadres tto the hese. Hlaaoy lbeli eaders that the gamble cod mand
the simple guerrilla bands that almost every- South to aid and guide the struggle coul never
one envisions when the Viet Cong are men- But all this was hidden well enough that go sour, simply because they were so certain -after tioned. They also differ sharply from the those who wished could go on claiming that of an early victory the villages ich, ofbcourse,
local forces-the provincial battalions and this was "Just a civil war." any grumbling could e dealt
va tip more with by secret ptheolice
expected victory, they
district companies, which are already well The Somask, worn uth Vietnam, deceive
above the guerrilla level-for the main forces ple people
have no permanent regional attachments, important and valuable to the V.C. This was brought off a feat probably without parallel.
and their units are much larger and more the mask of amiable agrarian reformers-the Although they were still no more than the
heavily armed. In fact, they almost exactly same mask that the Chinese Communists second government of South Vietnam, the
resemble regular troops in a regular army. had worn with such success until they got Viet Cong between January, 1964, and the
According to the Mao-Giap rules, these main control of China. Until the critical period early spring of 1965 wrung from the men and resources t-
forces have two functions: to help the local we are now examining, the Viet Cong also happy villages enough
forces and guerrillas increase the pressure wore this mask with great success, thereby increase the V.C. main forces to 24 regiments.
everywhere, until the established govern- gaining rather solid popular support in their complete with porter battalions, or the equi-
ment is visibly hanging on the ropes; and "liberated areas" and seriously softening up valent of eight army divisions. Even so,
then to strike the knockout blows in big set- every contested area. The success ulti- this was not enough to meet the war plan's ence
second
govern piece battles like that which finished off mately more ended mpo taut however than, Communisgt ment undertooklthe co siderable further re-
the French at Dienblenphu.
With more than an 16 160,,0000 men already under propaganda or V.C. land reform. It de- sponsibility of maintaining and providing
arms, and with the additional organization pended on a convincing pretense of govern- porter battalions for two complete divisions
of something like a brand-new regular army ment by consent, which was impossible with- of the North Vietnamese regular army, the
now decided upon, the V.C. second govern- out a considerable degree of real consent. 325th and the 304th, which covertly invaded 1965 ment obviously had its work cut out. At the To gain this degree of consent, the Viet Cong South Vietnam in late 96 4 and o earlye1 des
outset, all went easily enough. In the secret promised the peasants, again and again and spring in the V.C. local forces and
000 tspbands, the second government could
main-base areas, with their palm-thatched with utmost emphasis, that there would be 1y the
fications jungle-bidden forti- no V.C. taxation and no V.C. conscription. gue
barraks, their due -dug, These promises were approximately kept boast a main-force army of the strength of
supply and their painfully accumulated until the year 1964. Devious, even cruel, 10 light-infantry divisions. And this new
cdres and caches, recruits large were now numbers assembled of Viet for Cong tricks were often resorted to, of course. A army, with its porter battalions and longer
cadres potential recruit's government identity card range supply detachments, numbered close to
regimental training. The new main-fo500 would be stolen, for example, and he would 80,000 men. The achievement was astonish-1,00 men sacs had a eigngth of around
r ghly then be frightened into volunteering by ing, but the price was heavy. One can
mm each. In design they were roughly warnings that the government police would imagine the Viet Cong finance minister-
merits to regular light-infantry reef- shoot him as a Communist if they ever they have one, even if his name is not pub-
the capability 30 or 40 years ago, and they had picked him up. Or an obstinate noncontrib- lioly known-groaning when he learned the
he capability of being joined together in utor to the Viet Cong war chest would be true scope of the main-force program. And
light- blows that w e divisions for the knockout 'struggled with" by V.C. cadres before all the one can all but hear his colleagues airily tell-
ment was given an attached porter battalion people of his village, and if this public brain- ing him not to worry, because victory was
washing did not get results, he might then just around the corner.
of to and about 600 men get hies local supply be shot in the back of the neck as a "spy for it is almost unknown in America, but the
and was stepped To get all these men, areas recruit- the reactionaries and imperialists." But in truth is that a Viet Cong victory really was
ing was stepped in all x V.C. areas of the main, the V.C. military outfits really just around the corner in the late spring of
South Vietnam. A A major r expansion of the were manned by volunteers, which made the last year, months after the situation had
supply movement from North Vietnam, down average outfit both tough and highly moti- been supposedly saved by President John-
the Ho Chi Minh trail and along the sea- vated. And in the main, besides road tolls, son's decision to bomb North Vietnam.
smugglers' routes, was also undertaken to market tolls and the like, the V.C. tax col- Throughout the spring of 1985 almost the
provide the new regiments with their 57 lectors only asked the people of the villages whole South Vietnamese army was firmly
mm. recoilless rifles, heavy mortars, anti- for "voluntary contributions," which meant pinned down in the provinces by the urgent
aircraft guns and other crew-served weapons. that the burden on the peasantry was light requirements of local defense. In those
And many more specially trained cadres were and easily bearable. spring months almost the whole of the
brought down from the Communist North The trouble was that this semivoluntary army's slender mobile reserve, 13 South Viet-
to become officers and noncoms. system reached its limit with the creation of namese ranger and Marine battalions, was
By New Year's Day of 1964, at least five of the first five or six main-force regiments, as also being chewed up by new main-force
the new main-force regiments already had did the system of largely concealed aid and regiments. By mid-June, after the bloody
been recruited, armed and trained. By this direction from the North. If the masks were fight at Dong Xoai, about 60 miles from
time, too, because of their post-Diem surge, retained, enough men and resources to com- Saigon, only three of the government's re-
the Viet Cong controlled perhaps five million plete the war plan simply could not be se- serve battalions remained in good combat
to six million people. Even so, however, the cured, and both masks were therefore boldly trim. Meanwhile, the Viet Cong had an un-
second government's base in the country- and simultaneously dropped. Beginning in committed central reserve equivalent to at
side-the Viet Cong infrastructure, as our 1964, all the main forces and many of the least five divisions in their main-base areas.
intelligence officers call it-was still too small provincial battalions were completely re- No reserves on one side, strong reserves on
to support the ambitious military super- equipped with the new 7.64 mm. family of the other, meant, of course, that the V.C.
structure that was planned. To complete Chinese-made weapons, which required a could win province after province by concen-
the plan, the masks had to be dropped. This supply movement from North Vietnam too trating in heavily superior force wherever
was the Viet Cong gamble. If Gen. West- big to be hidden any longer. At the same they chose to do so. In this manner they
moreland's strategy attains the hoped-for time, preparations also began for the even- could count on rolling up South Vietnam
results, this dropping of the masks will be tual invasion of the South by complete units like a carpet before the summer ended. Then
President Johnson upset their calculations
remembered as the moment when the Viet of the North Vietnamese regular army. b ordering the commitment of U.S. troops
Cone began to lose the war. But it did not Thus the pretense was as abandoned that this on on a big scale.
look that way at the time. was "lust a civil war." At the same time, This order had all the elements of a bril-
two 1964 the Viet Cong had always worn and incomparably more important, the pre-ional two masks-one to deceive people abroad, tense of governing by consent was also quite liantly s uccessful, If good wholly amine to the
the other for the South Vietnamese them- ruthlessly abandoned. ambush, place, it like a complete surprise. There
selves. For foreign eyes, they had worn the The repeated Viet Cong promises that had been t was earlier surprise in February,
mask of an indigenous movement of social there would be no V.C. taxation and no V.C. when eon President gave the order a bomb
e
discontent. However, as early as 1956, Le conscription became dead letters. Taxes were
Duan, now first secretary of the Communist sternly imposed on the people of the villages. the after the But Ve this Cong second sun the
party of North Vietnam, had gone south to Quarter by quarter the Viet Cong increased el was quite as complete as the first, and r was
make preparations for the beginning of guer- these levies until they became cruelly bur- far more tao.
rilla war, with the aid of many thousands of densome. Universal military service was pro- cadres whom the Communist government in claimed for all males from 18 to 36. As the Nor was this all. Effective ambushers
the North had ordered to go underground in manhunt progressed, the Viet Cong press must never attack the head of a column, nor
the South when the French war ended in gangs began rounding up boys of 14 or 15. hold their fire until the column has passed-, so
the
ene higher direct of the V.C h had come all had now broken gtheifirst and mosthsacred es ape .But to op n fire on the middle colu oflthe
No. 92-16
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 11 1 04 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE June 6, 1966
column Insures that the ambushees can force the V.C. to take more rice and more the North, he also authorized direct use of
neither advance nor retreat, but must stand conscripts from the long-suffering villagers. American air power in the South, thereby
and fight and be annihilated. It was this He believed, therefore, that the already se- multiplying the air strength the Viet Cong
effect that President Johnson's order unwit- vere strains on the V.C. second government had to face. And finally, the American troop
tingly achieved. could be increased until its entire structure commitment vastly multiplied the helicopt-
In order to see why this was so, it is only Would crumble. And he planned to precipt- ers available for troop lifts.
necessary to consider What would have hap- tate this general breakup of the second gov- Today when the Viet Cong attempt "old
pened if the President had committed Amer- ernment's structure by breaking the main- never-fail," as they still frequently do, the
scan combat troops in Vietnam rather more force backbone of the V.C. Time alone can ambushers generally discover that they are
than a year earlier, when the Pentagon first tell whether Westmoreland is right, but he really ambushees. The post chosen for sur-
urged him to do so. In that spring of 1964, most certainly still believes he will be proved prise attack at once calls in the heavy ar-
the harshest and most burdensome period right-if the accidents of Saigon politics do tillery, and the big guns inevitably slow down
of the second government's main-force pro- not tragically forestall the proof. the assault. When dawn breaks, U.S. fight-
gram still lay in the future, and the Viet We have now examined two of the three ers and fighter bombers make their appear-
Cong had barely begun to drop their masks. main parts of the war's military pattern- ance, guided by spotter planes, and unless
It would still not have been too late for a the gamble taken by the V.C. second gov- the Viet Cong break off the attack, they be-
convincing reassumption of the Viet Cong ernment to create its main forces and the come exposed targets for decimation from
mask of agrarian reformers, with no need ambush effect of President Johnson's troop the air. If the situation warrants, there may
for heavy taxes or press-ganged conscripts. commitment. If the Viet Cong had not also be a heli-lift of infantry, either to cut
The V.C. could therefore have pulled back gambled by breaking Mao's first rule on pop- off the V.C. surrounding the post, or to take
and dug in for many more years of less in- ular support and if they now had a less bur- the V.C. ambushing force in the rear.
tensive war, on the classical, slowly erosive, densome and more flexible military organiza- "Old never-fail" has certainly not be-
elusive guerrilla pattern that they under- tion, I should be making a very different come "old always-fail." Nor have their novel
stand so well. There can be no doubt that military prognosis. tactical handicaps taken all the fight out of
this is precisely what the Viet Cong would But these conditions do not now exist in the Viet Cong, any more than their wide-
have done if the President had in fact com- Vietnam, because the rules have in fact been spread loss of popular support has deprived
mitted U.S. troops a year earlier. The rule broken. And more rule breaking is the es- them of the active help of the 10 to 15 per-
books are very strict about this: Mao Tse- sence of the third part of the war's military cent of genuine Communist converts in their
tung strongly emphasizes the need for any pattern, which is the acuteness of the combat "liberated areas." Only recently they were
guerrilla movement to be ready to retreat at problems now besetting the V.C. For the able to bring up two artillery batteries for an
once if the conditions of the struggle unex- Viet Cong leaders, beyond doubt, this is the attack on the very outskirts of Saigon-
pectedly develop in an unfavorable manner. pattern's most painful part, since their en- which did not succeed, but did cause much
But the Viet Cong could not follow this tire experience has taught them to put an disquiet in the city. And terroristic acts
pull-back rule when Johnson at last com- almost religious reliance on the simple fight- continue in most provinces at a very high
mitted U.S. troops, because the V.C. had al- ing rules laid down by Giap and Mao. These rate.
ready breached Mao Tse-tung's-cardinal rule tactical rules worked brilliantly well Yet it is deeply meaningful that in the
against alienating popular support- before for Mao in China, and for Giap against the months from last September-when the U.S.
the final victory. It is not easy, after all, for French and for the Viet Cong themselves un- troop commitment began to have a serious
any government, legal or clandestine, to pull til last year. They built the record, in fact, impact-until late April, when these words
back and to ask its people to fight onward that still leads people to repeat solemnly were written, the record shows only two
indefinitely, if the most sacred promises have that "regular troops cannot defeat guer- victorious V.C. operations much above the
been broken, and if this has been justified rillas." Yet these closely studied, carefully petty-terror level. These were the annihila-
by assertions that the war will end in tri- defined tactical rules for guerrilla war have tion of a South Vietnamese regiment in a
umph in a few weeks or months. It is very all but begun to work in reverse in Vietnam Michelin rubbber plantation early last winter
dangerous, too, for any guerrilla movement nowadays. This is the most far-reaching sin- and the more recent capture of the isolated
to dilute its fighting units with unwilling gle result of the U.S. troop commitment. Special Forces post at Ashau on the Laotian
conscripts, as the Viet Cong had done. In Consider, for example, "old never-fail." border. By contract, the Viet Cong failures
the early summer of 1965, this danger was In. the years before 1965, "old never-fail" was have been too numerious to be recalled
demonstrated by a first trickle of Viet Cong the sardonic name used by American officers These failures have vastly greater meaning,
desertions, previously all but unheard of- advising the South Vietnamese army for the moreover, than might be surmised from
a trickle that has now become a near hem- guerrillas' surprise-attack-plus-ambush com- newspaper stories of body counts of 50
orrhage in some units and some areas of bination. This combination was the prin- enemy dead here, 100 in another place, and
Vietnam. Above all, there was the danger cipal offensive tactic of the Viet Cong, ac- in another place above 200, after a Viet Cong
in the countryside, where heavy taxes and counting for over 80 percent of their more or North Vietnamese assault has been beaten
press-gang conscription had caused the showy and damaging victories during all the back. These stories mean that the V.C. are
people's former propagandized consent to be years when the war was going well for them. now regularly breaking the next-most-im-
widely replaced by sullen acquiescence. First would come the predawn news that portant guerrilla rule after the rule about
This danger was also being demonstrated by mortar shells were falling on an isolated always retaining popular support.
the tens of thousands who were refusing to government post, which was surrounded by a As Mao and Giap both emphasize, any
acquiesce. And these people, fleeing from strong V.C. force that had crept up under guerrilla movement lives and grows and has
"liberated areas" to government areas, have cover of darkness. The government's prov- its being by success. Great failures may
now become a pitiful refugee army of nearly ince chief (the military governor) would perhaps be precariously survived, as Nap-
a million men, women and children. Their hastily organize a relieving force, and the pended in China at the time of the famous
flight has even begun to leave the V.C. areas column of troops would move out, as dawn Long March. The rule books nonetheless en-
seriously short of hands to till the crops. began to break, along the wretched, narrow join guerrilla commanders always to prefer
For these reasons, it was much too risky to road leading to the post under attack. Then the mere assassination of a village elder to
pull back, and the second government made would come the report that the relief column the dramatic capture of a district town, if
its defiant choice to continue the war in the had been ambushed by another strong V.C. it is thought that the attempt on the town
main-force phase. force which had slipped into positions com- may The same basic considerations that led manding the road's most dangerous sector. been rfloundering forward with great hob-
the Hanoi and V.C. leaders to make this Next the radio would fall ominously silent, stinacy and considerable courage, from
choice also led Gen. Westmoreland to adopt meaning, of course, that the post under at- failure to bloody failure for many months,
his strategy of "seeking out and destroying" tack had also fallen. And so the govern- with few military successes.
the Viet Cong main forces. When the Pres- ment's forces would be further eroded and These changes in the tactical situation
ident's troop commitment abruptly gave demoralized, government control would be have quite directly affected every type of
Westmoreland the responsibility for turning reduced, and V.C. power and authority would Viet Cong unit, whether main-force, local-
the tide and winning the war, this careful once again grow proportionally. force or guerrilla-for the guerrilla bands
yet inspired soldier had keen studying the But "old never-fail" began to work very are almost always ordered to support the
Viet Cong for many anxious months. Ob- differently with the end of the rather prim- larger operations in their neighborhoods.
viously the V.C. and North Vietnamese main- itive situation envisioned by Mao and Giap- The main forces-Gen. Westmoreland's
force regiments, being heavier outfits that a situation in which the government had prime targets-are the units chiefly affected
could be located and engaged with greater few heavy guns, only the barest minimum of by another change of great significance.
ease, were the most suitable military tar- air power, and no air-mobile infantry. This Life in a main-force regiment once offered a
gets for the incoming American troops. Gen. siuation ceased to exist in South Vietnam good deal to tempt an ambitious young Viet-
Westmoreland's chief reasons, nevertheless, last year. First, a network of heavy-artillery namese. He belonged to a crack unit, which
for concentrating on the main forces were positions was thrown over most of the coun- was a matter of pride. He had been taught
and are paramilitary. Westmoreland rea- try, and these were linked by good communi- to believe in an early victory, and as a main-
soned that the Viet Cong had made them- cations to every government post in the force soldier he could expect personal ad-
selves politically vulnerable by breaking the populated areas, and to most of the more vancement when victory was won. Above
first rule of Mao Tse-tung, and that this remote posts as well. Second, after Pleiku all, he did not have to endure prolonged
vulnerability would increase as war pressures the President not only ordered bombing of hardship. Two or three night marches out
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 June 6, 19 66 CON (7RESSION AL lttWI WW - JIiLN it ! t 11 1911
from the base, one or two days of fighting
at the scene of his regiment's operation, and
two or three night marches back to his reg-
imental main-base area-that was about
the maximum effort that was normally re-
quired each month. The balance of every
month was spent resting, training, absorb-
ing replacements and doing meticulous sand-
table exercises to prepare the next sally
against a government post. And all these
weeks between operations were passed in the
absolute security of a main base, with its
simple but comfortable barracks, its reas-
suring fortifications, and its food caches.
Today, however, this quite bearable exist-
ence has suffered a savage transformation.
It began when Gen. Westmoreland called in
the B-52's of the Strategic Air Command,
with their immense loads of heavy bombs
that can penetrate even fortification tun-
nels 30 feet below ground. Daily since late
last summer, the B-52's have been hammer-
ing the main-base areas, with such effect, as
captured documents have revealed, that the
main-force regiments are now under strict
orders to-spend no more than one night, or
at most two nights, in the same place. Long
gone, therefore, are each month's restorative
stretches of orderly barracks life.
Night after night, the main-force soldiers
must bivouac in the jungle or on the moun-
tain slopes. Every day or every two days
there is a toilsome march to the next biv-
ouac. These movements cause supply prob-
lems, and the men sometimes go hungry.
There is little time for rest or training, or
any of the other things that keep and out-
fit happy and in combat trim. In addition,
as the American forces in Vietnam have
grown stronger, there have been more in-
fantry sweeps through the main-base areas-
many of which had not been visited by hos-
tile troops since the beginning of the French
war. Supply caches that took months, even
years, to accumulate are found and destroyed
by our men. Fortifications representing
hundreds of thousands, even millions, of
man-hours of hard work are discovered and
greatly damaged, if not always totally de-
stroyed. V.C. outfits that have sought the
base areas' security must either flee or stand
and fight against hard odds. In these ways
still another cardinal Mao-Giap rule has
been broken-the rule that a successful guer-
rilla movement needs completely secure
bases. Without this minimal security, Mao
says, any such movement must automatically
"deteriorate" into a mere "peasant revolt"
which "it would be fanciful to suppose"
could "avoid defeat."
From the foregoing follows the final pro-
found change in the V.C. situation. In
Vietnam the intelligence gathered has al-
ways been substantial, but the South Viet-
namese formerly had no way to process in-
telligence as it came in, much less to respond
to it promptly. Nowadays, in contrast, the
intelligence gathered has multiplied many
times over, partly by freer reporting by the
people of the countryside, partly by mechan-
ical means such as airborne infrared devices
that spot main-force campfires and the like,
and partly by the enormously increased nuin-
bers of deserters and prisoners of war. Fur-
thermore Gen. Westmoreland's headquarters
has now set up something like a Vietnamese-
American intelligence-processing factory,
capable of handling several tons of captured
documents and several hundreds of interro-
gations in a single week. Thus it is no
longer a case of blind men fighting men who
see all too well, as it was for so many years.
The new 'Oyes of the intelligence can even
penetrate main-base areas well enough so
that each B-52 strike has proved to have an
even chance of finding its pinpoint target of
barracks and fortifications within the huge
surrounding tract of swamp or jungle or
mountain forest. Movements of Viet Cong
units are also being swiftly tracked if luck
is good and the movements are fairly big.
Sometimes we have no luck, as with the re-
cent attack near Saigon. Yet good intelli-
gence enabled Gen, Westmoreland to mount
no fewer than eight uniformly successful
spoiling operations against long planned V.C.
attacks in a recent period of only a few
weeks. Thus another crucial rule is being
broken pretty frequently, for both Mao and
Giap lay great emphasis on all guerrillas'
need to move absolutely unseen, while
watching the smallest enemy movement.
Inasmuch as such texts as Mao Tse-tung's
On the Protracted War and Vo Nguyen Giap's
People's War, People's Army have always had
the standing of scripture for both the Viet
Cong and the North Vietnamese, the Mao-
Giap prescriptions' rather monotonous fail-
ure to work nowadays must be a very shaking
thing in itself. The Viet Cong soldiers must
be greatly shaken too by the failure of their
leaders to find substitute prescriptions that
work a bit better. Nowadays a Viet Cong
battalion commander getting his orders for
another surprise attack-plus-ambush must
have the same sinking feeling that the gov-
ernment's province chiefs always used to
have when word came in of another pre-
dawn assault on an isolated post. For the
long pull, an unending diet of many big and
little defeats, with only the rarest success to
raise the spirits, can in itself prove fatal to
the Viet Cong. The strain of declining
morale 1s already grave, as prisoner interro-
gations reveal, and this strain is bound to in-
crease if Gen. Westmoreland is allowed to
pursue his strategy.
These are the principal factors that con-
trol the present pattern of the fighting in
Vietnam. I would be less confident of their
great significance if I had not closely watch-
ed the trend of the fighting. When I visited
Vietnam in the spring of 1965, one could
easily discern American air power's effects on
the Viet Cong. But it was equally easy to
see that air power alone was not enough, and
that the V.C. would win during the sum-
mer if the President did not commit U.S.
ground troops.
When I visited Vietnam again last Septem-
ber, the full impact of the initial U.S. troop
commitment was really beginning to be felt.
The fine Marine victory at Chulai had taught
the Viet Cong that Americans were not "pa-
per tigers" after all-at any rate, not on the
field of battle. The first B-52 raids on the
main bases were beginning to show impres-
sive results. It was already clear that the
tide had turned, but it was by no means
clear as yet how the Viet Cong and their
masters in Hanoi would deal with this alarm-
ing change.
On this key point there was some disver-
gence between Gen. Westmoreland and the
majority of his staff. Westmoreland already
suspected that the President had achieved an
unintended ambush, and he therefore doubt-
ed whether the Viet Cong were free to follow
Mao's rules of "advance and retreat." His
staff members were almost unanimous in ex-
?pecting the Viet Cong to follow the rules.
This was a disturbing prospect, for a return
to classical guerrilla fighting was bound to
mean American troops endlessly marching
through jungle and over mountains in fre-
quently vain pursuit of mere companies of
the enemy. Westmoreland's staff asked
"whether the people at home would stand for
an endless penny-packet war." If there was
any way at all to exhaust American patience
and fortitude, endless penny-packet war was
surely the most likely way.
These worries were shown to be ill-founded
in October, in the obstinate battle for the
Pleime Special Forces post, and in the subse-
quent fighting in the la Drang valley, which
continued into early November. For days on
end, with superb courage and endurance, a
small band of men of the Special Forces,
both American and Vietnamese, took on and
hurled back a greatly superior number of
troops of the V.C. main forces. When the
Pleime outpost had been relieved at last, the
scene shifted to the Ia Drang valley. Here
the men of the 1st Air Cavalry engaged an
entire North Vietnamese division, composed
of the 32nd regiment, the 33rd regiment, and
the 66th regiment, with two V.C. main-
force regiments in occasional support. Even
by mid-October the number of American
combat troops on the ground was not large,
and Maj. Gen. Harry Kinnard, commander
of the lst Air Cavalry, could not afford to
overcommit his vital division. Hence he
never put into the line more than two bat-
talions-plus, the battalions in combat being
rotated by helicopter as the fighting went
on. On our side, therefore, we did not have
as much as a full regiment engaged at any
one time; whereas the enemy had three regi-
ments always engaged, with two more to aid
them.
As must happen, alas, in battle, 275 men
of the Air Cavalry were killed in the weeks
the action lasted. But we have since cap-
tured the enemy's complete battle plans, and
we also have a post-battle critique by the
North Vietnamese commander on the scene,
who has the pseudonym of Gen. Bai Quan.
This evidence reveals that in this single bat-
tle the enemy lost the staggering total of
5,000 killed and severely wounded, as well as
almost all his heavy weapons. By any test
this victory against such odds was a shining
feat of U.S. arms, all the more noteworthy be-
cause these were near-green American troops,
After the Is, Drang valley no one could any
longer believe in an intended Viet Cong pull-
back to low-level guerrilla activity. If the
V.C. could not or would not pull back, it was
clear that they would have to try to go for-
ward. Furthermore, there was increasing
evidence of a massive, continuing invasion of
South Vietnam by North Vietnamese regu-
lars coming down the Ho Chi Minh trail.
Reconnaissance also revealed that the North
Vietnamese were urgently improving the
trail to make it a truckable highway.
In November, therefore, Hanoi's apparent
intention to reinforce the Viet Cong to the
utmost led Gen. Westmoreland's staff to make
carefully revised estimates of the enemy's
maximum capabilities-the maximum mili-
tary buildup the North Vietnamese govern-
nient and the V.C. second government could
achieve and support. These estimates pro-
jected a continuous growth of the enemy
main forces in South Vietnam at the rate of
two regiments per month until the end of
1966. In other words, the main forces, which
had a strength equivalent to 10 divisions
when the President committed U. S. troops,
were projected to grow to a strength equi-
valent to about 18 divisions before next New
Year's Day.
This projection by Gen. Westmoreland's
staff was presented to Secretary of Defense
McNamara when he visited Saigon at the end
of November. It of course implied a need for
a good many more American troops to match
the enemey's expected increase of strength.
For this reason the new estimates caused a
panic in Washington when Secretary Mc-
Namara brought them home. Out of the
panic grew the President's peace offensive,
the pause in the bombing of the North, and
other manifestations that presumably helped
to renew the Hanoi leaders' slumping faith in
their basic theory of American weakness of
will. The question remains whether the
panic was justified. I think it was wholly
unjustified.
My chief reason is based on the situation
I discovered when I returned to Vietnam for
my most recent visit in February. On the
one hand, all was far from perfection on our
side. The stability of the South Vietnamese
government could certainly not be taken for
granted. And the President's hesitant and
intricate methods of war-making, combined
with the manifestoes of the war's senatorial
and other cities, had deprived our men of the
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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE June 6, 1966
absolute confidence in their support at home
that American troops in combat always ought
ideally to have. On the other hand, however,
these imperfections, though serious enough,
were powerfully counterbalanced by the sit-
uation of the Viet Cong.
The refugee flow from the V.C. areas was
increasing; by the end of February the total
was nearing 800,000 men, women and chil-
dren, or close to one sixth of the population
that the V.C. had controlled at their high
point. Viet Cong propaganda was already
publicly denouncing the refugee movement
as an Imperialist plot to diminish the rice
supplies available to the second government's
tax collectors, There were symptoms that
the V.C. second government's available pool
of conscripts had already begun to dry up in
more than one province. In Gen. Westmore-
land's highly successful Masher-White Wing
operation, the two prime-target regiments,
the 18th of the North Vietnamese 325th divi-
sion and the 2nd V.C. main-force regiment,
had come south into Bindinh province With
the primary intention of taking the offen-
sive-Instead they were so badly knocked
about that they were put out of action for
several months. But P.O.W. interrogations
revealed that these regiments' southward
move from Quangngai province had the sec-
ondary purpose of securing badly needed re-
placements, since the press gangs had been
coming back almost empty-handed.
When I went down to the delta town of
My Tho, I discovered the sad plight of the
most famous V.C. provincial battalion in
Vietnam, called by Hanoi radio the "Ever
Victorious Ap Bac Battalion" in memory of
a smashing success in the past. The "Ever
Victorious" had just suffered two drubbings
within two months by the local South Viet-
namese troops. Furthermore-and much
more revealing the battalion was now af-
flicted, according to a large number of de-
fectors, with a desertion rate well above 60
percent per year. Each province in Viet-
nam is markedly different from the next
province, and symptoms in Quangngai and in
Dinhtuong, the stamping ground of the "Ever
Victorious" must never be exaggerated into
nationwide symptoms, yet all this evidence
was pretty impressive nonetheless.
The provincial evidence and the immense
refugee movement were impressive, above all,
because they had no precedents. Even more
impressive, and equally unprecedented, was
the evidence of the many battlefields. Until
hardly more than a year ago, just one Viet
Cong prisoner of war or battlefield deserter
was so rare a phenomenon that Saigon would
be agog about him for days on end, and it
was also a real cause for celebration if as
many as four or five enemy dead were found
on the field of battle. Even today the V.C.
and North Vietnamese have not altered the
battlefield discipline that requires all killed
and wounded to be carried away by their
comrades, any more than they have changed
their rules against desertion. After the
Chulai fight, a couple of hundred Viet Cong
corpses were found hidden in a trench where
they had been dragged with butchers' meat
hooks, More recently, V.C. P.O.W.'s have
turned up with loops attached to their cloth-
ing to make dragging easier in case of need-
a prebattle precaution which must surely
raise fighting spirit In a wonderful manner.
Thus while others might be unimpressed, I,
remembering the quite recent past, was left
all but incredulous by the almost daily body
counts of enemy dead abandoned on the
battlefield, and by the constant news of pris-
oners of war and battlefield deserters.
It is also worth noting that in the two
months of January and February, the body
counts reached a grisly cumulative total of
7,362 enemy dead. This means that the true
total of enemy killed in action was certainly
above 10,000, for although counts made in
combat must be discounted for accidental
duplication, a big addition must also be
made for enemy dead dragged away in con-
tinuing compliance with the old discipline.
It is also conservative to assume that the
total of the enemy's disablingly wounded was
double the total of those killed. Hence the
overall figure for enemy dead and disabled
in January and February alone was probably
above 30,000. To this must be added 1,100
P.O.W.'s and battlefield deserters-the latter
being troops who seize the opportunity of
battle to squat down in a ditch until they are
overrun by our men.
To be sure, not more than half these heavy
V.C, losses were soldiers of the main forces,
for many were porters, guerrillas, local-force
troops and even civilians impressed as tem-
porary porters. But even so, it was abun-
dantly clear that the main forces were being
very badly knocked about. This was all the
more striking because the Ia Drang experi-
ence had taught the Viet Cong and North
Vietnamese commanders not to court any
more set-piece battles. Engaging main
forces had therefore become more difficult,
since they in most cases had first to be
sought out. Altogether the "seek out and
destroy" strategy struck me as succeeding
beyond all expectations. What is more im-
portant, this opinion was--and is-shared by
Gen. Westmoreland.
If you look at this war's military aspect
without regard to such political factors as
instability in Saigon, or hesitancy in Wash-
ington to give full backing to Gen. West-
moreland, you have to conclude that the
situation is full of promise. To be sure, the
enemy is still reinforcing at about the rate
projected in the November estimates. To be
sure, the very fact that the enemy is still
reinforcing means that clearly he intends to
use his reinforcements in battle. So there is
hard fighting still ahead. But if you make a
practical analysis of the V.C. second govern-
ment's problems, you are driven to conclude
that the present enemy reinforcement is like
one of those last high raises that losing
players sometimes make to frighten their
Opponents out of a poker game.
The limit on the number of troops the
North Vietnamese Communists can send
southward is not yet in sight, but the limit
is quite clearly in sight on the number of
troop units the V.C. second government can
sustain in the South. This is why it is
wrong to talk about an "unlimited war," and
this Is also the main reason for believing
that we are confronted with something like
a desperate last high raise in poker. If you
examine the projection of enemy-troop
buildup made by Gen. Westmoreland's staff,
you find, first of all, that most of the build-
up is accounted for by a very large additional
invasion of the South by North Vietnamese.
This is risky in itself, since many of the
southern rank and file of the Viet Cong
much resent the overt northern takeover in
the South. Second, you find a very puzzling
anomaly, in the form of a great increase in
the burden of the already overburdened
V.C. second government.
In the spring of 1965 the strain of sup-
porting main forces of a strength of 10 di-
visions was already severe. If the enemy
buildup continues until the end of this year
as projected by the Westmoreland staff, the
strain will be nearly twice as great, for the
V.C. second government will be supporting
main forces of the strength of 18 divisions.
All the strictly military personnel of the
main forces are now coming from North
Vietnam-but this was already the case in
1965. But now, on the one hand, the V.C.
second government has a reduced productive
and manpower base, primarily because of
the refugee movement. And on the other
hand, if the buildup continues as projected,
the second government is eventually going
to have to provide the main forces with
nearly twice as much rice and each month,
with at least double the number of men to
fill gaps in the regimental ranks, and with
close to double the number of men or women
(for women are now being drafted for this
purpose) to serve in the ported battalions
and the longer range transport detachments.
If the strain was already severe in the spring
of 1965, what then will be the strain on the
V.C. second government by December, 1966?
The answer, I think, is that the present
enemy reinforcement has behind it a truly
desperate decision-a decision, in fact, to
throw In all remaining reserves, and to con-
sume all the remaining stocks of food and
other supplies still cached in the main bases,
to make one final try for victory. If this be
true, we are indeed confronted, with a last
high raise. And the maker of a last high
raise always loses the game If another player
has the resources and the courage to call
and raise again.
I believe that we in America, have the
needed courage, as I know we have the
needed resources. To this hopeful observa-
tion, however, I must add two brief foot-
notes. First, a warning is needed concerning
that phrase "losing the game." When and
if Gen. Westmoreland succeeds in breaking
the enemy's main forces, the big war in
Vietnam will be over, and the game will
really be won. Breaking the main forces will
break most of the V.C. power in the country-
side. It will not break all the V.C. power,
however. A little war of mopping-up opera-
tions, costing few casualties and needing
fewer troops, but troublesome and ugly all
the same, may therefore continue for a con-
siderable period. By method and determi-
nation, that little war can be won in the
end in South Vietnam. But the War plan-
ners in Hanoi will still be the masters of the
V.C. remnants of the South. They will still
have the power to end all fighting by calling
home their men. And the prime reason for
maintaining a stern, persistent, though not
irrational, bombing pressure on North Viet-
nam is to teach the lesson that the call-
home order had better be given as soon as the
big war in the South is decisively lost.
Second, despite the hopefulness of the mil-
itary situation, the war can perhaps be lost
somewhere in the dark labyrinths of Saigon
politics. Despite all the positive factors, this
warning must be reiterated, and the need for
American patience with the vagaries of Viet-
namese politics must be emphasized
For close on a century before 1954, the
Vietnamese had no experience of self-
government. Under Ngo Dinh Diem, they
then made considerable progress. As au-
thoritarian governments go, the Diem regime
was worthy of considerable respect-for more
respect, certainly, than the dogmatic, harsh
and gloomy Communist regime in the
North-but under Diem, the Vietnamese got
their bellyful of authoritarian government in
Saigon. A long period of sometimes wild
cut-and-try is therefore unavoidable, before
the Vietnamese find the mode of government
that suits their traditions, habits and out-
look. There is nothing to worry about in
that-so long as they do not stab themselves
in the back during one of the wilder cut-
and-tries. For the long pull, moreover,
South Vietnam is one of the very richest
countries in Asia, with an industrious and
talented people who have been forcefully
dragged into the 20th century by all the
technological lessons of their bitter war ex-
perience. So I have no patience with those
who ask, "What shall we have in South Viet-
nam, even if we win?" Every sort of basic
factor promises a good future, if the suffering
people of South Vietnam can only be granted
peace at last. If that time comes, moreover,
the United States can not only take the
satisfaction of a stronger nation that has
rendered loyal service to a weaker ally, we in
our country can also sleep more easily in our
own beds. For if the northern Communist
aggression against South Vietnam is not suc-
cessfully defeated, there will be another such
aggression, and another, and another, until
men begin to say, "The line must be drawn
somewhere." And thus the Third World War
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may begin, and that is what we are now
fighting to avert.
THE JOSEPH H. HIRSHHORN MU-
SEUM AND SCULPTURE GARDEN
Mr, ANDERSON. Mr. President, a bill
to establish the Joseph H. Hirshhorn
Museum and Sculpture Garden has been
referred to the Committee on Public
Works. The proposed site is an area
bounded by Seventh Street, Independ-
ence Avenue, Ninth Street and Madison
Drive. As a member of the Board of
Regents of the Smithsonian Institution,
which would administer the center, I
want to thank Senator RANDOLPH for
introducing this legislation.
To Mr. Hirshhorn the American peo-
ple are indebted_ His gift of some 4,000
paintings and 1,600 pieces of sculpture
are thought to be among the most valu-
able contemporary collections in private
hands. Most of us will try to understand
Mr. Hirshhorn's desire to share with
others the pleasure these works have
brought to him. As a boy his horizons
rose beyond the Brooklyn slum in which
he determinately nutured an early ap-
preciation of the arts. Now Mr. Hirsh-
horn passes on to the American people
the fruits of his aspirations. It is only
fitting that these works have their per-
manent home in Washington-a city
whose emergence as a cultural center
mirrors the vitality and growth of our
20th century. Certainly, Mr. Hirshhorn
follows nobly in the steps of other great
humanitarians who have so generously
given of themselves.
AWARD FOR HIGHWAY SAFETY
TO INDIANA MAN
Mr. HARTKE. Mr. President, on
May 24 Jim Hetherington of WFBM-TV
In Indianapolis received the Creative
Award for television writers at the an-
nual Alfred P. Sloan Radio-TV Awards
for Highway Safety in New York City.
It is my pleasure to read his citation:
Jim Hetherington of WFBM-TV, Indian-
apolis, Indiana, displayed outstanding crea-
tive talent in preparation of the script far
an analytical documentary entitled A Cross
By The Road. The film explained with
dramatic effect the complexity and enormity
of the traffic accident problem, yet outlined
with clarity the interrelated solutions which
can be implemented. Widespread public
response to this exceptional film created a
better understanding of traffic safety values.
I am proud that Mr. Hetherington and
WFBM-TV have received this recogni-
tion for their outstanding public service
to the people of Indianapolis and
Indiana.
The principal address at the Sloan
Awards dinner was given by Under
Secretary of Commerce Alan S. Boyd.
His remarks effectively answer those
who would dodge responsibility for
mounting a really meaningful attack on
traffic accidents by continuing to blame
this national disgrace almost entirely
Under Secretary Boyd has given the
best explanation I have seen of the need
to take account of all elements in high-
way transportation and of directing our
efforts 'to helping motorists avoid acci-
dents, injury, and death.
As he so clearly shows, those who sit
back and contend that accidents are
caused in almost all cases by bad driving
are in effect making excuses for doing
nothing constructive about it.
Mr. Boyd shows that there is a way to
do something about it, and I believe all
my colleagues will be interested in his
reasoning. I believe he offers assurance
that the various legislative proposals
now before Congress can produce a pro-
gram that will get results for the Ameri-
can people.
I have offered amendments which I'
believe will improve and strengthen the
program proposed by the administra-
tion, and I am confident that the Con-
gress will enact a strong, fair and effec-
tive bill. We shall continue executive
consideration of S. 3005 and the pro-
posed amendments in the Commerce
Committee tomorrow.
Mr. President, I ask unanimous con-
sent that Mr. Boyd's speech be included
in the RECORD.
There being no objection, the speech
was ordered to be printed in the RECORD,
as follows:
REMARKS BY ALAN S. BOYD, UNDER SECRETARY
OF COMMERCE FOR TRANSPORTATION
(Prepared for delivery at the annual pre-
sentation of the Alfred P. Sloan Radio-TV
Awards for Highway Safety, at the Waldorf-
Astoria Hotel, New York City, May 24, 1966)
There is a normal human tendency to be
self-satisfied: to feel that what we are doing
now and the way in which we conduct our
affairs 'is good and sufficient. It is often
uncomfortable to consider that we can and
t should improve our activities. But we can
step out of our humdrum routine to promote,
to inspire, and to educate. Those whom we
honor tonight have done this by utilizing the
communications media with sensitivity and
imagination to promote Highway Safety.
In winning the Alfred P. Sloan Awards you
have demonstrated your ability to live up to
Mr. Sloan's own high ideals of public respon-
sibility. This sense of responsibility was re-
flected in his life-long commitment to the
cause of highway safety, and the personal
leadership he gave to this cause.
Thirty years ago he joined with three other
industry leaders in organizing the Automotive
Safety Foundation, which he continued to
support even after his retirement as an active
executive of General Motors Corporation. In
1948, as founder and chairman of the Alfred
P. Sloan Foundation, he established these
awards to the broadcasting industry, and he
continued to participate personally in this
program so long as his health permitted.
It is good to take occasion periodically to
recognize the efforts spent on traffic safety
because those who are devoting their energies
to this cause may be tempted to feel that they
have been rowing upstream and against a
strong current, at that. Tonight's ceremony
affords a brief pause to look around and see
where we have been and where we are going.
I can't leave this simile, however, without
urging you not to rest too long on your oars.
We have made considerable progress in
this long upstream struggle. Travel on the
Nation's roads and streets is almost three
times as safe as when the Automotive Safety
Foundation was founded-as measured in
deaths per vehicle miles.
But it still is far from safe enough. The
closer we get to shore, if you will, the stronger
the current-because of the enormous growth
in population, in drivers, vehicles, and high-
way usage. The absolute toll in lives lost,
injuries, accidents and damages now reaches
new records each year.
The figures are familiar and frightening:
Fifty thousand American skilled in. a year;
100,000 permanently disabled; nearly 4 mil-
lion injured; over $10 billion in economic
losses.
You know, and I believe more and more
American citizens know, that this national
tragedy need not continue. They agree with
President Johnson that "we can on longer
tolerate such anarchy on wheels."
Earlier this year President Johnson pre-
sented a program designed to carry forward a
comprehensive, accelerated attack on traffic
accidents. . Congress now is preparing to
make decisions about this program which I
am confident will launch a new era in safer
highway travel for the American people-
provided the program receives the strong and
continuing support it must have to be most
effective.
First, let me make it as clear as I can that
the Administration's approach is positive, not
negative.
The Administration has not sought to
create scapegoats. It has no script for "good
guys" and "bad guys." It has not thought
in terms of accusing or punishing anyone.
It has, instead, thought in terms of how
accidents, injuries, and deaths can be re-
duced. We in the Administration are not in-
terested in legislation for the sake of legisla-
tion. We are not concerned with organizing
elaborate programs for their own sake-or for
their propaganda value.
In three words: We want results.
Last April 22 in making an appeal for
enactment'of the Administration's highway
safety bill, President Johnson said:
"The American people are aroused. They
want action. We want action, too, but we
want it to be fair and intelligent-for the
American driver and the great industry that
provides his car."
That sums up our goal: to obtain tangible
improvements in highway safety, with fair-
ness and intelligence.
This objective has been the guideline in
formulating the Administration's proposals.
I believe an examination of those proposals
will bear me out.
These proposals do not anticipate any easy
cure, just as they do not single out any
particular villian. They do not prejudice any
fact of the safety issue. Rather, they offer a
program designed to take full advantage of
the progress made to date, and to force the
pace in discovering and implementing new
knowledge and new techniques that will
yield substantial, provable benefits.
The public discussion and debate of the
past few months, while they have stimulated
a desirable public interest in traffic safety,
have tended to center attention on one or
two elements of the problem. The Admin-
istration's program, on the other hand, con-
siders all aspects.
The scope and direction of the Adminis-
tration's program has been emphasized re-
peatedly by Secretary Connor in his appear-
ances before Congressional Committees. I
would like to quote from his testimony:
"The program that would be provided by
this legislation would devote the needed
emphasis and resources to all aspects of the
highway safety problem. It is based on the
recognition that accidents often are caused
by multiple factors-they are frequently the
result of some failure of the system which
includes the driver, his vehicle, and his en-
vironment, including the highway, or the
interaction of all three. It does not assume
that any one of these elements is more im-
portant than the others, and it is not di-
rected toward a panacea-type solution to the
highway safety problem.
"The approach of this legislation, besides
being directed toward all elements of the
traffic safety problem, would include the
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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD -SENATE June 6, 1966
participation of all levels of the Govern-
ment-Federal, State, and local-as well as
industry and private organizations."
I might add that the legislation was drafted
intentionally to be flexible with regard to
program, organization and administration,
so as to facilitate the full use of existing
knowledge and the results of research and
-development as they become available and
as their usefulness is proven.
Specifically, the Administration proposes
a broad Federal research and development
program in highway safety. The Admin-
istration also seeks directive authority to set
safety performance standards for automotive
vehicles and their components. And the
Administration is seeking $420 million over
a six year period to assist the States.in de-
veloping and improving their own compre-
hensive traffic safety programs under uni-
form national standards.
The latter provision recognizes the tradi-
tional responsibilities of State and local gov-
ernments with regard to control of the traffic
system.
The Federal Government's responsibility
to provide leadership and coordination for
these State programs was clearly established
.by Congress last year, in an amendment to
Federal-aid highway legislation. Now, the
Administration is seeking Federal funds to
assist the States in carrying out the objec-
tives of this amendment.
This approach is in keeping with the
spirit of Federal-State cooperation which
has worked so successfully In the Federal-aid
highway program. Through this program
the Federal Government has made and is
making an, enormous contribution to high-
way safety. It is enabling the States to con-
struct the Interstate Highway System, whose
controlled-access freeways are the safest
roads yet built. It is assisting the States in
their long-range improvement programs for
major highways. And now it is aiding them
in a priority program for eliminating the
danger traps that still remain on Federal-
aid highways.
The Federal-aid program, is providing sub-
stantial benefits in safety, as well as in faster,
more economical, and more comfortable
travel.
Still, highways are only one element of
the traffic safety problem. The legislation
now on the books, as a result of last year's
amendment, plus the financial aid requested
by the Administration, would permit the
development of a comprehensive program,
with no aspect excluded.
It would permit a program directed to-
ward the total highway transportation sys-
tem, and its three basic elements: the
driver, his vehicle, and the highway. The
States would continue to assume primary
responsibility for control of the driver and
the highway, but the Federal government
would take a portion of the States' responsi-
bility for the vehicle, to the extent that it
would assure that new vehicles met mini-
mum safety performance standards. This
new role for the Federal Government recog-
nizes the desirability for uniform national
standards for manufacturers, rather than
separate State standards.
In addition, under its authority to set uni-
form standards for other areas of State traf-
fic safety programs, the Federal Government
could identify the major gaps and weak-
nesses that exist throughout the country
today, and proceed in cooperation with the
States to upgrade current programs and
formulate new ones as needed.
The goal of the program I just outlined is
to get tangible improvements in highway
safety with fairness and intelligence. The
key to how this program must proceed to
get results lies in the concept that accidents
and their consequences result from failures
of the system which includes the driver, the is a complicated task, that It occasionally
vehicle, the highway, and their interaction. requires drivers to make decisions and to act
with speed or precision that is beyond their
abilities. We can help them by reducing the
difficulty of the driving task or by giving
them better tools to cope with it.
System engineering is the way to this
objective. It can be effective both in pre-
venting accidents and in reducing the sever-
ity of those that do occur. At the present
time, for example, highway engineers are
experimenting with breakaway sign supports
for those obstacles that must remain near
the pavement. Research also is underway in
the Bureau of Public Roads to develop elec-
tronic or mechanical aids for the driver,
which could, for instance, inform him when
it is safe to pass on a two-lane rural high-
way, or when he is closing too fast on the
car ahead.
The systems approach also looks to changes
in the vehicle that will make driving more
reliable, or that will prevent or reduce in-
jury and death when accidents happen. And
it looks to the interaction of the vehicle and
the highway, and to reducing the adverse
effects of the environment, particularly of
hazardous weather conditions.
By approaching highway safety as pri-
marily a technological problem-and only
secondarily as a social or legal one-and by
attempting to reduce the demands on the
driver, we encounter some raised eyebrows
from those accustomed to thinking of acci-
dents In terms of driver error. It has been
suggested, for Instance, that this approach
is somehow immoral, that it relieves drivers
of responsibility for misconduct, that it
excuses them instead of punishing them.
I do not agree. It is no more immoral than
shaving with a safety razor instead of a
straight edge.
It does say that the man who makes a mis-
take, where it is an honest one or pure negli-
gence, need not suffer instantaneous corporal,
if not capital, punishment. And that inno-
cent passengers and drivers of other cars
need not suffer with him. The drunken,
reckless, or irresponsibile driver can be
brought to justice through due process of
law.
Furthermore, the people we are trying to
protect are not, by and large, habitually
dangerous drivers. They are not the "suicidal
boobs" that self-styled experts like to preach
against. Nor are they imaginary. They are,
in fact, you and I.
The truth is that the great bulk of ac-
cidents involve average, normally responsible
drivers. This was borne out quite clearly
in an analysis by the Bureau of Public Roads
last summer of 150,000 California drivers'
records. The study showed that almost an
entirely different group of drivers is in-
volved in accidents each year. Removing
the repeaters-those who have two or more
accidents in one year-would have little or
no effect on the following year's accidents.
So, our annual traffic toll is, to an over-
whelming degree, an accumulation of rare
accidents, occurring to all too many generally
good drivers. It is plain, then, that if ac-
cidents are to be radically reduced, all
drivers-not just the "dangerous" few-
must be helped.
This is precisely what President Johnson's
traffic safety program is meant to do.
Relating this view of driver error or driver
responsibility more specifically to the safety
efforts we are honoring tonight, I would
guess-and this is an undocumented guess-
that most of the traffic safety efforts of radio
and TV stations in past years would come
under the heading of "driver motivation" or
"driver improvement," No one, of course,
would deny that there is room for. improve-
ment in the general level of driver com-
petence. For that matter, I suppose each
of us here could stand to improve his own
skill behind the wheel. But while driver
improvement is a worthy cause, it must be
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While this concept is simple enough to
state, its implications are not widely under-
stood. It requires the rather belated appli-
cation to highway transportation of what is
known in engineering as the "systems
approach."
The main obstacle to the most effective
use of systems engineering in the past, has
been the practice of assigning a "primary"
cause in accidents-and particularly of
blaming most accidents on "driver error."
In this way of thinking any accident that a
driver may conceivably have averted is ipso
facto his fault. The way to prevent acci-
dents, then, is to make all drivers perform at
all 'times without error.
Systems engineering, on the other hand,
recognizes that accidents can result from
multiple causes, in the sense that a cause is
any condition existing prior to the accident
which it might have been possible or prac-
ticable to eliminate, and but for which the
accident would have been avoided. In this
view, all accident causes are equal if, by the
elimination of any one of them, the accident
might have been prevented.
Rather than accepting driver error as the
"primary" cause of most accidents, systems
engineering seeks ways to change the ele-
ments of the highway transportation system
so that accidents will not occur, or so that
their severity will be reduced.
For a simple parallel we can take an Illus-
tration from industry. A worker could be
trained to operate a dangerous power ma-
chine and signs could be posted warning him
to work safely. Then if he gets careless
just once and maims himself, it is presum-
ably his own fault. On the other hand, the
machine could be designed with a protective
guard which would make it impossible for
him to get hurt.
In highway transportation, the effective-
ness of the systems approach has been
demonstrated quite clearly by the Interstate
Highway System. These controlled-access
freeways are consciously designed to prevent
many types of traffic conflict and to make
driving easier and safer,
They provide separate roadways for oppos-
ing traffic with wide medians, or median
barriers, to prevent headon collisions. They
have no intersections, or cross traffic at
grade, thus preventing angle collisions.
They have gentle curves and grades and long
sight distance. They have wide, paved
shoulders and clear roadsides.
On the best of our highways, if a driver
loses control of his car for whatever reason-
whether he was swatting a bee, lifting his
pet clog off the floor, falling asleep, or if he
had a "couple of beers"-if he goes off the
road, he has a chance of regaining control
without slamming into a tree, or rolling into
a ditch. What could have been a needless
fatality becomes simply an incident.,
Or take a case where the vehicle is at fault.
If the brakes fail, the driver has a better
chance to ride out safely on the Interstate,
because there are no intersections, or drive-
ways, or cross traffic, or sharp curves, and
there! are wide shoulders where he can get
out of the traffic stream.
Because safety has been engineered into
the Interstate System, the same drivers have
only a half or a third as many accidents on
the Interstate as they do on conventional
highways. This year alone, the Interstate
Highways now open to traffic will save the
lives of at least 4,000 persons who would be
killed if they were forced to use conventional
roads.
It is apparent, then, that if we try to
understand drivers as they are-with their
capabilities and their limitations-we can de-
sign highways and vehicles that make their
driving more reliable and more effective.
 11786'
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r
good time with all of the give and take that
he engendered, particularly as state chairman
of the Democratic party.
The contest of living was fun as parlayed
into politics, and he enjoyed it to the hilt.
This side of his personality overreached
the others: That of the lawyer, of good citi-
zen, leading layman in his church, of good
father and family man. This may or may
not be unfortunate, judging how one views
life.
It is sad that so much talent and energy
has been lost to this community, state and
nation through a physical accident such as
the massive coronary occlusion that Mr.
Phelan suffered early Monday. He had a
great future ahead of him both in, the law
and in politics, and this had not been dimin-
ished one whit by the fact that he did not
gain the nomination for the federal circuit
judgeship for which he was recommended.
His career in state government was going
forward; he had every intention of running
for the State Senate and most likely would
have, been elected, over our opposition, of
course; but elected nevertheless.
We were sort of looking forward to this,
and somehow secretly glad he did not stray
off onto the neutral pathways of the ju-
diciary which would have put him out of the
arena.
So as we take our leave of Walter Phelan,
with a great deal of sadness, we do so think-
ing of him loading the political cannon and
firing like mad, often in our direction. We
shall sincerely miss him in many respects,
not the least of which was that he was both
a gentleman and a staunch, but honorable,
combatant.
state legislature-a revision of Wyoming's
Municipal code.
Be was a co-sponsor of a legislative re
apportionment bill which passed the House,
'but died in the Senate. The reapportion-
ment 'formulain the measure was very simi-
lar to that later decreed by a three-judge
federal court.
One of the finest speakers on the political
scehe, he was much in demand for appear-
ances at political rallies and meetings
throughout the state. _
He was extremely popular, and for at least
eight or ten years he had been urged to seek
high office. Perhaps he would have this
year, or four years from now, had he lived.
Besides serving as state Democratic chair-
man and as a member and speaker of the
House of Representatives, he served as Lara-
mie county Democratic chairman, and eight
years as Laramie county attorney-and a
good one he was.
In the political arena, Walt Phelan asked
no quarter and gave no quarter. But he was
admired and respected by both Democrats
and Republicans throughout Wyoming. His
friends were many and devoted.
His death is a loss for all Wyoming, and
particularly for the City of Cheyenne.
We join with his many friends in extend-
ing sympathy to his wife and two children.
[From the Cheyenne (Wyo.) State Tribune,
- May 31, 1966]
And whither ,I go ye know, and the way
ye know.-St. John 14:4.
TRIBUTE TO WALTER
The last tilde we talked with Walter Phe-
lan, it was in company with Father Bernard
Brown, a Catholic priest who serves as an
Oblate order missionary with the flare Skin
Indians above the Arctic Circle. It really was
Father Brown's interview but Walter brought
him by because the priest was a house guest
of the Phelans and furthermore a longtime
family friend.
For once we did not engage in any political
needling with Walter, which quite often took
the form of our conversation. He was in-
tensely interested in Father'Brown and the
latter's dedicated efforts with the remote In-
dian tribe. For those who thought of Mr.
Phelan as strictly either a legal expert, and
he was an outstanding attorney in any
arena, or a doughty opponent on the politi-
cal field, and he certainly was that, too, this
was something of a switch.
But there were many sides to Walter, and
this is but one of those that were not revealed
to the general public who most often con-
ceived of him as a political battler, in the
thick of controversy. There were even some
very interesting side angles to this facet of
his personality, and one that made us like
him very much despite some of the jawbone
conflicts we engaged in.
For example, Walter once observed to us:
"There's no point in being in politics unless
you can have some fun out of it." This was
in connection with some statement calcu-
lated to outrage the Republicans, whom Mr.
Phelan quite frequently sought to annoy,
and took great delight in doing so.
As a master. of wielding the political shiv,
Walter often drove home the point; and
when it came his turn to receive the counter-
blows, he did so without complaint, or re-
sorting to the excuse that he had been ill-
used, or had suffered a low form of attack.
This was because he not only was a highly
intelligent man but he also. possessed an
intelligence graced by a well-developed sense
of humor; plus a sense of the spirit of com-
bat, that did not, carry with it rancor, spite
or ate.
Somehow' we got the impression that
through the swirling smoke of broadsides
fired through press releases, editorials,
speeches and other forms of political weap-
onry, Walter was having a tremendously
RESOLUTION OF THE ARKANSAS
BANKERS ASSOCIATION
Mr. HARRIS. Mr. President, on May
18, 1966, the Arkansas Bankers Assocja-
tion met in Hot Springs, Ark., and, among
other things, commended the foresight
and perception of the distinguished sen-
ior Senator from Arkansas [Mr. MCCLEL-
LAN] for his handling of the banking in-
quiry by the Senate Permanent Subcom-
mittee on Investigations, which he heads
as chairman.
As a member of the Senate Permanent
Subcommittee on Investigations, I would
like to ask unanimous consent that the
attached resolution be printed in the
RECORD.
There being no objection, the resolu-
tion was ordered to be printed in the
RECORD, as follows:
RESOLUTION
Whereas, the banking industry occupies
a position of great trust and responsibility
with respect not only to its stockholders
and depositors but, also, to the public; and
Whereas, isolated instances have arisen
where such trust has been violated, with
harmful publicity to banking as a whole; and
Whereas, the Arkansas Bankers Association
feels that all reasonable precautions should
be taken within the concept of the dual
banking system for adequate protection
against any breach of such trust; and
Whereas, certain laws have been promul-
gated, principally on the national level, which
duplicate existing laws; overregulate banks;
restrict free flow of money; and inhibit the
ability of banks to attract funds; and
Whereas, even though all financial insti-
tutions were created by law for specific func-
tions, with separate and distinct powers and
services, there is a willful, blurring of the
distinctions, and the attempted blending of
the services, to the confusion of the. general
public; and
Whereas, the Congress of the United States
is becoming more fully aware of the existing
conditions and problems, because Arkansas'
own native son, Senator JOHN L. MCCLELLAN,
has directed the attention of Congress to
the report of the Senate Permanent Sub-Com-
mittee on Investigations on recent practices
in banking: Now, therefore, be it
Resolved, That the Arkansas Bankers As-
sociation, in this Seventy Sixth Convention
here assembled, urges and requests that the
historic concept of the dual banking system
with its inherent public trust, separate and
distinct powers, be preserved without dupli-
cation and over regulation, and that Senator
JOHN L. MCCLELLAN be commended for his
foresight and perception in the necessity to
combat the existing trends.
Respectfully Submitted,
J. C. BARNETT,
Chairman.
SAM BOWMAN,
P. L. COPELAND,
WILLIAM H. KELLEY,
ELLIs E. SHELTON,
J. B. WADDINGTON,
The Resolutions Committee of the Ar-
U.N. OPPORTUNITY IN VIETNAM
Mr. RIBICOFF. Mr. President on
June 2, South Vietnam made a formal
request for United Nations observers to
oversee the elections for a constituent
assembly in September.
This request is a welcome one. It
should be hailed by all who long for a
solution to the tragic situation in Viet-
nam. For this request, if granted, will
give the United Nations an opportunity
to become actively 'involved where an
objective international presence is sorely
needed.
It will not be easy to gain United
Nations sanction for this proposal. The
President has given his strong support
to the South Vietnamese request. Am-
bassador Goldberg shares his enthusiasm.
We hope that Secretary General U Thant
will lend his great personal influence and
the prestige of his office to this upder-
taking. Most of all we hope that France
and the Soviet Union will give their sup-
port to the proposal when it comes before
the Security Council. Their votes are
important.
Mr. President, I ask unanimous sup-
port that an editorial which appeared in
the New York Times on June 3 be inserted
in the RECORD.
There being no objection, the editorial
was ordered to be printed in the RECORD,
as. follows:
U.N. OPPORTUNrrY IN VIETNAM
The formal request by the Saigon Govern-
ment for United Nations observers at the
election of a constituent assembly in Sep-
tember provides the opportunity for effective
U.N. involvement in the Vietnamese crisis.
We hope that Secretary General Thant, who
has been so alert to the menacing implica-
tions for the world of military escalation and
internal chaos in'South Vietnam, will swiftly
join President Johnson in endorsing Saigon's
bid for impartial supervision of the balloting
this fall.
The assembly election is an essential initial
step toward establishing democratic rule in
South Vietnam, and the U.N. Is the ideal
agency to supply observers to help guarantee
fair voting in a war-shattered country with
no tradition of representative government.
The United States, as we have often noted, is
much too deeply committed in Vietnam to be
considered detached in any election role it
might be asked to exercise.
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June 6, 1966 CoNGRESSIO At RECORD -'SENATE
The ' Legislature noted that three Maine
electric utilities and eight others from else-
where in New England, the "Sig 'Eleven
Powerloop," also plan an atomic plant in
that state.
The Maine Power Authority and the pri-
vate group, known as Maine Yankee Atomic
Power Company, would serve the same mar-
ket.
Maine Yankee Atomic and the Maine Power
Authority would generate an almost identical
supply of 700,000 kilowatts, more than the
state needs pending an unexpected industrial
expansion.
The plant at Otter Point would provide
what is known as base-load or constant power
and the proposed hydroelectric project at
Dickey-Lincoln School would furnish peaking
power.
Proponents of the Maine Power Authority
believe the two projects-theirs and Dickey-
could augment each other, increasing annual
residential use in Maine while cutting power
costs.
John N. Harris, technical consultant to ad-
vocates of the authority, believes the project
could operate nearly 40 percent more cheaply
than private utilities.
A power authority could produce at a cost
range of from 3.1 to 3.2 mills at the start
compared to a 4.8 mills cost factor for the
private companies, according to Harris.
The Legislature has asked for an interim
report next month and a complete report
by Aug. 1.
[From the Boston (Mass.) Globe, May 19,
OUR HIGH COST OF ELECTRICITY, IX; THE
GREAT BLACKOUT PUT THE SPOTLIGHT ON
PowER
(By Richard Connolly)
When the lights went out during the
Northeast blackout, the spotlight of public
scrutiny shone brighter than ever on the
private utilities of New England.
It still shines, much to the awareness of
the utilities themselves.
More people are asking more questions
about how our private utilities operate.
They want to know why New E`ngland's aver-
age electric rates are the highest in the
country.
They want to know what is being done
about it.
"Kilowatts ..." "Megawatts ..." "Firm
power ..." "Peaking power...."
The glossary of power terms goes on and
on, to the confusion of the average con-
sumer.
He is interested in power principally in
terms of his electric bill and whether it's go-
ing up of down.
The consumer is served by a monopoly.
He has no choice of product.
As one congressional critic of the private
power interests has pointed out, the con-
sumer cannot go bargain hunting for "Super
Krunchy Kilowatts."
Under these conditions he must rely upon
his elected representatives and the regula-
tory agencies which they appoint. Govern-
ment must stand guardian for the Interests
of the consumer.
Since the blackout, government in this
region has taken a closer look at private
power.
In Massachusetts, for example, the Legis-
lature created a special commission to in-
vestigate the massive blackout of last Nov. 9
and the generation, distribution and cost of
power.
The, commission was given a broad man-
date which also covers the electric rate struc-
ture and the financing of the electric com-
panies both private and municipally-
operated.
Headed by Sen. James P. Rurak (D-Haver-
hill), tie commission has held several orga-
nizational meetings to map its job and to
determine "how much money it will need.
The 17-member commission includes repre-
sentatives of labor, industry, private power,
public power and the Legislature.
The legislation which created the com-
mission was proposed` originally by the
Massachusetts Consumers' Council which
said the power question has been a chronic
problem.
.The only Way It could be solved, the Con-
sumers' Council maintained, was through a
"tough, hard-nose commission operating in
the public eye."
Whether the legislative commission finds
the answer for Massachusetts remains to be
seen.
In its overall approach to the problem, New
England has under consideration several
huge projects-the "Big Eleven Power Loop,"
Dickey-Lincoln School and Gov. Hoff's plan
to import Canadian power.
The advocates of each vouch for the rela-
tive cost benefits of the projects.
The Federal Reserve Bank of Boston stud-
ied the projects and the current condition of
the power industry extensively and concluded
that New England consumers would pay less
for electricity before long.
The analysis, conducted by John Wilkin-
son of its research department, showed that
the price would be about the same whether
the new facilities are erected by public or
private groups.
"Long ago," Wilkinson wrote in his re-
view, "state legislatures and the Congress
recognized that electric utilities were nat-
ural monopolies 'clothed with a public inter-
est' and they have been regtilated-more or
less-ever since.
"There is justification for the belief that,
in general, commission regulation of rates
and service has been neither very effective
nor very positive in the past," Wilkinson con-
tinued.
"There are many exceptions, of course, but
too often the incentive to reduce costs has
not been present, cost reductions have not
meant rate reductions, and assured markets
have not fostered efficiency and aggressive
innovations.
"For the bold expansion that the future
demands, many feel that another tool--reg-
ulation by competition-may better serve
the region.
"Competition or even the prospect of it is
healthy. The absence of competition, less
than ideal regulation, and a limited view of
the public interest may mean a sacrifice of
efficiency.
"But in a natural monopoly situation,
competition too many come at some sacri-
fice in efficiency . . .
"The elected representatives of the people
of the region will decide what mix of plans
and tools seem to offer the optimal solution."
NUCLEAR POWER PLANT SITE CHOSEN
AUGUSTA, ME.-Baily Point, a peninsula on
Wiscasset's Back River, has been named the
"preferred site" for a $100 million nuclear
power plant, the Maine Yankee Atomic
Power Co. president said Wednesday.
William H. Dunham said that if the U.S.
Atomic Energy Commission and other gov-
ernmental agencies approve, the plan is to
start building next year for completion in
1970. The plant would serve much of New
England.
DICKEY PROJECT DATA QUESTIONED
WASHINGTON.-Rep. EDWARD P. BOLAND
(D-Mass.) questioned in House Appropria-
tion Committee hearings made public
Wednesday the basis of cost and benefit esti-
mates used to justify Federal Development
of the Dickey-Lincoln Dam project in Maine.'
During closed hearings on public works
appropriations for the next fiscal year, Bo-
LAND, an opponent of the project, questioned
the reliability of data on which the esti-
mates were based.
II%85
TfrtBUTE'TO WALTER B. PHELAN,
DECEASED
Mr. McGEE. Mr. President, on Thurs-
day, June 2, it was my sad task to attend
the funeral of a dear friend and State
political leader, Mr. Walter B. Phelan,
of Cheyenne, Wyo.
A young man with a brilliant ca"eer
already well established and an even
brighter future to look forward to, Wal-
ter Phelan was stricken suddenly by a
heart attack. His untimely death came
as a shock-not only to his wonderful
family and those of us who have had the
honor to know him well, but to the entire
citizenry of the State of Wyoming.
For Walter Phelan was no ordinary
man. He distinguished himself in every
endeavor he undertook. As an attorney
at law, he was considered one of Wyo-
ming's outstanding barristers. He was
the county attorney at Cheyenne for 8
years. He was the chairman of his State
political party for 4 years. He served five
terms in the Wyoming State House of
Representatives; and during the last ses-
sion of that body, he was selected to the
position of speaker of the house. In this
position of leadership he was able to
achieve the passage of much beneficial
legislation and was almost singlehand-
edly responsible for adoption of a revi-
sion of Wyoming's Municipal Code. Wal-
ter had planned, this year, to seek office
in the Wyoming State Senate where he
most certainly would have been elected.
I know he would have made even greater
contributions to Wyoming's destiny in
that role.
Mr. President, our State-and indeed,
our country-has lost a friend and an
outstanding citizen in the death of Wal-
ter Phelan. My sentiments are echoed in
the editorials which have appeared in the
Wyoming press these past few days, and
I ask unanimous consent that they be
printed at this point in the RECORD.
There being no objection, the editorials
were ordered to be printed in the RECORD,
as follows:
[From the Cheyenne (Wyo.) Eagle, May 31,
1966]
WALTER B. PHELAN
A brilliant legal and political career sud-
dently came to an end yesterday morning
when Walter B. Phelan died.
At 46, Phelan already had established him-
self as one of the fine attorneys of Wyoming
and as a solid leader in the Wyoming Demo-
cratic party.
He served as Wyoming Democratic chair-
man from June, 1961, to Dec. 6, 1964, when
he resigned to accept the post as Speaker of
the Wyoming House of Representatives-an
honor bestowed upon him by fellow Demo-
cratic legislators.
He was serving his fifth term as a member
of the state House of Representatives at the
time of his death.
As Speaker of the House, during the regu-
lar session of the 38th legislature, he guided
several important pieces of legislation
through that body.
Long an outspoken critic of Wyoming's
Right-to-Work law, he saw to it that a repeal
passed the House in the 38th legislature.
The repeal was defeated In the Republican-
controlled Senate.
Largely because of his influence, the 38th
legislature repealed a provision that had pre-
vented Wyoming from accepting its share of
federal aid for education, and he helped to
push through the longest bill of the 1965
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Approved For Release,
June 6, 1966 CONGRESSINAL Ki-R
The United Nations operates with no such EXAMPLES OFFERED rally naive 'peoples to make contact with
handicap. Moreover, the precedent set in Asked to specify some bad conditions a world over the next hill or beyond the
usands miles away. As
September would be helpful in ae wider Po]p rpetual agingQB Inrm D yoelabo atories, they learn of this otherf world, where the
similar international supervision of the wider
elections that later will be necessary when the animals are literally never released from living is better and men have a say about
the cages. Some dogs have been continu- their destinies, their aspirations soar, m
ent aannd constr tia Vannnte peace me beco a and their ideas and attitudes undergo a
and constructon of an interim regime become rthel animals , some of them ously confined possible. Such laboratories
in serious condition, cannot escape the water change."
If the Soviet Union and entual want a- when the cages are hosed out. Meanwhile, as the industrialized na-
help tion clear the way on he eventual terming- tions of the world jet further into the
In one nate cages: Most acages ll the are cages toare o electronic era, Latin America has not
people, ple, Inadequate
the fighting on the basis
determination by the
their support rfor the r ssIgVietnamese ment 30"x30' x26. Collies, boxers, and other lagged far behind. if confirmation is
ee election o sea prsen a i large dogs cannot lie, much less stand, in a needed, one need only refer to the sad toward euch
observers would represent 'Me solution. a practical oor tistics de o the growth of television i
for small animals are small Cages and cats and other position. sta-
ro supervision a s will be cost
fund Lack of postoperative care: oItris het rare Latin America:
adequate
world organization riled by substantial
shortages, Transmitters Receivers
when laboratory, Mrs. Dyce charges, that offers year:
but t it it is is infinitesimal y
measured against the potential contribution adequate treatment after surgery. Often 1961------------------- 123 4,131,000 1961 toward establishing the rule of law in the.dis- they are left completely nattte led In some 1961------------------- 162 4, 692, 700
aster zone that is Vietnam. Careless handling by caretake. laboratories inexperienced caretakers are as- 1984------------------- 211 190 8,821,
1965------------------- 233 9,421,200
signed to animal care resulting often in 200
MENTAL CONDITION OF ANIMALS IN LABORATORIES EXPERI- crude treat INFORMATION AVAILABLE 1966 The major (protected target of Communist prop-
. Animal Welfare Institute has been agandists today is the developing world,
Mr. B May 27, 1R.966, a Mr. very President, on combatting these conditions by educational and, within the developing world, Latin
Friday, May 27, 1 Instructive means. It offers free of charge, to any inter- America receives special attention.
news report entitled "Few Animal ested laboratory, two complete reference Communi
bro Laboratories Science Inspection"
Moni- mall" and "Comfortable Quart, sefor 1Labo- L t n Americast al over 450ahours per
appeared in the Ch ratory Animals." A film, "Handling Labora- week.
tor. tory Animals," is distributed at cost. In addition to Spanish and Portu-
con- The article gixi s some mac of
research e But, Mrs. Dyce pointed out, education- guese, these broadcasts are delivered in dit faions cilities that where exst in perpetual many caging, made- alone is not enough. Legislation is the only English, 8 hours a week; French, 3
fa workable solution. The Animal Welfare In- hours; Creole, 12 hours; and two major
quate cages, lack of postoperative care, stitute strongly recommends bills S. 2322 and
and careless handling by caretakers are S. 3059, now before the Senate Commerce Indian dialects-Guarani, 31/2 hours;
hours count for 381/2
among the main abuses to animals. ' Committee. Both would establish humane and Quecha, 71/z hours. Communist ellite The Monroney amendment to S. 2322, th woas on uld esdef or alers' premises. in laboratories as Weekly broadlanguages
the animal protective bill now pending legislation regulating experimentation Total worldwide broadcasting by Com-
before the Senate Commerce Committee, For itself, the institute recommends the Clark- munist countries increased by 10 percent
would restore to that bill the provisions Cleveland bills. S. 1071 and H.R. 5647, now in 1965 over countries but two countries percent
for inspection of care and housing of re- pending in congressional committee. in 1965d for 1964, half that incres ac-
coun
fully animals during the time when and one of the ta was Cuba. The
search
they are not undergoing actual experi-
ments. COMMUNICATING WITH LATIN other was North Korea. Interestingly,
The article I have cited gives good AMERICA: PROGRESS AND PROB- NorthoKoreaddi s ontinued itEnglish to weekLatin
reasons for the passage of S. 2322 with LEMS America and initiated, in its stead, 14
the Monroney amendment. I ask unani- Mr. MONTOYA. Mr. President, last hours of Spanish.
RD. consent that it be printed in the week, i reported to the Senate on the The U.S. counterattack against this
mous
IL There ffectiveness of our information program Communist barrage is the responsibility
Thbeing no objection, in, the ECORD, in,Latin America in regard to books and of the Voice of America, the broadcast-
was as f llows: d to be printed on the RECORD, other printed materials. Ing arm of the U.S. Information Agency.
FEW follows Today, I would like to turn to an VOA broadcasts to Latin America in
FE ANIMAL LABORATORIES PARS INFORMAL Spanish, Portuguese, and English. rtant
aspect
ore INSPECTION-peoI E HEARINGS HELD equally of our effort to coma unicate In Spanish, there are daily airshows
n le really knew the con- from 6 to 9 a.m. and 6 to 11:30
ton of animals If people really
laboratories its in is most of the experimental with our Latin th. m plus a Monday-through-Friday
laboratories in the in the United States, they y would would I am referring g to the broadcast media, p.m.,
schedule of daily half hours for 5:30
demand corrective legislation;' said Mrs. radio, and television, through which we to 6 p of news, if a total of 62
Dorothy Dyce, of the Animal Welfare Insti- attempt to reach millions of people who
Lute, in an interview here. Hearings on bills cannot or will not read the books which hours per week.
to regulate these conditions open this week are produced by the U.S. Information Portuguese-language broadcasts total
before the Senate Commerce Committee. Agency. 231/2 hours weekly, consisting of a daily
As laboratory animal cte, whose for
head- the Convulsive social and political changes airshow from 5 to 8 p.m. and, Mondays itu quarters are in New York w
el Welfare Ins
qork city, Mrs. Dyce are occurring in Latin America. Many through p.m.-of newss, a half hour-4:30 to
travels throughout the United States, ob- ingredients have figured in this reac- Twenty-four and a half hours of
serving conditions in laboratories of hos- tion; one is radio.
search, and This change is affecting more and VOA's weekly total of worldwide English
re-
pitals, schools, institutions for scientific re-
search, houses. more facets of Latin American culture broadcasts may be heard in Latin Amer-
Out of 104 such laboratories visited since and' society. Ever growing numbers of ica. Additionally, 7 hours weekly are 1963, find every Dyce said that rt only two did she.
care both housed and before and but are participating in it-wit ingly or This cis the p ogramt "Report to Latin animal
apparently given proper comfortably
America
power
A
therwise
back after in surgery. These were at the Jewish Hot- ohis ongoing s cial evoluat on helps As ex- g ounders, ofntariesnews n interv ews,
Coll e, Brooklyn, N.Y., and at
pital
Dartmouth ogram College, Hanover, N.H., where in her tads- pressed in the U.S. Information Agency's aand ired v;
even ng fromh, 6 tort 30 P.m.
merit particularly conscientious veterinaries 25th semiannual report to Congress,
are in charge. a "devi& of comparatively recent inven- and repeated from 9 to 9:30 p.m.
She "pointed out, however, that without tion has led to what has been called the News accounts for 26 percent of the
legally authorized inspection and regulation, transistor revolution in communications. Spanish and 27 percent of the Portu-
pr vat laboratories chid s given a blanket one Cheap, battery-powered transistor radios guese programing of the Voice of
di since conditions might be good in one have enabled previously isolated, politi- America. Thirty percent of the Spanish
direct nection and bad in another.
No. 92-19
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11788
and 25 percent of the Portuguese is de-
voted to news analysis. Commentaries
and features, plus other features center-
ing on self-help and the Alliance for
Progress, make up the remainder.
Of the approximately 38 million radio
receivers in Latin America, 18 to 20 mil-
lion are capable of receiving shortwave
broadcasts. Including an estimated
530,000 In Cuba, VOA's daily listeners
number about 4,200,000.
For special events, however, such as
the coverage of Gemini flights, the VOA
can count on great numbers of local
Latin American radio stations picking
up the VOA broadcasts and relaying
them to listeners via medium-wave. In
the specific case of the Gemini VI and
VII launchings, 633 Latin American sta-
tions relayed the VOA coverage. A care-
ful estimate of the audience for the
Gemini IV coverage-which was relayed
by 522 stations-indicated over 57 mil-
lion listeners in Latin America.
Aside from special events, VOA and
USIS programs are being relayed by or
placed on 1,485 Latin American radio
stations for a total of 11,192 transmitter
hours per week. Taped package pro-
grams of VOA, placed on local stations,
account for 9,315 of these hours; place-
ment of USIS locally produced shows,
1,043; and relays of OVA programs, 834.
VOA's newscasts are used, In Spanish,
by 162 radio stations in 19 countries,
and, in Portuguese, by over 50 in Brazil.
As the number of countries-and the
number of transmitters in those coun-
tries-engaged In international short-
wave radio broadcasting keep increasing,
signals come closer together on the bands
of receivers. What it boils down to is
simply that the stronger scignals are
those which get through. Other things
being equal, the listener will prefer the
stronger, clearer signal, received more
audibly and with less interference.
VOA is doing well in this constant
Jockeying for position. Nearly half of
the total potential television audience of
39 million in Latin America listens to
VOA broadcasts.
That is not to say, however, that we
should relax. In an audience of 16.5
million is good, then 20 or 30 million is
that much better.
Radio has effected in Latin America,
as elsewhere in the developing world,
what Leonard Marks, Director of the
USIA, has referred to as a sort of "in-
stant literacy." For a long time, motion
pictures have filled a similar void in the
area, combining sight and sound, while
dispensing with the necessity for the au-
dience to be able to read and write. Tele-
vision, however, does all of this and
more. It bypasses literacy, on the one
hand, while, on the other, it has been
used in Mexico and other countries as an
Instrument for teaching literacy. In
closed-circuit arrangements, it helps
overcome such Inadequacies as lack of
trained instructors in universities. From
the political viewpoint, it brings the na-
tion and the world into the homes of
people.- To radio, it adds the element of
the visible. To the motion picture, as
traditionally known in moviehouses, it
adds the element of immediacy.
Much as television has already revolu-
tionized communication in Latin Ameri-
CONGRESSIONAL. RECORD-- SENATE June 6, 1966
ca-and between ourselves and Latin
America-we are merely on the thresh-
old of its full potential. What the fu-
ture holds, as orbiting communication
satellites are sent aloft in greater num-
bers, with stepped-up capabilities, and
for longer periods of time, we can only
guess.
During 1965, 23 countries with televi-
sion in Latin America devoted 7,000
hours of their telecasting time to USIA
materials. -
None of the, USIA's posts in these
countries paid anything for this massive
block of air time, which, if purchased,
would have cost-by conservative esti-
mates--$2,350,000.
Programing for Latin America by the
USIA draws on some of the material pro-
duced for worldwide use, such as "Report
From America," "Science Reports," Pres-
ident Johnson's speech at Johns Hopkins
University, "In Search of Peace"--on
Pope Paul's visit to the United States,
and "Walk in Space."
There is, additionally, areawide TV
programing specifically directed at Latin
America:
News: Feature clips which are distrib-
uted to posts not receiving U.S. commer-
cial news service.
Documentaries: Such as Alliance for
Progress specials and OAS specials.
News In depth: Special events cover-
age and special conferences, and a pilot
series, called "Hemisphere Perspective."
Series: "Panorama Panamericano," a
15-minute weekly videotape program is
a major regular vehicle for continued
coverage of Alliance for Progress events
throughout the hemisphere. It is car-
ried on 121 television stations in 101
cities of 20 Latin American countries.
Nuestro Barrio-"Our Neighbor-
hood"-is a 26-episode, continuing series
of 30-minute dramatic programs devoted
entirely to the Alliance for Progress, de-
signed for showing in evening peak-list-
ening periods and using top Latin Amer-
ican talent. It is being telecast at prime
time in 24 Latin American cities on top-
rated TV stations. Some cities plan
daily reruns.
Country programing: Eight USIS
posts produce 21 continuing television
programs, while 18 produce specials and
adapt and use mgterial provided by
USIA's Motion Picture and Television
Service.
Special output: Among special output
items have been television treatment of
the Tricontinental Conference in Cuba,
the Vietnam peace offensive, and the
Cuban exodus.
In summary, Mr. President, this is a
good record of performance that deserves
the wholehearted support of the Senate.
That is not to say that more cannot be
done, but the Voice of America and the
Ui9IS are doing a good job now, and I am
pleased to commend their performance
to my colleagues.
CONCLUSION OF MORNIAG
BUSINESS
The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tem-
pore. Is there, further morning busi-
ness? If not, morning business is con-
cluded.
BANK HOLDING COMPANY AMEND-
MENTS OF 1966
Mr. MANSFIELD. I ask unanimous
consent that the Senate proceed to the
consideration of H.R. 7371.
The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tem-
pore. The clerk will report the bill by
title.
The LEGISLATIVE CLERK. A bill (H.R.
7371) to amend the Bank Holding Com-
pany Act of 1956.
The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tem-
pore. Without objection, the Senate will
proceed to its consideration.
Mr. ROBERTSON. Mr. President, I
suggest the absence of a quorum.
The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tem-
pore. The clerk will call the roll.
The legislative clerk proceeded to call
the roll.
Mr. ROBERTSON. Mr. President, I
ask unanimous consent that the order for
the quorum call be rescinded.
The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr.
TALMADGE in the chair). Without objec-
tion, It is so ordered.
Mr, ROBERTSON. Mr. President,
H.R. 7371, the Bank Holding Company
Act Amendments of 1966, as amended by
the Banking and Currency Committee,
constitutes a major step forward in the
regulation of banks and banking. It
demonstrates clearly that the Congress is
fully aware of the special needs and prob-
lems in the field of banking, including
both the competitive problems and the
problems relating to public convenience
and necessity, and can and will pass ap-
propriate special legislation to handle
these special problems.
The Bank Holding Company Act of
1956 was the outcome of 18 years of ef-
fort on the part of my predecessor, Carter
Glass, and many years of effort on the
part of the Banking and Currency Com-
mittee after I became a member of that
Committee. It was intended to apply in
the field of banking and bank holding
companies the general purposes of the
antitrust laws-to promote competition
and to prevent monopoly-and the gen-
eral purposes of the Glass-Steagall Act
of 1933-to prevent unduly close connec-
tions between banking and other busi-
nesses. For the first time, the Bank
Holding Company Act of 1956 imposed
effective and meaningful restrictions on
the forming of new bank holding com-
panies, the acquisition of banks by bank
holding companies and the conduct of
business within bank holding company
systems. These controls have proved
generally effective and satisfactory.
However, like- all major statutes, the
Bank Holding Company Act of 1956 was
the product of compromise, and, like all
such statutes, experience under it dem-
onstrated the need for amendments of
one kind or another. We knew at the
time we passed the 1956 act that it
would be necessary to revise the act as
the result of experience under it, and we,
therefore, required the Federal Reserve
Board to report to us at the end of 2
years and annually thereafter with rec-
ommendations for amendments. The
Federal Reserve Board has done so, and
H.R. 7371, as reported, embodies many of
those amendments.
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 June 6, 1966 Approved For / I 67B00446R000400080017-2
fit SENATE 11801
cande Z roc public park areas, including supervision, and I have also proposed a first opportunity for this will be if the
a 8=04-940 qz the Du Pont beach, This was cease-fire during the 3 weeks of cam- constituent assembly can become a par-
quickly tied up in court and it looks like
that's where it will stay. paigning, and elections. The electoral liamentary assembly and designate a
But the most often heard complaint is that commission of South Vietnam has prop- government. Then, really, for the first
Du Pont enterprises do not pay their fair erly recommended that the constituent time, we will be off to some kind of
share of the taxes. True, in Gulf County, assembly should also have legislative representative government in South
St. Joe pays half the property taxes the power and should be able to transform Vietnam, a project to be devoutly wished
county operates on. But critics point out itself into a full-fledged parliamentary for and which will be of tremendous im-
the company owns three-fourths of the body if the proposed constitution so pro- portance to the future of the validity of
property.
If they just doubled St. Joe Paper Co's vides. I am particularly gratified by this the struggle there.
assessed value," said a Gulf county leader, proposal, because I have been advocating Mr. President, I ask unanimous con-
"it would put the county schools in good it myself fo: some time. On May 19, be- sent to have printed in the RECORD an
shape." fore the Political Committee of the Lib- article published in today's New York
To double the assessment would still leave eral Party of New York, I urged the Times, written by Charles Mohr, and
full evaluation as a distant goal. The $80- transformation of the constituent assem- entitled "Vietnamese Seek Lawmaking
million paper mill is on the rolls for less bly into an interim parliamentary assem- Right in New Assembly."
than nine million dollars. As for the land, bly, once the work of the constituent There being no Objection, the article
that is on the tax rolls as "wild land"-tax- assembly in
able at between $5 and $7.60 evaluation an producing a constitution is was ordered to be printed in the RECORD,
acre (averaging 17 cents a year)-whereas it completed. The interim parliamentary as follows:
really is farm land (those pines are quite a assembly would be authorized to estab- [From the New York Times, June 6, 19661
crop) with the proper evaluation of no less lish a caretaker civilian government VIETNAMESE SEEK LAWMAKING RIGHT IN NEW
than $25 an acre. until new elections are held under the ASSEMBLY-CIVILIANS' ELECTION LAW PLAN
From the beach property, which is actually Constitution. ALLOWS CHAMBER To ACT AS A NATIONAL
worth about $75 to $100 a front foot, the I would strongly urge the President of LEGISLATURE--CLOUD CAST ON KY HOPE-
county collects an average of 27 cents tax an
acre. the United States to use his good offices to
PREMIER'S INTENION TO STAY ON A YEAR
St. Joe is also supposed to pay personal persuade the ruling junta in Saigon to MAY BE PERILED IF JUNTA ADOPTS PROPOSAL
property tax on the equipment it uses to accept this proposal. It would be very (By Charles Mohr)
farm the pinelands, such as the bulldozers,' unwise for the junta to prolong unduly SAIGON, SOUTH VIETNAM, June 5.-The
planters, tractors, and trucks. But in Gulf their own military form of government. civilians drawing up a South Vietnamese
and Jackson Counties, no woodland equip- While I am pleased about the pro- election law have recommended that a
ment is listed on the rolls. In Bay county posal which would enable a constituent constitution-drafting assembly elected in
it pays on only $3,500 evaluation: in Liberty, assembly to become a parliamentary as- September be given legislative functions and
in $2,500-neither amount representing even sembly and designate the government, I be allowed to transform itself into a national
a healthy fraction of the cost of a piece of assembly.
big equipment, am concerned about another proposal of If adopted, this law could end Premier
St. Joe guards its tax immunity with a which we have just had news. The Nguyen Cao Ky's hope to cling to power well
vengeance. When Calhoun County at- electoral commission of South Vietnam into 1967.
tempted to levy a $550 tax on a bulldozer, the has apparently advised the military. The electoral-law drafting commission met
ozer, the hatwr MBDR4UBB 000400080017-june 6, 1966
tional Council on marine Resources and pie of these areas, which had been occupied draw from the conflict once a further com-
Erigineeririg Development, assisted by by Japan for five years during World War II, mitment was extended by others.
the Commission on Marine Science, threw out their colonial masters one by one The last two conditions laid down by Sec-
after that war. retary Dulles were the decisive obstacles to
Engineering and Resources. This Coun- Before the fall of the French colonial in- the formulation of any plan for U.S. inter-
Cil would operate within the Executive terest, France invited the United States to vention.
Office of the President. assist in trying to squelch the Indo-China On July 20, 1954, representatives of the
I am especially pleased that private in- revolt with economic and military aid. Thus, nine governments assembled at Geneva
under
our involvement beg
the dustry will be invited to give significant Administration wt h a decision announced curtain ton the French Empire in Asia -Great
leadership by its representation on the by Secretary Acheson on May 8, 1950, only a Britain, the Soviet Union, France, Commu-
Tell little more than a year after China fell to nist China, the United States, the Marxist
There exists in the world's means an the Communists-then called by some only Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam (North),
almost limitless potential for food pro- agrarian reformers. That decision was to the State of Viet-Nam (South), Cambodia,
t to and Laos. Three similar armistice agree-
. __._ -_.:
en
pure water, for new sources of fuels and
energy, for a revitalized, superior mer-
chant marine, and even for harnessing
wind and weather. We only need to
learn to apply our American techiologi-
cal genius to their use. There is an op-
portunity for economic growth unpar-
alleled since the industrial revolution.
The National Council will coordinate
the team efforts of the Federal agencies,
the Congress, the universities, the States,
and the business-industrial communities.
With its shores washed by three great
oceans the United States occupies a
n pinup position among the nations as a
y
f
.
a.rs -L...
sea-
line of 12,255 miles is second only in trol of the communist Viet Minh. In addi-
length to that of Canada. We now have tion, Viet Minh forces were in effective
the means and the Opportunity to lead control of large areas
the socentral uth of the 17th
the world in the exploration of the sea and the tip of the Ca Mau Peninsula, the
around us, as we have led in the conqu
Development of the War in Vietnam
EXTENSION OF REMARKS
OF
HON. CLARENC I BROWN JR.
the assoclatieu A-aoCS ? 1
Nam, Laos, and Cambodia) and to France in Laos, and Cambodia, and a declaration was
order to assist them in restoring stability issued.
and permitting these states to pursue their Besides stipulations on the cessation of
peaceful and democratic development." hostilities, the armistice agreements pro-
Approximately $375 million of military and vided for withdrawal of foreign troops and
economic assistance was channeled to South- prohibited Laos, Cambodia, and the two parts
east Asia from the American taxpayers of Viet-Nam from joining any military alli-
through fiscal year 1953. In August of 1950, ance or granting military bases to foreign
the first American military assistance ad- powers.
visory group of 35 personnel was sent to Also, the Geneva Agreements, in effect, rec-
Indo-China to advise on the use of this ognized as Communist territory Viet-Nam
American equipment. north of the 17th Parallel and two provinces
Nevertheless, by 1953, when President in northeastern Laos. Viet-Nam, north of
the 17th Parallel, had already been almost
Truman left the White House, all of Viet- totally occupied by the Viet Minh forces.
Nam above the 17th Parallel except Hanoi, The treaty provisions formalized this Ion-
a narrow corridor connecting to a coastal quest, but they also required the Viet Minh
strip around Haiphong, and a part of the to withdraw from South Viet-Nam, vast
southernmost part of the country.
President Eisenhower continued the pro-
gram of military and economic aid to France
and the Associated States of Indo-China at
levels set by the previous Administration
until the Fall of 1953. In September 1953,
increased aid of $385 million through 1954
was promised by the United States after two
modifications of French policy had been de-
cided on-both of them meaures designed to
avert impending disaster for the French.
Tinder the twin pressures of military re-
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES July 3, 1953, to take steps "to complete the constituting a political or territorial bound-
Monday, June 6, 1966 independence and sovereignty of the As- ary." The conference declaration envisaged
sociated states . within the French the reunification of Viet-Nam, providing for
Mr. CLARENCE J. BROWN, JR. Mr. Union." There was hope that the war, even the selection of a government for the entire
Speaker, under leave to extend my re= at that late date, could be cleansed of the country by free general elections to be held
marks in the RECORD,. I include the fol- appearance of colonialism and would no in 1956.
lowing speech I made May 1, 1966, before longer seem to Asiatics to be an effort by Similar to the splitting of Viet-Nam, the
the Rotary District 667 Conference at France merely to hold on to her possessions, assignment of two northeastern provinces of
The second significant decision was incor- Laos as sanctuaries for troops of the Com-
Miamisburg, Ohio, on the development porated in the plan of French General munist Pathet Lao not wishing to be de-
Of the war in Vietnam: Navarre-a plan of aggressive military action mobilized was, by the terms of the agree-
DEVELOPMENT OF THE WAR IN VIETNAM with increased French and native forces. ment, temporary-"pending a political set-
(By Congressman CLARENCE J. BROWN, JR., After the conclusion of the Korean armis- tlement."
Seventh Ohio District delivered at the tice on July 27, 1953, keeping the Chinese The United States did not sign any of the
Rotary District 667 Conference, Miamis- Communists from active military participa- three strange treaties concluded at Geneva,
burg, Ohio, May 1, 1966) tion in Indo-China had become one of the nor the conference declaration; nor did
Today we face a perilous time in our inter- concerns of American policymakers. On the South Viet-Nam.
national relationships abroad because of the day of the Korean armistice, the 16 mem- In fact, before the conference closed at
critical situation in Southeast Asia. The bers of the United Nations that had helped Geneva, the United States issued a unilateral
Buddhists and others opposed to the govern- to defend South Korea had issued a joint declaration pledging not to use force to dis-
In vbut warning that
ment of Premier Ky in Saigon have forced warning against Chinese Communist action turb the agreements
agree-
special elections to be scheduled in South in Southeast Asia. newed aggression
Viet-Nam sometime within the next three to On May 7, 1954, the day before the Geneva ments would be viewed as a threat to inter-
five months. If the independent government discussion on Indo-China began, the French national peace and security. At the same
Which results from those elections asks the suffered their decisive defeat at Dien Bien time, President Eisenhower announced that
United States military forces to leave Viet- Phu. On June 11, 1954, Secretary Dulles, steps would be taken to establish collectivein
t Asia. Communist aggression
Nam, our nations faces a difficult decision. tin a
ouch oeliver dat L+ohAngelles, he det iled defense m
Let me take a few minutes to review the
situation in Viet-Nam for you, with the hope States would consider additional help to the The attitude of the U.S. Government to-
of putting it into perspective. French: (1) a request for assistance from ward Geneva was summarized by the Presi-
As you may recall, prior to World War II the states fighting the Communists; (2) dent thus: "The agreement contains features
the French maintained a colonial empire in clear assurance. (from France) of complete which we how not like, but a great deal de-
Indo-China, which makes up most of the independence to Laos, Cambodia, and Viet- pends on they ork in pratice."
peninsula of Southeast Asia. The British Nam; (3) an indication of concern and sup- Another chief flaw of the Geneva settle-
in Burma and Malaya were the other colonial port on the part of the United Nations; (4) ment lay in provisions relating to the Inter-
power on the peninsula, and the Dutch con- assurance of collective action by other na- ntional Control Commission agrset up to su-
trolled the islands of Southeast Asia down tions along with the United States; and (5) pervise the .
toward New Guinea and Australia. The peo- a guarantee that France would not with- Commission, composed of representatives of
areas of which were under their control.
Some 80,000 to 90,000 Viet Minh troops were
moved out of South Viet-Nam in the execu-
tion of the agreement. Perhaps 5,000 to
6,000 melted into the civilian population and
remained in violation of the Geneva Agree-
ment. The Geneva Agreements also provided
that any civilians who were residing on one
side of the partition line could, if they chose,
go and live on the other side. By the end
of the time limit set for making the move,
which was extended to July 20, 1955, almost
900,000 civilians had moved from North Viet-
Nam to South Viet-Nam. In contrast, less
than 5,000 had moved from the South to the
North.
In spite of the relocation of Viet Minh
forces into North Viet-Nam, the armistice
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 June 6, 1966Approved Foe$W4$BSWQ 1 P67 0400080017-2
This contrasts with a 50 percent increase in
students.
in the past five years, the faculty has
increased 37 percent, contrasting with the
25 percent growth in students. .
In the ten years, the average faculty salary
has increased almost 96 percent; average
compensation, including fringe benefits, has
increased 118 percent, more than double.
to the last five years, the average salary
has been improved by 41 percent, average
compensation by 51 percent.
Curricular changes in the college include
strengthening the upper division offerings in
many departments; installation of the three-
to-five year concept as the normal time to
complete requirements for the Reed degree,
Increasing the number of inter-departmental
rouses; establishment of basic guide lines
for research institutes, and advanced degrees
in subject matter areas; and increased em-
phasis on the improvement of secondary
school education, including the Reed master
of arts in teaching program.
FINANCIAL SUPPORT INCREASED
Under President Sullivan's administration,
financial support of the college reached un-
precedented heights.. In 1956, financial sup-
port was approximately $218,000 for all pur-
poses; this year the figure will exceed $600,-
000, plus government grants. The total sup-
port received during the last decade exceeds
$8,460,000, excluding all government grants,
which have amounted to $3,890,000 during
this period.
Another index of the financial growth of
A3039
Mr. Speaker, it is my fervent hope that
the existing friendship between our two
countries will continue to the benefit of
both.
The Sea Around Us: Marine Resources
and Engineering Development Act of
1966
EXTENSION OF REMARKS
HON. ED REINECKE
OF CALIFORNIA
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Monday, June 6, 1966
Mr. REINECKE. Mr. Speaker, last
week the House agreed to the conference
report on S. 944 establishing the Marine
Resources and Engineering Development
Act of 1966. The compromise version of
the bill declares it to be the policy of
the United States "to develop, encour-
age, and maintain a coordinated, com-
prehensive, and long-range national pro-
gram in marine science for the benefit of
mankind, to assist in protection of health
and property, enhancement of commerce,
transportation and nef;n, ..... .............. ...
e Fu
s
d
endowment. In the past 10 years, it has risen the National Science Foundation's divisional a aii Fbl risrie and
and increased utilization on of of these and
from a market value of $2,003,000 to $5,364,- committee for science duration. other resources.-
000. This increase exceeds the total of all Sullivan was named first marshal for the As a member of the Subcommittee on
previous gifts to the endowment since the Harvard Class of 1939 and as chief marshal Oceanography of the House Merchant
-original grant establishing Reed College. for the Harvard Commencement in 1964. He Marine and Fisheries Committee I have
A significant event during President Sulli- is a nominee for Board of Overseers of long been concerned about the fact that
van's tenure was the selection in 1961 of Reed Harvard College.
College as one of the eight liberal arts col- the national marine science program
'leges comprising the first group to receive lacked a legislative base, a legislative
snatching awards from the Ford Foundation. commitment of policy and purpose, and
Reed was the only college in the western a statutory body to plan, evaluate, and
half of the country to be chosen. Under the Tribute to Denmark coordinate such a program. These will
terms of the grant, Reed raised more than be provided by the enactment of S. 994.
$2,809,000 in three years, matching two-to- EXTENSION OF REMARKS The great sea around us is corning to
one the Ford grant of $1,400,000. be recognized as the unexplored "inner
i. Simultaneously with the Ford matching or
program, Reed undertook a ten-year $20,000,- HON. HAROLD R. COLLIER space " We need to explore and probe
000 Advancement Program to strengthen the and study this "inner Space" to the same
College. This broad, effort planned improve- OF ILLINOIS extent and with the same enthusiasm
ments in all phases of the college's program, IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES with which we are now exploring and
including increases in faculty salaries, in- Monday, June 6, 1966 studying the vast outer space. For far
creased student aid, and new buildings. To too long we have taken for granted the
date, $10,291,000 has been received or pledged Mr. COLLIER. Mr. Speaker, I am oceans. We have ignored their wealth,
toward the $20,000,000 goal. happy to join with my distinguished Col- and failed to realize their potentials.
GRANTS RECEIVED league from Minnesota [Mr. NELSEN], in The Marine Resources Act will stimu-
Other foundation grants of major impor- paying tribute to the people of Denmark late the search for needed knowledge and
tance have included a 1964 Rockefeller Foun- on the anniversary of the promulgation technology; and it will encourage pri-
dation grant of $275,000 for a pioneer pro- of the Danish Constitution. It was on vate investment in endeavors looking to-
gram to discover talented Negro and other June 5, 1849, that the Danes received ward economic and greater use of the
minority group students, and to improve their charter of freedom from King treasures of the sea.
their undergraduate education; a Rockefeller Frederik VII.
Foundation grant (1965) of $336,000 to es- S. 944 proposes expansion of our use
tablish a research center in the humanities The United States has been enriched of the oceans, the Great Lakes and the
and to create a special program in the arts; through the years by the arrival in this Continental Shelf by development of a
and a Danforth Foundation grant (1965) of country of thousands of Danish immi- Comprehensive program of marine sci-
$185,000 to support continuing education of grants, many of whom settled in Illinois ence activities including exploration, ex-
high school teachers, and for instruction in and neighboring States. I have found ploitation, and conservation of. the re-
President the teaching of disadvantaged youth. the people of Danish ancestry to be in- sources of the ocean. These efforts will
than any Sullivan predecessors, ewithnthe dustrious, thrifty, Self-reliant, and loyal. include development of ocean engineer-
exception of President William T. Foster, For over half a century it has been pos- ing; studies of air-Sea interaction and
whose tenure also was 10 years. sible for Americans who are visiting in transmission of energy, long-range stud-
A graduate of Harvard College in 1939 Denmark to join the people of that na- ies of the potential benefits to the U.S.
(magna cum laude, Phi Beta Kappa), Pres- tion in celebrating the anniversary of economy, security, health, and welfare
ident Sullivan received the master of arts American independence. At Rebild, near to be gained from marine resources, en-
,degree from Harvard University in 1940. He the thriving city of Aalborg, is a beauti- gineering and sciences; and it will also
was the recipient of honorary degrees from ful park where Danes and Americans provide for a thorough study of the legal
Pacific University (1960) and Hebrew Union
College-Jewish Institute of Religion (1961), meet each Fourth of July to observe the problem arising out of the management,
He received Carnegie Corporation grants day upon which liberty was proclaimed use, development, recovery, and control
for, study and travel in 1954 and 1965. throughout our infant Republic in 1776. of marine resources.
Price , to accepting the Reed presidency? I can think of no finer tribute from one
Sullivan was executive vice .; president. and n$tion to another than that, activities would be placed witl,tije.Na-
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treasurer of the Educational Testing Service.
He had been associated with ETS since 1948.
From 1946 to 1948 he was assistant director
of the College Entrance Examination Board,
going to that Position from active duty in
the U.S. Navy, where he was an intelligence
officer. He was assistant dean at Harvard
College prior to entering the service in 1942.
COMMITTEES LISTED
President Sullivan is, or has been, a mem-
ber of a number of national and regional
committees, including the Governor's Com-
mittee for the Oregon Graduate Center for
Study and Research; advisory committee of
the Oregon State Agency for Surplus Prop-
erty; the Committee of Race and Education
of Portland Public Schools; executive com-
mittee, Metropolitan Interfaith Commission
on Race; and the board of governors, City
Club of Portland. He is a member of the
University Club, the Waverly Country Club,
and the Harvard Club of Oregon.
In 1964 he was named a member of the
White House's advisory group on domestic
affairs. He has served on the board of direc-
tors of the American Council on Education;
as_ a trustee of the Independent College
Funds of America, and as chairman of the
Oregon Colleges Foundation.
Sullivan also is on the advisory Committee
for graduate facilities of the U.S. Office of
Education, and a trustee of the Committee
of Economic Development.
Since 1962 he has been on the board of
trustees of the College Retirement Equities
Fund, and also serves or, th
"_,____
n
'
 Approved
June 6, 1966 F~~~q7/AtCBRO;tBPApMNBBBf000400080017-2 A3,041
Canada, India, and Poland, could act only
by unanimous vote in cases involving viola-
tions of the territory covered by the agree-
ments. This ' veto in the hands of a Com-
munist representative was an instrument for
sabotaging the execution of the agreements.
As I said, the final declaration issued at
Geneva in 1954 (subscribed to by neither the
United States nor South Viet-Nam) called
for free elections to unify all of the Viet-
namese in 1956. Recently Senator FULBRIGHT
and others have deplored the fact that this
election was not held.
The reasons for the refusal of South Viet-
Nam to acquiesce in the holding of the elec-
tion were stated by Prime Minister Diem on
July 16, 1955: "We do not reject the princi-
ple of elections as a peaceful and democratic
means to achieve unity. But elections can
be one of the foundations of true democracy
only on the condition that they are ab-
solutely free. And we shall be skeptical
about the possibility of achieving the condi-
tions of free elections in the north under
the regime of oppression carried on by the
Viet Minh."
The position of South Viet-Nam on this
point was "sustained by the United Kingdom,
one of the co-chairmen of the Geneva Con-
ference.
Among the stanchest opponents of the
holding of the 1956 election was the then
Senator John F.'Kennedy, of Massachusetts.
He issued "a plea that the United States
never give its approval to the early nation-
wide elections called for by the Geneva
Agreement of 1954. Neither the United
States nor free Viet-Nam was a party to that
agreement-and neither the United States
nor free Viet-Nam is ever going to be a party
to an election obviously stacked and sub-
verted in advance, urged upon us by those
ve already broken their own pledges
h
h
a
o
w
under the agreement they now seek to en- But e. viable via -=. a.=.._~+ a= ? K ?? only be honestly referred to as a Communist
force." security from outside aggression and from effort to continue the anarchy which had
Now, his brother Senator ROBERT KENNEDY, terrorism and guerrilla activities within the existed since before World War II. The
wants to include the Viet Minh in any nego- hower Administration had proceeded prompt- method was guerrilla warfare, terrorism, kid-
tiated peace! napping, assassination, and atrocity. The
As South Viet-Nam began its existence, ly in 1954 to form a regional defense orga- political approach was to destroy the leader-
Independence prospects for its survival were m.lnimal. nization, the Southeast Asia Treaty Organs- the local level by assassination or
Independence was thrust upon a people with- zation, and to bring South Viet-Nam, as well kship at idnapping and to pesuyda or inimidaor
out political experience and without politi- as Laos and Cambodia, within its protective the populace n revolt rsuade or ignore, the
cal leadership. It had no sense of nation- cover. tntral overnmrnt.
hood. It had no industry. And, by the Specifically, to meet the threat of infiltra- not difficult to convert antagonism
Geneva declaration,' it seemed doomed to tion from North Viet-Nam and the depreda- It was no
to French t colonialism to antagonism the
being swallowed up by the Communist rulers tions of guerrillas in the South, the United government in Saigon. It was not
of North Viet-Nam in two years. States provided military equipment and Viet-Nam g
Yet, when the Eisenhower Administrtation training to the forces of South Viet-Nam. difficult to slip through the jungle and into
left office in 1960, South Viet-Nam was be- The purpose of this conditional offer, a village at night and to decapitate or emas-
ginning to be a stable and established gov- Eisenhower said, was ". . . to assist the Gov- culate some respected local leader, be gone
ernment. Senator John F. Kennedy called ernment of Viet-Nam in developing and before dawn, and return to take advantage
the development "a near miracle." In his maintaining a strong, viable state capable of the local confusion and concern by
book, "Strategy of Peace," published in 1960, of resisting attempted subversion or aggres- preaching conversion to Communist doe-
trine.
he. said: "In what everyone thought was sion through military means."
the hour of total Communist triumph, Recognizing this fact, the Kennedy Ad- The year 1961 saw the development of the
(meaning the months 'after the Geneva ministration later did not use American conflict in Viet-Nam from covert guerrilla
Agreement) we saw a near miracle take forces to repel Communist aggression in action to open, if still small-scale war. In
place. . Today that brave little state Laos. The legal commitment of the United that year, for the first time, the Vietcong
(South Viet-Nam) is working in free and States to South
to Laos. Both of the these coun- bat. For committed forces of battalion
f they launched an
first tmet
whose association with the United States, commitm
whordl else economic and military aid has, in tries of Southeast Asia were brought under attack on a community as important as a
conditions of independence, proved effective." the protection of SEATO. provincial capital. The infiltrataion of Com-
The State Department's white paper of Although the Government of South Viet- munist troops from the North, facilitated by
December 1961, entitled "A Threat to the Nam never established unchallenged author- unchallenged Communist control of eastern
Peace," contains the following analysis of ity in the entire countryside, a period of Laos, increased. By the end of 1961, the m
that
ated
between progress in South Viet-Nam: The years of relative
to 1959. peace Buand stability t late in the latteryear t he 8,000 and 12,000 regular Vie ong troops we e
economic to 1960 m produced hViet-am. to an
econ nomic c miracle in South Viet-Nam. Food tempo of guerrilla attacks began to assume In South Viet-Nam-at least double the
production rose an average of 7 percent a year significant proportions, number present there one year earlier. The
and prewar levels were achieved and passed. In 1960, by which time real economic prog- United States doubled its forces of military
While per capita food production in the ress had come to South Viet-Nam, the armed advisors in South Viet-Nam from fewer than
north was 10 percent lower in 1960 than it forces of the Vietcong operating in South 700 stationed there when President Eisen-
had been in 1956, it was 20 percent higher Viet-Nam began to increase from the level of hower left office to 1,364.
in the south. The output of textiles in the 3,000 at the beginning of the year. During In the period 1961 to 1963, the number of
sought jumped in only one year from 68 mil- this year the Vietcong assassinated or kid- American troops in South Viet-Nam grew
lion meters (in 1958) to 83 million meters. napped more than 2,000 civilians. Acts of from 1,364 to 16,575. In this same period
Sugar production in the same ofle-year span terrorism were directed particularly against we were also faced with the Berlin Wall
increased more than 100 percent, from 25,000 local officials in rural areas to leave the crisis and the Russian missiles crisis in Cuba.
metric tons to 58,000 metric tons. countryside leaderless-the same tactic the The amount of aid, military and economic,
"Despite the vastly larger industrial plant Communists had worked in overthrowing to South Viet-Nam was increased substan-
inh,erited by the forth when Viet-Nam was China some dozen years earlier. tially although the exact figures for military
partitioned, gross national product is con- The signal from North Viet-Nam for in-
siderably larger in the South. In 1960 it was tensification of the conflict came on Septem-
estimated at $110 per person in the South ber 10, 1960, at the Third Congress of the
and $70 in the North. Foreigners who have Communist Party of North Viet-Nam with a
visited both North and South testify to the call for liberation of the South from the
higher living standards and much greater "rule of the U.S. imperialists and their hench-
availability of consumer goods in the latter: men." In December the National Front for
"The record of South Viet-Nam in these Liberation of South Viet-Nam was formed by
recent years is written in services and in im- Hanoi. This
negotiate a whom some
would like the group o with
proved welfare, as well as in cold economic
indexes. A massive resettlement program Viet-Nam and include in the new government
effectively integrated the 900,000 refugees on the theory that they are only reformers.
from the North, who voted with their feet In January of 1961 the United States was
during these years, into the economic and confronted not only with problems in South
social fabric of the South. An agrarian re- Viet-Nam but with far more acute difficul-
form program was designed to give soo,o0o ties in the neighboring nation of Laos. In
tenant farmers a chance to buy the land they Viet-Nam sporadic guerrilla attacks were
work for a modest price. Under the Govern- going on. In Laos, Communist Pathet Lao
ment's agricultural credit program, aimed forces were engaged in a full-scale offensive
at freeing the farmers from the hands of that threatened the government of Premier
usurers, loans to peasant families increased Boun Oum.
fivefold between 1957 and 1959. On March 23rd President Kennedy warned,
"Thousands of new schoolrooms were ? . if there is to be a peaceful solution,
built, and the elementary school population there must be a cessation of the present
in South Viet-Nam increased from 400,000 in armed attacks by externally supported Com-
1956 to 1,500,000 in 1960. A rural health pro- munists ... No one should doubt our resolu-
gram installed simple dispensaries in half of tion on this point ... all members of SEATO
South Viet-Nam's 6,000 villages and hamlets. have undertaken special treaty responsibili-
An elaborate malaria eradication program ties toward an aggression in Laos."
was launched to rid Viet-Nam of its most But sixteen months later, in July of 1962,
important infectious disease. Doctors and the Government of the United States ac-
nurses went into training in South Viet-Nam quiesced in a settlement which terminated
and abroad to serve their people's health any responsibility which the SEATO powers
needs. had toward Laos and imposed on that coun-
"This is a part, a very small part, of the' try a coalition government including Com-
setting againgt which the Vietcong launched munist representation. Acceptance of this
their campaign of armed action, subversion, settlement by the government of Laos, which
and terror against South Viet-Nam. It is a enjoyed recognition by the United States,
record of progress over a few brief years was brought about by suspension of Ameri-
equaled by few young countries." can aid.
And so, this was the situation 71/a years Infiltrators from North Viet-Nam, together
after Geneva-as 1962 began-just four years with local dissidents in Laos and South Viet-
Nam, stimulated in South Viet-Nam what
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 A3042 Approved For ~ggt7A13 &WBP67R~
$ "q( 400080017-2 June 6, 1966
aid are classified after fiscal year 1962. But ferent, but the beginning has plenty of Southeast Asia and for better than a month
it was then said to be running in excess of parallels. halted bombing of North Viet-Nam.
half a billion a year. There is a classic story about Teddy Roose- The silence of the Vietcong response was
In the late Summer and Fall of 1963, the velt's wanting to send the great white fleet deafening. There was no encouragement
internal crisis in South Viet-Nam arising around the world when he was President in whatsoever from the Vietcong, North Viet-
from conflict between the Diem regime and order to show off American power which had Nam, Communist China or from Moscow that
the Buddhists produced a deterioration of been built up during the Spanish-American the peace offensive launched at that time
the military situation and a decision by the War-which had immediately preceded his would get a response. Or perhaps it did get
U.S. Government to encourage a change of Administration. The Congress' refused to a response from the Communists, to the
horses. American aid was cut back. Of- appropriate the money for this venture, effect that they felt sure they were winning
ficial U.S. statements indicating lack of con- Teddy looked in the Treasury and found and nothing short of complete and uncondi-
fidence in the Diem government and calling enough funds to send the fleet hall way tional withdrawal by the American forces
for a change of personnel and policy were around the world and then told Congress if would be acceptable.
issued. Diem was removed in a military coup it would like to have the fleet back home, At the beginning of this year, the United
and was assassinated along with his brother, it could appropriate the necessary funds to States reluctantly renewed bombing in North
Nhu. finance the trip. Viet Nam-over the objection of many Amer-
While our government has never admitted The sham of calling American troops in i.cans.
It, I have always felt personally that we were Viet-Nam "advisors" was dropped in 1964 During this month-long peace offensive,
severely Implicated in the assassination and as the guerrilla attacks began to be aimed the doves were hard at work in this country.
overthrow of the Diem government. Our more and more at American nationals, as With demonstrations against the war, ser-
sympathy with that overthrow had been mo- well as the South Vietnamese, Whether our sous arguments to government leaders in
tivated by a belief that the best way to deal commitment to the war began at the Gulf favor of peace, and the general suggestion
with the unrest in South Viet-Nam was to of Tonkin in August of 1964, or at Pleiku that we should include the Communists in
bring into power a government that would six months.later, the sharpest escalation of any possible peace discussion. The Senate
be more "socially liberal" than that of Diem the war began early in 1965, until by year- Foreign Relation Commtitee undertook its
and. Madame Nhu, who had been critical of end there were approximately 181,000 serv- hearings on Viet-Nam under the leadership tes the United State fofor r not facing was the the icemen in South Viet-Nam. President John- of Senator FuLBRLGET and others opposing hat son's posture, after the election in 1964, Administration policies.
anarchy which was gripping the nation. shifted noticeably from that of a dove to that In the face of this, President Johnson,
With the Diem overthrow our involve- of a hawk. He ordered limited bombing of early in February, personally laid it on the
meat in the government of South Viet-Nam selected targets in North Viet-Nam and line for the Ky Government in Saigon by
became deeper and deeper, to the extent general air support for the war in the South. flying to Honolulu to meet with General Ky
that it would be difficult to call. the Govern- By the Fall of 1965 another noteworthy and arrange with him for the future exten-
meat of South Viet-Nam independent of thing occurred. That was when Lin Piao, sion of more vast amounts of aid for social
American influence. the Chinese equivalent of Secretary Mc- improvements in his country.
Strangely, the setbacks that occurred at Namara (Defense and Foreign Policy Admin- Immediately following the Honolulu meet-
the end of 1963 and the beginning of 1964 istrator) made a speech in which he outlined ing, Mr. Johnson sent Vice President Hum-
began only one month after Secretary McNa- the objectives of Chinese Communism in the PIREY to Southeast Asia to urge other na-
mafs, and General Taylor returned from world. The Western powers, he said, would tions there into active participation in the
South Viet-Nam with an optimistic report. So fall to Communism just as had Free China. war in Viet-Nam. And we asked the United
strong was their optimism, that an immediate The Communists would first take the rural Nations to intervene.
reduction of the American force in South areas of the world and then the cities, as Thus the Johnson Administration was
Viet-Nam by 1,000 men was announced and they had done in China. By the rural areas trying again, just as Dulles had tried, to get
the prediction was made that virtually all he meant Southeast Asia, Africa and Latin the same kind of international cooperation
American troops would be withdrawn by the America. And when these areas had been in Southeast Asia as the free nations had
end of 1965. secured, the industrial centers of the United shown in the Korean War. But there was
In January of 1964, when President John- States and Western Europe would fall easily. little response; and except for the limited
son was only one month in office, we still had This is also the way the war was being con- military support which The Philippines,
less than 17,000 men in Viet-Nam. The worst ducted in South Viet-Nang. (It is worth Australia, New Zealand, Thailand, and South
of the war, from the U.S. standpoint, still noting that the approach of Chinese Com- Korea are giving, the United States is con-
lay ahead and it might still have been pos- munism is different from that of Russian tinuing to bear the brunt of the burden in
sible to decide to withdraw. It might be Communism, which began in the cities and South Viet-Nam. The Security Council of
pointed out that we also still had, and still then spread to the rural areas.) the United Nations, at a meeting on Febru-
do have, the same Secretary of State and the And so Piao seems to verify the domino ary 2nd, agreed to consider the Viet-Nam
same Secretary of Defense we have had for theory that, should Communism win in War by a vote 9 to 2. The meeting was then
the last five years. But it was in 1964 that South Viet-Nam, other nations in that area adjourned for private consultations and dis-
the sharp escalation began, during the same will become principal targets until all South- cussions, and nothing further has developed
election year when one Presidential candi- east Asia is under Communist or Marxist since that time.
date was In the posture of the hawk and domination. Thus, developments in that Some of us at the time of the Honolulu
the other In the posture of the dove. section of the world have an amazing parallel meeting had the feeling that perhaps this
After the attack on American shipping by to the situation in Europe Immediately be- would put the President in a position of be-
Communist forces In the Gulf of Tonkin in fore World War II. Piao has spelled out the ing able to say later this year that the so-
August of 1964, President Johnson went to Chinese objectives much as Hitler spelled out called independent government in Saigon
the Congress he had dominated so effectively the Nazi objectives in Mein Kampf before had so benefltted from the policy declarations
since President Kennedy's assassination and World War II. Mein Kampf, though a best in Honolulu that they could now win the
asked for a resolution of support for the seller, was ignored. Many now suggest we war against Communism by themselves and
actions he might find it necessary to take in also ignore Piao. it would be possible for American troops to
South Viet-Nam. He also asked for a sub- Few people in this country read Chinese, be withdrawn-say by election day or Christ-
stantial financial commitment to that sit- and only a few more have any interest in mas.
uation. The Congress 'voted that support Asia, because our heritage and our commerce The Buddhists now seem to have precluded
without much hesitation-and without any have always directed our attention to Europe. this possibility. Now the initiative, which
specific elaboration by President Johnson. Since America has only recently arrived on shifted to the United States with the fall of
At this point it is well to note that the the scene of world leadership, we do not have Diem, seems to be shifting back to the
President of the United States, under the the tradition of knowledge and involvement Vietnamese.
Constitution, is given two clear powers. in world affairs which keeps us closely aligned Should the new government ask Amer-
First, to make United States foreign policy to remote nations like Viet-Nam. lean troops to leave, President Johnson must
and, second, to be commander-in-chief of Whether you consider our world leadership decide whether to risk the anger of world
American armed forces. The situation in role as having begun with the Cold War 20 opinion and a rear guard opposition from
Viet-Nam Is not the first time in which years ago, or with the beginning of World the Vietnamese by staying in that
a President has committed American men War II or World War I, we do not seem to beleaguered country whether they want 'us
and material to fight in foreign lands with- have the tradition or the training for It to or not; or, if we withdraw, he would in ef-
out a formal declaration of war from the the extent that the British have. Someone feet be writting off the lives of 2,800 Amer-
Congress. It is true that the Constitution once said it took 300 years of world leader- lean men and billions of dollars in Amer-
requires that Congress declare war, but in ship for the British to develop a Winston ican treasure which have been committed
view of the powers of the President this al- Churchill. unsuccessfully to the principle of keeping
most becomes a technical formality. United In the face of the obvious threat registered South Viet-Nam independent of the domin-
States Presidents have, from time to time, late in 1965 by Piao, President Johnson in- ation of Communist North Viet-Nam.
sent the Marines Into Mexico or Nicaragua situated during the year-end holidays, an un- Can we afford to withdraw in defeat in the
or some other place to protect American in- precedented peace effort. He sent American eyes of the world? And can we afford to
terests. In the past, major wars did not diplomats out by the plane-load all over the do it in the memory of those who have fallen
ensue. The result in Viet-Nam may be dif- world seeking assistance in urging peace in on the field of battle in Asia? On the other
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 June 6, 1966 Approved EffkT"I/L07k1WiBDRR000400080017-2 A304-3
hand, the risks of a more aggressive war are The situation in the world since the end the situation in Southeast Asia in order to
obvious-both toour economy and manpower of World War II has seen the line between meet whatever challenge faces us there in
and in the eyes of the world. Can we afford the Free World and the Communist World the future. It also behooves us to under-
it? Would it heal any Chinese-Russian split? become firmly established. It goes through stand the history of our involvement in that
In Viet-Nam, we have been committed to Korea at the 38th Parallel; between Quemoy- _ area in order to learn from it whatever lee-
a policy, in the words of the President, "of Matsu and Communist China at the Straits sons history can teach us. Aristotle said,
making it clear that aggression does not of Formosa; to the 17th Parallel in Viet- "That nation which fails to learn from his-
pay off for the Communists-." And thus, by Nam; it is blurred in Laos, but by our action tory is doomed to repeat it." That truism
a self-imposed limitation, we seem to have or inaction, it includes India in the Free is as valid today as it was 2,500 years ago,
been committed to a defensive war in which World but leaves Tibet to the Communists.
we will not go beyond the 17th Parallel on It is also blurred in the Near East. As a re-
the ground. And our air attacks north of sult of our non-intervention in the uprising
that line have been limited to supply routes of 1953, it leaves Hungary to the Commu- GI's Life in Vietnam
est European deflni-
shar
It
d h
p
as
s
only. The restrictions on our military op- nists an
erations are very similar to those which were tion at the Berlin wall. The greatest crises
self-imposed in the post-MacArthur days in of the world since the end of World War II
Korea. have occurred when there have been Corn-
And yet, some of the nations which are munist efforts to breach this line as when the
our allies elswhere in the world continue to Russian missiles were found in Cuba; when
supply North Viet-Nam directly or through the Communists invaded South Korea; and
Communist China. And reports come back now the Communist invasion of South Viet-
regularly that our troops and the South Viet- Nam.
namese are being outflanked through Laos Hopefully, and perhaps we should even
or Cambodia-or the Vietcong can escape to pray a little about it, whoever wins the elec-
those sanctuaries. tions scheduled in South Viet-Nam will be
As during the Korean War, we are told at in a position to stabilize the country and
home that we can have both guns and assist us in clearing that land of Communist
butter-that we can fight a war and have infiltrators. It might be a lot easier for them
"business as usual." to do so-and it might help the right ones to
Any questions about the prosecution of the win such an election-if we could be win-
war are turned aside with statistics or in- ning the war by the time elections are held.
volved explanations. Secretary McNamara And so, it looks as if we may have three
has made statements which would lead to to five months to try to accomplish that task
almost any conclusion one might wish to after four years of "limited defensive war."
make about the prospective length of the Americans must be aware of the situation
in Southeast Asia and understand what may
bvar. He has denied shortages of bombs and
then admitted that we made "distress pur-
chases" of bombs for $21 apiece that we had causes were. It will be necessary to under-
earlier sold for $1.70 each. He has denied stand the past and near future to know the
mismanagement of the wax. But only re- influences these events may have in the
cently a constituent of mine told me of a long run.
letter he had from a senior officer in Viet-Nam As I indicated earlier, only the President
can really make foreign policy and command
shipped six 6 x s's o ants-Ireezu he can citizen is unable to speak with any
tropical land with which to fight the war. EDITOR'S NOTE.-The following letter was
Last December Secretary McNamara called authority on such matters because there are
too many unknown quantities in the picture received from James Huskey, son of Mr. and
for the phasing out of B-52 bombers on the today. Even the average Congressman is not Mrs. Major Huskey who live east of Gatlin-
theory that they would no longer nger be needed much better off. Only the President has burg. James was a photo technician for the
would be defense b by missiles eir capability Mountain Press before volunteering for the
would be replaced by -and four available to him the sources of data and U.S. Army. The following letter was written
months later B-52's were being used heavily information necessary to making military and to his co-workers at the Mountain Press but
to push the war in Viet-Nam, foreign policy decisions. It is apparent it described conditions of this "dirty" war so
from the wide disparity in views held by
Mc ameraa and that Sryrof Members of Congress on the situation in well we are passing it along to all our readers.
is my Iy De personal
State Stay of Dean an Rusk N are, respectively, a Sec t We think James will not mind.)
Rusk the e least t Viet-Nam and what ought tp be done about Cu CHI, VIETNAM,
popular and the most sympathized with men it that there is no single clear-cut "right Tuesday night, MET A 1966.
in the President's cabinet. Secretary Mc- answer" among them. The President has not DEAR FRIENDS: I hope this finds each and
Namara is unpopular because he won't brook kept them that thoroughly informed. every one of you just fine. Tonight I am on
John-
Our foreign policy under President John-
and and never admits Congressmen an sympathize The with son has been bi-partisan only because the the night shift at S-1 with my clerks, the S-1
rreporters questions
reporters is on 24 hour basis, next week my shift will
are his admit own. . Republicans have made it so voluntarily, be working days, so I thought I would take a
Secretary Rusk because
But ut it St Is beginning to be apparent that many few minutes and drop everyone back there a
even when he will
istratvs even h Members of Congress do not feel they have p
It seems ems evident that they
a guerrilla war in been kept adequately informed. Their view- few words, since there is not much going on
Viet-Nam is not the kind of war we fight best. tonight.
We are an industralized nation used to the point is best reflected in that classic state- Our unit arrived here on the 29th and just
so-called conventional war of the World War ment used during World War II by Senator about now a few of us would like to go back
II variety. The Communists tackled us on Arthur Vandenburg: "I don't care to be in- to Schofield Barracks. This is the hottest
volved in the crash landing, unless I can be I have ever seen in my life. You just
into o the the basis ball-game, and, once we had gotten place
game, were repulsed and then in on the take-off." stay out in the sun here for 10 minutes and
brought to stalemate. They did not achieve Since about March 1st President Johnson you have a sunburn. It's hot and humid and
their objective and the peace which ended seems to have been making an effort to bring dirty, and you yourself stay sweaty and dirty
that war left things at the status quo. It the Senators and Congressmen more and all of the time, 24 hours a day, 7 days a week.
will be remembered that we did not nego- more into the problems of Southeast Asia. I We are living in tents, right now we have
tiate until we had secured South Korea and feel he will also be obliged to bring the peo- floors. We raised them off of the ground for
were holding the Reds effectively above the ple of America more into his confidence in when a rain comes everything inside of the
38th Parallel. this area. If we are facing the prospect of tents get wet. The rainfall is very high here
As one who gave two years of his life (al- defeat and may have to write off 2,600 Amer- in the monsoon season, it rains every day
though no blood, as many others did), to the ican lives and billions of dollars and the vast then the sun pops back out, then it is hotter
U.S. goal of keeping South Korea free, I'd effort invested in Viet-Nam and Laos over than before the rain came.
feel very unkind about it if our Govern- the last fifteen years, then it will be neces- A shower is something to appreciate over
ment had negotiated away the fruits of that sary for us to brace for that. If we face here, for you stay dirty all of the time and
war effort. I rather imagine there are a the possibility of deeper involvement and the clothes you wear stay damp and wet all
number of boys now fighting in Viet-Nam- further commitment to a difficult war, it cer- the time. You wear the same set of fatigues
and the families of the 2,600 boys who will tainly will be necessary to brace for that. over here for a week. Well, before that week
never fight again-who would be similarly Or, if we are to remain on some middle is up, they have rotted off of you. We were
disheartened should we negotiate away the ground, perhaps slow withdrawal from Viet- issued jungle fatigues and boots a few days
independence of South Viet-Nam for which Nam only to fight in Thailand or Cambodia ago and they are just great. They are made
they fought-not to mention the billions of or some place else on the Southeast Asia for tropical wear and they are better than
dollars American taxpayers have put into this peninsula, we should also be forewarned of the regular army fatigues.
principle in South Viet-Nam in the last 15 that, if possible. We are located at side of a small village
years. It behooves all Americans to be aware of called Ci Chu, out in an old rice paddy (base
EXTENSION OF REMARKS
OF
HON. JAMES H. (JIMMY) QUILLEN
OF TENNESSEE
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Monday, June 6, 1966
Mr. QUILLEN. Mr. Speaker, only
through letters can we here comprehend
in a small degree what it is like for our
men who live and fight in a country
where the terrain and climate are so un-
like that of our own land.
Since it is. impossible for us all to go
to Vietnam and learn firsthand just how
much is demanded of the men we send
into battle, I would like to insert a letter
from one of the young men in my dis-
trict which relates how he lives over
there. I commend his words to your at-
tention :
[From the Gatlinburg (Tenn.) Press and the
Sevier County (Tenn.) News Record, May
26, 19661
SEVIER SOLDIER IN VIETNAM WRITES ABOUT THE
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A3044 U~RESSIONAL RECORD - APPENDIX
camp) . We are about 30 miles northwest of In my own State of Connecticut, the
Saigon and about 20 miles or less from the Connecticut
Cambodian border. Partners of the Alliance, un-
_
of pop and beer. I don't care for the beer nership with the Brazilian State of
but I drink about six cans of pop a day along Paraiba, and I have had the pleasure of
with water and taking malaria pills and salt working with this organization's dedi-
tablets. cated and resourceful administrators.
Well, I though being a clerk you would not
see any action. I just thought wrong. I will Their enterprising and imaginative ideas be going along with the line companies to for the promotion of this vital program
take casualty reports and will be dodging continue to impress me, and the Con-
bullets. No one is safe in this war. Al- necticut Partners' latest endeavor in this
ready here in base camp we have had two area is one which I feel may aptly serve
casualties. The Viet Cong fire stray rounds as an example for similar groups
into camp all of the time hoping to hit some- throughout the Nation.
one. In order to generate grassroots su
After being here three months we are en- pport
titled to R&R (Rest & Recreation). There for this program among the maximum
-is a lot of places you can choose from to number of Connecticut residents, the
name a few, Hong Kong, Tokyo,, Manila, Connecticut Partners have distributed to
Bangkok (Thailand) etc. I hope to go to 10,000 selected Connecticut people a
Hong Kong, they say that city is more inter- package of materials concerning the pro-
estinng than carry the others. gram's work accompanied by letters from
y your weapon all of the time in
lieve me I have plenty for my .45. Since be-
ing here I have seen a few of my old buddies
here in the 2nd Ede., which came over here
in January. The 2nd Ede. cleared and
fought for every inch of this rice paddy for
our base camp, and they suffered a lot of
casualties. The 1st Bde. had a base camp
already secured for us when we arrived here.
Those guys out there in those bunkers are
firing their machine guns all of. the time at
night, for if- s night when charlie (VC)
gets out to fight. Then in the day he goes
back to his tunnels.
I'm due to rotate on 28 April, 1967 and I
sure wish that day would come. I don't
want to stay here any longer that I have too,
a year will be enough for me. The morale
of the troops is very high, actually this is
better than duty back in Schofield. Here
you don't have to put up with a lot of non-
sense and crazy things like you did back at
Schofield. A lot of difference between troops
in combat and troops back in a garrison post
somewhere.
I have now received a call about a cas-
ualty, so I had better sign off hoping to hear
from someone back there and let me know
how everyone is. So long for now.
JIM HUSKEY.
Connecticut Partners of the Alliance
HON. JOHN S. MONAGAN
OF CONNECTICUT
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
u
Mr. MONAGAN. Mr. Speaker, the do the dual job of educating influential
Americans on the importance of this program
Partners of the Alliance is a recent out- and, secondly, acquiring funds to carry on
growth-of the Alliance for Progress which the work.
has added a new dimension to our aid I would certainly like to have your com-
mission in Latin America. This orga- meats. Meanwhile,thank you for all you have
nization is composed of a nationwide net- done and with every good wish for the future.
Sincerely,
work of private
nonprofit groups of U
S
,
.
.
citizens in partnership with their Latin
American counterparts to stimulate ac-
tion for their mutual economic, cultural
and social development. Since this pro-
gram's inception, the soundness and
productivity of its novel, people to people
approach to the improvement of relations
has been demonstrated through various
cooperative endeavors such as assisting
In the equipping of hospitals and stimu-
lating croft.
Mr. Bigelow, urging participation in the
Partners' work. This type of direct per-
sonal appeal to humanitarian feelings
has required the exepnditure of much
time and effort, but I am confident that
its rewards will amply justify this ex-
penditure.
As I know that my colleagues will be
interested in this new approach to the
promotion of hemispheric cooperation, I
offer these letters in their entirely for
insertion in the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD:
CONNECTICUT PARTNERS
OF THE ALLIANCE, INC.,
Greenwich, Conn., May 31, 1966.
Hon. JOHN S. MONAGAN,
Member of Congress,
1314 Longworth Office Building,
Washington, D.C.
DEAR JOHN: Attached is a complete "pack.
age" of material sent to more than 10,000
known "givers" in the state of Connecticut.
It is our sincere hope that this effort, which
has been tremendous since all letters have
been personally-addressed (as per the en-
closed) and mailed first class. We are hope-
ful that results will justify the intense effort
we have made,
In view of the fact that the Governor's
letter accompanies the mailing, it has been
suggested that you might be willing to submit
the letter and, possibly Ogden Bigelow's
letter, to the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD. If this
is done, we can gain further publicity in
Connecticut but, more importantly, James
Boren, Director of the Partners of the Alliance
Programs in Washington will make reprints
of the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD for mailing to
all state plans. As a matter. Of fact, when he
was here with Charles Wiggin last week, they
indicated that they intend to ?se o
r
ANSON C. LowITL,
Managing Director.
CONNECTICUT PARTNERS
OF THE ALLIANCE, INC.,
Greenwich, Conn., May 23, 1966.
Hon. JOHN S. MONAGAN,
Member of Congress,
1314 Longworth Office Building,
Washington, D.C.
DEAR M. MONAGAN : Are you concerned
about tomorrow? How many times in recent
months have you been disturbed by news of
June
the inroads being made in this hemisphere
by those who are striving to destroy the
hopes, initiative, freedoms, and dignity of
the individual, and wished that you could
do something to combat this trend?
Unfortunately, it takes a lot more than
wishes and angry words to turn back an
underground movement of this scope. It
takes money-and plenty of it. A constant
barrage of political propaganda holding out
promises which never come true cannot be
answered by equally empty words. It is up
to US to give positive evidence to the frus-
trated peoples of Latin America that, under
our system, promises do come true-for those
who are willing to work!
The Connecticut Partners of the Alliance
is a people-to-people, self-help program, un-
der which our state has joined in a partner-
ship for progress with the little state of
Paraiba, in northeast Brazil, an area plagued
by drought, disease and illiteracy, where the
average span of life is 32, where only 23 %
of all of the elementary school teachers
hold high school diplomas and more than
half of all school children are in the first
grade. (For more details see enclosed
folder).
As a privately-financed, non-profit, tax-
exempt organization, Connecticut Partners
of the Alliance, Inc., is currently working
with leading Paraibans on thirty-nine proj-
ects, including: a 300-year old hospital; a
university; the only pediatrics hospital in
the northeast (now serving 22 million peo-
ple) ; two institutes for the blind; emergency
health and maternity posts;-elementary, high
and commercial schools; a home for, the
aged; two orphanages and other institu-
tions.
In each case, the people have donated their
labor. At no time have they asked for a
handout-just a hand. By giving them this
hand, the Connecticut Partners are making
dreams come true, building friendships and
faith where poverty and fear have long been
constant companions. If you still wish you
could do something definite to help end this
insidious trend-now is the time!
Sincerely,
OGDEN BIGELOW,
President.
STATE OF CONNECTICUT,
EXECUTIVE CHAMn.FRs,
Hartford, May 16, 1966.
DEAR FELLOW CITIZENS: Some months ago.
our Congressional delegation advised me of
the establishment of the Partners of the
Alliance under the auspices of the Alliance
for Progress. The program asked that each
of our 50 states join in a partnership for
progress with a country, a state or an area
in Latin America, to assist, through personal
involvement, in building or Completing spe-
cific projects where, by hard work, the peo-
ple had demonstrated their determination to
improve their way of life.
Connecticut was assigned Paraiba, a state
whose population approximates our own,
situated on the most easternly point of
Brazil's northeast. There, the people, frus-
trated by poverty, were constantly subject
to subversive propaganda setting forth
promises which never materialized.
As Governor, I convened a conference of
community leaders from all parts of the
state, and from all walks of life, informed
them of the program and sought their help
in selecting six qualified citizens to visit
Paraiba, meet with outstanding Paraibans
and evaluate those projects on which Amer-
ican cooperation would have the greatest
and most immediate impact. Shortly there-
after, the Connecticut Partners of the Al-
liance, Inc., an independent, tax-free cor-
poration, was established to implement proj-
ects which had been accepted by those who
had gone to Brazil, and by the Board of Di-
rectors.
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