THE MAN WHO LEADS AMERICA'S GREATEST DEBATE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP67B00446R000400050008-5
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 138
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 20, 2005
• Sequence Number: 8
• Publication Date: March 1, 1966
• Content Type: OPEN

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4156 -march 1, 1966
March 10, 1966, at 10:30 a.m., in room
2300, New Senate Office Building, on the
nomination of Frederick J. R. Heebee,
of Louisiana, to be U.S. district judge,
eastern district of Louisiana, vice Frank
B. Ellis, retired.
At the indicated time and place per-
sons interested in the hearing may make
such representations as may be perti-
nent.
The subcommittee consists of the Sen-
ator from Arkansas [Mr. MCCLELLAN],
the Senator from Nebraska [Mr.
HirosicA], and myself, as chairman.
ADDRESSES, EDITORIALS, ARTI-
CLES, ETC., PRINTED IN THE
APPENDIX
On request, and by unanimous con-
sent, addresses, editorials, articles, etc.,
were ordered to be printed in the Appen-
dix, as follows:
By Mr. FULBRIGHT:
Certificate of merit issued by the American
Red Cross to Howard E. Haugerud; article
published in the Washington, D.C., Daily
News of February 4, 1966, entitled "Dramatic
Minutes on a Bridge"; article published in
the State Department Newsletter of Feb-
ruary 1966, entitled "Red Cross Cites Hauge-
rud for Saving Policeman's Life"; and letters
from the Vice President, Representative
THOMAS E. MORGAN, Senator FULBRIGHT, Sen-
ator MONT/ALE, Senator McCLELLAN, Repre-
sentative FRASER, and Senator MCCARTHY, all
in commendation of Mr. Haugerud.
Transcript of radio broadcast made by
Edward P. Morgan on February 21, 1966,
relating to hearings recently held by the
Committee on Foreign Relations concerning
the war in Vietnam.
By Mr. HARTKE:
Editorials entitled "Misplacing the Blame,"
"Let's Declare Just What We Mean in Viet-
nam," and "Coincidence Underlines a Point,"
published in the Post-Tribune, Gary, Ind.,
February 3, 6, and 9, 1966, respectively.
THE MAN WHO LEADS AMERICA'S
GREATEST DEBATE
Mr. HARTKE. Mr. President, the To-
ronto Daily Star, one of Canada's great-
est papers, recently presented to its
readers a discerning portrait of the
chairman of the Senate Foreign Rela-
tions Committee, under the heading "The
Man Who Leads America's Greatest De-
bate." Says the article, by Staff Writer
Robert Nielsen under a Washington date-
line:
Questioning national dogma and offending
conventional wisdom is a risky habit, es-
pecially at times of stress. * * * His prestige
as one of that rare species, the philosopher-
statesman, is grounded in a 23-year record
of reasoned and often prophetic discourses
as Representative and Senator.
As the article points out, Senator FUL-
BRIGHT has been a prophet or a promoter
of all the major constructive and mod-
erating influences in world affairs, in-
cluding foreign aid, coexistence, and re-
straining of nuclear arms rivalry.
Mr. President, I ask unanimous con-
sent that this article, which is such a
deserved tribute to our distinguished
colleague, may be printed in the CON-
GRESSIONAL RECORD.
There being no objection, the article
was ordered to be printed in the REC-
ORD, as follows:
THE MAN WHO LEADS AMERICA'S GREATEST
DEDATE7--FULBRIGHT GOES ON THINKING,
AND SAYING THE UNTHINKABLE
(By Robert Nielsen)
Wsslinvorow.?The Vietnam ulcer has be-
gun to perforate and inflame the American
body politic.
It is a fime when conventional politicians
talk of "honor" or "victory" or at least "firm-
ness." But Senator JAMES WILLIAM FUL-
BRIGHT goes on doing what comes naturally
to him?thinking unthinkable thoughts and
uttering them when he believes they should
be aired.
He is doing it this week as his Senate
Foreign Relations Committee opens what
amounts to a full-dress public inquiry into
U.S. policy in Vietnam.
A few days ago FULBRIGHT mused aloud,
in his soft Ozark drawl, on, whether the
United States had been wrong to commit it-
self in South Vietnam, and on whether a
great nation -could admit such a mistake
and draw back.
Then he bored in on Secretary of State
Dean Rusk with embarrassing questions
about the origins of the war.
Questioning national dogma and offending
conventional wisdom Is a risky habit, es-
pecially at times of stress, and Fur.sarcm's
latest heresies have clearly earned him the
displeasure of President Johnson, who shows
an increasing preference for yes men.
Johnson snubbed FULBRIGHT at a meeting
with 20 congressional leaders before announc-
ing the resumption of U.S. bombing of North
Vietnam.
OVEREDUCATED
The Senator had just begun an exposition
of American policy in Asia since World War
II when the President pointedly turned to
Rusk and started a conversation.
FULBRIGHT has known worse rebuffs than
that.
President Truman once called him "an
overeducated Oxford s.o.b." (FULBRIGHT was
a Rhodes scholar) for suggesting that the
President should resign when the opposition
party captures Congress in the midterm
elections---as the Republicans did in 1946.
The late Senator Joe McCarthy tried to
nickname him "Senator Halfbright." It
never took, except among some rightwing
patriots who are regurgitating their old scur-
rilities into FuLnarcarr's mailbag these days.
But those who have disagreed with Fur,-
BRIGHT have usually found, in the end, that
it is unsafe to ignore his deeply considered
opinions.
As chairman of the Foreign Relations Com-
mittee, which carries the main burden of the
Senate's constitutional duty to give advice
and consent to administration foreign policy,
his words automatically carry weight.
His prestige as one of that rare species, the
philosopher-statesman, is grounded in a 23-
year record of reasoned and often prophetic
discourses as Representative and Senator.
Although he is exceptionally mild man-
nered, and almost unfailingly temperate in
language, FULBRIGHT has ample inner tough-
ness for the role of Great Dissenter in foreign
policy matters.
LAPSE
When the Bay of Pigs invasion by Cuban
exiles was being considered in 1961, FCTL-
BRIGHT did not fear to pit his detached schol-
arly judgment against the optimism of the
Central Intelligence Agency, the Pentagon,
and the State Department.
He wrote President Kennedy a long memo
condemning the project on bah political and
moral grounds. After the fiasco, the Presi-
dent said to him within the hearing of
others: "You are the only one here who has a
right to say T told you so.'"
McCarthy's fear-and-smear tactics caused
one of FuLsrucirr's few lapses from moderate
speech. He observed that democracy has
"no apparatus to deal with the boor, the liar,
the lout."
At a time when President Eisenhower was
trying to pussyfoot around the rampant Mc-
Carthy, and when Congress was afraid of
him, Pur..srucarr was the lone Senator to vote
to cut off funds for McCarthy's investiga-
tions.
By the end of the same year (1954) his
minority of one had become a majority of
the Senate voting censure of McCarthy and
breaking the latter's political power.
Arkansas lost an educator, and the United
States gained a statesman, as a result of
FULBRIGHT'S having got fired, for parochial
political reasons, from the presidency of the
University of Arkansas.
He made his mark in his first year (1943)
as a freshman Representative, successfully
moving a resolution favoring U.S. member-
ship in a world organization with powers
adequate to keep the peace. This was a
forerunner to the establishment of the
United Nations, and a decisive breakaway
from American isolationism.
Yet when the U.N. Charter was being eu-
phorically hailed in 1945, FULBRIGHT rose in
the Senate to voice critical reservations.
The U.N. was being sold on the ground
that it would not infringe national sover-
eignty, he noted. But unless it developed
to the point where it limited the autonomy
of nations in their dealings with others, it
would prove ineffective.
The rule of law, backed by U.N. power to
settle disputes, could not operate if the
member nations retained absolute sover-
eignty.
PROPHET
Since then FULBRIGHT has been a prophet
or a promoter of nearly every major con-
structive or moderating tendency in world
affairs: Foreign economic aid, European
union, the coexistence of capitalism and com-
munism, "polycentrism" in the Communist
world; restraint of the nuclear arms race.
Even without that record, his fame would
endure from one simple idea he had in 1945:
Conversion of surplus U.S. military supplies,
left overseas after the war, into exchange
scholarships.
At last count, more than 25,000 Americans
had gone overseas on Fulbright scholarships,
and 47,000 men and women had come to
study in the United States.
FULBRIGHT, now 60, was more noted as, an
athlete and good mixer than as a scholar at
Oxford University.
FULBRIGHT derives his authority from his
habit of standing back coolly from the
chaotic flux of current events, trying to detect
the significant movements and then fitting
them into their historical contexts.
His mind is richly stocked with political
history, and he resorts frequently to the
wisdom of the ancient philosophers, and of
the 18th and 19th century thinkers.
In a sense he is still an educator. From
his Senate forum he periodically lectures the
American people about their qualities, both
good and bad, especially as they relate to the
difficulties of conducting an intelligent for-
eign policy.
"We have clung too long to our youth as
a nation, during which our foreign policy
consisted in a series of exhilarating and suc-
cessful adventures. * * * But we live now in
a far more difficult and more dangerous
world, a world in which we must come of age.
Neither God nor nature has preordained the
triumph of our free society.
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Mr. President, I offer my resolution as
a constructive alternative to the John-
son administration's proposal. That
proposal, while abolishing the electoral
college and thereby preventing presiden-
tial electors from flouting the popular
will as expressed in the November elec-
tions, would freeze into our Constitution
the winner-take-all system whereby a
State's entire electoral vote would go to
the ticket carrying that State. A bad
consequence of the winner-take-all sys-
Lam is that the parties concentrate their
campaigns on those States having the
largest number of electoral votes to the
exclusion of the other States. A ticket
that can carry the major industrial
States can win a majority of the elec-
toral votes.
My proposal would give the people a
more meaningful voice in selecting their
national leaders by requiring presiden-
tial tickets to go after every congres-
aional district or special district in order
to be sure of winning a majority of the
electoral votes.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The
joint resolution will be received and ap-
oropriately referred.
The joint resolution (S.J. Res. 141)
proposing an amendment to the Consti-
tution of the United States providing
for the election of the President and
Vice President, introduced by Mr. SCOTT,
was received, read twice by its title, and
referred to the Committee on the Ju-
diciary.
-y?-,-,,,,
TAX ADJUSTMENT ACT OF 1966--
AMENDMENTS
AMENDMENT NO. 490
Mr. PROUTY (for himself and Mr.
JORDAN of Idaho) submitted amend-
ments, intended to be proposed by them,
jointly, to the bill (H.R. 12752) to pro-
vide for graduated withholding of in-
come tax from wages, to require declara-
Lions of estimated tax with respect to
self-employment income, to accelerate
current payments of estimated income
Lax by corporations, to postpone certain
excise tax rate reductions, and for other
purposes, which were ordered to lie on
the table and to be printed.
ADDITIONAL COSPONSOR OF BILL
Mr. MeGEE. Mr. President, I ask
unanimous consent that at the next
printing of a bill I have introduced to
promote the safety of railway employees,
S. 2180, the name of the junior Senator
from Nevada [Mr. CANNON] be added as
a cosponsor.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. With-
out objection, it is so ordered.
ADDITIONAL COSPONSORS COSPONSORS OP BILL
Under authority of the order of the
Senate of February 21, 1966, the names
r)k. Mr. DIRKSEN, Mr. HICKENLOOPER, Mr.
MORTON, Mr. SIMPSON, and Mr. TOWER
were added as additional cosponsors of
the bill (S. 2956) to amend the National
Labor Relations Act so as to make it an
unfair labor practice for a labor organi-
zation to discriminate on account of race,
color, religion, or national origin, intro-
duced by Mr. Domi:Nrox on February 21,
1966.
ADDITIONAL COSPONSORS OF
AMENDMENT
Under authority of the order of the
Senate of February 18, 1966, the names
of Mr. GREENING, Mr. HART, Mr. INOUYE,
Mr. JACKSON, Mr. KENNEDY of Massachu-
setts, Mr. KUCIIEL, Mr. :MCGEE, Mr.
METCALF, Mr. MOSS, Mr. MIJSKIE, and Mr.
SALTONSTALL were added as additienal
cosponsors of amendment No. 485, in-
tended to be proposed by Mr. BARTI.,:TT,
to the bill (S. 2933) to promote inter-
national trade in agricultural comnuali-
ties, to combat hunger and malnutriteon,
to further economic development, and
for other purposes, submitted by Mr.
BARTLETT (for himself and Mr. MAG:ZU-
son) on February 18, 1966.
PUBLIC HEARINGS ON S. 1676, A
BILL TO COORDINATE AND DIS-
SEMINATE BIRTH CONTROL IN-
FORMATION UPON REQUEST,
SCHEDULED WEDNESDAY, MARCH
2, AND THURSDAY, MARCH 3, AT
10 A.M., ROOM 4200, NEW SENA TE
OFFICE BUILDING
Mr. GRUENING. Mr. President, this
week on Wedriesda,y and Thursday the
eovernment Operations Subcommit tee
on Foreign Aid Expenditures, of which I
am chairman, will hold bearings in
which it is hoped that the growing popu-
lation dialog will be further expanded.
These public hearings will start at 10
a.m. This week the hearings will be
held in room 1200 of the New Senate
Office Building.
On Wednesday contributions will be
made by the following witnesses:
Dr. Donald M. Barrett, professor of
sociology, University of Notre Dame,
Norte Dame, Lid.; director of the Notre
Dame Institute for Latin American Pop-
ulation Research, and a member of the
Papal Commisaion on Population and
Birth Control.
Prof. Albert P. Blaustein, professor of
law and law librarian, Rutgers Univer-
eity, Camden, N.J.
Dr. Andre J. deBethune, author and
professor of chemistry, Boston College,
Chestnut Hill, Mass.
Dr. Joseph D. :Beasley, obstetric an
and gynecologist, Department of Child
Health and Pediatrics, Tulane Univer-
sity School of Medicine, New Orleans, La.
The subcommittee had hoped to hear
from Dr. Joseph P.. Martin of Cleveland,
Ohio, but Dr. Martin is suffering from
the flu. He will make his contribution at
a later hearing.
On Thursday contributions to these
extended hearings on S. 1676. my bill to
coordinate and disseminate birth control
information upon request will be made
by a man who is highly qualified to
discuss food and housing needs?Secre-
tary of Agriculture Orville L. Freeman.
4155
NOTICE OF WEATHER. MODIFICA-
TION HEARINGS
Mr. JACKSON. Mr. President, for the
information of the Senate and other
interested persons, I want to announce
that hearings have been scheduled by the
Committee on Interior and Insular Af-
fairs on S. 2375, the bill to authorize and
direct the Secretary of the Interior to
conduct a comprehensive program of
scientific and engineering research, ex-
periments, tests, and operations for in-
creasing the yield of water from atmos-
pheric sources. The hearings will start
at 10 a.m., Monday, March 21, 1966, in
room 3110, New Senate Office Building,
and continue until all of those wishing
to be heard have had an opportunity to
testify.
S. 2875 was introduced by our dis-
tinguished colleague, Senator ANDERSON,
for himself and 20 other Senators, on
February 4, 1966. The purpose of the
bill is to implement recommendations re-
cently released by the National Science
Foundation and the National Academy of
Sciences.
Because of the widespread interest in
weather modification and its possible ef-
fect on our water supply and resources,
it is my intention to invite testimony
from qualified scientific and engineering
individuals to give the committee the
benefit of their knowledge and expel 1-
ence. I trust that a complete record of
both past activities and the possibilities
for the future can be completely ee-
plored. It is time to move forward fl
this field with boldness and perseverance,
and S. 2875 is a step in this direction.
We must continue to do all in our power
to meet this Nation's water needs.
NOTICE OF HEARING ON NOMINA-
TION OF RUSSELL E. SMITH TO BE
U.S. DISTRICT JUDGE, DISTRICT
OF MONTANA
Mr. EASTLAND. Mr. President, cn
behalf of the Committee on the Judiciary,
I desire to give notice that a public hear-
ing has been scheduled for Thursday,
March 10, 1966, at 10:30 a.m., in mon
2300, New Senate Office Building, on the
nomination of Russell E. Smith, of Mon-
tana, to be U.S. district judge, district of
Montana, vice William D. Murray, re-
tired.
At the indicated time and place pee-
sons interested in the hearing may mat. e
such representations as may be perti-
nent.
The subcommittee consists of the Sen-
ator from Arkansas [Mr. MCCLELLAN I,
the Senator from Nebraska [Mi.
Hausical , and myself, as chairman.
NOTICE OF HEARING ON NOMINA-
TION OF FREDERICK J. R. HEEBE
TO BE U.S. DIS IRICT JUDGE.
EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISI-
ANA
Mr. EASTLAND. Mr. President, on
behalf of the committee on the Judiciary,
I desire to give notice that a public heal -
ing has been scheduled for Thursdaea
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March 1, 1966 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? SEN
TRICKS
"History plays cruel tricks. It allowed us
to believe that the triumphs of our past were
the product of our vigor and resourcefulness
alone. What we failed to perceive in our
past was the presence of another element;
The element of an improbable run of luck,
the luck of a rich and unspoiled continent
far removed from the centers of power poli-
tic's and world conflicts."
Although he is a hero to liberal inter-
nationalists and a dirty word to the self-
styled conservatives of the radical right.
FULBRIGHT himself is palpably a conserva-
tive. He has a conservative's respect for
tradition and an aristocrat's mistrust of mass
impulses.
He has voted the straight Southern line
against civil rights, without apologies and
with inner discomforts that can only be
guessed at, since he is certainly not a bigot.
He is forever counseling the United States
to be prudent as well as conciliatory in for-
eign affairs, to beware of thinking it can
police the world or remake the world in its
image.
MODERATION
If FULBRIGHT is passionate about anything,
It is moderation.
But his insistent desire to see things in
their true proportions can startle his coun-
trymen when it collides with national myths
and obsessions?as when he rated Fidel
Castro "a nuisance but not a grave threat"
to the United States.
Now he is applying his system of measure-
ment to Vietnam and if he turns out right it
will not be said, as it often has been, that
he was "right too soon."
In fact, he swallowed this week some of the
humble medicine he suggested for the coun-
try, and admitted he had been wrong to en-
dorse a 1964 congressional resolution au-
thorizing the President to take all necessary
steps to repel aggression in southeast Asia.
Johnson now is waving this blank check
under Congress' nose, and FULBRIGHT
evidently would like to write some conditions
into it.
This will not restore him to the best graces
of the White House, but then, FULBRIGHT
has never depended on the favor of Presi-
dents. Or even on the agreement of his
colleagues in Congress,
His constituency is scattered across the
country ?and many parts of the world, in
centers of learning and especially among
students and practitioners of International
relations.
LOYAL
His following is select, influential, and
His own status is unique, and indicated
by the fact that British Labor dissidents
wired a protest to him, rather than Johnson,
over the resumption of bombing.
Even if the Presidential frowns should be
followed by thunderbolts, FULBRIGHT might
take solace at having moved Walter Lipp-
mann to this hyperbole;
"The role he plays in Washington is an
indispensable role: There is no one else who
is so powerful and also so wise."
NEBRASKA'S STATEHOOD DAY
AND CENTENNIAL
Mr. HRUSKA. Mr. President, 99 years
ago today, on March 1, 1867, the free
State of Nebraska was recognized as the
37th State in the Union. Today we cele-
brate our natal day.
One year from now Nebraska will be
celebrating its 100th birthday. Ground-
work has been laid for ceremonies and
festivities marking the anniversary of a
century of pioneer heritage.
A fondly remembered part of that
heritage is the postal history of Nebraska
as a State and territory. Nebraska's re-
quest for the issuance of a Nebraska
statehood centennial commemorative
stamp in 1967 is presently on the agenda
of the Citizens' Stamp Advisory Commit-
tee to the Past Office Department. The
Centennial Commission's Commemora-
tive Stamp Committee has plans for re-
staging the first night airmail flight from
North Platte to Omaha. The Pony Ex-
press run from Fairbury to Scottsbluff
will be reenacted along the original
route.
The centennial program, according to
the Nebraska Centennial Commission,
has a three-part objective. The first is
to honor our heritage. It is only
through examination of our past and ad-
herence to proven ideals and principles
that we can be true to the land and con-
tinue to have a heritage worthy of honor.
It is remembered at this time that these
sturdy pioneers made sacred the land
called Nebraska by their great bravery
and sacrifices. By principles based upon
a strong democratic ideal and spiritual
faith a heritage has been forged deserv-
ing our highest respect. We are unalter-
ably committed to its preservation.
The second aim of our program is a
celebration or commemoration begin-
ning on our Statehood Day, March 1,
1967, and running through Thanksgiv-
ing Day, 1967. This period of time will
be filled with activities of national and
local importance and interest. It is in-
deed fitting that these 8 months be set
aside to commemorate the work of many
years which have given us such a great
State today. This is the birthday party.
The third objective is a rededication
to the future. With renewed spirits and
confidence, Nebraskans will look to the
future and join their fellow countrymen
in preserving the heritage and realizing
the promise of our great land.
The people of Nebraska extend the
hand of friendship. Inscribed on our
centennial seal is "Welcome to Ne-
braskaland?where the West begins."
In conclusion, Mr. President, I believe
that through the individual effort of
Nebraskans combined with the support
of all the Nation, the Nebraska Centen-
nial of 1967 will be a tremendous suc-
cess with lasting effects on our fine State
and our great Nation.
WAR ON HUNGER
Mr. McGOVERN. Mr. President, the
March issue of the Farm Journal strong-
ly endorses President Johnson's new
food-for-freedom program.
The Farm Journal called rather ur-
gently last October for efforts to meet
the population food crisis in the world.
That editorial appeared in the RECORD of
January 14. In its new comment on the
President's world food proposal the mag-
azine suggests that the label "war on
hunger" would be appropriate. It says:
We'd prefer "war on hunger" (words which
the President used). They have the neces-
sary ring of urgency.
As a past director of food for peace
and author of a book entitled "War
4157
Against Want," I offer no specific label
for the Nation's food program, but I
would like to join Farm Journal Editor
Carroll P. Streeter in his comment that
there should be a "necessary ring of ur-
gency" about the program.
Mr. President, I ask unanimous con-
sent that the Farm Journal editorial be
printed in the RECORD.
There being no objection, the editorial
was ordered to be printed in the RECORD,
as follows:
GOOD HUNGER PROGRAM
President Johnson's new food-for-freedom
program, with its implications for U.S. farm-
ers and for the hungry of the world has
Farm Journal's full support. It agrees in
intent with what we have been advocating
for months, particularly in our war-on-
hunger statement on this page of last
October.
The food-for-peace label has apparently
been tossed aside. The new one isn't much
better. We'd prefer "war on hunger" (words
which the President used). They have the
necessary ring of urgency.
In essence the policy calls for expanding
our food shipments from here to a practi-
cable degree; trying to put more of them on
a long time loan basis; going into the market
to buy what the hungry need, not just dump-
ing surpluses we want to get rid of; sending
food only to those who will show real effort
to help themselves; clamping down on feed-
ing unfriendly nations (does Russian belong
here); and guardedly bringing back into
production as fast as needed, but no faster,
some of our 60 million acres of idle land.
Nothing was said about charging more of
this cost to something other than agricul-
ture?a step we still urge.
If we really hew to these lines and not
just talk about them, and if we move in the
direction of more "freedom" for American
farmers as well as freedom from hunger (a
big "if" indeed), our "hunger" campaign
will be on the right track at last. Let's see
now if we do as we say.
FISH PROTEIN CONCENTRATE FOR
USE AS A DIET SUPPLEMENT
Mr. KENNEDY of Massachusetts. Mr.
President, Secretary of the Interior
Udall announced recently a dramatic
breakthrough in the worldwide struggle
against hunger when he revealed the de-
velopment of a new process for produc-
ing a wholesome fish protein concentrate
which can be used as a diet supplement
throughout the world.
For many years the people of the
United States have been actively engaged
in an effort to provide food for the
world's hungry people. The accelerat-
ing pace of modern life makes the prob-
lems of each country the concern of all
countries, and hunger is the greatest
common enemy in the world today. The
statistics of world hunger do not need
repeating. The President's recent mes-
sage to the Congress on food for freedom
clearly documented the problem.
It is enough for us to realize that more
than half of the world's inhabitants are
either chronically hungry or consistently
undernourished.
The task of providing food for the
world's starving millions has challenged
American ingenuity, and America has re-
sponded in many ways. One response?
the one cited by Secretary Udall?raises
the intriguing probability that the har-
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1158 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? SENATE March 1, 1981;
vest of the future can come from the
sea.
The bounty contained in the world's
oceans has never been underestimated.
Scientists and nutritional experts have
long known that fish and fish products
could go far toward erasing hunger in
many countries of the world. The ques-
tion has always been, how could this in-
valuable resource he exploited, how could
we actually get these fish products into
the mouths of the hungry?
An enormous amount of research has
gone toward answering this question, and
out of it has come at least one very hope-
ful product. That product is called fish
protein concentrate, or fish flour. It
seems to offer an exciting victory in the
war against hunger.
Fishprotein concentrate is an utterly
new concept in the food industry. For
years fishermen and fish processors have
used many devices to preserve fish
against rapid deterioration. They have
salted fish, smoked it, dried it, canned it,
frozen it. And they have been success-
ful in part with each of these methods.
But in every case they have been trying
to preserve fish in a form very closely
resembling its original state, and not try-
ing to extract from fish the greatest pos-
sible amount of nutritional value.
The process which results in fish pro-
tein concentrate takes a different ap-
proach. It is aimed not at preserving
fish in its original state, but rather at
taking advantage of the tremendous
amount of protein which is concentrated
in even the least valuable type of fish.
'?rotein deficiency is the most promi-
nent element of malnutrition in the
world today_ Meat is far too expensive
in most countries to provide a staple diet
item for the average person. Wheat
yields ample protein, but wheat is virtu-
ally unknown in many lands. Vegetables
of one kind or another are common
everywhere, but they often supply only
small amounts of a low quality protein.
Fish protein concentrate is designed to
meet this worldwide need for protein
with a food supplement which contains
a high. amount of high quality animal
protein in a form which is safe, inexpen-
sive, easy to transport, and palatable.
The idea of developing a fish flour has
been current among fishery technologists
for more than a decade. But it has al-
ways faced a tangle of questions: could
a fish protein concentrate be developed
economically? Could it be made accept-
able in countries where fish is not a com-
mon or recognizable part of the diet?
In 1963 the Bureau of Commercial
Fisheries of the Department of the In-
terior began intensive research into these
questions, and the National Academy of
Sciences soon joined in the project..
Work began with tests on various meth-
ods of removing the water and oil from
the whole fish so that it yielded a dry,
white powder containing most of the pro-
tein and minerals of the original raw
fish.
On the basis of preliminary research
in the laboratory, the Bureau was able to
design a model scale FPC production
Plant which could manufacture 100
pounds of FPC per day. While research
continued at the laboratory, construction
of the scale plant was begun, and the
plant was completed in the spring of
1965. This plant greatly accelerated the
"FTC study.
It was apparent early in the study that
a protein product which would be made
available to the poor of the world have
to be manufactured at a very low cost.
That meant using the whole fish as raw
material?not a fillet, or a steak, but the
whole flab,. And this introduced the
problem of wholesomeness.
With this and other considerations in
mind, the :Bureau of Commercial Fish-
eries began through exhaustive tests to
narrow down the focus of its Quest. By
last summer it had developed a process
whereby Atlantic red hake, a cheap and
plentiful fish, could be turned into a
highly acceptable protein concentrate
through treatment with isopropyl alco-
hol. The protein content of this pow-
dery substance is extremely high?about
80 percent., The estimated price is very
low?somewhere between 14 and 29 cents
a pound, depending on the capacity of
the plant which produces it.
In October of last. year an Advisory
Committee of the National Academy of
Sciences pronounced the concentrate
"wholesome,, highly nutritious, stable,
safe, and capable of economic produc-
Uon and marketing." The Committee's
report further said:
The product blends well with (F her forms
of food. The Committee has tested it as an
ingredient in beverages, noodles, gravy, bread,
and cookies. In percentages high enough to
be of nutritional significance, the product is
scarcely detectable, and in most forms, not
at all.
A similar test, a flavor profile, was
conducted by Arthur D. Little, Inc. It
revealed that fish protein concentrate is
not fishy in taste. FPC has been in-
corporated in noodles at levels up to 10
percent, in milkshakes at levels of 20
percent, and in dry beef gravy mixes at
up to 20 percent. In no case i.eas a fish
flavor detected by a trained panel. FPC
was ever, used in the making of tortillas,
with no fish taste and no change in
flavor.
On October 14, 1965, the National
Academy's Committee recommended that
the U.S. Government arrange for the
production of 3,000 tons of fish protein
concentrate within 2 years. The Com-
mittee recommended that an experi-
mental pilot plant; be constructed and
operated which could produce :0 tons of
concentrate per day based on the Bu-
reau of Commercial Fisheries' process.
These developments, culminating in Sec-
retary Udah's recent announcement,
make it clear that fish protein con-
centrate has been tested and proved to
be a valuable, comm.ercially marketable
product. The question remains, how
can it best be used?
Surely our first consideration should
be America's foreign aid program. Presi-
dent Johnson has proposed a food-for-
freedom plan designed to put America's
skill and abundance at the service of the
worldwide fight against hunger. Fish
protein concentrate should become a key
commodity in American food shipments
to poor nations. The Bureau (,)f Com-
mercial Fisheries, working closely with
the Department of State and the Agency
for International Development, should
distribute enormous amounts of fish pre-
tien concentrate which would have a
strong effect on the world's nutrition.
It should also make available to the
countries of the developing world the
fruits of this technical breakthrough sa
that each country could commence its
own production.
The potential of fish protein concen-
trate as a worldwide nutritional supple-
ment is clear. But let me point out that
commercial production and distribution
of fish protein concentrate could also
have widespread benefits in the United
States. In our own country nearly 13
percent of all households do not meet
two-thirds of the food nutrient allow-
ances recommended for their diets.
Another important beneficiary would
be the U.S. fishing industry. Full-scale
production of fish protein concentrate
would enable fishermen to use fish which
they now catch and discard because the
fish are of insufficient commercial value.
Fish protein concentrate would increase
the present use of fish by 7 billion pounds
per year in the United States alone.
Commercial use of fish protein concen-
trate would also allow fishermen to work
steadily the year round, catching mar-
ketable species of fish when they are
available and turning to species suitable
for fish protein concentrate during the
remainder of the year. This new process
could stabilize and diversify the fish mar-
ket, and increase employment in fish
processing plants.
But beyond the immediate advantages
to the fishing industry, production of
fish protein concentrate would also bene-
fit other parts of our economy. A major
FPC program would of course mean in-
creased demands for ships and thus more
work for shipbuilders. It would also
open a new field of research into fish
processing and the development of new
processing techniques. And it could
very well mean a whole new line of foods
for domestic use?many major food com-
panies in the United States have ex-
pressed interest in the use of FPC in
everyday food such as cereal, bread,
pastry, and even candy.
The potential contribution that fish
protein concentrate can make both at
home and abroad is clear, but it is essen-
tial that we plan now to take advantage
of its benefits. I, therefore, propose a
six-point action program to insure that
fish protein concentrate is put to work
quickly and effectively.
First. Our first objective muet be to
obtain approval by the Food and Drug
Administration for the commercial mar-
keting of FPC. The Food and Drug Ad-
ministration has so far refused approval
for domestic marketing of FPC because
the product uses the whole fish, including
the portions which are normally die-
carded. But exhaustive tests by the
Bureau of Commercial Fisheries, the Na-
tional Academy of Sciences, and an inde-
pendent testing firm all show that the
new FPC recently developed is safe and
wholesome.
In order to obtain FDA approval, a
group of New England Senators has
twice petitioned the FDA, and a formal
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The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there
objection? The Chair hears none, and
It is so ordered.
SENATOR ALLEN J. FLTENDER RE-
PORTS FROM CONGRESS ON
SOUTH VIETNAM
Mr. ELLENDER. Mr. President, I ask
unanimous consent to have printed in
the RECORD excerpts from reports which
I have made to the people of Louisiana
during the year 1965 and part of this
year, 1966, on the issue of Vietnam. I
also ask unanimous consent that preced-
ing each excerpt, the date of my report
be printed in the RECORD.
There being no objection, the excerpts
were ordered to be printed in the RECORD,
as follows:
[Prom the report of Feb. 27, 19651
SOUTH VIETNAM
Hearings began last week on the impor-
tant, $49 billion defense appropriations bill.
The Defense Subcommittee of the Senate
Appropriations Committee went into execu-
tive session to receive testimony and justifi-
cation from Defense Secretary Robert Mc-
Namara on this mammoth expenditure. As
a member of the subcommittee, I questioned
Mr. McNamara very closely as to our mili-
tary posture and our military policies
throughout the world. Like many other
Senators and Congressmen, I am becoming
extremely concerned about the effectiveness
of these policies, particularly in Vietnam.
It appears to me that we have gone in so
deeply in South Vietnam, that we now find
ourselves in over our heads. I am not at
all sure that we can gain any victory in that
God-forsaken corner of the world, and I fear
we are on the verge of finding another South
Korea on our hands which may be more
costly. God forbid that we become engaged
in a big war on the continent of Asia.
I become particularly concerned when I
recall the history of the French effort to hold
Indochina. That war lasted from 1916 to
1954, and in its latter stages we supplied the
French with approximately $1.5 billion worth
of American aid. The French at one time
had as many as 350,000 men in action on the
Indochina peninsula, of which about 175,000
were French nationals. The administration
of the Government and the entire population
were under their control; yet in 8 years, the
French were decisively defeated and driven
out of an area they had held for 100 years.
This history does not bode well for the fu-
ture of the American effort.
[Prom the report of Apr. 3, 19651
The news from the international scene has
been dominated in the last weeks by the
worsening situation in Vietnam. Personally,
I have long given up hope that any good can
come from our Nation's involvement in that
God-forsaken corner of the world. Based on
my personal knowledge and ray inspections
of the Vietnam situation, I repeatedly warned
and advised against the coming entangle-
ment, beginning with the Eisenhower ad-
ministration. My warnings were not heeded,
however, and we now find ourselves hanging
on the tail of an increasingly ferocious bear.
As it is, I am becoming more and more
concerned about the course of events. It
seems to me as if we have very little to win,
if, indeed, we can win, and a great deal to
lose. At this point, we can do little more
than hope that Red Chinese forces are not
brought into the fray, for we shall then have
another full-scale Korea on our hands?a
condition that I have tried to head off in
every way that I could.
Once again we are carrying the entire
burden, while our erstwhile allies sit back
and give advice.
It does seem to me, however, that our au-
thorities could take the necessary steps to
provide effective security for our facilities and
installations on Vietnamese territory. I have
in mind particularly the recent bombing of
our American Embassy in Saigon, which did
great damage and took a number of lives. It
is unthinkable that with the number of
forces we currently have in -that area that
adequate security from such sneak attacks
cannot be provided. I express the hope that
strong steps will be taken to assure that
such attacks do not occur in the future.
[From the report of May 8, 1965]
VIETNAM
I was invited to the White House last week
to take part in a briefing by the President
on the state of our affairs in Vietnam and the
Dominican Republic. The President an-
nounced to us at that meeting that he would
ask Congress to appropriate an additional
$700 million to carry out our expanded ef-
forts in Vietnam and to deal with the new
difficulties,we have run into with the Do-
minican Republic.
There is no doubt that ample funds are
already available to the President within the
Department of Defense to carry out these
purposes. It is apparent to me that the
administration is actually seeking a con-
gressional vote of confidence in respect to
the course our foreign policy is taking. The
President is seeking quick congressional ap-
proval as indicative of a united front on the
part of the American people.
As to Vietnam, I see no other course that
might now be followed with any hope of suc-
cess. Personally, I went on record as far back
as 1954 against the involvement of U.S. forces
in Vietnam, and advised President Eisen-
hower against it. Instead, he and Secretary
of State John Foster Dulles suggested that
U.S. military advisers be assigned to Vietnam,
and the pot soon began to boil and bubble.
President Kennedy augmented our forces
by a substantial amount, and now, of course,
we are engaged in what comes very close to
being a full-scale war. I regret that this has
come about, but now there seems to be no
alternative but to push ahead and attempt
to settle it in the shortest time possible, and
with the smallest loss of life. From all re-
ports the bombing we have engaged in north
of the 17th parallel is having considerable
effect, and I express the hope that some solu-
tion can be found without the necessity of
sending larger numbers of American boys
into action against the enemy. What I fear
is the possibility of our becoming involved in
another South Korea, or even greater in-
tensity,
[From the report of May 15, 1965]
THE JOHNSON DoorRiNE
On another front, it seems to me that the
President's leadership is more open to ques-
tion. I refer to his statement when he signed
the special congressional resolution making
more funds available for the struggle in
Vietnam. At that time, he indicated that
congressional passage of the resolution indi-
cated that the Nation and the Congress stood
ready to do "whatever must be done" to pro-
tect South Vietnam from aggression. In
other words, he apparently considers the con-
gressional action more or less a blanket en-
dorsement of whatever action he may take
in the future in regard to southeast Asia.
Yet, prior to this statement, many Members
of both the House and Senate rose to express
the feeling that their votes for the resolu-
tion should not be looked upon as an en-
dorsement of all future action. Although
these sentiments were issued a step ahead
of the President, he has chosen to ignore
them. Many Senators and Members of the
House are very much opposed to any action
which Would draw the United States into a
land war in Asia, and I share this attitude.
As I have said before, however, if the Chinese
Communists were to send masses of troops
to Vietnam, I would favor using all the
means at our command to deter the Chinese
aggression and protect the lives of our
American boys.
In connection with the Vietnam and
Dominican Republic situations, recent
Presidential statements have given rise to
what is coming to be known as the Johnson
doctrine. In short, this doctrine seems to
mean that the United States will act as the
policemen of peace, as New York Times Col-
umnist Arthur Krock puts it, to protect
nations and peoples all over the world. This
goes far beyond the so-called Truman doc-
trine, which was the savior of Greece and
Turkey, but which pledged only economic
and finaneial aid in the worldwide flight
against communism.
I expect that Congress is going to have a
great deal to say in the future about the
new Johnson doctrine, particularly if trouble
continues to flare up in the fax-off corners
of the world and American troops ars dis-
patched to put out the fires.
I, for one, am not sure that the Nation
is prepared to make the sacrifices that such a
course of action will necessarily call for.
Aside from that, it seems that we will be
compelled to go it alone.
[From the report of May 29, 1965]
VIETNAM AND THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC
The news from Vietnam continues to be
disturbing, although apparently conditions
in the Dominican Republic are settling down
somewhat. In Vietnam, it appears more and
more as if we are heading toward a Korean-
type situation of even greater dimensions.
This, of course, is the one thing that X have
bent every effort to avoid, beginning with
1956, 'when I first visited that beleaguered
land after the French had withdrawn their
farces.
We now have more than 50,000 American
fighting troops stationed in South Vietnam,
and we have been told that this number may
be increased to 75,000 in the near future.
This is the equivalent of almost three full
divisions. In addition, our men are now
being sent into direct offensive action, on
their own, against the Vietcong, according
to press reports. Reports are also being
received concerning the buildup of Chi-
nese men and material across the North Viet-
nam border. As fax as I can see, none of
this news bodes well for our Nation's hope for
peace.
Fortunately, we have been able to with-
draw a few of our boys from the Dominican
Republic, and there appears hope that the
multilateral peace force of the OAS will be
able to maintain order and effect a settle-
ment. No political agreement has been an-
nounced as yet, however, and I fear that if,
as, and when agreement is reached, it is
likely to prove of short duration. The Gov-
ernment of the Republic has already changed
hands four times?more or less violently?
in the 4 years since the assassination of
Rafael Trujillo. In this connection, I was
not surprised to hear President Johnson
promise that even more economic aid will
be sent to the Dominican Republic when the
fighting is settled and agreement is reached.
I can only remark that the same promise
was made after Trujillo was deposed, and it
cost our Government $103.9 million during
the years 1962 through 1964. Before that
time, our Nation extended $8.8 million in
aid to the Republic, some of which was mili-
tary hardware for internal security.
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1966 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? SENATE
retirement toward boosting this growing
field of industry. I wish him good luck
in this endeavor and I express the hope
that he will be as successful in this new
activity as he has been as a newspaper
editor.
ask unanimous consent that edito-
rials commenting on Mr. Hart's retire-
ment from the Dominion-News, of
Morgantown, W. Va.., and the Fairmont
W. Va.) Times be printed in the REcoaa.
There being no objection, the editorials
were ordered to be printed in the REcoao,
as follows:
itorom the Morgantown (W. Va.) Dominion-
News, Feb. 26, 1966j
it CRUSTY EDITos TAKF7S IT EASIER
Bill Hart's friend and fellow columnist,
)reAY Pearson, called him a "crusty editor."
Stronger terms have been used by Editor
VIlatter H. Hart's enemies. Others, including
mrm.er neighbors and friends in his native
Preston, consider him, a loyal friend and a
major benefactor to this part of West Vir-
ginia.
There.'s not much neutrality when people
ialk about Bill Hart of 7,-1 fame. A crusty
editor is hound to have enemies as well as
Iriends with a fair amount of switching back
and forth depending on different situations.
Sic is of the old school of personal editors.
He started as an e,ager boy reporter here 47
years ago: He advanced to editor in days
when it was not uncommon for editors to use
their editor's chair from which to mix per-
Jona], arid inailic affairs, especially in
matters.
Aar. Hart is a Democrat, He used his p0-
-Weal influence on many occasions to obtain
major benefits for his hometown and sur-
rounding area. He was unrelaxing in seek-
ing WPA projects ;end had a big hand in
obtaining some of the most worthwhile ones
iii the country.. Through the years he has
ought for aviation in general and Morgan-
.,own.'s beautiful airport in the mountains
Li particular. Several physical assets in this
area are permanent monuments to his crusti-
ess and persistence.
As a crusty editor, he has often gone it
alone in his crusades. Sometimes he's gone
overboard. He says he should have been a
Barnum. He has enlivened life hereabouts
by his showmanship, especially his ability to
hang Presidents, Presidents' wives, Cabinet
niembers, and other celebrities to Morgan-
town for such things as the Hart-promoted
"Fabulous Showcase" events at the airport.
A self-styled "least of these, my brethren"
ccuntry boy, Bill Hart was hobnobbed with
e great and near great in unabashed lash-
.011. Re haa ordered candidates, including
t)Te great President-to-he, to do his bidding
as a campaign strategist. He's as much at
le me in Washington as in Tunnelton or
Morgantown.
ic loves to travel and has seen much of
world. When it comes to airplanes, he's
stin an eager?thrilled r,nct thrilling?young
reporter.
rAitor Hart has a family of which he is
rely proud and one of which our whole corn-
minity is proud.
s ',day is the last day Mr. Hart's mune
appears in. the editorial page masthead as
editor. He is retiring from that post to take
tintiris a bit easier. All, that is, except yield-
lip to that eagerness to get around, to see
Ciii -1gS, and report. His inimitable column,.
"it May Interest You,- will continue in this
paper, often from far-away places such as
Saigon, Anchorage, Saudi Arabia and Cuba,
but always reflecting his pride in West Vir-
ginia, most especially Preston County and
Morgantown.
No.
t
We wish Bill Hart the happiness he gets
from freedom to travel and, the opportunity
to take it easier, when arid if his unabated
young reporter's eagerness pal-mita him, to
relax.
Best wishes, z-1 ancl_flight chief.
[From the Tolman t19(6W6.1Va.) Times, Feb. 28,
ALL OITT roe AVIATION"
Relieved of the daily responsibilities of get-
ting out a newepaper, Walter Lawrence hart,
of the Morgantown Dominion-News is going
to devote almost his full time in the future
to his "second love," aviation He plans to
travel extensively, and there is a possibility
he will be given a Government office rrom
which to opera Le.
Bill's interest in aviation gocs back ti the
days of the Works Progre.ss Administrwton.,
when he was a prime mover in the effort; to
obtain an airport for Morganto'wn. The late
U.S. Senator Matthew Mansfield Neely, to
whom Hart was close, had proposed an air-
port in the vicinity of Fairmont to serve this
community as well as Morgantown and
Cl arksburg.
When local leaders gave the idea a ,old
shoulder, Hart and others acted quickly to
obtain WPA. assistance for a Morgantown
airport. Those associated with the district
office of the Federal agency here in those days
recall his incessant demands for more men,
more equipment, and more money?all of
which he eventually got.
This connection with the world of flyng
expanded over the ye,ars. Han is now ac-
tively associated with Drew Pearson snd
:rack Alexander in a charter-freight airline
whose eastern base he may get changed to
Morgantown if the runways there will stand
the load. He has close ties with the Federal
aviation regulatory bodies and for years has
practically commuted between Morgantown
and Washington in pursuance of his fl-
terests.
A confidant of the mighty, the Morgan-
town editor has taken an active role in
politics. He was .-me of the first to know if
Senator Neely's decision to run far Governor
back in 1940. Unfortunately Bill's last polit-
ical "scoop"---a prediction that Arch Moore
would run for the U.S. Senate this year?did
not pan out, but his average is still high.
As editor, he has been the most vigorous
booster of what he proudly calls the Mor-
gantown Trading Territory or, more recently,
Mason-Dixonland. He has been an effee-
tive exponent of many community project;.
BillHart's influence as an editor in Mor-
gantown has been substantial. He now turns
to larger fields, and the cause of aviation
will gain an ardent full-time supporter.
FARM LABOR'S LOT INCHES UP
Mr. WILLIAMS of New Jersey. Mi
President, over the years, the New York
Times editorial board has taken great
interest in farm labor problems. Its edi-
torials in this field have been factual and
thought provoking.
The Times' most recent obseiwation---
its February 15 editorial?urges that,
Federal minimum wage legislation and
other protective laws which have bene-
fited American labor for the last 30 years
be extended to American farmworkers.
As chairman of the Senate Migratory
Labor Subcommittee, I endorse the
Times' editorial position and urge prompt
passage of S. 1861 through S. 1868,
These bills were introduced during the
last session of Congress and would estab-
lish a minimum wage for workers em-
1169
ployed on our Nation's larger farms, pro-
hibit harmful child labor outside of
school hours for some children under
the age of 14, provide National Labor
Relations Act coverage for farmworkers
employed on our Nation's larger farms,
establish a voluntary recruitment pro-
gram for farmworkers administered by
the Secretary of Labor to aid the farmer
in finding qualified employees and the
farmworker in finding employment, and
establish a National Advisory Council on
Migratory Labor to coordinate existing
programs affecting migratory farmwork-
ers and to recommend to the President
and Congress such new programs as may
be needed.
I wholeheartedly concur with the
Times' conclusion that legislation in tins
field is "as fundamental as any in the
war against poverty."
I believe that the Senate should have
the benefit of this informative editorial
and, therefore, ask unanimous consent
that it be printed in the REcoaa.
There being no objection, the editorial
was ordered to be printed in the RECO1 0.
as follows:
[From the New York Times, Feb. 15, 1966;
:FARM LABOR'S LOT INCITES UP
In the year since Congress banned the
mass import of low-wage farm labor from
Mexico, the man-months of work done by
foreign workers on American farms has de-
clined by 83 percent_ Seasonal job oppor-
tunities were thus created, Secretary Wirtz
estimates, for at least 100,000 more domest.c.
workers. This year even tighter limits cm
imported farm labor will be enforced.
Throughout the year farm interests sought
to kill the restrictions by warning that crops
would rot and prices skyrocket. Yet critical
labor shortages were few; harvests were huge
and the price of most fruits and vegetables
declined.
Despite the wage increases offered by grow-
ers to attract an adequate flow of domesti!
labor, farm wages remain abysmally low by
industrial standards. The Wirtz report indi
cates that the farm average is $1.14 an hour
and that in 11 States it is still under $1 an
hour. This compares with a $2.82 average
for factory workers.
Farm laborers should be placed under the
Federal minimum wage and the other pro-
tective laws that the rest of American labor
has had for 30 years. It is time for Presi-
dent Johnson to push forward energetically
on a front as fundamental as any in the war
against poverty.
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I
suggest the absence of a quorum.
The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr.
BASS ihi the chair). The clerk will call
the roll.
The Chief Clerk proceeded to call the
Mr. TALMADGE. Mr. President, I
ask unanimous consent that the order
for the quorum call be rescinded.
Mr. MORSE. Mr. President, I object.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Objec-
tion is heard. The clerk will continue to
call the roll.
The Chief Clerk continued the call of
the roll.
Mr. TALMADGE. Mr. President, I
ask unanimous consent that the order
for the quorum call be rescinded.
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[From the report of June 5, 1965]
In South Vietnam, the undeclared war con-
tinues to go badly. The decisions of our
policymakers have not borne fruit, and the
casualties mount day by day. The bombing
raids across the border into North Vietnam
apparently have not been successful in halt-
ing the aggression in the south, and I fear
we are being drawn more and more deeply
into a second Korean conflict, one that will
be more costly than the Korean war. An-
other pipeline to suck up American men and
materiel is being constructed, and no one can
predict when we will be able to close down
the Vietnam pumping station.
We now have more than 50,000 American
fighting men stationed in South Vietnam,
and we are told that thousands more are on
the way.
As one who has watched and studied
southeast Asia very closely since 1954, when
the French were driven from Indochina, the
senior Senator from Louisiana has a right to
feel bitter and frustrated. I have visited
that area on many occasions over the last 10
years, and on each return trip from there I
carried the same message: namely, that our
Nation should not become involved, on its
own, in a section of the world where we had
no direct interest and which lay far outside
our sphere of influence.
I told the late John Foster Dulles, then
Secretary of State under President Eisen-
hower, that preparations for war should not
be encouraged by the establishment of Amer-
ican military advisory groups in South Viet-
nam.
These military advisers do little more than
keep the pot boiling. At their request,
thousands of Americans were sent there to
train the natives how to use our military
hardware. Today we are sending thousands
to do the actual fighting, while our rich allies
of Western Europe gave us only their moral
support. Some are critical of our actions.
Despite my advice and on-the-scene experi-
ence, the advisers were sent in.
I advised President Kennedy to withdraw
our military; instead, their number was in-
creased. I suggested that steps be taken to
make certain that the enormous amounts
of economic aid to South Vietnam were dis-
tributed fairly and equitably; that President
Diem be persuaded to mollify the dissident
groups in his country, and satisfy their just
grievances. No firm action along these lines
was taken by our representatives.
In spite of all my efforts, we entered the
morass of southeast Asian politics with one
eye closed and the other on an idealistic
vision of what we hoped might somehow and
someway be brought about. Now our eyes
have been opened, and we have been brought
down to earth. I only hope it is not too late,
and that some way can be found to avoid an
all-out war on the Asiatic mainland.
[From the report of July 17, 1965]
SOUTH VIETNAM
In such a situation as now faces our Nation
In South Vietnam, where we have gone in so
deeply that the quicksands of southeast
Asian politica are threatening to pull us
under, we have no other recourse than to
close ranks and support the policies of Presi-
dent Johnson and his advisers. The present
and past administrations have taken a
gamble and now it is too late to retreat. I
for one do not believe that these so-called
protest demonstrations against our foreign
policy by beatniks, college students, and even
teachers, do much good. They may very well
do a great deal of harm, for the press and
other news media play up these demonstra-
tions to such an extent that foreigners are
led to believe that a majority of our people
are not supporting the President. In point
of fact, only a very small minority is doing
the demonstrating, making the noise, and
"teaching in," In my estimation, it would be
better if we had more "study-ins" and fewer
"teach-ins."
[From the report of July 24, 19651
VIETNAM
To turn to a subject far removed from the
District of Columbia, I was interested to
hear Defense Secretary Robert McNamara's
comments after his recent inspection tour
of Vietnam. The situation, he said, has
deteriorated "in many aspects," since his last
visit of 15 months ago. These sentiments,
of course, are in marked contrast to hie
somewhat rosy early estimates of Our Viet-
nam difficulties. On prior visits much opti-
mism was expressed by him and many state-
ments were issued to the effect that we had
tho situation well in hand.
Unfortunately, his most recent statement,
more closely approximates the true condi-
tions to be found in that unsettled corner of
the world. Long ago, I predicted that we
were embarking on a course of folly by be-
coming deeply involved in the civil strife
then building up in Vietnam.
It was my view that the presence of our
so-called military advisers would serve to
keep the pot boiling and cause both North
Vietnam and Red China to provide more and
more aid and assistance. I also pointed out
to our officials on both the Vietnam and
Washington levels, as well as to the Vietnam
leadership, that the administration of the
tremendous amounts of economic aid we
were making available left a great deal to be
desired. I did not feel that our aid was
being made available to all Vietnamese citi-
zens on an equitable basis, and because of
this, a large portion of the populace was
being alienated from the Government. My
advice went unheeded, and today not even
a Solomon could provide satisfactory an-
swers.
As a corollary to Vietnam, I am informed
that further tax reductions, which the ad-
ministration's economic advisers had "in the
works" for next year, may lave to be set
aside because of increased outlays for de-
fense. In testimony before a congressional
committee Tuesday, Gordon Ackley, the new
Chairman of the President's Council of Eco-
nomic Advisers, indicated that a possible in-
crease in the exemption now allowed each
taxpayer and his dependents, from $600 to
$1,000, was being considered by the admin-
istration.
In my view, and in light of the mammoth
tax reductions in income and excise taxes
the Congress has so recently enacted, further
proposals for tax reductions should be greeted
very skeptically by the Congress. Especially
Is this true when rising defense expenditures
are facing the Nation, as pointed out by Mr.
Ackley, and when the Federal Government
is headed into greatly expanded and more
expensive activities in social welfare and re-
lated fields.
It is estimated that every $100 increase
in the $600 exemption allowed for taxpayers
and dependents will result in the loss of $2.5
billion in revenue for the Treasury. Thus,
an increase of $400 in the exemption would
bring about a Federal revenue loss of $10
billion. I doubt very much that such a tax
reduction can be justified at this time, or
in the near future.
[From the report of July 31, 19651
THE PRESIDENT'S VIETNAM ADDRESS
I listened very closely to the President's
address to the Nation on the Vietnam situa-
tion last Wednesday at noon. As predicted.
President Johnson did not reveal much new
information or startling decisions. As a mat-
ter of fact, I was one of a small group of
Senators summoned to the White House early
Wednesday morning for an advance briefing
on the President's address. He is very much
worried, and as many of you know, he in-
herited much of the trouble that now pre-
vails in Vietnam.
The main point of his remarks was that
many more troops would be sent immediately
to Vietnam, raising our total force there
from 75,000 to 125,000 men. He stated that
more may be sent later, and in answer to
questions, indicated that the American peo-
ple could look forward to conflict in south-
east Asia for many years ahead?perhaps 6
or 7. As you may recall, Secretary of Defense
Robert McNamara recently stated our en-
gagement there may last as long as 5 or 10
years, while Ho Chi Minh, leader of North
Vietnam, has been reported as predicting
that American forces may be fighting in
South Vietnam for as long as 20 years.
To compensate for this drain of American
troops, the President stated that the draft
would be increased from 17,000 to 35,000
young men a month. I was pleased to hear
the decision had been made not to call up
the Reserves or to declare a state of emer-
gency at this time, although those possibili-
ties have not been ruled out for the future.
Mr. Johnson said that he had instructed
Secretary McNamara to request more defense
funds from the Congress to support the in-
creases. Further requests would be made in
the budget presentation next January, he
said.
I was also glad to hear President Johnson
assure us that he had asked General West-
moreland, the commander of our forces in
the area, what he needed to get the job done.
The President said that the general had
answered his request, and that all the needs
of our fighting men would be supplied. Over
the past few months, I have received cor-
respondence from some of the families and
friends of our men in Vietnam, which in-
dicated that the equipment and supplies they
were receiving left something to be desired.
If we are going to fight what amounts to a
full-scale war in Vietnam, it seems to me
that we should make every effort to see that
every possible advantage is working on our
side. It appears to me that we are going to
need all the odds we can get.
No doubt the Congress will approve the re-
quest for funds needed to support our efforts
In South Vietnam. In a situation such as
this, we in Congress can do little else, in all
good conscience, than support our President.
He is acting on far more accurate informa-
tion than Congress has at its command. I
only hope that the information given the
President represents a true picture of the
situation, which seems to grow from bad to
worse with each passing day. So far, the
results of plans pushed forward by our mili-
tary experts in the Pentagon have not been
reassuring. It strikes me that we seem to be
making some of the same mistakes made by
the French generals in the years before 1954,
when they were defeated at Dienbienphu and
driven out of Indochina. From my study of
that long, drawn-out guerrilla war, it is ob-
vious that one of the primary faults of the
French was that they greatly underesti-
mated the fighting potential of their enemy.
The Vietminh defined the terms of war very
differently than do the leaders of any mod-
ern army. And, just as was the case 10 or
15 years ago, the Vietcong is now in a posi-
tion to impose their own definitions.
But make no mistake about it, I hold no
brief with those in our society who seek to
divide the national purpose and weaken our
resolve to do what must be done in the de-
fense of freedom and in opposition to com-
munism. I wish only that some of our so-
called allies could be persuaded to bear the
burden with us. And I also hope and pray
that ways and means can be found to settle
this conflict by negotiation, as the President
also hoped for in his remarks Wednesday.
[From the report of Aug. 7, 1965]
MORE FUNDS FOR VIETNAM
Turning to a subject far removed from our
labor legislation, President Johnson last week
sent Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara
to the Congress with a request for an addi-
tional $1.7 billion for defense expenditures.
The request, of course, is necessitated by our
involvement in the Vietna;m conflict. It is
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one more step in which I predict will be a
long series of increased expenditures to carry
on the war in Vietnam. At this point there
is actually no way of telling for how long we
may be heavily involved in that strife-torn
section of the world.
As I said last week, I am sure the Congress
will approve this request without much op-
position, for no other course is open to those
of us who have responsibility in these mat-
ters. As you may recall, several months ago
the Congress was asked to approve a request
li)r an additional $700 million for expendi-
ture in Vietnam for economic aid and other
Purposes. What I fear is that because we are
now sending more and more American forces
In carry on the actual fighting, the South
Vietnamese will be more and more prone to
let us carry the entire burden. Since there
Il. no stable government in South Vietnam,
do not see how it will be possible to force
young Vietnamese to carry on the fight.
[From the report of Sept. 24, 19651
:HOPE IN VIETNAM_
On our eastern front in Vietnam, it seems
that at long last the tide of the battle may
be turning. Our large commitment of U.S.
men and materiel is beginning to bring
more and more pressure upon the enemy,
and of course, something would be seriously
wrong if victories could not be entered on the
ledger to at least partially balance the many
defeats we have had to bear at the hands of
the elusive Vietcong.
Unfortunately, the end is as yet nowhere
Iii sight, and I fear that a great many more
lives will be sacrificed before. another Amer-
ican peace can be imposed on the rice pad-
dies and jungles of South Vietnam.
While the news of our military victories
Is good, there is other recent news that is
deeply disturbing to me. Now that the
American commitment to South Vietnam
has been made very plain by the President's
statements and by the dispatch of more
than 100,000 American troops, it is no doubt
very obvious to the Vietcong that they can-
not expect to gain a military victory against
such odds. So it will be only natural for
them to seek other avenues for action.
The recent, student riots and demonstra-
tions which have occurred in various Viet-
narnese cities against the Government seem
to open up one of these avenues. The Viet-
cong must know, as well as you and I do, that
a stable government is absolutely essential
for any Western victory. I suspect, therefore,
that more and more civilian political action,
such as these student riots, will be orga-
nized and directed against the incumbent
Government. At the present, it seems to me
that a revolt of the civilian populace is by
no means out of the question, and it holds
dangers far more severe than any defeat of
American forces. It must not be forgotten
that the Vietnames people have very little
feeling of national unity, and feel very lit-
tle sense of allegiance to any Saigon govern-
ment. I express the hope that if we manage
to pull through the very dangerous monsoon
period, which will end in October. we will
not find ourselves out of the military frying
pan only to land into the fire of civilian
upheaval.
From the report of Jan. 15, 1966]
"UR VIETNAM CONFLICT
While on my tour of the State, I also
found that the Vietnam conflict was the sub-
ject of much intense interest and much
speculation as to the probable outcome.
Upon returning to Washington, I found
much, interest centering on the role the
United States is playing in the attempt to
bring that beleaguered nation out of its
difficulties. There is much difference of
opinion both within and without the Senate
as to what our future course of action
should be. Frankly, your senior Senator is
very much concerned about thii situation in
which we now find ourselves, and about the
pitfalls that lie along both slate of the path
we are following.
There is no question that it is now vital
that our Nation act decisively to prevent a
Communist takeover in South Vietnam. The
prestige and power of the United States has
beep laid on the line, and to withdraw under
present conditions would do us untold
damage not only on the Asian Continent, but
all over the world. Our Nation has never
run from a fight, and now that we have been
drawn so deeply into this one, it seems to me
that. we have no choice except to stick it out
until some sort of honorable resolution can
be achieved. If our adversaries will not agree
to meaningful peace talks, they should be
hit harder, and the industrial and political
centers of North Vietnam should be bombed
by our forces if necessary.
As wears carrying out, a n jittery cam-
paign in Vietnam, however, I frmly believe
that a. second front should he opened in
Western Europe. In other words. If a vic-
tory or a cessation of the fighting is im-
portant for the future protection of the free
world, we should make it plain to our so-
called allies in Western Europe that we ex-
pect some meaningful assistance from them
in carrying the burden. By meaningful
assistance, I mean mote than the moral sup-
port that has been offered until now. We
should impress upon our friends that the
United States cannot be expet led to bear
the entre load in southeast Asia, as we are
already doing in Korea, and at the same time,
maintain thousands of troops en duty for
their protection in Western Europe. If of-
fers of meaningful aid are not ibrthcoming,
advocate beginning the withdrawal of the
thousands of troops we now have garrisoned
across toe Atlantic. This seems to my mind
to be toe commonsense approa th, and one
that is long overdue.
In the past, we have been ton easy going
in our relations with our erstwhile allies. As
you. may know, I have complained about
this to ;crest and present administrations on
numerous occasions, and I have recommended
that a much stiffer line be taken by the
negotiators in our State Department. Until
now, the line has always been taken that the
United States is the richest and most power-
ful nation on earth, and therefore we should
be willing and able to carry on alone, no
matter what the cost and sacrifice. The fact
that the Western European nations have
also became rich and powerful during the
past two decades, due in large part to our
own generosity toward them, seems to be
almost completely forgotten.
Now, however, the shoe of his commit-
ments at home and abroad is beginning to
pinch Uncle Sam's foot a little bit. We are
waking up to the fact, or we should be, that
our Nation is simply not rich enough, or
powerful enough, to act as the policeman and
protector of the entire world. We need
assistance from those who are directly bene-
fiting from our protection. We have been
holding an umbrella OT military might over
Western Europe entirely too long. If we
cannot obtain help when it is needed, from
those we have been sheltering in the past, I
say that it is time to begin folding up the
umbrella.
I Prom the report of Jan. 22. .19661
MORE FUNDS FOR VIETNA aT
Also in connection with southeast Asia, the
President has sent to the Congreas a special
request for another appropriation to carry
on the struggle in Vietnam. The special
amount requested for this fiscal year is $12.7
billion, over and above the special appropri-
ations made for that purpose last year, and
above the billions of dollars provided in the
regular Department of Defense appropria-
tion bill.
The amount of this latest request - -- $12.7
billion?provides a good measure of the in-
creased role we are playing in the Vietnam
conflict. Although the Congress has been
informed that only about half the sum asked
for is to be actually expended this year, I
have no doubt that more and greater ex-
penditures can be expected in the future.
Of course, our boys fighting in the rice
paddies and jungles must be supported in
every manner conceivable, and I am certain
that the Congress and the country will do
everything possible to see that their needs
are met. You may rest assured that I shall
do everything in my power to render what-
ever assistance is needed in order to bring
the conflict there to a speedy end. Not, only
should our servicemen be supported, but as
I stated last week, if the enemy continues
to refuse to enter into meaningful negotia-
tions for peace, their industrial centers
should be hit by our forces until there 'an
be no Mistaking our intention to win an
honorable peace in Vietnam..
Also included in the supplemental appro-
priation request is the sum of $115 million
to be spent as an addition to this year's for-
eign aid program. Two hundred and ninety
million dollars of that amount is earmarked
for supporting assistance to southeast Asian
nations. South Vietnam is to receive $275
million of this supporting assistance, while
Laos and Thailand are to be the recipients of
another $15 million. One hundred million
dollars is also requested as an addition to
the foreign aid contingnecy fund.
I was surprised to see included n the see-
plemental request the sum of $25 million for
support to the Dominican Republic. It
seems as if the President is now learning
what it will cost if we continue our attempts
to police, pacify, and bring prosperity to
every corner of the world.
Before leaving the subject of southeast
Asia and Vietnam, you will recall that last
week I advocated that the administration
and the State Department toughen our pol-
icy toward our so-called allies in Western
Europe. On the question of assisting lei to
carry our worldwide burdens, particularly
In southeast Asia, where we hare no real
economic interest, I pointed out that the
struggle to protect and defend the free world
Is as much their struggle as it is ours. I
further stated that I could see no real rea-
son why our Nation should continue to main-
tain thousands of men garrisoned in West-
ern Europe. The defense against aggression
that these troops have provided has turned
out to be an umbrella, beneath which West-
ern Europe has found peace and prosperity.
Also, the maintenance of these thousands
of men has proved to be a substantial drain
of our U.S. gold supply, and the recipients
of this drain have been the coffers of our
allies.
Last week I did a little checking into the
record, and found that as of December 31.
1960, our military had 352,000 men stationed
in Western Europe, plus 9,916 U.S. employees;
and 311,000 dependents. The number s tit-
tioned abroad rose by 54,000 during the period
of the Berlin crisis, and then dropped some-
what after that. But the fact remains that
as of September 30, 1965, the United States
maintained 331,000 troops on guard in West-
ern Europe, supported by 11,344 civilian em-
ployees, together with 288,000 dependents.
To my mind and in light of the current
situation, this state of affairs is elmost in-
excusable. Our so-called allies have benefited
from the military umbrella we have been
holding over them for many years. They
were able to reduce their military spending
and build their own economy with the ex-
penditure each year of many millions of
dollars by our soldiers, their dependents, and
our civilian employees. Now when we go
to them for assistance, we find that nobody
is home. That is why I stated last week
that unless we can secure scone meaningful
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assistance from them as we try to find a
way out of the current conflict, we should
make it plain to them that we will begin
folding up the umbrella.
[From the report of Jan. 29, 19661
OUR ALLIES AND VIETNAM
Last week I called attention to the fact
that over the last 5 years the United States
has maintained a garrison of well over 300,-
000 troops on the other side of the Atlantic
in Western Europe. As a matter of fact, the
number of servicemen stationed in that sec-
tion of the world at the end of 1960 was
352,000. By September 30 of 1965, the total
had decreased by only 20,090 men under
arms?to a figure of slightly less than
331,000.
I also pointed out that in addition to these
fighting men, we maintain a sizable con-
tingent of dependents and supporting per-
sonnel. For instance, as of September 30 of
last year, there were almost 288,000 depend-
ents of U.S. servicemen in Western Europe,
in addition to over 11,000 U.S. civilian em-
ployees working for the Pentagon.
The idea behind these figures is simply
this. The economies of the Western Europe
nations?our so-called allies?have benefited
tremendously from the presence of these
American troops on their shores. These bene-
fits have been realized in two ways. First,
our troops have provided protection against
possible Russian aggression, and because of
this protection, our allies have been able to
throw the resources at their command into
the building up of their own economies.
They have not been required to devote large-
scale national efforts to develop and main-
tain military establishments as we have done.
Because they have been so successful in de-
veloping their peacetime economies, with
the assistance of both our massive foreign
aid program and our military presence, they
are today giving our American industry and
businesses real competition in the market-
places of the world.
In the second place, and equally important
to my way of thinking, the great amount of
money we have been required to send abroad
to support and maintain these troops, de-
pendents, and civilian employees, has been
spent for the direct economic benefit of the
host nations. It has also been to the direct
economic benefit of our own Nation. As an
illustration of this fact, I have recently ob.
tained figures indicating what it costs OUT
Government to maintain these hundreds of
thousands of troops, the supporting civilians,
and their dependents. That figure amounts
to approximately 2.4 billion annually. To be
specific, in the last fiscal year?fiscal year
1965?the total expenditure amounted to
$2,390 million. That figure includes only
Western Europe, and does not include the
maintenance and upkeep of the sizable garri-
sons we maintain in Greece and Turkey; it
does not include the cost of supplying and
maintaining the 6th Fleet, which Is con-
stantly on patrol in the Mediterranean and
Atlantic; nor does it include the major pro-
curement costs of the planes, ships, and guns
with which our fighting men are equipped.
I have also obtained figures concerning
our balance-of-payments deficits for fiscal
year 1965. By coincidence, last year's bal-
ance-of-payment deficits amounted to $2.3
billion, almost exactly equal to our Western
European support cost of $24 billion. Not
all of our military expenditures contributed
to our balance-of-payments problem, be-
cause some of the dollars were returned to
our shores. But our administrators readily
admit that a large portion of our Western
European expenditures do show up on the
balance sheets to keep our international ac-
counts in the red.
It is estimated that during the first half
of fiscal year 1966, that is, from July to De-
cember 1965, our deficit in payments-amount-
ed to approximately $1.3 billion. I have been
assured that stringent policies are being fol-
lowed by the administration, and that the
situation should improve considerably in the
coming months. That may or may not be
the case, for rosy predictions have been made
In this area before, and have turned out to be
sadly wanting. That is why I advocate
now, as I have in the past, that definite steps
be taken to secure Western European assist-
ance in the Vietnam conflict. Common-
sense requires it, and our own self-interest
demands it. We can no longer afford to po-
lice and protect all the world, with no help
other than lipservice from those we have
been protecting and defending in years past.
Our allies must be made to realize that the
struggle for freedom is as much their strug-
gle as it is ours. It is only realistic to expect
them to bear a fair share of the burden.
[From the report of Feb. 19, 1966]
Moles FONDS FOR VIETNAM
Last week the Senate laid aside the ques-
tion of repealing 14(b) in this session of the
Congress, and has moved on to other matters.
The first important legislation to be taken
up by the Senate after the Lincoln's Day
holiday was the supplemental military au-
thorization bill to carry on our efforts in
Vietnam,
This legislation would authorize additional
appropriations during the last half of fiscal
year 1966 for the procurement of planes and
ships, and for research and testing of new
devices and techniques to enable our forces
to deal more effectively with guerrilla fight-
ers. The bill also contains the sum of $1.2
billion for the construction of bases and fa-
cilities in southeast Asia.
I have been closely following the difficulties
our forces have been experiencing in receiv-
ing the necessary supplies and hardware
shipped from the States. A large part of
these difficulties has to do with the lack of
adequate port facilities for the unloading of
ships and the handling of vast amounts of
cargo which we are pouring into Vietnam. It
is my hope that the sums authorized in the
bill, and which will be provided by the Con-
gress in a separate appropriation measure,
will do a great deal to solve this vexing prob-
lem in the near future. I have on many oc-
casions stated my belief that our boys who
are fighting and dying in the jungles and rice
paddies of South Vietnam should be sup-
plied with all of the weapons and armaments
that are necessary.
I have received reports from time to time
that shortages have occurred among several
items of clothing and military hardware used
by our troops. I have looked into the matter
through the Department of Defense, and have
been assured that where such shortages do
exist, they are being filled as rapidly as pos-
sible. Plant production of some items, such
as special jungle boots and clothing, for ex-
ample, have not yet reached what our au-
thorities consider an adequate level to sup-
ply the need.
It is my hope and expectation that this
current legislation will make it possible to
fill any shortages of any items which might
be needed by our fighting men. As you may
know, the Subcommittee on Military Pre-
paredness, headed by Senator STENNIS, of
Mississippi, is looking into this problem, with
the view of seeing to it that any deficiencies
that come to light may be immediately cor-
rected.
In connection with the military construc-
tion authorization, I was very disappointed
several weeks ago when it was announced
that several items authorized and funded by
the Congress for military construction in
this country would be indefinitely delayed
because of mounting Vietnam expenditures.
Several projects scheduled for construction
in Louisiana were placed in this category.
I am glad to note that the supplemental
military authorization bill contains the sum
of $6 million for the rehabilitation and con-
struction of barracks at Fort Polk. In addi-
tion, the regular military construction bill
for the next fiscal year contains $861,000 for
the construction of living quarters at Fort
Polk, plus $700,000 for the construction of
troop housing and other facilities at Barks-
dale Air Force Base in Bossier Parish.
You may recall that when the President
first sent this special spending request to the
Congress earlier in the year, the total amount
asked for was $12.8 billion. The bill taken
up by the Senate last week dealt with only
$12.3 billion of that original request. The
other portion?$415 million?is in the cate-
gory of economic assistance, and must be
acted upon by the Foreign Relations Com-
mittee of the Senate before the funds can be
appropriated.
Of the $415 million total requested for sup-
plemental economic assistance, $275 mil-
lion has been programed for Vietnam;
$175 million is to be used to finance
the import of various agricultural and
industrial commodities into South Viet-
nam. The other $100 million will go to
finance the special counterinsurgency and
rural construction program that is being
developed.
One of the most interesting items in this
special appropriation request is the sum of
$21 million for the importation of rice into
Vietnam. It appears that under the on-
slaught of war, the production of rice has
been greatly curtailed, and where the Viet-
namese at one time were able to export this
commodity, it now must be brought into
their country.
It is for this reason that President John-
son recently announced that he had in-
structed Secretary of Agriculture Orville
Freeman to increase our rice acreage allot-
ment by 10 percent this year. More and
more of this staple cornmodity will no doubt
be required in the weeks and months ahead.
As I recently pointed out, it was not long ago
that we were forced to purchase 150,000 tons
of rice from Thailand for shipment to South
Vietnam. As long as the requirement must
continue to be met, and financed by the U.S.
Treasury, I would much prefer that the ex-
penditures be made on our home soil, for the
benefit of our American farmers.
[From the report of Feb. 26, 19661
RIGHT TO DISSENT?VIETNAM
Today, the Nation is doing battle in a far
corner of the world. While some of us may
not agree entirely with that battle or its
aims, it is nevertheless important that we
present a united front to the enemy. A noisy
minority speaking against our position Can-
not help doing more harm than good, it
seems to me. They cannot help but give
comfort to the enemy. Legitimate dissent
must be tolerated if we are to maintain our
free society, but in many cases the bounds
have been overstepped.
As you no doubt know, much debate over
our Vietnam policy is now taking place in
the halls of Congress and its committees.
My fear is that many Senators fail to under-
stand that we are already in action in South
Vietnam. It is no longer a question of get-
ting into the fight?we are already in it. In
other words, we are committed and Must now
back up our commitment.
I have no doubt in my own mind that many
of the statements now issuing from Con-
gress or from congressional commjttees will
do no good to our cause in the fighting. I
feel that some Congressmen and Senators--
although certainly they are not doing it wil-
fully?are giving a lot of relief and a lot of
propaganda material to Hanoi. In my opin-
ion, this may result in postponing the end of
the action?whether by military victory, a
Cease fire, or negotiation. In other words, as
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long as the pot of American public opinion
Is kept stirred up and boiling, the leaders of
Hanoi and Red China can continue in their
hopes that the escape valve will be opened in
time to let the Vietcong win the war. I be-
hove that too much dissension and difference
of opinion, especially on the part of those not
directly responsible for making and enforc-
ing the decisions, can be very misleading to
the enemy. The result will be longer war,
and the killing and wounding of more of our
soldiers. I. for one do not want to see that.
TEACHER SPEAKS OUT AGAINST
SLASH IN SCHOOL MILK PROGRAM
Mr. PROXMIRE. Mr. President, I
have received dozens of letters from
school administrators, teachers, parents
and children opposing the administra-
tion's plans to cut the special milk pro-
aTain for schoolchildren by 80 percent.
As time passes I become more and more
convinced that this cut simply cannot be
justified.
Here is what one Wisconsin school-
teacher says about the cut:
E am teaching in my 29th year and I feel
that one of the finest things the Government
has ever done for our boys and girls is the
milk program. It makes me sick to read
that this is to be dropped. In the same
paper you can read of large amounts being
spent for recreation programs for our rich
Lu enjoy. It doesn't seem fair to me to
deny our children milk which they need and
enjoy and then spend it for recreation.
Mr. President, as one who has long
fought against pork barrel public works
Projects which often are justified on the
grounds that they will enhance recrea-
tion benefits, I say amen to this state-
ment. We must allocate our resources
efficiently if the taxpayer is to get the
most out of his tax dollar. I know of
no program of greater proven worth than
the school milk program. Every penny
.amnt means greater health for our Na-
tion's children. We cannot forget this
ttreatest of our natural resources.
This Wisconsin teacher goes on to give
a concrete example of what the school
milk program means to her pupils. She
says:
5/Ey little 6- to 8-year olds must eat before
1:30 to meet the bus. Dinner is served at
11:30 and the last ones aren't home until
4:45. The milk break at 2 pm. is exactly
what they need. It is economical so every-
one has it, except three Amish pupils. It is
not only for low-income families whose chil-
dren do not have the milk these little bodies
need * *. Ti ls not only low-income fam-
ilies who have parents that do not buy milk
tor their children so I feel that all children
need the milk.
Mr. President; I would like to conclude
my remarks by quoting one last sentence
from this excellent letter. I think it
speaks for itself:
The breakfast program (proposed by Presi-
(lent Johnson) may be fine but it can never
do so much good to so many children for so
tile money.
PROCEDURES FOR THE REMOVAL,
RETIREMENT, AND DISCIPLINING
OF UNFIT FEDERAL JUDGES
Mr. HART. Mr. President, it is ad-
mitting to no weakness in our Federal
court system that we seek to determine
the adequacy of the procedures dealing
with the removal, retirement, and disci-
plining of unfit judges.
Rather the junior Senator from Mary-
land I Mr. Tymmsl, whose subcommit-
tee is conducting hearings in this area,
seeks to determine "whether the Federal
judiciary has the necessary statutory
tools to police its own house fairly and
efficiently, and, if not, to explore the pos-
sibility of enacting remedial legislation."
Senator ?rYDINGS displays botli courage
and energy in, opening up this admittedly
sensitive subject. All of us are the
better for his willingness and leadership.
Fortunately, there have been only rare
instances where a man of questioned
ability or integrity has presided over a
Federal court. But the infrequency of
having such a man on the bench does not
obviate the need for a solutiou to deal
with the problem when it arises
As SerlatOr TYDINGS points out in his
opening statement at the committee
hearings, many influential judtas them-
selves feel that present correcti,.7e meas-
ures are inadequate and that this inquiry
is needed.
We are well aware of the tremendous
backlog of cases that confronts our Fed-
eral courts today.. The delay before
many are brought to trial can be as
much as 3 years. The division of this
workload leaves no room for one judge
who is unfit. And, it goes without say-
ing, that in administering justiee, there
is no place for such a judge.
Cettainly, I consider Senator TYruNcs'
explanation of the problem and scope of
the inquiry as one to which we should.
direct our attention.
Mr. President, at this point it my re-
marks, I ask unanimous consent that
Senator TYDE,tcs' February 15 opening
statement at the hearings before the
SubcommAtee on Improvement: in Ju-
dicial Machinery be printed in the
RECORD.
There Leing no objection, tlia state-
ment was ordered to be printed in the
RECORD., as follows:
OPENING t.AT1a55ENT OF CHAIRIVIAN JOSEPH
D. TY-DINGS AT HEARINGS BEFORE THE SUB-
COMMITTEE ON IMPROVEMENTS IN JUDICIAL
MACHINERY ON PROCEDURES FOR THE RE-
MOVAL, IR ENIREMENT, AND DISCTPL, SING OF
UNFIT kEDERA L JUDGES, PEBRUARY 15, 1966
Today the Subcommittee on Imprt:vements
in Judicial Machinery holds its ire hal ses-
sion of hearings on the availability of and
need for procedures to govern the removal,
retirement, and disciplining of unfit. Federal
judges. An inquiry of this nature ...las been
contemplated for several months aml today's
session will be only the first step in a
lengthy and careful examination.
The purpose of these hearings is io deter-
mine whether the Federal judiciary has the
necessary statutory tools to police its own
house fairly and efficiently, arid, if not, to
explore the passibility of enacting ,temedial
legislation. These hearings do not indicate
any lack of confidence in the Federal bench.
Indeed, the, subcommittee recognitias that
our Federal judiciary, as a whole, is charac-
terised by men of remarkable integrity and
ability. We believe that, given the proper
tools, the judiciary has the capacity to handle
the problems created by the tiny handful of
judges who because of physical or mental
disability, senility, alcoholism, lazioess, or
misfeasance, do immeasurable harm to the
efficient administration of lustice.
Anyone even casually familiar with the
Federal courts knows that their dockets are
crowded and becoming more so as the
amount of judicial business increases year
by year. The situation is already critical.
In certain districts the average litigant may
wait for more than 3 years after joinder of
Issue before his case goes to trial. This is
not merely a matter of administrative con-
cern, for justice delayed is justice denied.
To remedy this state of affairs, we in the
Congress are constantly asked to provide
snore judgeships for various Federal districts
and circuits, and we often hear proposals to
place further limitations on the jurisdiction
of the Federal courts in order to halt the
constant increase in caseload.
But these measures cannot be enough. It
makes no sense to keep adding more judges,
or to deny litigants access to the Federal
courts, if the backlog is caused to sly degree
by inefficient or unit judges.
The workload in many districts is such
that the court is crippled if even a single
judge does not carry his share of the burden.
I think that everyone agrees Unit ideally
such an unfit judge should be replaced with-
out delay, but only after a careful, impartial
evolution of his fitness. Yet one thing that
recent events have made clear is; that. there is
at present no fair and effective procedure for
dealing with these cases when they arise.
The subcommittee cannot ignore the chit,-
rule that occurred recently in the western.
district of Oklahoma. For reasons that bane
not yet been made clear, the Judicial Council.
of the 10th Judicial Circuit, composed of
able and conscientious appellate judges,
reached the conclusion that Chief Judge
Stephen S. Chandler of the western district
of Oklahoma was "either unwilling or un-
able" to perform his judicial functions ade-
quately. It therefore ordered that, Judge
Chandler be assigned no more cases and take
no further action in cases pending before
him. It based its action on section 332 of
the Judicial Code, which gives a judicial
council authority to "make all necessary
orders for the effective and expeditious ad-
ministration of the business of the courts
within its circuit."
Judge Chandler has challenged this action
In a petition to the Supreme Court, and has
refused to obey the order with regime l to the
cases already pending before him. Just last
week, more than a month after tite order
was originally issued, the judicial council
agreed to rescind one part of the order and
to allow judge Chandler to dispose of those
cases already pending before him.
I do not wish to comment at this time on
the legal issues involved in the disuute be-
tween Judge Chandler and the judicial coun-
cil. Nor can I comment on the question of
Judge Chandler's actual fitness to continue
on the bench, since the facts have not yet
been brought out. An examination of the
procedures used, however, leads me to be-
lieve that, regardless of the outcome of the
Chandler case, the judiciary needs better
tools to deal with this sort of proble:n.
The judicial council's abortive action in
the Chandler case created havoc in the west-
ern district of Oklahoma. Look at what
happened: A judge was ordered to cease the
performance of his judicial functions yet he
was apparently given no notice that action
was about to be taken against him, no
charges were specified against him, iend he
was given no opportunity to present evi-
dence or argument in his defense. The
judge refused to relinquish jurisdiction over
cases pending before him, although he had
been ordered to do so and although the other
Judges of his district had divided his cases
among themselves.
The Chandler case is an unfortunate inci-
dent. It is unfortunate in that a judge has
apparently behaved in such a way that some
of his colleagues are convinced he is no
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longer fit to serve on the bench. It is un-
fortunate in that the procedures used?ap-
parently the only ones available to the judi-
cial council?did not allow Judge Chandler
to obtain a complete and fair hearing of the
charges against him. It is unfortunate in
that the judicial council's order and Judge
Chandler's intransigence created inexcusable
confusion for litigants and attorneys in the
western district of Oklahoma. And finally
and perhaps most important, it is unfortu-
nate in that the wrangling and recrimina-
tions that have occurred have _exposed our
fine Federal judicial system to disrepute and
even ridicule.
The Chandler case has brought to the at-
tention of the Nation, a situation that has
troubled many observers for a long time. In
October, long before the judicial council's
action regarding Judge Chandler, I an-
nounced that the Subcommittee on Improve-
ments in Judicial Machinery would conduct
a study of the problems posed by judicial
unfitness. We have done a great deal of re-
search on this subject, and today we hold
our first session of hearings.
The purpose of today's hearing is to out-
line and explore the difficulties that are
presently experienced in handling the in-
frequent instances of unfitness in the Fed-
eral judiciary. Historically the only method
of actually removing a Federal judge from
office, so that he is deprived of his title and
his right to salary, has been impeachment.
This has created several difficulties, which
our witnesses will explore with us in some
detail tomorrow and at later sessions. First,
constitutionally, impeachment lies only for
"treason, bribery, or other high crimes and
misdemeanors." It is uncertain whether
senility, insanity, physical disability, al-
coholism or laziness?all of which are forms
of unfitness that require remedial action---
are covered by the impeachment process.
The second difficulty lies in the nature of
the impeachment machinery. Even in the
early years of the Republic the inadequacy of
this process was recognized. "Experience
has already shown," Jefferson said in 1819,
"that the impeachment the Constitution has
provided is not even a scarecrow." It is a
cumbersome, archaic process which requires
one House of Congress, the House of Repre-
sentatives, to act as a grand jury, and the
other House, the Senate, to sit in judgment
as a court. The House can perhaps do its
share of the work effectively through the
Judiciary Committee, but what of the Sen-
ate? We all know that the Members of the
Senate are hard pressed to fulfill the
many demands of the office. If we were re-
quired to do nothing but listen to testimony
in an impeachment case for several weeks,
the legislative calendar would be completely
disrupted. Obviously, few _Senators would
be able to give so much of their time, yet I
submit that an impeachment trial before an
empty Senate Chamber would be little more
than a farce. It would hardly comport with
modern standards of justice. No conviction
of a criminal defendant would be tolerated
if it came after a trial at which most of the
jurors were not present to hear the testimony.
Impeachment is perhaps the sole method
of removal of Federal judges that may be
constitutionally employed by the Congress,
for the principle of an independent judiciary,
free from interference by the legislative or
executive branches, is central to the concept
of a government of separated powers. But
this is not to say that impeachment is the
only constitutionally permissible method of
removing a Federal judge from office. It
should be borne in mind that a judge is to
serve "during good behavior," while impeach-
ment lies only for "high crimes and misde-
meanors." It may be that the framers in-
tended to permit other methods of removal
not inconsistent with the principle of sep-
aration of powers. The scholarship on this
question is disappointingly sparse, and I
hope that one of the effects of our study will
be to stimulate some scholarly reexamina-
tion of the arguments for and against the
exclusivity of impeachment as a removal
procedure.
Aside from impeachment and the disputed
method employed by the 10th Circuit Judicial
Council in the Chandler case, there is only
one other provision which allows remedial
action to be taken in the case of an unfit
judge. This is a very limited provision which
permits the judicial council of a circuit to
certify the disability of a judge to the Presi-
dent, in which case the President may ap-
point an additional judge, in effect to take
the disabled judge's place.
Many people?including, let us emphasize,
many influential judges themselves?feel
that this array of weapons is inadequate
to deal with the problem of judicial un-
fitness, and that is why we are beginning
this inquiry today. It is not our intention
to conduct an expos?f the Federal judiciary.
Such an expos?ould undoubtedly find
little to expose. We intend, rather, to ascer-
tain whether there are now adequate pro-
cedures for dealing with those rare but dam-
aging cases of judicial unfitness that do oc-
cur. If, as of many of us expect, we find
that existing procedures are inadequate, we
shall attempt to remedy the situation.
The area of judicial fitness presents many
difficult questions of law and policy. I sus-
pect that we shall be at this job for some
time.
POOL FORGE'S 250TH ANNIVERSARY
Mr. SCOTT. Mr. President, it is fit-
ting that we take note of the 250th an-
niversary this year of the founding of
Pool Forge?the first iron forge in Penn-
sylvania. This humble establishment
was started in 1716 by Thomas Rutter
on the banks of the Manatawny Creek
in what is now Douglass Township, Berks
County.
Pool Forge was the forerunner of the
many Pennsylvania forges which were so
vital to early settlers and provided much
of the ordnance in our struggle for inde-
pendence. These early iranmasters with
their charcoal burning furnaces con-
tributed a great deal to our Nation's
early growth. We owe much to these
men of ability and courage who literally
started with the ground they walked
on and the forest around them. Their
primitive methods are long gone, and
the focus in metals has moved from iron
to steel.
Today Pennsylvania plays a mighty
role in all parts of the metals industry.
In this same county of Berks, metal
products range from basic iron and steel
Items to highly specialized steel alloys
and beryllium alloys for use throughout
the Nation. In this time of vastness and
complexity, we would be wise to keep the
realization that here is one small begin-
ning?one small forge which is not only
important as part of our history, but is
a vivid reminder of the pioneer spirit we
must keep with us. Courage and ability
never grow old, and although we work
at different tasks today, we have need
of the same incentives as that which
built Pool Forge.
GARY?A LOGICAL CHOICE FOR A
DEMONSTRATION CITY
Mr. BAYH. Mr. President, a massive
demonstration cities program which
would "offer qualifying cities of all sizes
the promise of a new life for their people"
was proposed by President Johnson on
January 26. In line with this recom-
mendation, I was pleased to join a num-
ber of e,olleaghes in cosponsoring the
demonstration cities bill, S. 2842, which
was introduced by the senior Senator
from Illinois [Mr. DOUGLAS].
Both the President's message and the
legislation proposed to achieve its goals
have aroused widespread interest among
'urban dwellers, city officers, and the
press. Recently the editor of the Gary
Post Tribune, Mr. Dale E. Belles, Jr.,
wrote an editorial in the form of an open
letter to the President, Secretary Weaver,
Senator HARTKE, Representative MADDEN,
and myself, which sets forth the reasons
why Gary, Ind., would be a logical com-
munity to be chosen as one of the "dem-
onstration cities."
Although Congress has not yet acted
on this significant measure, I agree with
Mr. Belles that it is not too early to begin
giving consideration to the qualifications
of prospective cities for this selection.
Because Mr. Belles' editorial quite ac-
curately reflects the spirit of cooperation
and enthusiasm of civic leaders in Gary,
I ask unanimous consent that it be
printed in the RECORD.
There being no objection, the editorial
was ordered to be printed in the RECORD,
as follows:
AS WE SEE IT?WIlY GARY IS A LOGICAL
DEMONSTRATION CITY
TO PRESIDENT LYNDON B. JOHNSON; SECRE-
TARY ROBERT C. WEAVER, DEPARTMENT
OF HOUSING AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT;
SENATOR BIRCH BAY1i; SENATOR VANCE
HARTKE; REPRESENTATIVE RAY J. MADDEN.
GENTLEMEN: We have read with interest
and excitement the President's message of
January 26 to the Congress on demonstration
cities.
We are convinced that Gary should be one
of those demonstration cities.
Here, in part, are the reasons:
A. On the positive side-
1. Gary has shown through the combined
governmental and civic launching of pro-
grams for new industry, downtown revitaliza-
tion, and improved educational and recrea-
tion facilities that it shares the President's
view that "1966 can be the year of rebirth
for American cities." It was beginning to
demonstrate before the Presidential program
was outlined that it meets its requirements
of being one of "those cities who help them-
selves" and where there is "a serious commit-
ment to the project on the part of local * * *
authorities."
2. Gary, through its long use of federally
assisted housing programs, has, as the Presi-
dent said, "built a platform" from which
further experimentation in development can
be launched. It is preparing to launch its
third urban renewal program, this one the
largest undertaken here to date, having
learned something of both "the strengths and
weaknesses" through past experiences.
3. Gary's City Council during the past year
has formally adopted a previously promul-
gated metropolitan plan, sharing with the
President the view that it "should be an in-
strument for shaping sound urban growth?
not a neglected document."
4. Gary's City Council, with urging of civic
leadership, adopted last year probably the
most liberal open housing ordinance of any
city in the Nation, exhibiting its realization
of the presidential point that "at the center
of the cities' housing problem lies racial dis-
crimination."
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E. On the opposite side, not negative ex-
actly, but showing need-
1. Gary is the core of an industrial area
where increasing steel and other production
insures growth, but has reached the point
where help is needed to make sure that "the
powerful forces of urban growth" do not
"overwhelm efforts to achieve orderly de-
velopment."
2.. Gary is still beset with what the Presi-
dent terms "crowded miles of inadequate
dwellings?poorly maintained, and fre-
quently overpriced" in which many of its
Negroes still live. While twin attacks,
through the housing ordinance and the new-
est urban renewal program, have been
lieunched, help will be essential.
3. Gary's mass transportation facilities
are deteriorated and inadequate. Its major
street system, cut up by railroads, Is unsuited
to carrying the necessary load. Some plans
have been drafted, but a coordinated effort,
preferably with Federal help, is needed.
4. Gary's parks, once a point of civic pride,
and its indoor cultural and recreational fa-
cilities have been outgrown or become out-
moded. Assistance is needed in pushing
through plans already under consideration
for meeting these needs both for the present
and the anticipated population.
5. Gary's "one industry" image Is grad-
ually being altered, but making it one of the
major "demonstration cities" could step up
the program of intended diversification which
could help make it a better city for all its
people in the future.
It is anticipated that as the broad outlines
of the President's proposals are solidified
into legislation, Gary governmental and civic
effort will combine to furnish detailed evi-
dence of how Gary meets the specific
guidelines he seeks to establish.
Meanwhile, we feel it our duty to make
this advance nomination of' Gary as one of
the demonstration cities hoping it may be-
come one of those "great urban areas" which,
T1.3 the President, says, can become "the mas-
terpieces of our eiviliRation."
Sincerely,
Duel E. BELLES, .Jr.,
P.WitOr.
C t I EA PLR AIR TRA VEL
Mr. JORDAN of North Carolina. Mr.
President, for over 30 years, in a succes-
sion of increasingly responsible positions
in the Federal Government, one of my
fellow North Carolinians has distin-
guished himself by successfully tackling
difficult assignments in the public sei'v-
ice.
An article by Burt Schorr in the Febru-
ary 28 issue of the Wall Street Journal
recognizes the excellent job that Charles
Li. Murphy is doing as Chairman of the
Civil Aeronautics Board. I request
unanimous consent that this article be
printed in the body of the RECORD.
There being no objection, the article
was ordered to be printed in the RECORD,
R.; follows:
if ,jsP,j'sR Ant '11:TAVEL?BAB CTIA IRMA AT MUR-
PHY NUDGES CARRIERS TOWARD THAT GOAT.
(liy Burt Schorr)
WASHINGTON. -Tr may take some months
to measure the success of the Civil Aero-
ninnies Board's policy statement recently
ill mod at reducing air travel costs.
As the Board hoped, the other domestic
trunielines appear to be matching United
Air Lines' proposed 25-percent excursion fere
discount, But there's always the possibil-
ity that these reductions won't achieve the
goal of lowering fares without hurting he
carriers' ability to finance their big orders
rel. a ow aircraft. New air travelers may not
be lured into otherwise empty seats in num-
bers sufficient to compensate airlines for the
revenues they stand to lose.
Yet even if such an eventuality demands
further fare tinkering by the CAB,- the ex-
cursion plan already makes this point clear:
Under its new Chairman, Charles S. Murphy,
the CAB has demonstrated an ability to move
carriers further along the path to lower fares
than they would have ventured on their own.
And in accomplishing this, the Board seems
to have ruffled fewer carriers feathers than
might hove seemed possible or ly a few,
months a,eo.
Moreover, this maintenance of cordial re-
lations 'between the CAB and the airlines
places the Board in a good position to seek
more bargelin flying for the public when
It deals with several important route assign-
ments now pending, including new service
between southwestern and northwestern
points.
Finally, the energetic attack on the fare
problem-- a potentially controversial issue
as airline profits soar through tae second
year of the air travel boom?appeers to have
quashed any congressional craiiiism that
the CAB isn't performing its assigned regu-
latory function. During an earlier period
of carrier prosperity in the 1950'8, Capitol
Mu censure caused a marked stiffening of
CAB fare policies, with unpleasant conse-
quences for airlines.
Board watchers are inclined to credit the
CAB's ado 'it fare maneuvering to the helms-
inanship of Chairman Murphy, wlyi took his
post last June. 1. Undoubtedly Mr. Mur-
phy's effectiveness has been enhanced by
Washington's knowledge that he enjoys the
esteem or President Johnson. The Chief
Executive's personal interest in air fares
hasn't been publicized, but in fent he has
followed the, subject attentively. What Mr.
Johnson Leportedly was anxious to have?
and what Mr. Murphy seems to be deliver-
ing?is a CAB fare policy designed to reduce
travel costs without crippling the airlines'
ability to ray for the $4.3 billion in new air-
craft they will put in service between now
and 1970.
ON; EXPERIENCE IN GOVERNIVILTIT
(i7k a Gevernment career dating back to
1934, Mr. Murphy is considered wise in the
workings of the Federal bureaucracy as it
operates tinder the Democratic Perty. For
1.1 years he was assistant legislative counsel
to the S( nete. (One job there: Helping
draft the Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938
which created the CAB.) From tint post, he
moved to the White House, advencing in
1950 to a key job as special counsel to Presi-
dent Truman. Immediately prior to his CAB
ap poi n tme n t. by President Johnson, Mr.
Murphy SA7 R.e. serving as Tinder Secretary of
Agriculture.
"Murphy knows how to get thin iT,S; done,"
comments one industry representetive who
deals :frequently with the Board. "His back-
ground in writing the Aviation Act, his Sen-
ate and Waite House jobs, and the backing
of the Proficient give him prestige the rest
of the Board can't ignore."
Mr. Murphy's Influence was evident in, for
example, tOe Board's recent 3 to 2 decision
endorsing Frontier Airlines' 90-dag experi-
mental offer of a general 50-percent discount
for standby seats on certain lightte patron-
ized flights. Other carriers, including United
and Western Air Lines, hied vehem intly op-
posed the innovation, but the Chairman,
supported by his two fellow Democrats,
Robert T. Murphy and Cl. Joseph Tvlinetti,
agreed witn the Denver-based locitl service
airline that "the only way to test The fares
is by actual experience." What wasn't made
public, however, was how one of the sup-
porting Democrats almost joined Republi-
cans Whithey Ctillilland and John G, Adams
in voting "no," then reconsidered out of a
desire to "cooperate" with the new Chairman.
The Chairman's hand was apparent last
July, too, when the Board rejected a 3-per-
cent fare increase proposed by United to off-
set a bigger baggage allowance. At the time,
United, Eastern Air Lines, and several other
carriers were still earning well below the
CAB standard for a reasonable rate of return
on invested capital. Nevertheleai, guided
by its new Chairman, the Board held that the
"favorable earnings" of the carriers provided
"an excellent opportunity for reductions in
fares, or improvements in service without
fare increases."
The Board's fare campaign intensified in
the following month with the first in a
series of hold-the-line orders suspending
proposed new jet fares. Here the Board
broke with the long-accepted practice of al-
lowing jet fares to include a surcharge that
pegged them about 10-percent higher than
propeller fares on the same routes. Here-
after, the Board said, it would allow new jet
service at propeller rates only.
The airlines were dismayed at the threat-
ened revenue loss?up to $200 million an-
nually by one reckoning. There was much
grumbling, too, that carriers fortunate
enough to have already filed fares for most
of their shorter-range jet service were barely
affected by the surcharge ban. Summing up
industry frustrations, United Chairman W.
A. Patterson fumed about "a very impetuous
conclusion reached very hastily."
It wasn't until this month's policy state-
ment that the CAB finally assured the car-
riers it would be willing to allow jet sur-
charges after all; United, and any other car-
riers filing reductions comparable to the 25
percent excursion fare discount, eineld re-
sume setting jet ticket charges higher than
propeller fares.
Actually, CAB insiders maintain, the
Board had this in mind all along. "The sur-
charge issue merely happened to be the first
fare question to come along," explains one.
"By issuing the suspension orders, the Board
had time to think over the fare Lieue and
also force carriers to come up with counter-
proposals."
CONVINCING THE CARRIERS
It developed, though, that counterpro-
posals were slciw in coming. So, in a series
of speeches and private discussions with air-
line executives, Mr. Murphy sought to con-
vince the carriers that the Board wiisn't out
to wreck them. This kept lines open be-
tween Government and industry cleopite ris-
ing tensions in Wall Street and aisline ex-
ecutive cffices over what sort of fare policy
the CAB eventually would settle on
Thus, shortly before the Board's definitive
statement, one Washington-based airline
vice president was pleased to find Chairman
Murphy demonstrating "a very enlightened
and progressive attitude. Rather than aim-
ing to reduce airline earnings, he and the
Board say carriers should pass along to the
public the benefits of improved air tech-
nology ? ? When you get clown to it, the
carriers have the same objectives."
The recent rash of youth-fare discounts,
allowing 50 percent off on stancley seats,
were another sign that airlines were begin-
ning to attune themselves to broad thinking.
Then came January's fruitful /limiting of
representatives of the 11 domestic trunklines
to discuss alternatives to the surcharge ban.
United first broached its plan at title Wash-
ington conference. "Everybody :recognized
that the Board has a problem with carrier
earnings," says one executive of an extremely
profitable airline who participated. "And
the industry accepted the challenge of deal-
ing with it."
The Board's success so far contrasts mark-
edly with CAB handling of the fare question
back in the early 1950's, a period when the
airline industry also was enjoying a boom_
Early in 1952, the domestic trunklines
sought to add $1 to all one-way domestic
ticket charges and eliminate a 5-percent
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4178 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? SENA LE march 1, 1966
guideposts have serious drawbacks. First,
it is not excessive profits but the visibility
of these profits which the guideposts fear
will lead to inflationary wage demands. And
since the accumulation of profits or the
failure to cut prices can never be as visible
as wage demands made during controversial
contract negotiations, the burden of public
pressure is always on labor.
Second, the wage-price guideposts are
presented as though they derive from "nat-
ural" and impartial economic criteria, when
in fact they mask very important political
judgments about the kind of society Amer-
ica will be. Implicit in the guideposts is the
assumption that the proportions of America's
wealth enjoyed by various sectors of the
population should remain constant. Since
the share of the gross national product
which goes to the wealthiest 20 percent of
Americans is about 10 times that going to
the poorest 20 percent, we cannot agree that
this assumption is in accord with justice.
The wage-price guideposts could be a step
to a more rational, democratic system of
economic planning, in which social as well
as economic criteria played a part. But if
they merely to become guarantees for Gen-
eral Motors' prosperity, then labor's rev lt
is fully justified.
THE ROLE OF THE VIETCONG
Mr. JAVITS. Mr. President, 2 weeks
ago, I urged the President to openly
acknowledge a central fact in the Viet-
nam struggle, the political-military fact
that the Vietcong should be accorded an
independent status at the future peace
conference. I also argued that it would
be detrimental to our own purposes and
to the stability and morale of the South
Vietnamese if any further concessions
were made to the Vietcong at this time.
Specifically, I argued against giving the
Vietcong a role in a coalition govern-
ment before negotiations and before free
elections, but only as a result of negotia-
tions. Max Lerner, in two articles, sup-
ports my position on this issue, and also
agrees with my view that the United
States must announce that it will accept
the results of a genuinely free election in
Vietnam.
I ask unanimous consent to have
printed in the RECORD Mr. Lerner's ar-
ticles of February 21 and 23 which ap-
peared in the New York Post.
There being no objection, the articles
were ordered to be printed in the RECORD,
as follows:
[From the New York Post, Feb. 21, 1966]
VIETCONG ROLE
(By Max Lerner)
With the ending of the televised Fulbright
hearings, the great debate on the Vietnam
war has reached the end of its first phase in
a dead heat.
The Fulbright forces succeeded in showing
that the war has moved by a succession of
unanalyzed steps to unintended conse-
quences. There can be little doubt that the
casualty lists hurt, that the war is unpopular
and is likely to get more so and that the
problem is not how America shall win but
how America shall extricate itself without
scuttling its Vietnamese allies and abdicat-
ing its national interests.
The proadministration forces in turn
have shown that no one knows how this can
be done, least of all the Pulbright witnesses
and the commentators like Lippmann on
whose analysis they lean. When Gen. Max-
well Taylor and Dean Rusk got their innings,
they may not have triumphed, but they
didn't come of second best. Rusk made the
legal case he was expected to make. But he
was best on the psychological and political
factors, as in his discussion of the historic
Oxford Pledge in its bearing on British un-
preparedness in World War II, just as Taylor
was best on the role of the French home-
front in the French defeat in the Indochina
war.
When the Fulbright forces, grasping for a
straw in an effort to find an alternative mili-
tary strategy, plumped for the enclave
theory, Taylor had little difficulty in show-
ing how frail a reed it was. It is hard to
advocate an outright military withdrawal
from Vietnam. But it doesn't solve anything
to propose a policy that will abandon the
Vietnam forces and villages to the Vietcong
and strip the American soldier of both his
mobility and his morale. The whole enclave
theory is an attempt to dress up a military
withdrawal in the guise of something less
inglorious.
That is the point at which Senator ROBERT
KENNEDY came in with his proposal to give
the Vietcong a share in whatever govern-
ment is set up in South Vietnam after
peace negotiations. That is further than
FULBRIGHT has gone, with his proposal that
we recognize and deal directly with the
Vietcong.
The trouble with the Kennedy proposal is
that it fails to distinguish between the Viet-
cong role the the negotiating table and the
Vietcong role in the postwar Government of
Vietnam. To recognize that the Vietcong
must have a role at the negotiating table is
crucial. To give them a role in the Govern-
ment of Vietnam would be fatal.
?The current administration refusal to deal
with the Vietcong is obviously an effort to
shore up the position of the Ky regime in
Saigon. But Ky, whose rigid refusal to sit
at any negotiating table with the Vietcong
is clearly for homefront consumption, has
said he is a realist and is learning to be a
politician. A realist learns to accept the in-
evitable. The inevitable is that the Vietcong,
as a major combatant, must be at the nego-
tiating table. They insist on doing sosas the
only legitimate government cif South Viet-
nam, which is impossible for us. America in-
sists on their coming to the table, if at all,
as an instrument of Hanoi?which is impossi-
ble for them. Why not have them there in
a third role, as representing neither Hanoi
nor Saigon but only the actual territory they
occupy and in fact administer?
Neither Hanoi nor Peiping will agree to
this straight off. Both are convinced the an-
tiwar forces in America will give them the
political victory they want even though the
Vietoong are suffering considerable punish-
ment and can have no hope for military vic-
tory. But if Johnson and Rusk are willing
to have the Vietcong at the negotiating table
as a third party, to represent the territory
they actually hold, then Washington can offer
Moscow a solution the Russians in the end
can back up without sacrificing their role as
Hanoi's champions.
But there is no reason to sign away South
Vietnam now by offering to include the Viet-
cong in the postwar government. The nature
of the peace arrangements is something for
the negotiating conference to decide. Any
coalition formula which will include the Viet-
cong is bound to result in a Communist gov-
ernment that has excluded or liquidated its
non-Communist partners. The experience of
Poland and Czechoslovakia after the Yalta
agreements is witness to what happens.
One cannot exclude the possibility that the
people of South Vietnam will want some day
to vote in a Communist regime. But it ought
not to be imposed on them by a peace treaty.
In fairness to them, there should be a mora-
torium of perhaps 2 years, during which the
economy and society of South Vietnam will
have a chance to rebuild themselves with aid
from American and other sources. A postwar
government should have a chance to
strengthen the political fiber of the nation
and show the people what can be accom-
plished in peacetime.
At the end of that period, the Vietnamese
should have a chance to ratify or reject what
such a regime has done and become. If at
that time it chooses a coalition popular front
or a straight Communist government, that
will be its own concern. Neither Hanoi nor
the Vietcong are today confident they would
get the suffrage of the people. If they were
confident, they would welcome the chance to
come to the negotiating table and agree to
such a solution.
[From the New York Post, Feb. 23, 1966]
THE KENNEDY TANGLE
(By Max Lerner)
The disarray surrounding Senator KEN-
NEDY'S proposal on the Vietcong peace role
was partly due to the clumsiness of trying to
stage a debate through press conferences and
TV shows on one side and press secretaries
on the other; this is where the British sys-
tem of straight parliamentary confrontation
between the Government and its opponents
would have served the Nation better. But
partly also it was due to the fact that few
public figures (and Senator KENNEDY is no
exception) have had a chance to think their
way through the touchy problems of a peace
conference and what would follow it. Com-
pared with this the Vietnam jungle is a
grove.
Too much of the general Vietnam debate
thus far has been on the strategy and politics
of the war, not enough on what happens
when the shooting stops. Senator KENNEDY
had a hectic couple of days, backing and
filling, in getting his position clear, and so
did Maxwell Taylor; as for HUBERT 1-117M-
PHREY, his troubles may still lie ahead. A
confused time was had by all, but out of it
may come some unraveling of the tangle.
I am not talking of the advertised agree-
ment between KENNEDY and the White
House, subscribed to by both sides. On the
crucial issues I doubt that there is any real
agreement.
Examining the peacemaking process phase
by phase, the first concerns the way in Which
the Vietcong will be represented at the con-
ference. Here KENNEDY does well to hold
his ground. I agree with him that the Viet-
cong, simply because of the area they con-
trol, must be at the conference as "an inde-
pendent entity."
The next phase has to do with the Viet-
cong role in a coalition government. KEN-
NEDY originally talked as if the "share of
power and responsibility" for the Vietcong
was something for America to back, and
something to emerge?however gradually?
from the conference. He now talks more
warily on both scores. He doesn't expect a
coalition government to be shaped "auto-
matically," but wants the administration not
to shut the door on it. Certainly this door,
like any other door, should not be shut, But
it still leaves the question of whether the
Americans are to put their influence behind
it. To say that America should accept a
solution agreed upon by the conference is to
omit the patent fact that the South Viet-
nam governmental delegation will oppose a
coalition agreement bitterly. To get the
agreement KENNEDY envisages will mean
American pressure.
Then there is the problem of elections.
KENNEDY now seems to talk of a coalition
government as including only "what they
(the Vietcong) win in free elections." He
also talks of a "permanent coalition" as a
possibility, presumably without such elec-
tions. Such a "permanent coalition" would
quickly eliminate the chances that free elec-
tions would ever be held. To prevent this,
KENNEDY speaks of an international control
authority to watch out for Communist at-
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March , 1966 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? SENATE
roundtrip discount. The year of the hung
proved to be the peak year for postwar
traffic; return on overall domestic trunkline
investment skyrocketed to 15.3 percent.
(Following a later general fare investigation
completed in 1980, the Board concluded that
10.5 percent was the proper average rate of
return for domestic trunks, lest year, by
comparison, the figure probably exceeded 12
percent, after eliminating the effect of the
investment tax credit.
'Vim CAB permi fled the $1 increase to
stand on an "interim" basis, but it refused
1,0 allow abandonment of the round trip dis-
emint and ordered a general fare inyestiga-
ion. En turn, the carriers withdrew their
proposal to end the discount and urged the
noard to halt the investigation. Finally,
rl May 1953, despite having spent a year in.
Irreliminary work on the Investigation, the
CAB acceded to the airline request by a 3-2
vote.
',SODDING 'T?, 0 NE CONGREss
It was this lenieney that moved the Bruise
Judiciary Committee, under Representative
IOWAN-CB/, GELLER, Democrat, of New York, to
include the CAB in an investigation of several
regulatory agencies 3 years later, By this
time, however, several changes in Board
reembership (a term is 6 years) had pro-
duced a majority considered less friendly to
carrier interests. Stung by CELLER committee
complaints that the Board had. "waltzed
around" the fare question and was guilty
et "scandalous abdication. of responsibility,"
the CAB hastened to atone by ordering the
prompt start of a general fare investigation.
lin tact, airlines entered a lean period just
as the investigation was getting underway;
:o0; their clamor for fare increases was re-
sisted until sagging, return on investment,
which reached a low of 1.5 percent in 1961,
cenfronted the Board with the prospect that
airlines might not be able to pay for the
'toed of new jets they'd ordered some years
earlier, and it agreed to a series of fare in-
creases.
Perhaps the expanded use of promotional
fares like the ones the Board now is en-
enraging might have filled many of the
empty seats of the early 'I960's. This in
turn could have reduced the need for higher
fares and kept air travel available to the
broadest possible segment of the population.
True or not? the erincept is one airlines
can expect to see tested again in future
neard rulings while Mr Murphy is in charge.
51; a recent press conference the Chairman
eaid of the airlines, "It seems to me they
neve to go out and hustle for business."
rile added the promise that "the Board will
-ielp as best it can to try to see that traffic
ei generated."
Around the end nf this year the CAB is
expected to decide the Northwest-Southwest
case, the last major assignment of routes
remaining on the continental United States
ir map. Competing carriers would do well
tr, show the Board "who is elate to do more
it the public" in. the way of lower fares, one
CAB source suggests, and several of the ap-
pihrants are indeed taking this tack. Simi-
1.trly, route awards expected next year in
the New York-Florida proceedings, as well
those later in the transpacific care involv-
ing service to Hawaii. otter further oppor-
ix nines for reduced air charges.
Chairman Murphy gets high marks from
CAB staff members and airline representa-
tives for his patient absorption of complex
hirilies. And, those who have witnessed his
talent for conciliating diverse views say it
Is Impressive. Both qualities should be in
great demand in the coming critical period
of domestic airline growth,
NO. 56--fl
THE FULBRIGHT PROGRAM: A
HISTOR,Y
Mr. PULBRIGHT. Mr. President, I
wish to call attention to a recent book by
Walter Johnson and Francis J. Coliigan
entitled "The F'ulbright Program: A
History."
Walter Johnson is Preston and Eterl-
frig Morton professor of history a:. the
University of CE:cag-o. He has bc(:n a
member of the Board of Foreign Scholar-
ships since 1947 and has provided con-
tinuity and leadership in promoting
educational exchange programs. From
1950 to 1953, he served as chairrar2n. of
the Board of Foreign Schoilnrships.
Francis J. Colligan is Director of Policy
P.eview and Coordination fel: the Bureau
of Education and Cultural Affairs at the
DL:partment of State. Mr. Colligan has
also been associated with the exchange
program since 1947 and during the years
from 1948 until 1957 he was executive
secretary of the program.
Both Walter Johnson and Francis
Colligan have done a tray remark able
job in describing the postwar develop-
ment of U.S. exchange programs. They
have been ablo to do this because they
have been active participants. At. the
same time, their participation has not
destroyed their critical faculties and the
book which they have produced is, I be-
lieve, a fair treatment of the successes
and the failures of what has become
known as tile Fulbright program. I am
glad to note for the record that the silo-
ceases have far outnumbered and out-
weighed the failures. Members of the
Senate I know receive many communica-
tions from. then: constituents requesting
information about the availability of
Fulbright grants and other questi inS
regarding the .orogram. This study by
Messrs. Johnson and Colligan will be
helpful not only to Members in answer-
ing inquiries but to individuals and in-
.stitutions in the United States that have
been involved in the program.
As author of the original legislation in
this field, which was in the nature of an
amendment to the Surplus Property Act
of 1944, I wish to take this occasion to
say that the program could never hove
succeeded had Lt not been for the hued
work and perseverance and support of
men like Walter Johnson arid Francis
Colligan, Throughout 20 years of this
program, they have been aided by ma ly
other people in the academic and latui-
neSS community too numerous tt me ..i-
tion. Any program can fail if it is not
properly administered and supported lay
tile American public. This program, I
am glad to say, has had this support.
THE PRESIDENT'S WAGE-PRICE
GUIDEPOSTS
Mr. HART, Mr.. President, for the
past several months, considerable dis.-
cussion has been devoted to the validity
of the administration's wage-Price
guideposts and their effectiveness as a
tool of economic policy.
4177
Implicit in this debate is the reog--
nition by those--in favor and opposed
to these guidelines?that sound planning
is necessary to assure the steady, con-
tinued growth of the Nation's economy--
without inflation.
The longrun best interest of the coun-
try is not served by either rising prices
or wages. Both business and labor are
well aware of the benefits that have
accrued to them as a result of the econ-
ozny's current, and unprecedented, pe-
riod of prosperity?benefits in the fonn
of increased profits and nearly Full
employment.
And, though both business and lshrr
have said?albeit for different reasons--
that the present guidelines are um cal-
istic, clearly each of them recognizes ,it
some guarantee of a stable economy is
needed.
In understanding both viewpoints, an
article in the February 18 issue of ?lie
Commonweal should be considered as
part of this discussion on economic
policy.
Mr. President I ask unanimous ecti-
sent that the magazine article to which
I refer be printed in the RECORD.
There being no objection, the article
was ordered to be printed in the RECOae,
as follows:
LABOR'S JUST COMPLAINT
The labor unions have begun to complain
about the President's wage-price guidepost'.?
and well they might. The best possible evi-
dence for their argument has now been sup-
plied by an unexpected source: General rAto-
tors Corp. All General Motors did was tell
the world how much money it made in lifJC:s;
and labor's case was matte.
The wage-price guideposts are based on
the theory that wage increases must be tied
to the increase in overall national productiv-
ity, so that demand does not outstrip supp'y,
causing price rises and inflation. But wage
demands are obviously related to corporative
profits; and so- the guideposts proposed that
increase in profits be likewise limited by the
rate of increase in national productivil y.
When profits are rising faster than produe-
tivity, the excess should be returned to
the public in the form of price cuts, let
workers have grounds for inflationary weer)
demands.
A few spectacular cases of pressure from
the Government have generally convinced lIe
public that the guideposts have been more
severely enforced against business than labor.
But these few cases involved industries whefe
prices were being raised. Totally ignored has
been the obligation of industries with rid rag
profits to cut prices. The results? Through-
out 19(35, labor unions were urged to limit
their demands to a 3.2-percent increase in
wages (in keeping with the 3.2 percent an-
nual Increase in national productivity .
And, in fact, labor gains did stay between 3
and 4 percent. But meanwhile corporations
enjoyed a 20-percent increase in profits.
Now General Motors, the Nation's largest
company, reveals it has done even better. It;
profits after taxes in 1065 jumped by 23 per-
cent. In 1984, screams of anguish went up
when the United Auto Workers obtained A
contract from General Motors which went
only slightly beyond the wage-price guide
posts. Who's complaining now?
The wage-price guideposts have merits.
Their existence is an admission of the need
for national economic planning. But the
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March 1, 1966 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? SENATE 4179
tempts at seizing the government. But this
would end with no effective government at
all, from which only a totalitarian group
could benefit, whether Communist or mili-
tary.
We need to clear up the question of when
the elections ought to come if they are best
to serve the interests of a stable and demo-
cratic Vietnam. KENNEDY speaks of free
elections to settle the "immediate composi-
tion" of the government. That is too soon,
as anyone must know who understands the
political immaturity of the southeast Asia
area and the chaos that war has wrought.
They should come after a waiting period to
give a government, whether of one party or
a coalition, a chance for stability. And lest
the government-in-power rig the elections,
this is where an international control com-
mission should function: in making sure the
elections are honest, and the votes honestly
counted.
I am glad KENNEDY opened the floodgate
on these themes. But the KENNEDY name is
so important in world opinion that he would
have done better to wait until he was clearly
ready.
SCHOOL MILIC AND LUNCH PRO-
GRAMS SHOULD NOT BE CUT
Mr. NELSON. Mr. President, I have
received a large number of telegrams,
calls and letters urging me to do every-
thing possible to restore the proposed
cuts in appropriations for the special
school milk and school lunch programs.
There are many places where the
budget can, and should, be cut this ses-
sion but these are not among them. Both
of these programs have had widespread
support over the years, both in Wiscon-
sin and across the country. They have
been built up over many years through
cooperative arrangements with the
States.
These programs are important to the
dairy industry and they are important
to the health of our schoolchildren.
I have received a large number of let-
ters from school administrators, school-
children, dairy farmers, cooperatives and
others. I ask unanimous consent that a
representative sample be printed in the
RECORD.
There being no objection, the letters
were ordered to be printed in the RECORD,
as follows:
AMERICAN SCHOOL FOOD
SERVICE ASSOCIATION,
Madison., Wis., February 18, 1966.
Hon. GAYLORD NELSON,
U.S. Senate,
Washington, D.C.
DEAR SENATOR NELSON: I wish to thank
you again for the generous time you gave to
me and Mr. Langkop when we visited with
you recently. We are very much concerned
over the administration's budget proposals
for the school lunch and special milk pro-
grams for 1966-67 and were very grateful
for an opportunity to visit with you concern-
ing the matter.
I am sending to you herewith a copy of a
bulletin which I have requested the Ameri-
can School Food Service Association to issue
to State directors of school lunch programs,
State presidents of school food service asso-
ciations, and State legislative chairmen con-
cerning the administration's budget pro-
posals for the school lunch and special milk
programs for 1966-67. I want to keep you
as fully informed as I possibly can, since I
am sure you will be receiving inquiries and
letters from many people in Wisconsin, and
It may also be helpful to you to get our
side of the picture when the budget comes
up for consideration in hearings and on the
Senate floor.
I believe the material I am sending to you
is quite self-explanatory, but I should like
to add some further explanation as to what
the program might look like in Wisconsin if
the President's budget proposals were to be-
come effective.
There are now only 6 school districts of
grades kindergarten through 12 or 9 through
12 which do not have the school lunch pro-
gram in Wisconsin. There are, of course, a
number of small rural districts operating
one-room or two-room schools which do not
have a lunch program since building facilities
would not permit. Thus you can see that
the program has been quite universally ac-
cepted and incorporated into the daily
school activities in nearly all. of the schools
of the State.
There are 105 school districts involving 151
schools with an average daily attendance of
24,009 pupils which have a milk program
only. In September these schools served
345,008 half pints of milk; in October, 452,-
541, and in November 379,654. The reim-
bursement from Federal funds in November,
for example, was $10,187.
There are 467 school districts involving
2,511 schools which have both the school
lunch and special milk programs. The aver-
age daily attendance in these schools is 644,-
488 pupils. In September these schools
served 7,660,488 half pints of milk; in Octo-
ber, 8,830,621; and in November, 7,494,993.
The reimbursement from Federal funds in
November amounted to $276,395. In these
schools the children also had the benefit of
a balanced noon meal which included a half
pint of milk. The figures given you above
are concerned only with the extra milk which
was consumed in these schools during recess,
milk breaks, or additional milk with the
noon lunch. In September these schools
served 6,011,450 lunches with milk; in Octo-
ber, 6,161,321; and in November, 5,310,818.
Therefore, in November, for example, there
were 12,805,811 half pints of milk consumed
In these schools in addition to other dairy
products which were served as a part of the
meal.
The point I am trying to make is that the
special milk program would virtually be dead
if it were limited to schools which do not
have a lunch service.
Although the chart shows a net reduction
of $19 million in the budget for the school
lunch program (approximately 10 percent of
this year's appropriation) the situation is
actually worse than it appears. Section 11
funds are used in granting high reimburse-
ment rates to schools in especially needy
areas. The funds appropriated for this sec-
tion are apportioned among the States pri-
marily on the basis of need for serving
lunches free of charge to children who can-
not afford to pay. From a national stand-
point the $6.5 million budget is but a token
of what would be required if the need were
to be met. The city of Chicago alone would
require the total appropriation. Conse-
quently, the funds appropriated for the cur-
rent year ($2 million) were apportioned
among the States to start experimental pro-
grams to determine what effect a high re-
imbursement rate and a reduced price to
children might have on participation, num-
ber of free lunches required, etc. Wisconsin
got $11,700. We were able to start four small
projects beginning in February?one in West-
boro; one in Pine Lake, near Rhinelander;
one at Neopit and one in Keshena. Thus you
can see that the $4.5 million increase in the
budget for such purposes will have but little
bearing on the program as a whole.
Appropriated funds available for reim-
bursement and section 6 commodities for
the current year total $152,915,000 (not in-
cluding the $45 milliop transfer from sec-
tion 32 funds for this purpose). Appropri-
ated funds for identical purposes next year
Would be $129,115,000. Thus there is actu-
ally a reduction of funds for the regular
program of 15.4 percent and not 10 percent
as it would appear on the surface.
Along with the 15.4 percent reduction in
funds, it is quite evident that surplus com-
modities will not be available in the kinds
and quantities we have had in the past.
Several valuable items have disappeared
from the surplus list. We have received only
202,173 pounds of cheese for schools this
year. Last year we used 821,770 pounds.
There are virtually no Government pur-
chases being made for price support pur-
poses. Butter has reached the same posi-
tion. Section 70 of the Agricultural Act of
1965 authorizes ie Secretary of Agriculture
to go out on t e market and buy butter,
cheese, and powdered milk in any quantity
needed to fulfill requirements of the pro-
gram regardless of price or surplus situation,
but he has not done so until February 10
when he announced he would buy a limited
quantity of butter to meet the needs of the
school lunch program. He made no offer to
buy cheese, however.
If the administrations proposals prevail,
It will mean an increase of perhaps 5 cents
per lunch in charges to children. Children
attending schools where there is a lunch pro-
gram would be required to pay the full cost
of the milk, unless the district were to sub-
sidize it somehow. There would be no milk
reimbursement for such schools, excepting
for the milk served to needy children who
would be unable to pay. This would be an
inconsequential amount, I'm sure.
Schools which have a lunch program are
now being reimbursed at the rate of 4 cents
per half pint of extra milk served, and the
schools which do not have a lunch service
are paid 3 cents per half pint. All schools
are paid a uniform rate of 4 cents per lunch
with milk. No reimbursement is paid for
lunches served without milk.
This letter has grown somewhat lengthy
and I apologize for it. Anything you can do
In behalf of adequately funding both pro-
grams in the coming fiscal year will be very
much appreciated.
Sincerely,
GORDON W. GUNDERSON,
Chairman, Legislative Committee, ASFSA.
MILK INDUSTRY FOUNDATION,
Washington., D.C., February 11, 1966.
Senator GAYLORD NELSON,
Senate Office Building,
Washington, D.C.
DEAR SENATOR NELSON: We Solicit your
support for continuance of the special milk
program which in fiscal year 1965 was used
by 92,005 schools and child care institutions
where 2,966,800,000 half pints of milk were
consumed. By comparison, 70,132 schools
participated in the national school lunch
program and used 2,876,150,103 half pints of
milk in fiscal 1965.
This usage of milk aggregated nearly 3 bil-
lion pounds. Had this milk not been so
used, there can be little doubt that it would
have been acquired by the Commodity Credit
Corporation in the form of nonfat dry milk,
butter, and cheese since approximately 5.7
billion pounds on a milk equivalent basis
was actually acquired. The direct cost at
the present support price would have been
$103 million, the exact amount Congress ap-
propriated for the special milk program for
fiscal 1966. In addition, there would have
been the cost of acquiring, handling, packag-
ing, and transporting the products which
would have been made from the 3 billion
pounds of milk used in the school lunch and
school milk programs.
While commercial consumption has shown
a gain during the past year and some further
gain is expected this year, it now appears that
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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? SENATE March 1, 1966
an estimated :3 to 4 billion pounds of milk in
the form of nonfat dry milk, butter, and
cheese will be acquired under the price sup-
port program in 1966.
In the light of these circumstances it
makes extremely good sense to continue the
apecial milk program. Nearly 22,000 more
schools and child care institutions use this
program than use the school lunch program.
More children are benefited by having a
nutritious energy-giving food in the form of
milk.
At a time when our Government is spend-
ing millions of dollars to rehabilitate school
dropouts, is enlarging the food stamp pro-
gram and carrying on a war against poverty,
it ,s inconsistent to curtail a program that
adds to the health, energy, and vitality of
children who are in school and thereby helps
them to stay in school. This is especially
trot, with respect to the 22,000 schools and
institutions which, because of lack of facili-
ties, funds or for other reasons do not have
a school lunch program.
We of the Milk Industry Foundation, a
trade association of milk processors having
mombers doing business in every State of the
Nation, including, of course, your State,
respectfully request your help in maintaining
the Special Milk Program at a level where all
schools and child institutions wishing to
pacticipate may do so.
Sin caret y,
Roemer EL NORTH,
ttery live Director.
Now eecrevioNe PUBLIC SCHOOLS,
NMI) Richmond, Wis., February 18, 1166.
TRU'. GAYLORD NELSON,
Senate Office
Washington, D.C.
! WAR SENATOR NELSON: The proposal in
Federal budget and in the Congress to
cut back in the the appropriation for the
special milk program in schools and to as-
sign the administration of the fund to the
Department of Health, Education, and Wel-
fare instead of the Department of Agricul-
ture has come to my attention. My per-
sonal feeling about this proposal, and its
tie-in effect with ether programs, are ex-
pressed as that of a parent, a taxpayer, and
a school administrator.
1. Since the milk purchased by the re-
duced appropriation is to be distributed to
needy children, there is an obvious tie-in
with programing under the Education Act
of 1965.
'e School lunch and special mik programs
have stood for years as evidence that a fed-
erally aided program can do an effective job
with a minirnum of Government interfer-
ence.
I. The Education Act of 1965 is becoming
a monument of regulation, detail, restriction
iind administrative putter work. What was
promoted as a first time opportunity for
education innovation on a national scale
has become restrictive to a point that pro-
graming is going to evolve into a number of
ricatly wrapped educational packages. In-
novation, as I understand the implication of
the term, will not happen.
.1. Any remote tie-in of the milk or lunch
program to the restrictiveness of Public Law
89-10 will tend to render that program In-
c! let:teal.
O. To spend billions in an emotion-
packed great-experiment program and at the
same time cut back in a program that has
proved itself nutritionally, educationally,
and economically sound for years, would be
difficult to defend, I'm sure.
Your serious effort to restore the fund-
ing for the milk program to its original
strength, and retain the administration of
the program to the Department of Agricul-
ture, will, I'm sure, receive the enthusiastic
support and imdorsement of your constitu-
ents.
Sincerely yours,
SHERMAN H. GROVES,
Superintendent.
MILE. PRODUCERS COOPERATIVE, INC.,
KENOSHA, Wis., February 16, 1966.
Senator GAYLORD Nrazoe,
Senate Office Building, Room 404:
Washingt on?O.C.
DEAR SENATOR NELSON: The Wisconsin
Council of Agricultural Cooperatives strongly
protests the proposed unprecedented 1967
budget out of $82 million for the special
milk program for schoolchildren. We urge
that the special milk program budgets be
restored to $H03 million, the current appro-
priation; preferably funds for this program
should be authorized at $115 millern.
The proposed reduction of $19 million in
the school lunch program should also be
restored by Congress.
A reduction of the size proposed is tanta-
mount to complete elimination of the special
milk program. Complete elimination would
divert about 1.5 billion pounds of milk now
consumed as fluid milk into manufactured
dairy products.
USDA reports indicate the price for milk
eligible for fluid consumption was $4.63 per
hundredweight in 1965, compared to $3.33
for milk used for manufacturing. The dif-
ference in the two prices is $1,30 per hun-
dredweight. The 1.5 billion pounds of milk
times $1 30 per hundredweight would mean
a loss of $19.5 million Li dairy farmers' pur-
chasing power.
The special milk program is one of our
moss effective vehicles for insuring good eat-
ing habis and at the same time improving
diets of all children. Certainly this impor-
tant aspect of the program should not be
based on ability to pay.
Does the administration realize how much
milk consumption in schools will decline
if the cost per half pint is increased? A
study in Chicago schools revealed that an
increase of 1 cent per half pint on white
milk and chocolate milk reduced consump-
tion by 10 percent,. This fact alone should
give cause for serious reconsideration of the
proposed action.
We urgently request that you do your
utmost to combat efforts to reduce the spe-
cial milk program appropriations. The pro-
gram, as we know it, has the support of not
only dairy farmers but the general public
es well. Our younger generation would be
dealt a disservice by the U.S. Congress if ap-
propriations for this program are dropped
below the current level.
Sincerely yours,
MILK PRODUCERS CO-Os, INC.,
E. Maciar, Sales Manager.
AUTO SAFETY
Mr. KENNEDY of New York. Mr.
President, :I ask unanimous consent to
have printed in the RECORD a brief on
auto safety prepared by the Honorable
Howard Grafftey, Member of Parliament
of Canada, Mr. C.. Alexander Brown, and
Mr. Rheal Casavant, also of Canada, for
consideration by the Federal Government
of Canada.
This brief concerns the rising accident
and death toll resulting :from auto
crashes in Canada. Although we usually
think of auto safety in the American con-
text, Canadians also use many cars de-
signed in the United States. It is only
natural for Canadians to be concerned
with the safety of American automobiles.
I call to the attention of my associates
the material prepared by Messrs. Graff-
tey, Brown, and Casavant. It is perti-
nent to our problems with auto safety.
There being no objection, the brief
was ordered to be printed in the RECORD,
as follows:
Fut'. TEXT OF BRIEF ON" TRAFFIC ACCIDENT
DEATHS AND INJURIES IN CAN ADA
INTRODUCTION
Significant new developments in the un-
derstanding of the complex casualty of
motor vehicle fatalities and injuries have
prompted us to set dOwn our knowledge and
understanding of this problem, together with
three recommendations for remedial action
that could be taken at the federal level, for
presentation to the Prime Minister of Can-
ada, the Minister of National Health isod
Welfare, the Minister of Justice, the Minister
of Trade and Commerce and Moister of
Industry.
This brief has been endorsed by:
C. E. Dionne, Member of Parliament, House
of Commons, Ottawa.
Stanley Knowles, Member of Parliament,
House of Commons, Ottawa.
Guy Marcoux, Member of Parliament, M.D.,
House of Commons, Ottawa.
John Matheson, Member of Parliament,
House of Commons, Ottawa.
Wilson Southern, television producer,
Champlain Towers, Ottawa.
This brief has been prepared and presented
by:
Howard Grafftey, Member of Parliament.
House of Commons, Ottawa.
C. Alexander Brown, writer, 135 Wood-
ridge Crescent, Ottawa 14, Ontario.
it Casa,vant, television executive, 195
Fontaine Street, Hull, Quebec.
BRIEF ON AUTOMOBILE SAFE'.'Y
In the past 10 years 35,031 people have
been killed in automobile accidents in Can-
ada, and 948,850 injured. It is estimated
that by the end of 1965, 4,800 more will die
and 150,000 will be injured. If the present
trend continues between the beginning of
1966 and the end of 1970, 26,000 more Ca-
nadians will die on our roads and more than
1 million more will be injured.
Accidents are now one of the leading causes
of death and injury in this, as in many other
countries. It is estimated that about half
of all cars in North America between the
time they are first driven and the time they
are scrapped become involved in at least
one injury-producing accident.
To the present time nearly all efforts to
correct this situation have been directed at
drivers. In spite of this, the toll of death
and injury, continues to increase and there
is absolutely no evidence to indicate that
to continue to expend most of our efforts in
educating, cajoling, and penalizing the
driver will yield adequate results. The prob-
lem of highway death and injury must be
attached in other areas. In modern times,
the techniques of epidemiology have been
successfully "extended from its original re-
striction to the communicable diseases to a
broad application of mass diseases of man;
to cancer, diabetes, congenital anomalies and
many others. It is not so generally appre-
ciated that injuries, as distinguished from
diseases, are equally susceptible to this ap-
proach, and that accidents as a health prob-
lem of populations conform to the same
biological laws as do disease processes and
regularly evidence comparable behavior."
Epidemiological approach
Applying the terminology of epidemiology
to automobile accidents, the roads are the
environment, the driver is the host, and au-
tomobiles are the agents. Drivers (the host
in our terms) are susceptible to human er-
ror. Therefore, there will always be acci-
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on insurance regulation in 1964 while insur-
ance companies paid the States $737.6
million.
DISTRICT SIXTH HIGHEST
The States that spent the least, in relation
to their income from the insurance industry,
were in order, Mississippi, Ohio, Oklahoma,
Missouri, Idaho, Michigan, Connecticut and
Minnesota. None budgeted more than 2.15
cents of the insurance tax dollar for insur-
ance regulation.
The District of Columbia, which budgeted
6.24 cents, ranked sixth highest. Maryland
and Virginia, which spent about 3 cents each,
ranked 33d and 34th, respectively.
States without any examiners at all, ac-
cording to the subcommittee's survey, were
Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, Delaware, Idaho,
Mississippi, Oklahoma, Tennessee, and West
Virginia. Yet Arizona and Mississippi alone
had the prime responsibility for checking on
the financial stability of 404 insurance com-
panies chartered in their States.
New Hampshire and Vermont had only one
examiner each; Maine and Montana, two;
Oregon and Wyoming, three.
NINE EXAMINERS HERE
The District of Columbia, with 50 com-
panies chartered here and another 630 doing
business, had 9 examiners. Virginia had
10 examiners for 846 companies, 95 of them
homegrown. Maryland, with 57 companies
chartered in the State and another 752 in
business there, had 12 examiners.
New York had 342 examiners for 736 com-
panies.
"No State insurance department, none of
the 50 States, is going to be any stronger
than the weakest examiner they have on
their payroll," one witness testified before
the subcommittee.
In some of the States that have no insur-
ance examiners of their own, private ac-
counting firms are hired to make the checks.
DODD said he had no illusions about getting
a perfect system of insurance regulation.
But, he said, "what we are getting now is
not even within shouting distance of this
ideal."
[From the Journal of Commerce,
Feb. 24, 19661
THREAT OF NEW FEDERAL CONTROLS Is
RAISED?SENATOR DODD URGES STATES To
ACT IMMEDIATELY
(By Alexander Picone)
A short while back we allowed as how the
substandard risk automobile insurance mar-
ket, a relatively insignificant segment of the
business, could turn out to be the "Achilles
heel" of State regulation, unless the com-
panies and the State regulatory authorities
pay more attention than has been given to
date to the cleansing of this obviously un-
pleasant fringe of the business. It is a full-
blown threat as of now.
Since 1960, some 58 high-risk auto Insur-
ance companies went under leaving over a
million persons without insurance. This,
plus other developments, has provided am-
munition for those who would prefer
stronger Federal supervision of the business,
if not complete takeover by repeal of the
McCarran Act.
STRONG EFFORT
It is useless to go on carping and edito-
rializing, but sincere executives must make
every effort?and do it now?to prevent even
the smallest black mark from spotting the
Image of effective State regulation.
Perhaps, there are some insurance execu-
tives among us who do not want State regu-
lation to continue. If this view is widely
shared by people within the industry then
efforts should be started to determine where
such defections exist.
The Senate Judiciary Antitrust Subcom-
mittee, of which Senator THOMAS J. Dom),
Democrat, of Connecticut, is chairman, has
the continuing responsibility of studying
the effectiveness of the system of State
regulation of insurance.
In a speech last reek on the floor of the
U.S. Senate. Mr. DODD, who has been called
the congressional watchdog of the insurance
business, revealed that nearly 1 of every 10
high-risk auto insurance companies had
failed in the last 2 years, leaving more than
half a million persons without protection.
He said the situation was appalling and added
that it may be time for the Federal Govern-
ment to pass legislation unless the States
take immediate and sufficient action. The
words "immediate" and "sufficient" should be
underlined. And, any action taken on a
State level would be futile unless the com-
panies cooperated fully and wholeheartedly.
POINT STRESSED
The Senator from Connecticut also
stressed a point which should, by now, be im-
printed on the minds of all insurance people.
,It is this: "The legislative history of the
McCarran Act clearly indicates that 'Congress
was making only a conditional delegation of
authority to the States, to be reconsidered
if the States should demonstrate an in-
ability to properly serve the public interest."
The Senator was kind enough to stress the
excellent record of some State insurance de-
partments and to assert his personal support
of State regulation as best suited for supervi-
sion of the insurance industry "because it is
at the level most aware of the local and
regional needs of the consumer." The Sena-
tor, like most public figures, is subject to a
multitude of pressures, political and other-
wise, and he may be forced to take steps that
are contrary to his personal convictions.
The bald fact, as the Senator sees it is that
State regulation, in toto, is not adequately
protecting the consumer, and at all costs,
he must be protected.
Mr. DODD, in his speech before the Senate,
raised these questions, questions which every
responsible person in the Insurance industry
should be prepared to answer:
"Can a form of regulation be adequate
which allows virtually 9 percent of the high-
risk automobile insurance companies in the
Nation to fail over a 2-year period, leaving
considerably more than half a million per-
sons without insurance?"
"Can a form of regulation be adequate
which generally doesn't maintain examiners
sufficient in number to carefully analyze the
financial standing of thousands of insurance
companies?"
"Can a form of regulation be adequate in
which at least six of the States have three
or less examiners and at least nine States
have no examiners at all?"
"Can a form of regulation be adequate
which is operated on a marginal budget of
usually less than 4 percent of the premium
taxes and fees collected from insurance com-
panies by the States?"
FEDERAL CONTAOL
Although no system of supervision can
hope to achieve perfection, Senator DODD
said. "we know that no type of Federal con-
trol would tolerate a failure rate of the mag-
nitude of that presently occurring in high-
risk automobile insurance."
Complete Federal regulation of insurance
may be undesirable, Senator DODD said, "but
we have a critical problem in the high-risk
automobile insurance area today, one which
needs serious attention. If the States do not
immediately and sufficiently respond, the
Federal Government will be left with no
alternative but to itself respond.
"There are alternatives not amounting to
outright Federal control which would pro-
tect the public from these many insolvencies.
An approach similar to that of the Federal
Deposit Insurance Corporation in banking or
a Federal Guaranty Fund are possibilities
which have merit.
"The time may be at hand to begin ex-
ploring the feasibility of these and other
possible legislative solutions to this very seri-
ous problem before the American public suf-
fers any further Injustices," the Senator
said.
As we said earlier, the time for carping has
passed, indeed editorializing is of little help.
What must be so evident is the fact that
the insurance commissioners should appoint
a competent all-industry committee and staff
to cooperate with the State regulatory au-
thorities and solve the high risk problem
and other problems affecting the private In-
surance concept and State regulation of in-
surance. The integrity of the private in-
surance business is on trial and we must
have faith that both the commissioners and
the companies will cooperate and come
through with needful solutions.
CONCLUSION OF MORNING
BUSINESS
Mr. MANSFIELD, Mr. President, is
there further morning business?
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there
further morning business? If not, morn-
usiness is closed.
EMENTARY MILITARY AND
PROCUREMENT AUTHORIZATION,
FISCAL 1966
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I
ask unanimous consent that the un-
finished business be laid before the
Senate.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The
Chair lays before the Senate the un-
finished business.
The Senate resumed the consideration
of the bill (S. 2791) to authorize appro-
priations during the fiscal year 1966 for
procurement of aircraft, missiles, naval
vessels, and tracked combat vehicles and
research, development, test, and evalua-
tion for the armed forces, and for other
purposes.
Mr. MORSE. Mr. President, it is my
judgment that the Senate is about to
start a session of the Senate which will
result in a series of votes, probably before
the day is over, which may be as impor-
tant to the future of this Republic as any
series of votes ever cast in the history of
the Senate.
Mr. President, I believe that at least,
irrespective of how we feel about the
issue, the American people are entitled to
have the attendance of their elected rep-
resentatives in the Senate on this very
critical occasion and, therefore, I sug-
gest the absence of a quorum and ask for
a live quorum.
The PRESIDING OFFIQER. The
clerk will call the roll.
The legislative clerk called the roll, and
the following Senators answered to their
names:
Aiken
Bass
Bayh
Bible
Boggs
Burdick
Clark
Cotton
Dodd
Ellender
Fannin
[No. 40 Leg.]
Pulbright
Inouye
Jackson
Javits
Kennedy, Mass.
Long, Mo.
Mansfield
McIntyre
Mondale
Monroney
Morse
Pastore
Prouty
Russell, S.C.
Russell, Ga.
Saltonstall
Smith
Talmadge
Tydings
Williams, N.J.
Young, Ohio
Mr. LONG of Louisiana. I announce
that the Senator from Maryland [Mr.
BREWSTER] is absent on official business.
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I also announce that the Senator from
Idaho [Mr. CHURCH], and the Senator
from Ohio [Mr. LauseuEl are necessarily
absent.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. A quo-
rum is not present.
Mr. PASTORE. Mr. President, I move
that the Sergeant at Arms be directed to
request the attendance of absent
Senators.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The
question is on agreeing to the motion of
the Senator from Rhode Island.
The motion was agreed to.
'the PRESIDING OFFICER. The
Sergeant at Arms will execute the order
of the Senate.
After a little delay, the following Sen-
ators entered the Chamber and answered
to their names:
Allott
Anderson
Bartlett
Bennett
Byrd, Va.
Byrd, W. Va.
Cannon
Carlson
case
Cooper
Curtis
Dirksen
Dominick
Douglas
Illastland
Pong
Gore
Gruelling
Harris
Hart
Hartke
Hayden
Hickenlooper
Hill
Holland
Hruska
Jordan, N.C.
Jordan, Idaho
Kennedy, N.Y.
Kuchel
Long. La.
Magnuson
McCarthy
McClellan
McGee
McGovern
McNamara
Metcalf
Miller
Montoya
Morton
-MOM
Mundt
Murphy
Muskie
Nelson.
Neuberger
Pearson
Pell
Proxmire
Randolph
Ribleoff
Robertson
Scott
Simpson
Smath ers
Sparkman
Stennis
Symington
hurrnond
Tower
Williams, Del.
Yarborough
Young, N. Dak.
The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. BASS
in the chair). A quorum is present.
Mr. MORSE. Mr. President, I shall
speak briefly in support of my amend-
ment, which I shall offer at the end of
the statement. I may at a later hour
offer a second amendment.
Mr. President, the major thesis of my
case against the pending business of the
Senate is that the bill goes far beyond
what its proponents claim for it. The
pending bill is a policy bill. The pend-
ing bill greatly enlarges American for-
eign policy in Asia. The pending bill
is pregnant with a policy that will lead
to the escalation of the war in Asia.
The pending bill, in my opinion, greatly
endangers the development of world war
three. Therefore I think that the pol-
icies inherent in the bill should not be
adopted by the Senate without restric-
tions being placed upon the bill.
It is my view, as I expressed in some
depth last Friday, that this bill greatly
weakens our system of checks and bal-
ances.
ii iS a bill that would greatly enlarge
the discretionary power of the President.
It is a bill that would_ give determination
by way of the exercise of what I consider
to be, for the fiscal year 1966-67, almost
unlimited discretionary power on the
part of the Secretary of Defense. There-
lore, I think that the bill should be de-
feated.
When we finally come to the rollcall
on the bill, I shall vote against the bill,
and when I vote against the bill,
I :hall not be voting to let down Amer-
ican boys in southeast Asia. But I shall
be voting to try to save the lives of many
who, in my judgment, will be sent into
Asia as a result of the passage of this
bill.
It is, of course, to be understood that
I expressed in some detail last Friday my
answer to the oft-repeated?but un-
founded--charge that those of us who
oppose the President's policies in south-
east Asia have no substitute plan.
We have a substitute plan, it plan that
we have expressed in great detail.
Mr. President, let me say that I sup-
port the position of General Gavin. I
support the enclave approach which
would afford an opportunity for other
nations to come in and live up to their
obligations under the United Nations
Charter to enforce the peace in south-
east Asia.
Mr. President, with those preliminary
remarks, I now proceed with my formal
statement in support of my .00sition in
opposition to the bill.
What is printed in the hearings is
enough to destroy the claim that there
is little difference between the Gavin-
Kennan proposal for Vietnam and the
administration objective. The adminis-
tration objective in South Vietnam,
which l.l quite different from any alleged
commitment, is one of clearing the
country for them cf the Vietcong, and
restoring Genera] Ky to full control over
the people and territory of South Viet-
nam. Only then will we be prepared for
any eleetions. That is what was in the
President's Honolulu speech, and here is
the military funding that will be needed
o carry it mit.
We are going to go to elections when
we destroy large numbers of Vietcong.
We are going to go to elections when we
have "pacified" the country and put Ky
in power. We are going to go to elec-
tions when we can be sure that Ky is
going to win the election. However, if
we had elections controlled by Commu-
nists, then we would have much to say
and to deprecate.
Much of the talk of the leaders of
our Government about elections in South
Vietnam spells out the word "hypocrisy."
I think we are highly hypocritical in
regard to our allegation that we seek
elections. I think we also seek con-
trolled elections in Vietnam, in that we
only want them when we control the
country.
I pont to Secretary MeNamara's
statement on page 105 of the hearings
in response to a question by Senator
SMITH, for this colloquy shovu the preg-
nancy of this bill with new foreign
policy.
read from the hearings:
Senator SMITH. Mr. SeCretarY are there
any plans to escalate .a.r.d step u the offen-
sive in Vietnam?
Secretary MCNAMARA. Well, thele are prep-
arations being made, and they are reflected
in this Local :1066 supplement, for substan-
tially increasing our deployments to South
Vietnam and raising the rate of activity of
our air units there. Whether or not we will
carry out such higher rates of aiiiivities and
actually deploy all of those addh..onal forces
is a decision that only the Pr: sident can
make, and no such cleaision his yet been
made. His instruction to us is to be pre-
pared to meet such higher deployments and
such higher rates of activity shott,c1 the need
for them arise.
Senator SmrrH. If there aren't any am-
munition shortages in the Vietnam fighting
and if there aren't any plans to etcalate and
step up the fighting in Vietnam, then why
have you recently opened a halt dozen or
more ammunition plants directed to start
operations on increased ammunitions?
Secretary McNAmARA. To be prepared to
support higher deployments and higher rates
of activity. We have laid out over the period
of the next 13 months?through ,J me 1937?
possible levels of deployment, and possible
rates of activity which are higher than pres-
ent levels of deployment and rates of activity.
and in order to be prepared to support them,
we are requesting funds to procure the am-
munition for such higher deployments and
higher rates of activity.
Elsewhere, Secretary McNamara was
pressed by Senator McCLELtax to de-
scribe and define our military strategy
and tactics in Vietnam. The Senator's
question appears on page 112 of tile
hearing record and it was:
Are we going to continue fighting what
appears to be a holding action?
I read further from the hearings:
Secretary MCNAMARA. I don't believe that
we would characterize our preseict military
strategy or present tactics as holding actions.
On the contrary, we are taking Lilo offensive,
seeking to find and destroy the enemy bases
and forces, and we propose to emtinini to
follow that strategy and tactic, using what-
ever forces are required to accomplish it in
order to convince the Vietcong ad particu-
larly the North Vietnamese who are directing
their operations, that they cannot win in the
south, and therefore, must cease their at-
tempt to subvert and destroy the political
institutions of the south.
Senator MCCLELLAN. That is Nvily it oc-
curs to me that it is primarily a holding
action. We are just going to hold on and
show them they can't win.
May I have order, Mr. President?
The PRESIDING OFFIC ER. The
Chair has attempted to secure the co-
operation of Senators. The Senate will
be in order.
Mr. MORSE. I continue to read:
Secretary MCNAMARA. No sir. As I have
said, our military strategy which is associated
with the political objective of preserving
the right of the South Vietnamese to deter-
mine their own destiny is to find and destroy
the Vietcong and North Vietnamese forces
operating in South Vietnam.
A few sentences later, the Secretary
added:
If the circumstances change, if the North
Vietnamese add greater force, if the military
risk associated with our present policy in-
creases beyond the limits we presently see,
It might be desirable or necessary in the
future to modify that strategy (deletic1).
This, of course, is quite in keeping
with the Honolulu speech of the Presi-
dent at the Honolulu airport on Febru-
ary 6, when he said:
We will leave here determined nut only lo
achieve victory over aggression, but to win
victory over hunger, disease, and decpair.
Today's press informs us once again
that General Ky intends to reu lily both
North and South under his command.
Dennite his many statements to tint
effect, they have never been rejected by
the American Government. We finance
and support Ky; we maintain him and
his coterie of ruling generals in com-
mand in South Vietnam. They are our
responsibility. When Ky declares it to
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March 1, 1966 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? SENATE
be the policy of his government to "go
North" he is reiterating what President
Diem declared the policy of his govern-
ment to be in 1955, a policy for which
he claimed American support.
Mr. President, in the Washington Post
this morning, on page A-13, we have a
story under the headline "Ky Says
Saigon's Task Is To 'Liberate' North."
The article reads:
South Vietnamese Premier Nguyen Cao
Ky believes his country has the "noble and
supreme task" of "liberating the North and
reunifying the fatherland."
Ky made the statement in a speech on
February 21 during a public seminar in
Saigon, but word of it became available In
Washington only yesterday.
In calling for reunification of the North,
Ky said "we cannot betray the 4,000 years of
our history, and " * we cannot betray the
sacrifices in bones and blood made by our
ancestors and our sons and brothers, and
* * * we cannot let the millions of the
North Vietnamese people continue to endure
these sufferings under the yoke of Chi-
nese colonialists and their North Vietnamese
puppet administration's lackeys."
Ky has made similar statements in the
past, but this appeared to be the first of its
kind since his Honolulu meeting last month
with President Johnson. Ky'd talk of "liber-
ating" the North is directly at odds with the
Johnson policy.
Mr. Johnson has repeatedly said that the
United States is not threatening the exist-
ence of the North Vietnamese regime and is
not attempting to alter its Communist form
of government.
BILL AUTHORIZES COMBINED WAR FORCE FUNDED
DEFENSE DEPARTMENT
The bill provides for the increased
scope of the war in three ways. First,
It provides for the funding of all military
forces serving in South Vietnam out of
U.S. Defense Department appropriations.
Second, it authorizes the construction
of new military bases throughout south-
east Asia at the discretion of the Secre-
tary of State.
And third, it provides for an increase
of nearly half a million men in the
armed services of the United States.
The first of these?the funding of all
military activities in Vietnam out of our
Defense budget?contemplates a total
and direct reversal of the policy of the
United States as set forth at the time
the Southeast Asia Collective Defense
treaty was presented and ratified.
I read section 401(a) :
Funds authorized for appropriation for the
use of the Armed Forces of the United States
under this or any other act are authorized
to be made available for their stated purposes
in connection with support of Vietnamese
and other free world forces in Vietnam, and
related costs, during the fiscal years 1966 and
1967, on such terms and conditions as the
Secretary of Defense may determine.
The bill provides a blank check on
American defense spending for expand-
ing this war into Laos and Thailand,
and when we get through paying and
equipping the armed forces of South
Korea and the Philippines I think we
will see the war spread to those coun-
tries, too.
Under this bill, and in this title, we
are making the Vietnam war an Ameri-
can war. No longer is there any pretense
that military aid to the forces of South
Vietnam, Thailand, South Korea, the
Philippines, Australia, or New Zealand
is aid to separate and independent mili-
tary identities. Their forces are to be
funded out of our American military
defense spending, and I predict that this
provision, which is totally unlimited as
to amount and as to countries, will serve
to further destroy the integrity of such
neighboring countries as Thailand and
any other country that is included in it.
ASIAN DEFENSE FORCE UNDER SEATO REJECTED
As I recited to the Senate on Friday,
this kind of organization was specifically
rejected in 1954 and 1955 when Secretary
of State Dulles presented the treaty to
the Senate, and when it was ratified by
this body.
He told the Foreign Relations Com-
mittee that he did not like to use the
word "SEATO" in connection with the
treaty, because the "0" stood for "Orga-
nization" and no organization was in-
tended or contemplated. He said:
We are trying to get away from the word
because it implies a southeast Asia treaty or-
ganization comparable to the North Atlantic
Treaty Organization. That organization is
designed in the case of the North Atlantic
Treaty to build up a defensive force on the
continent of Europe which itself would be
sufficient to resist attack by the Red armies.
As I point out, that is not now the purpose
under this treaty. We do not intend to dedi-
cate any major elements of the U.S.
Military Establishment to form an army of
defense in this area. We rely primarily upon
the deterrent of our mobile striking power.
That we made clear to our associate in the
treaty, and that is our policy.
So that we do not intend, Mr. Chairman, to
have under this treaty any such local com-
bined forces as have been created in Europe
under the North Atlantic Treaty, and which
goes by the name of NATO.
It was on that basis, and with those as-
surances, that the treaty was ratified by
the Senate. In this bill, we not only
reverse that policy by creating a local
combined force, including major ele-
ments of the American Military Estab-
lishment, but we are going to pay the en-
tire cost for all the countries that con-
tribute to it. I know that so far, we are
told that Ausrtalia and New Zealand are
paying their own way, but there is no
reason to expect they will continue to do
so, once the U.S. Defense Department
pays for everyone else.
Mr. President, when Secretary of State
Dulles presented the treaty to the Sen-
ate, he told the Foreign Relations Com-
mittee that he dici not like to use the
word "SEATO" in connection with the
treaty, because the "0," as he said,
stands for "organization," and no orga-
nization was intended.
That is very critical in this debate, Mr.
President. That is why I said last Fri-
day, and will not review it in detail, in
my judgment the Secretary of State is
quite mistaken in his now contention
that SEATO is a justification for a course
of action. But of course the Secretary
of State, when he testified before our
committee, forgot what he told the
Foreign Relations Committee in both
1962 and 1964 and in executive session
in regard to SEATO. He seemed then to
have been aware of what Secretary Dul-
les had said.
4189
EXPANSION OF BASES IN SOUTHEAST ASIA
The second way in which the bill au-
thorizes the expansion of the war is in
the authority it gives the Secretary of
Defense to penetrate further into that
area of the world.
Look at the language of section 302.
The bill authorizes certain construction
in support of military activities in south-
east Asia, and for other purposes. Sec-
tion 302 reads:
The Secretary of Defense may establish or
develop installations and facilities which he
determines to be vital to the security of the
United States, and in connection therewith
to acquire, construct, convert, rehabilitate, or
install permanent or temporary public works,
Including land acquisition, site preparation,
appurtenances, utilities and equipment in
the total amount of $200 million.
Do not tell the American people again,
I say to the Secretary of State, to the
Secretary of Defense, and to the Presi-
dent, that the United States seeks no
military bases in South Vietnam or in
southeast Asia.
Mr. President, stark realism ought to
warn us: "We spend these huge sums of
money for the building of American
bases in southeast Asia, and we will be
there for a long time."
In fact, at the present time, as I
pointed out in my speech last night here
on the floor of the Senate, we are finding
ourselves becoming more and more in-
volved in political controversy with
Japan for we are maintaining huge bases
in Okinawa, and we are maintaining our
naval bases in Japan.
Even the majority party in Japan is
split over our course of action. Even the
majority party of Japan wishes more
favorable negotiations for our use of
those bases to the economic advantage
of Japan. There are many in the ma-
jority party who believe that we should
get out now, and of course the other
parties in Japan campaign on that con-
troversy as one of their major issues
in opposition to the Government of
Japan.
When we spend these huge sums of
money for the building of American
bases abroad, the tendency is to post-
pone and postpone and postpone getting
out. In my judgment, in view of what
is going to develop in southeast Asia, it
Is my great concern and my fear that
the construction of these bases, contrary
to the enclave theory of a General Gavin,
will result in America's presence in
southeast Asia for many years to come.
I believe that now is the time to reject
that policy. I believe that now is the
time to reject a bill which has that
policy included in it, and also, to reject
a bill which, in my judgment, gives to
the Secretary of Defense and to the
President of the United States the dis-
cretionary power which this bill would
give them. For, as section 5 provides:
The Secretary of Defense may establish
or develop installations and facilities which
he determines to be vital to the security
of the United States.
As Senators know, I am always con-
cerned about giving broad discretionary
power to any administrator of the Gov-
ernment because that always increases
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4i90 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD SENATE March , 191;6
the danger of going further and further
down the road?a road on which we have
already traveled too far?of government
by executive supremacy.
a deplore the extent to Which Con-
gress has already delegated what I con-
sider to be entirely too much discretion-
ary power to the executive branch.
Therefore, I say that it is a great mis-
take to approve the policy of building
these installations in southeast Asia.
That is why I say that the Secretary of
,Aate. the Secretary of Defense, and the
President of the United States should no
larger repeat what they have been say-
ing so freouently, that we seek no mili-
tary bases in southeast Asia.
this see bin refers to installations and
.i'acilities 'vital to the security of the
United States," Who is to say what is
vital to the security of the country?
W1'AT IS VITAL IN ASIA?
Why not the Congress rather than, as
in the provisions of this bill, the Secre-
tary of Defense. It is he who is author-
ized by this bill to establish the outposts
of American military command that will
thence have to be defended by all the
resources of this Nation that may be re-
quired to defend them. And these so-
called vital interests are not in the West-
ern Hemisphere, for the short title of the
bill explains that it refers to military
activities in southeast Asia.
Mr. President, one of the great differ-
ences between sincere men in this debate
From its inception, which started two and
a half years run, is that the Senator from
Alaska and I have stated time and again
on the floor of the Senate in our speeches
that, in our judgment, South Vietnam is
not worth the life of a single American
boy.
repeat that assertion today.
To my judgment, we cannot justify the
slaughtering of a single American boy in
South Vietnam. I am perfectly willing
to let history be the judge. To those who
are talking about protecting our boys
over there by enacting this bill, let me
say in rebuttal that we who are urging
defeat of the bill, are urging its defeat
so that it will force upon the administra-
tion a change of policy which will pre-
vent the killing of American boys in
South Vietnam.
Mr. President, that is one of the pre-
cious checks which the Constitution gives
to Congress; namely, the check on the
purse strings. All this talk that if we
exercise this check we will be endanger'
big the lives of American boys is entirely
unreal.
If we exercise the check, we will have
to change the policy. We will have to
return to such a program as General
Gavin has been advocating. We will
have to fall back on a program which
prevents escalating the war and sending
our forces farther and farther into
South Vietnam, eventually into North
Vielnam?and, in my opinion, ultimately
into China, where they will be killed by
the hundreds of thousands.
That is the issue at stake here.
Let the American people understand
that that is the issue. Let the American
people answer Congress on that issue as
we go forward across the Nation in the
months ahead in this historic debate at
the grassroots of America over our for-
eign policy.
As long as we remain free, the Ameri-
can people have the ultimate check upon
Congress. in my judgment, we have
reached the point now so that American
foreign policy can be changed only by
the American people. I am satisfied
that it is not going to be changed by
Congress.
T do not accept the premise f the op-
position that we have vital it Lerests in
southeast Asia which call for .milateral
American military action. The world
has sona vital issues in southea.st Asia.
The world has some obligation vis-a-vis
sonth.eatt Asia.
When I speak of the world. I mean
those nations which have pledved them-
selves, caier their own signaturis, to pre-
serve the peace?but not the United
States unilaterally. Every sigaatory to
the United Nations Charter hit o an obli-
gation to preserve the peace of the world.
Do we not see the great difference?
One of the great differener's which
exist between us as sincere min is the
honest difference of opirdoll as to
whether we have any right, legally or
morally, to set ourselves UP as the police-
men of the world, to carry out what we
consider to be the policy that v,?-e believe
the world should adopt. That is why
we are having so much difficulty, in so
many places around the world, in get-
ting more than token support, More than
lip service to our foreign policy in Asia.
As the war escalates. and more human
beings on both sides of the war are
slaughter ed, we will find rising opposi-
tion and resentment to our country's
policy. That is why I have been pleading
that we should come to grips with the
great moral issue involved, toe, in con-
nection with the war. For, in my judg-
ment:, our policies cannot be reconciled
with the glorious, historic record of our
Republic in support of histmOc ideals.
For I consider that we have walked out
on those ideals.
Since when, and in. what act of Con-
gress, is southeast Asia defined as vital
to the security of the United States,
justifying any unilateral action that may
be needed on our part to defend it? The
most that can be cited is the SEATO
treaty, which., however, does not define
the area as vital but refers to a -common
danger" to all SEATO members that has
never been seen by our SEATO partners.
The resolution of August 1964 cites
southeast Asia as an area where the
United States regards the maintenance
of international peace and security" as
vital to our interests. The continued in-
trusion of large-scale American military
forces, bases, and navies into this area,
as provided by the bill, will destroy what
little international peace and security is
left to the people of Thailand, Laos,
Malaysia, and eventually Burma and
Cambodia, for the war that is lapping at
their shares will engulf them, no, if it
is allowed to proceed on its present
course.
According to Secretary Mer.,a,mara's
testimony on pages 52 and 52 of the
hearings, about $975 million of existing
and new military construction money is
to be spent in South Vietnam, the re-
maining $666 million elsewhere in the
general area. Senators cannot authorize
a Defense Department to exercise this
kind of discretion and then not see it
exercised. This is how the war has been
enlarged and under this provision it will
continue to be enlarged.
On the basis of my observations in my
many years in the Senate, if the military
is given the funds it seeks, it always finds
ways to spend those funds. If mere
men----I care not who they are?with all
the human frailties that characterize
each one of us, gets this kind of power,
the danger is that they became drunk
with power. The best way to stop in-
toxication is to keep liquor away from
the potential intoxicant. The best way
to avoid the growing danger in this coun-
try that leaders of this country will be-
come more drunk with power is to deny
them the authorization for the exercise
of the power.
That is the policy involved in the bill.
Sometimes it is said that the resolu-
tion of August 1964 justifies this course
of action. The resolution of August 1964
cites southeast Asia as an area where
the United States regards "the mainte-
nance of international peace and se-
curity" as vital to our interests. The
continued intrusion of large-scale Ameri-
can military forces, bases, and navies
into this area is what I am concerned
about, for they bring an enlargement of
the war, not peace or security. We
ought to reject the policy of this bill that
Permits another enlargement of the war
at the discretion of the President.
NEW MANPOWER INCREASES PROVIDED IN BILL
The third way in which the bill au-
thorizes an escalation in the war is in
the manpower increases for American
Armed Forces it provides.
I call the attention of Senators to the
tables furnished by the Secretary of De-
fense which appear on pages 14, 15, and
16 of the hearings. There we see that
the plans of the Defense Department call
for increases in active duty military per-
sonnel by a net total?these are in-
creases?of 452,843 men to be financed
by this measure. That increase is
planned to be realized by the end of
fiscal year 1967. Three hundred and
forty-seven thousand of these men are
expected to be added by June of 1966.
Surely Senators who continue to de-
lude themselves that this pending meas-
ure merely finances what has already
been done and what is now being done
have simply not read the hearings. Tile
purpose of the new authorisation is sub-
stantially to increase our ground and air
operations in southeast Asia and to pro-
vide both the manpower and the ma-
terial to do it. Our immediate objective
is to eliminate the Vietcong forces from
South Vietnam and to establish General
Ky as the unchallenged authority
throughout South Vietnam.
It seems to be well understood that
General Westmoreland wants at least an-
other 200,000 men in South Vietnam to
step up the work of seeking out Vietcong
forces and destroying them. Assuming
that we can do that without North Viet-
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nam raising the ante on its side, those
400,000 troops will have to remain in
South Vietnam as occupation forces for
the indefinite future.
In fact, I think with the adoption of
this bill the American people ought to
understand that we are going to have
large numbers of American soldiers in
southeast Asia for a long, long time to
come. I only raise the caveat that, in
my judgment, when the American people
fully come to understand that that is
inherent in our policy in southeast Asia,
they will repudiate any administration
that sponsors such a plan, and they
should.
RESPONSE FROM OTHER SIDE UNKNOWN
The most amazing thing about this bill
is the ease with which Congress has ac-
cepted its authorization for a larger war
without even asking what we expect the
other side to do in response. There is
not a word in the hearings of what the
administration expects the Vietcong,
North Vietnam, China, or Russia to do
in response to our projected buildup.
Our leaders are, in effect, whistling in
the dark. They are engaging in wishful
thinking that China will not come in, or
that Russia will not come in, or that
North Vietnam will not commit her army.
But they have been so wrong so many
times in regard to what was going to
happen in Asia that I think time will
prove them wrong again. I do not think
the people of the United States or any
other Western nation will be permitted
to maintain a foothold in Asia. No mat-
ter how many years it will take to throw
us out, we will be thrown out, but at
the cost of a shocking holocaust.
Is it assumed that North Vietnam, that
Russia and China, will do nothing? If
that is the assumption, on what is it
based?
Or is there evidence that North Viet-
nam will increase its own military
strength in the south? Or will the So-
viet Union pour more equipment into
North Vietnam to be used in the south?
We are preparing another escalation in
the war, I say to my colleagues, and we
are doing it in this bill without so much
as a hint as to what the response of the
opposition may be.
I have quoted Secretary McNamara's
statement on page 115, wherein he said
that if the North Vietnamese add greater
force, if the military risk associated with
our present policy increases beyond the
limits we presently see, it might be de-
sirable to change our strategy of not
seeking to destroy the Government of
North Vietnam. But as to the possibil-
ities and expectations of the adminis-
tration as to what the response of North
Vietnam will be, I find nothing in the
hearings. Nor are we given any hints
about possible reactions and responses
from the two great Communist powers,
China and Russia.
We have already been through the ex-
perience of the failure of the bombing of
the north to force Hanoi to the bargain-
ing table. We were all assured a year
ago that air raids on North Vietnam
would quickly demonstrate to her the po-
tential destruction the U.S. Air Force and
Navy could visit upon her and bring her
to the sensible conclusion that in the
face of such overwhelming power she
should seek the best peace she could get
at the negotiating table.
We listened to testimony of General
Gavin and Ambassador Kennan. We
heard the general point out that Hanoi
and Saigon are, in fact, two hostage
cities, and that an attack on one will
mean, in all probability, an attack on the
other.
I most respectfully express the view
that I am at a loss to understand how
my colleagues who support this bill think
that we can go forward with a new pol-
icy that is authorized under the bill and
not have it result in a great escalation
of the war on both sides, by the United
States and by North Vietnam, and I think
eventually by China, too, with Russia not
for long standing on the sidelines as a
noncombatant.
Mr. President, I am very much of the
opinion that there is no hope of our
reaching a peace table. We may event-
ually reach a surrender table, only to
have the war continue in a different
form. But there is no hope for a peace
table under the policies in this bill.
I repeat that we were all assured a
year ago that air raids on North Vietnam
would quickly demonstrate to her the
potential destruction the U.S. Air Force
and Navy could visit upon her and
bring her to the sensible conclusion that
in the face of such overwhelming power
she should seek the best peace she could
get at the negotiating table.
The Vice President is now abroad in
the country trying to sell that policy.
He is going to be answered, although it
is interesting that he does not want to
come before a public meeting of the For-
eign Relations Committee or apparently
even an executive meeting of the Foreign
Relations Committee to try to defend
the action he took on the trip that took
him into southeast Asia.
But, Mr. President, come or not come,
policies that he is now advocating, think-
ing that people can be bombed to a peace
table, must be answered and will be
answered, because he has drawn the is-
sue. We will meet him on the issue be-
cause in my judgment he, too, must be
repudiated.
The Senator from New York [Mr.
KENNEDY] has brought out with crystal
clearness the alternative that ought to
be followed in recognizing that we must
not take the position that we are going
to dictate the terms, who will be in-
vited to the negotiating table, and as to
who will comprise that interim gov-
ernment that is going to be necessary
for that period of years until at long
last the people of North and South Viet-
nam will be in a position where they
can really exercise the precious privilege
of self-determination.
All of the proposals for bombing the
enemy to a negotiating table have thus
far failed, in my judgment, and will con-
tinue to fail, if we are talking about a
peace table.
That expectation proved false. The
reaction of Hanoi was just the opposite.
The Defense Department and Secretary
Rusk contend now that she has increased
her support to the Vietcong.
What does Secretary McNamara or
Rusk think will be the response of Hanoi
to the increased deployment of troops
and increased air activities provided for
in this bill? Senators do not know. If
the administration has any opinion, it
has not revealed it.
I cannot vote for these continued ex-
pansions of the war that jeopardize, and
do not conserve, more of our Armed
Forces than are already there.
This bill does not support the men in
Vietnam. It calls for the sending of hun-
dreds of thousands more, for military
objectives that are well beyond the ca-
pacity of our existing Vietnamese force
to achieve.
For these reasons and the reasons I
have already expressed in the series of
speeches I have made in opposition to
this bill heretofore in the Senate, when
the roll is called on the bill itself, I shall
vote against it.
HANDWRINGING IS NOT ENOUGH
Mr. President, I have one closing com-
ment with regard to what we are reading
In the newspapers today, the wire re-
ports, about, may I say respectfully, the
handwringers who conclude that the bill
is not a proper vehicle for any limiting
language. They should be asked what is
the proper vehicle.
The only measure on this subject is the
foreign aid supplemental and subsequent
to that, the appropriation. Will they
take the position that maybe those bills,
after they have authorized this policy,
are the proper vehicle for placing some
restriction on this administration?
Or are we always going to hear from
them that the proper vehicle has not
come along while the whole world slides
deeper into war?
Now is the time to place the restric-
tion on this administration. Now is the
time for Senators who voted for the res-
olution in August 1964, to go on record
as to the degree they want it modified
because this is the first opportunity they
have had to pass upon any policy in re-
gard to America's program in southeast
Asia.
I will say to them that they will never
have a better chance, never a more ap-
propriate chance to take a stand on
whether or not they reaffirm the position
that they took in August 1964, or now
believe that that resolution should be
restricted.
Therefore, it is with sadness in my
heart that I say that I am keenly dis-
appointed that Members of this body who
have been making so many speeches in
so many places expressing the view that
they did not agree when they voted on
the resolution of August 1964, to all the
things that this administration has done
in southeast Asia under it.
Apparently they are willing today to
vote without any restriction to a whole
line of expanded policy in southeast Asia.
In my opinion they do a great injury by
following that course of action without
voting restrictions now.
As I announced last night, I would
have offered my amendment yesterday
had I not said that I would accommo-
date a group of Senators on two occa-
sions to see if they could reach an agree-
ment on a possible modification of the
resolution of August 1964. Therefore I
withheld offering the amendment.
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1192 CONGRESS I[ONAL RECORD ? SENATE March 1, 1966
offer the amendment now. I send
it to the desk. It is the amendment
which proposes to add a new section, at
the end of the bill, as follows:
402. The joint resolution entitled
"Joint resolution to promote the mainte-
nance of international peace and security in
southeast Asia", approved August 10, 3964
UM Alit. 384) , is hereby repealed.
I say to the Senate that I have checked
in regard to the applicability of this
amendment as an appropriate amend-
inent to the pending measure and I have
been advised that it is in order.
President, I ask that the amend-
merit be read.
The PRESIDING Oriel.CER (Mr. Nm-.
SON in the chair). The amendment
will be stated,
The legislative clerk read as follows:
nag. 402. The joint resolution entitled
"Joint resolution to promote the mainte-
winee of international peace and security in
southeast Asia", approved August 10. 1964
((8 Stat. 384 ) , is hereby repeated.
Mr. *RUSSELL of Georgia. Mr. Pres-
ident, I am somewhat in a dilemma with
respect to the amendment proposed by
Ihe Senator from Oregon.
It had been my intention to offer as a
substitute an amendment, that would
reaffirm all of the original powers and
tel of the original purposes of the joint
resolution. of August 10, 1964.
Tnere is no doubt in my mind that a
substantial majority of the Senate would
support men an amendment.
It is evident that there would be so
much explanation, and hemming and
'lawny?: on the part of those who have de-
layed action on this authorization for so
many days, that this debate would be
prolonged for several more days if not
weeks.
have concluded, after careful con-
sideration, that the defeat of the pro-,
posal of the Senator from Oregon by the
Members of the Senate would have the
same effect as the adoption of the sub-
stitute proposal that I envisioned. I
say that, Mr. President, because when his
amendment has been defeated, this will
leave the original joint resolution of Au-
7, 1964, commonly called the Tonkin
Gulf Resolution, unimpaired, in full
strength and vigor, and with Congress,
except for two Members of the Senate,
who voted against the 1964 resolution,
solemnly and solidly behind the President
in the steps that he has taken in south-.
east Asia.
Whatever we may call it, no matter
how much those who hesitate to take a
Formal position in this matter may
obfuscate the issue, when we defeat the
amendment of the Senator from.
Oregon--and I can understand why he
deplores the positions of some of those
who have been associated with him in
thai light?the effect will be a reaffirma-
Lion of the President's power.
F stated when I brought the bill to the
neer that I did not regard this author-
ization for weapons, medicine, and facil-
ities?including port facilities--as being
either an affirmation or a rejection of
our policies in Vietnam and that the bill
did not get policy in the slightest degree..
I have done my best to keep policy deter-
ininations out of the bill, because I
thought it was more orderly to have them
considered in some other way. But the
question of policy has been injected into
the debate now, and I wish to make it
perfectly clear that so far as tne senior
Senator from Georgia is concerned?and
I hope the President will take the same
view?the vote on the amendment of the
Senator from Oregon will be, in effect, a
reaffirmation of the joint resolution
passed in August 1964.
I have not reached my cteiclusion
hastily. I opposed the original pro-
posal to send American military ad-
visers or a training mission, together
with a quantity of military equipment
and materiel, to South Vietnam. as vig-
orously as I could. I am not now in
favor of intervention througl Kart the
entire world. By instinct and inclina-
tion, I must confess that I am tn isola-
tionist. I do not believe that tee might
and Power of the United States can bring
about the millennium. I do net believe
that any number of treaties, however
solemnly drafted, however well-inten-
tioned, will absolutely clear up all the
strife among the peoples of the world,
of different nationalities, different races,
and different creeds. There is nothing
in all history to suggest that they will.
But I am in favor of striving for peace,
because this is indeed a laudable aim to
work for. Nevertheless, as a realist, I
am not in favor of contributing Ameri-
can money and American blood in un-
limited quantities for a goal that I do
not believe is attainable.
When the joint resolution of August
1964 was brought forward, I sti,w how
broad it was in its terms. I cannot plead
ignorance. I understand theit some
Senators say that they did not know
exactly what they were voting nor when
they voted for that joint resolution. I
knew how broad it was. For tliat rea-
son, I suggested that Congress reserve
its power in this matter by a provision
that the resolution could be terminated
by a concurrent resolution, in which the
executive branch of the Government
does not participate.
That provision, was written into the
joint resolution, I think that the Sena-
tor from Oregon would have been better
advised if he had tried to secure adop-
tion of a concurrent resolution instead
of offering an amendment to this bill
for supplies md equipment.
I am a congressional man.. I have
stood here for more than 30 yam and
deplored?almost wept over?the slow
erosion of congressional power that has
placed this body in a position inferior to
the other branches of the Government.
The whole genius of our Government was
to provide three coequal branches?legis-
lative, executive, and judicial.
But, Mr, President, I cannot ig-
norance. I knew that the joint resolu-
tion conferred a vast grant of power upon
the President. It is writteen in terms
that are not capable of misinterpretation,
and about which it is difficult to become
confused. I read one or two sentences:
Cons,onaut with the Constitution of the
United States and the Charter of the United
Nations and in accordance with its obliga-
tions under the Southeast Asia Collective De-
fense Treaty, the United States is, therefore,
prepared, as the President determine;, to take
all necessary steps, including the use of
armed force, to assist any member or protocol
state of the Southeast Asia Collective De-
fense Treaty requesting assistance in defense
of its freedom,
The language could not have been
drawn more clearly. :Personally, I would
be ashamed to say that I did not realize
what I was voting for when I voted for
that joint resolution. It is only one page
in length; it is clear; it is explicit. It
contains a very great grant of power. I
would be the last to deny it.
I stand here today supporting the
pending measure with all the power of
my being, not because I believe that the
United States should be the policeman
of the world, but because we are con-
fronted with a condition. We are not
discussing possibilities and theories and
contingencies. We are confronted with
a condition where more than 300,000 of
the flower of the young manhood of this
Nation are 9,000 miles away from home,
on foreign soil and waters. I have just
enough of the old clan spirit of the
Scotch-Irish?indeed, of the Riropean
people?to come to the defense If those
of my own blood when they are in dan-
ger anywhere throughout the world.
As I see this matter in its simplest
terms, I am not going to quibble over
how those men got there. I am not
going to involve abstract constitutional
arguments. :I intend to try to help them.
I regard this situation as being similar
to one in which a man has become in-
volved in quicksand. He has slowly
sunk until only his eyes can be seen.
Along comes his brother with a rope
under his arm. The unfortunate man
says, "Brother, please help me out of the
quicksand."
The brother asks, "How did you get in
the quicksand? What did you want to
walk over there for? You ought to have
had more sense. When are you going to
get out of the quicksand?"
Mr. President, I am not going to go
through all of that. I am going to throw
the rope. I intend to do all within my
power without splitting hairs, without
legalisms, and without theorizing to sup-
port these men who are there in Vietnam,
not of their own volition. They did not
order themselves there. But they are
there because they were ordered by
authority established under our form of
government.
I am not afraid of the constitutional
issue that is involved here. There is no
question in my mind about the consti-
tutionality of all that has been done. I
have grave doubts as to the wisdom of
some of it, but there is no question what-
ever as to the constitutionality of it.
There have been over 125 instances in
which American men have been ordered
to take action or maintain positions
abroad through pure Presidential order
without the support of the kind that was
afforded to the President of the United
States in the Tonkin Gulf resolution.
Wilson sent the marines into Vera
Cruz to satisfy American honor. As I
recall it, Buchanan sent troops into for-
eign lands. He sent them to attack and
charge and carry the forts at Canton in
China because of an insult to the U.S.
flag.
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There was a day when the American
People cheered when Theodore Roosevelt
said: "Perdicaris alive, or Raisuli dead."
That was in the days when we were not so
completely international. That was in
the days when people were proud to be
American citizens. That was in the days
when an American citizen felt that he
had a right to look to his country to pro-
tect him. That was before we got all of
this infection that is today making this
county quiver and hesitate and raise a
fictitious issue.
There should be no question as to the
constitutionality of this situation. There
is nothing mandatory in the Constitution
about declaring war.
In an effort to separate governmental
powers and establish a system of checks
and balances, the Constitution of the
United States provides that the power
to declare war is in the Congress. How-
ever, that same Constitution, in enumer-
ating the powers of the President of the
United States, provides that he is Com-
mander in Chief of all the Armed Forces
of the United States. Every person
knows that the Commander in Chief has
a right to order the forces wherever he
may will. Congress then, to shift back
to the system of checks and balances, has
ways of exercising its responsibility. One
way is the power of the purse. It can
deny the President the funds. But I
hope that we never have another in-
stance in which an attempt is made to
deny funds in the middle of an under-
taking that has been approved by Con-
gress. That can only mean hardship to
the young men serving in our Armed
Forces. It would not really punish those
whose actually ordered them there.
The Constitution grants the Congress
a great many powers that it does not
exercise. One is that Congress has the
power to define and punish offenses
against the law of nations.
A substantial argument could be made
that we are undertaking to punish of-
fenses against the law of nations in the
fight in Vietnam.
We have waged war without a declara-
tion of war time and again. Not only
has the Commander in Chief waged war
without any formal declaration of war,
but Congress has also done so.
I have a very errant and varied ap-
petite in reading. I suppose that I have
accumulated more useless information
from books than has any other living
person. I spend hours each day in read-
ing. However, one sometimes comes up
with something that is helpful.
When this question of constitutionality
was raised a few months ago, I remem-
bered that I read an old book that was
entitled "Our Naval War With France."
I sent to the Congressional Library for
the book.
If ever there were a case in which Con-
gress waged a war for 3 years, it was in
the naval war with France. In propor-
tion to our strength in that period we put
more of our resources and men into that
war than we have put into this war in
South Vietnam.
I am not going to read at length from
this book. It is fascinating to me, but
No. 36-7
It would be very boring to most people
to read about the battle between the
privateer Bette and the man-of-war Ex-
calibur, and how one boarded the other.
I get a vicarious pleasure from that type
of reading.
As recounted in this book, when our
representative to France had been in-
sulted, the President sent a message to
Congress and said:
I will never send another minister to
France without assurances that he will be
received, respected, and honored as the rep-
resentative of a great, free, powerful, and
independent nation.
Our people had much more confidence
in themselves when we had about 31/2
million people scattered along the Atlan-
tic seaboard from Canada to Florida than
we have today when we are unquestion-
ably the greatest power on earth.
I continue to read:
Congress had already begun to act, and
during the spring and summer of 1798,
adopted a number of warlike measures. The
first of these was an act, passed April 27,
to provide additional armament for the pro-
tection of American trade; and on the 30th,
another, organizing the Navy Department.
We had no Department of the Navy
until 1798. It had been in the Depart-
ment of the Army.
I continue to read:
Acts soon followed directing the construc-
tion and purchase of more vessels, authoriz-
ing the capture of French vessels, suspending
intercourse with France, establishing the
Marine Corps, and making other necessary
provisions for hostilities. Inasmuch as under
the Constitution of the United States treaties
are the supreme law of the land, these meas-
ures of defense, being in conflict wth exist-
ing treaties with France?
That refers to the treaties?
were deemed unlawful. Therefore, to avoid
this difficulty, as well as to get rid of trouble-
some obligations, the treaties were abrogated
by the act of July 7, on the ground that they
had already been violated by France.
Here Congress was abrogating treaties
of immunity and friendship with France.
In that case, we walked right up to a
declaration of war.
It will be recalled that our Government
summoned George Washington from his
well-earned retirement to Mount Vernon,
and said:
We are about to fight these French. We
want you to come and take command of the
armies.
What George Washington said should
cause some people to be ashamed of
themselves. He said:
I must not conceal from you my earnest
wish that the choice had fallen upon a man
less declined in years and better qualified to
encounter the usual vicissitudes of war.
Feeling how incumbent it is upon every per-
son, of every description, to contribute at all
times to his country's welfare, and especially
In a moment like the present, when every-
thing we hold dear and sacred is threatened,
I have finally determined to accept the com-
mission of Commander in Chief of the Armies
of the United States.
Mr. President, the book continues
about how they established the Marine
Corps. I could read the reports of 100
naval engagements. We sent American
frigates to the Bay of Biscay; we sent
them into the Mediterranean; we sent
parties into the harbors at Martinique
and Guadalupe and Cap-Haitien in Haiti,
where the French were then stationed,
and cut out their ships and attacked
their forts; and we had a good many
people killed and we killed many French-
men over a period of 3 years. But no-
body declared war and nobody urged
that we declare war.
I remind you, Mr. President, that there
were men in ?that Congress who had
served in the Constitutional Convention.
They had some idea of what was intended
by that document, the Constitution of
the United States.
Oh, I realize it is considered as out-
moded, in some quarters. Some persons
think tile Constitution has no place in
today's Acheme of things. But as long as
I am in the Senate, I shall refer to the
Constitution as a guide for my actions.
I have taken an oath to do so, and I
make no pretense to great piety, but I
shall not welsh.
Here is another paragraph:
To supplement the activity of the Navy
in the defense of the country, private enter-
prise was stimulated by issuing letters of
marque. The act of June 25, 1798?
That was an act of Congress, my fel-
low Senators, not an act of the President
of the United States?
The act of June 25, 1798, ordered that mer-
chant vessels might "repel by force any as-
sault" committed upon them by French
cruisers or privateers, capture the aggres-
sors and recapture American vessels which
had been taken by the French.
It goes on to say:
The act of July 9 authorized the President
to grant the owners of private armed ships
* * * special commissions * * * and such
private armed vessels, when duly commis-
sioned, shall have the same license and au-
thority for subduing, seizing, and capturing
any French armed vessels * * as the pub-
lic armed vessels might by law have.
That law was passed by the Congress
of the United States. This was no
quick, overnight affair. It lasted for
over 3 years. I do not wish to bore Sen-
ators, but there are many references
to many acts of Congress while the
United States was waging war for 3 years
without any formal declaration.
I do not favor any declaration of war
in this case. Whom would we declare
war against? If we can only declare it
against the Vietcong, it would have been
just as sensible in other eras to have said,
"We declare war against Francisco Villa,
or we declare war against Sandino"?I
believe that was the bandit down in
Nicaragua we fought for some time.
It just does not make sense to declare
war against the Vietcong.
Should we declare war against the
North Vietnamese? We do not recognize
North Vietnam. They are not in the
United Nations. And we do not know
what effect such a declaration of war
would have.
A declaration of war against North
Vietnam might bring into play mutual
defense treaties between and among
North Vietnam, Communist China, and
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March, J966
the. Soviet, Union. So I am not in favor
of declaring war. I see nothing to be
gained by it, and I perceive that we might
Lose a great deal. It would be a vary,
very foolish step to take.
President, the issue of constitu-
tionalism comes with a hollow sound
from anybody except the Senator from
Oregon and the Senator from Alaska.
They voted against the Tonkin Ba,y
resolution; and therefore they can
certainly offer or urge any argument
they wish against this matter free of any
criticism.
We gave the President of the United
States power in that resolution. If we
want to take it back, the best way i.s
through a concurrent resolution.
But I knew what I was doing. I did
It with some qualms, but I am not here
today to plead ignorance and say I did
not know what I was doing, or that I did
not know the power would go so far,
when the -resolution said he could use
any steps?any steraa?that might be
necessary to protect our vital interests
in the main tenance of international
peace and security in southeast Asia.
So we may criticize the President, but
With the exception of 2 Members of
this Congress-535 Members?we are
absolutely changing face when we do it,
because we voted him even greater
powers than he has employed.
do not, discount the possibility that
Red China and even the Soviet Union
might be brought into this war. I had
that in mind when I was originally
urging that we not become involved in.
any way. I appreciate the fact that the
distinguished Senator from Kentucky.
1Mr. MORTON I , who was then Assistant
Secretary of State--I had forgotten all
about the incident until last summer,
when I returned from my illness, he
mentioned it here on the floor?was sent
down to Georgia to tell me a mission
had been sent to South Vietnam, and
that we were going to send. material. I
told him then, "I think you. have made a
mistake, but the Commander in Chief
can commit our flag, and I will support
he flag, even though I think it is going
to be a long struggle and costly in blood
and treasure."
-OTI that way today. I think the
sooner we come to some decision there,
the better off everybody will be. I do
not favor all this timidity, whether it
is in the executive branch of the Gov-
ernment or in the Congress. If we are
going to keep men there, I am not in
favor of having them picked off by
handfuls here and there. in order to
keep down the casualty lists, when we
know over a period of years it, is going to
amount to massive numbers_ If it is
our policy to keep them there?and it is
our avowed policy?I say, "Visit such
punishment on the North Vietnamese as
will bring about a conference, and let,
us come to some determination of this
issue. Let them. have an election in
South Vietnam_ If they want a Com-
munist government and can vote for it
without intimidation, I think they have
a right to have it, under our doctrine
of self -determin ation."
However, self-determination is some-
what like the Constitution; it becomes
less deserved in our system as we go
along, because it seems that we support
authoritarian regimes and republics
alike, if we happen to be allied with
them by treaty.
Mr. President, I must say that I was
more than mildly surprised and per-
plexed by the timing of this assault, par-
ticularly the vehicle which was selected
for it. This is an authorization bill, and
I have tried to point out that it did not
specifically involve policy, although I
concede that money is going to be spent
hi Vietnam.
If Senators wish to punish the Presi-
dent by starving 300,000 American boys
and leaving them in Vietnam, they
should not only vote for the resolution
of the Senator from Oregon but should
also vote against the authorization.
Senators have this power. But, I have
an idea, if they do, that they will hear
something from the American people.
Every State in the Union has men in
Vietnam. The people hack in the "boon-
docks" and in our towns, and those liv-
ing in the fords of the creeks., have a
high value of life. It is a matter of grief
when one of those coffins, with the Amer-
ican flag draped over it, comes back home
to a small town. It is not a matter of
higgling and haggling about policy or
Presidential power. It is a matter which
strikes right into the homes of a whole
community.
We have been placed on notice that
this authorization would be sought.
Last August there was brought before
the Senate and clearly explained a $1.7
billion supplemental appropria Lion for
the same purposes involved here.
It passed by an 89-to-0 vote. At that
time, it was declared on the floor of the
Senate that the $1.7 billion would be
just the downpayment. that additional
authorizations; and appropriations would
be required early this year. Now we run
into difficulties?right in the middle of
the war?with a maze of technicalities,
legalisms, surmises, false premises, more
than I have ever seen hurled at one bill,
much less a relatively modest authoriza-
tion of this kind.
Mr. President, it has been stated on
the floor of the Senate:, in flights of hy-
perbole, that this measure is an open-
ended invitation to war. I suppose this
could be said about every annual appro-
priation bill enacted for the Defense
Department from year to year, if it could
be said, with accuracy, of the pending
bill. If this is an open-ended invitation
to war, then every appropriation bill for
the maintenance of our Armed Forces is
also an open-ended invitation to war.
I, for one, am not willing to go about
curbing the President's power by punish-
ing American boys in Vietnam.
Mr. President, I do not wish to discuss
this matter at further length, although
I am full with it, because I have been
torn by conflicting emotions, as I am sure
most Senators have, concerning this is-
sue. But I am not badly torn when it
comes to the issue of supporting Ameri-
can soldiers, sailors, marines, or airmen,
because I have some familiarity with
the lives they must live and their obliga-
tions. I know that they do not control
their own comings and goings, that it is
impossible to do so in any military estab-
lishment. I cannot conceive of a higher
duty on the part of Congress than to
support those who have been brought
into the Armed Forces, who have been
taken out of their businesses, taken away
from civilian pursuits, paid a minimum
salary, and then there is haggling over
whether we are going to support them or
not.
To me, it is utterly incomprehensible.
I cannot understand it.
We have taken a calculated risk in
Vietnam. We took it when the first man
landed. We had it when a contingent,
landed there yesterday. We took a cal-
culated risk when we operated our air-
power in the south. We took a calcu-
lated risk when we operated our airpower
in the north. I hope that we will take
a calculated risk in undertaking to put
a "stopper in the bottle" at the port at
Haiphong and cut off their supplies to
those trying to conquer South Vietnam.
I do not believe that we are ever going
to bring this war to a termination until
that is done.
Mr. President, sometimes I believe that
the American people do not realize the
tremendous might and strength of our
military organization. Howevir, our
enemies know it. There was no doubt
about it in the mind of Mr. Khrushchev
when he received that letter on Cuba,
He knew more about the strength of
this country, and respected it more, thou
those who may tremble now at the
thought of a confrontation.
It did not take Mr. Khrushchev long
to send an answer, although I am not
satisfied with the termination of that
episode. I believe that in our exultation
and celebration of that victory, we gave
the victory away. We are now in the
position of babysitting for Castro. when
we should have destroyed him when we
found the long-range missiles there.
That is my own view. As an individual
I can express it, although I realize that
it is not a majority view, either of Con-
gress or the American people; but I just
do not know when we will ever have an-
other reason for doing it.
Congress had passed a resolution
shortly before, declaring that the intro-
duction of any offensive weapon into
Cuba was an act of aggression against
the United States. But now we arc baby-
sitting for Castro, who is 90 miles away
from our shores, while fighting other
communism 9,000 miles away. The hu-
man and logistical costs are staggering
to contemplate. There is no doubt, in
my mind that if we had wiped out Castro.
there would not be any similar probing;;
along the perimeter of the Iron Curtain
for the next 8 to 10 years. There will be.
even if we bring the Vietnamese situa-
tion under control?as we will, eventu-
ally. There will be further probings on
the part of communism in their quest for
world domination, because they axe not
going to stop. But firm action against
Cuba would have stopped them for a
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long time. It would certainly have
slowed down the Communists.
Mr. President, if there ever were a time
when Congress should have at least an
appearance of unity?whether we have
any unity or not?it is today. Upon the
unity of the American people in this
Vietnam war depend the hopes of bring-
ing it to an early conclusion. I do not
doubt that Hanoi, Peiping, and Moscow
know what is going on. With every little
sign of dissent, every criticism, every at-
tack on American foreign policy, they
will say, "Well, we are catching hell out
there in Vietnam, but look what is going
on back in the United States. We will
hold on for a while longer. They will
tire, and they will withdraw. Thus we
will gain a victory."
So I say, Mr. President, it is time for an
appearance of unity. And I hope that
this issue will not be brought up recur-
ringly on every bill that comes along.
It should have been fought out when the
Tonkin Gulf resolution was before the
Senate. If an issue were to be made of
the situation, it should have been made
then.
Mr. President, generally I do not ap-
prove of appeals to emotion, because I do
not believe they serve any useful purpose;
but I should like to tell the Senate of a
letter I received from a Georgia widow,
with a son who is a corporal in the 1st
Battalion of the 1st Marines. He had
served his hitch in Vietnam and was re-
turned to the United States in December
1964, but was shipped back to Vietnam in
August of 1965. She wrote me to ask if it
were right for a person who had finished
one tour of duty there to be sent back so
quickly. She informed him she had writ-
ten to me, and she sent me his answer.
This is from a man who had already
served one hitch in Vietnam and had
been sent back. This is the reply to her
letter she received from him:
DEAR IVIorxxs: I can't approve of what you
did; I could not come home any way but the
right way, and that is when my time is up,
or else I'm wounded or dead, and I believe it
will be because my time is up.
He had faith in himself. I do not know
whether he is still alive and serving there.
The letter continues:
The other two ways I don't like. I'd love
to be home, but there are times a man can't
do what he would like to do, but has to do
his part, and I believe this is my part. I hope
you understand it isn't because I don't want
to see you, but rather it's because I have a
duty to do here. Come October I'll be home.
There may be a finer or higher sense
of duty than that, but it has not been
reflected here in this body.
? Robert E. Lee is one of my heroes. I
say that unashamedly. He was a great
man, though he was the head of the rebel
armies. He said that "Duty" is the most
sublime word in the English language.
The spirit of that American fighting
in Vietnam is the most sublime spirit.
Would to God it could permeate some of
those in this Chamber, because we can-
not win by haggling over an authoriza-
tion bill at this time.
Mr. SALTONSTALL. Mr. President,
we have listened to a very eloquent plea
by the Senator from Georgia for action
on the bill. I know we are going to do it
very shortly. The Senator from Georgia,
who made his plea, has pointed out the
authority involved under the Constitu-
tion, and our duty in the Senate. He
expressed himself very fully on this sub-
ject. He and I spoke on the floor over
2 weeks ago, when we brought the bill
out of the Senate Armed Forces Com-
mittee by a unanimous vote. We believe
there should be prompt action because
the boys in Vietnam should be supported,
and they need this authorization and the
appropriation to support them.
I am opposed to the amendment of the
senior Senator from Oregon for two rea-
sons. First, I do not think it is in order
in connection with the bill presently
before us, and second, I oppose it on its
merits. This is no time to pull the rug
out from under the President.
S. 2791, which authorizes $4.8 billion
in supplemental fiscal 1966 defense ap-
propriations, provides necessary funds
so that our men in Vietnam will have
the equipment, food, and clothing they
need to carry out their assigned tasks in
the best possible way. It was reported
out of the Armed Services Committee by
a unanimous vote, even though some
committee members may not entirely
agree with our Vietnam policy.
Whether that policy is right or wrong
was not considered central to considera-
tion of this bill. It is a separate issue
which, as I stated at the time the bill
was reported, should be considered
separately.
Of course there should be free and
open discussion of our role in Vietnam.
Certainly no one denies the right of an
individual to raise questions regarding
the wisdom of our policies there; we know
there are important differences within
this body on the issue. But S. 2791 is not
the proper place to debate the funda-
mental question raised by the Senator
from Oregon.
We must be aware that the issue pre-
sented by the Senator from Oregon is
not a matter of withholding from the
President some new authority he has re-
quested. It is a question of withdrawing
from him authority which the Senate,
with but two dissenting votes, freely gave
to him in August of 1964, and withdraw-
ing it at a most awkward time. The
implications of such an action are there-
fore very serious, and the consequences
could be far reaching and lasting.
The legal basis for our participation
in the Vietnam conflict has been ques-
tioned here and elsewhere. I find it
significant and gratifying that recently
the house of delegates of the American
Bar Association by a unanimous vote of
279 to 0 upheld the legality of our in-
volvement and said it was consistent with
the United Nations Charter.
There are different opinions in this
body regarding Vietnam, but I think we
all applaud the recent statement of Presi-
dent Johnson as he received the National
Freedom Award in New York:
We stand for self-determination?for free
elections?and we will honor the result.
His statement of our purpose is worth
repeating:
Our purpose in Vietnam is to prevent the
success of aggression. It is not conquest; it
is not empire; it is not foreign bases; it is
riot domination. Our men in Vietnam are
there to keep a promise made 12 years ago.
The Southeast Asia Treaty promised?as
Secretary John Poster Dulles said for the
United States?"that an attack upon the
treaty area would occasion a reaction so
united, so strong, and so well placed, that
the aggressor would lose more than it could
hope to gain." But we keep more than a
specific treaty promise in Vietnam. We keep
the faith for freedom.
None of us likes the situation in which
we find ourselves in Vietnam. Everyone
is troubled by it. We know that an in-
creasing number of Americans is being
exposed to danger and that some of our
boys are being wounded or killed. We
all want peace in that troubled area, but
we must face the facts. We are in Viet-
nam?we are there because of our belief
that people everywhere should be free to
determine their own way of life, free to
make the basic decisions regarding their
government. We know there is no easy
way out. As George Kennan, in analyz-
ing our policy, said recently in testimony
before the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee:
A precipitate and disorderly withdrawal
could represent in present circumstances a
disservice to our own interests and even to
world peace greater than any that might
have been involved in our failure to engage
ourselves there in the first place.
Given the situation and the responsi-
bilities of the President as Commander
in Chief and the chief agent of our for-
eign policy to exercise leadership in this
crisis, can we shoot down his authority,
restrict his actions, and indeed in effect
repudiate the earnest efforts he has made
to bring peace to that troubled area? I
think we cannot, and I think we should
not.
Whether or not one has misgivings
about our policy in Vietnam, it seems to
me inappropriate at this time to take the
action recommended by the senior Sena-
tor from Oregon. What would be the
consequences of such an action? What
would be its effect on the morale of those
serving us there? What would be the
effect on our allies and on the Govern-
ment of South Vietnam? How would
Thailand, Cambodia, Indonesia, and
other neighboring countries react?
Such an action would bring satisfaction
to our enemies, consternation to those
countries who, like us, are dedicated to
the preservation of freedom, and would
strike a crippling blow at the morale of
our fighting men presently in Vietnam.
This is a time to show the world that
individual differences over particular ac-
tions do not prevent us from presenting
a united front, from supporting our Com-
mander in Chief.
Senators and other Americans ought
to continue to discuss the situation in
Vietnam, to raise questions about poli-
cies, and offer constructive suggestions.
That is one thing, but to shoot from un-
der the President at this time his au-
thority which we almost unanimously
gave him in 1964 is, to me, unthinkable.
Of course, we expect the President to
use sound judgment and to confer and
consult with his advisers and the Con-
gress as he goes about the difficult task
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March 1, 1966
of ending this conflict. He has kept us
informed so far and has asked our views
and I see no reason to think he will stop
doing so.
I am confident that when the vote is
taken on the Morse amendment it will
be defeated by an overwhelming margin.
That will reveal our unity of purpose,
that will give hope to our servicemen
and to the people of South Vietnam, and
will dismay our enemies who may have
been deluded into thinking discussion
meant fundamental disagreement. It
will remind the world of our concern for
our fellow man as he :fights to remain
free and to live in peace and rebuild his
economy and the social and political life
of his country. At this difficult time we
cannot repudiate our President or imply
that we have no confidence in his future
actions. Passage of the Morse amend-
ment would be misunderstood around the
world with irreparable damage to our
prestige and that of our President. I
shall vote against it, and hope that it
will be overwhelmingly defeated.
Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, will the
Senator yield to me for I minute?
Mr. SALTONSTALL? I yield.
Mr. STENNIS. I wish to say to the
Senate and to the people of this Nation
that I do not believe the solidarity and
unity of this Chamber has ever been
better represented in a time of peril than
it has by the two spokesmen we have
just heard, the Senator from Georgia
I Mr. RUSSELL!, who is the chairman of
the committee, and the Senator from
Massachusetts [Mr. SALTONSTALL I, who
is the ranking Republican member of the
committee. I salute them and commend
them.
T would like to be associated with
every point that they made. I would like
to be especially associated with the point
that the Senator from Georgia made
when he said every dissent, every divi-
sion, every expression of doubt, every ex-
pression of uncertainty is encouragement
to our adversaries. They are looking for
that kind of encouragement. They know
that, they cannot beat us on the field of
battle, but they are looking here for en-
couragement to carry on their activities.
hope that we get an overwhelming
vote.
Mr. LONG of Louisiana. I will only
state what I said some time ago when I
said I hoped that this amendment would
be offered, because T. wanted to speak
against- it and vote against it.
Senators have complained in some in-
stances that they have 'not had an op-
portunity to express themselves. If
anyone does not have confidence in the
President, if he wants to withdraw from
the President as our Commander in
Chief under the Constitution, the au-
thority given the President to take what..
eversteps he finds necessary to resist
aggression, then that Senator should
vote for the amendment. If th.e motion
te table is made, he should vote against
the motion to table.
As far as T am concerned, I am voting
on the merits of this matter. I under-
sWorl the merits of the matter when I
voted in August of 1964. I understand
very well that we cannot fight a war by
having 535 commanders in chief. There
must be one Commander in Chief. We
must unite behind that Commander in
Chief and have faith and confidence in
:him, just as we have in the men that we
send there to defend our national honor
and the freedom of the world.
I will vote against the amendment and
I hope that anyone who lacks faith and
confidence in the President will vote
against the motion -to table in the event
it be made.
Mr. President, I have an editorial here
that I wish to put in the RECORD from
WTOP in Washington. It is a very fine
statement making clear the fact that
those who wish to urge a policy of weak-
ness and urge that we should not be firm
and strong in our commitments, and
those who wish to further erode the
strength of our position, should seek to
address themselves to the President in-
dividually and personally rather than
through the press and the CONGRESSIONAL
R,ECORD.
Mr. President, I ask unanimous con-
sent that the WTOP editorial be printed
in the REcoaa as a part of my remarks.
There being no objection, the edi-
torial wa,s ordered to be printed in the
RECORD, as follows:
[Editorial broadcast on Feb. 23 ;.nd 24, 1966,
over WTOP radio and telev ision]
PRENEGOTIATIC)N STRATD (Or
Perhaps the wisest thing that has been
said in the most recent flap about Vietnam
came from U.N. Ambassador Arthur Gold-
burg following a White House conference.
The Ambassador was asked about Senator
KENNEDY'S statement, to the effect that the
Communists might be allowed to participate
in a coalition South Vietnamese government.
His response was that enough h,ei been said
on the subject already.
There has been a gre;t; to-ing and fro-ing
here in Washington the last couple of days
about Senator KENNEDY'S argument that it
might be necessary to admit dissident
groups?meaning the Vietcong, mostly?into
"a share of power arid resporsibility" In
Saigon.
There have been any number of attempts
at clarification, with the result that Senator
KENNEDY appears to be edging ct)ser to the
White House view on how the Communists
might become entitled to share power in
South Vietnam. But in the mids;, of all the
declarations on the subject, a fat emerges
which needs attention.
IL is that the United lAates cannot decide
publicly before negotiations start just what
our final bargaining po.:itions wilt be. The
situation allows a considerable number of
options, depending on a number of circum-
stances when and if the C.iommun sts decide
to talk to as.
We have offered unconditiona negotia-
tions. We have agreed to have the Vietcong
represented, in fact if not in tame, We
have said?before Senator HENS I Olt raised
the issue?that we will accept tie conse-
quences of self-determination alDeng the
people of South Vietnam, whetho r we like
those consequences or not. Sures y this is
as much as we ought to concede in advance
of talks a'oout the terms of a peace agree-
men t.
This was a WTOP editorial, 3::ck Jurey
speaking for WTOP.
Mr. JAVITS. Mr. President, I feel
moved to speak because I think there
is a point of view which has not been
expressed.
Those of us, like myself, who 'viii vote
against the Morse amendment and want
to table it, and who will vote for the
bill to give the President additional
funds, are not again writing a blank
check.
I do not, and I cannot accept the vote
against the Morse amendment as being
a reaffirmation. Reaffirmation is the
word used by the Senator from Georgia
[Mr. RUSSELL]. He made a most moving
speech, with which I agree in substance,
as well as the speech of the Senator from
Massachusetts [Mr. SALTONSTALL1.
I cannot accept the fact that this will
be a reaffirmation of the resolution of Au-
gust 1964. The fact is that as the Presi-
dent has handled this situation he leaves
us no other alternative. He has left no
alternative for those who disagree with
his policies except to vote against an au-
thorization on another occasion. As I
agree with his policies ?to date, I shall
vote for this authorization. But if to-
morrow I disagree with his policies the
President leaves us no alternative but to
vote against an authorization, and I
shall do so.
Why is that so? It is a fact that the
President has, in my Judgment, the con-
stitutional authority?as the house of
delegates of the association of the bar
found, as the Senator from Massachu-
setts [Mr. SALTON5TALL] said, as Com-
mander in Chief and the official charged
with foreign policy of the Nation?to in-
tercede in Vietnam or any place with the
Armed Forces of the United States where
the interests of the United States are in
such imminent danger. He can come to
the Congress for the necessary authority
which is, generally speaking a declara-
tion of war.
I thoroughly agree with the Senator
from Georgia [Mr. RUSSELL 1 that a dec-
laration of war would be most inadvis-
able at this time and I have said so in
debate on the floor of the Senate.
The President was not satisfied with
that. He not only ordered U.S. troops
to Vietnam under aforementioned Presi-
dential authority but he came to the
Congress for a resolution and asked us
to join in the policy. That resolution
was not juridically necessary and it has
no juridicial force. But in terms of pol-
icy it is critically important. It com-
mitted us to Presidential policy as of
that time.
That is what the Gulf of Tonkin reso-
lution meant. Having associated our-
selves with this policy then, we now have
a right to be consulted once again.
The Senator from Oregon told us the
only logical thing he could do, consider-
ing his point of view, was to give us the
opportunity to repudiate the policy the
President set, and lie is right,. If we
voted for the amendment of the Senator
from Oregon., and the other body did, as
it is also required to act, we would no
longer be the President's partners in a
policy sense.
It is a fact, whether we like it or riot,
that by virtue of having acted on the
resolution of August 1964, we are a party
to present policy. But we are a party
that should be consulted now as well.
We must be given an opportunity at the
Initiative of the President, to reaffirm
our support for a new situation and also
to set limits to his commitments of U.S.
power. Our August 1964 resolution is
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analogous, in my mind, to a power of at-
torney that one gives to a lawyer or
someone else for a particular purpose:
buying a house, a withdrawal of money
from a bank account, and so forth, which
power is also on very general terms.
I agree with the Senator from Georgia
[Mr. RussELLl that we are not engaged
in legal tautologies. I understood per-
fectly that? the President would get a
grant of enormous authority. I said so.
The Senator from Kentucky [Mr.
COOPER] said so. The Senator from
Georgia, I am sure, understood that very
clearly. I know that he is an excellent
lawyer; of course he did.
Mr. RUSSELL of Georgia. Mr. Pres-
ident, will the Senator from New York
yield?
Mr. JAVITS. I yield.
Mr. RUSSELL of Georgia. The Sena-
tor knows that we were approving the
use of the President's constitutional
power.
Mr. JAVITS. Exactly.
Mr. RUSSELL of Georgia. We put
Congress behind the President. We put
the imprimatur of congressional power
on a power that he could have exercised
anyway. The late Senator Borah an-
swered an argument that the Congress
could make the President bring home
certain troops then stationed in Europe:
We could not make the President do it. He
is Commander In Chief of the Army and Navy
of the United States; and if in the discharge
of his duty he wants to assign them there, I
do not know of any power that we can exert
to compel him to bring them home. We may
refuse to create an army, but when it is cre-
ated he is the commander.
? Mr. JAVITS. The Senator is exactly
correct. The logical sequel to that is
that if the President has abused his
power to commit our forces, Congress
still has a remedy. That remedy is to
deny him the money. Then he can no
longer exercise the power, and he must
withdraw our forces. That is exactly
what the Senator from Oregon is telling
us.
The Gulf of Tonkin action has no
role with reference to the action subse-
quently taken. At that time we were
reacting to an attack upon American per-
sonnel and equipment. Our ships were
In the Gulf of Tonkin. Since that time,
and specifically from February to June
of 1965, we have been engaged in com-
bat operations. We are no longer ad-
vising; we are in direct combat opera-
tions in South Vietnam with organized
American forces. I respectfully submit
that this is an entirely different policy
decision from the decision which au-
thored the Gulf of Tonkin resolution.
Therefore, I am speaking today to ex-
plain why I back the actions of the Pres-
ident to date and to give notice why I
may refuse to back him tomorrow.
Incidentally, I think there is a rather
broad feeling pretty much along this line
throughout the country. That is why
the President has been making all the
statements he has made?and quite
properly?about his willingness to nego-
tiate without conditions and about the
limited purpose and the limited means
he proposes to use to attain that pur-
pose. But it is extremely important that
the President should at no time mask his
purposes. Consistent with the national
security and with the way this matter is
being handled, the President has a duty
to the country and to Congress to at no
time mask his purposes. We ought to
know at all times exactly what his pur-
pose is, if we are called upon to support
that purpose. I think the President
would do well to associate himself with
Congress. Personally, I believe he is
making a great mistake in not again
coming to Congress and asking for a
resolution of support. By coming to
Congress again with a resolution, he
would thereby give us an opportunity to
support his present policy in a formal
and direct way, and not force us to ex-
press approval or disapproval through
other legislative means.
Therefore, when I vote in favor of this
authorization bill, I am not reaffirming
the joint resolution of August 1964 nor
rejecting it. New policy support should
necessitate a new resolution. Without
such a resolution, I am left with no al-
ternative but to protest against future
Presidential actions in Vietnam through
the authorization and appropriations
process, that is, through the back door.
And on behalf of the people of my State,
I shall protest should any policy go be-
yond limited military means and objec-
tives.
The final question, then, is, why do I
support the President as far as he has
gone? I do support him, and I shall
vote that way, and shall know what I am
voting for when I vote. The President
has expressed a willingness to negotiate
unconditionally. I believe, as I have
said in a previous speech, that if we ac-
tually get a chance for peace talks, the
President will, as Averell L. Harriman
indicated, recognize the National Libera-
tion Front of the Vietcong as a party to
the negotiations. I am against the idea
that they should be included in a coali-
tion government before negotiations.
A second element of the President's
policy, as I understand it, is that he is
applying limited means to a limited pur-
pose. In other words, he is not asking
Congress for general mobilization. He
assures us that he is not prejudicially
draining down the forces of the United
States that are charged with responsi-
bilities around the world; but that he is
utilizing forces which are available to
the United States for this purpose, and
that the purpose is solely to bring about
sufficient pacification of major popula-
tion concentrations in South Vietnam to
enable that country to proceed to free
elections and self-determination.
I think this is a very exciting day. It
indicates the complete maturity of our
country when not only the President, but
also Senators like the Senator from
Georgia [Mr. RUSSELL], can say that if
In free elections, after a reasonable pac-
ification period insuring the elections
will really be free, the Vietnamese decide
they want a Communist government,
that is what they will have. We cer-
tainly will not stand in the way of free
elections. This is an extremely impor-
tant and most mature declaration of pol-
icy on the part of very important people
in our country.
There is one ambiguous point in the
President's declaration to date. The dif-
ficulty is that the President seems con-
tent to carry around in his pocket a worn
copy of the August 1964 joint resolution.
The President may further wrongly as-
sume that a vote for this authorization
bill is an endorsement of any future
actions.
Perhaps that is the real essence of the
argument of the Senator from Oregon
[Mr. Moasa], and of the previous argu-
ments which I have heard him make?
and he knows that I have the highest re-
spect for his judgment in the matter. I
have debated as an administration de-
fender in this particular matter. I speak
in the role of a liberal, although the gen-
eral liberal community is considered to
be unafavorable to what the Government
is doing in Vietnam. I do not agree with
that because it seems to me to be anoma-
lous that the liberal community of the
United States should not recognize a
struggle for freedom, as this one is, in
my judgment, within the conditions I
have described. Nonetheless, that is so.
So I have engaged in these debates.
And I recognize the problem of escala-
tion. We are always faced with the
problem that if we put in another 100,000
men, the other side will put in another
100,000; then it will be increased 100,000
beyond that. Then we shall move into
Cambodia, into North Vietnam, and into
Laos; or *e may take some other overt
action against Communist Chinese in-
stallations, and the fat will then be in the
fire.
But I do not conceive of that at all
within the authority which I would be
voting the President by supporting the
bill to authorize $4.7 billion in additional
appropriations. I do not believe, from
everything that he has shown to date,
that the President will construe our ac-
tion in that way. I believe we are mak-
ing a pact with him based exactly on
what he has said. I make the urgent plea
in terms of penalty, of being a grievous,
deep offense in this country, that if the
President wishes to espouse another
policy which goes beyond the present
deployment of our forces, the President,
because he has now opened the door by
the joint resolution of August 1964,
should again come back to Congress for
a new declaration of policy.
If there is any escalation beyond that
point, then all of the arguments which
have been made with reference to the
escalation become relevant and
pertinent.
I believe I have stated the situation
thoroughly. It is my judgment that if
the President sticks to his peace offensive,
If he sticks to the limited purpose which
he has described to us, and the means
which he has described to us, those mis-
sions will accomplish that purpose.
This particular appropriation, it seems
to me, has as its base the testimony of
the Secretary of Defense, found at page
55 of the hearings.
I believe that to be so important that-I
hope my colleagues will indulge me as I
read it into the RECORD.
Senator ELLENDER asked:
Now, you have asked, for an increase in the
number of personnel generally, in the amount
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4198 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? SENATE March 1, 1966
of 510,521 as appears on page 12 of your state-
ment, that is your exhibit appearing at page
l2 Now many of those will be directly con-
nected with our operations in South Viet-
nam?
This was Secretary McNamara's an-
swer:
ileeretary MCNAMARA. PlTSt, Senator EL-
LENDER, we haven't asked for 510,521 to be
added to the original 1966 program, but,
rather, that amount less the military jobs
transferred to civilian jobs, plus another
adjustment, with the result that the net
Increase we are asking above the original
total is 452,843.
Senator ELLE/V-1)Pa. Well, they are Amer-
icans who are going to be employed either
in the Army, or the Navy, or the Air Force
as well as personnel to take care of the ad-
ministrative portion of our operations.
Secretary MCNAMARA. The net total is 453?-
000, not 510,000.
Senator ET.1.ENDER. At the bottom of your
exhibit, you have a total of 510,521, you
deduct 74,300 and add 16,620 to give you the
figure--
Scorer:Iry NiciNAmeatA. That is correct, sir.
It is 453,000_
Senator ELLENDER. Well, of that 453,000,
how many of those will be used in South
Vietnam?
Secretary MCNAMARA. Well, these are ad-
ditions to the total LT.S. military force and
It is not possible to say that any of those
in particular will be used In South. Vietnam,
but, In the net, all of them are being added
because of the South Vietnam conflict.
Mr. President, we have a right to as-
sume that the order of magnitude we are
talking about in this supplementary ap-
propriation is approximately 450,000
personnel. The exact number is not
material.
T am satisfied, as one Senator, that
this kind of deployment in South Viet-
nam is enough, and that we will .not have
to go in for a general mobilization. We
should not prejudicially drain the per-
eonnel available for our responsibilities
around the world; We can do the limited
job in South Vietnam described by the
President with the presently projected
force level.
With my eyes wide open, I am pre-
pared to support that kind of effort. My
reason is twofold: First, we must show
that wars of national liberation, so-
called euphemistically by the Com-
munists, do not work. Even if they were
to work, T do not believe in the domino
theory. It will not be Malaya, Burma,
or Thailand tomorrow, but it may very
well be S or 10 Latin American countries,
or 4 or 5 African countries, or 3 or 4
countries in the Middle East.
The Communists will try this ap -
preach wherever they can because it will
he a formula that worki. We shall have
ehowit our inability to deal with it.
In terms of averting World War III,
it is so critically important that we show
our ability to deal with these guerrilla
wars, that I believe that every American
boy who falls in Vietnam is as much a
hero as any boy who fought the Kaiser
in World War I or Hitler in World
War
Before I conclude, I shall read a letter
which made my hair stand up. I believe
that it will have the same effect on
everyone else.
My second point is that in our great
struggle with communism, the difference
between the Soviet, Union and Com-
munist China is that the Communist
Chinese think that in order to prevail,
they most exterminate a good part of
mankind.
The Soviet Union believes, and I think
this is fairly clear from their policy, that
they can outcompete the free world.
We very much prefer the latter kind
of policy and welcome the competition
on these grounds. We are ardent rooters
for the latter because we think we can
do mighty well ourselves. However, the
Soviet Union is now engaged in this
struggle in Vietnam up to its neck. Why?
Because it is still placing its leadership
of the Communist world on a higher
priority than it places the effort to ar-
rive at a detente or coexistence with the
United States and the rest of the world.
I want to change that priority. The
only way to avoid world war III and to
change that priority is to show the Com-
munist Chinese that the Soviet Union
scheme of peaceful competition is better
than the risks of war.
I consider that what has been done
in South Vietnam, regardless of whether
I would have gone there in the first place,
or whether it is the best place for the
confrontation?and there will be a lot
of argument about that?is now a fact.
The situation is there. It makes little
some to rehash past mistakes.
I believe that we must ultimately find a
way to gel; along with Communist China.
The alternative is ever-increasing risks
of war through miscalculation. The co-
existence idea must prevail, rather than
the extermination idea which prevails
presently among the Communist bloc.
It is for those reasons that I shall sup-
port the request for the appropriation
now, without any assurance that I would
do so tomorrow.
Mr. President, it is also for Haase rea-
sons that 71 shall oppose the amendment
of the senior Senator from Oregon.
I think ii is most unfortunate that, be-
cause of the disputes and the differences
and the unhappiness in many quarters,
especially ,n very articulate quatters, in
the newspapers, the press, the radio, and
television, there is some feeling that the
boys who are fighting in Vietnam are not
quite earning the kind of gratitude, un-
derstanding, and appreciation frem the
American people as did those who fought
in World Wars I and H. This is a very
unhappy and most unfortunate situa-
tion.
I hope very much that whatew sr may
be our view upon this situation?and I
certainly have frankly expressed
nine?
that we will give recognition to those who
are encountering the terrible dangers in-
volved in this struggle. We have ex-
tended such recognition from our hearts
for the patriotism of Sc many others
around the world.
Mr. President, I should like te close
by reading a very brief note. I sent a
letter of condolence to this family which
lost a son, a lieutenant, in the action in
Vietnam.
The family wrote me as follows, the
letter being signed by the members of
the family:
DEAR MR. AND MRS. JAVITLn Thank you for
your letter of comfort in this tragic time.
We have lost our only child, a woniierful,
loving, devoted, dedicated. son. Be has left
us with beautiful memories. Our hope is
that all involved in the struggle for the
freedom for which Joseph sacrificed his life
will be channeled in the right direction be-
cause that sacrifice must not have been in
vain.
The letter is signed, "Sincerely, Joe
and Pat De Gennaro."
Mr. President, if I can help as a Sena-
tor, as a human being, I shall do every-
thing that I can.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The
Senator from Montana.
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, for
the information of the Senate, it is my
intention, at an appropriate time, to
move to table the amendment offered by
the distinguished Senator from Oregon
[Mr. MORSE I. While the Senator's
amendment is in order, of course, under
the Senate rules, I feel that it is inap-
propriate and inadvisable in coiniection
with this bill at this time.
S. 2791, the pending business, la a mili-
tary "nut and bolts" measure. The ques-
tions involved in it are clear and tangi-
ble. Regardless of the Tonkin Bay reso-
lution we will have to dispose of this
measure sooner or later. It is a bill which
should stand alone and, in my judgment,
should be considered on its own merit. I
do not believe that any Member of the
Senate wishes to delay the bill, as such,
unduly. Difficulty has arisen here pri-
marily because S. 2791 has been given
in the minds of some a significance which
it does not possess. There arc many
views, for example, on the precise mean-
ing of the Tonkin Bay resolution which
the distinguished Senator from Oregon
seeks to rescind by his amendment.
They cannot be resolved, in my judg-
ment, through the vehicle of S. 2791 and
so I shall move to table. If the Senator's
amendment is tabled, it will have the
effect of keeping in force the Tonkin
Gulf resolution as passed by the Senate
on a rollcall vote of 88 to 2 in 1964.
The prevailing constitutional situation
will be unchanged. The significance of
the Tonkin Gulf resolution will remain
unchanged. It will still be as it is now,
for each Senator in his own conscience
to decide. The President believes that
this resolution gives him some additional
assurance, some authority in addition to
that embodied in his constitutional posi-
tion as Commander in Chief. Obviously
that is the case or he would not have
asked for the resolution in the first place.
But among Senators, I know, there has
been a wide divergence of view as to
what, if any, constitutional significance
attaches to a resolution of this kind.
Those divergencies will remain. Indeed,
that has been the case with all these so-
called hand-upholding resolutions begin-
ning with the Eisenhower administra-
tion.
Insofar as the leadership is concerned,
however, a vote to table is most of all a
vote to get on with the main business of
S. 2791. It is also a vote to keep the
Tonkin Gulf resolution in effect with
whatever constitutional force it may
have, even as a vote against tabling, as
the distinguished Senator from Oregon
has indicated, will result in its rescinding
provided that the other House also
agrees.
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To that extent, the issue is clear even
though this is not the appropriate way,
in my opinion, to consider this matter.
As long as it has come before the Senate,
however, a choice will have to be made.
We are in too deep now. The situation
is one of the utmost delicacy and the
risk of misinterpretation is very great.
It is, in short, a situation which each
Senator will have to face up to on the
basis of his own convictions.
Several Senators addressed the Chair.
The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr.
BAYH in the chair). The Senator from
Washington is recognized.
Mr. JACKSON. Mr. President, will
the Senator yield?
Mr. MANSFIELD. I yield to the Sen-
ator from Washington.
Mr. JACKSON. Mr. President, I
should like to ask the distinguished lead-
er, is it his interpretation that his mo-
tion to table shall have the effect of reaf-
firming the Tonkin Gulf resolution?
Mr. MANSFIELD. If the Senator was
on the floor, he will recall that I said,
in the course of my brief remarks, it
meant that the Tonkin Gulf resolution
would still be in effect.
Mr. JACKSON. Mr. President, my
only concern is that I think, after this
long debate on the floor, it would be un-
fortunate if we came out of our delibera-
tions with muted decisions. While a bill
of this sort is not necessarily the place
to offer this kind of amendment, I think
the country is entitled to know the posi-
tion of the Senate on Vietnam. I am
very pleased that the majority leader
makes that interpretation in offering his
motion to table.
Mr. MANSFIELD. I appreciate the
remarks of the Senator from Washing-
ton, and again call to his attention what
I previously said:
Insofar as the leadership is concerned,
however, a vote to table is roost of all a vote
to get on with the main business of S. 2791.
It is also a vote to keep the Tonkin Gulf
resolution in effect with whatever constitu-
tional force it may have, even as a vote
against tabling, as the distinguished Senator
from Oregon has indicated, could well result
in its rescinding, provided that the other
House also agrees.
I yield to the distinguished minority
leader.
Mr. DIRKSEN. Mr. President, this
entire matter had long discussion be-
fore the majority leader came in and his
question as to whether or not there would
be a vote directly on the Morse amend-
ment or on the motion to table came up.
There was some apprehension that a vote
on the motion to table might leave some
misapprenhension or misimpression
abroad.
In all kindliness, I say to my distin-
guished friend the Senator from Oregon
that I wish to make clear that the posi-
tion of the minority?and I think I
speak for most of them?is that we com-
pletely separate ourselves from the views
expressed by the distinguished Senator
from Oregon, both in committee and on
the floor, and that if those views are
something of a symbol in southeast Asia,
we wish to do what we can to destroy
that symbol as a reflection of the views
of the American people.
So when we vote for the motion to
table?and the majority leader informed
me this morning that he intended to
make that motion?I wish to say for my
part, to my fellow Senators and to all the
wide world, that what we are trying to
do is get on with the serious business, the
undramatic business of this struggle in
Vietnam and wind up as quickly as pos-
sible, and to supply the American troops
with whatever is necessary to do a com-
plete and final job.
Mr. MANSFIELD. I yield to the
Senator from Wyoming.
Mr. McGEE. Mr. President, I am
happy that the majority leader has
moved to table the amendment of the
Senator from Oregon.
Mr. MANSFIELD. No; I will move.
Mr. McGEE. Will move to table it.
I, too, however, express concern over
how the vote on that matter will be inter-
preted. People sometimes have difficulty,
I think, understanding a parliamentary
move on the floor of the Senate. As a
matter of fact, if I may say so, there is
sometimes some disagreement among
Senators as to what their votes mean. It
is no wonder that beyond our shores,
there is occasionally confusion as to the
meaning of an action taken by the U.S.
Senate.
For that reason, I think we should be
under no illusions about what will be said
about a Senate vote this afternoon to
table the amendment of the Senator from
Oregon. If that motion is indeed agreed
to, as I am sure it will be, I trust that it
will be understood that this is in no
sense a diminution of the Tonkin resolu-
tion, that this is in no sense a back-
handed slap at an existing policy posi-
tion. I think we should make it unal-
terably clear, especially to the aggres-
sors, that this has no significance for
them that could be equated with a re-
traction or withdrawal or some other
form of weakness. I think it is impor-
tant that we make that clear because
there are those who press against their
restraints as they seek a sign of weak-
ness, as they probe for soft spots of which
they can make the maximum psycho-
logical use.
I personally believed that the Gulf of
Tonkin resolution was very clear at the
time it was passed. I did not think I
was confused about it, and do not think
I am now, but I do respect those who are
raising questions, and I think as we vote
on the motion which will be made by
the majority leader to table the rescind-
ing proposal of the Senator from Oregon,
that we still should make clear on the
Memo) that we are taking two actions.
Those who believe with him that we
should rescind the August 1964 resolu-
tion should stand up and be counted.
I think that is their free right to expres-
sion, and I think it is a part of our sys-
tem. I think it is a part of the risk that
we have to afford in our kind of society.
But for the others, I desperately hope
than an overwhelming vote to table will
mean exactly what it says, that there is
no intention on the part of the Members
of the Senate to in any way detract, by
that vote, from the President's position
in southeast Asia. I think that must be
made unequivocally clear, that no ag-
gressors should take comfort in it, that
no psychological warriors may seek to
exploit it beyond its real meaning.
If we take those precautions, I think
we will be, in a sense, sustaining, in
effect strengthening and reaffirming the
role of the President himself as Com-
mander in Chief.
This is a technique used many, many
times in our history by our Commander
in Chief. I only hope that the parlia-
mentary maneuver does not lend itself
to a negative interpretation, or to a
weakened response. Let the aggressors,
I say, stand on notice that the Senate is,
indeed, with the President on the ques-
tion of aggression.
I wish to thank the majority leader
for yielding to me at this time.
Mr. NELSON. Mr. President, I wish to
make a few brief remarks about the
amendment offered by the Senator from
Oregon which I shall oppose because it
has no current relevance. I have taken
no time on the bill, and do not intend to
do so. However, first I should like to
take this opportunity to commend the
Senator from Arkansas [Mr. FULBRIGHT],
and the Committee on Foreign Relations,
for the great contributon he and the
committee have made to the dialog
concerning the issue which now con-
fronts the country.
Far too little credit has been given to
the chairman of that committee, and to
the committee itself, for the great con-
tribution to the public education they
have made.
I have had occasion twice to be back
in my own State. I have no notion, no
judgment, and no guess as to whether
it changed the viewpoints of the people
in the country on balance; but I do know
that It was the first time in the history
of our involvement in South Vietnam
that the people of this country have had
an opportunity to hear the experts rep-
resenting diverse viewpoints intelligently
discuss the subject on television in their
homes.
I read a number of columnists who de-
clared that no one learned anything as
a result of the hearings. Well, Mr. Presi-
dent, of course Mr. McNamara did not
learn anything. He did not pick up any
new facts, and neither did the chairman
of the committee nor those in the Con-
gress and of the press who have made it
their business to study the issue. But
the general public learned a great deal.
Tragically, Congress has permitted al-
most 2 years to pass by without adequate-
ly discussing what is involved in south-
east Asia. In my opinion the lack of
debate and discussion is what has caused
the confusion and misunderstanding in
this country.
The contribution to this debate of the
hearings in the Foreign Relations Com-
mittee has been of great value and sig-
nificance, and I wish to commend the
chairman and the committee.
Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, will
the Senator from Wisconsin yield just
briefly?
Mr. NELSON. I am glad to yield to
the Senator from Arkansas.
Mr. FLTLBRIGHT. First, I appreciate
what the Senator said. I have already
said publicly that I believe one of the
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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? SENATE March 1, 1966
most serious mistakes I have made as
chairman was in not accepting or urging
the Senate to accept the amendment of-
fered by the Senator from Wisconsin in
August 1964. I do not believe it is proper,
and do not wish to take the time to ex-
plain the circumstances of that particu-
lar moment, but, nevertheless, I believe
it was a mistake and I commend the Sen-
ator from Wisconsin for having more
foresight than I had at that time, and
think many other Senators, as to the
possible significance of that resolution.
He did offer a very sensible, limiting
amendment to that resolution, and I re-
'ret that we did not have the kind of
discussion of it in public at that time
that we have had recently. But I do
commend the Senator from Wisconsin
for his foresightedness and regret that
I did not have as much.
Mr. NELSON. I believe that the Sen-
ator advised me at that time that his
interpretation of the resolution was the
same as the purpose of my amendment,
and that therefore the amendment was
unnecessary.
Mr. FULBRIGHT. I thought it was.
Mr, NELSON, I also wish to commend
those who have participated in this de-
bate on both sides of the aisle.
Although very frequently I do not
agree with the Senator from Oregon, I
should like to say that he has made a
most valuable contribution to this dis-
cussion?and he will continue to do so.
One thing, however, that disturbs me
very much is the argument I have heard
advanced in the press, by columnists,
by distinguished Members of Congress,
and people in the executive branch, that
we should not be debating this issue
because what we say here, in our free
country, will be misunderstood by some
Communists in. some other country,
Communists who do not know what free
speech is all about and never will.
Mr. President, this is the greatest par-
liamentary body in the world. It is the
oldest parliamentary body in the world.
Its function and purpose is constructive
debate. The strength of this Nation is
measured by its capacity for intelligent
debate, not by its ability to goosestep.
hope we do not undermine that source
of our power. I have heard it implied
here and elsewhere lately that free
speech and dissent should stop because
it may be misunderstood in Communist
countries. This is a dangerous parallel
to the theory that was recently used by
the Russian court in sentencing two
writers to jail, not because of what they
said in Russia but because they pub-
lished books in this country which the
Russians thought would be misunder-
stood in America and damage Russia.
On that theory the Russian court sen-
tenced the writers to jail.
Over here, we have people saying that
we should stop debate because someone
else who cannot understand the debate
might misunderstand our resolve and
damage America.
Mr. President, freedom is what democ-
racy is all about. If some foreign dicta-
tor does not understand it, that is too
bad. I have no intention of giving up my
freedom of speech because some Commu-
nist does not understand what free
speech is all about--and never will.
Regarding the Tonkin Bay resolution,
let me comment briefly. It has been re-
peatedly stated by those who unquali-
fiedly support the Tonkin Bay resolu-
tion that there were only two Senators
who had any reservations about it.
Mr. President, I had reservations
about that resolution and I made them
clear. I was in the Chamber on August
6, August 7, and August 8, and partici-
pated in the dialog concerning the reso-
lution, as did several other Senators, who
also expressed grave reservations about
the resolution. Their remarks were in-
tended to interpret that resoletion and
demonstrate congressional intent.
I discussed the subject on three dif-
ferent days with the chairme o of the
Foreign Relations Committee, and I am
a little weary of having my vete inter-
preted as an unqualified endmaement of
escalation. The record will show it was
not such an endorsement.
The chairman of the Foreign Relations
Committee was in the Chamber?the
Senator from. Arkansas (Mr. Pm .sinstrrl ,
as th.e spokesman for the administra-
tion As a U.S. Senator, I was entitled
to accept his advice, counsel, and inter-
pretation of that resolution as an ex-
pression of the intent of the adminis-
tration.
Mr. President, I shall not i sad the
whole dialog, but I will read a Fart of it
from the REcoin of August 6 anti 7, 1964,
as follows. Addressing myself to the
chairman of the Foreign Relatio.o; Com-
mittee:
But I am concerned about the Congress
appearing to te:il the executive bra ach and
the public that we would endorse a iiomplete
change in our mission. That would concern
me.
Mr,. Purinsiduir. I do not iaterpret ,ihe joint
resolution in that way at all. It str ikes me,
as I understand it, that the joint riesolution
is quite consistent with our existing mission
and our understanding of what ,ae have
been doing in South Vietnam for the last
10 years.
Skipping some of it, 1 addrea;ed the
chairman once more, as follows:
in view of the differine interpratations
which have been put upon the joint resolu-
tion with respect to what the sense ..,if Con-
gress is, I should like to have this point
clarified. I have great confidence in the
President. However, my concern is hat we
in Congress could give th.e impression to
the public that we are prepared at this time
to change our mission and iiubstantiAlly ex-
pand our commitment. If that is what the
sense of Congress is, I am opposed to the
resolution. I therefore ask the distinguished
Senator from Arkansas if he would consent
to accept an amendment, a copy of which I
have supplied him. I shall read it into
the RECORD:
"On page 2, line 3, alter the word, "Mat'
insert '(a) '.
"On page 2, between lines 6 and 7, insert
the following:
" '(b) The Congress also approves mid sup-
ports the efforts of the President--
This was the amendment to the Ton-
kin Bay resolution?
to bring the problem of peace in southeast
Asia to the Security Council of the United
Nations, and the President's declaration that
the United States,, seeking no extension of
the present military conflict, will respond to
provocation in a manner that is "limited and
fitting". Our continuing policy is to limit
our role?
Listen to these words?
to the provision of aid, training eseistance,
and military advice, and it is the sense of
Congress that, except when provoked to a
greater response, we should continue to at-
tempt to avoid a direct military involvement
in the southeast Asian conflict'."
This amendment is not an interference
with the exercise of the President's constitu-
tional rights. It is merely an expression of
the sense of Congress. Would the Senator
accept the amendment?
Mr. FULDRIGHT. It states fairly accurately
what the President has said would be our
policy, and what I stated my understanding
was as to our policy; also what other Sena-
tors have stated.
?
I do not object to it as a statement of
policy. I believe it is an accurate reflection
of what I believe is the President's policy,
judging from his own statements. That
does not mean that as a practical matter I
can accept the amendment. It would delay
flatters to do so. It would cause confusion
and require a conference, and present us
with all the other difficulties that are in-
volved in this kind of legislative aiition. I
regret that I cannot do it, even though I do
not at all disagree with the amendment as a
general statement of policy.
I would think that ought to be a suffi-
cient answer to those who have repeat-
edly insisted that the Tonkin resolution
was a blank check. It was not. I had
reservations. So did others. I was as-
sured that we were not changing our
role in southeast Asia. We have changed
it. Obviously we cannot turn back the
clock. But I trust that, for the cake of
the historical record this may correct
those gross misinterpretations of the
record which have been so frequently
uttered on the floor and elsewhere in
recent months.
Mr. President, I ask unanimous con-
sent to have printed extracts of the
statement to which I previously referred.
There being no objection, the extract
was ordered to be printed in the Recons,
as follows:
But I am concerned about the Congress
appearing to tell the executive bramh and
the public that we would endorse a complete
change in our mission. That would concern
me.
Mr. FULDRIGIIT. I do not interpret the joint
resolution in that way at all. It strikes me,
as I understand it, that the joint resolution
is quite consistent with our existing mission
and our understanding of what we have been
doing in South Vietnam for the last 10 years.
(August 7, 1964)
INTERPRETATION
Mr. NELSON. Mr. President, I have reed the
RECORD. There was some colloquy on the
floor yesterday. I noticed that every Senator
who spoke had his own personal Interpreta-
tion of what the joint resolution means.
One Senator yesterday stated for the REC-
ORD that he understands the resolution to
mean that there will be no more privileged
sanctuaries,
Another Senator interprets the resolution
to mean that it would authorize the Chief
Executive to eliminate any aggression, I ature
and present. Some Senators interpret this
language to mean aggression against South
Vietnam; others interpret it to mean aggres-
sion directly against our military forces,
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Another Senator interpreted the joint res-
olution to mean that it is the sense of Con-
gress that no change is suggested by Con-
gress in the present mission in South
Vietnam?the mission that has been ours for
10 years, which is to supply advisers, tech-
nical advice, and materiel, for the purpose
of attempting to encourage the establishment
of an independent, viable regime, so that we
can withdraw our forces; and that it has not
been our mission in the past 10 years to sub-
stitute our military forces for the South
Vietnamese forces, nor to join with them in
a land war, nor to fight their battle for them,
nor to substitute our Government for theirs.
This 10-year-old limited mission can, be
legitimately defended as a responsibility of
ours to assist free and independent nations;
and it can be legitimately questioned, too, be-
cause of the geographic location of that mis-
sion.
In any event, I am most disturbed to see
that there is no agreement in the Senate on
what the joint resolution means. I would
like to see it clarified.
NELSON'S AMENDMENT
Mr. NELSON. In view of the differing in-
terpretations which have been put upon the
joint resolution with respect to what the
sense of Congress is, I should like to have this
point clarified. I have great confidence in
the President. However, my concern is that
we in Congress could give the impression to
the public that we are prepared at this time
to change our mission and substantially ex-
pand our commitment. If that is what the
sense of Congress is, I am opposed to the
resolution. I therefore ask the distinguished
Senator from Arkansas if he would consent to
accept an amendment, a copy of which I have
supplied him. I shall read it into the
RECORD:
"On page 2, line 3, after the word 'That'
insert (a) '.
"On page 2, between lines 6 and 7, insert
the following:
"(b) The Congress also approves and sup-
ports the efforts of the President to bring the
problem of peace in southeast Asia to the
Security Council of the United Nations, and
the President's declaration that the United
States, seeking no extension of the present
military conflict, will respond to provoca-
tion in a manner that is 'limited and fitting'.
Our continuing policy is to limit our role
to the provision of aid, training assistance,
and military advice, and it is the sense of
Congress that, except when provoked to a
greater response, we should continue to at-
tempt to avoid a direct military involvement
in the southeast Asian conflict,'"
This amendment is not an interference
with the exercise of the President's constitu-
tional rights. It is merely an expression of
the sense of Congress. Would the Senator
accept the amendment?
Mr. FULDRIGHT. It states fairly accurately
what the President has said would be
our policy, and what I stated my under-
standing was as to our policy; also what
other Senators have stated. In other words,
it states that our response should be ap-
propriate and limited to the provocation,
which the Senator states as "respond to
provocation in a manner that is limited and
fitting," and so forth. We do not wish any
political or military bases there. We are not
seeking to gain a colony. We seek to insure
the capacity of these people to develop along
the lines of their own desires, independent
of domination by communism.
The Senator has put into his amendment
a statement of policy that is unobjection-
able. However, I cannot accept the amend-
ment under the circumstances. I do not
believe it is contrary to the joint resolution,
but it is an enlargement. I am informed
that the House is now voting on this re,so-
No. 36-8
lution. The House joint resolution is about
to be presented to us. I cannot accept the
amendment and go to conference with it,
and thus take responsibility for delaying
matters.
I do not object to it as a statement of
policy. I believe it is an accurate reflection
of what I believe is the President's policy,
judging from his own statements. That does
not mean that as a practical matter I can
accept the amendment. It would delay mat-
ters to do so. It would cause confusion and
require a conference, and present us with all
the other difficulties that are involved in this
kind of legislative action. I regret that I
cannot do it, even though I do not at all dis-
agree with the amendment as a general
statement of policy.
Mr. PULBRIGHT. Mr. President, in
that connection, I certainly agree with
what the Senator from Wisconsin has
said. He is right to have made it. I
have stated that I understood, from the
information that was given to us, a spe-
cific incident was presented as the reason
for that resolution. It was that a direct
attack had been made on our ships on
the high seas?this is what we were
told?where they had a right to be.
We were told it was an unprovoked
attack. In other words, we had not done
anything that properly could be consid-
ered as provocation. These facts are
difficult for a committee or any of us
to check. I think we were told things
happened at night and things were mov-
ing rapidly, and so on.
I had no reason to doubt the factual
situation. On the other hand, it is ex-
tremely difficult to prove what happened.
In any event, the Senator from Wis-
consin has certainly stated very clearly
what the situation was. We all know the
President has, without any resolution,
the right to respond to an immediate
attack. He has the right to take actions
of a temporary nature, one might say,
to protect our interests. Then at some'
point, if hostilities continue, if the Con-
stitution means anything, a declaration
of war should be sought.
I will leave it to Senators, the manager
of the bill, the administration, whether
or not we are now at war. This bill and
other events would indicate we are. I
have discussed this matter with some of
those who have responsibility in this
area. They are reluctant to do what I
have suggested. I am not at all sure, if
we continue along the course we are fol-
lowing, it will not be necessary to impose
powers and disciplines and controls upon
our economy sooner or later. We cannot
carry on this kind of conflict and call
it a skirmish. So this is a matter I think
the administration should be giving
thought to.
I have a few remarks to make gener-
ally about the situation, in addition to
the pending measure, but I want to join
the Senator from Wisconsin in paying
tribute to the Senator from Oregon for
the analysis he presented to the Senate
last Friday, particularly with regard to
the legal basis for our involvement in
Vietnam. I think he did the finest job
of research, of putting together and pull-
ing together the various aspects concern-
ing Vietnam, particularly the shifting
basis upon which the administration has
presented its case. First they said that
action was not based on SEATO, then
that it was, and so on. I shall not take
the time to elaborate; I only recommend
a reading of the Senator's speech by
anyone who is interested in following the
origin and legal basis of the Vietnam
situation. It is difficult for people who
do not make it their business to follow
these matters to understand the issue.
I think this fact lies at the root of much
of the confusion in the country as to why
we are involved, how we got in that war.
To them I recommend a reading of the
analysis made by the Senator from Ore-
gon.
I wish to say a few words generally
about the southeast Asia situation and
a few words about the pending measure.
In a book written in 1898 called "The
Mysterious Stranger," Mark Twain, one
of our greatest writers, for whom all
Members here have admiration; I do
not know of anyone who does not?who
had a genius for understanding human
nature and presenting it in printed form,
wrote the following on war. I read a
paragraph:
There has never been a just one, never an
honorable one?on the part of the instigator
of the war. I can see a million years ahead
and this rule will never change in so many
as half a dozen instances. The loud 'little
handful?as usual?will shout for the war.
The pulpit will?warily and cautiously?
object?at first; the great, big, dull bulk of
the Nation will rub its sleepy eyes and try
to make out why there should be a war and
will say, earnestly and indignantly, "It is
unjust and dishonorable and there is no
necessity for it." Then the handful will
shout louder. A few fair men on the other
side will argue and reason against the war
with speech and pen, and at first will have
a hearing and be applauded, but it will not
last long; those others will outshout them,
and presently the antiwar audiences will
thin out and lose popularity. Before long
you will see this curious thing: the speakers
stoned from the platform, and free speech
strangled by hordes of furious men who in
their secret hearts are still at one with those
stoned speakers?as earlier?but do not dare
to say so. And now the whole Nation?
pulpit and all?will take up the warcry and
shout itself hoarse, and mob any honest man
who ventures to open his mouth, and
presently such mouths will cease to open.
Next the statesmen will invent cheap lies,
putting the blame upon the nation that is
attacked, and every man will be glad of those
conscience-soothing fantasies and will dili-
gently study them, and refuse to examine
any refutations of them, and thus he will by
and by convince himself that the war is just
and will thank God for the better sleep he
enjoys after this process of grotesque self-
deception. (Mark Twain, "The Mysterious
Stranger," 1898.)
Past experience provides little basis
for confidence that reason can prevail
in an atmosphere of mounting war fever.
In a contest between a hawk and dove
the hawk has a great advantage, not
because it is a better bird but because
it is a bigger bird with lethal talons and
a highly developed will to use them. In
China this is the year of the horse; in
America it appears to be the year of the
hawk.
Without illusions as to the prospect of
success, we must try nonetheless to bring
reason and restraint into the emotionally
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1202 CONGRESSIONAL RECOE D ? SENATE March 1, i;
charged atmosphere in which the Viet-
namese war is now being discussed. In-
stead of trading epithets about the legit-
imacy of debate and about who is and is
not giving "aid and comfort" to the
enemy, we would do well to focus calmly
and deliberately on the issue itself, rec-
ognizing that all of us make mistakes and
that mistakes can only be corrected if
they are acknowledged and discussed,
and recognizing further that war is not
its own justification, that it can and must
be discussed unless we are prepared to
sacrifice our traditional democratic, proc-
esses to a false image of national
unanimity.
That is largely what these hearings
the Senator from Wisconsin referred to
were all about.
The issue underlying our vote on the
military supplemental authorization now
before the Senate is not whether, but
how, to bring about an early and honor-
able end to the war in Vietnam. I em-
phasize "underlying" because later I shall
state clearly that this particular bill
should not be interpreted as a policy
statement. I know that it may be and
the Senator from Oregon stated it will
be, but I shall refer to the statements of
the chairman of the committee who in-
troduced it.
Since I have properly been held re-
sponsible for some things that I said
in regard to the 1964 resolution, I think
we are entitled to rely on the statement
made by the chairman of the Armed
Services Committee as to the effect of
this bill.
Thoreau'. vigorous differences of opin-
ion as to whether an early and honorable
peace is more likely to be gained by
intensifying the war or by reducing its
scale, but no responsible participants in
the debate have advocated either expand-
ing the conflict into a general war with
China or an unconditional and disorderly
withdrawal of American forces from
Vietnam. nivided though we are, there-
fore, with respect to means, there re-
mains a powerful consensus in support
of the objective of an early and honor-
able peace.
The Harris survey contained in the
Washington Post on February 28 reports
a growing consensus for peace along
with a cowing division as to how to
achieve it and a mounting uneasiness
as to the continuation of the war. The
lanais survey reports that the American
people "are becoming split between those
who favor an all-out military effort to
shorten the war and those who prefer
negotiation to the risk of escalation."
The survey reports that no more than
10 percent of the American people favor
immediate withdrawal arid only about
16 percent favor an all-out war against
North Vietnam, leaving the great ma-
jority of our people in between, hopeful,
that is, of an early and honorable end
of the war but divided as to how it can
be achieved. According to the Harris
survey, this great majority who agree on
the goal of peace are almost evenly
divided as to how to attain it, with 33 per-
cent favoring an increased military effort
and 34 percent favoring an accelerated
effort to bring about negotiations.
Discounting extreme points of view, as
I think we can and must, the practical
choice before us is between a policy of
accelerated war confined to Vietnam but
nonetheless aiming at total victory with-
in South Vietnam and a policy of de-
escalation. aimed at neogtiation and an
accommodation among the parties to the
South Vietnamese civil war.
My own view is that the second course
Is the wiser by far. I am in agreement
with Mr. :Kerman, General Gavin, and
General Ridgway, all of whore have indi-
cated that they favor a military policy
of "making do with what we have" in
South Vietnam until an honorable peace
settlement can be negotiated.
I might say that General Ridgway did
net appear. He had been ill, but he
wrote me a letter which I made public.
shall put it in the REcoRn. It endorses
in full the statements and 1 lie theories
of General Gavin.
Mr. MORSE. Mr. President, will the
Senator yield for a suggestion
Mr. I.FULBRIGHT. I yield.
Mr. MORSE. Will the Senator obtain
the letter and put it in the REcoari? I
think it is important to put it in the
RECORD,
Mn, FUILBRIGHT. I sha; I. I over-
looked bringing it with me.
ask unanimous consent that the let-
ter from General Ridgway may be
printer', in the RECORD.
The PRESIDING OFFIClqn With-
out objection, it is ac ordered.
(See exhibit 1.)
Mr. FULBRIGHT. That letter was
from General Ridgway, who was the
Chief of Staff under General ,:lIlisenhower
at the time of the 1954 tragedy
shall try to explain why I believe that
a policy of accommodation is preferable
to a policy aimed at military victory,
even a military victory confined within
the limits of South Vietnam. I shall try
also to suggest what seems to me to be
the central requirement for an accom-
modation in southeast Asia.
Hi story seldom if ever tells us exactly
what we must do in specific situations,
but it does provide guidance as to the
kinds of policies that are likely to suc-
ceed and the kinds that are likely to fail.
The experience of nations in the last 150
Years leaves one in no doubt that gen-
erally policies of accommode lion make
for m( ire durable peace :.ettlements
whereas policies of total victory make for
renewed conflict, usually ':,:enerating
greater problems than they sol I com-
mend to the attention of my colleagues
the following examples:
In 1815, the great powers of Europe,
led by the great conservatives. Lord Cas-
tlereagh of England and Prirwe Metter-
nich of Austria, granted terns of peace
to a defeated and helpless France which
can only be described by 20th-century
standards as astonishingly generous.
They did so despite the fact that France
had conquered most of Europe and kept
it in turmoil for a quarter of a century.
Under the terms of peace, the French
lost no territory at all that had been
theirs before the Great RevolLtion, were
subjected to a limited occupation of only
3 years. and we:re compelled to make
limited reparations and then were given
assistance in paying them, with the re-
sult that France's financial obligations
were liquidated within 4 years of the end
of hostilities.
Three years after the end of the Na-
poleonic Wars, France was brought into
the concert of Europe as a full and equal
great power. The conservative states-
men who made this generous peace did
not do so out of love for a revolutionary
and aggressive France but out of respect
for the power and dynamism of the
French nation. Wanting above all
things peace and stability, Castlereagh
and Metternich gave France a peace
that she could endure. Castlereagh said
that he had come to Vienna not to col-
lect trophies but "to bring the world
back to peaceful habits." He was ad-
mirably successful. Not only was France
reconciled with the nations that defeated
her but never again after 1815 did
France engage in major aggression and
never again did she pose a major threat
to the peace of Europe.
Another example of a highly success-
ful peace based on accommodation came
out of our own War of 1812. The Amer-
icans won a great victory over the Brit-
ish at New Orleans, but the victory did
not win the war because the Treaty of
Ghent which ended the war had already
been signed when the battle was fought.
England at the time was at the peak of
her power. Napoleon had already been
defeated, the British fleet was unchal-
lenged on the seas, and undoubtedly, had
they wished to do so, the British could
have defeated the young American Na-
tion militarily and might even have
brought it back into the British Empire.
They had the generosity?and the wis-
dom?not to do so. Had the British tried
to use their overwhelming power to re-
conquer America, they would probably
have encountered fierce national resist-
ance by an aroused American people
fighting for their own homes, their own
towns, and their own farms. The Brit-
ish themselves had supported the
Spanish in their successful guerrilla war
against Napoleon and, powerful as they
were, the British knew how hopeless it
would be to try to subjugate a patriotic
people determined to defend their in-
dependence.
The Treaty of Ghent simply restored
the status quo between America and
England as it had existed before the war.
There were no victor and no vanquished,
and the issues that had set America
against England remained unsolved. But
what diplomacy did not resolve history
did. Never again did England and
America go to war; and in the 20th cen-
tury, confronted with new circumstances
and new dangers, they have become each
other's closest allies. It all began with
the unpromising Treaty of Ghent.
By contrast with the conflicts of the
19th century, 20th century warfare has
been marked by total victories and total
defeats. The total victories of 1918 and
1945 both generated more problems than
they solved, sowing the seeds of new,
unforeseen, and greater conflicts. These
conflicts were generated by the totality of
things?by the totality of violence in two
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world wars and the totality of the vic-
tories that ended them.
The harshness of the treaty of Ver-
sailles was more in its implementation
than in its provisions. For many and
complex reasons, the vindictive provi-
sions of the treaty, those pertaining to
reparations and the occupation of Ger-
many, rather than the promising parts
of the treaty, those pertaining to dis-
armament and the League of Nations,
were most vigorously implemented in the
1920's. The failure of the belligerents
of World War I to reconcile in the 1920's
was the most important single factor
behind the rise of Hitler in the thirties.
In short, the vindictiveness of World War
I became the major cause of World War
The cold war of the last 20 years was
spawned by the total victory of 1945.
The total destruction of German and
Japanese power created a vacuum which
was soon enough filled, quickly and eag-
erly by Russia and belatedly and reluc-
tantly by America. Had the generals
who tried to kill Hitler in 1944 been suc-
cessful at that time or earlier, a nego-
tiated peace might conceivably have
saved Germany from partition. It was
the total defeat of Germany that re-
sulted in her division, and that division,
the product of a total victory, became the
paramount issue in a new, great, and
still unresolved conflict, a conflict which
could rise up, indeed, and cause us trou-
ble now.
As we consider now whether we wish
to bid for victory or accommodation in
southeast Asia, we would do well to con-
sider the wisdom of a tragically prophetic
letter written by Lord Lansdowne to the
Daily Telegraph of London on November
29, 1917. He wrote:
We are going to win the war, * * * but its
prolongation will spell the ruin of the civil-
ized world, and an infinite addition to the
load of human suffering which already
weighs upon it. Security will be invaluable
to a world which has the vitality to profit
by it, but what will be the value of the bless-
ings of peace to nations so exhausted that
they can scarcely stretch out a hand with
which to grasp them??Lord Newton, "Lord
Lansdowne: A Biography" (London: Mac-
millan, 1929), page 467.
The debate between those who would
accelerate the war in Vietnam and those
who would reduce its scale is as fateful
and significant as any we had in the
last two decades. There is a deceptive
appeal about proposals for expanded
military action; they are simple and
clean cut and they seem to promise quick
and easy solutions to difficult and pain-
ful problems. Proposals for accommo-
dation, on the other hand, as the Sen-
ator from New York has discovered, are
complex, ambiguous and easily misun-
derstood. History, however, suggests
that the military solution that seems so
promising today is likely to result in dis-
aster tomorrow, whereas the course of
accommodation, which always seems so
difficult, is the only course with demon-
strated promise of being able to bring
about a lasting and honorable peace.
The essential principle of an accom-
modation in southeast Asia is that it
must apply not just to Vietnam but to
all of southeast Asia. Vietnam, after
all, is only one of many small and weak
nations on the periphery of a powerful
China and, as has been pointed out in-
numerable times, what happens in one
such country may well happen in an-
other.
This premise underlies the domino
theory, which holds that if one country
falls to the Communists so must an-
other and then another. The inference
we have drawn from this is that we must
fight in one country in order to avoid
having to fight in another, although we
could with equal logic have inferred
that it is useless to fight in one country
when the same conditions of conflict are
present in another, that the failure of
subversion in one country might simply
result in the transfer of subversion to
another. Some of us can really see no
reason why there should be considera-
tion of only one aspect of the so-called
domino theory.
History and logic and commonsense
suggest that a viable settlement in Viet-
nam must be part of a general settle-
ment in southeast Asia. Unless we are
prepared to fight a general war W elimi-
nate the effects of Chinese power in all
of southeast Asia, we have no alterna-
tive but to seek a general accommoda-
tion. This is what really causes un-
easiness among most of us. The central
issue is the contest between Chinese and
American power; and the prospect for a
lasting peace depends far more upon the
resolution of that issue than it does on
the matter of who is to participate in
a South Vietnamese Government and
by what means it shall be formed. If
the issue between Chinese and American
power in southeast Asia can be resolved,
the future of Vietnam should not be too
difficult to arrange, although it would
involve some difficulty, of course; but if
the issue of Chinese and American
power is left unresolved, even a total
victory in South Vietnam is unlikely to
solve very much. As long as China and
America are competitors for predomi-
nance?particularly military predomi-
nance?in southeast Asia, there can be
no lasting peace or stability in that part
of the world.
Just as history suggests the advisabil-
ity of accommodation, it also offers guid-
ance as to the kind of accommodiation
which might make for lasting peace in
southeast Asia. In the past when great
powers have competed for predominance
over smaller and weaker nations, the one
workable alternative to the victory of one
or the other has been neutralization. In
such arrangements, it is the fact of neu-
tralization rather than the political or
Ideological complexion of the small coun-
tries concerned that has made for stabil-
ity and peace. Neutralization is not a
foolproof method of resolving great
power conflicts, but it is a demonstrably
more successful one than total victory.
Switzerland is an example. The Swiss
Federation was established by the Con-
gress of Vienna in 1815 as a perpetually
neutral state. To this day, despite the
fact that she is surrounded by great
powers, Switzerland remains both neu-
tral and at peace.
Belgium was established as a perpetu-
ally neutral state under the guarantee of
the great powers by a treaty signed in
1839. The treaty was violated in 1914,
but the more astonishing fact is that for
75 years Belgium remained both neutral
and at peace despite the ambitions of the
great powers and despite her strategic
location .between France and Germany,
the latter baying been one of the most
powerful nations in that area. Belgium
might well have been the victim of great
power ambitions, but neutralization
made her instead the beneficiary of great
power rivalry and also served as the
means of regulating that rivalry. The
solution lay quite simply in the fact that,
hopeful as was each great power for its
own hegemony, it was no less fearful
of the hegemony of the other and neu-
tralization was judged to be the accept-
able price of its prevention.
Austria is the outstanding contempo-
rary example of accommodation by neu-
tralization. Ten years after World War
II Austria was divided and occupied by
the great powers. The State Treaty of
1955 laid the basis for the independent
and prosperous national existence that
Austria now enjoys and at the same
time resolved a major issue between Rus-
sia and the West without upsetting the
European balance of power.
Applying historical experience, it seems
to me that the crisis in southeast Asia
can only be resolved on a lasting basis
by the neutralization of the entire region
as between China and the United States.
China is profoundly fearful of American
bases on her periphery; she demonstrat-
ed that by intervening in the Korean war
in 1950 only when American troops ap-
proached her Manchurian frontier.
Fearful as she is of American military
power in southeast Asia, China might
well be willing to purchase its removal by
the exclusion of her own. It would seem
to me highly advisable that, by one means
or another, we indicate to the Chinese
that we are prepared to remove American
military power not only from Vietnam
but from all of southeast Asia in return
for a similar prohibition on her part.
A general neutralization agreement for
southeast Asia could be enforced in two
ways. First, a degree of automatic en-
forcement would arise from the prospect
that the reintroduction of Chinese mili-
tary power would be followed by the re-
introduction of American power. Sec-
ondly, a neutralization agreement could
and should be placed under the guaran-
tee of the major powers with interests in
the southeast Asia, notably the United
States, China, the Soviet Union, Great
Britain, France, India, and Japan.
It is quite likely that the Chinese are
not at present prepared to enter a neu-
tralization agreement. As long as the
United States is expending more and
more lives and more and more money in
an ever widening but inconclusive war
In Indochina, the Chinese can logically
hope that the American people will soon-
er or later find the effort intolerable and
force the withdrawal of U.S. forces from
southeast Asia.
As a matter of fact, that is what in
effect happened in the Korean war.
The American people got tired of the
Korean war. The policy of growing in-
volvement that the United States is now
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following in the apparent belief that it
will persuade the Chinese of our deter-
mination to remain in southeast Asia
may in fact have the opposite effect:
it may persuade them, however wrongly,
that the American people and their Gov-
ernment will sooner or later withdraw
itheir support from an insupportable
commitment and abandon southeast
Asia to the unchallenged hegemony of
China.
Mr. Charles Taylor, a correspondent
for the Toronto Globe and Mail, one of
the few Westerners who have been al-
lowed to report from Peiping?and who
was here in Washington at a meeting a
few days ago?recently wrote of the
Chinese:
ft is a matter of faith with them that the
Milted States can never win a land war in
Asia and that for all its awesome power,
the United States lacks the resources to
light several revolutionary wars at the same
time and will eventually be engulfed with-
out direct Chinese intervention.
Mr. Taylor quotes the Peiping Review
as saying:
If South Vietnam alone is enough to keep
the U.S. aggressor forces tied clown so hope-
lessly, one can easily visualize what is in
store for Yankee imperialism once it gets
tzelf entangled in other parts of Asia.
What then can we do to induce China
to pay the price of a neutralization
agreement? What we can do, it seems
to me, is to confront her with the per-
fectly credible prospect of being con-
fronted with that which she most fears,
Which is to say, with permanent Ameri-
can military bases on her periphery.
We can make the threat of permanent
bases credible by reducing the cost of
sustaining them to a level which the
Chinese will know we can sustain indefi-
nitely. This, I think, is the implication
of views put forth by such eminent in-
dividuals as George Kerman, Walter
Lippmann, and Generals Gavin and
Ridgway, each of whom has suggested
that we confine our military efforts in
Vietnam to "making do with what we
have," or holding easily defensible forti-
fied bases somewhat like Guantanamo or
Gibraltar, which has been held for some
200 years, I believe, by the British.
If we were to entrench ourselves in
Powerful. bases on the coast of Vietnam
or inland where appropriate, bases which
could be held with minimal loss of life
and at moderate cost, the Chinese would
be confronted with a perfectly credible
threat of permanent American bases on
their periphery. Knowing that we could
remain in these bases indefinitely, they
would have a powerful inducement to
seek an agreement for the neutralization
of all of southeast Asia. At the very
least, such a policy would convert a situ-
ation in which our enemies believe them-
seives to be wearing us down to one in
which we, at supportable cost, would be
wearing them down.
The present policy of gradually ex-
panding warfare is costing the United
States a tragic toll in lives, large and
growing sums of money, and a world-
wide loss of prestige, including mounting
disaffection on the part of those very
allies to whom we are supposed to be
proving our high determination. In ad-
dition, according to late information, the
present policy seems to be costing our
Goveinment the confidence of growing
numbers of the American people.
I think that is reflected in the polls
that I mentioned earlier.
A policy of holding impregnable bases,
on the other hand, aimed at a general
solution based on the neutralization of
southeast Asia, would reverse the Ameri-
can position in all of these respects, cre-
ating the long-term prospect of a stable
peace and the short-term prospect of
nothing more than drastically reduced
military engagements.
Mr. President, I want to say a few
words more directly about the pending
hill. Although I think the pending bill
has a significance a?s to our overall policy,
it authorizes money to carry on the war,
arid is not a policy statement. I am
dubious of this legislation because pass-
age of the measure may be viewed as an
endorsement of the present policy in
Vietnam for the reasons that I have just
offered--which policy I do not endorse.
state again, as I did yesterday, that I
accept wholly the statement made by the
able and distinguished Senator from
Georgia [Mr. RUSSELL], the chairman of
the Committee on Armed Services when,
in presenting this bill to the Senate, he
said that nothin.g in this legislation can
properly be construed as determining
foreign policy, as ratifying decisions
made in the past, or as endorsing new
commitments.
I think that we are entitled to rely
upon that statement from the Senator.
We have had this debate about policy. I
hereby state that I do not meaa by voting
for this bill that I endorse the military
or political policies that are being fol-
lowed, as understand, at the present
time in escalating the war in Vietnam.
Mr. MORSE. Mr. Presideet, will the
Senator yield for an observation?
Mr. ELM:BRIGHT. I yield.
Mr. MORSE. Mr. President, this is an
appropeiate place to make the observa-
tion that the principle that the Senator
from Arkansas seems to be relying upon
is that when there is ambiaoity as to
what the policy of the bill is, then legis-
lative history is made by turning to the
statements of the Senator in charge of
the bill. That, of course, completely falls
when the administration itself states
what its policy is in the heari 558 on the
bill and in the bill itself.
In my judgment, there is no question
as to the policy of this administration in
the bill. Therefore, there is not anything
that the Senator from Georgia can say
to change that policy. The policy is set
out with complete clarity in the bill itself
and in the statements of the, witnesses
of the administration.
Mr. PULBRIGHT. Mr. President, I
recognize, as I have said in discussing
the matter with the Senator privately, as
all of us have, that this is a very difficult
situation in which we have an authoriza-
tion for an appropriation. An appro-
priation is normally not inclined to be
considered as a statement of policy. It
is normal that legislation, according to
our rules, should not be included in an
appropriation bill.
say that we are faced with an ex-
tremely difficult situation. I am very
reluctant to vote for this measure for the
reasons the Senator has stated. The
alternative proposed by the Senator from
Oregon would result in a situation which
would force a decision on the floor as
to whether the Senate should reaffirm
policies which I do not wish to reaffirm,
speaking for myself. We are merely de-
laying the decision to a better day so we
can make the decision under more favor-
able circumstances and determine what
our policy should be.
I think it is unfortunate that in the
beginning of this session these questions
have arisen in connection with an au-
thorization for the armed services.
This gives at least some color to the
pleas that we are interfering with the
supplies of our soldiers. This opens up
opportunities for all kinds of irrelevant
and very damaging debate, irrelevant, I
think, to the real essence of policy.
What I am trying to say is that insofar
as this bill is concerned, I accept that
statement in the same way the Senator
from Wisconsin said he relied upon the
statement of the Senator from Arkansas.
I thought I was telling him, as far as I
knew at the time, the truth of the matter
I was trying to interpret what the ad-
ministration told US in presenting that
1964 resolution.
So as a matter of legislative history,
for whatever it is worth--and I must say
in many cases it is not worth much?
that is the limit of our power. I know
we do not have the votes to change the
existing resolution which has been under
discussion; and, therefore, I think it is
the better part of wisdom to follow the
course upon which I suggest.
It is not a happy choice. It is very
seldom, any more, that one has a good
choice between what he likes and what
he does not like. The choice always
seems between the lesser of two evils.
At least about 99 percent of the time,
that is the kind of choice we have here
Mr. CLARK. Mr. President., will the
Senator yield?
Mr. FULBRIGHT. Yes; I yield.
Mr. CLARK. I should like the RECORD
to show my complete agreement with the
position taken by the Senator from
Arkansas. I shall vote against the Morse
amendment and I shall vote in favor of
the bill.
I do both with a heavy heart, most
reluctantly, as the least unacceptable of
all available choices. But I wish to make
it very clear indeed that my votes, both
against the Morse amendment and for
the bill, do not indicate an endorsement
of the policy which I fear the adminis-
tration is following.
Mr. FULBRIGHT. The Senator has
expressed very well what I feel. We are
holding it in abeyance for a better day,
a better opportunity, where the matter
of our involvement in Vietnam as a mat-
ter of national policy can be discussed as
freely as possible and without being
entwined into our flag, which flies over
the Capitol.
Nobody wants a white flag on the Capi-
tol, and I do not like this kind of dis-
cussion in connection with it. It makes
it very difficult, really, for us to discuss
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Mad oh 1, 1966 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? SENATE 4205
a matter of high policy under these
circumstances.
That is why I think it is the better part
of wisdom, in effect, to defer to a better
day a full-fledged discussion, and I hope
a proper decision on this matter of policy.
Mr. MORSE. Mr. President, will the
Senator yield?
Mr. FULBRIGHT. I yield.
Mr. MORSE. I understand the argu-
ment of the Senator from Arkansas and
the Senator from Pennsylvania. Where
they lose me is when they assume they
are going to be in a better position to
discuss policy when they get 450,000
more American boys over there. That is
the policy they are approving in this bill.
Mr. FULBRIGHT. The Senator knows
very well that I do not approve of 450,000
more men over there, or even 450,000.
As I understood General Gavin's state-
ment?and I have tried to associate my-
self with it here today?he said we
should make do with what we have there.
He did not develop, as far as I have at-
tempted to develop today, the next steps.
As I see it, this is implicit in what he
did say on how to go about treating a
state of mind on the part of the Chinese
so they will negotiate. This is the first
step. All of the discussion of what the
final solution will be is for the future.
It is all right to speculate about it, but
the No, 1 problem now is how we get
them in a mood even to have a discussion.
It is obvious now that this constant
escalation from 20,000 to 200,000 has by
no means brought them along closer to
negotiation. If anything, I think the
Chinese reason that we are foolish
enough to expend our manpower and our
treasure and our material at such a
furious rate that we will grow tired of
the effort. As large as we are, because of
our many other commitments, we will
reach the point where we cannot afford
it, and that is the way we will sooner or
later give up the ghost. ?
That is in effect what both General
Gavin and Mr. Kennan said: We should
look at this more in perspective with re-
gard to our overall commitments, and
not concentrate so much upon just
Vietnam.
Mr. CLARK. The Senator said, I
suspect inadvertently, "to bring the
Chinese to negotiate." Did he not mean
"to bring the Vietcong to negotiate"?
Mr. FULBRIGHT. No; I mean the
Chinese. I think the Chinese are in-
volved in this. I think the Senator from
Pennsylvania will agree that the great
concern that underlies much of what has
been said is the possibility or even the
probability that the course we are pur-
suing will lead to a conflict with the
Chinese.
We also know that much moral sup-
port and external physical support to the
Vietcong in the way of equipment, and
so forth, comes from the Chinese; and
the proximity of this area to China?it is
as close as Cuba is to the United States.
Of course, North Vietnam adjoins China.
The Senator will remember what con-
sternation arose in this country when we
discovered Russia's presence in Cuba.
Why would it not be somewhat similar,
when we are so close to China?
Mr. CLARK. The Senator is probably
correct. _It is my view, however, that
the end of this war is going to come
first through some arrangement with the
Vietcong that Hanoi is prepared to sup-
port; whereas China is, I believe, just
sitting back watching American boys get
killed while they do not have a single
soldier involved. I would question
whether the Senator would be able to
force Hanoi to continue to fight if they
did not wish to do so.
Mr. FULBRIGHT. Of course, I should
be happy to settle it with the Vietcong
if we could, if they are so disposed.
There is another matter about the
Vietcong. The Vietcong have been
deceived twice, as the Senator knows:
By the French in 1946 and I guess you
might say all of us in 1956, after failing
to go through with the Geneva accords.
I do not know whether they will be
disposed to make a settlement or not. I
think the Chinese could have great in-
fluence upon them. One thing which
leads me to approach it this way for pur-
poses of discussion is that we constantly
hear, as an excuse for this bill, about
the buildup in Thailand. We have heard
that discussed at nearly every meeting
of the committee: "You know, the
Chinese have already given orders and
subversive organizations are being start-
ed in northeast Thailand, and that is
the next one on the course."
That is part of the justification for
this bill. It is assumed that even if we
wipe out the Vietcong, next we are going
to be over there in Thailand. It is that
domino theory in this connection.
So that is what has led pie to believe
and to think along the lines that If we
settle South Vietnam, we will not have
settled very much, because we have
Cambodia, Laos, Thailand. All right,
they are all very weak. We should try to
begin looking at the problem on a
broader basis, in order to get some kind
of a settlement that might be useful. I
do not wish to have a succession of these
conflicts, and I know nobody else does.
Mr. GORE. Mr. President, will the
Senator yield?
Mr. FULBRIGHT. I yield.
Mr. GORE. Could it not easily be
reasoned that the spread of insurgency
to other areas in southeast Asia is the
result of the buildup of an American
expeditionary force?
Mr. FULBRIGHT. I think the Sena-
tor is quite correct. Implicit in what
I am saying, if I did not make it clear,
is that the thing that would be of great
? value as an incentive to the Chinese and
the North Vietnamese in leading to a
settlement would be a withdrawal of our
military.
To put It another way, our presence
itself is the principal reason for much
of the activity, the insurgency, the en-
ergy, and the willingness of the enemy
to sacrifice. I often think of what con-
sternation struck us as we realized that
Russia had a real presence In Cuba.
This country was ready to do anything.
We would not have hesitated if the
President had ordered an invasion. As
the Senators know, we would have ap-
proved it, and everyone would have ap-
plauded.
President Kennedy picked a better
method, a much wiser method that had
never occurred to most of us, as a mat-
ter of fact, a very ingenious method,
which in my view was a form of accom-
modation. He allowed Russia to save
her face and to get out without humilia-
tion.
And what has happened? The Cubans
are Communists, but with the Russians
gone, we do not hear any more speeches
on the floor of the Senate about Cuba.
Very few. Senators will remember at
what white heat everyone's tempers were
around here, and the great speeches that
were made denouncing Castro, and so on.
I have hardly heard Castro mentioned in
recent years; only incidentally, when we
receive these circulars from some orga-
nized group of emigres, and we feel sad
about them and all that.
But the country is not concerned about
Cuba at present. It has simmered down,
and that is what George Kennan says
this country ought to do, simmer down
about Vietnam and look for some form
of solution.
I think the Senator is quite right: As
long as we are there, to them it is like
the presence of the French. As long as
the French were there, there was bound
to be agitation to get them out.
I know this may not sit well with my
fellow Americans, to be compared with
the French. I know we are there under
the best of motives. I do not question
the motives; all I question is the wisdom.
I do not believe that our motives are
bad. Our motives are of the best. We
wish to help them. But that has no
effect upon the wisdom of what we are
doing, or whether what we are doing is
designed to achieve our purpose, or
whether the purpose we set out with is
achievable.
I applaud the efforts concerning paci-
fication and improving the life of these
people. It is possible that they think we
are like the French, that our administra-
tion looks the same as that of any for-
eigners. We look like the French. Of
course we do not talk like them, but we
have similar characteristics. It reminds
me of the article I read, which was
placed in the RECORD the other day, that
we are sleeping in the same beds as the
French but dreaming different dreams.
We look too much like colonialists from
a western country, perhaps. I do not
believe that our motives are bad. I be-
lieve that our motives are high. I be-
lieve it is a question of wisdom as to
policy, particularly when we believe it is
within our power to accomplish what we
say is our objective.
Mr. McGOVERN, Mr. YARBOROUGH,
and Mr. GRUENING addressed the
Chair.
Mr. FULBRIGHT. I yield to the Sen-
ator from South Dakota first, and then
I shall be glad to yield to the Senator
from Texas and the Senator from
Alaska.
Mr. McGOVERN. When the Senator
from Georgia [Mr. RussELL1 presented
the bill on February 16, he had this to
say about it:
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4206 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? SENATE March 1, 1966
This bill cannot possibly be construed as
either an endorsement of or as an attack
upon national policy. It involves more the
throwing of a rope to a man in the water.
We may have cause to question how he got
there, but he is there, he Is a human being,
hi is our friend and a member of our family
and, therefore, if we have a rope and do not
throw it to him to enable him to assist him-
self out of the water this would be a callous
and heartless attitude for us to take.
As 1: interpret that statement by the
Senator in charge of the bill, it is open
to question whether we were right in
getting so deeply involved in this struggle
but that, nevertheless, because of those
policies which may be open to question,
we have our troops in there, over their
heads?as he states?in the water, and
we have no other reasonable or accept-
able course other than to throw a rope
to them in the form of needed equip-
ment. Is that the Senator's understand-
ing-of what we are doing with regard to
this bill?
Mr, FULBRIGHT. Yes, Our forces
are there, and I believe that as I have
Already said to the Senator from
Oregon?I do not know whether the
Senator from South Dakota was in the
Chamber?there is a distinction between
the necessity to authorize an appro-
priation for the Army and a statement
of policy or endorsement of policy. I
read another part of the same Senator's
speech that this was not interpreted to
be a statement of policy, but the Senator
from Oregon has made the point that it
is impossible to insulate these two. If
we totally reject what is-going on, one of
the ways to stop it is to cutoff the
money; but this is a drastic thing to do
and, furthermore, the Senator has to
admit it is utterly unrealistic to think
that we can,
I notice that the Senator from Oregon
has a quizzical look, on his face, so let
me assure Idin that I mean he does not
have the votes?and the Senator knows
that he does not have them. Therefore?
we are faced with the facts in this case.
I like to argue theory in other forums,
but in the Senate we have to recognize
the facts and vote accordingly on an
issue which could if pressed have the
effect of reaffirming a policy I do not
wish to reaffirm. This may not be a
very gallant or straightforward way in
ordinary business, but in politics, I be-
lieve it is perfectly logical and necessary,
certainly in this instance,
Mr. YARBOROUGH. Mr. President,
will the Senator from Arkansas yield?
Mr, GRUEN-MG. Will the Senator
from Arkansas yield?
Mr. FULI3RIGHT, I have only one
more page to read, but I yield at this
time to the Senator from Texas.
Mr. YARBOROUGH. I desire to ask
this question of the Senator from Arkan-
sas. Does the Senator know the ap-
proximate speed of our bombers which
were used over North Vietnam before the
Pause? How fast were they going?how
many miles per hour?
Mr. FULBRIGHT. These are the best
we have?supersonic, I believe-1,200 to
1,400--
Mr. YARBOROUGH. One thousand
five hundred mile,s per hour?
Mr. FULBRIGHT. In that neighbor-
hood; yes. These are the best we have.
Mr. YARBOROUGH. How close were
they bombing to the Chinese border?
approximately 30 miles?
Mr. FTILBRIGHT? Somewhere around
that fig ure, I believe.
Mr. YAP. BOROUGH. So that with a
speed of 1,500 miles an hour and the
border 30 miles away, we were dropping
bombs only 1 minute from Red China;
is that not correct?
Mr. FULBRIGHT. Less than 1
minute--
Mr. 'YARBOROUGH. Less than a
minute--
Mr. FULBRIGHT. Much less than a
minute I believe, is it not?
Mr. YARBOROUGH. In the opinion
of the Senator from Arkansas, as chair-
man of the Foreign Relations Committee,
and having studied this resolution, when
we bomb within less than 1 minute of
the Chinese border, could not the neutral
nations of the world believe, in the Sena-
tor's thinking, that we are tweaking the
tiger's tail and trying to lure him into a
war?
Mr. FULBRIGHT. It certainly could
be interpreted as such. This is one of
the explanations which I have been curi-
ous about. I do not like ever to challenge
anyone's veracity without having any-
thing to base it on and, therefore, I can-
not do it; but I have often wondered
what were our ships doing up there, so
close to that seacoast? It has been stated
that we were approaching them on the
radar at night, so I do not know, but I
certainly believe that is subject to some
kind of interpretation.
Let me ask the Senator, did he say
tweaking whose tail?
Mr, YARBOROUGH. I asked whether
the neutral. nations of the world might
not think we were kind of stomping the
tiger's
Mr. FULBRIGHT. The Senator must
mean the dragon's tail, in this case.
Dragon's tail, is it not? The Senator
must he thinking of a "tiger in your
tank." [Laughter. 'I
Mr. YARBOROUGH. I invite the at-
tention of the Senator from Arkansas to
page 35 of the February 21 issue of U.S.
News & World Report, on page 35, under
the subhead of "U.S. Goals in Vietnam."
The article states, under a Honolulu
dateline, that there are 12,000 villages
and hamlets in Vietnam, that the Gov-
ernment holds a thousand and that the
other 11,000 are held by the Vietcong.
The article states that our aim this year
is to recapture and pacify 900 out of
South Vietnam's 11?000 hamlets held by
the Communists-900 of the 11,000 this
year, 1,500 in 1967, and, hopefully, to ac-
celerate the rate in future years.
My question for the distinguished
chairman of the Foreign Relations Com-
mittee is: As a result of the recent hear-
ings, how do we intend to pacify these
villages and hamlets? Do we intend to
burn these villages down and destroy
them? Or how can we pacify them?
Mr. FULBRIGHT. I stated a moment
ago that I believe the objectives which
have been announced are, for all prac-
tical purposes, practically impossible for
foreigners to achieve. This is one of the
things I have in mind. As the Senator
stated, if we burn these villages down,
that would be a difficult way to pacify
them, naturally. We would have to re-
build them. But even if we did rebuild
them after burning them down, that
would not necessarily create a viable
structure for these people who differ
from us in so many ways. They could
not help regarding us as anything but
similar to their former colonial masters.
When we have poured in 200,000 troops
with all the services that go ith it, we
are completely disrupting their economy.
We all read about the same things in
the newspapers, that the whole economy
of Vietnam is being thrown into chaos by
the infusion of so much money, so
rapidly, by our troops and by our con-
struction there. It is creating an almost
intolerable situation. So we do, more
and more, have to take control of this
country. We have to do that, to try to
keep them in there. The bill before the
Foreign Relations Committee for eco-
nomic aid is to try to control inflation.
I am not sure whether it will control or
enhance it. It is questionable. This is
a very, very difficult thing. I cannot
think of anything quite comparable in
our experience. We can think of the
Philippines, if we like, at least it is some-
what near there, but we did not do the
Job there. Magsaysay did it with very
little economic aid. We did not do it
ourselves. I do not believe that we could
have done it. But, he did it.
Mr. YARBOROUGH. Mr. President,
I thank the distinguished Senator from
Arkansas for his comments. Mr. Presi-
dent, I ask unanimous consent to have
printed in the RECORD, the article pub-
lished in the U.S. News & World Report
on page 35, in the issue of February 21,
1966, entitled "U.S. Goals in Vietnam."
There being no objection, the article
was ordered to be printed in the RECORD,
as follows:
U.S. GOALS IN VIETNAM
110N0LULU,?liere's what the United States
and South Vietnam are hoping to accomplish
in this year's lighting:
Recapture and pacify 900 out (A South
Vietnam's 12,000 hamlets held by Commu-
nists.
Consolidate control of 1,000 Government-
held hamlets?making a total of 1,900 ham-
lets firmly under Government control.
Build 2,050 new classrooms.
Construct 500 miles of road, 148 bridges,
57 dams, and 120 miles of canals.
In 1967, the aim is to pacify 1,500 more
hamlets. After 1967, it is hoped, the rate of
pacification will snowball?with the iiountry
brought entirely under control of the Gov-
ernment within 5 to 7 years.
Mr. GRUENING. Mr. President, will
the Senator yield?
Mr. FULBRIGHT. I yield to the Sen-
ator from Alaska.
Mr. GRUENING. I first would like to
say I find myself in complete accord
with the fears, doubts, and questions
which the distinguished chairman of
the Foreign Relations Committee has
expressed. I may not take the same
position on the bill as he has, but I real-
ize the dilemma which faces us.
I wish to comment briefly on the collo-
quy had between the Senator from
Arkansas and the Senator from Oregon,
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and the fact that we have a certain
amount of comfort in accepting the as-
surance by the chairman of the Armed
Services Committee that voting for the
bill is no compliance with or acceptance
of the present foreign policy or future
policy. That may be true.
As the Senator from Oregon pointed
out, no Member of the Senate, not even
the chairman in charge of the bill, can
make a commitment that the President
makes. We find that commitment in
the very letter of transmittal, in which
it is stated:
In the last 2 years, in repeated acts of
authorization and appropriation, the Con-
gress has provided continuing support for
our national decision "to prevent further
aggression" in southeast Asia. The quoted
words come from the joint resolution of
Congress?Public Law 88-408?approved on
August 10,1964.
That was the basis for the resolution.
Of course, that resolution was drafted in
the White House. So there we have it
in black and white.
If we vote for the bill, we are approv-
ing the policy which the Senator from
Arkansas, the Senator from Alaska, the
Senator from Oregon, and other Sena-
tors do not approve of. There it is in
black and white. One may find comfort
in the words of the chairman of the
Armed Services Committee [Mr. Rus-
SELL], but there it is. If we pass this
bill, the administration has served no-
tice that we approve the policy.
Mr. FULBRIGHT. I do not agree
with that. I do not accept that.
Mr. GRUENING. It is there.
Mr. FULBRIGHT. It is there, yes;
this business of our relations with the
executive has been a difficult one. No
government of any importance that I
know of, a country as big as this one, has
the same relationship between the legis-
lative and executive. In England and in
all other large parliamentary bodies the
executive is a part of the legislative, and
they work problems out between them-
selves, and they have their own method
of resolving their differences. They have
the very important power that when they
disagree with the executive they can
change him. We cannot do it. We have
to accommodate to it. In many ways
our President has much greater power,
regardless of the Legislature, than is true
of the executive in other countries. Peo-
ple do not recognize that fact.
Mr. MORSE. Mr. President, will the
Senator yield?
Mr. FULBRIGHT. I yield. I have
about concluded my statement.
Mr. MORSE. This is the last time I
shall interrupt.
I would like to go back to the time of
what happened at the Tonkin Bay inci-
dent. I judge, from the way the Senator
from Arkansas has expressed himself,
that he is not too sure just exactly what
happened at Tonkin Bay.
The Senator from Oregon is not,
either.
There is one thing we ought to make
very clear in the RECORD. It is that the
administration told us that our ships
were 70 or 75 miles away. I was one who
pressed them on this, because I had been
informed in advice from the Pentagon
building that our ships were a much,
much shorter distance away than 75
miles. We learned subsequently that the
ships were only 13 or 14 miles away from
the place where bombing took place by
the South Vietnamese ships, which we
had completely equipped. The testimony
also brought out that our officials in
Saigon had constant information as to
what they were doing.
History has already recorded that our
ships were sufficiently close in proximity
to those South Vietnamese vessels that
were bombing islands three or four miles
off the mainland of North Vietnam that
we were in fact giving coverage. At
least, our destroyers were close enough
to come to the assistance of those ships
if they got into trouble.
The Senator will recall that in the For-
eign Relations Committee?and the
record will show it?I said to the ad-
ministration witnesses, "What do you
suppose we would have done if Russia
had had destroyers 75 miles from Key
West and started bombing Key West?"
We know what we would have done. We
would have sunk those Russian ships.
Mr. FULBRIGHT. The Senator for-
gets that we are "good guys." It makes
a lot of difference.
I have about concluded.
I should like to make another comment
about the House committee report with
regard to the urgency of the bill. I do
not think there is any reason at all to
apologize for the discussion that has
taken place, since the House report states
that there is no urgency for the bill. I
have stated that and placed it in the
RECORD, and I shall not do so again. Fur-
thermore, the House is only acting on the
bill today.
According to the House Committee on
Armed Services, which, as we know, is
composed of gentlemen who can hardly
be considered unsympathetic to the ma-
terial needs of the armed services, there
is no urgency about this supplemental
authorization. In the words of the re-
port of the House Armed Services Com-
mittee:
If there is one reservation felt by many
members of the committee regarding the
necessity for this legislation, it arises from
the possibility that many of the items in-
volved, in all three categories of procurement,
research and development, and construction,
may simply have been moved from the reg-
ular 1967 authorization to this supplemental
1966 authorization without any real program
for acceleration. Obviously no military ad-
vantages would be gained by such a book-
keeping situation. Testimony on this sub-
ject was indecisive and the committee has
not yet been provided with sufficient defini-
tive data to pinpoint the exact degree of real
acceleration, or to determine the amounts
involved in the proposed legislation which
could safely and should properly be deferred
until the regular 1967 authorization.
The accusations which have been
leveled at us have been perfectly un-
justifiable. There has been direct ref-
erence to the debate which has gone on
about this question, as well as the hear-
ings. I do not take with very good grace
the criticism that has been leveled at
members of the Foreign Relations Corn-
tmittee or any other Members who have
taken part in the debate. Some strong
words were used on the floor of the Sen-
ate in an attempt to try to show that the
delay in passing this bill was injuring
our Armed Forces, which is nonsense.
There are shortages of certain mate-
rials in Vietnam, but no evidence has
been offered to show that this is due to
a present lack of money. Whatever
shortages there may be are due to con-
gestion in the ports, to the lack of ware-
housing or transportation, or to poor
planning, but not to lack of money. If
I understand the situation correctly, this
money might just as well be carried in
the regular Defense Department au-
thorization which will soon be before
us and which will, of course, require well
over half of the total taxes paid by the
190 million people of the richest Nation
in the world.
I intend, with great reluctance, to vote
for this bill. I hope I have made it clear
that my vote will not indicate support
of present military policies. I shall vote
for the bill because, althOugh available
evidence, including the stated reserva-
tion of the House Armed Services Com-
mittee, indicates that this supplemental
authorization is not necessary to meet
the present material needs of our Armed
Forces in Vietnam, the merest possibil-
ity that a delay in funds might conceiv-
ably handicap our fighting men obliges
me to support it. However unwise the
policy that put them there, our men are
In Vietnam and fighting, and one cannot
take the chance?even a very remote
one?of denying them anything they
may need. The only item mentioned in
which there might be a delay in issuing
contracts is for helicopters. I am un-
willing to vote against this bill because?
and only because?of the dim and re-
mote possibility that it may actually
serve some useful purpose for our fight-
ing men.
EXHIBIT 1
FEBRUARY 11, 1966.
Gen. MATTHEW RIDGWAY,
U.S. Army (Retired), Mellon Institute, Pitts-
burgh., Pa.
DEAR GENERAL RIDGWAY: I regret that you
do not feel in a position to testify before
the committee concerning the situation in
Vietnam. many of the members of the com-
mittee, and I particularly, had hoped that
you would give us the benefit of your vast
experience and knowledge in military af-
fairs.
I can certainly understand your desire to
restrict your activities in the next few weeks
and I hope that you will be fully recovered
from your illness soon.
You have no doubt read press accounts
of General Gavin's testimony before the com-
mittee on Tuesday. His testimony was ex-
tremely well presented and his comments
will, I am sure, be very helpful to the mem-
bers of this committee and the public gen-
erally in gaining a better understanding of
the issues facing us in Vietnam. If you
have any comments on his testimony or on
Vietnam generally, the committee would be
glad to have them, either for publication or
for the information of the members only.
If you do not care to make any comments, I
will certainly understand.
With kind regards, I am,
Sincerely yours,
3. W. FULBRIGHT,
Chairman.
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66
PITTSBURGH, PA.,
February 19, 1966.
[Ion. J. WmfrAivt PULBRIGIIT,
U.S. Senate,
Washington .1) C.
DEAR SENATOR PTITBRIGHT: Your gracious
letter is deeply appreciated. While it is
dated February 11, it was only delivered to
no here on the 18th.
welcome the opportunity you kindly of-
fer me to comment on General Gavin's testi-
mony, and I have no restrictions to request
BS to the disposition you may wish to make
of my comments. If, in your judgment,
they merit distribution among the members
of your committee, or inclusion in the ro::-
ords of the hearings. I shall be happy.
On December 13 last, General Gavin wrote
me, enclosing a copy of a draft of a letter he
had written for publication in Harper's
magazine, saying that since I was men-
tioned in it, he "thought it appropriate for
me to see its" even though "you may not be
in agreement with the sentiments expressed
in it."
On December 17, I replied that I thought
"the letter-swill have a substantial impact
on al.l thoughtful persons who read it and
on those in official circles in Washington--
executive and legislative?concerned with
the problems with which it deals." At the
same time I wrote Harper's magazine that
my own views accord completely" with
those of General Gavin, as stated in the draft
sent me. f added that I was. then consider-
ing publishing an article on the Vietnam
situation. Actually I had been working on
the draft of one prior to receipt of General
OILVUI'S letter, and for some time now that
draft has been undergoing review by a pros-
pective publisher.
When General Gavin's letter was pub-
lished, I was disturbed to see the distortions
which it had been subjected, and which
had read into his statements thoughts I as-
sume he had never entertained. I tele-
phoned him verifying the correctness of my
assumption, and was gratified to have him
state his intention of making all this clear
in his testimony before the Senate Foreign
Deletions Committee the following day.
watched all of General Gavin's testimony
before your nommittee. I thought it re-
worded great depth and breadth of view, and I
was deeply gratified, not only by his com-
plete candor in responding to all questions
and the temperate language in which his
tinswers were couched, but equally so by the
clarity of his presentation. I thought it dis-
sipated the cloud of misinterpretation and
misrepresentation by which others had ?b-
emired the meaning he had intended. Again
I found myself in basic agreement with his
staled views.
In conclusion, having sat before the TV
screen throughout all of the hearings, may
1 state, sir, my respectful opinion that you
conducted them in the finest traditions of
the Senate, and that you and your colleagues
performed a signal service to our people.
Out of these hearings I hope will accrue in-
creasingly strong support for the middle
course which I believe the President to be
following, in rejecting the counsel of ex-
tremists in either direction, while continuing
to seek an honorable solution which will put
;LB end to hostilities without prejudice either
in our vital interests, or to the fulfillment of
our pledges.
With my highest respect, I am,
Sincerely.
Ms 13. hireew AY,
;e!Ur!r(11, U.S. Army, Retired.
Me. SMATHERS. Mr. President, I
si tall necessarily be brief because, regret-
tably, the condition of my throat is such
that I cannot speak for as long as I
should like. However, I am happy to
have an opportunity to make a, few
remarks,
I think I express the views of the ma-
jority of the Members of the U.S. Senate
when I say I am. relieved and pleased
that the Senate is finally going to have
an opportunity to vote on the amend-
ment which has been offered by the dis-
tinguished Senator from Oregon to re-
peal the Southeast Asia Resolution of
1964.
While I do not agree with the distin-
guished senior Senator from Oregon and
his conclusions with respect to most
matters having to do with Vietnam,
nevertheless I recognize him.. as does
every other Senator, as a man of great
courage and a man of great forthright-
ness. Be has presented to us the real
problem with which we are all con-
cerned, and now we have a chance to
vote up or down the real issue fJ, stake.
I have listened with interest to the re-
marks made by a man for whom I have
great respect, the chairman of the For-
eign Relations Committee I Cdr. Fut.-
saicuTl, with respect to the fact that he
did not think this was necessarily going
to be a vote on the key issues of what we
are doing in Vietnam, whether we should
be there or not, or whether we are giving
support to the resolution as passed in
1964.
I quote from the CoNctiEssiomm. REC-
aim of August 6, 1964. The distinguished
Senator from Arkansas said:
It should be made equally clear to these
reg Imes?
Meaning the Comm:mists?
if it is mit yet sufficiently clear, that their
aggressive and expansionist ambitions, wher-
ever advanced, will meet. precisely that de-
gree of American opposition which is neces-
sary to frustrate them.
That it. what the distinguished Sena-
tor said that day.
When one reads what the President
said .when he sent to Congress the pres-
ent request for supplemental funds, it is
in almost precisely the same language.
I quote from the first page of the mes-
sage:
We are currently engaged in a mojor effort
to open ii road to a peaceful settlement.
Whether the present effort is suceessful or
not, our purpose of peace will be constant;
we will continue to press on every loor.
13ilt, until there is a response?and until
the aggression ends--we must do ell that is
necessary to support our .allies and our own
fighting forces in Vietnam.
'Phis is the purpose of the piee;ent re-
quest. It has been made so that we can
meet whatever force they apply against
us and meet whatever force they apply
against South Vietnam.
That is what I understand the distin-
guished Senator from Arkansas said the
Gulf of Tonkin resolution meant when he
led the debate for it in 1964.
At this point in my remarks, I ask
unanimous consent to have inserted in
the ree,ord the full text of Public Law 88-
49a of the 88th Congress approved Au-
gust ill, 1964--the joint resolution and
to promote the maintenance of interna-
tional peace and security in southeast
Asia together with the :President's mes-
sage to the Congress dated August 5,
1964.
There being no objection, the material
was ordered to be printed in the REcoso,
as follows:
[Public Law 88-408, 88th Cong.]
H.J. RES, 1145
Joint resolution to promote the mainte-
nance of international peace and security
in southeast Asia
Whereas naval units of the Communist
regime in Vietnam, in violation of the prin-
ciples of the Charter of the United Nations
and of international law, have deliberately
and repeatedly attacked United States naval
vessels lawfully present in international
waters, and have thereby created a serious
threat to international peace; and
Whereas these attacks are part of a de-
liberate and systematic campaign of aggres-
sion that the Communist regime in North
Vietnam has been waging against its neigh-
bors and the nations joined with them in the
collective defense of their freedom; and
Whereas the United States is assisting the
peoples of southeast Asia to protect their
freedom and has no territorial, military, or
political ambitions in that area, but desires
only that these peoples should lie left in
peace to work out their own deetinies in
their own way: Now, therefore, be it
Resolved by the Senate and HOUSe of Rep-
resentatives of the United States America
in Congress assembled, That the Congress
approves and supports the determination of
the President, as Commander in Chief, to
take all necessary measures to repel any
armed attack against the forces of the
United States and to prevent further
aggression.
SEC. 2, The United States regards as vital
to its national interest and -to world peace
the maintenance of international peace and
security in southeast Asia. Consonant with
the Constitution of the United Slates and
the Charter of the United Nation.; and in
accordance with its obligations under the
Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty, the
United States is, therefore, prepared, as the
President determines, to take all accessary
steps, including the use of armed force, to
assist any member or protocol state of tile
Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty re-
questing assistance in defense of its freedom.
SEC. 3. This resolution shall expire when
the President shall determine that the peace
and security of the area is reasonably assured
by international conditions created by action
of the United Nations or otherwise, except
that it may be terminated earlier by concur-
rent resolution of the Congress.
Approved August 10, 1964.
To the Congress of the United States
Last night I announced to the P merican
people that the North Vietnamese regime
had conducted further deliberate attacks
against U.S. naval vessels operating in inter-
national waters, and that I had therefore di-
rected air action against gunboats end sup-
porting facilities used in these hostile op-
erations. This air action has now been
carried out with substantial damage to the
boats and facilities. Two U.S. aircraft were
lost in the action.
After consultation with the leaden. of both
parties in the Congress, I further enuounced
a decision to ask the Congress for a resolu-
tion expressing the unity and determination
of the United States in supporting freedom
and in protecting peace in southeast Asia.
These latest actions of the North Viet-
namese regime have given a new and grave
turn to the already serious situation in
southeast Asia. Our commitments in that
area are well known to the Congress. They
were first made in 1954 by Preeiden 1, Eisen-
hower. They were further defined in the
Southeast Asia Collective Defense Troaty ap-
proved by the Senate in February 1955.
This treaty with its accompanying protocol
obligates the United States and other mem-
bers to act in accordance with their con-
stitutional processes to meet Communist ag-
gression against any of the parties or protocol
states.
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Our policy in southeast Asia has been con-
sistent and unchanged since 1954. I sum-
marized it on June 2 in four simple proposi-
tions:
1. America keeps her word. Here as else-
where, we must and shall honor our commit-
ments.
2. The issue is the future of southeast
Asia as a whole. A threat to any nation in
that region is a threat to all, and a threat
to us.
3. Our purpose is peace. We have no mili-
tary, political or territorial ambitions in
the area.
4. This is not just a jungle war, but a
struggle for freedom on every front of hu-
man activity. Our military and economic as-
sistance to South Vietnam and Laos in par-
ticular has the purpose of helping these
countries to repel aggression and strengthen
their independence.
The threat to the free nations of south-
east Asia has long been clear. The North
Vietnamese regime has constantly sought to
take over South Vietnam and Laos. This
Communist regime has violated the Geneva
Accords for Vietnam. It has systematically
conducted a campaign of subversion, which
includes the direction, training, and supply
of personnel and arms for the conduct of
guerrilla warfare in South Vietnamese terri-
tory. In Laos, the North Vietnamese regime
has maintained military forces, used Laotian
territory for infiltration into South Vietnam,
and most recently carried out combat opera-
tions?all in direct violation of the Geneva
agreements of 1962.
In recent months, the actions of the North
Vietnamese regime have become steadily
more threatening. In May, following new
acts of Communist aggression in Laos, the
United States undertook reconnaissance
flights over Laotian territory, at the request
of the Government of Laos. These flights
had the essential mission of determining the
situation in territory where Communist
forces were preventing inspection by the In-
ternational Control Commission. When the
Communists attacked these aircraft, I re-
sponded by furnishing escort fighters with
instructions to fire when fired upon. Thus,
these latest North Vietnamese attacks on our
naval vessels are not the first direct attacks
on Armed Forces of the United States.
As President of the United States I have
concluded that I should now ask the Con-
gress, on its part, to join in affirming the na-
tional determination that all such attacks
will be met, and that the United States will
continue in its basic policy of assisting the
free nations of the area to defend their free-
dom.
As I have repeatedly made clear, the United
States intends no rashness, and seeks no
wider war. We must make it clear to all that
the United States is united in its determina-
tion to bring about the end of Communist
subversion and aggression in the area. We
seek the full and effective restoration of the
international agreement signed in Geneva in
1954, with respect to South Vietnam, and
again in Geneva in 1962, with respect to Laos.
I recommend a resolution expressing the
support of the Congress for all necessary ac-
tion to protect our Armed Forces and to as-
sist nations covered by the SEATO Treaty.
At the same time, I assure the Congress that
we shall continue readily to explore any
avenues of political solution that will effec-
tively guarantee the removal of Communist
subversion arid the preservation of the in-
dependence of the nations of the area.
The resolution could well be based upon
similar resolutions enacted by the Congress
in the past?to meet the threat to Formosa
in 1955, to meet the threat to the Middle
East in 1957, and to meet the threat in Cuba
in 1962. It could state in the simplest terms
the resolve and support of the Congress for
No. 36-9
action to deal appropriately with attacks
against our Armed Forces and to defend
freedom and preserve peace in southeast Asia
in accordance with the obligations of the
United States under the southeast Asia
treaty. I urge the Congress to enact such
a resolution promptly and thus to give con-
vincing evidence to the aggressive Commu-
nist nations, and to the world as a whole,
that our policy in southeast Asia will be
carried forward?and that the peace and se-
curity of the area will be preserved.
The events of this week would in any event
have made the passage of a congressional res-
olution essential. But there is an additional
reason for doing so at a time when we are
entering on 3 months of political campaign-
ing. Hostile nations must understand that
in such a period the United States will con-
tinue to protect its national interests, and
that in these matters there is no division
among us.
LYNDON B. JOHNSON.
THE WHITE HOUSE, August 5, 1964.
Mr. SMATHERS. Mr. President, let
us recall that we had a united Congress
and a united nation. The resolution
was adopted by the House of Representa-
tives by a vote of 414 to 0 and the Senate
by a vote of 88 yeas to 2 nays. I am
confident that we have that support to-
day and that the Congress will over-
whelmingly defeat the Morse amend-
ment.
Let us also be very clear on this issue:
Public Law 88-408 previously referred
to declares that the United States re-
gards as vital to its national interest
and to world peace the maintenance of
international peace and security in
southeast Asia.
I am confident that the Congress ap-
proves and supports the determinations
of our President, as Commander in Chief
to take all necessary steps to repel any
armed attack against the forces of the
United States, to prevent further aggres-
sion, and that the United States is pre-
pared, as the President determines, to
take all necessary steps, including the
use of armed force, to assist any member
or protocal state of the Southeast Asia
Collective Defense Treaty requesting as-
sistance in defense of its freedom. I
might point out that South Vietnam is
a protocal state and did request our
assistance.
Now is the time to again demonstrate
our support for administrative policy and
get on with the business at hand to let
our fighting men know that their country
is united in its efforts and their efforts
for the cause of freedom.
The time for action is now.
The time to show a unified nation to
the free world is now.
The time to stand up against Commu-
nist agression is now.
The time to give full support to our
fighting men abroad is now.
The time to give full support to our
President in the interest of our own na-
tional security as well as promoting the
cause of freedom is now.
Whether Senators agree with the dis-
tinguished Senator from Arkansas or the
distinguished Senator from Alaska on
this point, of course, what we are doing
Is carrying out the spirit of the resolu-
tion.
I would hate to think that anybody
was going to delude or kid himself into
believing that when we vote to table
this amendment which has been offered
by the distinguished Senator from Ore-
gon that we are not in fact voting to keep
on the books the resolution which we
passed in August 1964, which we did, as
the distinguished chairman of the For-
eign Relations Committee said, to let us
meet every aggressive act with precisely
the correct response so that we can pre-
serve freedom in South Vietnam.
I would not want the people deluding
themselves over the fact any more than I
would want members of the Finance
Committee to say that when we reduce
taxes from 50 to 40 percent, "I really
mean that I voted for 45 percent."
When the 50 percent is eliminated,
there is left standing the result. There
is no middle ground. The act will speak
for itself. It will be a law on the books.
I have only spoken on the floor one
time this year with respect to the entire
question of our policies in southeast
Asia. But I believe that the discussions
which were held and the debates which
have developed have been very useful.
Certainly they have been legal. Cer-
tainly they have been lawful in every
sense. But I do think this kind of de-
bate can be carried on so long that it
begins to hurt. I think there is no doubt
that it has now begun to hurt, not only
in the United States but elsewhere.
There was an article in the Washington
Post on February 27, by Mr. Ward Just,
of the Washington Post Foreign Service,
which I would like to read in part:
SAIGON, February 26.?Senior U.S. officials
here are dismayed and angered by congres-
sional criticism of the war in Vietnam. This
view is shared, it is understood, by virtually
every top official in the U.S. civilian and mili-
tary command.
These officials believe that what one senior
diplomat called "organized congressional
criticism" of the U.S. position here has
damaged morale in the Armed Forces, sowed
doubt in the minds of Vietnamese leaders,
and encouraged the enemy to believe that the
United States cannot stay the course.
He goes on to say:
An American delegation which journeyed
to Ankhe, headquarters of the 1st Cavalry
Division, earlier this week was told that the
criticism of the war effort "cannot help but
hurt morale" among American soldiers.
I do not want to go so far as to bring
in personal matters, but I wish to relate
from personal knowledge and personal
experience that I know these continued
criticisms directed against the policies
we are following in Vietnam have greatly
disturbed and dismayed some of our own
servicemen out there.
Obviously, there is no question that
some some of our allies have been worried
about what our course of action is going
to be. Certainly the South Vietnamese
want to know whether we really mean
what we say, whether we will stand by
our commitments, whether we are going
to stay and help them defeat communism
or put our tail between our legs and
get out because it has become difficult
and hard and is costing us materiel and
men.
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I AlrTB004?n00400050008-5
4ALaa_sitiE
March 1, 1966
Mr. CLARK, Mr. President, will the
Senator yield?
SMATHERS. I would like to
finish my discussion and then I will be
happy to yield.
I think that by a- vote here today the
vast majority of the Senate can prove
and establish beyond the hint of a doubt
the fact that we uphold the hand of the
President.
Certainly we do not like to be out there.
wish that my two sons were home and
I wish that the sons of other parents
were home. Nobody wants to be tied
down there.
When our President took over, there
were approximately 25,000 men there.
When the preceding President took over
there were about 1,000 men there. Do
we put our tail between our legs arid
run, and say we signed a treaty but it
does not amount to anything? I do not
think we can do that.
We have had to meet aggression with
aggression. The President has said
over and over again that this is a limited
war with limited objectives. We have
riot struck Red China. We have not
31;ruck some of the strategic targets in
Vietnam. This is the course we are en-
deavoring to follow, hoping we can some-
how bring these people to the negotia-
tion table.
I would like to read an article by Max
e'reedman, a fine liberal columnist with
svhom I do not always agree. I do re-
spect, him, and I do think that he is one
of the greatest columnists of all time.
In wrote an article last night in. which
I thought he put his finger right on the
nubbin of the problem. He said:
) 11 tit North Vietnam is ready to accept the
f:Let, that she cannot impose her will by mili-
tary force and organized subversion on South
vietnam, the road to peace will remain closed.
The war, rather than diplomacy, holds the
key to peace. For, in the judgment of highly
placed officials in Washington, it will be im-
possible to persuade Hanoi that the Presi-
dent's promises and assurances will be ful-
Idled while they are regarded, as they now
ore, as no more than a skillful effort to
weaken and divide the Conununist military
r!Ill paign.
Mr. President, I never in my life have
known of anyone getting into a fist fight
when he was a young man or a little boy
who was able, while losing, to say "Let us
stop now; let; us negotiate; let us sit down
and show how reasonable we can be."
The only time you can get a man to
negotiate is when you are beginning to
hurt him a little; when he is beginning
Li) suffer a little. Then you can say to
him, "Let us negotiate," and he will listen.
ii you. He will not listen to you when.
lie feels he is winning. This is the situa-
tion, expanded many times, that we find.
kids y in Vietnam.
Until the Communists know that we
intend to stay there, until they know that
we mean business, until we show that we
are united, until we show that we are not
ening to be driven out, and until we show
that we will live up to our commitments,
we are not going to get them to negotiate.
0:very time someone gets up and talks
about the tide changing and people los-
ing heart, it encourages the enemy. That
iII bow the Vietnamese Communists won
before. As General Maxwell Taylor said
before the Foreign Relations Committee,
that is how they won in 1954. He said
the Communists won in Paris, not out in
Indochina. That was so because the
French people had lost heart, because
they were divided, and because they
gave up.
Certainly, this is not the intention or
the desire of the American people. Cer-
tainly, t is not the intention or desire
of anyone in Congress. I do not believe
that we ought to give that impression,
or that we are even considering such a
thing. I do not really believe that we
are. However, some of the debate in
this Chamber is being interpreted in
that way.
',et, us have no illusions abom this par-
ticular vote. While I disagree with the
conclusions of the Senator from Oregon,
I believe he is absolutely cormI in stat-
ing that when we vote, there will be no
mental gymnastics which we can follow.
No one can say that what we co will not
in effect be a reaffirmation of the Gulf of
Tonkin resolution which was passed in
August 1964.
If any Senator does not like that, he
ought to vote for the amendasmt of the
distinguished Senator from Or:Ton. By
our vote to table the amendment of the
Senator from Oregon, we shall be voting
to reaffirm the decision we mad' when we
passed the joint resolution of August 10,
1964. When I vote, I want to reaffirm
it, and I believe the great majority of
Senators have the same feeline
Mr. CLARK. Mr. President, will the
Senator yield?
Mr. SMATHERS. I am happy to yield.
Mr. CLARK. I have listened with
growing amazement to the comments of
my good friend from Florida, comments
which, to my way of thinking, impose a
dilemma on those of us who in many
ways obj act to the acts of our Govern-
ment in Vietnam, although not necessar-
ily, yet, to the policy as enunciated by
the President.
I should merely like to state for the
record that I have not the slightest in-
tention of having my vote on this ques-
tion interpreted as the Senator from
Florida would, like to have it interpreted.
I do not believe for a moment that the
Gulf of Tonkin resolution added as much
as one inch to the powers of the Presi-
dent. H?r had all those powers without
adding another. They were his right as
Commander in Chief.
I do not intend to vote in favar of the
Morse amendment, and I do no intend,
no matter what the Senator from Flor-
ida may say, to have my vote interpreted
in any other way but the way I stated it
a few moments ago in a colloquy with the
Senator from Arkansas [Mr. Fursamml.
am opposed to a policy which would
escalate this war. I shall vote against
the Morse amendment. I shall vote for
the bill. Nothing that the Senaor from
Florida can say will change my own in-
terpretation or the interpretation of the
people of Pennsylvania of the way I
shall vote.
Mr. SMATHERS. All I say is that the
joint resolution of August 10, 1964, Is in
simple, understandable English. It is on
the books. There it is. It will stand
as the law of the land, it seems to me,
until it is removed. If any Senator
wishes to challenge it, he can offer a pro-
posal to change it, as the Senator from
Oregon has done. The Senator from
Oregon does not like the joint resolution;
he wants a change. I have not seen any
other amendments or proposals to change
the joint resolution of 1964.
So when we vote on the motion to
table the amendment of the Senator from
Oregon, it seems to me that we can
arrive at only one conclusion: that we
are affirming the resolution 01 1964. I
shall vote to table the amendment.
I want to reaffirm the position we took
in August, 1964. I want to uphold the
hand of the Commander in Chief. I
want to uphold the hand of the President.
I want to uphold our boys in the fight
they are making, because I believe it is
right to do so. I do not believe we should
quit. We should not run away. We will
not run away.
I do not believe we should cut and run
merely because the struggle is getting
difficult, and no others want to make the
sacrifice we are making.
The Senator from Illinois, I think,
wishes to comment.
Mr. DIRKSEN. Mr. President, will the
Senator yield?
Mr. SMATHERS. I yield.
Mr. DIRKSEN. It occurs to me that
now and then we should refresh our-
selves a little on the power of the Com-
mander in Chief. The Constitution
makes the President the Commander in
Chief, and that is a reflection of the
experience that George Washington had
with divided authority under the Conti-
nental Congress. The closest that the
Constitutional Convention ever came to
putting a limit on the powers of the
President was when they toyed with the
idea of a limitation to the effect that
the President could not take command
of an army in the field. But that pro-
posal was dropped in the Convention, at)
there is no limit whatsoever.
In the joint resolution of 1994, Con-
gress was only affirming the power that
the Commander in Chief had to use the
Armed Forces of this country. Every
time we support or approve action by the
President, we are in effect supporting
his capacity as Commander in Chief
under a constitutional power that cannot
be modified, unless the Constitution is
changed.
So we ride along with the joint resolu-
tion of 1964. I see no reason why it
should be modified or changed, or why
we should be Indian givers and pull it
back, now that we are in the thick of
things. We gave the President the power
with our eyes open. We knew is we
were doing. Now to smash it up, to im-
pair it, or to diminish it in any respect
would be about as foolhardy an act as
Congress could undertake.
Mr. SMATHERS. I totally agree with
the Senator from Illinois. I should like
to have his comments concerning who I,
would be the reaction around the world
should we now withdraw our endorse-
ment. What would be the reaction
around the world were we at this par-
ticular moment to say to the President
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that we now rescind the endorsement
which we gave him in August, 1964?
Mr DIRICSEN. I doubt whether that
reaction could be measured. /t would
be almost fantastic in its dimensions.
I said to the Senator from Oregon
earlier today?and I said it with the ut-
most of candidness?that as I listen to
the international radio monitors and
hear his name mentioned and his
speeches quoted from time to time, and
reported by short wave from Peiping,
and out of Hanoi, I believe he has become
something of a symbol. He may laugh
about this, but I have read pages and
pages in the international monitors, and
the Senator from Oregon has become a
symbol.
I said today that, in my judgment, we
shall have to destFoy that symbolism, if
we are to indicate to the world that we
mean business?and we do mean busi-
ness.
Mr. MORSE, Mr. President, will the
Senator yield?
Mr. SMATHERS. I yield.
Mr. MORSE. I do not propose to let
any despicable Communist or group of
Communists anywhere in the world de-
' termine whether the senior Senator
from Oregon will carry out what he con-
siders to be his trust in the Senate and
to say whatever he thinks needs to be
said in trying to bring about a policy
that he believes will be in the best in-
terests of his country.
Mr, DIRKSEN. Oh, surely; I would
be the last to impeach the motives of the
Senator from Oregon. I am only stating
what I think is a fact.
- The name of the senior Senator from
Oregon has become a symbol, and they
have tied this viewpoint to his name.
That does not represent, in my judg-
ment, the feeling of the Senate or the
feeling of the people of this country.
We must destroy that symbolism.
Otherwise, they will go on with the idea
that if they stay at it long enough we
will throw our hand in and withdraw.
Of all the things that we could not
countenance for one single moment, that
would be it.
Mr. MATHER& Mr. President, I
thank the distinguished minority leader
for his contribution. I totally agree
with him.
Mr. President, I should like to make
a very brief reference to the comments
of the distinguished Senator from Ar-
kansas [Mr. FuLsruatirl with respect to
the new Harris poll, by which he con-
cluded that the people were in effect
leaving the position taken by the Presi-
dent of the United States.
- I do not think that anyone who reads
that poll can accurately arrive at that
conclusion. I submit that if one reads
the second column in which It states the
basic stand on U.S. policies he will see
that it states: "Disagree. Carry war
more to the north." In January, 12 per-
cent wanted to do that. In February,
when the poll was taken, 16 percent
wan,ted to do that.
. ,
What is happening is that the Presi-
dent i? losing some of the people who
were supporting him in his limited war
with limited objectives, and they want
to go further.
The next question asked was: "Agree,
but increase the military effort." Thirty-
three percent were in this category in
January and 33 percent were in the
same category in February.
In the next category, "Agree, but do
more to negotiate," 39 percent of those
interviewed in January thought we
should do more to negotiate. However,
after the President has made such great
efforts to negotiate, the percentage is
now 34. This is not disagreement. This
Is an understanding and appreciation
that we have explored every possible
avenue open to us with respect to nego-
tiating this matter. We are still trying
to negotiate the matter. As we read the
poll, it appears that the middle group is
beginning to move into the "hawk" group,
and that is where the President loses the
percentage.
As I stated at the outset, I firmly be-
lieve that the vast majority of the people
of the United States, as well as the vast
Majority of Senators and Representa-
tives, totally and completely support and
endorse the program of the Commander
in Chief, the President of the United
States. They uphold his hand. They
support and approve the manner in which
General Westmoreland is conducting our
efforts out there. They applaud the sac-
rifice being made by our young men.
When we have an opportunity today to
vote on this particular measure and vote
resoundingly to table, there is no other
conclusion that can be reached than that
we are voting to affirm that resolution
which we agreed to in 1964 concerning
the course of action in which the Presi-
dent is leading us.
I yield the floor.
Mr. COOPER. Mr. President.
Mr. McCARTHY. Mr. President.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Sen-
ator from Oregon wanted the floor. The
Chair notes that so many Senators wish
to express themselves on this important
piece of legislation that it is extremely
difficult for the Chair to observe the order
in which the floor has been sought, par-
ticularly when a Senator seeks the floor
and then yields temporarily.
The Chair will try to Make note of this
in the future. The Senator from Oregon
had previously asked for the floor. I was
going to recognize the Senator from
Kentucky, but then thought of the com-
mitment that had been made to the
Senator from Oregon.
Mr. MORSE. Mr. President, I yield to
the Senator from Kentucky.
Mr. COOPER. Mr. President, I ap-
preciate the difficulties that you are hav-
ing. My remarks will not be long.
I recognize after this long debate the
limitation of adding very much to it. I
did want to speak now because I spoke
on this matter at the time the joint reso-
lution was agreed to in August 1964, and
I took notice of the effect that the 1964
resolution could have.
In questions I directed to the chair-
man of the Committee on Foreign Rela-
tions, I asked if the 1964 Bay of Tonkin
resolution would ultimately be used to
approve any action that the President
might take, including the bombing of
cities and ports in North Vietnam, and
to undertaking a course of action which
could lead to a war that might involve
China and become world war III.
I cannot say that I was not conscious
of the implications of the resolution
when I raised those questions that day,
August 6, on the floor of the Senate.
However, in voting for the resolution I
expressed my concern at the time that
because we were approving great powers
to the President of the United States, he
had the duty to immediately and assid-
uously search out the possibility of nego-
tiations, and, if necessary, refer the
question to the Geneva powers or, indeed,
to the United Nations for settlement.
I spoke in the Senate again in March
1965, and pointed out that I believed the
President had placed preconditions upon
our willingness to negotiate. I asked
him to assert clearly that the United
States would negotiate without pre-
conditions.
Mr. GORE. Mr. President, before the
Senator leaves that matter, will he yield?
Mr. COOPER. I yield.
Mr. GORE. Of course, the resolution
and its contents and the context in
which we agreed to the resolution is not
the important thing. The important
thing is what we do from here.
Mr. COOPER. That is the point that
I was going to make.
Mr. GORE. Since so much emphasis
has been placed upon that, I should like
to read a portion of some material.
Mr. COOPER. I do not want to speak
so much on the 1964 resolution. I have
already said that I understood its impli-
cations at the time we agreed to it. I
wanted to speak with reference to the
present day, and what can be done look-
ing to the future.
Mr. GORE. I shall be brief, if the
Senator will yield further.
Mr. COOPER. I yield.
Mr. GORE. The Senator will recall
that on the night before the resolution
came to Congress, at the time that our
forces were responding to the attack,
President Johnson spoke by radio and
television to the American people.
I should like to read a portion of the
speech of the President. I shall not
take the time to read that entire address.
However, this is it, in part:
But repeated acts of violence against the
Armed Forces of the United States must be
met not only with alert defense, but with
positive reply. That reply is being given as
I speak to you tonight. Air action is now in
execution against gunboats and certain sup-
port facilities of North Vietnam which have
been used in these hostile operations.
I call this specifically to the attention
of the Senate and the country in order
to indicate the atmosphere in which the
Senate acted.
I read further from the speech:
Yet our response for the present will be
limited and fitting. We Americans know,
although others appear to forget, the risk of
spreading conflict. We seek no wider war.
I have instructed the Secretary of State to
make this position totally clear to friends
and to adversaries, and, indeed, to all.
, In the message t,o Congress the next
day, there appeared this sentence in the
message of the President:
As I have repeatedly made clear, the United
States intends no rashness and seeks no
wider war.
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Then days after this resolution was
reed to, to indicate, I think, that the
resident did not then interpret this
Solution as being tantamount to a
edaration of war, he said in a public
eeth to the American people:
eome others are eager,to enlarge the con-
let. They call upon us to supply American
ys to do the job that Asian boys should do.
ey ask us to take reckless action which
ight risk the lives of millions, and engulf
Uch of Asia, and certainly threaten the
eace of the entire world. Moreover, such
a tIon would offer no solution at all to the
^ at problem in Vietnam.
1 thank the Senator for yielding. I
I; lied to read these statements of the
resident or the United States, both
ef ore the resolaition was passed and 2
? as after it was passed, to indicate that
t e legislative intent was not then, in my
inion, what it has since been inter-
reted to be.
Mr. COOPER. I agree that circum-
s ances have changed. But they have
c anged because Of the continued in-
c 'ease In forces, which has been matched
?y the other side.
I said I did not wish to spend too much
t me discussing the resolution of August
,
, except to say that it could have put
t e Senate upon notice that the progres-
s eovc enud rietd, fhevents entd atlhwr Presidenteah which dcyh although haveapossess,ny occurredauwthweauthority
dtuyi could
dd ti ahgnphalt
? e
Ixtrve such action as he might take in
tie future, as I saw it, according to the
,
s ond paragraph of the resolution.
But that is past, and we come now to
t is day, and another legal question is
^ ised?a stale question, perhaps, by
ow?in which we are asking, "If we take
tion today, and pass the bill are we
f rther approving the policy of the Pres-
i ent of the 'United States?"
Many say, "1 am not," and of course
at is their view and their opinion and
ate of mind.
I do not think the action we take to-
y will affect the President's powers in
v way. Even if we should rescind the
ugust 1064 resolution, we are now en-
ged In a war, and have been engaged
s nee we passed the resolution. About
3 ,000 troops were fighting in Vietnam
t en. Even if we rescind this resolu-
t on today, it could not reduce the pow-
e s Of the President, as Commander In
[et to carry on a war in which we are
eseritly engaged.
As I see it, the only constitutional
pOwer Congress has to stop the Presi-
' rit's action is to deny him funds. The
other things we can do are merely ex-
pressions of approval or disapproval.
But I am bound to say that the ac-
ton we take here in approving this au-
t crization bill, will in my view, at least
be a measure of approval. It is a way
o saying to the President, "To this point,
a least, we do give a kind of approval
your course of action." That is my
derstanding of it. Others, of course,
ve their own positions. ,
hi
But now I should like to go further,
e are all trying, as we can, to give the
resident advice in some way. This de-
bate is the best evidence that we are
speaking because we are concerned.
a ?
Otherwise, there would be no debate
on the matter. The bill would have been
passed two weeks ago. While the de-
bate is an indication of concern about
the policy in Vietnam, it is also an indi-
cation of concern about Vietnam's con-
Seciuences
We cannot withdraw honorably, we
cannot surrender, and we cannot afford
to deny the young men who did not
choose that battlefield, this measure of
support.
So I would say at this point the most
Important thing that we can accomplish
In this debate is to try to look ahead,
and advise the President as to what our
views are in the hope that they will in-
fluence a restrained course of action.
I followed the debate in the Foreign
Relations Committee, and it was a very
effective debate. I have followed the
debate on the floor.
The debate has indicated our concern
with policy, and I believe it grows out of
the fear that the war is going to be
moved up, step by step, until finally we
may find ourselves in a major war with
China, unlimited in area and unlimited
in weapons and forces. No one can say
that will happen, but it is a concern.
I noted in the hearings of the Foreign
Relations Committee, that the chairman
of the committee and others?including
my friend, the able Senator from Ten-
nessee [Mr. GORE I, whose questions were
so incisive?the fear there were no limits
which were being placed by our country
upon the expansion of the war. I re-
member the chairman said that he could
see no limits except surrender by one
side or the other.
I would agree that if North Vietnam
and China intervened and intervened
and intervened, there might be no limit.
But I wish to say today I think there
is a limit which is within the control
of the United States and its President?
one which is within our control for trial.
I think that the administration must
decide whether or not it can maintain
a situation where negotiations are Pos-
sible. Because if one thing was made
clear by the debate in the Senate and
in the Foreign Relations Committee?
and I am not a member of the commit-
tee?it is the firm opinion that this war
should be settled by negotiation and not
by a total war.
Then the question is, "How can we
maintain such a situation where nego-
tiations may be possible?"
If force is met by force, there will be
escalation, until finally there is likely to
come such an engagement of forces,
both on our side and on the other side,
when there will be no possibility of deci-
sion except for war and surrender.
I do not think that it would be the
United States which would surrender
and I do not want to see the enlarge-
ment of the war. The President has the
power to limit the situation so negotia-
tions will still be possible.
This means that the battlefield must
be kept at its narrowest scope consistent
with the actual security of our forces.
I was one of those who believed that
bombing should not be resumed, but that
is now past: So I would urge today, that
the battlefield ought to be confined to
South Vietnam.
If we move north, and extend bomb-
ing north, and extend it north again, we
may reach that point where our troops
are wholly committed and engaged and
settlement would not be possible, except
as war determines. And, at some point,
China may consider that it must make
its decision about entering the war.
Mr. PASTORE. Mr. President, will
the Senator from Kentucky yield?
Mr. COOPER. I am glad to yield to
the Senator from Rhode Island.
Mr. PASTORE. I am very much in
agreement with what the Senator from
Kentucky has said, but what disturbs
me is that we seem to have two schools
of thought in the Senate, as we seem to
have two schools of thought in the coun-
try. We have characterized the situ-
ation as the "dove" concept and the
"hawk" concept. There are those ready
to blockade Haiphong, to bomb Hanoi, to
go the full distance if we are in war.
Their logic is let us try for all-out vic-
tory. Then there are some who feel that
possibly we should accept the enclave
theory.
Mr. President, I listened carefully to
General Gavin and I believe that by the
time he finished testifying it was rather
uncertain exactly what he meant by
"enclave." So much so that I believe a
Senator asked him the question categor-
ically whether he was in agreement with
the administration policy, and I believe
that he answered in the affirmative.
The Senator from Kentucky has stated
that we should make sure it is within the
power of the President. Indeed, it is
within the power of the President to
keep this conflict within reasonable lim-
its, if that is at all possible, consonant
with the security of our boys. But, Mr.
President, would it be to the interest of
this Nation to announce publicly what
the limits are? Is that not exactly the
question?
Mr. COOPER. I have not said that we
should. I am talking about actual lim-
itations on the battlefield, not announced
limitations.
Mr. PASTORE. I know the Senator
has not said that.
Mr. COOPER. I have said, though,
that the Senate should make known?
by our own statements and our advice?
what our position is, with the hope that
it would influence the decisions of the
President of the United States.
Mr. PASTORE. Well now, if the Sen-
ator will indulge me for another moment,
I believe this issue preoccupies every
American, particularly Members of Con-
gress, we have responsibility in this prem-
ise for this conflict in Vietnani, and I
believe it overrides every other matter
and every other issue that can come be-
fore Congress in this session. We have
205,000 American souls committed in that
part of the world?and they had no de-
cision, no choice, in going there. They
were commanded to go, and out of a
sense of duty to their country, and their
patriotism, they are there now.
What disturbs me is this: I have lis-
tened to many briefings. We have been
Invited to briefings in the White House.
We have faithfully attended these brief-
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e6-113 -3.EIN A
Ing. We have been briefed by the Sec-
retary of Defense the Secretary of State,
arid Many other officials, including the
President of the United -States.
Only a short while ago, the Vice Pres-
ident came back from' tour tour of that area
- and he briefed us as well.
The one thing that comforts Me?if
anyone can gain any comfort at all frorri
this very confusing and complex situa-
tion?is the tqct that from all the con-
- versations I-have heard from men, in
high places irilhe GrOverrunent who have
the power of decision, they have talked in
a restrained Manner. They have talked
4n terms which are restrained.
? -I attended one meeting where certain
Senators were pushing for greater ef-
forts. The Secretary of Defense then
? made it abundantly clear?and this has
been reiterated time and again by the
Secretary of State?that we have no
desire to overthrow, the government of
Hanoi. Further, we have no desire to
bomb the industrial complex of North
Vietnam, because we feel that whatever
ammunition and arms are coming in,
now being supplied by North Vietnam,'
are coming in from other places. The
only bombing we can engage in is that
bombing which has to do with trans-
portation of men and materiel?lines of
communication, and the defeat of the
forces of the Vietcong and the North
-Vietnamese who are hi South Vietnam.
Mr. President, I do not know how more
clearly the President of the United
States, the Secretary of Defense, and
the Secretary of State can tell Congress
and the American people that all that we
have in Vietnam is a limited political
objective, and that our whole push is a
restrained offensive. ,
I know that there are many people
who say that we should never have gone
twice in the first place. A long time ago,
In 1954, in 1961, in 1962, and in 1963, with
the fall of Diem, that may have been a
debatable question; but the fact remains
that we are there riQw.
I have never heard a responsible per-
sOn say that we should get out. It was
? refreshing to hear my distinguished col-
league, the Senator from Oregon IMr.
Moan), state today that he adopts the
\ Gavin theory. That is going a long way,
for the Senator from Oregon. I do' not
say that facetiously, because the Senator
has been consistent. If any man in the
Senate has been consistent, it has been
the Senator from Oregon [Mr. /yroasEl,
I have not agreed with him, but he has
been consistent. When he goes so far
as to say that, he would be willing to ac-
cept the Gavin philosophy, then, in fact,
he is saying that we cannot get out. We
Cannot get out, but let us be careful how
far we go.
- I believe that that idea palpitates in
the hearts of every Member of the Sen-
ate, every Member of Congress, and every
eF1cAn....11,9 one wiShes to see ,a mas-
jengagerffent with Red, China. No
One wishes to se a nuclear or a thermo-
nuclear horilb_used again by America in
Asia, hope that never happens, under
anY circumstances.
woUld hope that this Government,
out of all Of.tbese debates,. out of all of
the confusing and divergent points of
view, at some point will sbow and indi-
cate to the mothers of America, whose
sons are in Vietnam, that there is some
sense of unanimity in America, at least
in Congress?on this issue.
All I am saying is that the man who is
calling the "shots" is the President of
the United states. He is the man who
has the responsibility to make the de-
cision. I do not believe that he is going
to change overnight. I do not believe
that he is going to change overnight, be-
cause he has stayed awake long into
every night trying to figure out what his
next step should be.
We cannot go on debating and delay-
ing forever. I do not care what the
Senator from Oregon says, I do not care
what the Senator from Arkansas or the
distinguished chairman of the Commit-
tee on Foreign Relations says, the fact
is, we cannot change or take away from
the authority of the President, whether
we vote for this resolution or not, or
amend it. We are pommitted. We are
committed, and we are going to vote this
money for our boys in Vietnam. These
men who met yesterday talked it out,
but they knew in their hearts that there
was nothing they could do?even though
they disagreed with the policy?to im-
pede the passage of this proposed legis-
lation.
We have been told time and again by
our American military leaders that this
money is necessary and that this equip-
ment must be sent to our boys. There-
fore, let us not delude ourselves about
that. We are going to vote for this
money, with or without an amendment.
All I am saying to my colleagues is
this: There is the situation. It is there.
We are committed. We are committed
heavily. No matter how much we talk,
the President of the United States has
the responsibility of making that deci-
sion, and he will make it today, he will
make it tomorrow, or he will make it
next week.
I say only this, that I pray to God
that some light from on high will illu-
mine the President's mind to make a
decision which will be good for the Amer-
ican people and good for peace in the
world.
I thank the Senator from Kentucky.
Mr. COOPER. I also thank the Sen-
ator from Rhode Island for a fine speech,
but I did not answer his question.
Mr. PASTORE. Well?sufficiently?
I usually ask a question as a reason to
make a speech.
Mr. COOPER. Mr. President, I am
going to close my remarks in a few min-
utes. Let me point out again that I am
not questioning the authority of the
President. I believe that nothing we do
in the Senate in the way of a resolution
or amendment can take away his au-
thority as Commander in Chief, except
to deny him the funds and thus nullify
or vitiate his authority. But, we can
advise, and that is what we are talking
about, and should do.
The President has stated again and
again that our objectives in the war are
limited. I do not doubt his sincerity in
making this statement, which he has
made many times. However, there is a
vast difference between the pronounce-
4213
ment of limitations, honest as they are,
and a course or policy which could lead
to their nullification.
What I have been pointing out is that
if while we admit our objective is limi-
tation we still take steps which ex-
tend the conflict?then we will reach
that point where there can be no settle-
ment possible except by the outcome of
war.
There is the possibility now of limiting
the war to South Vietnam. I am not
talking about enclaves, but I am talking
about limiting the war to the territory
of South Vietnam. I belive with this
limitation, and with the development of
the strength of our forces and our sup-
ply system?which is much better than
the supply system from the north?it
would be much more difficult for the
north than for us if the north introduced
more troops.
So the war could be limited to its
narrowest scope, to South Vietnam. The
limitation would avoid escalation in
forces and weapons, and help avoid pos-
sible internvention of China as we ap-
proach her borders, either physically or
by bombing.
I think this is a power which is in the
hands of the administration. That is
my reason for speaking today.
Mr, MORSE. Mr. President, I shall
take but a few moments to make a few
replies to some of the arguments which
have been made today on the other side
of the issue. In fairness to my record,
I think I owe it to myself to make these
replies.
Before replying to some of the argu-
ments of the opposition, I wish to have
the attention of the Senator from
Arkansas for a moment.
There is no substitute for scholarship
in meeting issues and in presenting to
the Senate information and data in sup-
port of a position taken by a Senator.
When we go back to reflect on the debate
of today, we shall recognize that the
Senator from Arkansas, as is typical of
him, being the great student that he is,
made a speech today that is characterized
by scholarship.
The eloquent remarks of the Senator
from Arkansas took us back to the his-
tory of some of the wars of mankind and
the policies that were followed in the
ultimate solution of those wars. He
pointed out that when the solution was
one of surrender, there was never a peace
which lasted very long; and when there
was, as he used the term, a solution of
accommodation, and there were long
periods in which at least the combatants
In such wars lived in peace.
That is a lesson to learn in the con-
test in which we are now involved. That
is why I find myself, and have right
along, holding to the position which the
Senator from Arkansas so eloquently ex-
pressed today?that we must find an ac-
commodation.
My great concern with the course of
action we are following is that it is a
course of action which seeks surrender.
Surrender will never give us peace. The
course of action we are following is based
primarily upon a unilateral approach by
the United States in the situation in
southeast Asia which is not gging to give
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us pace, either. That is why it is im-
Port nt that we work out an accommoda-
tion , That will make it possible for others
to cdrre in and settle the war for, us.
cannot settle the war, and we will
Settle the war successfully, if we
oing to measure success in terms of
I have said so many times, I have
not ny doubt that we can bring about
sue devastation in Asia by our military
mig t, fighting an enemy at the present
tint which has no navy, no air force, no
hea equipment. I have been heard to
say 0 many times in the last few years
that we can continue to shoot fish in a
bar 1?and that is what we are doing.
We Can bring about great human de-
stru ton by our military might. What
males us think that will lead to peace?
Wb 4t makes us think that will lead to the
typ of accommodation the Senator from
Ark rises talked about today?
T at is going to lead us to a world
whi h for decades to come will be in tur-
mei , and the primary responsibility for
tha turmoil will be the unilateral course
of a tion we are following, for the most
par.
0 great chairman of the Foreign
Rel dons Committee made one of the
gr test contributions in recent weeks
tow d the offering of an intelligent solu-
tion of a great crisis that any Senator in
my arty Years in the Senate has made
in a critical situation.
r. FULBRICTIIT. Mr. President, will
he maw' yid d ?
r. MORSE. I yield.
r. VULBRIGHT. I wish to express
my appreciation to the Senator. His
great contribution has stimulated us to
thirk about this problem in a way that
we otherwise would not have. I am
ple cd indeed he feels that way. My po-
sit! n is implicit in other statements I
hay made, and I have only tried to carry
on fortify them. I am pleased that he
app oyes of it.
r. MORSE. What the Senator has
is typical of the generosity of the
8 tor from Arkansas. I appreciate
his ?ernarks, but I want him to know I
app eciate something much more, and
tha is his friendship.
r. FULBRIGHT. I thank the Sen-
to from Oregon.
r. MORSE Let me now say that I
do ot question in the slightest the sin-
eer y, the high Motivations, the dedica-
tio to our country, and the loyalty to
Our country of all my colleagues in the
Se ie, whether or not they hold views
con r ary to mine.
e have had great differences of opin-
ion in the last 2i/2 years over the matter
of ?reign policy, and those differences
wil continue. The vote is not going to
set le them today. The vote will tern-
por ily in this body stop discussion, but
it ill settle nothing in this great con-
tes which is reaching the grassroots of
thi country. The American people are
goi g to make clear to our Government,
as he French people made clear to the
Fr eh Government, that our continued
p tioijaation in this war wilt not con-
tin e to have public support._
e vote today will not more settle
an thing than did the vote on the Ton-
kin Lay resolution.
Only time will be the judge of what I
have said. But so far as this Senator is
concerned, short of a declaration a war
I am going to continue to oppose our
foreign policy in respect to this war.
That foreign policy must change.
Xs FREE DEBATE UNPATRIOTIC?
I turn to the first point that was made
against me this afternoon. I say
"against me" because it certainly was an
argument to which I hold the opposite
point of view.
I do not question the sincerity of those
any more than I question the sincerity
of the Senator from Illinois who made
the statements that the Senator from
Oregon is quoted in Peiping, Hanoi, Mos-
cow, and quoted in other Communist
areas of the world.
I do not intend to let a bunch of Com-
munists silence my lips. If I can be in-
fluential in changing the foreign policy
of my country in the interest of preserv-
ing freedom and giving a greater assur-
ance of a legacy of freedom to be handed
down to future generations of American
boys and girls, no Communists in Hanoi
or Peiping are going to stop me.
These issues are fundamental and basic
and our differences are honest and sin-
cere. The argument that those of us
who are trying to get changes in this bill
are letting down our boys in southeast
Asia loses me completely.
I say respectfully that in my judgment
we do not protect those by waving the
flag into tatters. Those of us who try to
follow the program so brilliantly and elo-
quently outlined by the Senator from
Arkansas this afternoon, and which, in
my humble and inadequate way, I have
been urging on the floor of the Senate for
a long, long time past, are not letting
down these boys in Asia.
We are trying to stop increased kill-
ing of our men which, in my judgment,
we are going to become guilty of as a
nation if we follow our present policy
and if we authorize the new policy that
is inherent in this bill.
Mr. President, if the stamp of approval
is put on this policy this afternoon, in
my judgment, we are on our way to a
further escalation and expansion of this
war that is going to call for many more
thousands of men in southeast Asia.
I pointed out on Friday, I pointed out
last night, and I pointed out earlier to-
day in my speech that this administra-
tion, in its own statement of policy
through its Secretary of Defense, in his
testimony before our committee, admits
that this bill will authorize an additional
452,843 military personnel within this
period of 1966-67. There is already
talk of 800,000 additional men, if we find
there is an escalated speedup in South
Vietnam because of what may happen on
the part of the program of our enemies.
My good friend from Arkansas and I
disagree on how to implement this mat-
ter. I will come to that later. I wish to
point out that when those of us trying
to follow the program of the Senator
from Arkansas do so, we are trying to
create a situation where this country will
not have to be sending, in round num-
bers, 500,000 additional men over there.
We cannot send 500,000 additional men
over there without enlarging the war
and increasing the killing of larger num-
bers of them. Those of us who oppose
this war feel we have no business there
there on that scale.
The Senator from Rhode Island is cor-
rect. The Senator from Oregon from the
beginning has taken the position that we
had no business getting involved there
and creating the situation we created.
We cannot pull stake and get out.
I have said over and over, and I am
sure ad nauseam to some Senators, that
if we just pulled stakes and got out,
mankind would then probably be con-
fronted with the greatest human mas-
sacre ever known because through
whichever side is stronger over there, it
would be a blood bath. That is why
there has to be a position taken where
there is power to stop the blood bath.
But we have the defensive position
where other nations, noncombatant na-
tions, can come in to enforce a peace.
That is what is needed and that is what
the enclave theory is going to provide
for.
What was one of the main points of
the arguments of General Gavin, as the
Senator from Arkansas has said? We
have to make use of what we have. We
should not follow a program of expand-
ing. We should take these positions that
will protect the Vietnamese and our
soldiers.
That does not mean, as he pointed out,
that we are going to retreat. When
asked in the hearing he made clear he
is advocating no retreat, but a holding
operation. He is not going to permit the
Vietcong to advance.
Of course, this strategy will help pro-
vide for the accommodation that the
Senator from Arkansas is pleading for
because it brings to an end the exten-
sion of the war and this bill will extend
it further and in an alarming degree as
I shall point out in just a moment.
Then, it provides an opportunity for
other nations that are not combatants
to take advantage of what is their clear
obligation to come in with peacekeeping
approaches, including peacekeeping
forces, if necessary; separate the com-
batants, stop the warmaking.
Then, the interesting thing is that if
it gets into that situation where people
start coming to their senses and the na-
tions start coming to their senses, there
will be the beginning of negotiations.
Of course, General Gavin pointed out
that if we follow the course of action we
are now following, with more and more
bombing into North Vietnam, it will be
only a matter of time before we shall be
bombing urban centers. Urban centers,
he said. Once we begin the bombing
of urban centers, the situation cannot
be controlled. Once we get into the situ-
ation of bombing cities, let us face it:
we cannot bomb Hanoi today, without
bombing a large number of Russians,
for there are many Russians in Hanoi.
They are there giving technical assist-
ance and advisory assistance for the de-
fense of Hanoi and other defense centers
of North Vietnam.
Then the great danger will be that
when we begin to bomb urban centers in
North Vietnam, as was pointed out by
the Senator from Texas [Mr. Yint-
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sortovonl, we shall be only seconds away
from the Chinese border. When we be-
gin to drop bombs within 30 miles of
China proper?and we have already
done so?think of what a miscalculation
can do, what a mistake can do, what the
dropping of a bomb on China can do.
There are no risks of an escalated
war? There are no risks of a war with
China? It is beyond my power of com-
prehension to assume that there is no
danger of war with China. We are liv-
ing 24 hours of the day and night under
the danger of a war with China, which
can be caused even by a miscalculation.
So many of us are urging that the
program of a great military strategist
of our country, General Gavin, be fol-
lowed. It was not so long ago, when he
was in uniform, that we recognized how
fortunate we were to have such a bril-
liant mind exercise strong influence in
the development of American military
strategy. His being out of uniform in
no way, so far as the senior Senator
from Oregon is concerned, diminishes
his intellectual ability. I shall continue
to heed him.
We find General Gavin's views but-
tressed by those of former Ambassador
George Kennan, who in effect said the
same thing?that we ought to make use
of what we have; we ought to take a
holding position; we ought to take a de-
fensive position, where the Vietcong can-
not advance, but where we will not ad-
vance and carry on the war at an ex-
panded rate. He is a witness whom we
ought to heed.
As my chairman knows, I think we
have just started to listen to the wit-
nesses we ought to hear. As he knows, I
have submitted to the committee a list
of witnesses who I think ought to be
called in a public hearing, for the Amer-
ican people are entitled to have their
foreign policy discussed in public hear-
ings of the Committee on Foreign Re-
lations. We have yet to hear our first
China expert. We have yet to hear our
first constitutional law authority. We
have yet to hear our first international
law authority.
But I am not going to be deterred
from urging the type of approach that
the distinguished Senator from Arkan-
sas [Mr. Furinacirr], chairman of the
Committee on Foreign Relations, has
urged in his eloquent, brilliant, and
scholarly speech this afternoon, when
he said we ought to make an approach
to accommodation, if we want peace. If
we want to annihilate the enemy, let us
stop talking about accommodation; but
also just forget about peace, because
that course of action will result in a
heritage of intense Asiatic hatred to-
ward future generations of American
boys and girls. All we are doing is con-
demning our future generations to mas-
sive burdens and possible destruction?
if that does not occur even while we are
still alive, in our generation.
What makes us think that the United
States will be allowed to maintain a foot-
hold of domination anywhere in Asia?
The Asiatics will throw us out, if it takes
50 or 100 years to do it. We ought to be
thinking further into the future. I re-
spectfully say that, in my opinion, not
very much thought is being given to it
at the present time by very many.
CONGRESSIONAL CHECK THROUGH PURSE
STRINGS
The second argument that was ad-
vanced against me this afternoon, re-
lated to the constitutional check of Con-
gress through the purse strings. My
good friend from Georgia [Mr. Rus-
SELL] said he recognized that we have
the control of the purse strings. That
is a check. I am merely asking, "Why
don't you use it in this bill?" The Sen-
ate has before it an authorization bill for
more than $4 billion. It will move on to
an appropriation. It will be passed; and
as I said earlier this afternoon, merely
provide the military with the money,
and the military will spend it. They
will find ways to spend it. What I seek
to do as of now, until we can try to work
out a program of accommodation such
as the Senator from Arkansas has
spoken about, is to stop increasing the
money we give the military.
But it is said that we will be letting
down the boys. Of course not. The
purpose of the check is to force the
President to change his foreign policy.
The regular Defense Department funds
are not affected. But this bill is for an
increase, and that is what should be
checked.
That is what I am pleading for. I am
saying that we should not give the Presi-
dent this additional authority and
money. We have this checking author-
ity; in my judgment, we should use it.
Deny the President the money. That
will not be letting down the boys; it will
be saving the lives of thousands of them,
because we will change the President's
policy, and he will be forced to move into
a defensive position which will not in
any way weaken the security of our
country.
So I am a little at a loss to understand
how in one breath my opposition can talk
about the purse strings being a check,
and then with the next breath say, "Of
course, we should not exercise this check
against the President, became, after all,
he is the Commander in Chief. He is in
charge; therefore, we should give him
what he wants."
I have been arguing that the time has
come to stop giving the President what
he wants. In my judgment, the Presi-
dent is leading us into the increasing
danger of massive war that can lead to
world war III.
The checking principle of the Consti-
tution means exactly what it says. The
responsibility of Congress is to exercise
the check. Go ahead and give the Presi-
dent everything he wants. If we con-
tinue to do so, then stop talking to me
about using the purse strings as a check.
Here and now, in this bill, are the time
and place to exercise that check. If we
are ever going to exercise the check of
the purse string, now is the time. Do
not forget what the Secretary of Defense
has said. I have quoted it before; I shall
do so briefly again. If there is any ques-
tion as to the policy contained in this
bill, so far as the authority to extend the
war in southeast Asia is concerned, the
Secretary of Defense gave his answer
when Senator SMITH asked the question:
Mr. Secretary, are there plans to escalate
and step up the offensive in Vietnam?
Secretary McNamara replied:
Well, there are preparations being made,
and they are reflected in this fiscal 1966 sup-
plement, for substantially increasing our de-
ployments.
What does that mean? It means our
manpower. Secretary McNamara later
in the hearings stated:
The figure I have given in round num-
bers?
Four hundred and fifty thousand
men?
increasing our deployments to South Viet-
nam and raising the rate of activity of our
air units.
That means obtaining the money so
that we can expand the policy and the
air battles and the airpower. That is the
policy. I am merely asking that we
check the President and not give him
that authorization.
As to all the talk about not going to
supply the material for these boys, I
simply say that me must not expand the
operations. As the Senator from Ar-
kansas pointed out in his comment, we
already have too much of a backlog and
delivery problem to even take care of the
manpower that we presently have over
there. It will take many months to
build the installations called for in the
bill in order to accommodate the ships
and the delivery of materiel.
Mr. President, we are not going to be
letting any boys down unless we continue
to expand this war while they are in a
situation in which we cannot even de-
liver to them all of the supplies as rap-
idly as we want to deliever them at the
present time.
We have already overextended our-
selves. We have already gone too far
both in sending manpower and in the
rate of the hostilities that we are con-
ducting.
HOW BIG A WAR CAN WE WAGE WITIIOUT
DECLARING WAR?
I come very briefly to the constitutional
argument. We again hear about the res-
olution of the house of delegates of the
American Bar Association. -
It is only a resolution. The Com-
mittee on Foreign Relations wired the
American Bar Association and asked for
a memorandum in support of the reso-
lution. The committee asked for a doc-
umentation that would support the con-
clusion. No documentation has been re-
ceived.
However, I have been advised as to
what happened. The house of delegates
of the American Bar Association is char-
acterized by a good many characteristics
of a political institution.
I have been advised by one who sat
there during the meetings that there
were emotional and political speeches.
I repeat that, in my judgment, this war
is an unconstitutional war and it has
been from the very beginning.
Mr. President, on last Friday I set
forth at some great length in the RECORD
the material discussing the constitu-
tional debates on article I, section 8, of
the Constitution, when the declaration
of war section was written into the Con-
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siltation, and when the debates were
I ad as to whether there should be a
declaration of war and power to make
war.
Will TY! found that I quoted from
-Hamilton. 1 rotated from the Federalist
Pagers. I quoted from the Constitu-
tional Fathers, which quotations made
it perfectly clear that what they were
:inciting to do was to prevent the Presi-
dent of the United States from having
the power of the King of England to
make war. They sought to vest that
-:-)0IV Cr in the Congress of the United
;a Lams.
There In is not been one word uttered
this debate that changes what the
Constitutional Fathers said and ob-
viihisly intended.
Mr. President, I ask unanimous con-
son( that that material from ray speech
01 to,st Midas/ be printed at this point
iii noe REcorai.
Moore being no objection, the material
was ordered to be printed in the RECORD?
101.10WS :
Ti "The Federalist" Hamilton wrote:
"The President is to be Commander in.
cijile? of the Army and Navy of the united
ill-AU:es, tn. this respect his authority will be.
min:Eu.9.1i), the rame with that of the King of
iizent Britain, lint in substance much in-
rtirioe to it. It will amount, to nothing more
!luta the supreme command and direction
of the mill taly and naval forces, as first
gencrial and admiral of the Confederacy,
while that cif the British King extends to the
declaring ot war and to the raising and roF,r-
.1r, of fleets and. armies?all which, by
the Constitution under consideration, would
appertain to the Legislature."
Me. MORS3E. Mr. President, I have
nom time to time quoted one eonstitu-
al authority after another in regard
La ibis matter. I quoted great American
emiters such as Professor Commager, of
.nonlairat University, who talked to me
length the other morning on the long-
distance telephone. He told me?and I
:say this with immodesty, I know?that I
we s correct in the many statements that
r have :made on the history of article I,
eaction 8 of the Constitution, and as to
al at hannened in the Constitutional
convention. ffe told me how right I
nave been in the position I have taken
tnat, gilder the Constitution, a declara-
tutl war is necessary if we are going
ind Ameriean boys constitutionally
is tie
Tao argument was made this morning
hy fly good friend, the senior Senator
Csion ?eorgi.a., that on a number of or'-
'so is a President alone had sent men
iota battle. That does not make it, con-
etlint i.011
i3OIero-. Line thing is that we can
add D 11 of Om mistakes and all of the
wrongs, one on another, and never end
w: in a summation of right.
'u'' nod of practices that have
no constitutional basis does not make
the practices constitutional. Let; us not
'..orttet that, as a result of some of the
,'cam ales that, were cited of sending the
Marines to certain places, we are still
"tying the price. We are still paying
the terrible twice, the loss of confidence
its, and the loss of prestige because
we misused I,ne Marines at the times a
l'resident sent, them in.
In Latin America, this has been re-
ferred to as an example of shocking
American military intervention.
T do not want to see my country con-
tinue that. I want to see my country get
back inside of the Constitution. How-
ever, Mr. President, I have discussed my
views with regard to the international
aspects of tins matter with a recognized
international lawyer such as Ben Cohen,
who has, because of his Millianey in the
field of international law, represented
the United States in a consideraine num-
ber of international conferences.
Mr. President, over year am), I had
printed in the Rricona that great trea-
tise of Ben Cohen in respset to the in-
ternational law aspects of this problem,
using him as my authority.
I called him on yesterday and talked
to him about it again. He again veri-
fied the position I have been taking in
regard to the international law aspects
of this problem.
I have used the win-Clogs of the great
Edward Corwin on our Constitution and
on the power of the Presidency, sustain-
ing my position.
I have used the writings of Prof.
Roger Fisher, of Harvard.
Mr. President, as I have said now for
2y2 years, in my judgment, we have been
following an illegal course of action in
southeast Asia in respect to our Consti-
tution. There is no doubt about our
frequent violations of the United Na-
tions Charter.
Mr. President, as an old law leacher,
I know the importance of dm:union-
tat ion.
On last Friday I had printed in the
RECORD a memorandum of law, prepared
by a group of American lawyers, which
holds a view different from thar of the
American Bar Association, together with
a letter of transmittal from that group,
submitting the memorandum to the
President of the United States under
date cif January 25, 1963. I do not en-
dorse every proposition is it; but It, poses
the issues that are still unsettled and
unsolved.
I ask unanimous consent that, at the
close of my remarks, this material be
printed in the REcona. it appear ii in the
CONGRESSION.AL RECORD of Febru afar 25,
1966, at pages 3996 to 4904.
The PRESIDING OF.ACFR, Without
objection, it, is SO ordered.
(See exhibit 1.)
Mr. MORSE. Mr. President, come
now to the Tonkin Bay resolution.
I CIO say to my friend, the Senator
from Alaska, that I shall alwa?ys be proud,
Us I am sure he will be proud, to have our
grandchildren read that we did not vote
for the resolution in August 1164. I
would not vote for a renewal of tne reso-
Intion becaitse, in my judgment, it, sought
to recognize a power tha ; a President of
the United States does not have.
There was some talk earlier today by
the Senator from Georgia Mr. RlissEiml
who talked?about the Lebanon resolu-
tion, and about the Cuban resolution,
and also, I think, about the Formosa
resolution.
Mr. President, the Cuban resolution?
let me say it again?the Cuban resolu-
tion differs from all the other resolu-
tions, because it did not give the Pres-
ident any power to make war.
The majority leader knows why it did
not. I will refresh his memory by re-
minding him that the Senate accepted
the proposal I made to modify the Cuban
resolution. It would not contain any
language giving war power to the Pres-
ident as did the Formosa resolution and
the Labonon resolution. That; is not in
the Cuban resolution. The Senator from
Oregon was responsible for its being
taken out. And only because it was
taken out, the Senator from Oregon voted
for that resolution. I voted aga,nist the
Formosa resolution; I voted against the
Lebanon resolution. I have voted against
every resolution that has been presented
in the Senate which seeks to /nye the
President the power to make war, be-
cause, in my judgment, we cannot give
him that power. Congress must declare
war.
MAJOR MILITARY EFFORTS HAVE :FOLLOWED WAR.
MESSAGES, NOT PRECEDED THEM.
Mr. President, there has been a lot of
talk here today about the power of the
President as Commander in Chief. The
President, as Commander in Chief, does
not have the power to make a war. The
President, as Commander in Chief, has
the power to respond immediately to the
self-defense needs of our Nation. The
President had the power, as Commander
in Chief, to respond immediately to any
attack that was made upon us on the
high seas in Tonkin Bay. The then
President of the United States, Franklin
Delano Roosevelt, had the power to re-
spond immediately after Pearl Harbor
to the self-defense needs of this Repub-
lic. But he recognized that he also had
the obligation to ask Congress for a dec-
laration of war.
Last Friday, I put in the RECORD the
war message of Franklin Roosevelt fol-
lowing Pearl Harbor and the war mes-
sage of Woodrow Wilson on April 2, 1917,
before a joint session of Congress, when
he gave his reasons as to why he thought
the Congress, under article I, seetion a
of the Constitution, should declare war
mageanitn.st the German imperial Govern-
' wish to take a moment, if Uri Sen-
ators will bear with me, to find that
declaration, because once again, I wish
to read the first paragraph of tlan great
war message of Woodrow Wilson.
I do not have to refresh the memorY
of the Senators as to the understanding
of that great American historian. Prior
to entering politics, he was one of the
great historians of the time. He was
more than a historian; he was one of the
great scholars of American political sci-
ence, one of the great profesioni at,
Princeton University.
I read the first paragraph frosa the
message of Woodrow Wilson on that his-
toric night in April 1917:
I have called the Congress into cxtaitordi-
nary session because there are serious, very
serious, choices of policy to be made, and
made immediately, which it was neither
right nor constitutionally permissiblo that
I should assume the responsibility of mak-
ing.
He knew his constitutional history. He
knew his constitutional law. He knew
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March 1, 1966 CONGRESSIoN A
L RECORD
that as President of the United States,
he was without constitutional authority
to make war against the German Im-
perial Government without a declaration
of war by the Congress. Mr. President,
I am perfectly willing to rest my case
on this issue with Woodrow Wilson.
Mr. GRUENING. Mr. President, will
the Senator yield?
Mr. MORSE. I yield to the Senator
from Alaska.
Mr. GRUENING. I should like to say,
in connection with the allusion of the
Senator from Oregon to the Tonkin
Gulf resolution, that it is difficult to un-
derstand why it was not clear at the
time when that resolution was drafted at
the White House, sent to Congress, and
approved by a great majority, that it,
itself, was a violation of the very kind
to which the Senator is addressing him-
self.
The Tonkin Bay resolution, in its op-
ening paragraph, spoke of the attacks
on naval vessels, and said they "have
thereby created a serious threat to in-
ternational peace."
"A serious threat to international
peace." But article 33 of the United
Nations Charter, to which we are a sig-
natory, said that, "the parties to any
dispute, the continuance of which is
likely to endanger the maintenance of
international peace and security"?those
very same words?"shall, first of all, seek
a solution by negotiation," and it names
eight alternatives: negotiation, inquiry,
mediation, conciliation, arbitration,
judicial settlement, resort to regional
agencies or arrangements, or other
peaceful means.
That resolution was a violation of the
United Nations Charter and its purpose.
We were as violative of that charter as
we have charged the other people of
being.
Mr. MORSE. As the Senator from
Alaska knows, I completely agree with
him. I am just not going to give into the
United Nations aspects of this tonight,
because if I started, in justice to the sub-
ject, it would take a long time. But as
the Senator knows, I have argued here
for two and a half years that we have
violated at least 13 articles of the United
Nations Charter in our course of conduct
in southeast Asia, and we have violated
section after section of the Geneva ac-
cords.
It is no alibi to say that we did not sign
them, and then at the same time say we
are in there, in part, because the North
Vietnamese are violating them. We
cannot have it both ways, Mr. President.
Mr. GRUENING. If the Senator will
yield further, of course we gave uni-
lateral approval, and, through Under
Secretary of State Walter Bedell Smith,
said we would adhere to 12 of the 13
articles.
Mr. MORSE. I agree with the Sena-
tor. I made my case on that last Fri-
day, as I have made it many times here-
tofore.
I only wish to say now, Mr. President,
that from the beginning, when we took
this little Vietnamese exile by the name
of Diem out of Washington, D.C., and
No. 36-10
out of Paris, who had never fought the
French, militarized him, and set him up
as our first puppet President of South
Vietnam, we violated the Geneva accords.
The Geneva accords? do not provide for
two governments in Vietnam. The 17th
parallel was nothing but a line of de-
marcation separating the military forces
of the Vietminh and the French. That
is what that 17th parallel was for.
The accords then provided for 2 years
to work out, under the direction and
jurisdiction of an International Control
Commission represented by India, Can-
ada, and Poland, arrangements for an
election in July 1956, that would estab-
lish a government and a reunification of
all Vietnam.
That is what the Geneva accord called
for. Who divided Vietnam? The
United States. That is our record. Of
course, we are going to hear about that
when we get into the councils of the
world. There does not seem to be much
enthusiasm for getting into an open
world debate on Vietnam in the Security
Council; but I am still hoping it will
come, and if it does not come, then I
wish to repeat very quickly here, my
President ought to get before the Gen-
eral Assembly of the United Nations and
make a plea to the world for that Gen-
eral Assembly to take over its peacekeep-
ing functions in South Vietnam, and stop
the danger of this war escalating into a
holocaust.
FLOOR MANAGER DOES NOT CONTROL POLICY
Then, Mr. President, there is another
point on which my good friend, the Sena-
tor from Arkansas [Mr. FULBRIGHT], and
I may not see eye to eye, although I fully
understand his point of view. I believe
that the situation of the Senator from
Georgia [Mr. RUSSELL], is quite different
on this bill from the situation of the
Senator from Arkansas, the chairman of
the Foreign Relations Committee, on the
Tonkin Bay resolution. There is no am-
biguity in this bill, to justify any legis-
lative history, as there was in the Tonkin
Bay resolution.
For the Senator from Georgia from
Georgia to say that it does not involve
policy does not erase the record of the
administration as to what the policy of
the bill is. It contains new authority
which makes it possible to escalate the
war. The Secretary of Defense says so,
that it is a decision for further escalation,
to be made by the President. He has not
made it yet, but we are going to give him
all the materiel, all the manpower, and
all the money for the escalation of the
war.
Mr. President, that is what I am pro-
testing. It is that policy which should
be stopped.
Now is the time to check the President.
He must not be placed in a position that
he can exercise his discretion to escalate
the war and send increasing numbers
of American boys to their deaths in
southeast Asia.
As I stated earlier, in my judgment,
southeast Asia is not worth the life of a
single one of our boys. It is not our uni-
lateral responsibility. It is the responsi-
bility of the nations of the world, who
have committed themselves to keep the
peace, to start living up to their obliga-
tions.
Therefore, I dismiss the point by saying
that nothing which the Senator from
Georgia has said can make legislative
history for the simple reason that unless
a bill is ambiguous, then anything the
Senator in charge of the bill states is
superfluous. We know what the intent
is. It is that intent which I am pro-
testing. That is why I do not believe
that the statements of the Senator from
Georgia help my friend the Senator from
Arkansas [Mr. FULBRIGHT], one iota in
regard to the policy which is spelled out
in the bill.
Mr. President, first, a vote for my
amendment would be a vote to make clear
to the President that those who vote for
the amendment disapprove of the con-
tinuation of the exercise of the power he
has been exercising under the Tonkin
Bay resolution.
A vote against the bill would constitute
a check on the purse strings, in order to
deny to the President the authoriy that
the bill would give him to expand the
war. For it is an expansion of the war
which I believe is so dangerous. It is
an expansion of the war which I fear
would lead us to a war with China and
eventually with Russia.
Mr. President, it is a risk we should
not take. That is why I say that we
should take the General Gavin program,
the so-called holding operation, and then
use that time period in order to urge
other nations to come in and enforce the
peace.
I make this plea to the chairman of
my committee: A vote for the authoriza-
tion bill will be a vote which will not
strengthen those in the American popu-
lation who, in my judgment, in increas-
ing millions, wish the United States to
follow a course of action whereby the
war will not be escalated.
A vote against the bill, in my opinion,
would strengthen those within American
public opinion who, in increasing num-
bers, are urging a change in our course
of action in the operation of our foreign
policy in southeast Asia.
A vote for this bill on the part of any
Senator who has great reservations about
the Tonkin Bay resolution, who has great
reservations which many have expressed,
In terms of fear as to what may happen
in Vietnam, even by miscalculation, or
direct planning on the part of the ad-
ministration to expand the war, would be
a vote to weaken those in American pub-
lic opinion who, in increasing numbers,
in my judgment, are insisting that our
foreign policy in southeast Asia be
changed.
The only alternative left the Amer-
ican people, if Congress will not carry
out, in this instance, its power of check
through the purse strings, would be for
them to take the issue to the polls. I
shall be one who will urge them to take
to the polls, because I believe that every
procedure available to the American
people, under our constitutional system,
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1218 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? SENATE March 1, 1966
should be exercised with them to check
the expansion of this war, to increase
thereby the possibility of finding a
peaceful solution or, as the Senator from
Arkansas has said, an accommodation
which will lead to peace.
Mr. President, I wish to put into the
1.,!,ceose the conclusion of that great re-
port of my majority leader which sets
forth, for those who will read it, the
warning signs of where we may be going
in southeast Asia if we follow the au-
thorization of this bill, if we give to
the administration the authority to ex-
pand the war, which this authority
would give to the administration, de-
Pendent only upon the decision of the
President of the United States.
Mr. President, speaking most respect-
fully of my President, and I make no
personal comment. I will not vote to give
to this President, or to any President,
the kind of discretionary power which
the bill would give to him. As the Sec-
retary of Defense states, the President
gave instructions to submit this bill to
provide for all these authorities which
will result, if they are exercised, in an
escalation of the war, all dependent upon
the discretionary decision of the Presi-
dent of the United States.
Mr. President, we should not give it to
any man--no man; and if we give it to
any mere man, with all the frailties that
every man possesses, we will weaken our
system of constitutional checks, and we
will enhance the growing danger in this
country of a government by men and
not of law. We would also increase the
danger of a government by executive
supremacy, instead of a government
which would preserve the precious sys-
tem of three coordinate and coequal
branches of government.
Mr, President, I rest my case.
,Exinerr
il'A'I'ERS COMMITTEE ON AMERICAN
:emicy TOWARD VIETNAM,
Nen York, N.Y., January 25, 1966.
i,VINDON B. JOHNSON,
President of the United States,
Washington,
Mr. PRESIDENT ! Following the issuance by
ihe Department of State in March 1965 of a
memorandum captioned "Legal Basis for U.S.
Actions Against North Vietnam," our com-
mittee, in consultation with leading author-
itief; in the fields of international law and
constitutional law, undertook to research the
legal issues, culminating in the memorandum
of law (here enclosed).
Our committee's memorandum of law has
been endorsed, among others, by Profs.
Quincy Wright, of the University of Virginia;
Wolfgang Friedmann, of Columbia Univer-
sity; Thomas T. Emerson, of Yale; Richard A.
Falk, of Princeton; Norman Malcolm, of Cor-
nell; D. F? Fleming, of Vanderbilt; David
Haber, of Rutgers; Roy M. Mersky, of the
University of 'I'exas; William G. Rice, of the
University of Wisconsin; Chancellor Robert
M. tVlacIver, of the New School for Social
Research; Profs. Robert C. Stevenson, of
Idaho State University; Alexander W. Rud-
zineki, of Columbia; Darrell Randell, of the
American University in Washington, D.C.:
:fed Profs, Wallace McClure and William W.
Van Alstyne, both from Duke University and
the World Rule of Law Center.
For the reasons documented in our memo-
rancium our committee has reached the re-
grettable but inescapable conclusion that the
actions of the United States in Vietnam con-
travene the essential provisions if the United
Nations Charter, to which we are bound by
treaty; violate the Geneva accords which we
pledged to observe; are not sanctioned by the
treaty creating the Southeast Asia Treaty
Organization; and violate our own Constitu-
tion and the system of checks end balances
which is the heart of it, by the prosecution
of the war in Vietnam without; a congres-
sional declaration of war.
The principal argument adva need in the
State Department's memorandum is that
our Government's action in Vietnam is justi-
fied under article 51 of the United Nations
Charter sanctioning "individual or collective
self-defense if an armed attack occurs against
a member of the United Nations." However,
South Vietnam is indisputably Apt a mem-
ber of the tmited Nations and, indeed, under
the Geneva accords of 1954, is merely a tem-
porary zone. Moreover, since the Geneva
accords recognized all of Vietnam as a single
state, the conflict in Vietnam is -civil strife"
and foreign intervention is forbidden. We do
well to recall that President Lincoln, in the
course of our Civil War to preserve the union
of the North, and the South, vigorously op-
posed British and French threats to inter-
vene in hehalf of the independance of the
Confederacy.
In addition, the right of collective self-
defense under article 51 is limit(xl to those
nations which are within a regional com-
munity which history and geography have
developed into a regional collective defense
system. The United States?a country sep-
arated by oceans and thousands of miles
from southeast Asia and lackin4 historical
or ethnic connections with the peoples of
that area--cannot qualify as a bona fide
member of a regional collective defense sys-
tem for southeast Asia.
The State Department's memorandum also
contends that the actions of the United
States "being defensive in characer and de-
signed to resist armed aggression, are wholly
consistent with the purposes and principles
of the caarter and specifically with article
2, paragraph 4." Yet article 2, paragraph 4,
declares in clear and unambiguous language
that "all members shall refrain in their in-
ternational relations from the threat or use
of force against the territorial integrity or
political independence of any state or in any
other manner inconsistent with the purposes
of the United Nations."
The State Department's memonnidum also
attempts to justify our Govermnent's ac-
tions in Vietnam on the ground that the
"North Vietnamese have repeatedly violated
the 1954 Geneva accords." But this state-
ment ignores our Government's antecedent
violations of the pledges we made On July
21, 1954, Under Secretary of State Walter
Bedell Smith in a declaration confirmed by
President Eisenhower, pledged that. our Gov-
ernment would not "disturb" the Geneva
accords and would "not join in all arrange-
ment which would hinder" the rights of
peoples "to determine their own future."
However, the United States departed from
these pledges when, on July 16, 1955, the
Diem regime announced with American back-
ing, that it would defy the provision calling
for national elections, thus violating the
central condition which had made the
Geneva accords acceptable to the Vietminh.
And the United States also chose to ignore
the ban on the introduction of troops, mili-
tary personnel, arms, and munitions into
Vietnam, and the prohibition against the
establishment of new military bases in Viet-
nam territory?provisions set out in the Ge-
neva accords. It is an historical fact that
the refusal to hold the elections prescribed
by the Geneva accords, coupled with the
reign of terror and suppression instituted by
the Diem regime, precipitated the civil war.
In the light of the foregoing, more fully
detailed and documented in the enclosed
memorandum, we submit, Mr. President, that
the State Department has incorrectly advised
you as to the legality of U.S. actions against
Vietnam.
We further submit, Mr. President, that the
frequent citation of the pledges given by
Presidents Eisenhower and Kennedy to aid
South Vietnam afford no justification for
U.S. intervention in Vietnam. President
Eisenhower has stated that his administra-
tion had made no commitment to South
Vietnam "in terms of military support on
programs whatsoever." President Kennedy
insisted that the war in Vietnam was "their
war" and promised only equipment and
military advisers. Hence the historical facts
fail to support the point advanced. Beyond
this, these Presidential pledges do not even
have the status of treaties, not having been
ratified by the Senate. Manifestly, the obli-
gations assumed by our Government under
the United Nations Charter, with the advice
and consent of the Senate, transcend any
Presidential pledge undertaken vis-a-vis the
South Vietnamese regime.
Our Government has often urged that our
presence in South Vietnam is solely to pre-
serve freedom for its people and to uphold
the democratic process. Yet the series of
regimes supported by the United States in
South Vietnam have been authoritarian in
character, quite without populer support
and largely indifferent to the welfare of the
local population. Ambassador Henry Cabot
Lodge, on June 30, 1964, commenting on the
consequences of massive Americau involve-
ment in Vietnam, stated, "Well, that means
we become a colonial power and I think it's
been pretty well established that colonialism
is over. I believe that if you start doing that
you will get all kinds of unfortunate results:
you'll stir up antiforeign feeling; there'll be
a tendency to lay back and let the Americans
do it and all that. I can't think that it's a
good thing to do.
As we have stated, our committee has also
come to the painful conclusion that our
Government's action in Vietnam violates the
clear provision of our Constitution which
vests in Congress exclusively the power to
declare war--a power not constitutionally
granted to the President. The debates in
the Constitutional Convention at Philadel-
phia make explicitly clear that wan-making
was to be a purely legislative prerogative and
the President was not to have the power to
wage a war or "commit" our Nation to the
waging of a war, although the Executive was
intended to have the power to repel sudden
attacks.
In pointing out that the President lacks
constitutional power to make war, our com-
mittee does not imply that a declaration of
war by the Congress is desirable. Rather, we
mean to point out that the failure to abide
and conform to the provisions of our Con-
stitution inevitably lead to tragic situations.
In alerting the American people to the
unconstitutionality of the war being waged
in Vietnam, we are following the example
followed by Abraham Lincoln who, in a
speech made on January 12, 1848, before the
House of Representatives opposing the war
undertaken by President Polk, set out the
reasons which impelled him to vote for a
resolution which declared that "the war with
Mexico was unnecessarily and unconstitu-
tionally commenced by the President."
Our committee conducted its research be-
cause of a deep sense of responsibility as
members of the bar and because of our dedi-
cation to the principle of world peace
through law. It was the American lawyers
who conceived and nurtured this principle,
and after holding conferences on four con-
tinents (San Jose, Costa Rica; Tokyo, Japan;
Lagos, Nigeria; Rome, Italy), finally con-
vened the First World Conference on World
Peace Through Law at Athens, Greece, in
July 1963.
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March 1, 1966 CONixtur.
In the proclamation of Athens, the decla-
ration of general principles for a world rule
of law, among other things, declared that
"all obligations under international law
must be fulfilled and all rights thereunder
must be exercised in good faith."
Mr. President, we submit that our Govern-
ment's intervention in Vietnam falls far
short of the declaration of principles at
Athens, Greece, in July 1963, and is in viola-
tion of international agreements. The rule
of law is the essential foundation of stability
and order, both between societies and in
international relations. When we violate the
law ourselves, we cannot expect respect for
the rule of law by others. Our present uni-
lateral intervention is an offense, we submit,
against the spirit of American institutions.
As lawyers, we feel that the national inter-
est is best served-indeed it can only be
served-by (a) a commitment that our Gov-
ernment will be bound by and implement
the principles of the Geneva accords of 1954,
and that the main provisions thereof be the
basis for the establishment of an independ-
ent, unified neutral Vietnam; (b) an invoca-
tion of the provisions of the United Nations
Charter to assure peace in southeast Asia;
and (c) a declaration that there will be no
further bombing of Vietnam, that we will
agree to a cease-fire, and publicly declare
that the United States is willing to negotiate
directly with the National Liberation Front-
a point endorsed by leading Senators and
Secretary General Thant and mandated by
article 33 of the United Nations Charter re-
quiring that the "parties to any dispute S * *
shall first of all, seek a solution by negotia-
tion * * * or other peaceful means of their
own choice," and that all elements of the
South Vietnamese people should be repre-
sented in that country's postwar govern-
ment.
Respectfully yours,
ROBERT W. KENNY,
Honorary Chairman.
WILLIAM L. STANDARD,
Chairman.
AMERICAN POLICY VIS-A-VIS VIETNAM, IN
LIGHT OF OUR CONSTITUTION, THE UNITED
NATIONS CHARTER, THE 1954 GENEVA AC-
CORDS, AND THE SOUTHEAST ASIA COLLECTIVE
DEFENSE TREATY
MEMORANDUM OF LAW
(Prepared by Lawyers Committee on Ameri-
can Policy Toward Vietnam, Hon. Robert
K. Kenny, Honorary Chairman)
Executive committee
William L. Standard, Chairman; Carey Mc-
Williams, Vice Chairman; Joseph H. Crown,
Secretary,
Lawyers Committee on American Policy
Toward Vietnam, 38 Park Row, New York,
N.Y.
AMERICAN POLICY VIS-A-VIS VIETNAM
The justification of American involvement*
in Vietnam has troubled lawyers in the
light of the literal language of our Consti-
tution and the United Nations Charter.
Though the United States initially entered
South Vietnam only to advise, American
troops, now numbering 125,000,1 have moved
*For a historical background, see Robert
Scheer, "How the United States Got Involved
in Vietnam" (A Report to the Center for the
Study of Democratic Institutions, Post Office
Box 4068, Santa Barbara, Calif., 93103) ; sam-
ple copy free.
President Johnson, in his news confer-
ence of July 29, 1965, stated:
"I have today ordered to Vietnam the Air
Mobile Division and certain other forces
which will raise our fighting strength from
75,000 to 125,000 men almost immediately.
Additional forces will be needed later, and
they will be sent as requested." (Presiden-
tial Documents, vol. 1, No. I, p. 15, Aug. 2,
1965.)
from a passive to an active combat role.
American forces have mounted repeated air
strikes against targets in North Vietnam. Is
such action, raising the threat of large-scale
war, consonant with our Constitution, our
obligations under the United Nations Char-
ter, the provisions of the southeast Asia col-
lective defense treaty?
Observance of the rule of law is a basic
tenet of American democracy. Hence it is
fitting that American lawyers examine the
action pursued by our Government to deter-
mine whether our Government's conduct is
justified under the rule of law mandated by
the United Nations Charter, a charter adopted
to banish from the earth the scourge of war.
We shall explore and assess the grounds
advanced to justify the course of conduct
pursued by our Government vis-a-vis Viet-
nam. In section I, we examine American
policy in the light of the United Nations; in
section II, in the light of the Geneva accords
and the southeast Asia collective defense
treaty; and in sections III-IV in the light of
our Constitution. Mindful of the grave im-
portance of the issues, we have exercised the
maximum diligence in the preparation of
this memorandum which is fully docu-
mented.
I-THE UNITED STATES IN VIETNAM: THE
UNITED NATIONS CHARTER
The Charter of the United Nations was
signed on behalf of the United States on
June 26, 1945, by the President of the United
States, and was ratified on July 28, 1945, by
the Senate., Thus, the United States became
a signatory to the Charter, along with 55
other nations (there are now 114), obligat-
ing itself to outlaw war, to refrain from the
unilateral use of force against other nations,
and to abide by the procedures embodied in
the Charter for the settlement of differences
between states. In essence, the obligations
assumed by member nations under the
United Nations Charter represent the princi-
ples of international law which govern the
conduct of members of the United Nations
and their legal relations.
The Charter of the United Nations is a
presently effective treaty binding upon the
Government of the United States because it
is the "supreme law of the land.", In-
deed, the Charter constitutes the cornerstone
of a world system of nations which recognizes
that peaceful relations, devoid any use of
force or threats of force, are the fundamental
legal relations between nations. The follow-
ing provisions of the Charter are relevant:
(a) "All members shall refrain in their
international relations from the threat or
use of force against the territorial integrity
or political independence of any state or in
any other manner inconsistent with the pur-
poses of the United Nations" (ch. I, art.
II(4) ) .
2 See Historical Note under title 22, United
States Code, sec. 287. By the act of Dec. 20,
1945, c. 583, 59 Stat. 619 (22 U.S.C. 287-
287e) , Congress enacted "The United Nations
Participation Act of 1945," empowering the
President to appoint representatives to the
United Nations and to render various forms
of assistance to the United Nations and the
Security Council under specified terms and
conditions.
a The treaties to which the United States is
a signatory are a part of the fundamental
law, binding upon all officials and all govern-
mental institutions. Art. I, sec. 2, clause 2, of
the U.S. Constitution confers power upon the
President to make treaties with the concur-
rence of two-thirds of the Senate. Art. VI,
clause 2, of the U.S. Constitution provides
that treaties so made, together With the
Constitution and the laws of the United
States made pursuant thereto, are "the
Supreme Law of the Land." Missouri v.
Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 432-434; Hines v
Davidowitz, 312 'U.S. 52, 62-63; United States
V. Pink, 316 U.S. 203, 230-231; Cleric v. Allen,
331 U.S. 503-508.
(b) "The Security Council shall determine
the existence of any threat to the peace,
breach of the peace, or act of aggression, and
shall make recommendations or shall decide
what measures shall be taken * * * to main-
tain or restore international peace and se-
curity." (Ch. VII, 39.)
It is thus plain that signatory members of
the United Nations Charter are barred from
resorting to force unilaterally and that only
the Security Council is authorized to deter-
mine the measures to be taken to maintain
or restore international peace (apart from
the question as to whether or not the Gen-
eral Assembly has any residual authority by
virtue of the "Uniting for Peace" resolution
for this purpose when the Security Council
is unable to meet its responsibilities 4),
It may be recalled that in 1956, Israel
justified its attack on the Egyptian forces in
the Sinai Peninsula "as security measures to
eliminate the Egyptian Fedayeen 'Com-
mando' bases in the Sinai Peninsula from
which raids had been launched across the
Israeli frontier." Starke, "Introduction to
International Law," fourth edition, London,
1958, at page 83 et seq.
When Great Britain and France introduced
their troops into the Sinai Peninsula, under
claim of a threat to their vital interests, the
"preponderant reaction of the rest of the
world was to condemn this action as inter
alia, a breach of the United Nations Char-
ter." Starke, "Introduction to International
Law," fourth edition, London, 1958, at pages
85-88.
When the Soviet Union suggested a joint
military operation with the United States to
restore the peace in the Middle East, Secre-
tary of State John Foster Dulles rejected this
proposal as "unthinkable" (New York Times,
November 6, 1956). Dulles declared:
"Any intervention by the United States
and/or Russia, or any other action, except by
a duly constituted United Nations peace
force would be counter to everything the
General Assembly and the Secretary General
of the United Nations were charged by the
charter to do in order to secure a United
Nations police cease-fire."
At a news conference on November 8, 1956,
President Eisenhower, answering an an-
nouncement of the Soviet Union at that
time, declared that the United States would
oppose the dispatch of Russian "volunteers"
to aid Egypt, saying that it would be the duty
of all United Nations members, including the
United States, under the clear mandate of
the United Nations Charter to counter any
Soviet military intervention in the Middle
East. The President said:
"The United Nations is alone charged with
the responsibility of securing the peace in
the Middle East and throughout the world."
United Nations Action in the Suez Crisis.
Tulane Studies in Political Science, volume
IV entitled "International Law in the Middle
East Crisis."
To the fundamental, substantive and pro-
cedural requirements and conditions vesting
sole authority in the United Nations to
authorize utilization of force, there are only
two exceptions set forth in the charter. The
first exception is found in article 51 of chap-
ter 7:
"Nothing in the present charter shall im-
pair the inherent right of individual or col-
lective self-defense if an armed attack oc-
curs against a member of the United Nations,
until the Security Council has taken meas-
ures -to maintain international peace and
security."
Article 51 of the charter marked a serious
restriction on the traditional right of self-
defense. As was stated by Prof. Philip C.
Jessup in his work, "A Modern Law of Na-
tions," published in 1947 (at pp. 165-166) :
4 The constitutional validity of the "Unit-
ing for Peace" resolution adopted in 1950, is
disputed.
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'Article 51 of the charter suggests a fur-
ther limitation on the right of self-defense:
it may be exercised only 'if an armed at-
tack occurs.' * * * This restriction in article
al very definitely narrows the freedom of
as ion which states had under traditional
Law. A cane could be made out for self-
defense under the traditional law where the
injury was threatened but no attack had
yet taken place. Under the charter, alarming
military preparations by a neighboring state
wonld -justify a resort to the Security Coun-
cil, but would not justify resort to anticipa-
tory force by the state which believed itself
three tened."
'lie traditional right of self-defense, even
prior to the adoption of the United Nations
charter, was limited. As stated by Secretary
of Sitate Daniel Webster in the Caroline
ease," and as adopted In the Neurenberg
:lodgment in 1045, any resort to armed force
in self-defense must, be confined to cases in
which "I:he necessity of that self-defense
is instant, oyerwehlming and leaving no
choice of means and no moment of delibera-
iion."
Li expressly ill-tilting independent military
action to instances of armed attack, the
founding nations explicitly and implicitly
rejected the right to the use of force based
on the familiar claim of "anticipatory self-
defense." or "intervention by subversion," or
iiprif-enaptive armed attack to forestall
threatened aggression," and similar rationale.
iaticiti concepts were well known to the
rounding nations if only because most of
the wars of history had been fought under
iiiinners carrying or suggesting these slogans.
More importantly for our purposes here,
however, the United States was aware of these
precepts before the Senate ratified the United
Nations Charter and consciously ac-
quiesced in their rejection as a basis for in-
dependent maned intervention."
ft has been. authoritatively said that the
exceptional circumstances stipulated in Cr-
Inde iii are "clear, objective, easy to prove
sod difficult) to misinterpret or to fabricate".."
The wording was deliberately and carefully
I' 101
Renee article 51 can under no circum-
souices afford at justification for U.S. inter-
vention in Vietnam, since the Saigon regime
is indisputably not a member of the United
Nations and, indeed, under the Geneva Ac-
In support of his views, Erofessor Jessup
not (ii:
"The documentary record of the discus--
cots at San Francisco does not afford con-
clusive evidence that the suggested inter-
pret:Ai:on or the words 'armed attack' in
ertiele 51 is correct, but the general tenor of
Lile discussions, as well as the careful choice
of words throughout chapters VI and VII of
title charter relative to various stages of ag-
ipetvetion of (-fingers to the peace, support
die view stated." (Jessup, "A Modern Law
mi Nations," p. 166.)
Hee, Louis tiankin. (professor of law and
iiiternational law and diplomacy, Colurnbin,
uniiiirsity), 57 "American Society of Inter--
national Law Proceedings," 1963, at p. 152..
Moore's "Digest of International Law." vol.
p 412.
hid .
faiarings on U.N. Charter, Committee on
linrcern Relations, U.S. Senate, 79th Cong.,
I. Isess., July 9-13, 1945, at p. 210.
thinkin, ibid.
1.1 the conference itself, every
ward, every sentence, every paragraph of the
el :sneer's text was examined and reconsid-
elf ci by the representatives of 50 nations and
much of it reworked." (Report to the Presi-
dent en the results of the San Francisco Con-
'tense by the Chairman of the U.S. Dele-
ga lion, i.e., the Secretary of State, June 26,
1945 hearings on U.N. Charter, Committee
in Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate, 70th Cong.,
1st sees., at p. 41.)
cords of 1954, South Vietnam is merely a
temporary zone not even qualifying politi-
cally as a state (See Section II infra), even
if it be assumed that an "armed attack,"
within the meaning of article 51, has oc-
curred against South Vietnam. For, as has
been shown, article 51 is operative only in
the event. of "an armed attack against a
member of the United Nations." Hence,
neither the right of individual self-defense
nor the. right of collective h self-defense can
become operative.
It has been claimed that United States in-
terventimi in Vietnam is sanctioned under
article 5 on the ground (1) that South
Vietnam in an independent state. (2) that
South Vietnam had been the victim of an
armed attack from North Vietnam and (3)
that the United States, with the consent of
South Vietnam, was engaging in "colletcive
self-defense" of that country, as islaimed by
the United States in a communication to the
United Nations Security Council in March
1905 (U.S. Chronicle, vol. 2, p. 22). To sus-
tain this claim, all three elemenis must be
satisfied.
This CB ins As untenable, however, on sev-
eral grounds. First, South Vietnam was not
recognized as an independent state at the
1951 Geneva Conference (see sec. II,
infra). Even if it had become 1 de facto
state in the course of events since 1951, the
infiltration from North Vietnam cannot be
deemed to constitute .en "armed attack"
within the purview of article 51.
Since the Geneva Accords recognized all
oi Vietnam as a single state, the conflict
whether of the Vietcong or Ho Chi Minh
against South Vietnam is "civil strife', and
foreign intervention is forbidden, because
civil strife is a domestic question--a posi-
tion insisted upon by the United States in
its civil war of 1861. Ho Chi Minh can com-
pare his position in demanding union of
Vietnam viith that of Lincoln., when Britain
and Franc were threatening to intervene
to assure the independence of the Confeder-
acy (and with the added point that the
national elections mandated for 1056 in the
Geneva Accords were frustrated by South
Vietnam with apparent support of the United
States; see sec. II, infra). Nor should it
be overlooked that Lincoln had very little
support from the people of the S. into, who
generally supported the Confederitcy, while
Ho Chi Minh has a great deal of support
from the people in South Vietnam organized
in the National Liberation Front whose mili-
tary arm is the Vie :Leong. There is, there-
fore, a basic issue whether the hostilities in
Vietnam constitute external aggression (by
North Vietnam) or "civil strife." Here it
should be noted that the United Nations is
authorized to intervene where civil strife
threatens international peace, as the United
Nations did in the Congo, in accord with
article 39 of the charter?but individual
states are not permitted to inter', cue
The third element .retraisite for the invoca-
tion of the right of collective self-defense
under Art ale 51 presupposes that: the na-
tions invoking such right are properly mem-
bers of a regional collective system within
the mirview of the United Nations Charter.
The point: here involved is: Can the United
States validly be a genuine member of a re-
gional systsm covering southeast Asia. Arti-
cle 51 and Article 53, dealing with regional
systems, were interrelated amendatory pro-
visions intended primarily to integrate the
inter-American system with the United Na-
tions organization (see fn. 8, 13, 15). The
concept that the United States?a country
separated by oceans and thousands of miles
from southeast Asia and bereft of any his-
torical or ethnic connection with the peoples
of southeast Asia?could validly be con-
sidered a member of a regional system im-
planted in southeast; Asia, is utterly alien
to the regional systems envisaged in the
charter. The "Southeast Asia Collective
Defense Treaty' ?connecting the United
States with southeast Asia, architectured by
Secretary of State Dulles, is a legalistic ar-
tificial formulation to circumvent the funda-
mental limitations placed by the United
Nations Charter on unilateral actions by
individual members. However ingenuous
ordisingenuous?the Dulles approach,
SEATO is a caricature of the genuine
regional systems envisaged by the U.N. Char-
ter. A buffalo cannot be transformed into
a giraffe however elongated its neck may be
stretched. The Dulles approach to collec-
tive defense treaties employed legal artifice
to circumvent the exclusive authority vested
in the United Nations to deal with breaches
in the peace. Articles 51 and 53 were in-
tended to make a bona fide integration of
regional systems of cooperation with the
world system of international security--but
these envisaged regional systems Which his-
torically and geographically developed into
a regional community?not contemplating a
regional system which fused a region like
southeast Asia with a country on the North
American Continent. SEATO is not a re-
gional agency within the letter or spirit, of
the U.N. Charter as to authorize the United
States to claim the right of collective self-
defense even if there had been tin armed
attack on a member of the United Nations
geographically located in southeast Asia. If
artifices like SEATO were sanctioned, the
path would be open for the emasculation of
the United Nations organization and the
world system of international security as-
siduously developed to prevent the scourge
of war.
Hence article 51 cannot be properly in-
voked for (1) South Vietnam does not have
the political status of a state; (21 even if
South Vietnam were deemed a de facto state,
the infiltrations do not constitute an "armed
attack" within the purvie,w of article 51; and
(3) the United States cannot claim the right
of "collective self-defense" in respect of a
regional system involving southeast Asia.
Apart from ,article 51 (inapplicable to the
situation here), the only other exception to
the renunciation of the "threat or use of
force" by member states is found in chapter
VIII of the charter dealing with regional
arrangements. Article 53 of -said chapter
contains two paragraphs of particular sig-
nificance:
(a) "The Security Council shalt, where
appropriate, utilize such regional iirrange-
ments or agencies for enforcement action
under its authority. But no enforcement
action shall be taken under regional arrange-
ments or by regional agencies without the
authofization of the Security Council, with
the exception of measures against an enemy
state, as defined in paragraph 2 of this
article." (Ch. VII, art. 55(1).)
Paragraph two of that article psosides:
(b) "The term enemy state as used in
paragraph 1 of this article applies to any
state which during the Second World War
has been an enemy of any signatory of the
present charter."
With respect to regional arrangementa
therefore, it is clear that no enforcement
action may be undertaken without the au-
thorization of tlie Security Ciiiinen of the
United Nations, save and except in iinly one
instance; against any state which. during
World War II, was an enemy of :111V of the
charter," to wit, Germany, Italy and ./ap,an.
The reason for this exception appeti rt;
clear. When the charter was signed in San
Francisco on June 26, 1945, peace treaties
had not yet been finally signed by the allied
nations with each of the enemy states. Rep-
arations, sanctions, territorial changes, bed
not then been finalized. And so, in order to
permit necessary flexibility in these respects,
this sharply limited exception, permit ting ac-
tion against an enemy state in World War II
by an allied government, was spelled out.
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Since Vietnam was manifestly not an "enemy
state" within the purview of article 53(b),
enforcement action under SEATO is unau-
thorized and cannot be justified in view of
the express restrictions set out under article
53(a) of the United Nations Charter.
In summary, the United Nations Charter
obligates all of its signatory members to re-
frain from the threat or use of force, and
only the Security Council (apart from the
residual authority (see footnote 4) granted
the General Assembly under the "uniting for
peace" resolution) is authorized to deter-
mine the existence of any threat to the peace,
breach of the peace or act of aggression and
'o determine the measures to be taken to
.naintain or restore international peace. To
these salient provisions, there are only two
exceptions: the first, the right to self-de-
fense if an armed attack occurs against a
member of the United Nations; and, the
second, the right of nations to enter into
appropriate "regional arrangements," sub-
ject, however, to the provision that no en-
forcement action shall be taken under such
arrangements without the authorization of
the Security Council, the only exception to
the latter requirement being with respect to
measures against an enemy state, as defined
in the charter.
We have shown that none of the afore-
stated exceptions can be invoked by the
U.S. Government with respect to its conduct
in Vietnam. It follows therefore that the
fundamental requirements of ?the United
Nations Charter with respect to the renun-
ciation of force and the threat of force are
directly applicable to the actions of the
United States.
One other noteworthy charter provision is
article 103 which subordinates all regional
and treaty compacts to the United Nations
Charter.
"In the event of a conflict between the
obligations of the members of the United
Nations under the present charter and their
obligations under any other international
agreement, their obligations under the pres-
ent charter shall prevail." (Ch. XVI, art.
103.)
This supremacy clause was drafted to meet
the predictable reassertion of dominance by
the great powers within their respective
geographic zones or hemispheres. Because
of the unhappy history of a world frag-
mented by such "spheres of influence," the
supremacy clause and the restrictions on
the use of force under regional agreements
emerge as limitations upon the superpowers
even within their awn geographic zones. It
is significant that the United States not
only accepted these limitations, but actively
supported their incorporation within the
charter.13
" Hearings on U.N. Charter, Committee on
Foreign Relations, "U.S. Senate, 79th Cong.
1st sees., supra, n. 6, at p. 306.
On May 15, 1945, Secretary of State Stet-
tinius issued a statement at the San Fran-
cisco Conference regarding the Act of Cha-
pultpec vis-a-vis the United Nations Or-
ganization which declared (so far as here
pertinent), hearings on U.N. Charter, op.
cit., p. 306;
"As a result of discussions with a number
of interested delegations, proposals will be
made to clarify in the charter the relation-
ship of regional agencies and collective ar-
rangements to the world organization.
"These proposals will?
"1. Recognize the paramount authority of
the world organization in all enforcement
action.
"2. Recognize that the inherent right of
self-defense, either individual or collective,
remains unimpaired in case the Security
Council does not maintain international
peace and security and an armed attack
against a member state occurs. Any meas-
ures of self-defense shall immediately be
Article 103 makes clear that the obligations
of the United Nations Charter prevail vie-a-
vis the obligations of the SEATO treaty.
Indeed, article VI of the SEATO expressly
recognizes the supremacy of the United Na-
tions Charter (see sec. II infra). Moreover
the frequent citation by President Johnson
of the pledges given by Presidents Eisen-
hower, Kennedy, and himself to aid South
Vietnam afford no justification for U.S. inter-
vention in Vietnam.14 In the first place,
these pledges or commitments do not even
have the status of treaties, for these Presi-
dential pledges have not been ratified by the
Senate. And even if these Presidential
pledges had been solemnly ratified by the
Senate, any obligations thereunder must yield
to the obligations imposed under the United
Nations Charter by virtue of the supremacy
clause embodied in article 103. Nor would
the illegality of U.S. intervention in Vietnam
be altered by the circumstance that the
Saigon regime may have invited the United
States to assume its role in the Vietnam con-
flict. The supremacy clause of the charter
reported to the Security Council and shall
in no way affect the authority and responsi-
bility of the Council under the Charter to
take at any time such action as it may deem
necessary to maintain or restore interna-
tional peace and security.
"3. Make more clear that regional agencies
will be looked to as an important way of
settling local disputes by peaceful means."
The first point is already dealt with by
the provision of the Dumbarton Oaks pro-
posals (ch. VIII, sec. C, par. 2) which pro-
vides that no enforcement action will be
taken by regional agencies without the au-
thorization of the Security Council. It is
not proposed to change this language.
The second point will be dealt with by an
addition to chapter VIII of a new section
substantially as follows:
"Nothing in this chapter impairs the in-
herent right of self-defense, either individ-
ual or collective, in the event that the Secu-
rity Council does not maintain international
peace and security and an armed attack
against a member state occurs. Measures
taken in the exercise of this right shall be
immediately reported to the Security Council
and shall not in any way affect the authority
and responsibility of the Security Council
under this charter to take at any time such
action as it may deem necessary in order to
maintain or restore international peace and
security."
The third point would be dealt with by
inclusion of a specific reference to regional
agencies or arrangements in chapter VIII,
sec. A, par. 3, describing the methods where-
by parties to a dispute should, first of all,
seek a peaceful solution by means of their
own choice.
The U.S. delegation believes that pro-
posals as above outlined if adopted by the
Conference would, with the other relevant
provisions of the projected charter, make
possible a useful and effective integration of
regional systems of cooperation with the
world system of international security.
This applies with particular significance
to the long-established inter-American sys-
tem.
" President Johnson, in his news confer-
ence of July 28, 1965, declared:
"Moreover, we are in Vietnam to fulfill one
of the most solemn pledges of the American
Nation. Three Presidents?President Eisen-
hower, President Kennedy, and your present
President?over 11 years have committed
themselves and have promised to help de-
fend this small and valiant nation" (Presi-
dential Documents, vol. 1, No. 1, p. 15).
President Eisenhower has stated that his
administration had made no commitment to
South Vietnam "in terms of military support
on programs whatsoever" (the New York
Times, Aug. 18, 1965, p. 1).
manifestly prevails and cannot be annulled
by mutual agreement of third parties.
It is by virtue of the supremacy clause
that the Secretary General of the United
Nations has called the world's attention to
the emasculation of the authority of the
United Nations resulting from actions taken
by regional agencies without reference to the
Security Council.
We believe that any fair study of the
United Nations Charter will affirm the obser-
vations of Prof. Lewis Henkin, of Columbia
University, when he speaks "of the law of the
charter":
"So far as it purports to prescribe for the
conduct of nations, it consists, basically, of
one principle: Except in self-defense against
armed attack, members must refrain from
the threat or use of force against other states
* * * the rule of the charter against unilat-
eral force in international relations is the
essence of any meaningful concept of law be-
tween nations and the foundation on which
rests all other attempts to regulate interna-
tional behavior. It is a rule which all nations
have accepted and which all have a common
interest essential to law." 15
It appears difficult to escape the conclusion
therefore, in the light of the aforesaid, that
the action of the U.S. Government in Vietnam
contravenes essential provisions of the
United Nations Charter. The U.S. Govern-
ment has decided for itself to use armed
forces in South Vietnam and to bomb North
Vietnam without authorization of the Secu-
rity Council or the General Assembly of the
United Nations. The failure of the United
States to honor its obligations under the
United Nations Charter is a regrettable but
inescapable conclusion which we as lawyers
have been compelled to reach. We, as law-
yers, urge our President to accept the obliga-
tions for international behavior placed upon
us by our signature of the United Nations
Charter.
II?THE UNITED STATES IN VIETNAM: THE 1954
GENEVA ACCORDS AND THE SEATO TREATY
Officials of the U.S. Government have nev-
ertheless asserted, on different occasions, that
the actions of the United States in Vietnam
are consistent with the U.S. duties and obli-
gations under the United Nations Charter
and sanctioned by the treaty creating the
Southeast Asia Treaty Organization
(SEATO) .10 The conduct of the U.S. Govern-
ment has been justified as support of a legiti-
mate government defending itself against in-
surrection from within and aggression from
without. We have demonstrated above that
even if this latter position were accepted on
its face, unilateral conclusions and actions
taken by the Government of the United
States upon the basis of such conclusions are
violative of the firm obligations under the
10 Henkin, in 57 "American Society of In-
ternational Law Proceedings," 1963, supra,
n. 6, at p. 148. See also in further explication
of Professor Henkin's succinct conclusion:
Statements of Hon. Edward R. Stettinius, Jr.,
Secretary of State, the testimony of Senator
minikin, and the testimony of Mr. Pasvolsky,
Special Assistant to the Secretary of State
for International Organization and Security
Affairs, in hearings on U.N. Charter, Com-
mittee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate,
79th Cong., 1st sess., supra, ii. 8, at pp. 34-147,
210, 95-100 and 304-307; Jessup, "A Modern
Law of Nations" (1947); Proclamation of
Athens and Declaration of General Princi-
ples for a World Rule of Law, adopted by
the First World Conference on World Peace
Through Law, Athens, Greece, July 6, 1963;
Francis T. P. Plimpton, U.S. Representative
to the United Nations, State Department
Bulletin, vol. XLIX, No. 1278, Dec. 23, 1963,
pp. 978-979.
16 Geneva Conf. Doc. No. IC/42/Rev. 2, in 1
"American Foreign Policy"; 1950-55 Basic
Documents 750; New York Times, July 24,
1954, p.4.
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IONAI It 1 CORP ? SENATE Uarch I. i9(11
United Nations; Charter. However, we do not
let the matter rest with this assertion, but
proceed to an examination of the validity of
the claims made by the U.S. Government in
support of its conduct in Vietnam.
The Geneva, agreement, under which the
war between Vietnam and the French was
terminated, effected the division of Vietnam
into north and south, at the 17th parallel.
The said "agreement on the cessation of hos-
tilities in Vietnam," entered into in Geneva
oci July 20, 1954, provided that, the division
of Vietnam at, the 1.71h parallel was only "a
cirovisional military demarcation line," on
ei ;hr side of which the opposing forces
imuld be "reprouped"?"the forces of the
C'copies Army of Vietnam to the north of the
lane ;And the forces of the French Union to the
eolith" (ch. I. art.
'the Geneva agreement makes plain that
nn or the 17th parallel was to be
temporary and a step in the preparation for
a, general entetion. to elect a government for
a -waned nation. Pending such election,
adminstration in each regrouping
acme 1was to1 he in the hands of the party
whocie forces are to be regrouped there"
lart 1.4(a) I.
The day after the aforesaid cease-fire
agreement was entered, into, representatives
ot Cambodia, the Democratic Republic of
Vietnam (Vtetminh), Laos, France, the Peo-
ples Republic of China, the U.S.S.R., and the
United Kingalinn affirmed The Final Declara-
tion of the Geneva Conference on the Prob-
lems of :Restoring Peace in Indochina, July
21, 1954.)g The declaration emphasized that
the north-south division MIRA solely a means
or ending the military conflict and not the
creation of any oohitical or territorial bound-
ary. Article 9 or the declaration stated:
"Tie Conference recognizes that the es-
sential purpose of the agreement relating to
Vicitnam is to settle military questions with
a view to ending hostilities and that the
military demarcation line is provisional and
shall not in coy way be interpreted as con-
eti tuting a political or territorial boundary."
This reinstitutes a recognition of the
fact that Vietnam is a single nation,
Maided into two zones only temporarily for
administrative purposes pending an election.
This being so, the action of the North Viet-
cennese in aiding the South Vietnamese, to
the extent that it has taken place, neither
r- It is relevant to note that at the time
One provision was agreed upon, the Viet-
minh occupied all hut a few "islands" of ter-
ritory to the north of the 171 h parallel as
well as approximately two-thirds; of the ter-
ritory smith of that line. See map showing
areas or South Vietnam under Vietminh con-
trol at end of May 1953 in Henri Navarre,
"Agonie de L'Indo-Chine" (1953-54) (Paris,
1.956) , p. 37. Thus, by the cease-fire. agree-
ment he Vietminh gave up substantial areas
or territory in what, is now called South Viet-
no 01.
Au . article in the New Republic, May 2.2,
1965, p. 29, by the Honorable Henry W. Edger-
ton, senior (*amid!. judge of the U.S. Court or
Appeals for the District of Columbia, brit-
delineates the provisional character or
tin) ''Cretvern ent," of south visariane and
easta doubt on 1.11e el aim to the
existence of that, Government.
n See ".Further Documents Relating to the
lescussion of Tildochina at the Geneva
tionterence" June 19 July 21, 1954 (London)
(der Niajesty's Stationery Office, Cmd 9239),
1954. (referred fa) as "Geneva Accords").
Tint French-sponsored Bao Dal regime, which
was not endowed as yet with ally real politi-
sithstance, did not sign the Geneva Ac.
cold' not until 1956 did France relin.quish
eamtrol over South Vietnam; the Republic of
Vietnam was proclaimed on Oct. 26, 1955,
bat French troops were not completely evac-
licitert from the country until Nov. 1, 1956.
affect the character of the war as a civil
war nor constitutes foreign intervcaition. It
cannot bc considered an armed attack by one
naticin on ancither.
The United States is in fact a foreign na-
tion vis-a-vis Vietnam.; North \Cietnam is
not. The latter by the Geneva Agreement
was to participate in an election ant to de-
terinine vinether North and Soutli Vietnam
should be united, hut to select a government
of the nation of Vietnam, constitc;;Ing all of
Vietnam? north, south, east, and west. It
was the refusal on the part. of the Diem
regime and the subtieqiernt "gown tunents"
of the re inth, supported by tic e United
States, to participate in such eleciiiions that
opened the door to the present cot diet.
It wes veto stated in the declaretion that
the clear objective of settling political prob-
lems and anifying the tuition was to be by
means of free general elections. Article 7
of the declaration provided:
"The Conference declares that io far as
Vietnam ,,s concerned, the settlement of
political problems effected on the basis of
respect for the principles of independence,
unity and territorial integrity, shell permit
the Vietnamese people to enjoy the funda-
mental freedoms, guaranteed by democratic
institutions established ae, a reset; of free
general elections by secret ballot. In order
to insure that sufficient progres.) in the
restoration of peace has been nade, and
that all the necessary conditions indain for
free expression of the national will. national
elections snail be held in July under
the supervision of an Internatiohal Com-
mission."
The reference to "national elections" re-
inforces the evidence of the historic :id status
of Vietnam as a single nation. To present
the picture, as the United States repeatedly
has done, as though North Vietnam were
an interloper having no organic relationship
to South Vietnam is to ignore both the ap-
plicable leg ed principles .and treaties and the
facts of his iory.
Although the United States par' icipated
in the discussion leading up to the Geneva
accords, it end not sign the final det ioration.
Instead, the U.S. Government, thr ;ugh its
Under Secretary of State, Waltee Bedell
Smith, made its own unilateral declara-
tion" on July 21, 1954. In this deelaration,
the United Slates took note of the Geneva
agreements and declared that the United
States would "refrain from threat or the use
of force te disturb them, in accordance
with article 2(4) of the Charter of the
United Nations dealing with the ()litigation
of members to refrain in their international
relation.s from the threat or use of firree."
Referring to free elections in Viett am, the
United States declaration stated:
"In the case of nations now divided
against their will, we shall continue to seek
to achieve :nifty through elections' super-
vised by the United Nations to insicre that
they are conducted fairly." "i
Note tint article 7 s;dpulates tnat the
elections we to be antecedent to and a
neceasary ccadition for the "fundamental
freedoms. guaranteed by democratic institu-
tions" and that the electione were to be held
"in order to insure . that all thi . neces-
sary conditions obtain for free expression
of -the natio :cal will." This particular por-
tion of the Geneva Accord has frequently
been quoted out of context, with Hie key
phrases in reverse order, in order to justify
the refusal to hold elections on the ;irounds
that the neccissary conditions did no!, exist.
"See "Extracts From Verbatim. Heat irds of
Eighth Plena.sy Session,- Geneva Accords.
',Nowhere in its own declaration did the
United States recognize the political parti-
tion of Vietnam; insofar as it referred to the
country, it designated it as "Vietnam." not
"South Vietnitm" and "North Vietnam"
Thus the United States recognized Lila
fact that Vietnam was a single nation.
Nevertheless the justification of United
States policy today ignores this admitted
fact. The United States persists in de denial
that it is intervening in a civil war. It seek.;
to justify the bombing of North 'Vietnam
by the United States on the basis that North
Vietnam is a foreign aggressor iu South
Vietn am.
Nor is this all. The United States further
pledged "that it will not join in any ar-
rangement which will hinder" the reunifica-
tion of Vietnam, and concluded with the
hope that:
"The agreement will permit Cambodia,
Laos, and Vietnam to play their part, in Dill
independence and sovereignty in the peaceful
community of nations, and will cm' ible the
people: of the area to determine their own
fature."
No election was ever held pursuant to the
Cleneva Accords, although both tile Interna-
tional Control Commission (composed of
India, Poland, and Canada) and the United
Nations announced readiness to Supervise
such elections. South Vietnam announced
that it did not regard itself obliged to take
part in the elections because the participa-
tion of North Vietnam would rencier sucti.
elections not free, a position apparently sup-
ported by the State Department.*c' In 1955,
following the Geneva Accords, then Prime
Minister of State Diem repudiated thr Geneva
Agreements and refused to held the elections.
Former President Dwight D. Eisenhower, in
his Memoirs, suggests a further reason for
Diem's refusal to hold elections pursuant
to the Geneva Accords:
"I have never talked or corresponded with
a person knowledgeable in Lido Chiciese af-
fairs who did not agree that had elections
been held at the time of the fighting possibly
80 percent of the population weatld have
voted for the Communist Ho Chi Minh at;
their leader rather than. Chief of State Bao
DM."
The consequences of the repudiation of
the Geneva Accords were delineated by Sen-
ator ERNEST GRUENING in a speech to the
Senate on April 9, 1965:
"That civil war began?let me repeat, be-
cause this is crucial to the issue?wlien tint
Diem regime?at our urging---refused to
carry out the provision contained in the
Geneva Agreement of 1954 to hold elections
for the reunification of Vietnam. That was
one of the underlying conditions of the
"See, Question No. 7, "Questions ;hid An-
swers on Vietnam," Department of State
publication No. 7724, August 1991, p. Ii. See
also footnote 19, George MeT. Kahn]. acid
John W. Lewis, professors of government an,
Cornell University, in their article. "The
United States in Vietnam," which appeared
in the June 1965 issue of the Bulletin of
Atomic Scientists, note (op. cit. p. 31) :
"When on July 16, 1955, the Diem govern-
ment announced, with American led:king,
that it would defy the provision calling for
national elections, it violated a central con-
dition which had made the Geneva Accorda
acceptable to the Vietminh. Regardless of
what sophistry has been employed to demon-
strate otherwise, in encouraging this move.
the United States departed from the posi-
tion taken in its own unilateral declaration.
And France in acquiescing abandoned the
responsibility which she had uneqinf;ocally
accepted a year earlier."
(Citing--Allan B. Cole. ed., Condiet In
Indo-China and International Repercus-
sions," a documentary history, 1941, 1955
(Ithaca, N.Y.) 1956, pp. 226-228; and Donald
Lancaster, "The Emancipation of French
Indo-China" (Oxford, 1961), pp. 370--372.)
cit Dwight D. Eisenhower, "Mandate for
Change: The White House Years, 1953 1956"
(London, 1963) , p.372.
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Geneva agreement. The civil war began and
has continued with intensified fury ever
since * *. For over 800 years, before the
conquest by France, Vietnam was a united
country. After defeating the French in
1954, the Vietnamese went to the conference
table at Geneva, agreeing to a settlement
only on condition that reunification elections
be held. Yet, nowhere in President John-
son's speech of April 7, 1965, at Johns Hop-
kins University is there held out a hope of
ultimate reunification of Vietnam. He con-
ditioned the ultimate peace 'upon an inde-
pendent South Vietnam instead'."
In view of all of the aforesaid, the assump-
tions and justifications for our governmental
policy in Vietnam do not appear to have sup-
port, either in law or in fact. The conduct
of the U.S. Government in Vietnam appears
plainly to violate the terms of the Geneva
Accords and to repudiate solemn pledges to
"refrain from the threat or the use of force"
to disturb the Geneva Accords.
Moreover, nothing in the provisions of the
southeast Asian Collective Defense Treaty
would appear to justify the conduct of the
U.S. Government in Vietnam. The SEATO
Treaty was signed in Manila some 7 weeks
after the signing of the Geneva Agreement
on the Cessation of Hostilities in Vietnam.
The SEATO Treaty became effective,in Feb-
ruary 1955, following the treaty ratification
by eight member states-the United States,
France, Great Britain, Australia, New Zea-
land, Thailand, Pakistan, and the Philippine
Islands.
By the preamble and by article I of the
SEATO Treaty, the parties acceded to the
principles and supremacy of the United Na-
tions Charter in accordance with article 103
thereof, which it will be recalled, provides as
follows:
"In the event of a conflict between the
obligations of the members of the United
Nations under the present charter arid their
obli6ations under any other international
agreement, their obligations under the pres-
ent charter shall prevail."
The supremacy of this provision was ex-
pressly reiterated by the eight SEATO na-
tions under article VI of said treaty, in
which each solemnly agreed that the SEATO
Treaty:
"" * * does not affect the rights and ob-
ligations of any of the parties under the
Charter of the United Nations, or the re-
sponsibility of the United Nations for the
maintenance of international peace and se-
curity."
The key provisions of the SEATO Treaty
are to be found in article IV. Paragraph 1
thereof permits the use of force by one or
more member states only in the event of
"aggression by means of armed attack." But
where the integrity or inviolability of any
territory covered by the treaty is threat-
ened "by other than armed attack" or "by
any fact or situation which might endanger
the peace of the area," then, paragraph 2 of
article IV requires, as a prerequisite to inter-
vention, that "the parties shall consult im-
mediately in order to agree on the measures
to be taken. * *
The consent of all eight SEATO nations
was originally required before any military
action under article IV could be undertaken
by any of them (New York Times, May 28,
1962). Later, this rule was modified so that
action could be undertaken if there was no
dissenting vote-i.e., an abstention would not
count as a veto (New York Times, April 19,
1964). At the last two annual meetings of
the Ministerial Council of SEATO, France
has refused to support a communique pledg-
ing SEATO backing for South Vietnam
against the Vietcong (New York Times, April
15-16, 1964; May 3-6, 1965; see also, Los
Angeles Times, May 3-4, 1965). It would
appear that with the threat of a French
veto a formal SEATO commitment in Viet-
nam has not been sought by the United
States. However, even if there had been
unanimity among the SEATO nations, the
provisions of article 53 of chapter VIII of the
United Nations Charter will still prevail:
"But no enforcement action shall be taken
under regional arrangements or by regional
agencies without the authorization of the
Security Council. * *
Manifestly, no such authorization has ever
been conferred, either by the Security Coun-
cil of the United Nations or by the General
Assembly, from which it follows that Ameri-
can action in Vietnam clearly cannot be sup-
ported by reference to SEATO.
So long as the United States remains a
member of the United Nations, our right to
intervene is circumscribed by the provisions
of the United Nations Charter. As members
of SEATO, our right to intervene is limited,
both by the requirement for unanimity
among all of the eight treaty nations and,
In addition, by the superseding requirement
of article 53 of chapter VIII of the United
Nations Charter, prohibiting any enforce-
ment action under a regional arrangement
without the authority of the Security Coun-
cil. Our justification for acting contrary to
our solemn obligations under the United
Nations Charter appears tenuous and in-
substantial, The fact of the matter is that
the U.S. Government has simply acted as its
own judge of its own interests in patent dis-
regard of the fundamental law embodied in
the United Nations Charter.
III-CONSTITUTIONAL ASPECTS OF UNITED
STATES INTERVENTION IN VIETNAM
This disregard of the rules of the charter,
inherent in U.S. intervention in Vietnam,
is compounded by the fact that such inter-
vention is also violative of our own Consti-
tution. Whatever doubts may have existed
prior to the President's "Report to the Nation
Following a Review of U.S. Policy in Viet-
nam" 2' (set out at his news conference on
July 28, 1965) , as to whether U.S. action in
Vietnam constituted the conduct of a war,
the President in that report made it ex-
plicitly clear that "this IS really war," noting
that "our fighting strength" was being raised
from 75,000 to 125,000 "almost immediately"
and that "additional forces will be needed
later, and they will be sent as requested."
Can the President's conduct be squared with
our Constitution (apart from the obligations
imposed upon member states by the United
Nations Charter)?
It is the genius of our constitutional sys-
tem that ours is a government of checks and
balances. A dangerous concentration of pow-
er is avoided by the separation-in Articles
I, II, and III of the Constitution-of the leg-
islative, executive, and judicial powers. The
doctrine of "separation of powers" is funda-
mental to, and is one of the "great structural
principles of the American constitutional
system." 25 The Supreme Court has recently
characterized this "separation of powers" as
"a bulwark against tyranny," United States
v. Brown- U.S.-, 33 Law Week 4603 (June
7, 1965). The Supreme Court had earlier
said:
"The power to make the necessary laws is
in Congress; the power to execute in the Pres-
ident. Both powers imply many subordi-
nate powers. Each includes all authority
essential to its due exercise. But neither can
the President, in war more than in peace,
intrude upon the proper authority of Con-
gress, nor Congress upon the proper author-
28 Presidential Documents, vol. 1, No. 1
(Aug. 2, 1965), pp. 15-19. See also State De-
partment bulletin, April 26, 1965, p. 606;
State Department bulletin, May 24, 1965, pas-
sim; State Department bulletin, May 31,
1965, p. 838, Krock, "By Any Other Name,
It's Still War," New York Times, June 10,
1965.
25 Corwin, "The President: Office and
Powers" (New York, 1957), p. 9.
ity of the President." Ex parte Milligan, 1
Wall 2, 139 (1866)
Classically stated by Blackstone 26 and de-
rived from Plato, Aristotle, Polybius, Cicero,
Machiavelli, Harrington, Locke, and Montes-
quieu," this constitutional separation of
powers was deliberately carried over by the
Framers into the conduct of foreign affairs,
For, contrary to widely held assumptions, the
power to make and conduct foreign policy
is not vested exclusively in the President, but
is divided between him and Congress, with
each endowed with complementary, but sepa-
rate 28 powers and responsibilities."
Thus, in making and carrying out general
foreign policy, Article II, Section 2 requires
the President to have the "Advice and Con-
sent of the Senate, to make Treaties, pro-
vided two-thirds of the Senators present con-
cur." And the President also requires the
advice and consent of the Senate to "appoint
Ambassadors, other public Ministers and
Consuls."
When statecraft fails and the question be-
comes the ultimate one of war or peace, the
Constitution imposes a tight rein upon the
President. His participation ends at the
threshold of the decision whether or not to
declare war. Under Article I, Section 8,
Clause 11, that power is confided exclusively
to the Congress.") There is no mention of
the President in connection with the power
to "declare war." Under the Constitution,
Congress alone must make this decision.
The Clause does not read "on recommenda-
tion of the President," nor that the "Pres-
ident with advice and consent of Congress
may declare war." As former Assistant Sec-
retary of State James Grafton Rogers has
observed: "The omission is significant.
There was to be no war unless Congress took
the initiative." Rogers, "World Policing
and The Constitution," p. 21 (Boston, 1945) .
"Nothing in our Constitution is plainer
than that declaration of war is entrusted
only to Congress." Youngstown Sheet and
Tube Company v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 642
(1952) (Jackson, J.).
That the President lacks constitutional
power to make war is underscored by the
historic statement made by President Wood-
row Wilson on the night of April 2, 1917,
when he addressed the Congress in a joint
session:
"I have called the Congress into extraor-
dinary session because there are serious,
"Blackstone, "Commentaries on the Law
of England," 146 (7th ed. 1775).
27 Cf., Sharp, The Classical American Doc-
trine of "Separation of Powers," 2 U. of Chi.
L. Rev. 385 (1935).
28 "One of the most striking facts in the
institutional philosophic history of the
United States (is) that the legislative-execu-
tive quarrels during the colonial period con-
vinced the colonists of the desirability of a
separation of powers rather than a union
of powers." Wright "Con,senstis and Con-
tinuity," p. 17 (Boston, 1958).
"The doctrine of separated powers is im-
plemented by a number of constitutional
previsions, some of which entrust certain
jobs exclusively to certain branches, while
others say that a given task is not to be
performed by a given branch." United
States v. Brown, supra-U.S., 33 Law Week,
at p. 4605.
28 Story, "Commentaries on the Constitu-
tion" (Boston, 1833) , passim, Dahl, "Congress
and Foreign Policy" (New Haven, Conn.,
1950); Robinson, "Congress and Foreign Pol-
icy-Making: A Study in Legislative Influence
and Initiative" (Ill. 1962).
2? Article I, Section 8, Clause 11 of the Con-
stitution reads:
"The Congress shall have the power:
"1. To declare war, grant letters of mar-
que and reprisal, and make rules concerning
captures on land and water."
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eery serious choices of poliey to be made,
ancl made immediately, which it was neither
right nor constitutionally permissible that
I should assume the responsibility of mak-
ing." St-
President Franklin Roosevelt also heeded
his constitutional responsibilities and was
:ilso mindful and sensitive of the consti-
tutional limitations applicable to the Presi-
dent when, before a joint session of the Con-
gress on December 7, 1941, he requested the
Congress for a declaration of war following
'Pearl Harbor.
The decision to place the responsibility for
declaring war exclusively in Congress as the
direct representative of the people, and not
even to provide for the President's partici-
pation in that decision was a most deliber-
ate one by the Framers.
'1' mc Constitutional Convention had been
urged to rest the power to declare war, the
"last resort of sovereigns, ultima ratio
regum," in the executive, or, alternatively. in
the Senate. :3 Story, "Commentaries on the
Constitution." par. 1166. The arguments
were made that "large bodies necessarily
move slowly" and "despatch, secrecy, and
vigor are often indispensable, and always
usel ul toward success." Story, ibid.
When the issue was debated at the Con-
vention, Mr. Gerry stated that he "never ex-
pected to hear in a republic a motion to em-
power the Executive alone to declare war."
Madison and Gerry "moved to insert 'declare,'
striking out 'make' war; leaving to the Ex-
ecutive the power to repel sudden attacks."
The motion carried. Farrand ed., "Records
of the Federal Convention" (New Haven,
I).lii IL pp. 318-319..
Nowhere in the debates is there support
for he view that the President can wage a
war or "commit" our Nation to the waging
of a war. On the contrary, warm.aking was
Lu be a purely legislation prerogative. The
wily use of force without a declaration of
,fl President', Wilson went on to say:
"With a profound sense of the solemn and
even tragical character of the step I am tak-
ing and of the grave responsibilities which
it involves, but in unhesitating obedience to
what I deem my constitutional duty. I ad-
vise that the Congress declare the recent
course of the imperial German Government
to be in fact nothing less than war against
1lie Government and people of the United
:States; that it formally accept the status of
belligerent which has thus been, thrust upon
and that it take immediate steps not only
to put the country in a more thorough state
of defense but also to exert all its power and
employ all its resources to bring the Gov-
ernment of toe German Empire to terms and
end the war."
.t The Flamers concluded and provided
osat "the power of declaring war is not only
the highest sovereign prerogative; but that
IL is in its own nature and effects so critical
and calamitous, that it requires the utmost
deliberation, and the successive review of all
the councils of the nation. War, in its best
,tstfate, never fails to impose upon the people
the most burdensome taxes, and. personal
,t.tilerings. It is always injurious and some-
time of the great commercial,
t,1;,,ntifacturing. and agricultural interests..
Nay, it always involves the prosperity, and.
not infrequent:iv the existence of a nation.,
Ti, is :sometimes fatal to public liberty itself..
by introducing a spirit of military glory,
which is ready to follow, wherever a succes-
eive commander will lead; and in a republic
whose institutions are essentially founded
on the basis of peace, there is infinite danger
that war will find it both imbecile in de-
and eager for contest. Indeed, the his-
tory of republics has but too fatally proved,
that they are too ambitious of military fame
1,isti conquest, and too easily devoted to the
war that was contemplated as the debates
clearly show, was "to repel sudden ottacks." "
These constitutional provisions that only
Congress shall have the power to declare war
and that Congress has the sole responsibility
to raise and support the armies, to provide
for a navy, and to impose the taxes to provide
the funds to carry on a war, reflected a pro-
found distrust of executive autlacelty and a
corresponding reliance upon the tegislature
as the instrument for the decisionmaking in
this vital area. Bemis,. "The Diplomacy of
the American Revolution" (New Yak, 1935),
These provisions reflected thing:- painfully
learned during the early colonitl period,
when every major European vier had its
counterpart on the American fron.ers. The
Colonies were therefore determined to end
the imperial authority to decide for them
what wars they should enter and what the
outcome of those wars should be. Savelle,
"The American Balance of Power, and the
European Diplomacy 171:3-78," in Morris ed.,
"The Era of the American Revolution" (New
York, 1939), pp. 140-169.
The Convention was not only (determined
to deny warmaking power to the President,
but was also unwilllng to entrust it to the
Senate alone. To assure the fullest consid-
eration, the Framers therefore proeided that
the House of Representatives, larger and
more representative than the Senate, should
also be brought in to decide this vital ques-
tion. Thc action and decision of the whole
Congress were therefore constitutionally
made necessary to this fateful undertaking.
"The Constitution says,. therefore, in effect,
'Our country shall not be committed formally
to a trial of force with another nation, our
people generally summoned to the effort and
all the legal consequences to people, rights
and property incurred until the House, Sen-
ate and the President agree.'" Rogers,
"World Policing and the Constitution" (Bos-
ton, .I1945), p. 35.
-Concededly there have been many in-
stances, when the President has sent U.S.
Armed Forces abroad without a declaration
of war by Congress.3' These have ranged
from engagements between pirates and
American ships on the high seas to the dis-
patch of our Armed Forces to Latin Ameri-
can countries.
These precedents cannc.t justify the pres-
ent actions without bringing to mind Swift's
comment on "precedents" in ''Crulliver's
Travels":
"It is a maxim among these lawyers, that
whatever hath been done before, rosy legally
be done again; and therefore they take spe-
cial care to record all the decisions formerly
made against common justice and the gen-
eral reason of mankind. These, under the
name of precedents, they produce as au-
thorities to justify the most iniquitous opin-
ions; and the judges never fail to directing
accordingly."
Here it is important to distineuish our
country's involvement in the Korean war.
views of cierna fogs, who flatter their pride
and betray their interests. It should there-
fore be difficult, in a republic to cited:fro war;
but not to make peace." Story op. cit.,
sec. 1166.
Manifestly the residuary power eft to the
President --"th repel sudden attack" con-
templated attacks on the countty's geo-
graphical territory?not "sudden at tacks" in
far-off lands, such as southeast Asia. Cf.
Tonkin Bey joint resolution. of Aug. 6-7,
1964, discussed in sec. IV, infra.
"See U.S. Senate Committee or. Foreign
Relations and Committee ,on Armed Services,
hearing, "Situation in Cuba," 87th Cong., 2d
sess., Sept. 17, 1962 (Washington. G.P.O.,
1962), pp. 82-87; Rogers,. op. cit., -specially
pp. 93-123.
For the United States fought wider the
aegis of the United Nations pursuant to a
definitive resolution of the Security Council
authorizing and directing the employment
of Armed Forces of member states, so that
the United States was thus perfoeming its
solemn obligations undertaken in iecorning
a signatory of the United Nations Charter,
a treaty which is the "Supreme Lew of the
Land." But in the Vietnamese situation,
there has been no authorization by the Se-
curity Council; indeed the Security Council
has not even been seized of the metter, has
not been requested to entertain jurisdiction
of the present conflict.
It is therefore unfortunately vitally neces-
sary, although trite, to recall that "the Gov-
ernment of the United States has been em-
phatically termed a government of !aws, and
not of men." Marbury v. MarliNc,n, 1 Cr.
137 (1803). Under a government 17l. laws.
the President is not free from the ,.hacks of
the Constitution of the United States; the
President is not free to assume the pow-
ers entrusted solely to the Congress. Ours
is not a government of executive su-
premacy..
Here it is fitting to recall that on May 6,
1954, at a time when the fall of Lien Bien
Phu was imminent, then Senator Lyndon.
Johnson, as Democratic leader of the Senate,
at a Jefferson-Jackson dinner, critieized the
Eisenhower administration in these terms:
"We will insist upon clear explanations of
the policies in which we are asked to co-
operate. We will insist that we and the
American people be treated as adults?that
we have the facts without sugar coating.
"The function of Congress is nut simply
to appropriate money and leave the problem
of national security at that."3"
A New York Times survey (June 1.1, 1965)
reports widespread "uneasiness" over the
President's foreign policies; that tie .Arner-
lean academic world "is intellectually and
emotionally alienated from the President, to
whom it gave such strong support in the
election"; that there is "increasing?and
mutual--hostility between the President and
many segments of the press"; that many'
Democratic Members of Congress are "restive
and unhappy * * * over what tiny regard
as [the President's] high-handed manner
of making and carrying out deeielons on
foreign affairs"; that many friendly govern-
ments abroad "are apprehensive ali)out Mr.
Johnson's use of national power"; that
among these views are expressions of "dis-
may," the unreliability of CIA and FBI
reports which the President accepted, the
lack of clear policy, the disregard of "prie-
eiples, support or advice."
It is therefore imperative that Congress
guard zealously against any executi ye usur-
pation of its exclusive power to declare, or
to decline to declare war.
President Johnson has not been. aninind-
ful of the damaging consequences inherent
in the violation of the separation 01 powers.
As recently as August 21, 1965 the President
vetoed a $1.7 billion military construction
bill, calling it "repugnant to the Conistitti-
tion." In a stern message to Congress, the.
President described certain section:: of the
bill as clear violations of the "separation of
powers"; warned Congress to stop meddling
Si "With all its defects, delays, eit 1 incon-
veniences, men have discovered no la elinione
for long preserving free government except
that the executive be under the law, and
that the law be made by parliamentary de-
liberations," Mr. Justice Jackson, concurring
in Youngstown Sheet and Tube Company v.
Sawyer, supra, 343 U.S. at 655 (1952).
3? Jackson, "Role and Problems of itaneress
with Reference to Atomic War," May 17, 1954,
publication No. L 54-135, Industrial College
of the Armed Forces.
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in the prerogatives of the executive branch
(New York Times, August 21, 1966, p. 1).
Yet the President has not hesitated to in-
trude upon the exclusive power vested in
Congress to declare war.
TV?CONGRESS HAS NOT DECLARED WAR IN VIET-
NAM; ITS JOINT RESOLUTIONS ARE NEITHER
A SUBSTITUTE FOR A DECLARATION OF WAR NOR
DO THEY MAKE PRESIDENT JOHNSON'S WAR-
MAKING CONSTITUTIONAL
Congress has not declare war in Vietnam
and the President does not claim that any
declaration of war supports his actions in
Vietnam. In fact, the President is reported
to be extremely reluctant to ask Congress
directly to declare war.,7 Instead, the Presi-
dent is reported (New York Times, June 19,
1965, p. 10) to believe that authority for his
actions may be inferred or extracted from
the Tonkin Bay Joint Resolution of August
6-7, 1964 (H.J. Res. 1145; Public Law 88-408,
78 Stat. 384, 88th Cong., 2d sess.) and
the Joint Resolution of May 7, 1965 (H.J.
Res. 417; Public Law 89-18; 79 Stat. 109, 89th
Cong., 1st sess.) making a supplemental ap-
propriation to the Defense Department for
the Vietnam operations.
The Tonkin Bay resolution is not a decla-
ration of war. At most, it is an ultimatum?
if that. It "approves and supports the de-
termination of the President, as Commander
in Chief, to take all necessary measures to
repel any armed attack against the forces
of the United States and to prevent further
aggression." It goes on to express the view
that "the maintenance of international
peace and security in southeast Asia 'is vital'
to the national interests of the United
States" and declares he readiness of the
United States to take all necessary steps, in-
cluding the use of armed forces, to assist
any member or protocol SEATO state to de-
fend its freedom. The resolution, however,
provides that all such steps shall be "con-
sonant with the Constitution of the United
States and the Charter of the United Na-
tions and in accordance with its obligations
under the Southeast Asia Collective Defense
Treaty."
It is clear that Congressmen who voted for
the Tonkin Bay Joint Resolution were not
voting a declaration of war in Vietnam. The
resolution does not mention North Vietnam
nor China; indeed it does not even mention
Vietnam. It was "passed in the fever of in-
dignation that followed reported attacks by
North Vietnamese torpedo boats against U.S.
fleet units in Tonkin Bay." CONGRESSIONAL
RECORD, June 9, 1965, p. 12528. There is no
evidence that Congress thought or under-
stood that it was declaring war. It took no
contemporaneous action which would have
implemented a declaration of war. And the
remarks of several Members of the House and
Senate during and since the debate on the
resolution reinforce the conclusion that the
Tonkin Bay Resolution was not regarded as
a declaration of war. Congress manifestly
cannot delegate to the President its exclusive,
power to declare war; and even under the
specific terms of the Tonkin Bay Resolution,
the President's actions neither conform nor
are consonant with the Constitution?and,
as we have seen in the earlier analysis, the
President's actions are not consonant with
the Charter of the United Nations, nor with
the SEATO Treaty.
In passing the May 7, 1965, resolution, au-
thorizing a supplemental appropriation for
the Vietnam operations, Congress was con-
fronted with a fait accompli which se-
verely circumscribed its action. Its constitu-
tional check on the will or errors of the
Executive was by the President's message, re-
duced to its power of the purse. Such a cir-
cumscription will not necessarily prevent un-
3, Wall Street Journal, June 17, 1965, "The
United States May Become More Candid on
Rising Land-War Involvement," pp. 1, 16,
No. 36---11
wise or unpopular decisions or allow for the
exercise of the full discretion which the
Constitution intended Congress to have, and
for it alone to exercise. Nevertheless, a reso-
lution authorizing an appropriation does not
constitute a declaration of war, nor can it
constitutionally authorize the President to
wage an undeclared war.
The presidential assumption of powers
vested exclusively in the Congress concern
arrogations of power which convert republi-
can institutions, framed for the purpose of
guarding and securing the liberties of the
citizen, into a government of executive su-
premacy. If the Constitution has such elas-
tic, evanescent character the provisions for
its amendment are entirely useless; presi-
dentially-determined expediency would be-
come then the standard of constitutional
construction.
Under the rule of law, compliance with
the forms and procedures of the law are as
Imperative as compliance with the substance
of the law. A lynching is a totally inade-
quate substitute for a trial, regardless of the
guilt of the victim. What Mr. Justice Frank-
furter wrote in another context is equally
applicable here: "The history of liberty has
largely been the history of observance of
procedural safeguards." McNabb v. United
States, 318 U.S. 332, 347, (1947).
Under our system, constitutional powers
must be exercised in a constitutional man-
ner by constitutionally established institu-
tions. Disregard of fundamentals in an area
concerning the highest sovereign prerogative
affecting the very lives and fortunes of its
citizens in the interest of a short term ex-
pediency undermines" 'constitutional moral-
ity' to such an extent that the maintenance
of the order itself is endangered." Fried-
rich, "The Philosophy of Law in Historical
Perspective," p. 216 (Chicago, 1963).
Finally, it cannot be over emphasized that
even a declaration of war by the Congress
would not negate the violations of our ob-
ligations assumed under the United Nations
Charter or negate the violations of interna-
tional law inherent in United States inter-
vention in Vietnam.
Conclusion
A learned authority in international af-
fairs has stated:
"Bluntly, all the rules about intervention.
are meaningless if every nation can decide
for itself which governments are legitimate
and how to characterize particular limited
conflict. Unless we are prepared to continue
a situation in which the legality of inter-
vention will often depend upon which side
of the fence you are on, and in which, there-
fore, our policy becomes one of countering
force with force, we must be willing to refer
questions of recognition (i.e., legitimacy of
the government involved) and characteri-
zation of a disorder (i.e., whether an armed
attack from abroad or a civil war) to some
authority other than ourselves. The United
Nations is the most likely candidate for the
role." "
The United States has not observed the
letter or spirit of its treaty obligations with
respect to the action taken in Vietnam.
World order and peace depend on the will-
ingness of nations to respect international
law and the rights of other nations. The
United Nations is a symbol of the rejection
of fatal policies which led to World War It,
and an acceptance by the peoples of the
world of the principles of collective security,
and the avoidance of war and the use of
armed forces in the settlement of differences
between nations. The United Nations was
28 Roger Fisher, professor of law at Harvard
University, "Intervention: Three Problems
of Policy and Law" found in Essays on Inter-
vention, a publication of the Marshon Center
for Education in National Security, Ohio
State University Press, pp. 19-20.
intended to insure the preservation of inter-
national peace, security, and justice, through
rules of law, binding upon all member na-
tions. The fundamental condition for the
effective functioning of the United Nations
is the observance on the part of all signatory
nations of the obligations assumed under
the charter. Only in this way can the awe-
some potential of a third world war be
prevented.
We have concluded that the U.S. Govern-
ment is in violation of its treaty obligations
under the U.N. Charter. We urge upon the
Government that all steps be immediately
taken to undo this illegality by an immedi-
ate return to an observance of the letter and
spirit of the provision of the U.N. Charter.
This is a solemn hour in history. We have
a moral obligation to history to return to the
high purposes and principles of the United
Nations?to honor the pledges we solemnly
assumed?to settle international disputes by
peaceful means?to refrain in international
relations from the threat or use of force.
At this fateful hour, we do well to recall
the prophetic dream of President Franklin
D. Roosevelt, the architect of the United Na-
tions, who upon his return from the Yalta
Conference in his last address to the Con-
gress in March 1945, said:
"The Crimea Conference * * ? ought to
spell the end of the system of unilateral
action, the exclusive alliances, the spheres
of influence, the balances of power, and all
the other expedients that have been tried for
centuries?and have always failed. We pro-
pose to substitute for all these, a universal
organization in which all peace-loving na-
tions will finally have a chance to join."
Should we not, 20 years after President
Roosevelt's hopeful dream-20 years after
the advent of the nuclear age with the awe-
some potentiality of incineration of our
planet and the annihilation of our civiliza-
tion and the culture of millenia?should we
not "spell the end of the system of unilateral
action * * * that has been tried for cen-
turies?and has always failed"?
Mr. CASE. Mr. President, the meas-
ure before the Senate would authorize
the appropriation of supplemental de-
fense funds required by our forces in
Vietnam. I shall vote for the measure
for what it is?an authorization to fund
urgent military requirements. And I
shall vote to table the amendment to re-
peal the so-called Tonkin Gulf resolu-
tion of 1964.
Much has been said in recent days
about the implications of our votes for
or against this or that proposition bear-
ing upon the foreign policy of the United
States. We have been reminded that
the Senate approved ratification of the
Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty
in 1955 by a vote of 82 to 1, and adopted
the Tonkin Gull resolution by a vote of
88 to 2. And it has been suggested that,
by these acts, the Senate conferred upon
the President complete discretion to deal
with southeast Asia as he may see fit.
I do not so regard my votes for the
SEATO treaty and the Tonkin Gulf reso-
lution. Nor do I feel that, by now voting
against repeal of the resolution and for
this authorization bill, I am abdicating
my responsibility as a Member of the
Senate and of the Committee on Foreign
Relations to maintain a vigilant watch
over the course of this Nation's, policies
in southeast Asia in the months ahead.
Eighteen months ago, when we
adopted the Tonkin Gulf resolution, we
were giving a vote of confidence to the
President in his handling of a particu-
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March 1, 11j66
lar situation. To repeal that resolution
today would make no sense unless one
feels, as some of my colleagues may feel,
that it is time for a vote of no confidence
in the President. That is not my view,
and that is why I shall vote to table the
amendment.
I am satisfied that the administration
is sincere in its purpose to avoid an esca-
lation that would lead to a general war
in the Far East and in its conviction that
our objectives can be attained without
that happening.
At the same time, I believe that we
have a continuing and continuous re-
sponsibility to satisfy ourselves that our
policies make sense and should be sup-
ported. And I believe that the President
has a similar responsibility to Congress
and to the people to keep us fully in-
formed at all times.
:Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I
send to the desk a motion and ask that
it be read.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The mo-
tion will be read for the information of
the Senate.
The LEGISLATIVE CLERK. The Senator
from Montana [Mr. MANSFIELD] pro-
poses as follows:
I hereby move to table the pending amend.-
tnent of the senior Senator from Oregon
[Mr. MORSE! to the pending bill, 5.2791, a
bill to authorize appropriations during the
fiscal year 1966 for the procurement of air-
craft, missiles, naval vessels, and tracked
combat vehicles, and research, development,
Lest, and evaluation for the Armed Forces,
and for other purposes.
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I
ask for the yeas and nays.
The yeas and nays were ordered.
The PRESIDING OFFICER,. The
question is on agreeing to the motion of
the Senator from Montana.
On this question, the yeas and nays
have been ordered: and the clerk will
call the roll.
The legislative clerk called the roll.
Mr. LONG of Louisiana. I announce
that the Senator from Maryland [Mr.
BaswsTsa 1 is absent on official business.
I also announce that the Senator from
Idaho [Mr. CHURCH] and the Senator
from Ohio I Mr. LAUSCHE] are necessarily
absent.
I further. announce that, if present
and voting, the Senator from Maryland
I Mr. BREWSTER I and the Senator from
Ohio [Mr. LauscHE I would each vote
"yea."
The result was announced?yeas 92,
nays 5, as follows:
[No. 41 Leg.]
SAS--92
Aiken. Cotton lull
Allot t curtis
Holland
Anderson Dirksen Hrudsa
tartriett Dodd 'Inouye
it;ESS Dominick Jackson
I iayh Douglas Javits
itennett Eastland Jordan, N.C.
Bible Ellender Jordan, Idaho
Boggs Ervin Kennedy, Mass?
Burdick Fannin Kennedy, N.Y.
Byrd, Va. Fong K fiche'
yrd, W. Va. Gore bong, Mo.
Cannon Harris Long, La.
Carlson Hart Magnuson
Case Iliartke Mansfield
Clark Hayden McClellan
:ociper Hickenlooper McGee
McGovern
McIntyre
McNamara
Metcalf
Miller
Mondale
Monroney
Montoya
Morton
Moss
Mundt
Murphy
Muskie
Nelson
Neuberger Srnsthers
Pastore Smith
Pearson Sparkman
Pell Stennis
Prouty Symington
Proxmire Tal,nadge
Randolph Thurmond
Ribieoff Tower
Robertson Tydings
Russell, S.C. tams, N.J.
Russell, Ga. WiPiams, Del.
Saltonstall Yo.riterough
Scott Yon n g, N. Dak.
Simpson
NAYS-5
Fulbright McCarthy Yoang, Ohio
Crucini rig Morse
.NOT VOTING--3
Brewster Church Lau -che
So Mr. .MansFmn's motion to lay on
the table Mr. MORSE'S amendment was
agreed to.
APPOINTMENTS BY THE VICE
PRESIDENT
The VICE PRESIDENT. he Chair
wishes to announce the f olle wing ap-
pointments:
BOARD OF VISITORS TO THE AIR FOR( E ACADEMY
Pursuant to Section 9355 of title 10,
United States Code, the Chair appoints
Senators MeGEG, Moss, and ALLOTT as
members of the Board of Visitors to the
Air Force Academy.
BOARD OF VISITORS TO THE COM T GUARD
ACADEMY
Pursuant to Public Law 207 of the 81st
Congress, the Chair appoints the Sen-
ator from Connecticut [Mr. Donal as a
member of the Board of Visitors to the
U.S. Coast Guard Academy.
BOARD OF VISITORS TO THE MILITARY ACADEMY
Pursuant to Public Law 1028 of the
84th Congress, the Chair appoints Sen-
ators ELLENima, ROBERTSON, and MURPHY
as members of the Board of Visitors to
the U.S. Military Academy.
BOARD, OF WITETTORS TO THE MERCHAN MARINE
ACADEM Y
Pursuant to Public Law 301 of the
78th Congress, the Chair appoints Sen-
ator ROBERT F. KENNEDY of New York, to
the Board of Visitors of the Merchant
Marine Academy.
BOARD OP VISITORS TO THE NAVAL ACADEMY
Pursuant to Public Law 1028 of the
84th Congress, the Chair appoints Sen-
ators HOLLAND, BIBLE, and BOGGS as
members of the Board of Visitors to the
U.S. Naval Academy.
JOINT COMMITTEE ON SEDUCTION OF NON-
ESSE NTIAE FEDERAL EXEENDITI LIES
Pursuant to Public Law 250 of the 77th
Congress. the Chair appoints Senator
CLINTON ANTI ERSON as a member of the
Joint Committee on Reduction of Non-
essential Federal Expenditures to fill the
vacancy created by the retirement from
the Senate of Senator Harry P. Byrd.
INTERPARLIAMENTARY UNION, CANBERRA,
AUSTRALIA
Pursuant to Public Law 170 of the 74th
Congress, the Chair appoints the fol-
lowing Senators to attend the Inter-
parliamentary Union, Canberra, Aus-
tralia? April 11-16, 1966; Senators TAL-
MADGS, YARBOROUGH, LONG Of MiSS01111,
SCOTT, HRUSKA, and SIMPSON.
PLEMENTARY MILITARY AND
PROCUREMENT AUTHORIZATION,
FISCAL 1966
The Senate resumed the consideration
of the bill (S. 2791) to authorise appro-
priations during the fiscal year 1966 for
procurement of aircraft, missiles, naval
vessels, and tracked combat vehicles, and
research, development, test, and evalu-
ation for the Armed Forces, and for
other purposes.
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, it is
my understanding that the distinguished
Senator from Alaska [Mr. GIwSNING1 is
about to propose an amendment. I
understand that he does not intend to
speak on it very long. I understand that
the distinguished chairman of the com-
mittee may have a few words in answer.
It will be my intention then to move
to table the amendment of the Senator
from Alaska [Mr. GRUENING]. I would
anticipate there will be a yea-and-nay
vote. I can guarantee that there will
be.
I suggest that all Members sl,ay close
to the floor as possible.
The VICE PRESIDENT. The Senator
from Alaska is recognized.
Mr. GRUENING. Mr. President, I
call up my amendment No. 481 to S. 2791,
and ask that it be read.
The VICE PRESIDENT. The amend-
ment will be stated for the infermation
of the Senate.
The legislative clerk read as follows:
On page 3, after line 8, add the following
new section:
"SEc. 302. During any period iihat any
armed force of the United States it engaged
in armed conflict or hostilities in iiouthcit sr.
Asia, no person who is a member of tint u
armed force serving on active duty by virtue
of involuntary induction under the Univer-
sal Military Training and Service Act shall
be assigned to perform duty in such area.
unless (1) such person volunteers for service
in such area, or (2) the Congress hereafter
authorizes by law the assignment to duty in
southeast Asia of persons involuntarily in-
ducted into such armed forces."
Mr. GRUENING. Mr. President, the
proposed amendment would merely pro-
vide that draftees should not be sent to
southeast Asia to combat without the
consent of the Congress.
It does not provide, as some columnists
have mistakenly reported, that they shall
not go. It provides that Congress must
approve.
There are two objectives. C'ongress
should be further included in our pro-
ceedings. There has been much discus-
sion in the last few days and months on
the degree of participation of the Con-
gress in some important measures. This
would be one way for Congress to partici-
pate and stand up and be couned.
The history of the proposed amend-
ment is that last August when I was
visiting in the White House with Presi-
dent Johnson, who had invited me to
come there and express my views or
opposition to our policy in southeast
Asia, I told him that I was planning
that afternoon to introduce this amend-
atory legislation.
The President asked me very insist-
ently not to do it. Then he said "If we
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my vote reflects my conviction that we
must protect men we have sent into bat-
tle no matter how mistaken the policy
may be that sent them to that battlefield.
I accept the words of Senator RUSSELL,
chairman of the Armed Services Com-
mittee, when he said in presenting this
bill to the Senate:
It could not properly be considered as de-
termining foreign policy, as ratifying deci-
sions made in the past, or as endorsing new
commitments.
I agree with these further observations
of Senator RUSSELL:
Mr. President, an attempt to brush aside
the misgivings and reservations that many
Senators and members of the public hold
about events in southeast Asia would be
futile. This is not my purpose. I, too, am
extremely unhappy and concerned about the
gravity of the situation there and what our
commitment portends.
This bill cannot possibly be construed as
either an endorsement of or as an attack
upon national policy. It involves more the
throwing of a rope to a man in the water.
We may have cause to question how he got
there, but he is there, he is a human being,
he is our friend and a member of our family
and, therefore, if we have a rope and do not
throw it to him to enable him to assist him-
self out of the water, this would be a cal-
lous and heartless attitude for us to take.
I think the debate over the past few
weeks and the Senate Foreign Relations
hearings have been most helpful in
clarifying some of the problems we face
in Asia. I only wish more Senators had
been involved in the debate of our south-
east Asia policy a year ago. I hope now
that we will do everything in our power
to avoid an all-out war in Asia. Such
a war would claim the lives of vast num-
bers of American men and in the end
create conditions of disorder that would
open the way for the very tyranny we
fear. I hope the debate will continue on
all aspects of our Asia policy. It is only
through such free and open discussion
that we can find the way to an effective
policy.
THE AMERICAN PEOPLE ARE BEING MISLED INTO
AN UNNECESSARY HOLOCAUST IN VIETNAM
Mr. GRUENING. Mr. President, yes-
terday, in discussing S. 2791, I stated
that, in my opinion, the American people
are being misled into an unnecessary
holocaust.
S. 2791, the supplemental procurement
and construction authorization bill, now
before the Senate, will plunge the United
States into an unlimited war in Asia.
It is a blank check for unlimited esca-
lation.
I use the word "misled" advisedly be-
cause the true facts are not made avail-
able to the Amercan public and we are
asked to legislate under a cloak of
secrecy.
Just as when we were asked to pass
the Bay of Tonkin resolution in August
of 1964 and to pass an unneeded $700
million appropriation in May of 1965, we
are now asked to pass?in a hurry?a
$4.8 billion military authorization which
is far more than it seems, and takes us
one more step down the road to a major
war which, while now confined to south-
east Asia, could easily spread to the rest
of the world.
The President was clear when he re-
quested this supplemental authorization.
He said in his message of January 19,
1966:
In the last 2 years, in repeated acts of au-
thorization and appropriation, the Congress
has provided continuing support for our na-
tional decision "to prevent further aggres-
sion" in southast Asia. The quoted words
come from the joint resolution of the Con-
gress?Public Law 88-408?approved on Au-
gust 10, 1964. It is in the letter and the
spirit of the resolution that I request this
supplementary appropriation. While that
resolution remains in force, and until its ob-
ligations are discharged, we must persevere.
I believe the resolution is right, and I believe
the course we follow is necessary. I intend
that those who must face danger and death
as we follow that course shall be supported.
I am confident that the Congress will agree.
In the clear and enequivocal words of
the President, the supplemental is re-
quested within "the letter and spirit"
of the Tonkin Bay resolution.
We are being urged to pass this sup-
plemental as an urgent matter.
Yet, as the able and distinguished
chairman of the Foreign Relations
Committee, Mr. FULERIGIIT, pointed out
on February 28, 1966:
The Armed Services Committee of the
House stated that there was no particular
urgency and that this bill is a kind of leg-
erdemain affecting next year's budget. It
was handled in this way so that there would
not be as big a deficit as would have been
the case otherwise. Therefore, these au-
thorizations were shifted into this bill. As
far as the material being needed now, the
House stated that the testimony on that
point was not persuasive.
The report of the Armed Services
Committee of the House states:
The essential purpose of, and underlying
cause for, the proposed legislation is, of
course, the war in Vietnam. Aircraft, both
fixed wing and helicopters, ships, missiles,
and tracked combat vehicles are all being
utilized at a rate greater than it was pos-
sible to anticipate when the 1966 authoriza-
tion for those items was passed. This leg-
islation was approved by the committee
solely in order to achieve more rapid pro-
curement of replacements of articles con-
sumed, and to provide proper equipment
for a larger force in a shorter period of time.
If there is one reservation felt by many
members of the committee regarding the
necessity for this legislation, it arises from
the possibility that many of the items in-
volved, in all three categories of procure-
ment, research and development, and con-
struction, may simply have been moved from
the regular 1967 authorization to this supple-
mental 1966 authorization without any real
program for acceleration. Obviously no
military advantages would be gained by such
a bookkeeping situation. Testimony on this
subject was indecisive and the committee
has not yet been provided with sufficient
definite data to pinpoint the exact degree of
real acceleration, or to determine the
amounts involved in the proposed legisla-
tion which could safely and should properly
be deferred until the regular 1967 authori-
zation.
We realize the difficulty of determining
exact future needs in any wartime frame-
work, however, and to the extent of the pro-
posed legislation we are accepting in good
faith the assurances of the services and the
Department of Defense that this authority
is needed for these purposes at this time.
We assure the Members of the House that
the performance of the Department of De-
fense and of the services in living up to these
assurances will be closely followed.
As I have said, we are called upon to-
day to legislate under a cloak of secrecy.
And it is not easy for an individual
Senator to obtain the necessary informa-
tion on which to determine whether the
broad grants of power to the President
and the Secretary of Defense which
would be made by this bill are really
necessary. In the 367-page printed
Volume of the Senate hearings on S. 2791
there are not fewer than 958 deletions?.
close to 3 deletions per page. The
374-page printed volume of the House
hearings on a companion bill contains
the same abundant deletions.
Even if an individual Senator should
obtain unanimous consent from the Sen-
ate Committee on the Armed Services to
read the original hearing record contain-
ing all the testimony, including the por-
tions deleted for security reasons, the
individual Senator would be better in-
formed, presumably, but could in no
event share that additional information
with the American people.
Thus, if in the course of the original
hearings, it should be disclosed that sub-
stantial escalation is provided for in this
bill?as Secretary of Defense McNamara
did testify to publicly?the individual
Senator could not reveal the factual
background to the American people if
those facts are based on the classified
material he read.
There are five basic policy decisions
which the Senate is being called upon
to decide in voting on S. 2791.
In the first place, it is being called
upon to authorize unlimited escalation as
the President may decide. As Secretary
of Defense McNamara stated before the
Senate Committee on Armed Services:
The budget will provide forces and equip-
ment sufficient to fight the war at substan-
tially increased scope and intensity, should
that become necessary and desirable.
In the second place, S. 2791 would au-
thorize the Secretary of each military
department to build military installa-
tions and facilities any place in south-
east Asia they may decide. This is con-
trary to established precedent under
which military installations and facilities
are authorized on a line item basis.
In the third place, S. 2791 would au-
thorize the Secretary of Defense to build
such permanent military bases anywhere
in the world. This again violates estab-
lished precedent for line item authoriza-
tions by the Congress for each such base.
The House hearings clearly reveal that
the Department of Defense, in sub-
mitting its budget request for these
military bases, could not justify its re-
quest on the basis of specific items,
again pointing to the fact that there is
no urgency for the authorization of such
bases because the military planners do
not now know what they will need.
And finally, S. 2791 would change the
method of funding the support of Allied
forces in southeast Asia from the military
assistance program?coming within the
purview of the Senate Committee on
Foreign Relations?to the regular au-
thorizations for the support of the
Department of Defense?coming within
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4232 (.1 )NGRESSIONAL RECORD SENATE March 1, 1966
the purview of the Senate Committee on
Armed Services. This is a vital change
in policy since, to all intents and pur-
poses, this represents a downgrading of
civilian influence in South Vietnam as
represented by our Ambassador there to
the benefit of our military commander
there.
There are thus five policy decisions
involved in S. 2791:
First. A reaffirmation of the Bay of
Tonkin resolution;
Second. Delegation to the President
of the power of unlimited military
osculation in southeast Asia;
Third. A change in long established
precedents for Congress to authorize the
establishment, of each military base and.
the delegation of such authorization
authority to the Secretary of Defense
and the Secretaries of the-Army, the Air
Force, and the Navy: and, finally,
Fourth. A change in financing the
support of the allied forces in South
Vietnam from the military assistance
program to the regular authorizations
to the Department of Defense.
8. 2791 is therefore not a simple
military supply bill. It is a bill making
sweeping changes in 'U.S. policy.
If this were just another military
authorization bill to supply needed ma-
terial for our fighting men in Vietnam,
there would be no question of my support
for it.
But S. 2791 is not just another military
authorization bill.
S. 2791 is nothing more than another
device like the premise was to commit
the Congress to administration policy.
It is designed to obtain blanket con-
gressional approval of what has been
done militarily in Vietnam and of what
may be done militarily in the future how-
ever great the escalation and into what-
ever part of southeast Asia this military
adventure may lead our forces.
-
I have in the past and will in the fu-
ture support military authorization and
appropriation needs but only where such
.needs are real and where the bill is not
iaeing used as a coverup device for se-
curing enormous delegations of power
from the Congress to the executive
branch or for securing congressional ap-
proval for future policies, the nature of
which is not disclosed to the Congress.
It has been alleged and will be again
that this bill is needed to support our
boys at the front. On the contrary, the
enactment of this bill will spell the death
of thousands more. I want to see that
wanton scarifice of the flower of our
youth stopped. I have voiced again and
again on the floor of the Senate my con-
viction that all South Vietnam is not
worth the life of a single American boy.
We have already lost over 2000, of them,
and under this bill the casualties will
steadily increase. I cannot in good
conscience lend my vote to this needless
and unjustifiable slaughter. I shall vote
against this bill.
Mr.. RUSSELL of Georgia. Mr. Presi-
dent, I ask unanimous consent that the
order for the yeas and nays entered on
Saturday, February 26, 1966, on the com-
mittee amendment in the nature of a
substitute, be rescinded, and that the
bill proceed to a third reading, and then
I shall ask for the yeas and nays on
passage.
The VICE PRESIDENT. Is there ob-
jection to the request of the Senator
from Georgia? The Chair hears none,
and it is so ordered.
The question is on agreeing to the com-
mittee amendment.
The committee amendment in the
nature of a substitute was agreed to, as
follows:
TITLE I?PROCUREMENT
SEC. 101. In addition to the ftu.ds author-
ised to be appropriated under Public LA,w
89-37 there is hereby authorized 1.), be appro-
priated during the fiscal year 1966 for the use
of the Armed Forces of the United States for
procurement of aircraft, missiles, naval ves-
sels, and tracked combat vehicles ii amounts
as follows :
A irci'aFt
For aircraft: for the Army, $E25,600,000;
for the Navy and the Marine Ccirps, $738,-
300,000; for the Air Force, $1,585,700,000.
/if iss71,:s
For missiles: for the Army, $64,000,000; for
the Navy, $263200,000; for the Marine Corps,
$27,500,000; for the Air Force, $63,700,000.
Tracked combat vehicles
For tracked combat vehicles: for the Army,
$75,800,000; for the Marine Corps, $10,900,000.
TITLE II? RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT, TEST, AND
EVAL CATION
Sac. 201 In addition to the funds author-
ized to be appropriated under Pablic Law
89-37 there is hereby authorized to be appro-
priated during fiscal year 1966 for the use of
the Armed Forces of the United ).itates for
research, development, test, and evaluation,
as authorized by law, in amounts as follows:
For the Army, 8271195,000;
For the Navy (including the Mari) le Corps),
$52,570,000;
For the Air Force, $71,08.7,000.
TITLE II I?MILITARY CONSTRUE': ION
SEC. 301. The Secretary of each military
department may establish or develop military
installations and facilities by acquiring, con-
structing, converting, rehabilitating, or in-
stalling permanent or temporary public
works, including land acquisition, site pre-
paration, appurtenances, utilities aid equip-
ment, which are necessary in connection with
military activities in southeast Asia, or in
support of such activities, in the total
amount as follows:
Department of the Army, $509,7C0,000;
Department of the Navy. $254,6C0,000;
Department of the Air Force, $2'71,100,000.
SEC. 302. The Secretary of Defense may
establish or develop installations and facili-
ties which he determines to be vital to the
security of the United States, and in connec-
tion therewith to acquire, constrict, con-
vert, rehabilitate, or install permanent or
temporary public works, including tand ac-
quisition, :).ite preparation, appurtenances,
utilities and equipment in the total amount
of $200,000,000.
SEC. 303. The Secretary of each military
department may proceed to establish or de-
velop installations and facilities ur. der this
Act without regard to section 3646 of the
Revised Statutes, as amended (31 U.).C. 529)
and sections 4774(d) and 9774(d) of title 10,
United States Code. The authority to place
permanent or temporary imporvements on
land includes authority for surveys, admin-
istration, overhead, planning, and .):upervi-
sion incident to construction. That author-
ity may be exercised before title to the land
is approved under section 355 of the Revised
Statutes, as amended (40 U.S.C. 255), and
even though the land is held temporarily.
The authority to acquire real estate or land
Includes authority to make surveys and to
acquire land, and interests in land (including
temporary use), by gift, purchase. exchange
of Government-owned land, or otherwise.
SEC. 304. Whenever--
(1) the President determines that compli-
ance with section 2313(b) of title LO, United
States Code, for contracts made under this
Act for the establishment or development of
military installations and facilities in foreign
countries would interfere with the carrying
out of this Act; and
(2) the Secretary of Defense told Comp-
troller General have agreed upon alternative
methods of adequately auditing those con-
tracts;
the President may exempt those contracts
from the requirements of that section.
SEC. 305. There are authorized 10 be ap-
propriated such sums as may be necessary
for the purposes of this title, but the appro-
priations for public works authorized by
sections 301 and 302 shall not exceed----
(1) for section 301: Department of the
Army, $509,700,000; Department of the Navy.
$254,600,000; Department of the Air Force.
$274,100,000, or a total of $1,038,400,000.
(2) for section 302: a total of $200,000,000.
TITLE IV?GENERAL PROV/SIO
SEC. 401. (a) Funds authorized for appro-
priation for the use of the Armed Forces
of the United States under this or any other
Act are authorized to be made available for
their stated purposes in connection with sup-
port of Vietnamese and other free world
forces in Vietnam, and related costs, during
the fiscal years 1966 and 1967, on such terms
and conditions as the Secretary of Defense
may determine.
(b) Within 30 days after the end of each
quarter, the Secretary of Defense shall render
to the Committees on Armed Services and
Appropriations of the Senate and the House
of Representatives a report with respect to
the estimated value by country of support
furnished from appropriations authorized to
be made under this subsection.
The VICE PRESIDENT. The question
is on the engrossment and third reading
of the bill.
The bill was ordered to be engrossed
for a third reading and was read the third
time.
Mr. RUSSELL of Georgia. Mr Presi-
dent, I ask for the yeas and nays on
passage of the bill.
The yeas and nays were ordered.
The VICE PRESIDENT. The bal hav-
ing been read the third time, the question
is, Shall it pass? On this question, the
yeas and nays have been ordered, mud the
clerk will call the roll.
The legislative clerk called the roll.
Mr. LONG of Louisiana. I announce
that the Senator from Maryland [Mr.
BREWSTER], the Senator from Oregon
[Mrs. NEUBERGER I , and the Senator from
Maine [Mr. MusHrE] are absent on offi-
cial business.
I also announce that the Senator from
Idaho [Mr. CHURCH] and the Senator
from Ohio [Mr. LA uscia] are necessarily
absent.
I further announce that, if presei it and
voting, the Senator from Maryland I Mr.
BREWSTER , the Senator from Idaho [Mr.
CHURCH], the Senator from Ohio [Mr.
LAUSCHE], the Senator from Maine [Mr.
MusHiE], and the Senator from Oregon
[Mrs. NEUBERGER] would each vote "yea."
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The result was announced?yeas 93,
nays 2, as follows:
[No. 43 Leg.]
YEAS-03
Aiken Hart Moss
Allott Hartke Mundt
Anderson Hayden Murphy
Bartlett Hickenlooper Nelson
Bass Hill Pastore
Bayh Holland Pearson
Bennett Hruska Pell
Bible Inouye Prouty
Boggs Jackson Proxmire
Burdick Javits Randolph
Byrd, Va. Jordan, N.C. Ribicoff
Byrd, W. Va. Jordan, Idaho Robertson
Cannon Kennedy, Mass. Russell, S.C.
Carlson Kennedy, N.Y. Russell, Ga.
Case Kuchel Saltonstall
Clark Long, Mo. Scott
Cooper Long, La. Simpson
Cotton Magnuson Smathers
Curtis Mansfield Smith
Dirksen McCarthy Sparkman
Dodd McClellan Stennis
Dominick McGee Symington
Douglas McGovern Talmadge
Eastland McIntyre Thurmond
Ellender McNamara Tower
Ervin Metcalf Tydings
Fannin Miller Williams, N.J.
Fong Mondale Williams, Del.
Fulbright r Monroney Yarborough
Gore Montoya Young, N. Dalt.
Harris Morton Young, Ohio
NAYS.-2
Gruelling Morse
NOT VOTING-5
Brewster Lausche Neuberger
Church Muskie
So the bill (S. 2791) was passed.
The title was amended, so as to read:
"A bill to authorize appropriations dur-
ing the fiscal year 1966 for procurement
of aircraft, missiles, naval vessels,
tracked combat vehicles, research, devel-
opment, test, evaluation, and military
construction for the Armed Forces, and
for other purposes."
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I
move that the vote by which the bill was
passed be reconsidered.
Mr. DIRKSEN. Mr. President, I move
that the motion to reconsider be laid on
the table.
The motion to lay on the table was
agreed to.
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, it is
always a great honor and a distinct
privilege to congratulate the distin-
guished senior Senator from Georgia
[Mr. RUSSELL]. Today is no exception.
The able and skillful chairman of the
Armed Services Committee has again
earned the highest respect of the Senate
with the near-unanimous passage of the
supplemental authorizations for our
Armed Forces.
Characteristically, his resolute and
highly capable handling of this measure,
more than anything t,7.-_?2, was responsible
for this great success. He was eloquent.
He was articulate. The credit is his and
it is richly deserved.
The Senate's action today represents
just one of many brilliant achievements
in support of our servicemen brought
about by the tireless efforts of the great
Georgia Senator. Through the years he
has keenly appreciated and anticipated
consistently the needs of our servicemen.
That is extremely important. But even
more, he, like no others, has devoted his
unexcelled determination and undaunted
No. 36-12
capacities to assuring the fulfillment of
those needs?all to make our troops un-
matched on the face of the earth. So
again today he has successfully repre-
sented those men with his usual incom-
parable advocacy, or, as he put it him-
self?with all the power of his being. We
are grateful. All America is grateful.
We are grateful, too, for the splendid
efforts of the junior Senator from Mis-
sissippi [Mr. STENNIS]. As chairman of
the Preparedness Investigating Subcom-
mittee, he is always a tireless and de-
voted worker for the men in our armed
services. Today's success is his to share.
And to the distinguished senior Sena-
tor from Massachusetts [Mr. SALTON-
STALL] goes high commendation and
sincere appreciation for his unsurpassed
cooperative leadership. As always, his
unfailing efforts helped immensely to
bring about the passage of this most
important authorization.
Finally, I personally am deeply grate-
ful to those Members of this body who
so ably and properly presented their own
views concerning our efforts in Vietnam,
but who nonetheless joined today in giv-
ing our fighting men the decisive sup-
port which they deserve so much. I am
referring particularly to the distinguished
Senator from Arkansas?that astute and
eloquent chairman of the Foreign Rela-
tions Committee. I also refer to the
senior Senators from Indiana [Mr. HART-
KE] , Idaho [Mr. Oilmen], Pennsylvania
[Mr. CLARK] , and Tennessee [Mr. GORE],
to the junior Senators from Ohio [Mr.
YouNc] , and South Dakota [Mr. McGov-
ERN] , and to all other Senators who,
while examining and analyzing our
southeast Asia policy and the nature of
our commitments there?which is truly
their privilege in the best traditions of
this body, today stood behind our troops
to meet the vital needs of those brave
men who risk their lives daily.
Mr. LONG of Louisiana. Mr. Presi-
dent, the senior Senator from Maryland
[Mr. BREWSTER] Was not available to
vote today. The RECORD will reflect that
had he been here he would have voted
for the bill that was passed as he said
in his speeches on the floor of the Senate.
He would have voted to table the amend-
ments that were offered.
The senior Senator from Maryland
[Mr. BizewsTzs] was appointed as a
congressional adviser to the American
delegation to the GATT Trade Center
meetings in Geneva, Switerzerland. He
is serving as the personal representative
of the Senate Commerce Committee at
the trade meetings.
The GATT meeting which opened on
Monday has been specifically called to
consider ways and means of promoting
increased trade with underdeveloped
nations.
Senator BsEwsTER will be in Geneva
for a week as a member of the American
delegation. He regarded the mission as
extremely important to the United
States, and of particular interest to the
port of Baltimore, one of the foremost
trading centers in the United States.
We assured the Senator that we would
make every effort to see that he had a
pair; and in the event that that was not
possibl", if it appeared his vote would
be required, we would seek to have him
return. We did not think that that was
necesary and the RECORD will so show.
MESSAGE FROM THE HOUSE
A message from the House of Repre-
sentatives, by Mr. Hackney, one of its
reading clerks, informed the Senate that,
pursuant to the provisions of 42 United
States Code 2251, the Speaker had ap-
pointed Mr. YOUNG of Texas as a mem-
ber of the Joint Committee on Atomic
Energy, to fill an existing vacancy there-
on, on the part of the House.
The message announced that the
House had passed a bill (H.R. 12889) to
authorize appropriations during the fis-
cal year 1966 for procurement of aircraft,
missiles, naval vessels, tracked combat
vehicles, research, development, test,
evaluation, and military construction for
the Armed Forces, and for other pur-
pbses, in which it requested the concur-
rence of the Senate.
SUPPLEMENTAL MILITARY AND
PROCUREMENT AUTHORIZATION,
FISCAL 1966
Mr. RUSSELL of Georgia. Mr. Presi-
dent, I ask unanimous consent that the
Senate proceed to the consideration of
H.R. 12889.
The PRESIDING 0101010ER (Mr. HAR-
RIS in the chair). The bill will be stated
by title for the information of the Senate.
The LEGISLATIVE CLERK. A bill (H.R.
12889) to authorize appropriations dur-
ing the fiscal year 1966 for procurement
of aircraft, missiles, naval vessels, tracked
combat vehicles, research, development,
test, evaluation, and military construc-
tion for the Armed Forces, and for other
Purposes.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there
objection to the immediate consideration
of the bill?
There being no objection, the Senate
proceeded to consider the bill (HR.
12889),
Mr. RUSSELL of Georgia. Mr. Presi-
dent, I move to strike out all after the
enacting clause of H.R. 12889 and sub-
stitute therefor the language of S. 2791
as it just passed the Senate.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The
question is on agreeing to the motion of
the Senator from Georgia.
The motion was agreed to.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The
question is on the engrossment of the
amendment and the third reading of the
bill.
The amendment was ordered to be en-
grossed, and the bill to be read a third
time.
The bill was read the third time.
The PRESIDING Ors'ICER. The
question is on passage of the bill, as
amended.
The bill (H.R. 12889) was passed.
Mr. RUSSELL of Georgia. Mr. Presi-
dent, I move that the Senate insist on its
amendment, request a conference with
the House on the disagreeing votes there-
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on, and that the Chair appoint conferees
on the part of the Senate.
The motion was agreed to; and the
Presiding Officer appointed Mr. RUSSEL/.
of Georgia, Mr. STENNIS, Mr. SYMINGTON,
Mr. SALTONSTALL, and Mrs. SMITH C011-
forces on the part of the Senate.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without
objection the Senate bill (S. 2791) is in-
definitely postponed.
PERSONAL STATEMENT
Mr. MeCARTHY, Mr. President, I
had intended to make these remarks be-
fore the motion to table was acted on,
but when the motion was presented, I
thought it would be presented as an
amendment rather than a motion. Since
I felt; my remarks would have little effect
on the outcome of the vote, I withheld
them until this time.
It was my hope that we would have a
straight vote on the amendment of the
Senator from Oregon. The matter of the
Tonkin Gulf resolution has been dis-
cussed for sometime, and it was indicated
that there would probably be a vote on
the question of rescinding it, which had
been suggested by some officials high in
the administration.
There was a later indication that, fol-
lowing the vote on that, or perhaps as a
substitute, we would have a vote on the
reaffirmation of the Tonkin Gulf reso-
lution.
I had intended to vote against the
Morse proposal to rescind the Tonkin
Gulf resolution, but also to vote against
the amendment which would have reaf-
firmed that resolution.
It is my judgment, by virtue of the
various interpretations that have been
placed on the Tonkin Gulf resolution
since it was first approved in August
1964, that the resolution, in the minds of
some persons, has taken on a meaning
and a significance which had not been
attributed to it at the time it was before
the Senate and was passed on August 10,
1964.
It is my opinion, in view of the con-
tinuing discussion of the resolution, that
the Senate will be somewhat slow in the
future about adopting resolutions of this
kind.
The fact is that I made a statement,
which was affirmed by some Members of
the Senate--and the position I took was
reaffirmed by the President in his press
conference?that this resolution did not
give to the President any power he did
not have before we passed the resolu-
tion, and that if we had rescinded it we
would not have taken away any powers
he possessed under the Constitution and
any powers which have been confirmed
by the history of this country and by
precedents.
think the question must be asked:
What purpose do resolutions of this kind
serve?
Acknowledging that the resoluti.on
gives the President no power which he
does not already possess, there are, then,
two purposes.
One, it may be reassuring to the Presi-
dent in the way of congressional or pub-
lic support. Second, there is the possi-
bility that passing such resolutions will
prevent second-guessing and improper
criticisms.
Those of us who served either in the
House or in the Senate following the ac-
tion of President Truman in the Korean
war will remember the conversations in
the cloakroom to the effect that it
would have been wise if President Tru-
man had had a resolution passed to pre-
-vent criticism on the part of Members
who had given their vote in support of
a resolution for that action in Korea.
I think President Truman acted quite
properly, and took the responsibility
which the President has, without in any
way seeking to take authority or power
which he did not properly possess and
carry it out on his own accord.
Various interpretations have been
placed on the resolution by Members of
the Senate. The minority leader said
we should not rescind the resolution be-
cause we would be taking away powers
the President was given. I submit we
could not take way any power by rescind-
ing the resolution because we did not
give the President any power by passage
of the resolution.
It was suggested in debate?not so
much an the floor, but outside this
Chamber, in statements made by some
people high in the administration?that
because Congress passed the resolution,
Congress should not be critical of new
policies or new applications. I submit
this is a dangerous interpretation of the
resolution.
:In view of the experience we have had
over the last 6 months in the interpre-
tation and application of the resolution,
I think we ought to be most careful in
the future with regard to similar resolu-
tions, not just because of the political
implications but because what is in-
volved is a fundamental change of the
constitutional power of the Presidency.
If we are to allow this practice to grow
and establish precedents whereby reso-
lutions of this kind begin to take on
strength of their own, the only logical
conclusion is that, first, the constitu-
tional powers which Presidents have ex-
ercised since the country was founded
are being challenged, and perhaps even
undermined.
Second. There is danger in this kind
of resolution that there may be a growth
of tradition and the establishment of
precedents of power in the Congress
which it does not possess and which is
not provided for under the Constitution.
Third. There is danger that in the
passage of resolutions of this kind it may
lead to challenges on the part of Con-
gress as to the power of the President.
Whether the attempt would be success-
ful or not is an open question, but if we
are concerned about protecting the con-
stitutional powers of the President, if we
are concerned with not making the Sen-
ate into a kind of garden club which
passes resolutions with reference to
Presidential powers, and if we are con-
cerned perhaps with the freedom of this
body to carry out its own constitutional
responsibilities in the field of foreign
policy, resolutions of this kind should not
be approved in the future.
ORDER OF BUSINESS
Mr. MANSFIELD. I am about to lay
down the pending business.
Mr. MORSE. I invite the attention of
the majority leader and the minority
leader to the fact that this is a day of
precedents in the Senate: a very im-
portant precedent, I believe, was estab-
lished and the policy reaffirmed.
The minority leader will recall that a
few days ago on the floor of the Senate,
we were discussing how to dispose of the
bill, timewise, and I urged that the Sen-
ate go ahead without a unanimous-con-
sent agreement and the probabilities
would be that we might finish the bill by
Tuesday night.
I invite attention to the fart that this
Tuesday night, the time is now 6:15, and
a vital precedent has been established.
In fact, as an old common law lawyer,
and a believer in sound precedent. I
should like my majority leader to know
that that precedent is going to stand.
Accordingly, we can forget about
unanimous-consent agreements on major
legislation from now on, because we save
time without having them.
Mr. DIRKSEN. The distinguished
Senator from Oregon is truly generous.
He is extremely tolerant. He possesses
an infinite amount of wisdom with re-
spect to human nature, and I congratu-
late him.
Mr. MORSE. Mr. President, that is a
great compliment and I thank the Sena-
tor from Illinois.
Mr. JAVITS. Mr. President, I should
like to join the minority leader and the
Senator from Oregon [Mr. MORSE I in
saying that I, too, believe that the Senate
has had one of its finest days of debate.
It has resulted in the exercise of self -
discipline which the Senate has shown
sow 1 ? he Chamber today.
ORDER FOR .ADJOURNMENT
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I
ask unanimous consent that when the
Senate concludes its business today, it
adjourn until 12 o'clock noon tomorrow.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. With-
out objection, it is so ordered.
U.S. PARTICIPATION IN THE ASIAN
DEVELOPMENT BANK
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I
ask unanimous consent that Calendar
No. 982, HR. 12563, be laid down and
made the pending business.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The bill
will be stated by title for the informa-
tion of the Senate.
The LEGISLATIVE CLERIC. A bill, H.R.
12563, to provide for the participation
of the United States in the Asian De-
velopment Bank.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there
objection to the present consideration of
the bill?
There being no objection, the Senate
proceeded to consider the bill.
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President? no
action will be taken on the Asian de-
velopment bill tonight.
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march 1, 1966
States, credit shall be given for amounts for
which liability is relieved by this section.
SEC. 2. The Secretary of the Treasury is
hereby authorized and directed, to pay, out
of any money in the Treasury not otherwise
appropriated, to the said Lieutenant Charles
W. Pittman, Junior, an amount equal to the
aggregate of the amounts paid by him, or
withheld from sums otherwise due him, on
account of the liability to the United States
referred to in the first section of this Act.
No part of the amount appropriated in this
section in excess of 10 per .centum thereof
shall be paid or delivered to or received by
any agent or attorney on account of services
rendered in connection with this claim, and
the same shall be unlawful, any contract to
the contrary notwithstanding. Any person
violating the provisions of this Act shall be
deemed guilty of a misdemeanor and upon
conviction thereof shall be fined in any sum
not exceeding $1,000.
With the following committee amend-
ments:
Page 1, line 5, strike "$3,493.71" and insert
"$3,358.70".
Page 2, lines 10 and 11, strike "in excess
of 10 per centum thereof".
The committee amendments were
agreed to.
The bill was ordered to be engrossed
and read a third time, was read the third
time, and passed, and a motion to recon-
sider was laid on the table.
The SPEAKER. This concludes the
call of the Private Calendar
CALL OF THE HOUSE
Mr. HALL. Mr. Speaker, I make the
point of order that a quorum is not
present.
The SPEAKER. Evidently a quorum
is not present.
Mr. ALBERT. Mr. Speaker, I move a
call of the House.
A call of the House was ordered.
The Clerk called the roll, and the fol-
lowing Members failed to answer to their
names:
[Roll No. 251
Gubser
Hagan, Ga.
Irwin
Jones, Mo.
Keith
Leggett
Matthews
Miller
Morgan
Annunzio
Baldwin
Baring
Berry
Bolling
Dawson
Dingell
Dowdy
Downing
Dyal Morton
Edwards, Calif. Mosher
Fisher Olson, Minn.
Fuqua Powell
Griffin Purcell
Rostenkowski
Saylor
Scott
Springer
Steed
Todd
Toll
White, Idaho
Willis
Wilson,
Charles H.
Wright
The SPEAKER. On this rollcall 394
Members have answered to their names,
a quorum.
By unanimous consent, further pro-
ceedings under the call were dispensed
with.
PROVIDING FOR CONSIDERATION
OF H.R. 12322, COTTON RESEARCH
AND PROMOTION ACT
Mr. SISK, from the Committee on
'Rules, reported the following privileged
resolution (H. Res. 750, Rept. No. 1302)
which was referred to the House Calen-
dar and ordered to be printed.
H. RES. 760
Resolved, That upon the adoption of this
resolution it shall be in order to move that
the House resolve itself into the Committee
of the Whole House on the State of the Union
for the consideration of the bill (H.R. 12322)
to enable cottongrowers to establish, finance,
and carry out a coordinated program of re-
search and promotion to improve the com-
petitive position of, and to expand markets
for, cotton, After general debate, which
shall be confined to the bill and shall con-
tinue not to exceed two hours, to be equally
divided and controlled by the chairman and
ranking minority member of the Com-
mittee on Agriculture, the bill shall be read
for amendment under the five-minute rule.
At the conclusion of the consideration of the
bill for amendment, the Committee shall rise
and report the bill to the House with such
amendments as may have been adopted, and
the previous question shall be considered as
ordered on the bill and amendments th reto
to final passage without intervenlrsg dion
except one motion to recommit.
AUTHORIZING APPROPRIATIONS
DURING FISCAL YEAR 1966 FOR
PROCUREMENT OF AIRCRAFT,
MISSILES, NAVAL VESSELS,
TRACKED COMBAT VEHICLES, RE-
SEARCH, DEVELOPMENT, TEST,
EVALUATION, AND MILITARY
CONSTRUCTION
Mr. SISK. Mr. Speaker, by direction
of the Committee on Rules, I call up
House Resolution 743 and ask for its im-
mediate consideration.
The Clerk read the resolution, as
follows:
H. RES. 743
Resolved, That upon the adoption of this
resolution it shall be in order to move that
the House resolve itself ihto the Committee
of the Whole House on the State of the Union
for the consideration of the bill (H.R. 12889)
to authorize appropriations during the fiscal
year 1966 for procurement of aircraft, mis-
siles, naval vessels, tracked combat vehicles,
research, development, test, evaluation, and
military construction for the Armed Forces,
and for other purposes, and all points of or-
der against said bill are hereby waived. After
general debate, which shall be confined to
the bill and shall continue not to exceed
three hours, to be equally divided and con-
trolled by the chairman and ranking mi-
nority member of the Committee on Armed
Services, the bill shall be read for amend-
ment under the five-minute rule. At the
conclusion of the consideration of the bill
for amendment, the Committee shall rise and
report the bill to the House with such amend-
ments as may have been adopted and the
previous question shall be considered as
ordered on the bill and amendments thereto
to final passage without intervening motion
except one motion to recommit.
The SPEAKER. The gentleman from
California is recognized for 1 hour.
Mr. SISK. Mr. Speaker, I yield 30
minutes to the gentleman from Califor-
nia [Mr. Swam], and, pending that, I
yield myself such time as I may consume.
Mr. Speaker, House Resolution 743
provides an open rule, waiving points of
order, with 3 hours of general debate for
consideration of HR. 12889, a bill to
authorize appropriations during the fiscal
year 1966 for procurement of aircraft,
missiles, naval vessels, tracked combat
vehicles, research, development, test,
evaluation, and military construction for
the Armed Forces, and for other
purposes.
The essential purpose of, and under-
lying cause for, H.R. 12889 is, of course,
the war in Vietnam. Aircraft, both fixed
wing and helicopters, ships, missiles, and
tracked combat vehicles are all being uti-
lized at a rate greater than it was possible
to anticipate when the 1966 authorization
for those items was passed. It is hoped
that the legislation will achieve more
rapid procurement of replacements of
articles consumed, and will provide
proper equipment for a larger force in a
shorter period of time.
The bill authorizes $3,417,700,000 for
procurement; $151,650,000 for research,
development, test, and evaluation; and
$1,288,100,000 for military construction.
Mr. Speaker, there have been ques-
tions raised, and we have heard a great
deal of discussion in the past few days
respecting this particular piece of
legislation.
It seems to me that the issue is very
clear cut and the interpretation to be
placed upon a vote for and in support
of this legislation is very simple. We
simply desire to make certain that our
men in uniform will have ample equip-
ment and weapons to meet our commit-
ments there and to make certain that
we carry out the aims and the programs
of our Government in South Vietnam
and in other areas of the world where
such commitments exist. Through the
proper and timely and, yes, the escalated
carrying out of those commitments we
will that much sooner bring the enemy
to the point of being willing to discuss
peace with reference to these problems.
Mr. HALL. Mr. Speaker, will the gen-
tleman yield?
Mr. SISK. I will be glad to yield to the
gentleman from Missouri.
Mr. HALL. Mr. Speaker, I appreciate
the gentleman from California yielding
to me, and I would like to associate my-
self with his statement as far as the vote
on HR. 12889 is concerned. My question,
in the interests of consistency, inasmuch
as last week I raised similar doubts re
waiving all points of order on the rule
making in order debate on the supple-
mental foreign aid bill authorization, is
one on the rule. As the member of the
distinguished Committee on Rules of this
House who is bringing this legislation to
the floor, will the gentleman kindly ad-
/vise me why line 9 is inserted therein
eliminating all points of order? This was
a bill which was brought from the Com-
mittee on Foreign Affairs recently. It
was stated then that there was no reason
within the bill itself for this, and that it
had simply been inserted on recommen-
dation of the Parliamentarian without a
request by the chairman of the commit-
tee or without the desire of the Com-
mittee on Rules. Is this the same
situation today?
Mr. SISK. Mr. Speaker, if I may com-
ment, I would like to call the gentleman's
attention to page 5 of this legislation, the
bill H.R. 12889, and specifically to call his
attention to line 8 of page 5, Title IV:
General Provisions, section 401(a) . If
the gentleman will read that, he will find
that this bill provides for certain trans-
fers of funds. Therefore, that would be
subject to a point of order, since it does
amount to a transfer of funds.
Mr. HALL. Mr. Speaker, if the gentle-
man will yield further, I have read that
in detail. I know that the committee of
which I am a member, the House Com-
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Library 'i 'ewes and Construction Act Amendments of 19116?Continued
Est trim ated
[Mai
Fisleral
annelids 1
Title
I,
seri, ices
E2timated
ncitching
funds 2
Estimated
Federal
amomits
?disis
2'62,
701
$33,
106
$17.
101
Puerto Pico _ _
800,
431
387,
244
190.,
489
V irgin Islands
53,
477
28,
025
14,
901
Title TI, construction
Estim ited
Federal
amoutits
$29, 008
413, 10(1
552
Estimated total of basic and additiona Federal amen As.
2 Estimated total of basic and additional matching expenditure,: from Ohl .0 and local sources.
EXCERPT FROM PROPOSED LEGISLATION
,,AUCATION
have proposed a total Federal investment
in education and training during the com-
ing year in excess of $10 billion?a threefold
increase, since 1961.
Our education programs must be admin-
isitered wisely and well. Shortly after pas-
!ewe of the Elementary and Secondary Edu-
eation Act of 1965, I directed that the Office
iff Education be reorganized to carry out its
expanded responsibilities more effectively and
efficiently. This reorganization has now
been completed.
hi addition, we established the new post
at Assistant Secretary for Education in the
Department of Health, Education, and Wel-
fare to strengthen program coordination
throughout the Government.
The Congress has already put this Nation
on the path toward the achievement of goals
to-
1..81x tend special educational help to 12
illion disadvantaged and handicapped
children;
2. Eliminate illiteracy within a decade;
2. Bring public library services to 15 mil-
lion more Americans;
4. Reduce by half the rate of high school
filaments over the next 5 years;
5. Guarantee the opportunity for educa-
tion beyond high school on the basis of abil-
ity: to learn, rather than ability to pay;
Provide college building and facilities
to meet the needs of 9 million students ex-
pected by 1975,
intl educational opportunity for every cit-
izen requires that we build on the beginnings
we have aireigly made, I recommend
measures to expand the Headstart program
for preschool children; to strengthen the
Elementary and Secondary Education Act of
1965; to expand Federal assistance to higher
education; and to improve the Nation's
libraries,
expand the Headstart program or pre-
oot children
,ocw programs have had the visible suc-
cess of Operation Headstart. The disadvan-
taged children who have benefited from this
program are already entering first grade--
with new confidence in themselves and
eagerness to learn.
1: have requested funds almost double the
Headstart program during the corning year
La insure full year programs for 210,000 chil-
dren; summer programs for 500,000 children.
This marks a significant step in providing
greatly expanded preschool assistance for
5-year-olds from disadvantaged homes, and
tiummer nursery programs for 3- and 4-year-
cis.
TT
erengthen the Elementary and Secondary
Education Act of 1065
Though funded only 4 months ago, the
1.ilementary and Secondary Education Act of
effin has already begun to bring its benefits
te Hie Nation:
-ipeci al help is being provided the dis-
advantaged?remedial teaching, health and
Food services, augmented teaching and coun-
seling staffs.
No. 36
Est i mated
reciching
funds 2
515, 201
212,855
12, 648
More books--interesting and up-to-date?
have begun to appear on school library
abelvea.
New approaches to old problems axe being
tried; instructions for the student extends
beyond the classroom to museums, hos-
pitals, factories.
Regional education laboratories are- being
developed to stimulate new technicues of
teaching and lea7ning in our schools.
State educational agencies are strength-
ening their m toffs and assuming greeter re-
eponsibtlities.
Educational deprivation cannot be over-
come in a year. And quality cannot be
achieved ovcenight.
I propose that the Elementary and Sec-
ondary Education Act be extended for 4
years.
My budget includes increased funds for
each title of the act.
In addition, I propose that coverage of the
act be enlarged to raise from $2,000 te $3,000
the family income formula for allocating aid
for educatioo of the disadvantaged com-
mencing: in fiscal 1968; to earmark additional
funds for children of American Indiens and
migrant workers.
Careful study of the incentive grant pro-
vision of title I shows that payments would
be made to many districts unrelated to need.
I therefore recommend repeal of ihe in-
centive grant provision of title I in ceder to
focus Federal aid on basic grants to more
than 20,000 local school districts.
Too many schools in urban and rural slums
are ancient and in disrepair. Chsolete
schools aggravate the problem of eliminating
de facto segregation in our northerim com-
munities, thus depriving -children of full
educational opportunities.
There is a pressing need for long-range,
community-wide planning to bring innova-
tion and imiOnation in school construction.
I propose that 85 million be added to title
TIT to help communities in. planning school
construction to encourage innovation and to
deal with obsolescence, overcrowding, and
special problems such as de. facto segrega-
tion.
A recently completed study of the fed-
erally impacted area program, requested by
Congress, has concluded that certain provi-
sions should Oe revised.
I recommend revision of the existinsr law?
To require school districts to abeorb a
uniform and fair share of the burden of edu-
cating children in federally affected districts;
To base pcyme:ffts on school expenditures
in local districts :rather than on natl.- mal or
State average per pupil cost;
To eliminate eligibility for Federal im-
paced area assistance in those cases where
Government property is leased to private en-
terprises that pay local taxes.
JOINT COMMITTEE ON ATOMIC
ENERGY
The SPEAKER. Pursuant to the pro-
visions of title 42, United States Code,
section 2251, the Chair appoints as a
member of the Joint Committee on
Atomic Energy the gentleman from
Texas Mr. YouNcl to fill an existing
vacancy thereon.
PRIVATE CALENDAR
The SPEAKER. This is Private Cal-
endar day. The Clerk will call thr first
individual bill on the Private Calendar.
ENZO (ENZIO) PEROTTI
The Clerk called the bill (H.R. 4926)
for the relief of Enzo (Enzio) Perotti.
The SPEAKER. Is there objection to
the present consideration of the bill?
Mr. TALCOTT and Mr. GROSS ob-
jected, and, under the rule, the bill was
recommitted to the Committee en the
Judiciary.
OSMUNTDO CABIGAS
The Clerk called the bill (H.R. 'i838)
for the relief of Osmundo Cabigas.
The SPEAKER. Is there objection to
the present consideration of the bill?
Mr. TALCOTT. Mr. Speaker, I ask
unanimous consent that the bill be passed
over without prejudice.
The SPEAKER. Is there objection to
the request of the gentleman from Cali-
fornia?
There was no objection.
RONALD WHELAN
The Clerk called the bill (H.R. ';141)
for the relief of Ronald Welan.
Mr. GROSS. Mr. Speaker, I ask
unanimous consent that this bill may be
passed over without prejudice.
The SPEAKER,. Is there objection to
the request of the gentleman from Iowa?
There was no objection.
RONALD POIRIER, A MINOR
The Clerk called the bill (H.R. 8865)
for the relief of Ronald Poirier, a minor.
Mr. HALL. Mr. Speaker, I ask unan-
imous consent that this bill may be
passed over without prejudice.
The SPEAKER. Is there objection to
the request of the gentleman from
Missouri?
There was no objection.
LT. CHARLES W. PITTMAN, JR U.S.
NAVY
The Clerk called the bill (H.R. 9302)
for the relief of Lt. Charles W. Pittman,
Jr., U.S. Navy.
There being no objection, the Clerk
read the bill, as follows:
H.R. 9302
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of
Representatives of the United Stat,,s of
America in Congress assembled, That Lieu-
tenant Charles W. Pittman, Junior, United
States Navy, of Columbia, South Carol)na, is
relieved of liability to the United Steies in
the amount of $3,493.71, representing the
total amount of overpayments of comeensa-
tion made to him by the Department of the
Navy during the period June 6, 1960, through
June 30, 1964, as a result of the use of an
erro.neous pay entry base date. In the audit
and settlement of the accounts of any
certifying or disbursing officer of the United
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:Leciorti9EITM4g1fi R000400050008-5 4251
mittee on Armed Services, in its wisdom,
inserted this there for this stated pur-
pose. If in fact this does eliminate the
question of the transferability between
operation and maintenance funds, and
pay of the Army or personnel funds for
all the military services, then why is it
necessary to have a waiver of all points
of order, which I believe the gentleman
will agree with me eliminates the pow-
ers of the individual Members as to ger-
maneness and as to other functions in an
authorization bill which is coming from
a legislative committee to be considered
in debate on the floor of the House? It is
getting to be a habit rather than a neces-
sity for simply inserting the waiver in all
rather than an appropriation bill or a
Ways and Means Committee bill. I won-
der if the elected Members, the people's
personal representatives in this Con-
gress, realize that they are waiving away
by operating under such rules their
power of objection and even compound-
ing it because of the fact that it is not
necessary?
Mr. SISK. Let me say to my good
friend from Missouri that I well .appre-
ciate the statements he is making. I
want to assure the gentleman that the
Committee on Rules does not take light-
ly this idea of waiving points of order.
We only do this when we feel it is essen-
tial in order to expedite the legislation
as well as in order to be completely fair
to all Members of the House. Accord-
ing to legal advice which we had in the
committee that this particular transfer
would be subject to a point of order,
which means that one individual could
bring about the elimination of transfers,
we sincerely feel that this would be in
the best interests of the legislation. I
want to say to my good friend that I do
not think you will find the committee
feels lightly about this whole question of
waiving points of order. We are con-
cerned, I think, to try to see every Mem-
ber's rights are protected and that legis-
lation is brought to the floor where it
may be considered from the widest pos-
sible standpoint, with an open rule, with
the right of amendment and the right of
every Member to make his position
known. However, as the gentleman
very well knows, from time to time, on
these transfers which are subject to
points of order, it is simply felt that it is
In the best interests of the expeditious
handling of the legislation to waive
points of order in such a case. I hope
the gentleman will accept that state-
ment, that it was done in all good faith.
Mr. HALL. Mr. Speaker, I do accept
that, and I am delighted with the state-
ment of the gentleman from the Com-
mittee on Rules, which is thus made a
matter of record, but if you will refer to
page 2 of the report of the committee
where it discusses section 401, it plainly
sets forth that in the original Depart-
ment of Defense language there was this
"transferability," but that the commit-
tee added the words "for their [the serv-
ices] stated purposes."
And then there is the last sentence in
that paragraph, discussing section 401
(a) wherein there appears the state-
ment:
There is no intent to authorize additional
appropriation transfer authority for the pur-
poses of this section.
Mr. Speaker, I also want to get that
in the RECORD.
Then there is the question which sim-
ply comes back to the statement of
whether, if there is no intent and if it
was not requested?it has not been re-
quested over the past 19 years based
upon my available research and knowl-
edge, by the Committee on Armed Serv-
ices that any points of order be waived,
why is it suddenly injected here so that
debate thereon can be eliminated?
Mr. Speaker, I believe we are treading
on dangerous ground.
Mr. SISK. I well appreciate the gen-
tleman's position, but our advice was that
that language was subject to a point of
order. I understand the explanation of
the report and I gather that that possi-
bly was not the intent.
I well understand the gentleman's feel-
ings, and I want to assure the gentleman
that the committee is going to look close-
ly at all requests for waiving points of
order and we shall not do so unless such
requests are made.
Mr. HALL. I appreciate that.
Mr. Speaker, I withdraw my reserva-
tion. I have done this in order to em-
phasize the point that I made in the
House last week when we were consider-
ing the rule on the bill which came to
us from the Committee on Foreign Af-
fairs, and I shall continue to object to
the inclusion of such points of order.
Mr. McCORMACK. Mr. Speaker,
would the gentleman yield?
Mr. SISK. I yield to the distinguished
Speaker of the House of Representatives.
Mr. McCORMACK. Mr. Speaker, I
wish to congratulate the chairman and
members of the Committee on Armed
Services for the very fine hearings which
the committee held on thi,; bill, and for
the manner in which they expedited the
consideration of the bill in the commit-
tee.
I also wish to congratulate the chair-
man and the members of the House
Committee on Rules for their prompt
action so that this bill could be brought
up at this time, which is the earliest con-
sideration of the bill that could possibly
be accomplished.
Mr. Speaker, these two actions repre-
sent leadership on the part of the Com-
mittee on Armed Services and on the
part of the Committee on Rules.
Mr. Speaker, this bill is a very im-
portant one. As stated in the commit-
tee report, it is directed toward the sup-
port of our forces in Vietnam. All of us
understand the purpose of this bill.
When we are voting on this bill every
Member will appreciate the fact that he
or she is voting to give our boys who are
fighting in South Vietnam and carrying
out the word of our country and the obli-
gation of our country, and to act in ac-
cordance with the national interest of
our country, the means and the facili-
ties?the military means and facilities?
to accomplish the purposes that we have
in mind?to stop aggression and to bring
about as early as possible peace in this
area, and in the world.
Mr. Speaker, in connection with this
legislation there is the resolution of
August 10, 1964, which completely covers
the entire situation. In that resolution
we said, in unity with the Chief Execu-
tive, and to show the world the unity
between the Chief Executive and the
legislative branch, that the United
States?and I quote:
The United States regards as vital to its
national interest and to world peace the
maintenance of international peace and
security in southeast Asia. Consonant with
the Constitution of the United States and
the Charter of the United Nations and in
accordance with its obligations under the
Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty, the
United States is therefore prepared, as the
President determines, to take all necessary
steps, including the use of armed force, to
assist any member or protocol state of the
Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty re-
questing assistance in defense of its freedom.
Now, Mr. Speaker, the President has
the power and has had the power under
the reserved powers of the President as
Commander in Chief, but this resolution
was adopted at the time in order to show
the world the unity that existed be-
tween the executive branch and the legis-
lative branch of the Government of the
United States.
Mr. Speaker, we took the same course
of action in the Formosan resolution
when President Eisenhower was the
Chief Executive of our country. We
took the same course of action in the
Middle East resolution when President
Eisenhower was our Chief Executive.
Both of the resolutions are still the
law of our land, just the same as the
resolution of August 10, 1964, is the law
of the land today.
So, Mr. Speaker, the firmness of Presi-
dent Johnson in performing his duties as
Commander in Chief of our Armed
Forces, following in consonance with
this resolution, is the finest example of
leadership that could be evidenced by
any man.
If we had firm leadership in the thirties
when Hitler was around, the probabilities
are that World War II never would have
taken place.
If we had that firm leadership as
exemplified by the late Sir Winston
Churchill, I believe Hitler would never
have been permitted to go in and take
over Austria.
Those who felt that Hitler would be
satisfied were living in a dreamworld
of hope. Hitler was not satisfied. Then
followed the taking over of the Sudeten-
land?the forcing of the Czech Govern-
ment to cede the Sudetenland, an impor-
tant part of Ccezhoslovakia, to the Ger-
man Reich. They hoped Hitler would be
satisfied. But Hitler was not satisfied.
Later Hitler without opposition took over
the remainder of Czechoslovakia. Then
came the rape of Poland and then the
war.
We were dealing with a militant ag-
gressor in those years and we are dealing
with a militant aggressor today. There
is the calculated risk of action?yes.
But there is the calculated risk of in-
action. And the calculated risk of in-
action was evidenced in the thirties when
Hitler was permitted to go ahead?and to
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1:252 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? HOUSE March 1, 1966
go ahead?and to go ahead?finally
bringing about the great catastrophe
known as World War II.
So this bill is up today to enable our
boys and those of our allies to fight for
freedom and to fight against militant;
aggression. It is as important today that
we have firm leadership as it was im-
oortant in the thirties when firm, strong
leadership was lacking.
Sc' in voting for this bill today. I am
voting not only for the bill but I am also
voting again for the resolution that we
adopted on August 10, 1964, which was
adopted by an overwhelming majority
of both branches of the Congress. Thus,
we will convey to the actual and potential
anemy and also the rest of the world that
America, is united. They will understand
that message. They will understand that
action. They will ; understand that
language.
Mr. SISK. Mr. Speaker, on behalf of
he Committee on Rules, I express my
appreciation to the distinguished Speaker
of the House for his comments with
reference to our committee. I join with
him in his commendation of the Com-
mittee on Armed Services for their ex-
peditious handling of this bill.
nuther, Mr. Speaker, I join with our
distinguished Speaker in the very
eloquent way in which he has expressed
the position of the House of Representa-
tives, and join fully and wholeheartedly
with him in the hope that our vote will
be unanimous. I join with him, too, in
feeling that we will again be expressing
our support for the resolution which was
adopted in 1964.
Mr, Speaker, I reserve the balance of
my time.
(Mr. SISK asked and was given per-
mission to revise and extend his
remarks.)
Mr. SMITH of California. Mr. Speak-
er, I yield myself such time as I may use.
(Mr. SMITH of California asked and
was given permission to revise and ex-
tend his remarks.)
Mr, SMITH of California. Mr. Speak-
er, House Resolution 743 will provide for
hours' debate, an open rule so far as
amendments are concerned, waiving
points of order for the consideration of
H.R. 12889, to authorize additional ap-
propriations for fiscal 1966 for procure-
ment, of aircraft, missiles, naval vessels,
tracked combat vehicles, research, devel-
opment, test, evaluation, and military
construction. Points of order are waived
because of section 401(a) which appar-
ently provides additional leeway for the
use of funds previously appropriated.
The purpose of the bill is to authorize
additional appropriations in fiscal 1966
in the areas of weapon procurement, re-
search and development, and military
construction. These additional funds are
required because of the accelerating situ-
ation in Vietnam.
The authorization is broken down as
follows: $3,417.700,000 for procurement,
$151,650,000 for research and develop-
ment, $1,288,100,000 for military con-
struction, and $4,857,450,000 for total au-
t horization.
All services share in the authorization,
and in all parts of it. The Marines are
included with the Navy.
The committee has tightened up the
language submitted by the Department
of Defense in section 401 to insure that
funds appropriated for one purpose will
not be shifted to another, according to
the report. However, the requested rule
asks that points of order be waived, be-
cause of this very point. The language
in question is the last phrase of section
401, lines 14 and 15 on page 5 of the bill.
The committee also added an amend-
ment to insure that it would receive in-
formation prior to contract letting on
intended military construction. In the
same field, the committee added author-
izations to the bill for the Navy to con-
struct additional facilities at Okinawa
and Subic Bay. The Joint Chiefs ap-
proved the addition.
This authorization is not to be merely
a speeding up of fiscal 1967 actions, but
is to be in addition thereto. While testi-
mony on this subject and solid facts are
indecisive as to how much an increase
will be achieved, the committee has the
assurances of the Department of De-
fense and will keep a close watch on the
situation to see that an actual increase
is achieved.
Pages 5 through 21 of the report detail
the various construction projects, re-
search programs, and weapons covered
by the bill. Three billion one hundred
forty-nine million six hundred thousand
dollars alone is for aircraft, planes, and
helicopters. Also included are tracked
vehicles, missiles and missile ground
support equipment. Construction proj-
ects run the gamut from troop housing
to airfields and supply depots.
Finally, section 302 includes a $200
million authorization to provide the Sec-
retary of Defense with authority to pro-
ceed with any construction he finds vital
to U.S. security, wherever needed, to sup-
port our troops.
There is no minority report.
As stated by the distinguished chair-
man of the Committee on Armed Serv-
ices, Mr. RIVERS:
Our men are in South Vietnam. They need
weapons. This bill is an essential step in
providing t.Aose weapons.
Mr. Speaker, I know of no objection to
the rule, and urge its adoption.
Mr. Speaker, I yield 5 minutes to the
gentleman from Wisconsin Mr. LAIRD].
Mr. LAIRD. Mr. Speaker, I rise in
support of the pending legislation, which
is authorized by this rule. I hope that
the House will take prompt action on the
appropriation authorization. Our De-
fense Appropriations Committee has had
hearings on all items included in this
authorization bill and is ready to report
as soon as the authorization becomes
law.
The funds authorized in this bill are
needed now because our Defense Estab-
lishment is spread dangerously thin from
one end of this world to the other if we
are to meet all of the worldwide commit-
ments outlined by the Secretary of De-
fense iin his Senate testimony within the
past 2 weeks. Not to pass this legislation
would place reserve stocks for American
fighting men in a dangerous position in
some sections of the world.
We have Reserves and National Guard
troops that have recently enlisted in the
Reserve and National Guard that have
gone as long as 3 and 4 months without
fatigues in which to train. That fact
came out in the testimony before our
committee. Funds are needed and are
necessary to carry on worldwide commit-
ments of this Nation. I hope that the
House will move forward and act
promptly on this legislation.
Mr. Speaker, for the past, 10 clays our
Nation has witnessed confusion within
the administration on the U.S. peace
terms and future form of government in
Vietnam. This spectacle has produced
so much official fog that it can only be
harmful to the war effort.
It is time, indeed it is past time, for
the party in power to face its responsi-
bilities and offer clear, consistent leader-
ship with regard to our goals in Vietnam.
Instead, we see a continuing wrangle that
disputes whether we should be in Viet-
nam at all, what our aims are there, and
whether the right means are being used
to achieve these aims.
These divisions were brought to a
head when a prominent Democratic Sen-
ator proposed settling the problem of
Vietnam as the problems of Poland, of
Rumania, of Bulgaria, of Czechoslovakia
were settled after World War II?by
admitting the Communists to a share of
responsibility and power in government.
This proposal has triggered an outpour-
ing of contradictory statements and
doubletalk from administration spokes-
men.
Some spokesmen denounced the idea.
Vice President HUMPHREY declared:
Such a plan would be like putting a fox in
a chicken coop * * * an arsonist ii a lire
department.
Under Secretary of State George Bell
termed the Senator's suggestion "ab-
surd." McGeorge Bundy said the
United States is "not going to deliver
the South Vietnamese people to the ad-
ministrations of a Communist regime,
because that is what this war is all
about."
But, almost simultaneously, other of-
ficial spokesmen began to talk in differ-
ent terms. Gen. Maxwell Taylor, one of
the President's chief advisers on Viet-
nam, said the Senator's call for Com-
munist participation in the government
was "very, very close" to his own view.
However, just 2 days before, General Tay-
lor had told the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee that he did not see how "the
freedom of 15 million South Vietnamese
could be compromised." At the time
this was generally understood to mean
that General Taylor opposed any politi-
cal role in South Vietnam for the Com-
munists. The next day, February 23, the
Senator in turn seemed to back off from
his original proposal by saying that he
was not proposing that the Vietcong
should automatically have a share of
power in an interim preelection govern-
ment but was merely saying that they
should not be "automatically excluded"
from having it,.
Mr. Speaker, at almost the same time,
Bill D. Moyers, the White House press
secretary, said there was no disagree-
ment between the administration and
the Senator "if Senator KENNEDY did not
propose a coalition government. with
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4253
Communist participation before elections
are held." But then Moyers, when
asked what kind of government the ad-
ministration envisioned in the interim
Period between negotiations and elec-
tions, said this "should be left to the
negotiating parties."
Mr. Speaker, the same day the Presi-
dent in a speech attempted to answer the
question: Who has a right to rule in
South Vietnam? Unfortunately, he con-
fined himself to broad philosophy,
rather than addressing himself to the
questions raised by the Senator. The
President said:
The people must have this right?the
South Vietnamese people?and no one else.
Washington will not impose upon the people
of South Vietnam a government not of their
choice. Hanoi shall not impose upon the
people of South Vietnam a government not
of their choice. We shall insist for ourselves
on what we require from Hanoi; respect for
the principle of government by the consent
of the governed. We stand for self-deter-
mination?for free elections?and we will
honor their results.
At a news conference on February 26,
the President avoided the opportunity
to make the administration view clear.
He was asked:
Mr. President, to clear up some confu-
sion * * * about the role of the American
military in Vietnam could you set the rec-
ord straight on whether the American troops
in Vietnam are fighting to stabilize and
maintain a democratic, non-Communist gov-
ernment or whether their goal is to get free
elections in which the Communists might
emerge as a part of a coalition government?
The President replied:
Well, I would have to refer you to the
detailed statements of Secretary Rusk " *.
If they're not satisfactory, I would refer you
to the statements of the Prime Minister in
Honolulu.
Since Secretary Rusk and Prime Min-
ister Ky have not been in complete
agreement, this answer given by the
President is anything but helpful.
Premier Nguyen Cao Ky and Chief of
State Nguyen Van Thieu have both said
they would never deal with the Vietcong
or the National Liberation Front. Sec-
retary Rusk has said there is no insuper-
able obstacle to representation of the
Vietcong at a peace conference and that
the administration would accept any
government in Vietnam provided that
the elections were free.
On February 27, the debate within the
party in power reached new heights.
The Senator insisted that the adminis-
tration would be prepared to see Com-
munist elements in the government. The
Senator cited Mr. Moyers eight times as
support for his views although he agreed
that the administration had on some oc-
casions made conflicting statements.
The Senator pointedly said:
Statements that are made that we will
never deal with assassins and we will never
deal with murderers makes it difficult for
them to believe they are being asked to come
to the negotiating table other than to sur-
render.
The Senator also moved back to his
original position, saying that in return
for certain concessions, "we"?note he
does not say the South Vietnamese peo-
ple but "we"?"would see that they
played a role in the processes of the gov-
ernment, whether it is in the interim
period of time or in the final period of
time."
Vice President Hummarv, that same
afternoon, reminded the Senator that
the Vietcong was "not an Asian version
of Americans for Democratic Action"
and that he is "not going to be any part
of suggesting to the people of South Viet-
nam or any other government, that you
should reward the kind of banditry and
murder which has characterized the
Vietcong by giving it legitimacy in a gov-
ernment. I just do not believe in it.
There is no legitimacy to the National
Liberation Front. It is exactly what it
says it is, a front and we do not intend
to recognize it as a sovereign entity."
The Vice President also pointed out
the dangers in coalition governments
when he cited the situation in Laos to-
day. He described Laos as "a country in
turmoil; the Pathet Lao attacking,
backed by thousands of North Viet-
namese troops and moving in on the
Mekong River which if the Communist
attack is successful, would destroy the
hopes of the development of that vast
area."
Mr. Speaker, is it any wonder that a
member of the administration admitted
that "the credibility of our Government
has been assailed. We have a great
problem here maintaining our credibil-
ity with our own people." This remark
was made last December.
I call upon President Johnson to end
the confusion. Perhaps he is unable to
be as forthright as his Vice President,
but he should make unmistakably clear
whether he is supporting the suggestion
that the Vietcong be given a share of
power and responsibility in an interim
government and in a government estab-
lished after elections or whether he is
supporting his Vice President. The
American people have a right to know
exactly what it is their young men are
fighting for in Vietnam, and they have
the right to know it now.
Several Democratic Members of the
other body have endorsed the proposal
that the Communists be admitted to a
share of power and responsibility in the
Government of South Vietnam.
The longer uncertainty continues
about the attitude of the President to-
ward a settlement that would, in the
Vice President's words, "put the fox in
the chicken coop," the more difficult it
will be to maintain the morale of Amer-
ican fighting forces and the people of
South Vietnam. And the more difficult
it will be to justify American casualties
in a war that is presumably fought to
prevent Communists from forcing them-
selves into positions of power and re-
sponsibility.
Let there be no misunderstanding
about the issue. The question before
the President is not the ultimate gov-
ernment of South Vietnam after a free
election. The question is what is the
attitude of the United States toward in-
clusion of Communists in a government
that would rule until elections are held
and would determine the form of the
elections?a government that would de-
termine whether the elections would be
truly free.
Unless the United States is prepared
to oppose a coalition interim govern-
ment at a peace conference, South Viet-
nam will go the way of the satellite na-
tions of Eastern Europe and of Laos.
Mr. Speaker, if a coalition government
including Communist representation is
acceptable to the President?as it is to
many influential members of his party,
all the fighting in South Vietnam?all
the sacrifices?all the bloodshed?make
no sense, and they should not be further
prolonged.
Mr. REID of New York. Mr. Speaker,
will the gentleman yield?
Mr. LAIRD. I yield to the gentleman
from New York.
Mr. REID of New York, Mr. Speaker,
I would like to ask the gentleman a ques-
tion and make a statement before I ask
the question. I intend to support the
rule and to back strongly the President's
supplemental authorization of $4.8 bil-
lion to fully back our men in the field,
but I do think it is unfortunate, given
the importance and implications of the
legislation, that the House today is lim-
iting debate to merely 3 hours.
Mr. LAIRD. Debate and full consid-
eration of this request as well as the U.S.
commitment in this area of the world is
absolutely vital. I agree with the gentle-
man from New York and hope we proceed
in that fashion here in the House of
Representatives.
Mr. SISK. Mr. Speaker, I yield to the
gentleman from Virginia [Mr. ABBITT]
such time as he may consume.
Mr. ABBITT. Mr. Speaker, I support
the rule and the bill, H.R. 12889, the
supplemental defense authorization bill,
commonly known as the Vietnam mili-
tary bill. This legislation is of vital im-
portance, not only to our military men
fighting in Vietnam but to all Ameri-
cans.
Our boys, through no choice of their
own, are in Vietnam where they are be-
ing shot at, many of whom are being
wounded, mutilated and killed. It is in-
herent upon us to furnish them with all
necessary military material that is at our
command so that they will not be lack-
ing one whit to protect themselves and
to achieve the goals for which they have
been sent. We either must furnish every
needed article of offense and defense or
else it is our duty to pull them out. We
must support them wholeheartedly and
fully or else bring our boys back home.
It is not fair to them and it is not fair
to America to do less.
This is not the time to argue whether
we should be in Vietnam or whether we
should have gone. , We are there and
our boys are being killed by the Com-
munists daily. It is inherent upon us
to put up or get out and I call upon this
administration to do everything neces-
sary by way of supplying our men with
the needed munitions of war immedi-
ately and constantly and I, therefore,
wholeheartedly support this bill and
hope it will be passed unanimously.
(Mr. ABBITT asked and was given
permission to revise and extend his re-
marks.)
Mr. SISK. Mr. Speaker, I yield 3 min-
utes to the gentleman from California
[Mr. COHELAN].
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4254 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD -- HOUSE march I, 1966
(Mr. COHELAN asked and was given
permission to revise and extend his re-
marks.)
Mr. COHELAN. Mr. Speaker, I rise
in support of the rule and of the bill
which is to follow. I appreciate very
much the gentleman from California
giving me this time, which I have asked
for in order to present the following
statement in behalf of 78 Members of
the House of Representatives, and I un-
derstand there may be a few more com-
ing in before the day is over.
I understand that several of the 78
Members who signed this statement will
make additional remarks.
But as one who has just returned from
an inspection tour of Vietnam and who
served for 6 years on the Armed Services
Committee, I believe this statement
stands by itself as a timely and impor-
tant contribution to the discussion and
understanding of a critical issue:
We agree with President Johnson's state-
ment that "we will strive to limit conflict,
or we wish neither increased destruction nor
increased danger." We therefore reject any
eon tention that approval of this legislation
will constitute a mandate for unrestrained
or indiscriminate enlargement of the mili-
tary effort, and we strongly support con-
tinued efforts to initiate negotiations for
a settlement of the conflict.
We, in particular, wish to express our con-
currence with the President's statement of
last week in which he declared the Viet-
namese conflict to be a limited war ior
limited objectives calling for the exercise of
"prudent liminess under careful control."
That is the end of this statement, and
it is signed presently by 78 Members of
the House of Representatives. A list of
the signers is included below:
WILLIAM ANDERSON.
'VI:COMAS ASHLEY.
JONATHAN HINGHAM.
JOHN BEATNIK.
.10EIN BRADEMAS.
JAMES BYRNE.
itO BALD CAMERON.
trVTANUEL GELLER,
JEIRREY COHELAN.
JAMES CORMAN.
DOMINICK: DANIELS
WILLIAM DAWSON.
IJILARLES DIGGS.
Jo] IN Dow.
KENT DYAL.
DON EDWARDS.
GEORGE FALLON.
LEONARD EARBSTEIN.
DONALD ERASER.
%in-VE(1FL FRIEDEL.
IHGHARD FULTON.
ET)WARD GARMATZ.
ROBERT CITA LIVID.
.IAC OB OILBERT.
.To LIN GILL IGA
MARTHA GRIFFITHS.
RICHARD HANNA.
J LI& BUTLER HANSEN.
WH.LIAM HATHAWAY.
,GUSTUS HAWKINS.
KEN HECIILER,
HENRY HELSOICKI.
FLOYD HICKS,
Cu LET HOMPIELD.
ASSES HOWARD.
J. OLIVA HUM.
CIIARLES JOELSON.
HAROLD JOHNSON.
JAMES KEE.
CECIL KING.
El, I a, KREBS,
WILIERT LEGGETT.
CLARENCE LONG.
TORBERT MACDONALD.
HARRIS MCDOWELL, JR.
ROY MCVICKER.
JAMES MACKAY.
JOHN MACKIE.
SPARK MATSUNAGA.
LLOYD MEEns.
PATSY MINK.
WALTER MOELLER.
WILLIAM MOORHEAD.
JOHN MOSS.
LUCIEN NEWEL
ROBERT NIX.
JAMES O'HARA.
ARNOLD OLSEN.
EDWARD PATTEN'.
ME.LVIN PRICE.
HOLLAND LEDLIN.
'FLrcav[As REEs.
JOSEPH RESINICX.
HENRY REITG'S.
GEORGE Rooms.
BENJAMIN ROSENTHAL,
EDWARD ROY BAL.
FERNAND ST GERMAIN.
JAMES SG uEVIER.
OAR.LTON F2:ICKLES.
ROBERT SWEENEY.
HERBERT TENZER.
FRANK THOMPSON, JR.
PAUL TODD, JR.
MORRIS TJDALL.
LIONEL VAN DEERLIEL.
WESTON VIVIAN.
TESTER WOLFF.
Mr. SMITH of California, Mr.
Speaker, I yield 10 minutes to the gentle-
man from Iowa Mir. GROSS] and ask
unanimous consent that he be permitted
to speak ont of order.
The SPEAKER Is there objection to
the request of the gentleman from
California?
There was no objection.
(Mr. GROSS asked and was given per-
mission to revise and extend his
remarks.)
Mr. GROSS, Mr. Speaker, last week,
when the foreign aid supplemental au-
thorization bill was before the House, I
questioned the need for an additional
$100 million for the contingency fund
for a period of 120 days when $50 million
had been provided in the regular ap-
propriation for the entire current fiscal
year and 'not a dime tad been spent in
Vietnam.
I said then that money from the pre-
sent contingency fund was being used
by President Johnson, not in Vietnam
but to help the British in the boycott of
Rhodesia?in a joint and outrageous
effort to destroy that friendly govern-
ment which is seeking its independence
from Britain.
In addition to the use of contingency
funds, I am going to try to ascertain
before the day is over whether U.S. mili-
tary planes are being used in this repre-
hensible enterprise and, if so, on what
conditions; and by what authority.
The subject of "United States -British
Persecution of Rhodesia on last Thurs-
day brought the gentleman from Illinois,
[Mr. O'HartAll to the floor of the House
where he referred to Inc and proceeded
to unburden himself of a few remarks
from which I quote briefly:
Our position as regards Rhodesia --
He said.?
Is based upon our nationsa morality and our
sense of virtue * * *. Our virtues and
moralities do not change with the scenery
of different parts Of the world. What we
stand for * * * is the right of self-deter-
mination of peoples everywhere *.
cannot make it too clear that the issue in.
Rhodesia is essentially the same as the issue
In Vietnam.
Then he topped it off with this:
But we are not beholden to Britain, nor
Britain to the United States, becalt;e our
two countries think alike and act with
similar response when the virtues and
moralities are in issue.
I assume that when the gentleman
from Illinois says our "virtues," "moral-
ity," and support for "self-determina-
tion" does not change with the scenery
that these ingredients would apply with
equal force and effect to the city of Chi-
cago, among others. There, according
to reports, Mayor Daley, the nominal
head of the Democrat political machine,
with whom I assume the gentleman from
Illinois has at least a passing acquain-
tance, is accused by some Negroes and
whites of denial of the right to deter-
mine "the kind of lives they will make
for themselves and their children.''
A Negro leader has announced he will
be a candidate to unseat the mayor and
perhaps attention should be given, in the
interest of "virtue," "morality," and
"self-determination," to a boycott of Chi-
cago by the 50 States?a boycott in which
the virtuous British would be invited to
participate.
But let us take a quick trip abroad and
see, as the gentleman from Illinois says,
how well "our two countries?the United
States and Britain?think alike and act
with similar response when the virtues
and moralities are the same,"
Let us begin with Cuba, less than 100
miles off our shores. Perhaps, the gen-
tleman from Illinois [Mr. O'HARA I would
like to describe to the House the stand-
ard of "virtue," "morality," and 'self-
determination" the U.S. Government
ascribes to Fidel Castro. He might also
explain the British version of "virtue"
and "morality" which permits them to
trade as usual with Dictator Castro while
the latter supplies subversives and guer-
rillas to undermine the governments of
Latin America. and bleed this country of
money and troops, as in the case of the
Dominican Republic.
Perhaps the gentleman from Illinois
would also like to explain the "virtue"
and "morality" of British trade and
profits as usual with Communist North
Vietnam whose guns have killed 2,000
Americans and wounded another 11,000.
He might further explain by what stand-
ard of "virtue" and "morality" the Brit-
ish continued to trade with Red China
during the Korean war when 35,Wal
Americans were being killed and another
120,000 wounded. Without Red Chinese
troops, equipment and supplies in North
Korea there would have been little more
than a skirmish.
Turning now to Africa I can vemem-
ber how the society of bleeding hearts
in Washington hailed the establishment
of a so-called independent, self-deter-
mining government in Ghana. They
called it the African "showcase of de-
mocracy," and the dollars of American
taxpayers rolled in. Not too long after-
ward, the head of that government,
Nkrumahs also known as the "Re-
deemer," made a trip to Washington, re-
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ceived the red carpet treatment, and
promptly went on a national television
network to boast that he was a Marxist.
Thereafter, he kept the path hot to Mos-
cow, carrying high the torch for commu-
nism, at the same time grabbing the
money we so tenderly proferred him.
That worked so well that Dictator
Nkrumah either executed, or jailed and
held incommunicado, all self-determin-
ing opposition. Through the years since
1957, We heard of n9 strangling boycott
by the virtuous British, in which the U.S.
Government was joined to bring down
the tyrannical Nkrumah government
and provide freedom for the Negroes of
that land.
Can the reason be that the Rhodesians
unlike the British and Ghanians never
picked the pockets of American taxpay-
ers? For the Rhodesians the moral of
this story seems to be that if you want
to escape a boycott and economic pun-
ishment climb aboard the Johnson gravy
train as have the British, Ghanians, and
a host of others. The tried and tested
formula these days seems to be to grab
all the foreign aid possible, then stage
an insurrection, throw out the bad guys,
establish a military dictatorship, and
start the process all over again.
Incidentally, it would be interesting to
know the extent of Dictator Nkrumah's
masterminding, along with his Commu-
nist pals, including the notorious Ro-
berto Holden, of the massacres and
atrocities that have taken thousands
upon thousands of lives, black and white,
Protestant and Catholic, on the African
Continent in the last few years.
Now Ghana has just acquired a mili-
tary dictatorship and it will be interest-
ing to hear from the apologists, both in
and out a Congress, when it is expected
"virtue" and "morality" will take over.
Or is a military dictatorship now ac-
cepted as "self-determination"?
When it became apparent that the
showcase government of Ghana was in
reality a brutal tyranny, Nigeria was
then tauted as the new showcase. Prime
Minister Balewa was pro-Western and
an able man. But early this year Negro
troops of the Nigerian army cut him down
with their machineguns, along with some
of his Cabinet officials, and established a
military dictatorship. If there has been
a British-United States boycott of Nige-
ria for the purpose of establishing "vir-
tue," "morality," and "self-determina-
tion" for the Negroes of that African
country we have not heard of it.
Mr. Speaker, it was some 190 years ago
that a little band of men assembled on
this continent, announced they had ab-
sorbed enough abuse from the British
monarchy, and sued for their independ-
ence.
Promptly haughty Britain, then mis-
tress of the seas, threw a blockade on
this continent and attempted to strangle
the colonists economically. That failed
because, in part, the British could get no
help. France, a world power, helped
break the blockade.
A few months ago British subjects in
Rhodesia announced they, too, had paid
enough tribute to and taken enough dic-
tation from Britain. They announced
their independence.
Promptly the British Government es-
tablished a boycott in an effort to stran-
gle the Rhodesians economically and just
as promptly the shameless opportunists
In Washington announced they would
join and help bring the Rhodesians to
their knees.
Why have the ultraliberal opportunists
In Washington involved this Government
in still another affair on the African
Continent?a move that may well lead to
warfare?
Because, they say, Rhodesia, which has
been self-governing for two decades, "is
not yet ready for independence," and be-
cause the color line has been drawn too
tightly in Rhodesia.
These Washington opportunists have
apparently never read history or they
would know that the rebel colonies of
1776 had at hand a large population of
colored natives, Indians, and many thou-
sands of Negroes, none of whom were
recognized as a part of the community
for political or governmental purposes.
But laying aside for the moment the
history of our forefathers' successful
struggle to win freedom and independ-
ence from the leeching British in Lon-
don, it is unbelievably reprehensible that
the United States would now join Britain
in clamping a boycott on any friendly
country.
Rhodesia is a friendly country. It is
not and never has been an enemy. It
is strongly anti-Communist and has
offered to send combat troops to Viet-
nam even though they may be needed
at home if the British carry out their
threat to use military force. Whether
the British, in that case would use
Englishmen to kill Englishmen or hire
mercenaries as they did in 1776, is not
known at this juncture.
But by what authority did Lyndon
Johnson impose a boycott on trade with
Rhodesia? Article 1, section 8, para-
graph 3 of the Constitution of the United
States provides that Congress has sole
power to regulate commerce with for-
eign nations. No power is vested in the
executive to block foreign trade except
under laws which control trading with
the enemy and Rhodesia has not been
designated an enemy.
Additionally Congress, less than a year
ago, in legislation which bears the John-
son signature, amended the Export Con-
trol Act of 1949 to provide that:
The Congress further declares that it is
the policy of the United States (A) to oppose
restrictive trade practices or boycotts fos-
tered or imposed by foreign countries against
other countries friendly to the United States
and (B) to encourage and request domestic
concerns engaged in the export of articles,
materials, supplies, or information, to refuse
to take any action * * * which has the effect
of furthering or supporting the restrictive
trade practices or boycotts fostered or im-
posed by any foreign country against an-
other country friendly to the United States.
Mr. Speaker, I charge that President
Johnson, in his usurpation of authority
to regulate foreign commerce with Rho-
desia deliberately violated the Constitu-
tion of the United States, and I charge
that in the second instance, with refer-
ence to the Export Control Act, as
amended, he deliberately violated the will
and intent of Congress, if not the law.
4255
Yes, let us have virtue and morality but
let it begin here at home.
On the walls of this Chamber hang
two portraits and only two. One is that
of the man often referred to as "the
Father of his Country," George Wash-
ington, the first President of this Re-
public. It is not difficult to imagine what
Washington would say to those in this
country today who so blithely use the
power of the Government he welded to
join in destroying the Government of a
valiant little country seeking its inde-
pendence from British dominion.
The other gentleman we honor each
day is the Frenchman, Lafayette, with-
out whose help in breaking the British
boycott of 1776, it is doubtful that either
portrait would hang in this Chamber.
Instead, there would probably be one
portrait?that of King George III.
To those who now pander to the Brit-
ish, in view of their dealings with Com-
munist China, Communist North Viet-
nam, and Communist Cuba, I ask again
whether this Government is operated on
a standard of double, triple, or quadruple
morality?
Mr. SISK. Mr. Speaker, I yield to the
gentleman from Georgia [Mr. FLYNT].
Mr. FLYNT. Mr. Speaker, I support
the rule called up by the gentleman from
California [Mr. Simi and I support the
bill, H.R. 12889.
If the resolution referred to a few
moments ago during the debate on the
rule by the Speaker of the House of Rep-
resentatives were at issue today, I would
vote to reaffirm that resolution.
(Mr. FLYNT asked and was given per-
mission to revise and extend his re-
marks.)
Mr. SISK. Mr. Speaker, I yield to the
gentleman from Texas [Mr. WRIGHT].
(Mr. WRIGHT asked and was given
permission to revise and extend his
remarks.)
Mr. WRIGHT. Mr. Speaker, this de-
bate on Vietnam which has been going on
in the other body for some weeks, and
which we join in the House today, will
serve a national purpose if?instead of
producing recriminations?it makes us
face up to our present alternatives, which
are relatively few.
In conducting this debate, we need to
bear in mind that it could be hurtful to
the national purpose if it should result
in giving Hanoi and the Vietcong a false
impression of indecision and irresolution,
increasing their will to persist and thus
prolonging the war.
I do not mean to imply that we should
refrain from engaging in debate. The
right to debate this and any other issue
freely, both in this forum and through-
out the land, is the very thing for which
American men are dying in Vietnam
today.
But surely this particular bill, provid-
ing the military wherewithal necessary
to the successful conduct of the effort
to which the Nation is committed, must
pass. And it must pass overwhelmingly.
This bill is hardly a proper vehicle for
the expression of disaffection from our
national objectives. Let us express ver-
bally whatever reservations we may
sincerely feel, but a vote against this bill
would be almost unthinkable.
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It would be like coming upon a man in
the ocean, whose boat had capsized and
left him swimming, and?instead of
throwing him a lifeline?engaging in a
long, abstract debate about whether he
should have been in the ocean in the
first place. The time for discussion
would be atter the lifeline had been
thrown.
'today American men are engaging a
ruthless and relentless enemy in the
jungles of Vietnam. For the most part,
it did not ask to go. We sent them.
Certainly, by all that is right and holy,
we owe them the obligation to back them
up with the weapons, the tools, the ma-
teriel, and the united support that they
need.
leo]. any Member of this House to vote
against this bill today would not hasten
the end of the war. If any considerable
number of our Members were to do so, it
could result in unnecessarily extending
the war by planting false hopes in the
minds of our enemies. It has been their
central hope that, if they hold on long
enough, eventually we will weary of the
long, twilight struggle as did the French,
and ultimately withdraw. If we would
hasten their lying down arms and corn-
inc to the conference table, then let us
demonstrate clearly and forcefully to-
day that theirs is a vain and forelorn
hope. The best opportunity for such a
demonstration on our part would be by
a unanimous vote for the adoption of
this bill.
If we really will peace, then the peace
offensive and the military offensive must
go hand in hand. They must be con-
ducted with equal vigor, for one depends
upon the other.
We might as well pontificate on the
free coinage of silver or the admission of
slave States to the Union as to argue
about whether American troops should be
in Vietnam. The fact is that we are
there. The question is: Where do we go
from here?
Hardly anybody actually wants to tuck
tail and run, inviting an armed Commu-
Fast takeover. Few indeed are blood-
thirsty for a bigger war. Practically no-
body is really satisfied with the present
situation, and almost everybody yearns
for an honorable solution. In the search
I7or this elusive grail, we have been re-
peatedly frustrated.
Perhaps the clue to such a solution
may be found in a comment by President
johnson, 00011 receiving the Freedom
Award on February 23, wherein he said:
Wu ask who ins a right to rule in South
VeLunn. Our answer there is what it has
been here for 200 years: The people must
have this right?the South Vietnamese peo-
hle?and no one else.. We stand for self-
determination?for free elections?and we
will honor thou-result.
Part of the vulnerability of the South
Vietnamese to Vietcong propaganda
stems from the dismal fact that for the
; 2 years of its independent existence
South Vietnam has not elected its na-
tional leaders. They have had 10
Premiers in the past 2 years alone, and
not one of them chosen by the people.
Little wonder that so many in that land
snow limited enthusiasm for defending
Lien- freedom.
Think for a moment what a dramatic
thing it would be if the President should
publicly and formally propose to the
United Nations a clear-cut peace plan
based upon one simple keystone?the will
of the people.
To begin, the President could recom-
mend that a free election be held in all
of South Vietnam?not next year but
this year?in which it would be proven,
by ballots rather than bullets, just ex-
actly what government the people of
South Vietnam want to represent them.
He could propose that these elections
be supervised by the U.N. to avMd their
being falsely rigged by either side?and
be preceded by a U.N.-supervised 6-
weeks truce to provide a proper atmos-
phere for toeir conduct.
It would be necessary, of course, for
both combatant forces to agree in ad-
vance to respect and abide by the. results
of the elections. But on what defensi-
ble basis could Hanoi or the Vietcong
refuse? A turndown on their part would
expose as total fraud their pretenses at
representing the popular will, betray
their lack of faith in the people of South
Vietnam, and help turn the tide of Asian
opinion to our side.
Surely we would have nothing to fear
from such free elections. There has
been no truly free election anywhere in
the world during the past 15 years which
has given any real comfort to the Com-
munists. The South Vietnamese people
have demonstrated their desire to par-
ticipate. On last May 30, elections were
held throughout South Vietnam for pro-
vincial and municipal advisory councils.
In spite of Vietcong threats and intimi-
dation aimed at keeping peop[c away
from the polls, fully 70 percent of those
registered voted in the election even
though the officers elected were to have
very little real. authority.
As a second stage, we might want to
consider building into the plan a con-
crete proposal for similar free elections,
either 2 or 3 years hence, in ii hich all
the people of North and South Vietnam
could vote on unification as decreed in
the Geneva accords of 1954.
Both north and south profess to want
reunification of the country?but each
on its own terms. The Geneva agree-
ment specified that such nationwide elec-
tions would be conducted in July of 1956.
South Vietnamese leaders we never
satisfied that really free balloting would
result in the northern zone, and the
solemn agreement was never kept, Much
of the present bitterness stems f Tom this
failure.
A somewhat disturbing report in the
morning newspaper today quotes South
Vietnamese Premier Ky as saying that
his country has the "noble and supreme
task" of "liberating the North and re-
unifying the fatherland." Let us
devoutly hope that he does not mean a
reunification merely on his own terms
brought a bous solely by the force of arms
and unratified by popular vote, for this
would be as wrong in principle as the
evil against which we fight. The evil
of communism lies not in its name alone,
but in its policies and its methods. We
shall not defeat' it by mimicking those
methods. We shall defeat it ultimately
by demonstrating to the world that there
is a far better alternative by the way of
democracy, the way of the freely and
constitutionally expressed popular will.
We have repeatedly said that we stand
behind the Geneva accords, even though
we were not a signatory. This proposal
would be wholly consistent with our joint
declaration with Great Britain, made in
Washington on June 29, 1954, as re-
ported in the Department of State Bul-
letin, volume XXXI, which read:
In case of nations now divided against
their will, we shall continue to seek unity
through free elections, supervised by the
United Nations to insure that they arc con-
ducted fairly.
So actually we have said these things
before, at different times and places.
But most of the world, unfortunately,
does not know that we have said them.
Maybe we have not quite put them into
one simple package sufficiently dramatic
to constitute a clarion call to peace and
freedom in Asia.
At worst, it would put Hanoi on the
psychological defensive. If the overture
failed, then all the world would know
that we really had tried, and everybody
would have a clearer idea as to just what
we're fighting for?the right of every
people to have a government of their own
choice, and not one forced upon them by
anybody else. No longer, if Hanoi re-
jected the proposal, could the Vietcong
masquerade as liberation forces or accuse
us of trying to force our will upon their
country.
Surely this is one weakness in Senator
ROBERT KENNEDY'S proposal that the
Vietcong be admitted to a coalition gov-
ernment, for the impression arises that
we are bartering away the freedom of
South Vietnam.
The point is that we are not there to
impose on the South Vietnamese a gov-
ernment of our choice but to defend
their rights to a government of their
choice.
Let us make this crystal clear---so clear
that nobody can mistake or misconstrue
it. Such an assertion of our faith in the
democratic processes would show the
strength of our deepest national convic-
tions. It would be consistent with every
major civilizing development since the
Magna Carta.
We would be challenging the aggres-
sors to let the people decide?in the
forum of reason rather than the battle-
field of war. If they should refuse, it
would further condemn them even in the
eyes of Asians, perhaps gain us more al-
lies and certainly leave us in a better psy-
chological position if we are to stay and
fight.
And if they should accept, it might
pave the way to the conference table and
the honorable settlement for which all
men of good will so fervently yearn.
But if we would encourage the enemy
to join us on this or any other avenue to
peace, then we must demonstrate beyond
doubt that we have both the will and tile
means to triumph in the military phase
of this struggle against aggression, and
the patience to persist even in the face of
adversity. Unanimous passage of this
bill today would be one such clear dem-
onstration.
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Mr. SISK. Mr. Speaker, I yield to the
gentleman from California [Mr. HOLT-
FIELD] 5 minutes.
(Mr. HOLIFIELD asked and was given
permission to revise and extend his
remarks.)
Mr. HOLIFIELD. Mr. Speaker, I am
supp6rting this rule and I am supporting
the legislation. I think if a study of the
map of southeast Asia is made, you
could readily determine that we are not
fighting in South Vietnam just for 16
million people. We are fighting to keep
1 billion people from sliding into the con-
trol of Red China. That is what we are
fighting for.
In that 1 billion people, there are 85
million people, highly industrialized and
scientifically trained people in the nation
of Japan with a capability of making any
kind of plane or electronic gear or any
other kind of equipment that can be
used in war. This is the one thing that
Red China needs?the industrial capa-
bility of Japan.
We are fighting against the four-prong
formula of Communist conquest?infil-
tration, subversion, terrorism, and guer-
rilla takeover. If this formula of
Communist conquest is allowed to go
unchallenged, it will be used in every
country in southeast Asia and in every
country of the underdeveloped world.
Let no one believe that our surrender
and withdrawal from Vietnam would
bring peace in southeast Asia or in the
world. It would bring further use of
the formula of Communist conquest in
every country in southeast Asia and in
the underdeveloped world.
Peace cannot be established by the sur-
render to a dictator's forces of tyranny
and aggression. We cannot bring peace
to the world in that way. None of us
want war. None of us want our boys to
be killed in foreign jungles. We all want
peace and we all want to negotiate, but
we do not want to reveal every term of
possible negotiation before we get to the
negotiation table. That is not the way
that negotiation is successfully accom-
plished. Peace can be established in
my opinion by the support of just prin-
ciples by our country and hopefully by
other countries throughout the world.
Mr. Speaker, I yield back the balance
of my time.
Mr. SISK. Mr. Speaker, I move the
previous question on the resolution.
The previous question was ordered.
The SPEAKER. The question is on
agreeing to the resolution.
The resolution was agreed to.
Mr. RIVERS of South Carolina. Mr.
Speaker, I move that the House resolve
Itself into the Committee of the Whole
House on the State of the Union for the
consideration of the bill (H.R. 12889) to
authorize appropriations during the
fiscal year 1966 for procurement of air-
craft, missiles, naval vessels, tracked
combat vehicles, research, development,
test, evaluation, and military construc-
tion for the Armed Forces, and for other
purposes.
The SPEAKER. The question is on
the motion offered by the gentleman from
South Carolina.
The motion was agreed to.
No. 36-15
IN COMMITTEE OF THE WHOLE
Accordingly, the House resolved itself
into the Committee crf the Whole House
on the State of the Union for the consid-
eration of the bill H.R. 12889, with Mr.
CAREY in the chair.
The Clerk read the title of the bill.
By unanimous consent, the first read-
ing of the bill was dispensed with.
The CHAIRMAN. Under the rule, the
gentleman from South Carolina [Mr.
RivERs] will be recognized for 11/2 hours,
and the gentleman from Massachusetts
[Mr. BATES] will be recognized for 11/2
hours.
The Chair recognizes the gentleman
from South Carolina [Mr. RIVERS].
Mr. RIVERS of South Carolina. Mr.
Chairman, in that a little later, time may
be of the essence, I yield 10 minutes now
to the distinguished gentleman from New
York Mr. RYAN] .
(Mr. RYAN asked and was given per-
mission to revise and extend his re-
marks.)
Mr. RYAN. Mr. Chairman, I thank
the distinguished chairman of the Com-
mittee on Armed Services for having
yielded to me to start what I hope will be
a reasoned debate on the policy consid-
erations which should guide us in con-
sidering this very important bill today.
The bill before us authorizes a supple-
mental appropriation of $4.8 billion prin-
cipally for the procurement of aircraft
and missiles and the construction of
bases. The funds are needed, we are
told, for the war in Vietnam. This is
certainly not a routine authorization for
a routine appropriation. It is rather a
request for another brick in the arch of
congressional support which the admin-
istration is constructing for its policy.
Although the war is being fought without
a declaration of war, the President never
hesitates to remind the Nation that it is
being fought with the sanction and ap-
proval of Congress. The President made
It clear in his news conference on Febru-
ary 27 that he regards support of this
authorization for military appropriations
as an endorsement of the administra-
tion's Vietnam policy. If the President
considers this a matter of policy, so do I.
The basic issue is U.S. policy in Viet-
nam.
The question is not whether courageous
American soldiers, sailors, and airmen
are to be adequately equipped, supplied,
and protected in carrying out and ex-
ecuting their assigned missions. Of
course, as long as they are committed to
battle, they must be provided for prop-
erly. No one argues that. If this were
simply a bill to give supplies to the dedi-
cated men in the field, it would have my
full support. The real question is what
our goals and objectives in southeast
Asia should be and what strategy should
be adopted in an attempt to realize them.
It is not a matter of support for men in
combat, but whether they should be in
combat at all, or if they are, what their
missions should be in the context of what
strategy and what policy.
This is a bill to finance escalation, not
to finance an existing policy or decisions
already made. It is now before us, and
our responsibility is a heavy one.
We should understand, if not accept,
the fact that modern warfare is con-
ducted without a formal declaration of
war by Congress. We delude ourselves,
and we delude the American people, if we
pretend that Congress should ignore
policy when it authorizes the appropria-
tion of funds.
Let us admit it. Since the House grip
on the budget is the only hold it has on
foreign policy, an authorization request is
the only time when the House can re-
view foreign policy.
Yet the American people rely on Con-
gress to oversee foreign policy. I am re-
ceiving hundreds of letters about the
Vietnam crisis. I am sure we all are.
Unless we are prepared to tell our con-
stituents that they have come to the
wrong place?that they should write to
the President instead?we must at some
point take a stand. This bill is likely
to be our only chance.
We are entrusted by our constituents
to act in this, as in every matter, in their
interest and in the national interest.
Today is the third time in 2 years the
House has been called upon to express
Itself on our policy in Vietnam. It may
be the last time.
THE IMPORTANT DEBATE
Mr. Chairman, there is a crucial de-
bate raging within the councils of gov-
ernment, and this authorization touches
the fundamental issues. The important
debate is not about "withdrawal" or
"mindless escalation." Nor is it about
appeasement or bombing China. There
are no Chamberlains or Hitlers in seats
of power in this country.
Mr. Chairman, the U.S. objective in
Vietnam has not been clear. Most Gov-
ernment officials now agree on one of
two general objectives, and many of them
vacillate between the two. One's view
of what military and diplomatic strategy
to pursue really depends on which of
these objectives he believes that the
United States should seek.
The general objective sought by one
view is a limited one: to prevent the Viet-
cong from taking over South Vietnam by
force, and to end hostilities in such a
way that ultimately the United States
can honorably leave the country. Those
who favor this objective generally argue
that the United States can and should
only play a limited role in Asia. They
believe that a future Vietnamese Govern-
ment would be independent of China, at
worst a Tito-type situation. Therefore,
they are not overly troubled by the pros-
pect of a coalition government in Viet-
nam, reflecting the political realities.
This general view was expressed be-
fore the Senate Foreign Relations Com-
mittee by the distinguished diplomat,
George Kennan.
Those who take this line believe the
Vietcong must be a party to negotiations
and are prepared to accept an interim
coalition government. This was the es-
sence of Senator ROBERT F. KENNEDY'S
statement on February 20.
Furthermore, those who take this line
have a military strategy which they be-
lieve will lead to a solution. That strat-
egy is based on the theory that we must
show Hanoi and the Vietcong that they
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cannot win the war. This military strat-
egy has been most clearly outlined by
Generals Gavin and Ridgeway. Pro-
ponents of this view oppose escalation of
(Ale war.
The second general objective has been
gaining popularity within the adminis-
tration during the past month. It is a
much wider objective. It holds that the
United States should help the Saigon
government to gain control of South
Vietnam and to carry out an extensive
pacification plan which will deny the
Vietcong the allegiance of a significant
part of the population. Those who urge
this objective believe that, if South Viet-
nam goes Communist, the whole area of
southeast Asia will be jeopardized.
Conversely, they believe that, if the Viet-
cong are decisively defeated, Chinese
communism will be effectively contained.
Those who take this view are horrified
by the thought of an interim coalition
government?or by the prospect of elec-
tions which the Vietcong might win.
This is the line of reasoning which, ac-
cording to Senator FULBRIGHT, calls for
"total victory." It is the doctrine
espoused by the Secretary of State. Offi-
cials who follow this approach neces-
sarily react very sharply to Senator Roe-
ERT F. KENNEDY'S proposal.
!Those who take this line have a mili-
tary strategy of their own. They want
the United States to conduct search-and-
destroy missions?to drive the Vietcong
out of areas which they now control.
They then want our troops to "hold"
these areas, while pacification plans
proceed.
This is the strategy proposed by Vice
President HUMPHREY and Gen. Maxwell
Taylor. According to General Wheel-
er's testimony before the House Armed
Services Committee (hearings on H.R.
12334 and 12335, pp. 4932, 4933,
4949 ) , this is the strategy of General
Westmoreland. It calls, of course, for
a continually increasing U.S. troop com-
mitment. It believes that the U.S. role
in southeast Asia must be long term, and
that we will need many bases and supply
lines. In short, this is a policy of ex-
tended escalation.
Mr. Chairman, this crucial policy de-
bate may well determine the course of
0.S. domestic and foreign policy for the
next decade. It is a debate which Con-
press should not avoid. Otherwise, we
abdicate our responsibility and con-
tribute to the process by which the Ex-
ecutive determines when and where and
how to put this Nation to war.
Mr. Chairman. I am convinced that
the authorization which we consider this
afternoon deals directly with the sub-
stanee of this debate. As I will demon-
strate, it is an escalation authorization.
a my view, it deals directly with policy.
Iwor it in effect says to the President:
r-1.1.-e is the money with which to escalate.
If you do so, it is all right with us.
Mr. Chairman, it is not all right with
me. In my view of domestic and inter-
national policy, a wider war is not the
answer.
WIPLICAT[ONS OF MINDFUL ESCALATION
''-i CSC I want to make clear what I
understand the mindful escalation policy
to propose. It would impose a military
solution upon an essentially political
problem. My understanding of that
policy comes from reading the transcript
of the hearings before the House and
Senate Armed Services Committees,
reading dispatches from Vietnam in the
New York Times and Washington Post,
and listening to the recent speeches and
comments of President Johnson aid Vice
President Hu M PHREY
The object of the policy is to w pc out
the Vietcong, and to hold huge areas of
the Vietnam countryside while the
Saigon government carries on a program
of pacification. Its pi oponente hope
that the countryside can be cleared in 2
or 3 years?through intensive search and
destroy missions?but they believe that
the pacification of the countryside may
take a great many more years of realize.
Advocates of this escalated policy have
no illusions about its cost. They know
that it will take a great many men to
conduct the search and destroy missions;
more important, they know that it will
require a great many more men to hold
on the countryside once it has been ini-
tially cleared. While it would be nice to
believe that these tasks can be left to
the South Vietnamese themselves, advo-
cates of this policy are convinced that
the countryside cannot be held without
the presence of American troops in each
village and hamlet.
Most of those who urge mindful escala-
tion admit that the cost will he con-
siderable. They are calling for a mini-
mum of 400,000 American troops. Ac-
cording to Hanson Baldwin, writing in
the New York Times magazine on Sun-
day, February 27, all of the President's
military advisers agree that more than
double the present strength is essential.
Senator STENNIS has said 600,000 men
may be required. Seymour Topping re-
ported from Saigon in the New York
Times on .Pebruary 26 that military au-
thorities there expect that during peak
combat periods there would be at least
2,000 American casualties per month.
Mr. Chairman, I am not persuaded by
these military "experts." I might re-
mind my colleagues that the military
have been wrong before. It. wae Secre-
tary of Defense MacNamara, who upon
returning from Vietnam on Oci,ober 2,
1963, said the major part of American
forces would be home by Christmas, 1965.
I do not doubt that America has the
ability to defeat the Vtetcong and to se-
cure victory for the Saigon government.
But I am, neither convinced that the
allies could secure victory according to
their timetable, nor persuaded that the
total annihilation of the Vietcong is
worth the cost to America.
I have always taken General Mac-
Arthur's crisp comments on a land war
in Asia most seriously. Senator Cain
asked General MacArthur whether he
had told Secretary of State Dull is that:
Anybody who commits the land power of
United Stales on the continent of Asia ought
to have his head. examined.
MacArthur replied:
I don't know whether I made the state-
ment, but I confirm absolutely the seltiments
involved.
Military situation in the Far East:
Hearings before the Committee on Armed
Services and Committee on Foreign Re-
lations, U.S. Senate, 82d Congress, 1st
session, part 1, page 156.
I have also been impressed by the study
which Gen. Matthew B. Ridgway had
made on the conditions for a land war in
Indochina while he was the Army's Chief
of Staff. After reading the full reports
of the study, General Ridgway con-
cluded:
We could have fought in Indochina. We
could have won, i' we had been willing to
pay the tremendous coat in men and money
that such intervention would have required--
a cost that in my opinion would have even-
tually been as great as, or greater than, that
we paid in Korea. (See "Ridgway, Soldier:
The Memoirs of Gen. Matthew B. Ridgway,"
Harper & Row, 1056) .
Mr. Chairman, I think it is clear that
the cost of the policy of mindful escala-
tion may be just as great as the cost, of
the Korean war. In that war there were
157,000 casualties, including 54,000
deaths.
We have all perhaps read the report
published last month by Senator MANS-
FIELD upon his return from Vietnam. Its
conclusions are sobering. We would do
well to recall them this afternoon. The
report concluded:
Despite the great increase in Amuse in
mil-
itary commitment, it is doubtful in view of
the acceleration of Vietcong efforts that the
constricted position now held in Vietnam by
the Saigon government can continue to be
held for the indefinite future, let alone ex-
tended without a further augments ,ion of
American forces on the ground. Indeed, it
present trends continue, there is no assur-
an.ce as to what ultimate increase in Ameri-
can military commitment will be required
before the conflict is terminated. For the
fact is that under present terms of reference
an.d as the war has evolved, the question is
not one of applying increased U.S. pressure
to a defined military situation, but rather
of pressing against a military situation which
is, in effect, open ended.
The Mansfield report, it seems to me,
makes it indelibly clear that the :A sir can
be won only by literally multiplying the
numbers of American troops. It points
out that, when we began to increase our
troops after the authorization last May,
the Vietcong began to supplement their
forces correspondingly. The report also
point out that the Vietcong at the pres-
ent time "have the capability of a sub-
stantial increase in their numbers within
a short period of time." Although an
estimated 35,000 Vietcong were killed last
year, their ranks swelled from 103.000 to
230,000 during that time. At a minimal
guerrilla ratio of 5 to 1, it would have
been necessary to recruit 600,000 new
troops just to keep pace.
To put the matter more vividly, Secre-
tary of Defense McNamara estimates
that 4,500 North Vietnamese are infil-
trating South Vietnam each month. To
keep the current 4-to-1 superiority, it will
take 20,000 additional troops a month to
Vietnam.
A more depressing way of looking at
these statistics is offered by Prof. Ber-
nard Fall. He points out that the
traditionally accepted guerrilla ratio?
based on the experience of Malaya and
the Philippines?is 10 to 1. According to
U.S. News & World Report for March 7,
the Vietcong now have 235,700 men.
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Thus, an army of more than 2 million
men would be required to defeat the
Vietcong. At present the Saigon gov-
ernment has an army of about 570,000
men, but the manpower pool appears to
be pretty well depleated. Professor Fall
doubts that the Saigon government
could ever field an army of more than
1 million men. Therefore, to defeat the
Vietcong, he reasons, the United States
would be required to send at least a mil-
lion men to fight in Vietnam.
Mr. Chairman, I am troubled by the
escalation of this war for yet another
reason?the threat of Communist
China. The threat of Chinese interven-
tion must always remain a consideration
in any review of our role in Vietnam.
This is the area where our aspiration to
secure freedom may collide with China's
ambition to secure protective satellites.
We must look beyond the conflict in
Vietnam to the potential collision be-
tween the United States and China .
Prof. Roger Hilsman, Jr., former As-
sistant Secretary of State for Far East-
ern Affairs, testified before the Sub-
committee on Far Eastern Affairs of the
House Committee on Foreign Affairs on
February 1:
Today Communist China and the United
States are on a collision course. The out-
come can only be war.
The cost of war with China, Mr.
Chairman, would be inestimable.
Then there is the possibility that in
the face of mounting casualties the ad-
ministration will have difficulty in resist-
ing increasing pressure to end the land
war by using ultimate weapons on Hanoi,
Haiphong, or China.
Mr. Chairman, these are my concerns
about a policy of mindful escalation.
Yet I believe that an analysis of the
proposed authorization makes it clear
that continued escalation is precisely
what is intended.
AUTHORIZATION FOR ESCALATION
My study of the bill, hearings, and
Secretary McNamara's testimony before
the Senate and House Armed Services
Committees shows that virtually all of
the authorization is for procurement of
aircraft or missiles, and for bases and
other military construction. The rest is
for research. No new authorization is
asked for ammunition or supplies.
The bill before us is not simply de-
signed to keep the war at the present
level, but to permit the escalation of the
war in the discretion of the Executive.
The largest item in the authorization
bill is $3.4 billion for procurement of air-
craft and missiles. Almost all of this is
for the procurement of aircraft and air-
craft parts. This is not simply to re-
place aircraft which have been lost in
battle. In 1965, 275 fixed-wing aircraft
and 76 helicopters were lost. According
to Secretary McNamara, aircraft cost
less than _$2 million per plane. Thus,
less than $600 million are needed to re-
plenish the air force. Yet the bill au-
thorizes almost $3 billion for aircraft.
It is also worth noting that most of
the lost aircraft were lost in missions
over North Vietnam. Secretary McNa-
mara estimated that 169 of the 275
planes were lost over North Vietnam. It
seems fair to conclude that, if the De-
fense Department expects to lose more
planes this year than in did last year,
the losses will result primarily from a
stepped-up program of bombing in the
north.
We should be especially reluctant to
underwrite such a project. Bombing of
North Vietnam has neither brought the
North Vietnamese to the bargaining
table nor stopped the inflow of men and
munitions. Indeed, Secretary McNa-
mara estimates that infiltration from the
north has more than tripled since we
began the bombing. Senate hearings,
page 338. It should also be noted that
the intervention of regiments of the
North Vietnamese Regular Army came
about as a result of the bombing which
was started on February 7, 1965.
In his testimony before the Senate
Armed Services Committee Secretary
McNamara explained at page 132-133
that the authorization is not just for
replacement of planes:
It does include added inventory.
He explained:
We are providing for procurement of air-
craft to be added to the force or modernize
the force, rather than to replace potential
losses.
As for helicopters, Secretary Mc-
Namara stated:
The number of helicopters that we are
buying far exceeds any number that we are
likely to lose, and far exceeds any number
that would be required to modernize units
in the forces as of July of last year. (Senate
hearings, p. 191.)
Besides the procurement of aircraft
and missiles, the other major request in
the authorization bill is for military con-
struction; $1.2 billion are requested for
this purpose. Certainly there is a need
for increased port facilities and access
routes to transport supplies to the men
who are already in Vietnam. Also, hos-
pitals, housing, and community facilities
are needed. But the bill goes beyond
this by providing for the construction
of airfields and ports which will allow
continued escalation of the war without
further action by Congress.
Thus, in explaining the administra-
tion's request for funds, Secretary of De-
fense McNamara said:
We will be prepared to house and support
additional units if their deployment should
be required in the future. (Senate hearings,
p. 12.)
Following this theme, the House Com-
mittee on Armed Services Report at page
16 states that the money is needed "to
achieve and maintain objectives in
southeast Asia under present force de-
ployments and to provide a base for aug-
mentation thereof."
Furthermore, other policy decisions
appear to be hidden in this authorization
bill. Only about one-half of the $1.2
billion request for military construction
will be spent in South Vietnam; $346
million will be spent on "other" parts of
the Asian mainland?presumably in
Thailand.
The decision to build new military air-
fields, ports, and facilities in Thailand
may seem desirable militarily, but it also
appears to represent a decision to broad-
en the base of the war. Similarly, many
of the new airfields and ports will be
built?under this authorization?with
cement, rather than with temporary
construction materials such as alumi-
num matting. This would seem to sug-
ges:; a decision to build military ports
and airfields which will last for a long
time to come.
Mr. Chairman, my conclusion that this
authorization will be considered as con-
gressional approval of mindful escalation
is drawn largely from the testimony of
the Secretary of Defense before the
House and Senate Armed Services Com-
mittees. At one point in the Senate
hearings, page 105, for example, the
following exchange took place between
Secretary McNamara and Senator
SMITH:
Senator SMITH. Mr. Secretary, are there
any plans to escalate and step up the offen-
sive in Vietnam?
Secretary MCNAIVIARA. Well, there are prep-
arations being made, and they are reflected
in the fiscal 1966 supplement, for substan-
tially increasing our deployments to South
Vietnam and raising the rate of activity of
our air units there. Whether or not we will
carry out such higher rates of activities and
actually deploy all of those additional forces
is a decision that only the President can
make, and no such decision has yet been
made.
Mr. Chairman, I believe that Congress
should have some voice in the decision
about whether to escalate this war rather
than stabilize it. Yet as Secretary Mc-
Namara's statement makes clear, this
authorization would put that decision
squarely and solely in the hands of the
President.
Mr. Chairman, I think it is important
to point out that the House Armed Serv-
ices Committee report expresses the com-
mittee's view that there was inconclusive
evidence that the authorization is neces-
sary for this fiscal year. It states this
doubt at page 3:
If there is one reservation felt by many
members of the committee regarding the
necessity for this legislation, it arises from
the possibility that many of the items in-
volved, in all three categories of procurement,
research and development, and construction
may simply have been moved from the
regular 1967 authorization to this supple-
mental 1966 authorization without any real
program for acceleration. Obviously no
military advantages would be gained by such
a bookkeeping situation. Testimony on this
subject was indecisive and the committee has
not yet been provided with sufficient defini-
tive data to pinpoint the exact degree of real
acceleration, or to determine the amounts
Involved in the proposed legislation which
could safely and should properly be deferred
until the regular 1967 authorization.
I would suggest that the administra-
tion has asked for this authorization for
yet another reason, not connected with
military necessities or bookkeeping. It
wants a congressional authorization
which it can cite as evidence of approval
of the strategy of escalation.
Mr. Chairman, this is not a simple
authorization to continue the war at its
present level. We should not pretend
to ourselves or to the American people
that it requires no policy judgment on
our part. This authorization represents
the administration's decision to make it
easy to escalate the war in the future.
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THE NATURE OF THE COMMITMENT
There are those who believe that Viet-
nam marks the single great battleground
of freedom. They argue that we should
be prepared to send every soldier, every
plane, and every bomb that we have to
gain control of that country.. If the
government of Saigon does not triumph,
they argue, no country can be assured
of freedom.
Mr. Chairman, let us examine the na-
ture of our commitment to Vietnam.
Until this month, the administration
argued that it was based on the state-
ments and policies of three American
Presidents.
The most. important building block in
this argument was President Eisenhow-
er's letter to President Diem on October
23, 1954. The letter said:
We have been exploring ways and means
to permit our aid to Vietnam to be more
effective and to make a greater contribution
to the welfare and stability of the Govern-
ment a Vietnam. I am, accordingly, in-
structing the American Ambassador to Viet-
nam to examine with you in your capacity
as Chief of Government, how an intelligent
program of American aid given directly to
your Government, can serve to assist Viet-
nam in its present hour of trial, provided
that your Government is prepared to give
assurances as to the standards of perform-
ance it would be able to maintain in the
event such aid were supplied.
The purpose of this offer is to assist the
Government of Vietnam in developing and
maintaining a strong, viable state, capable
of resisting attempted subversion or aggres-
sion through military means. The Govern-
ment of the United States expects that this
dC will be met by performance on the part
o( the Government of Vietnam in undertak-
ing needed reforms. It hopes that such aid,
combined with your own continuing efforts,
will contribute effectively toward an inde-
pendent Vietnam endowed with a strong
Government. Such a government would, I
hope, be so responsive to the nationalist
aspirations of its people, so enlightened in
Purpose and effective in performance, that
it will be respected both at home and abroad
and discourage anyone who might wish to
impose a foreign ideology on your free people.
For a while the administration main-
timed that our military commitment
stemmed from this letter. But that argu-
ment has since been discredited. It was
Oral, deflated in a 1965 essay by Arthur
Larson, who was Director of the U.S. In-
telligence Agency under President Eisen-
hower. Larson goes through the lette:r
sentence by sentence and concludes:
The nearest thing to a commitment at this
atage was an indicated willingness, subject
to some stiff (and as yet unsatisfied) condi-
tions and understandings, to provide eco-
nomic and technical assistance, including
military advisers, material, and training"
(Larson, "Vietnam and Beyond.")
Then, on August 17, 1965, President
Eisenhower settled the question sur-
rounding his letter once and for all.
We said we would help that country?
lie said--
We were not talking about military programs,
but about aid. (See Max Frankel's article
-Military Pledge Is Denied by Eisenhower,"
New York Times, Aug. 18, 1965.)
After President Eisenhower refused to
accept responsibility for our military in-
volvement, the administration turned to
a treaty and congressional declarations
to explain the root of our commitment.
It pointed to the SEATO Treaty and two
principal actions of the Congress?the
Gulf of Tonkin resolution of August 1964
and the $700 million supplemental ap-
propriation for military activities in
southeast Asia which passed the House
on May 5, 1965.
In his testimony before the Senate
Foreign Relations Committee, Secretary
Rusk said on February 18 that our com-
mitment to Vietnam grew out of SEATO.
"It is this fundamental SEATO obliga-
tion that has from the outset guided our
actions in South Vie'inam," he said.
However, our obligation under SEATO
is clearly limited under the treaty. In
the first place, the testimony, Senate re-
port, and Senate debate which sur-
rounded the passage in 1954 of the
Southeast Asia Treaty make it clear that
instances of Communist subversion, in-
spired from without, were to be treated
under article IV paragraph 2 of the treaty
which says:
Tf, in the opinion of any of the parties,
the inviolability or the integrity cf the ter-
ritory or the sovereignty or political inde-
pendence of any party in the treaty area or
of any other state or territory to which the
provisions of paragraph 1 of this article from
time to time apply is threatened in any way
other than by armed attack or is affected
or threatened by any fact or situa-
tion which might endanger the peace
of the area, the parties shall consult imme-
diately in order to agree on the measures
which should be taken for the common de-
fense.
Instead, Secretary :Rusk relies upon
article en. paragraph 1.? which says:
Each party recognizes that aggression by
means of armed attack in the treaty area
against any of the parties or against any
state or territory which the parties by unani-
mous agreement may hereafter designate,
would endanger its own peace and safety,
and agrees that it will in that event act
to meet the common clanger in accordance
with its constitutional processes. Measures
taken, under this paragraph shall be immedi-
ately reported to the Security Cott mil of the
United Nations.
Even if paragraph 1 of article IV were
applicable, the nature of our obligation
to Vietnam would be limited.
As Secretary of State John Foster
Dulles told the Senate Foreign Mations
Committee at page 14 of the Senate hear-
ings on the treaty:
We made clear at Manila that :1: was not
the intention of the United States to build
up a large local force including, for example,
U.S.. ground troops for that area, but that
we rely noon deterrent power of our mobile
striking force.
It was apparent to the signers of the
treaty, ta the Eisenhower administra-
tion, and to the U.S. Senate that the
treaty did not involve any promise to
commit American ground troops to Asia.
Senator Alexander Smith, one of the two
U.S. Senators to accompany Mr. Dulles
to the treaty conference in Manila, em-
phasized this point in the debate on the
Senate floor.
Senator Smith said:
The great contribution which this country
is capable of making to the defense of south-
east Asia in the event of an act of open
aggression would be, as Secretary Dulles has
said, to strike at the source of aggression
rather than to rush American manpower into
the area to try to fight a ground war. We
have no purpose of following any such policy
as that of having our forces involved in a
ground war. (CO.NGRESSIONAL RECI /1E, 84th
Cong., 1st sess., p. 103.)
Article IV paragraph 1 is only opera-
tive in the event of an open armed at-
tack. If such an attack should occur,
each state agrees to "act to meet the
common danger in accordance with its
constitutional processes." This provi-
sion helped to assuage the doubts of a
Congress which was troubled that the
Korean war had been fought without, a
declaration of war. It make it clear that
the treaty signatories are not bound to
take any action without going through
the appropriate constitutional channels.
Thus, the President of the United States
is obligated to consult Congress before
meeting the obligations of the treaty.
Moreover, the treaty requires that
"Measures taken under this paragraph
shall 'be immediately reported to the Se-
curity Council of the United Nations."
Yet, if we accept Secretary Rusk's con-
tention that we have been acting in
Vietnam under this treaty since 1954, we
should recognize that for the first decade
we were violating the treaty by not re-
porting the measures taken to the
Security Council.
The framers of the SEATO treaty did
not contemplate our involvement in an
Asian land war, and we have not acted
in accord with the provisions of the
treaty. SEATO should not be consid-
ered the source of our increasing com-
mitment in Vietnam.
President Johnson has also often
said that our commitment to Vietnam
was sealed by the Gulf of Tonkin. resolu-
tion.
However, the Gulf of Tonkin resolu-
tion in August of 1964 did not contem-
plate extending the war to North Viet-
nam, nor the landing of large American
armies in Vietnam.
That resolution is cited as the legal
basis although before it was ad ipted in
the House and Senate the Senate debate
made it clear that the resolution was an
affirmation of the then existine policy.
Senator FULERIGHT, in making the leg-
islative history of that resolution, had
the following exchange with Senator
MCGOVERN:
Senator McGOVERN. Does the Sena tor
think there is any danger in this resolution
that we may be surrendering to General
Khanh's position as to where the war should
be fought? (General Khanh had ad vocateci
attacking North Vietnam.)
Senator FULBRICHT. I do not thi Ilk there
Is any danger of that. * * * I do not think
the policy that the war be confined to South
Vietnam has changed. I think it is still the
policy .I think it is the correct one.
Later in the debate, Senator BREW-
STER asked:
So my question is whether 'there is any-
thing in the resolution which would au-
thorize or recommend or approve the land-
ing of large American armies in Vietnam or
in China.
Senator FULBRIGHT replied:
There is nothing in the resoluta:in, as I
read it, that contemplates it.
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Senator FtiLBRIGHT during the debate
also said:
I personally feel it would be very unwise
under any circumstances to put a large land
army on the Asian Continent.
Mr. Chairman, in my view the policy
pursued in Vietnam was not contem-
plated by the resolution of August 1964.
Last May 5 the administration asked
House approval of a supplemental ap-
propriation of $700 million for military
activities in southeast Asia not because
the appropriation was necessary but be-
cause the administration candidly
sought congressional approval for a new
departure in policy.
No longer was the United States aid-
ing the South Vietnamese to fight their
own war. The United States was fight-
ing the war. I voted against that bill
because I was not willing to vote ap-
proval of the decision to convert the
conflict into an American war. The
administration had not defined its ob-
jectives, and there had been no congres-
sional debate.
On May 5 there were 34,000 American
Armed Forces personnel in South Viet-
nam. Today there are 210,000 and 6
divisions.
The war has indeed escalated, and the
administration cites the $700 million
supplemental appropriation vote of
May 5 as another legal basis for our
commitment as well as one of the bricks
in the arch of congressional support.
Let there be no mistake about it.
Today's vote will be similarly construed.
Mr. Chairman, there is yet a third ex-
planation for our commitment to Viet-
nam?one which invokes American his-
tory and evokes America's idealism. In
his speech at Freedom House on Febru-
ary 23, President Johnson appealed to
the traditional American devotion to lib-
erty. We are in Vietnam, he said, to
"keep the faith for freedom."
In his speech last week, President
Johnson recalled President Roosevelt's
four freedoms. Freedom of speech, free-
dom of religion, freedom from want, and
freedom from fear. I agree that we are
dedicated to these freedoms at home and
abroad. But our commitment is no less
great in Paraguay, Spain, or Southern
Rhodesia than it is in South Vietnam.
Do we not have as strong a moral respon-
sibility to "keep the faith for freedom"
for the people of Cuba and Hungary as
for the people of Indochina?
In these cases the United States has
recognized that it cannot join the bat-
tles of every nation in the world. We
should send economic aid; we should ex-
ert diplomatic and economic pressure;
we should set a personal example; we
should strengthen the United Nations;
but we cannot commit ourselves to fight
an unlimited military war in every case
of injustice.
Our friends around the world recog-
nize that no matter how great our love
for freedom, our resources are not omni-
potent. They know that we are pre-
pared to use our full resources to stop
armed aggression, as in Berlin, and to
defend ourselves against a nuclear threat,
as in Cuba. However, they do not expect
us to devote all of our resources to the
battle in Vietnam. Many of the world's
leading diplomats no doubt share the
view of George Kennan, the distinguished
former Ambassador to Yugoslavia and
the Soviet Union:
Not only are great and potentially more
important questions of world affairs not re-
ceiving as a consequence of our preoccupa-
tion with Vietnam, the attention they should
be receiving, but in some instances assets we
already enjoy, and hopeful possibilities we
should be developing, are being sacrificed to
this unpromising involvement in a remote
and secondary theater of activity.
Most of the world's leaders seem to be
baffled and distressed?rather than
heartened?by our increasing involve-
ment in Vietnam.
Whatever the nature of the commit-
ment may be, we are clearly not obligated
to pursue a policy of continued escalation
which involves a full-scale land war on
the Asian mainland.
ALTERNATIVES TO ESCALATION
Mr. Chairman, there are realistic al-
ternatives to the extended escalation
policy implicit in this bill, and they
should be considered before we embark
upon a wider war.
I want to make it clear that I do not
consider pulling out to be an acceptable
course of action. The damaging effect
of withdrawal upon our prestige and our
relations with other countries of south-
east Asia and our allies elsewhere would
be severe. The consequences for Cam-
bodia and Thailand must be recognized.
We are past the point of unilateral with-
drawal even if it would have been sensi-
ble?which I do not suggest.
The decision has been made without
being formally made. We do have a
pledge to the freedom of the people of
South Vietnam and their right to freely
choose their own government. However,
within the framework of that pledge,
there are reasonable and honorable al-
ternatives.
In past speeches before the House, I
have made specific proposals for a diplo-
matic resolution of the conflict. I be-
lieved they were meritorious when I out-
lined them on June 10, 1964, and again
on February 24, 1965.
Although conditions have changed and
we have Americanized the war, I still be-
lieve they should be pursued.
They should be explored in a stabilized
situation, not an intensified war. If we
follow what might be called the Gavin-
Kennan-Fulbright-Hilsman plan, we can
hold Saigon, the provincial capitals, and
our own bases, while we support the
South Vietnamese as long as they are
willing to carry forward counterguerrilla
warfare and programs of economic and
social reform.
This would bring about a deescalation
of our military involvement in South
Vietnam which should be accompanied
by a cessation of :the bombing in North
Vietnam. While pursuing this military
strategy, we should continue to press for
negotiations.
Mr. Chairman, I have consistently said
that the conflict in Vietnam was not sus-
ceptible to a wholly military solution?
that it would be won not on the battle-
field but in battle for men's minds, that
the Government must win the confidence
of the people, that we could help with
support?but that our power must be ex-
ercised in a supporting role for the bene-
fit of the underdeveloped peoples. We
must assist development, not insist on
domination.
This raises the whole question of our
intervention policy, whether in ViOtnam
or Santo Domingo or in any one of the
40-odd nations with which Dean Rusk
reminded us we have treaty obligations.
Of course, we cannot withdraw from the
world. Neither neoisolationism nor the
doctrine of military might should guide
our actions. George Kennan said at
hearings of the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee on February 10 that we
should not be asked "to shoulder the
main burden of determining the political
realities in any other country." The ad-
ministration has sought to create a vital
interest where there was a stake but not
a life or death embrace.
Mr. Chairman, our obligation to the
freedom of the South Vietnamese did not
require nor commend increasing escala-
tion and a further influx of American
combat troops. Rather it commended
to us a search for political and diplo-
matic alternatives. In the interest of
aiding that search, eight of us sponsored
on January 21 and 22, a conference of
experts and scholars to examine and
analyze the situation in Vietnam, pre-
pare realistic proposals to facilitate a
negotiated settlement and to project the
framework of a creative Far Eastern for-
eign policy.
The report of the ad hoc Congres-
sional Conference on Vietnam was issued
on February 15, 1966. Our colleague, the
gentleman from New York [Mr. ROSEN-
THAL], deserves our commendation for
his initiative in this project. While I do
not necessarily subscribe to all of the
conclusions and recommendations in
that report, I believe they point to the
general direction our policy should take.
Therefore, I include the foreword and
the conference recommendations at this
point in the RECORD:
AD HOC CONGRESSIONAL CONFERENCE ON
VIETNAM
FOREWORD
On January 21 and 22, 1966, a group of
experts and scholars met in Washington at
the invitation of eight Members of the House
of Representatives to analyze the current
situation in Vietnam and prepare realistic
proposals to help end the war and facilitate
a negotiated settlement.
The sponsoring Congressmen have felt un-
satisfied with the recent role of Congress in
foreign affairs. They believe their office re-
quires a more fundamental examination of
foreign policy than that allowed by even the
most careful consideration of specific legis-
lation. The sponsors are convinced that the
level of congressional analysis can be raised
through greater intimacy between the legis-
lative branch and the intellectual and uni-
versity community. It was with this in mind
that they invited to Washington a group of
experts particularly qualified to discuss with
them Vietnam and its implications for Amer-
ican diplomacy.
Some of the participants have spent con-
siderable time in Vietnam, and have obtained
intimate association with conditions there.
Others offered the important perspectives of
experience in negotiation, study of eco-
nomics, diplomacy or international law, or
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expert knowledge of relevidit geographical
areas.
ll'articipants were requested not to dwell
on episodes. or errors of the past. Instead,
they were asked to discuss present policies
and possible alternatives to them; to analyze
the problems involved in reaching and en-
forcing a settlement in Vietnam; and to pro-
ject the outlines of a creative American pol-
icy toward Asia.
Certain conclusions and recommendations
emerged in the discussions and these are
:aided explicitly at the beginning of the re-
port. The subsequent summary of the dis-
sex E Si011 S also includes some individual points
which contributed to the analysis, although
they were not unanimously endorsed.
The sponsors regard the proposals made by
the conference as important contributions to
their own thinking about Vietnam and the
formulation of American foreign policy.
They feel the report deserves the attention
of their congressional colleagues, members of
I,he executive branch, and the American
people. Finally, they view the conference
as having set an important precedent for
fixture congressional initiatives in foreign
affairs.
N NICE RECOMMENDATIONS
The Conference reached the recommenda-
tions and conclusions set out below. A sum-
mary of the discussions from which they
were developed follows.
Vrcsent strategies
1. There are diplomatic alternatives, not
yet fully explored, to continued military
eocalation of the war in Vietnam.
7. Continued bombing of North Vietnam
is not in the American interest either in
shortening the war or in improving prospects
for a negotiated settlement.
3. There should be no further escalation
of American troop commitment. There are
serious risks of inviting greater North Viet-
namese and Chinese activity.
4_ Unilateral withdrawal of all American
troops prior to a cease fire or peace confer-
ence is not in our national interest.
how policy initiatives
5. The most productive course for the
future h; a deescalation of military activity
and commitment.
6. The National Liberation Front must be
recognized as a principal belligerent in the
war, and as a necessary party to any peace
conference and settlement.
7. To improve the likelihood of negotia-
tions, the Saigon government should be
broadened to include representatives less
:hostile to negotiations.
6. The United States must help promote
greater contact between all South Vietna-
mese factions--representatives of the Na-
tiinril Liberation Front, the Saigon govern-
ment, and influential private citizens.
Negotiations and the convening of a
conference
.). The difference between the several ne-
gotiating positions is not insurmountable.
The United States might agree to Hanoi's
four points, treating them as one interpreta-
tion of the 1954 agreement and thus an ap-
propriate basis for negotiations. The con-
troversial point three of the Hanoi program
would then he a subject for subsequent dis-
eixesion rather than prior approval.
ia. The 1954 Geneva Conference should be
reconvened with all parties to the hostilities
represented.
1 le A procedure for reconvening the Ge-
neve Conference would be to have the three
nations on the international Control Com-
mission (Canada, India, Poland) request a
conference to receive new instructions on
enforcement of the 1954 agreements.
17. The inability of the United Nations
thus far to use Its good offices to help end
the Vietnam war dramatizes the urgency of
including China as a full member of that
institution. Despite the difficulties of in-
volving the U.N. in a se Alement of the war,
all parties should seek opportunities to
utilize the United Nations in appropriate
ways.
Terms of a settlement'
13. A cease-fire must be secured. Given
the dispersed. nature of the conflist, a cease-
fire might be more easily reached at a con-
ference, though the possibility of a prior
cessation of hostilities should be explored
carefully.
14. Agrimmcnt must be reached on a pro-
visional government in South Vietnam and
procedures for the holding of elections to
form a ccuistiment assembly. A la-ovisional
government might be established on the ba-
sis of geographical areas contrtiled, with
contested areas to be administered tempo-
rarily by ihe International Contrel Commis-
sion. Alternatively, decisions regarding such.
a government could be reached by prior ne-
gotiations between all parties in the south.
15. All parties moist firmly adhere to the
results of free elections.
16. Amnesty must be cranted I'm all par-
ties in the conflict.
17. Guarani:33es of the cease-fire, the provi-
sional government, free elections, troop with-
drawals, amnesty, and neutralizatien must be
enforced by an effective International Con-
trol Commission. The International Control
Commission must, therefore, be sienificantly
strengthened. United Nations participation
in this pr :mess might reduce adrxenistrative
difficulties and set precedent far future
United Nations participation in the solution
of other civil conflicts threatening world
peace.
lb. A settlement should assure the neu-
tralization of the two zones of Vietnam, Laos,
and Cambodia. Arms control aereements
must be reached applying to other nations
of the area, prescribing their nonparticipa-
tion in military alliances, the freedom of
their territory for foreign military hates, and
their protection from outside arms, material,
and armed personnel infiltration.
Mr. Chairman, these 13 points by no
means exhaust the possibilities for nego-
tiations. Rather, they indicate the di-
rection in which our policy should, in my
view, be directed. Unfortunately, our
policy does not now appear to be headed
In this direction. During the oause in
the bombing in December and January
the administration appeared genuinely
to seek negotiations. There war, no ap-
parent response from Hanoi to the Pres-
ident's peace offensive, and the adminis-
tration appears to doubt the possibility of
negotiations.
But this Nation should never abandon
the search for peace. We should never
abandon ourselves to all-out war. We
are not only the strongest nation on
earth, we are the most ingenious. We
have an unflinching belief in the law, and
we have a great tradition of domestic
Peace preserved by the law. It is in this
tradition that II have a great belief in the
possibility of world peace through world
law. Or, more precisely, I believe that
world law is our only hope for world
peace.
It was with this faith in international
law that the United Nations was founded
some 20 years ago. It was founded by
men who had learned a lesson far more
profound than the lesson of Munich or
Manchuria or Ethiopia. They had
learned the lesson of London, of Berlin,
of Paris, of Hiroshima. They had
learned that while wars can be won, they
are never an answer. They provide no
answer for the hundreds of thousands
who are injured, made homeless, killed.
The lesson of the Second World War was
the need for a world order and interna-
tional law.
But we seem to have forgotten that
lesson in the war we fight today. We
should have taken this dispute to the
United Nations the moment it arose.
We should have taken it to the Security
Council. If the Soviet Union blocked us
there, we should have gone to the Gen-
eral Assembly. There is a good case to
be made against the Vietcong. That
was the place to make it.
Mr. Chairman, I cannot believe that
it is now too late to bring tile United Na-
tions into this dispute. Finally, last
month, we took the matter to the Se-
curity Council. They decided not to act.
Now we should be prepared to take it to
the General Assembly.
There are those, I know, who say that
the United Nations is too weak to handle
this war. If it should try to handle this
war, and fail, says the argument, then
the United Nations will be damaged, per-
haps permanently.
But, consider the damage which fol-
lows from not taking this issue to the
United Nations. In effect, we are saying
to the world:- The United Nations can-
not handle major disputes. Mr. Chair-
man, need I remind this body that the
United Nations was founded precisely to
handle major disputes. If we embark
on a major war on the Asian mainland,
and bypass the United Nations, we throw
away the lessons of the last war, and dis-
card the hope of our fathers.
It is often said that each new irenera-
tion must learn its lessons anew. I pray
that that maxim will not prove true cf
the lessons of total war.
At the outset of this speech, Mr. Chair-
man, I said that a great debate is now
raging about which of two objectives
this Nation should pursue in Vietnam ?
a negotiated settlement or "total vic-
tory." In all candor I must confess that
the debate appears to be being won by
those who ask "why not total victory?"
This objective will be sought through
a policy of mindful escalation. Its pro-
ponents will elevate the America:1i troop
commitment slowly, gradually condition-
ing the American people. They are
mindful of the domestic consequences
which might follow full mobilization.
Its proponents will also be selective in
their bombing of North Vietnam. They
are mindful of the danger of an all-out
war with North Vietnam, or beyond that,
with China.
Mr. Chairman, those of us who urge
stabilization of the war are also mindful
of the effects of escalation. We are
mindful of the domestic effects and the
international effects. We should accept
the challenge of the generals and explain
why not total victory.
Mr. Chairman, I do not doubt that
America can win this war if we are will-
ing to pay the price. If we are willing
to sacrifice American lives and Viet-
namese lives, to sacrifice the poverty pro-
gram at home, to sacrifice a treaty ban-
ning nuclear proliferation. But is this
in our national interest? Is it in the in-
terest of world peace and the rule of law?
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Do we not have an obligation to the U.N.
Charter which requires that threats to
the peace be dealt with by that interna-
tional organization? We are not dis-
cussing Munich. We are discusing Laos;
we are discussing Algeria. Each of those
conflicts ended with a compromise set-
tlernent, a negotiated peace. That
should be our goal in Vietnam.
But instead, the administration's
policy is now swayed by those who coun-
cil us to abandon ourselves to the
great game of war. We can win it they
urge, so let us. Mr. Chairman, it is hard
to resist this temptation, I am sure. But
that is the role of statesmen and politi-
cians. When generals council victory,
We must council peace.
Mr. Chairman, when I vote on this
measure it will be with a heavy heart.
I know that few in this body will vote
with me, and I do not lightly disagree
with my President and my party.
This has not been an easy decision for
me to make. In fact, it has caused me
more soul searching than any vote I have
cast in 6 years in this House. I yield to
no one in my devotion to my country. I
yield to no one in my respect and admira-
tion for the qualities of courage, dedica-
tion, and patriotism of the American
soldier. He performs miraculously in
battle regardless of the conditions under
which he fights. I know something of
what he is experiencing in Vietnam to-
day, for 20 years ago I too fought a jungle
war in the Pacific. I hoped then, as my
father did before me in the Meuse-Ar-
gonne almost 50 years ago, and as my
brother did after me in Korea, that
thereafter disputes among nations could
be settled through international law.
I fully recognize that war is still an
instrument of national policy. It is used
today in Vietnam where we are at war
without a declaration of war. If war
were declared by Congress, the situation
might be different. But today on the
basis of the record I am unwilling to
ratify with my vote an authorization
which will be interpreted as the sanction
for greater escalation of our military
commitment.
It will be accepted as the third brick
in 2 years in the arch of congressional
support for a policy which may well lead
to world war III.
Imbedded in this authorization are far
reaching questions about how the United
States should relate to the developing
world and the social, political, and mil-
itary revolutions in that world, about
our relations with the Soviet Union,
about our approach to China which is
the key to peace in Asia.
Mr. Chairman, now is the time to re-
assess our policy and find an honorable,
diplomatic resolution of the Vietnam
conflict and then build a viable policy
in the Far East.
Mr. RIVERS of South Carolina. Mr.
Chairman, I yield myself as much time
as I may require.
Mr. Chairman, at the outset I want
to say that I totally, unequivocally, inter-
nally, and eternally, disagree with the
position of the gentleman who has just
preceded me. This bill, the title of which
I have react in asking for the House to go
into the Committee of the Whole House
on the State of the Union, is for the pur-
pose of providing the needed equipment
and bases for our boys in southeast Asia.
The bill, as I have said, is supplemental
to fiscal 1966 for procurement authoriza-
tion and is directed entirely to the sup-
port of- these men in this part of the
world.
I would like to state at the outset that
regardless of the debate that is raging
in other places in the area known as
Washington, D.C., one thing is crystal
clear to MENDEL RIVERS, a Representa-
tive from South Carolina; namely, our
soldiers, our sailors, our marines, our
airmen, our Coast Guardsmen, are in
southeast Asia. Most of these men are
in Vietnam and,' for your information,
that number exceeds 250,000. They need
your support, they need facilities, and
weapons. The passage of this bill is your
expression to your fighting men in this
part of the world, mostly Vietnam, and
to the American public and to the world
that we intend to support our forces in
every possible way.
The bill we have for consideration
today is H.R. 12889 which authorizes sup-
plemental appropriations during fiscal
year 1966 for the procurement of aircraft,
missiles, tracked combat vehicles, re-
search and development and military
construction for the Armed Forces.
For my part, I do not need to know
anything more than what I have just
stated. Your flesh and blood are far
away?today they need your support?
they are dying for you and for me.
Let me describe the bill briefly for you.
The Department of Defense submitted
two separate bills, one for procurement
and research and development, and the
other for military construction. We
combined these two bills for the simple
reason that they both constitute a part of
the same program and it was felt that
dealing with the whole matter at one
time was proper for all concerned.
This bill contains authorization for
appropriation as follows:
Procurement
$3,
417,
700, 000
Research, development, test,
and evaluation
151,
650, 000
Military construction
1,
288,
100,000
Total
4,
857,
450, 000
I will draw your attention to three
tables on page 5 of the report which set
out, very clearly, the authorizations and
appropriations for fiscal year 1966 in the
first two columns and in the third col-
umn, the additions which will be made
by this bill. The amounts for aircraft,
missiles, and so forth, are set out in
money amounts. I will not recite all of
the details that appears on these three
tables. It is all set out there in clear,
factual fashion.
In virtually every respect this bill is
exactly like those which you have con-
sidered in the past, and merely repre-
sents more of the same. There are two
differences, however, that I would like to
point out. First there are no naval ves-
sels in this bill as there always have been
in the regular programs; and second, for
the first time the bill contains authority
for tracked combat vehicles. We
amended the law last year to include the
requirement that these items be specifi-
cally authorized. But other than that
there is nothing new.
PROCUREMENT
On page 6 of the report you will see
that the Army will receive at total of
$965,400,000 broken down into aircraft,
missiles, and tracked combat vehicles.
Each aircraft, missile, and tracked com-
bat vehicle is named and described. For
obvious reasons, numbers are not given
but you may be sure that if any Member
of the House wishes to have that kind
of detail I will be very glad to furnish
it with the understanding that it is
classified material.
On page 9 of the report you will see
that the Navy and Marine Corps will
receive $802,900,000. This again is
broken down in the same fashion?and
on page 11 it will be seen that the Air
Force will receive $1,649,400,000, in this
case broken down only into aircraft and
missiles. In all these instances each of
the items is named and described.
A matter of particular note, I think,
is that of the $3.4 billion representing
procurement in this bill, a little over $3.1
billion is for aircraft and the reason for
this is quite simple. Mr. McNamara tes-
tified that:
Although the aircraft loss rate continues
low, the rapidly increasing number of sorties
Is resulting in larger total losses. In 1961,
we lost 38 fixed-wing aircraft and 24 heli-
copters to hostile action.
In 1965, with both the very large increase
in activity and the attacks against North
Vietnam, we lost 275 fixed-wing aircraft and
76 helicopters. We anticipate that 1966
losses will be somewhat higher.
A total of about $1.8 billion for the re-
placement of aircraft losses is included in
the fiscal year 1966 supplemental. Another
$168 million is included for the Army to
equip new aviation units.
The considerably higher rates of utiliza-
tion of many types of aircraft in all the
services will also increase the consumption
of spares. For example, Air Force taCtical air-
craft in Vietnam are now flying 60 percent
more hours per month than they normally
do in peacetime. And you may recall that
I mentioned last August, we were increasing
the utilization rate of Military Airlift Com-
mand aircraft also by about 60 percent. Ac-
cordingly, we have included in the fiscal year
1966 supplemental about $1.2 billion for air-
craft spares and other aircraft equipment for
all the services.
I will now go to "Research and devel-
opment."
The amount in this bill for research
and development is very small. Nor-
mally, in the regular programs, research
and development comes to almost half
of the total bill. Here the sum of $151,-
650,000 represents only about 3 percent
of the bill. The reason for this is evident
in that the weapons that the men are
fighting with and will fight with are the
result of research and development car-
ried on in the past. Actually the funds
in this supplement will be used in every
instance to accelerate development proj-
ects of particular interest to our opera-
tions in southeast Asia.
On pages 13 through 15 of the com-
mittee report there is set out consider-
able detail as to the research and devel-
?Pent programs which are contained in
this bill.
Perhaps one of the most important
items is a very much intensified program
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to !grid a cure for a partieularly virulent
strain of malaria. Another important
item relates to field medical treatment
facilities and equipment. Others are an
aingraf t photo flasher system for night
photography?and acceleration of the
frozen blood program to provide backup
for the blood bank system.
ITAR Y CONSTRUCTION
he 'Military construction" portion of
the report begins on page 16. It will be
seen there that the total program is $1,-
2138,100,000, On pages 17 and 18 are set
out; in quite considerable detail the_ areas
in which the construction will be carried
on and the amounts involved.
I; is in the military construction por-
tion of the bill that there is the only
monetary addition made by the com-
mittee. The committee added $49.7 mil-
lion. This addition covers two items--
the construction of a jet-capable field in
Okinawa for the Marines, and ship re-
pair facilities in the Philippines for the
Navy. These were found to be very
irn-
portant projects which had not been in-
cluded in the program but which after
its submission were approved by the
Joint Chiefs of Staff.
While on the subject of "Military con-
struction," I should point out another
amendment made by the committee.
This appears as subsection 401(b) on
page 5 of the bill. It is also set out on
page 2 of the report.
Under this amendment, the Secretary
of Defense is required to furnish to the
Armed Services Committees a description
of each military construction project,
"together with full and complete justifi-
cation therefor, including a. cost analysis
thereof, prior to the execution of any
contract for the establishment or devel-
opment of a military installation or
facility."
The reason for this amendment is the
fact that the committee was concerned
over the lack of preciseness in the "Mili-
tary construction" request.
As the report states:
While providing sufficient latitude to the
Department to construct necessary facilities,
the committee felt that it should receive
Information prior to the contract execu-
tion ?-
Relating to these projects.
The committee does not mean to infer
by this amendment that it doubts the
need for these construction projects.
The committee is anxious, however, to
avoid giving the Department of Defense
anything like a "blank check."
Obviously it is difficult to plan con-
struction in an area some of which is in
an actual combat condition. I would be
leas than frank if I did not tell you that
some of these facilities described on
pages 17 and 18 of the report may never
lie built, or, if built, not in the locations
which appear in the secret backup ma-
terial. The progress of the war and
many other considerations will dictate
the actual course to be followed.
Me. Chairman, that is the bill.
Let me repeat what I said at the out-
set?that while I have very strong per-
sonal feelings about the war in Vietnam
and nave expressed myself frequently on
this subject, I feel that these considera-
tions have very little to do with this bill
and its passage.
Our men are in Vietnam. They need
our support and our help. Passage of
this bill is that support and that help.
Let the debate as to whether we should
be in Vietnam, or how we should conduct
the war in Vietnam, be carried on at
another time. I will join in such debate.
This is not the time for that debate.
This is the time for only one thing?and
that is to vote our fighting men the
weapons that they need.
Me. FARBS1EIN. Mr. Chairman, will
the gentleman yield just for a moment?
Mr. RIVERS of South Carolina. I
yield to the gentleman for just one
moment.
Mr. FARBSTEIN. This bill also in-
cludes appropriations for housing, hos-
pitals, doctors, food, and clothing for
our Armed Forces; does it not?
Mr. RIVERS of South Carolina. This
bill and the rest of the supplemental
together, yes. That is absolutely right.
You cannot light a we r without taking
care of such necessary things as that.
Mr. FA RBS rEIN. I thank the gentle-
man from South Carolina.
Mr. RYAN.. Mr. Chairman, will the
gentleman yield for a question?
Mr. RIVERS of South Carolina. I am
delighted to yield to the gentleman from
New York.
Mr. RYAN.. Mr. Chairman, is. this not
a supplemental authorization bill for the
fiscal year 1966?
Mr, nivERs of South Carolina.. That
is right.
Mr. RYAN. Did I understand the
gentleman to say that he had been as-
sured by Secretary of Defense McNamara
that our boys had everything they need
and that there were no shortages?
Mr. RIVERS of South Carolina. "Pos-
itively," I said.
Mr. RYAN. Will the gentleman ex-
plain where in this bill there is an au-
thorization for money for clothing?
Mr. RIVERS of South Carolina. For
clothing?
Mr. RYAN. For clothing.
M:r. RIVERS of South Carolina. For
the gentleman's information, we do not
authorize clothing. We authorize weap-
ons systems, implement; of war. Cloth-
ing comes under housekeeping. It is a
continuing appropriation, and ihe Ap-
propriations Committee has exclusive
jurisdiction on that. They prcvide an
awful lot of clothing. I knew you will
be delighted to hear we have all the
clothing we need, and we are getting
along like a million dollars.
Mr. RYAN.. I thank the gentleman.
May I ask another question? Where in
this bill is there an authorization for
money for food?
Mr. RIVERS of South Carolina. That
is not in this bill.
Mr. RYAN. Then I take it the gentle-
man did not intend, In answering the
question of the gentleman from New
York Mr. FARBSTEIN], to leave the im-
pression that this bill authorized money
for clothing and food.
Mr. RIVERS of South Carolina. We
have an Appropriations Committee that
takes care of all of that.
Mr. FARBSTEIN. Mr. Chairman, will
the gentleman yield?
Mr. RIVERS of South Carolina. Cer-
tainly. I yield to the gentleman from
New York.
Mr. FARBSTEIN. But this includes
hospitals, does it not?
Mr. RIVERS of South Carolina. That
is right.
Mr. FARBSTEIN. And this is made
evident on page 19 of your report. With-
out this appropriation we could have no
hospitals or the necessary money to build
whatever new hopsitals are needed in
Vietnam; is that correct?
Mr. RIVERS of South Carohna. In
southeast Asia.
Mr. LAIRD. Mr. Chairman, will the
gentleman yield?
Mr. RIVERS of South Carolina. I
yield to the gentleman from Wisconsin.
Mr. LAIRD. I would like to inquire of
the chairman to make the record emi-
nently clear that there are no appropri-
ations included in this particular bill.
This is an authorization bill for appro-
priations, and the question of the cloth-
ing will be considered in the supplemen-
tal appropriation bill which will be before
the House in a week or 10 days.
There may be no clothing shortages
as far as Vietnam is concerned., but I am
sure that the distinguished chairman,
from South Carolina, will admit that
there are clothing shortages in the -
United States and in other sections of
the Army because of the drawdown in
stocks.
Mr. RIVERS of South Carolina. Let
me say this: This is an authorization bill.
Our committee does not authorize cloth-
ing. If the gentleman on the Appropria-
tions Committee?and he is a distin-
guished member?says there are clothing
shortages, this comes under his commit-
tee and I will accept that statement.
Mr. PEPPER. Mr. Chairman, will the
gentleman yield?
Mr. RIVERS of South Carolina. I
yield to the gentleman from Florida.
Mr. PEPPER. Mr. Chairman, I want
to commend the able chairman for the
splendid statement he has made and
for bringing this bill to the House, and to
assure him that I am wholeheartedly for
this bill.
What I want to ask is this: Every time
I see a picture in the paper of some
American men going down a jungle trail
in Vietnam, running the risk of being
attacked by snipers and being ambushed
and the like, I just wonder if there is
not some way that the genius of our
country can provide a method of fer-
reting out, or a method of destroying, the
enemy without those men having io walk
and to expose themselves on those jungle
trails.
My question to the able gentleman is
this: Is there any way that we can pos-
sibly provide the firepower to our men
over there which will save their lb es and
limbs better than they are mm being
saved from the enemy?
Second, could we do this by increasing
the amount of our research appropria-
tion? I notice that the bill provides- for
the Army $27 million-plus, for the Navy
$52 Million-plus, and for the Air Force
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$71 million-plus for research and devel-
opment.
Mr. RIVERS of South Carolina. Right.
Mr. PEPPER. I know there are many
problems, but could we possibly provide
any more money for research that would,
at a greater financial expense, conserve
the lives of our precious men over there?
Mr. RIVERS of South Carolina. At the
moment the Defense Department tells us
this is all they need, but following this
up, on the 7th of March we will begin
hearings on the regular 1967 authoriza-
tion, and in that bill there no doubt will
be more research and development au-
thorization. No doubt some of the ques-
tions which perplex the gentleman will
be answered in that bill as far as re-
search and development is concerned.
As far as the safety of the men is con-
cerned, we have tried every way on earth
to safeguard these men. I do not like
the idea of photographers following them
all over the place with TV cameras, show-
ing all kinds of things. I do not like
that, but they do it. There are many
things I do not like about this war, but
I have to back my President, and he does
the very best he can.
This is the most insidious thing we
have ever gotten into. There has never
been a war like this or one to compare
with it. We are learning all kinds of new
things.
Just the other day a friend of mine
invented a light which he puts in a
C-123?and you open up the bays andi
a very vast light comes out and lights up
the whole area like a football field. They
try all kinds of things that the minds of
these great scientists can produce to save
our men and ferret out the Vietcong.
People have called me lots of things.
Some have called me a hawk. No one
has called me a dove. But what I am in-
terested in is the American Eagle and
keeping the American Eagle flying.
Mr. PEPPER. I remember President
Roosevelt telling me? during the early
part of World War II, when he was As-
sistant Secretary of the Navy in World
War I we were losing a terrific amount
of tonnage and lives to German subma-
rines. The Navy decided to put a re-
search program into effect and invited
a great number of the inventors of the
country to come to facilities that the
Navy established for them in New Lon-
don, Conn., and put each one in a little
cubicle and let him go to work with his
idea. He said that in 6 months' time
those men had come up with the best
methods that we had been able to con-
trive to diminish our shipping losses due
to submarine warfare.
Now, all I want to say here is that I
was wholeheartedly behind the able
chairman and his committee and the
President, but I hope, I will say, that we
will tell the armed services of our coun-
try and the Department of Defense, do
not spare any money in research and do
not spare any money in more weapons
or more firepower. You will not have
any trouble with Congress giving more
money for research and for more and
better weapons which will save the lives
of the men making this gallant fight.
No. 36- 16
Mr. RIVERS of South Carolina. Mr.
Chairman, I assure the gentleman from
Florida that we have told the Secretary
that 100 times. Every chance we have
had. Every bill we have had before our
committee has come out of our commit-
tee unanimously.
Now, as far as research and develop-
ment is concerned, we have averaged be-
tween $6 and $7 billion per year on that.
We are exploring every area we know. I
do not think we have been niggardly
with- our funds at all. We have given
them everything that they claim they
need.
Mr. STRATTON. Mr. Chairman, will
the distinguished chairman yield to me?
Mr. RIVERS of South Carolina. Of
course I will yield to the distinguished
member of the committee.
Mr. STRATTON. Is it not true in re-
sponse to the questions raised by the
gentleman from Florida that the overall
departmental appropriation request is
also a request for very substantial
amounts of ammunition to do just the
job he is talking about, so that we can
use our vast productive capacity and
vastly superior firepower to save lives of
American soldiers?
Mr. RIVERS of South Carolina. So
much so that we have opened up another
ammunition plant which is now in full
production.
Mr. STRATTON. I thank the gentle-
man.
Mr. RYAN. Mr. Chairman, will the
distinguished chairman yield to me?
Mr. RIVERS of South Carolina. I do
not have much time, but I will yield to
you one more time.
Mr. RYAN. Could the chairman tell
the Committee what he expects in the
way of an increase in our troop strength
in South Vietnam? The chairman said
earlier we have 250,000 men there. What
does he expect in the next 6 months, and
in the next year?
Mr. RIVERS of South Carolina. I did
not say 250,000 on the mainland. I said
over 250,000 in southeast Asia.
Mr. RYAN. Could the chairman tell
us what he anticipates in the next 6
months?
Mr. RIVERS of South Carolina. Your
guess could be as good as mine; but it
will be sizable. It will be sizable; but
Your guess is as good as mine. However,
I will tell you one thing: I would rather
have too many than too few, and that is
what we ? are trying to do. I know the
gentleman agrees with me that we do not
want to have too few, because these Com-
munists do not frighten very easily.
Mr. BATES. Mr. Chairman, I yield
myself such time as I may desire.
Mr. Chairman, I join with the distin-
guished chairman of the Committee on
Armed Services in urging your support
of H.R. 12889. Before proceeding with
my remarks, Mr. Chairman, I would like
to address myself briefly to some of the
questions which have just been asked,
especially in reference to inventories.
Now, on yesterday,. when Gen. Lewis
Walt appeared before the House Com-
mittee on Appropriations, I asked to have
a conference with him in respect to the
military situation and the inventory sit-
uation specifically under his command
presently in Vietnam. He advised us
that this is the third war in which he
has participated and never has he found
the inventory situation as good as it is
presently in Vietnam. This does not
mean that our inventory situation back
here in the United States or in anticipa-
tion of future developments is all that we
want, because as we brought out in the
hearings?and it is in the published
hearings presently before you?we do
have shortages, including shortages of
Marine clothing.
Mr. RIVERS of South Carolina. Mr.
Chairman, will the gentleman yield to
me?
Mr. BATES. I will be glad to yield to
the chairman.
Mr. RIVERS of South Carolina. The
shortages about whiCh I was speaking
were not in Vietnam. There are no
shortages in Vietnam. I am sure the
gentleman will agree with me on that.
Mr. BATES. Yes, indeed. That is the
point I tried to establish.
Mr. LATTA. Mr. Chairman, will the
gentleman yield to me?
Mr. BATES. I will be glad to yield to
the gentleman.
Mr. LATTA. Before my question, let
me say that since I have been a Member
of Congress I have always supported
these authorization requests and the ap-
propriations for them. I intend to sup-
port this one. But I know there are a
lot of Members of Congress who have
had many, many letters from parents
who have received letters from boys in
South Vietnam indicating certain
shortages.
Therefore, Mr. Chairman, I would like
to call to the attention of the gentleman
in the well, the gentleman from Massa-
chusetts [Mr. BATES] , an article dated
Monday, February 21, 1966, written by
Mr. Hansen W. Baldwin, which goes into
great detail with reference to some of
the shortages which exist in Vietnam.
I know that the gentleman from
Massachusetts has seen this article, but
I would like to have the comments of
the gentleman upon the article.
Mr. BATES. I have not only read the
article, but I have also talked on the
telephone personally with Mr. Baldwin.
As a matter of fact, this morning at 8
o'clock. I met with the Secretary of
Defense and asked him to complete the
study which is now being made of Mr.
Baldwin's article and to which reference
has been made by the gentleman from
Ohio. However, the Secretary of De-
fense did indicate generally?and I want
to say "generally"?and the report has
not been submitted to me yet?that the
accusations and the charges which are
made by Mr. Baldwin in his article are
not accurate.
Mr. LATTA. Mr. Chairman, if the
gentleman will yield further, I want to
thank him for following through on this
matter. I know this article was very
disturbing. We have had other reports
which seem to verify some of the charges
which have been made in this article.
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March
Mr. Chairman, I look forward to fur-
ther discussion of this matter on the
floor of the House as a result of the re-
quest which you have made..
Mr. BATES. I will say to the gentle-
man from Ohio that no one is more con-
cerned than I am to make absolutely
certain that our men have what they
need in combat.
Mr. MINSHALL. Mr. Chairman, will
tile gentleman yield?
Mr. BATES. I am glad to yield to the
gentleman from Ohio.
Mr. MINSHALL. As a member of the
Defense Subcommittee of the Committee
on Appropriations, we have been holding
intensive hearings for the past several
days on exactly the subject about which
my distinguished colleague [Mr. LATTA 1,
and the gentleman from Massachusetts
have been discussing, mainly with ref-
erence to clothing shortages. We have
discussed this question with General
Johnson, Chief of the Army; we have re-
cently discussed it with General Greene
arid General Walt of the Marine COrps,
and also the Chief of Naval Operations,
Admiral McDonald.
As a result of our subcommittee hear-
ings there is no doubt in my mind or in
their mind that our troops in Vietnam
are currently receiving all that they pres-
ently need. I concur with the chairman
of the Committee on Armed Services
when he says that they are getting all
they need. However, what concerns Gen-
eral Johnson and General Greene are
forecast shortages and the shortages that
are presently in existence today with ref-
erence to our troops here on the
homefront.
There is a definite shortage of cloth-
ing, specifically of cotton khaki pants
that they are issuing to the Marine Corps.
They are presently receiving only one
issue of cotton khaki pants, whereas the
normal issue calls for three pair. This
shortage will not be relieved until late
this year.
So, we cannot say that there are no
shortages of clothing. There is this par-
ticular shortage, plus others, that we
'brought out in the hearings, and which
will be made public when our hearings
are published.
The Army will have adequate fatigue
jackets but not enough pants in the
months ahead. The Marines forecast a
shortage of cotton khaki pants. This
will be a funny looking Military Estab-
lishment. George Washington's army at
Valley Forge may have had no shoes, but
the Great Society's forces are running
out of pants.
Mr. BATES. As a matter of fact, I
heard about them in our own hearings.
Mr. LATTA. Mr. Chairman, will the
omit:dem:in yield further?
Mr. BATES. I yield further to the
gentleman from Ohio.
Mr. LATTA. There have also been
other shortages that have been brought
to the attention of the Armed Services
Committee in addition to clothing.
Mr. Chairman, I would like to call to
the attention of the gentleman the testi-
mony which appears on page 5068 of the
hearings which were held by the Com-
mittee on Armed Services where General
Greene was being questioned by Mr.
Blandford.
Mr. Chairman, Mr. Blantiford asked
the question:
How about 10:5 ammunition, proximity
fuse ammunition, proximity fuses, and 8-
inch howitzer ammunition? His there been
any reduction in that for practice purposes?
General Greene replied:
We have had some snortages in 105-milli-
meter illuminating ammunition ,i. I checked
on that specifically when I was :art this last
time in south Vietnam. Howerer, although
we don't have the levels that w, would like,
our operations at night using this ammuni-
tion have not been restricted. We still had
enough on hand. I would say that 105-
millimeter illuminating would have to
necessarily be used carefully in raining.
Then Mr. Blandford asked the follow-
ing question:
Well, actually, am I correct that there has
been a reduction in the availability of this
type of ammunition for training purposes?
General Greene replied:
That would depend, of cours, upon the
division commanders. T cannot give you the
specific answer.
Then he goes on to another question
which appears at the top of page 5069 to
which General Greene replied:
We have had a problem there again in 4.2
illuminating projectors..
Then Mr. Blandford asked this ques-
tion:
Where are the other places whcre we have
problems?
General Greene replied:
believe the committee in the; ,- visits and
examination of this prolciem, as I recall,
found six different types of amr kunition in
which there were indications of shortages.
The Manne Corps has not been hampered or
crippled in actual operations in South Viet-
nam in any of these areas.
Mr. Chairman, this is testimony which
was given by General Greene before the
Committee on Armed Services_
believe we ought to admit these short-
ages exist and do something about them.
Mr. BATES. I want to thank the gen-
tleman from Ohio for revealing to the
House this matter which was uncovered
by our Committee on Armed Services,
and we certainly intend to pursue this at
every opportunity.
I would just like to say to the Members
generally now, if anyone has any specific
items that they have reason to believe is
hi short supply either overseas or here,
call it to our attention and we will cer-
tainly look into it and ;3ee that the situa-
tion is rectified.
Mr. RIVERS of South Carolina,. Mr.
Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
Mr. BATES. I gladly yield to the
gentleman.
Mr. RIVERS of South Carolina. Gen-
eral Greene also said this?and we cer-
tainly do not want to cover up any-
thing?but this is what Gener. .11 Greene
said:
The Marine Corps has not been hampered
or crippled in actual operations in South
Vietnam in a,ny of these areas.
If we find any shortages, believe you
me, we certainly are going to follow
through ,:an them.
(16
If the gentleman will yield further?
right today in Washington, Lieutenant
General Walt who heads the marines
In the Da Nang area, said that he has
never had an army of marines with bet-
ter morale or better equipped. That is
what he said today and he also said he
has fought in three wars.
So wherever we find shortages, we will
follow through on them. So I do not
think we need to worry about that kind
of thing in Vietnam today.
Mr. BELCHER. Mr. Chairman, will
the gentleman yield?
Mr. BATES. I yield to the s entleman.
Mr. BELCHER. This does not neees-
sarily involve the question of shorOges,
but I had a complaint from the wife of a
serviceman in Vietnam. She said his
letter stated there were 10 of them in
their outfit, I think it was in the enei-
neers?and all their sidearms and weap-
ons had been taken away from them.
He said that four of them had been killed
by snipers and they had no means of
protecting themselves.
I also noticed on television, as I im-
agine a lot of other Members of the
House did, where a lady complained that
her husband had been attacked and the
only thing he had to defend himself with
was a knife. He had no side arm or rifle
whatsoever to defend himself with. Has
anything like that come to tile attention
of the committee?
Mr. BATES. I have heard a story
such as the gentleman relates. Has the
gentleman addressed any inquiry him-
self to the Department of Defense?
Mr. BELCHER. Yes, I have.
Mr. BATES. What was their rep10
Mr. BELCHER. They have not had
time to make a reply yet.
Mr. BATES. If the gentleman will
give me specific information, I will be
very happy to cooperate with him. Be-
cause certainly the interest which the
gentleman displays is on something that
we on the committee also take very, very
seriously. If there are any problems--if
there are any shortages, we want to cor-
rect the situation. We do not want, to
hide anything under a bushel.
Mr. BELCHER. Of course, this did
not involve the question of a shortage.
The guns were there but they were taken
away from the men and the guns were
locked up.
Mr. BATES. I am not referring only
to shortages. I am referring to any other
kind of situation that the gentleman will
give me specific information on and I
will be happy to cooperate with him.
Mr. LATTA. Mr. Chairrnan, will the
gentleman yield?
Mr. BATES. I am glad to yield to the
gentleman.
Mr. LATTA. This is a very important
matter. I think when the committee
was before the Committee on Rules they
asked for 3 hours and you thosteht that
3 would be adequate.
Mr. BATES. The gentleman is bouts
very well.
Mr. LATTA. I thank the gentleman
for yielding because we did bring out
something that was apparently over-
looked in the Armed Services Commit-
tee. I want to commend the gentleman
in the well.
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You gave assurances that you will
look into these matters as they
come to the attention of the Mem-
bers. I, also want to commend the
chairman of the committee because he
has been most helpful in the past about
these matters. I think in my own case
when I hear from parents of servicemen
in Vietnam instead of bucking these
things over to the Pentagon and getting
their stock reply?"We will look into
it"?I will buck them over to your com-
mittee. I will get more information that
way.
Mr. BATES. I shall be very, very
grateful to the gentleman if he does so.
As a matter of fact, yesterday afternoon
someone made an inquiry of me with re-
ference to a particular bomb. This
morning I was at the Pentagon, as I
indicated a few moments ago, and I
asked the Secretary of Defense to get
out his book. We looked specifically into
that book to find out about the inven-
tory situation that we have and as to
the present usage rate on this particular
bomb and what our production is going
to be and what our inventory is going
to be 12 months from now. So if the
gentleman will give us the information
to which he refers, he will be doing us a
favor. We would be most happy to co-
operate with him because this is our
business and when we come before the
House we want to indicate what the
facts truly are. I must say that the
gentleman has been most helpful here
today.
Mr. HUNGATE. Mr. Chairman, will
the gentleman yield?
Mr. BATES. I yield to the gentleman.
Mr. HUNGATE. I understand the
gentleman is fully familiar with the ar-
ticle by Hanson Baldwin that appeared in
the New York Times of February 21, and
the committee has the problems therein
mentioned under active consideration.
Mr. BATES. Yes, we have had the full
discussion on that and will get full dis-
closure of information on those points.
Mr. HUNGATE. I thank the gentle-
man very much.
Mr. BATES. Mr. Chairman, just to
complete our thinking on this particular
point. If this bill was before the Con-
gress 10 years ago, not a single item in it
would be considered by the Committee on
Armed Services. Now why do I say that?
Because years ago our committee did not
take under its jurisdiction and purview
missiles or airplanes. This year we are
adding tracked vehicles. The only thing
this committee had at one time under its
jurisdiction was the question of the con-
struction and also naval vessels, but there
are no naval vessels in this particular
bill, So now when we come before you,
we want to make certain that as fully as
possible we give you all the information
to which you are entitled.
In fact, there was a time when naval
vessels were provided by the Congress
when we did not even have to give an
authorization because there was enough
authorization left over from World War
II to last a thousand years.
Mr. Chairman, I agree fully with the
distinguished Speaker of the House when
he said that if we had had firm leader-
ship prior to World War II, perhaps we
would never have had World War II.
I believe, too, that if we had not de-
clared that Korea was outside the de-
fense perimeter of the United States,
perhaps there would have been no Ko-
rea. But that is history. Today we are
dealing with facts and not with con-
jecture.
As the distinguished chairman of this
committee has said, our boys are now in
South Vietnam. Maybe some in your
family are in South Vietnam. I know
that my family is represented there.
So this bill contains authorizations
for appropriations for procurement, for
research and development, test and eval-
uation, and for military construction in
the amount of $4.8 billion.
We have done much in the field of re-
search and development. This year
alone we will spend $6.7 billion just in
military research and development. The
fantastic things that have been invented,
if they could be revealed here, would give
you considerable comfort. Some of these
are already in the hands of our troops
and more are forthcoming.
I would like to say that we do have
one reservation, and that is the question
of the timing of this specific legislation.
Was it necessary to come here today, or
could it have waited in the orderly proc-
ess of things and been considered with
the fiscal year 1967 bill, which we will
consider on the 8th of March? That is
a question. We asked for the specific
facts. I must be frank and candid and
say to you that the information which
came to us was inconclusive. We did
feel that much that is in this bill per-
haps could have been deferred until the
1st of July, but we do not want to gam-
ble. We do not want to take a chance.
Oh, I know and you know that when
the President comes up here with a
budget for 1967 and he can eliminate
from it $12 billion, like we have in this
general appropriation supplemental bill,
then, of course, it looks much better as
the American people review it. But
from a military point of view it achieves
no purpose if bookkeeping is the only
purpose.
Nevertheless, we do not want to gam-
ble. If this bill can be expedited, we
want it expedited, because we want to
make certain that our young men have
what they need when they need it and
not have too little too late.
The rapid buildup of U.S. forces in
South Vietnam in the calendar year 1967
did not provide time for the advanced
development of detailed plans. Many of
these will be submitted as soon as the
Secretary of Defense receives this in-
formation. I would not say that clair-
voyance was used by the Department of
Defense as to the development of pro-
grams either last year or this year.
Many of the members of our own com-
mittee believed a year ago that we should
have increased our production of heli-
copters, ammunition, and production in
other fields. But it was not done at the
time we recommended because it was
never believed, so we were told, that this
war would escalate to the degree which
it has.
But as I have indicated, we are dealing
with facts and not with fantasies, and
we have young men there today and we
must support them.
In the military construction area this
bill provides for troop housing, ports,
depots, hospitals, signal communica-
tions, airfields, and community facilities,
not only in Vietnam, but nearby in the
Philippines, in Guam, in Okinawa, Wake
Island, Midway, and even in Thailand.
Some will even be built in the United
States. The list appears on page 26 of
the report.
As proposed originally by the Depart-
ment of Defense, the language in section
401(a) of this bill was susceptible of an
Interpretation that it constituted an un-
limited transfer of authority to the ex-
tent that the Department of Defense
appropriations for personnel functions
could have been used for procurement,
or that procurement appropriations
were authorized to be transferred to
operations and maintenance-type ex-
penditures in behalf of South Vietnam.
But our committee wisely?I believe
wisely?added the words, "for their
stated purposes," so that whatever we
have in this bill must be used for the
general purposes intended and not ac-
cording to what someone might want to
do regardless of the intent of Congress.
I will invite your attention to the fact
that any aircraft, missile, or tracked
combat vehicle for which funds are au-
thorized in this bill can be made avail-
able to the Vietnamese or to the Koreans
or to the Filipinos or to the Australians
or whoever else might be engaged in
combat on our side in Vietnam.
Why did we do this? The practical
aspect of this is obvious. When these
men are engaged in combat, that is no
time to be keeping detailed accounting
records.
The fact of the matter is that the U.S.
Government and the people of this coun-
try must pick up the tab anyway. So
let the men spend the time on defending
themselves and executing the war, rather
than keeping these detailed reports.
Now, Mr. Chairman, I shall close. I
have already taken more time than I had
anticipated, but the basic purpose of this
bill is to support our fighting men, as well
as our friendly allies, who are in Vietnam
now fighting for the objectives of free-
dom.
There might be all kinds of debate
that could extend day after day, as it has
in the other body, as to whether we are
bombing enough, or just right, or too
little, or whether we should get out of
South Vietnam altogether. But while
we are discussing this, time is moving on,
and it takes a long time for many of these
implements of war to be manufactured.
Our forces require essential supplies,
equipment, and facilities, to enable them
to accomplish the job which they have
been sent over there by us to do. I ad-
vocate that all members of this com-
mittee, regardless of what disposition
they might have in respect to foreign
policy, to support this bill and to support
our men that we have sent 10,000 miles
away to fight in the cause of freedom.
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March 1, -.1!:c';
Mr. RIVERS of South Carolina.. Mr.
Chairman, I yield 10 minutes to the dis-
tinguished majority leader [Mr. At:aural.
(Mr. ALBERT asked and was given
permission to revise and extend his
remarks.)
Mr. ALBERT. Mr. Chairman, I con-
gratulate the distinguished chairman of
this committee and the distinguished
ranking member, both of whom have
adequately explained the details of this
bill. I join them in urging the prompt
adoption of this measure.
The hill which is now before this
House, its background and its implica-
tions, have been considered with all the
wisdom and experience we can bring to
bear. It has been referred from commit-
tee with a strong endorsement which has
taken into account every pertinent cir-
cumstance and consideration. It has
been examined and debated, and exten-
sive public discussion has taken place. I
believe that the time for debate is over
and the time to pass this bill is at hand.
What is needed now is prompt and over-
whelming approval of the present bill to
demonstrate to those who oppose us that
there is no division in the Congress or
among the American people regarding
support for our troops in Vietnam.
I think recent discussions have made
our goals in Vietnam crystal clear. As
the President stated on February 23:
Our purpose in Vietnam is to prevent the
success of aggression. It is not conquest; it
is not, empire; it is not foreign bases; it is not
domination. It is to prevent the forceful
conquest of South. Vietnam by North
Vietnam.
The Secretary of State wisely pointed
out on February 18:
We are in Vietnam because the issues posed
there are deeply intertwined with our own
security and because the outcome of the
struggle can profoundly affect the nature of
the world in which we and our children will
live.
Now, I do not intend to try the pa-
tience of my colleagues by repeating on
this occasion all the reasoning which has
led to the conclusion that we must stand
by the people of South Vietnam. Of
course the task which faces us is not an
easy one. Of course it is not without
risks, grave risks. Of course, we cannot
foretell how long it will be before an
obdurate aggressor will be brought to his
senses. But the difficulty of the task is
not the criterion. This country was born
under a resolution which called for lib-
erty or death.
Our men are in Vietnam now, they
have undertaken the brave struggle with
courage and determination. They are
not going to be abandoned by this House
at this hour. We are standing and they
are fighting for what we believe is the
right war in the right place and at the
right time.
Surely we are under no illusions about
the nature of the war we are fighting
or the goals of those who have provoked
it. This is no struggle for liberation..
This is a part of an international con-
spiracy aimed at all southeast Asia. This
is not a civil war. It is an invasion,
organized, sponsored and led from
flanoi. The hardened international
conspirators behind this invasion have
already made it clear that Thailand is
the next target in southeast. Asia while
the free lands of Latin America and
Africa should not be neglected.
The horrors which have been visited
upon the people of South Vietnam as a
result of these decisions are well known
to us. Our hearts go out to them in
their suffering, but. also our admiration
for the determination with which they
have resisted the onslaught. I am proud
that this country has, in consonance with
our cherished traditions? lived up to its
promises made to come to the assistance
of the South Vietnamese*
I hope that any doubts abeut whether
we have a legitimate commitment to
South Vietnam have been laid to rest.
Our vital interests are involved in the
struggle of the people of South Vietnam
to build a new society according to their
own desires, free from Communist ag-
gression. Our commitment to Vietnam
has been expressed since 1954 in congres-
sional resolutions and acts, Presidential
declarations, bilateral assistance agree-
ments, and the SEATO treaty, as well
as in the joint resolution of August 7,
1964. The. Congress has supported this
commitment at every stage of the way.
The vote we ask on the bill before us
today will be a further expression of sup-
port for that commitinent. The word of
the United States is at stake here, and if
the word of the United States is not good
everywhere, it will not be good anywhere.
If we fail ,in our commitments at one
time how can friend or foe ever depend
on our commitments at anytime.
That the Communist north might at-
tempt to take over South Vietnam by
subversion or aggression was clear from
the moment the Geneva agreements
were signed in 1954. Indeed, :t is a fact
accepted even by the few scholars expert
on Vietnam who criticize aspects of our
policy, that the Communists violated the
Geneva agreements before the ink was
dry on them. They did this primarily
by leaving -their agents and caches of
arms behind in the south, thus failing to
regroup to the north as agreed, with a
view to the battle they foresaw even then.
The United States declared formally at
Geneva that we "would view any renewal
of aggression in violation of the afore-
said agreements with grave coacern and
as seriously threatening international
peace and security."
In October 1954, President E,senhower
undertook a program of direct assistance
to help South Vietnam become "capable
of resisting attempted subversion or ag-
gression through military meal is." And
the United States joined with its allies
in the SEATO Treaty, which was made
applicable to South Vietnam by a spe-
cial protocol. On May 11, 1917, Presi-
dents Eisenhower and Diem, issued a joint
statement which included the following
language:
Noting that the Republic of Vietnam is
covered by article r'ir of the Southeast Asia
Collective Defense Treaty, President Eisen-
hower and President Ngo Dinh Diem agreed
that aggression or subversion threatening
the political independence of the Republic
of Vietnam would be considered as endanger-
ing peace and stability.
On August 2, 1961, President Keit d y
declared:
The United States is determined that tl,e.
Republic of Vietnam shall not be lost 10
the Communists for lack of any support
which the United States can render.
And on December 14 that year, redly-
to President Diem's appeal for addi-
tional support to meet the growing effort
of the north, President Kennedy reaf-
firmed that the United States was "pre-
pared to help the Republic of Vietnam
to protect its people and to preserve its
independence."
President Johnson has reaffirmed these
commitments many times, and on Au-
gust 7, 1964, the joint resolution of the
Congress, adopted by a vote of 504 to 2.
stated inter aim, as follows:
The United States regards as vital to tis
national interest and to world peace the
maintenance of international peace and se-
curity in southeast Asia. Consonant with
the Constitution of the United States and
the Charter of the United Nations, and in
accordance with its obligation under the
Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty,
the United States is, therefore, prepared, as
the President determines, to take all neces-
sary steps, including the use of armed force,
to assist any member of protocol state of
the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty,
requesting assistance in defense of its free-
dom.
This resolution is still on the books.
This resolution is the law of the land.
The legality of the U.S. involvement
in South Vietnam is not subject to ques-
tion. As my colleagues surely know
the American Bar Association's House of
Delegates has voted unanimously on this
question, to uphold the only reasonable
view possible; namely, that our action
concords with the Constitution, the
United Nations Charter, and the SEATO
Treaty. Specifically, the charter recog-
nizes the right of individual and collec-
tive self-defense, a right inherent under
international law. And the applicability
of the SEATO Treaty under which the
pertinent obligations are individual and
collective, was definitively spelled out by
the Secretary of State in his :fil.tement
of February 18.
At this late stage can there be any
doubt who started the war in South
Vietnam or who provoked its escalation?
It is crystal clear that the actions of the
United States have constituted a meas-
ured response to escalation by North
Vietnam. Having laid the groundwork
for aggression as early as 1954, the Com-
munists hoped to achieve their conquest
through rigged unification elections in
1956. However, the South refused to be
taken in this way, insisting that the vot-
ers' freedom to vote would have to be
supervised and guaranteed by an ade-
quate and impartial system of supervi-
sion. The north thereafter began gre d-
ually to infiltrate native South Viet-
namese trained in guerrilla warfare, with
the result that from 1957 to 1959 over
,
1 000 civilians were assassinated or kid-
,
napped by the Vietcong. From 1959
through 1961 Vietcong terrorism and
armed attacks were intensified. In 1961,
in response to President Diem's request.
the small American military mission was
increased in order to add advisory tune-
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tions to its former logistical and support
functions. North Vietnam between
1962 and 1964 greatly increased its in-
filtration of military personnel, political
cadres and equipment, and the number
of American military advisers had to
grow. By early 1965, Vietcong attacks
reached intensive levels, and as a result
we responded with air attacks against
the north and the introduction of corn..
bat personnel. Regular units of the
North Vietnamese military forces were
introduced from December 1964, and
this infiltration has continued to grow.
Does any one doubt that the so-called
National Liberation Front of South
Vietnam is an artificial creation of
Hanoi. This apparatus was created in
late 1960 in Hanoi, indeed the names of
the alleged leaders were not even dis-
closed until spring of 1962. When these
names finally were released, these pur-
ported leaders were unknown to the peo-
ple of South Vietnam, in fact Vietcong
prisoners to this day reveal a singular
unawareness of the names of these so-
called leaders. An attempt has been in-
tensified to create the impression that
the Vietcong front is composed of inde-
pendent South Vietnamese groups as
well as Communists, and that it repre-
sents the people of South Vietnam.
However, the flow of refugees away from
Communist areas, the Vietcong's ever
increasing reliance on terror, the morale
of the South Vietnamese fighting forces,
and the lack Of support by legitimate
South Vietnamese organizations give the
lie to these claims. The Vietcong have
never been able to gain any kind of a
foothold in South Vietnamese political
parties, labor unions, refugee groups,
regional organizations or churches, and
South Vietnamese politicians who have
opposed particular governments in Sai-
gon have never defected to the Vietcong.
The Vietcong's attempts to call gen-
eral strikes have failed, and their best
efforts to prevent the people from voting
in last year's provincial and municipal
council elections also failed. People
outside Vietnam are in many cases re-
grettably ready to believe the fiction that
the Vietcong represent an indigenous
political movement, perhaps because this
would make our own withdrawal easier
to bring about, but the people of South
Vietnam are not duped by these preten-
sions. The Vietcong are an arm of
Hanoi, and the South Vietnamese know
this.
In certain quarters we still hear the
call for negotiation, for peaceful settle-
ment. Does any one at this stage doubt
the sincerity and perseverance of the
United States in seeking a peaceful so-
lution in South Vietnam? Again and
again, using every channel available, the
United States has invited Hanoi to meet
for discussions without the imposition of
any conditions whatsoever. Every sug-
gestion made has been considered and,
where possible, acted upon by the United
States. At considerable military cost,
the air attacks against the former sanc-
tuary of North Vietnam were shut off for
over a month.
Hanoi, however, has remained obsti-
nate and vitriolic about these negotiation
efforts, rejecting them out of hand in-
sisting upon prior acceptance of its own
conditions. As the Members of this
House know, the chief stumbling block
remains Hanoi's insistence upon recog-
nition of the so-called National Libera-
tion Front as the sole, genuine represent-
ative of the South Vietnamese people,
Hanoi has likewise insisted upon accept-
ance of this front's program, that is,
upon handing over South Vietnam to
Hanoi.
I do not say that we should give up
our attempts to negotiate a peaceful set-
tlement in South Vietnam. Indeed, we
must continue ?to persevere in these ef-
forts. But I do believe that we must not,
we cannot betray our commitments to
the South Vietnamese people. This Na-
tion has the resources and the will to
win in South Vietnam, and win we shall.
Our objectives are limited and reason-
able. They boil down to making North
Vietnam back off from its aggression in
South Vietnam. I for one ain not going
to be frightened from this course by those
who raise the specter of a possible war
with Communist China. We seek no
such confrontation with Red China, and
our limited objectives should be clear to
Peiping's leaders. At the same time, we
possess the awesome power necessary to
such a confrontation, should the Chinese
Communists indulge in suicidal rash-
ness. The central point is that we must
persist in the struggle to thwart the am-
bitions of Hanoi backed by Peiping, so
that, pacification achieved, the noble,
revolutionary programs which were the
subject matter of the Honolulu Confer-
ence can proceed with greater vigor?
and the people of South Vietnam can
live in peace.
The issues are clear, Mr. Speaker. Our
commitments and our obligations are
clear. Our duty is clear. Our troops and
the civilian representatives who are help-
ing the South Vietnamese are doing their
duty. The people of this country will
not shirk their duty. And just as surely,
this House will not shirk its duty. Our
military have carefully considered what
they need to carry on the fight, and the
bill which is before us is a request for the
funds necessary to provide for these
needs. Let us, then, without further pro-
longing discussion, without feeding the
hopes of the enemy that he can win in
Washington what he cannot win on the
batlefield, proceed to enact this bill. Our
fighting men deserve this vote of con-
fidence, immediately, overwhelmingly,
and without further ado.
Mr. BATES. Mr. Chairman, I yield
5 minutes to the distinguished gentle-
man from Indiana [Mr. BRAY] .
(Mr. BRAY asked and was given per-
mission to revise and extend his re-
marks.)
Mr. FINO. Mr. Chairman, will the
gentleman yield to me?
Mr. BRAY. I yield to the gentleman
from New York.
Mr. FINO. Mr. Chairman, I want to
thank the gentleman from Indiana for
yielding to me at this time.
Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of
this bill, but I do so with several qualms.
My first qualm is that the President
seems to want to keep this war on an un-
admitted. "no win, no lose" middle track.
We are not pulling back to enclaves and
we are not pushing ahead to military
success. This kind of policy is costly?
much too costly. I will not vote to fund
a war that throws men into a meat-
grinder and money into a pool of quick-
sand. I want to see us switch to mili-
tary and diplomatic tactics aimed at put-
ting us in a position to negotiate a suc-
cessful conclusion to this war before we
have spent tens of thousands of lives
and tens of billions of dollars.
To move into this particular legisla-
tion, I would like to say I am not sur-
prised that the Armed Services Commit-
tee had to make provision for additional
funds for Navy construction in the Far
East. Secretary McNamara has been ex-
tremely careless during the last few years
in assessing American maritime and na-
val needs. He has grossly underesti-
mated our civilian and military seapower
needs in the Far East. Our merchant
marine has been left to stagnate. Our
Navy has also been neglected?as witness
the fact that it was up to the Armed
Services Committee to provide for Navy
construction needs in the Far East. I
think the Secretary's lack of awareness of
seapower and water transport has been
costly to our war effort. From Vietnam
to Brooklyn Navy Yard, Secretary Mc-
Namara has done too little, too late.
I would like to say, frankly, that I am
worried about American maritime power.
Secretary McNamara decided some time
ago that Vietnam could be supplied by
airlift, and he neglected the merchant
marine. Now the Russians are building
a merchant marine that is planned to
make our merchant marine look like a
tugboat fleet. The British have said
that our merchant marine is so old and
shoddy it can for the most part be in-
sured only at a premium?and this could
force many of our ships off the sea. I
would have thought that the British
would be content with bringing supplies
to North Vietnam. Evidently they want
to get the profits out of supplying both
sides in this war.
In short, the administration has not
shown any foresight in planning the
needs of our Navy or merchant marine.
I hope that this carelessness is over and
done with. There is only one area in
which this administration has antioi-
pated seapower needs before they de-
veloped. I have read recently that our
Potomac fleet is being reactivated.
Evidently the President has determined
that our budget is so well balanced that
the Presidential yacht can be brought out
of mothballs?but we cannot afford
Brooklyn Navy Yard.
I am also disturbed that much of the
supplemental appropriation before us
here today really belongs in the 1967
budget, but has been moved up to get it
out of the fiscal 1967 budget to make
room for wasteful spending programs in
next year's budget. I do not think a
supplemental appropriation should serve
this purpose.
I support this bill as a military spend-
ing bill necessary to support troops in
the field, but in many ways it disturbs
me. Its disturbs me if it has any con-
notation as being a mandate for escala-
tion. It disturbs me that votes for this
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march 1, 1966
authorization may be construed as sup-
port of administration policy?my vote is
not a vote in support of administration
policy, my vote is rather a vote in sup-
port of American troops. I would also
like to say that my vote here today is not
a vote for the budget gimmick aspect of
this bill. I am starting to feel that
everything that ciomes before us these
days has a budget gimmick in it.
I am getting tired of the President's
little devices for getting expenditures
out of the fiscal 1967 budget and getting
receipts into it. I am getting tired of
ha; foreign and Vietnamese policies. We
are pursuing policies at home and
abroad that would not convince a child,
no less Ho Chi Minh, that we have any
long-range fortitude. We are pursuing
wasteful programs at home and absurd
programs abroad. We are giving our
allies aid while they give Ho Chi Minh
trade. We are stationing troops in Eu-
rope to protect Europeans who thumb
their noses at our war effort because
they think that any nation pursuing
such shapeless and soggy policies must
be in water over its head.
I am worried about the President's
policies. There is too much blood and
too little belt-tightening. I favor a
tough policy, but toughness is not op-
timistic, extravagant, and malcoorcii-
tinted sacrifice for insufficiently defined
objectives. Toughness is a stern, calcu-
lated unwavering pursuit of reasonable
and well-defined goals. This is not a
definition of administration policy.
The policies of this administration are
dangerous because they are not coming
to grips with diplomatic reality as re-
gards our allies and military reality with
respect to Vietnam. The administra-
tion's glittering generalities and opti-
mism have built the American people
up for a letdown if we cannot win a
reasonable settlement at a reasonable
cost. The potential backfire of this se-
crecy, optimism and misrepresentation
would cheer Hanoi more than all the
dissent in these United States. It is con-
structive dissent that can head off the
backfire.
My vote is for our soldiers, and for
their splendid endurance in the face of
this nerve-shattering war. I do not sup-
port the way in which the administra-
tion is conducting our overall cold war
oolicy.
I would also like to point out a way
in which we can cut military expendi-
tures to make up for the money we are
voting today. We can begin to with-
draw some of the 318,000 troops we have
in Europe to protect the allies who do
not support us. Three weeks ago, I in-
troduced a resolution, House Resolution
728, to call on the President to begin
withdrawing troops. Today's expendi-
ture authorization makes my budget-
cutting resolution more important. I
urge this House to consider House Reso-
lution 728, and I am putting its text and
other information in the Appendix today.
Mr. BRAY. Mr. Chairman, we have
heard from many that we should not be
Ia. Vietnam, I do not care to discuss
that matter at this time, because it is
a moot question. It is a condition, not
a theory that confronts us. We are in
Vietnam. Several hundred thousand
troops, sailors, a:nd airmen are there en-
gaged in as vicious war as anyone has
participated in during the history of this
country. We are suffering heavy losses.
The situation is very precarious.
So, Mr. Chairman, the purpose of this
bill today is to provide the proper weap-
ons and supplies for serviceman who are
in Vietnam. The weapons a ad supplies
called for i.n this legislation are neces-
sary.
After all, Mr. Chairman, we only have
two alternatives before us in southeast
Asia. We are in Vietnam in treat force,
and the enemy has refused ti even talk
about peace. So one alternatiae is to sur-
render. That would make the United
States the paper tiger of our time, and
it would also result in turning over all
of southeast Asia to the Communists.
The ultimate results of such action on
our part is horrible to even contemplate.
Mr. Chairman, we have a mother al-
ternative?an alternative which the ap-
peasers ignore. That alternative is to
win, and that is what this leaislation is
designed to help us accomplish.
Mr. Chairman, despite the fact that
the United States has been bemoaned
and cursed and attacked at home and
abroad--and I especially refer to those
attacks at home with reference to the
demonstrations which are designed to do
everything they can to defeat he United
States?despite this fact the United
States ts still the "Real McCoy." Despite
all of the anvil choruses denouncing the
United States and demandina that we
surrender, the fact of the matter is that
we are still there, arid do not plan to
surrender until peace is secured. Also,
despite the fact that we have made many,
many errors?no question abtiut that?
in our military planning, and timing, I
have never yet seen and I do not be-
lieve anyone has ever seen American
troops any braver, more dedicated, and
more patriotic than those which are par-
ticipating in the conflict in South Viet-
nam.
Mr. Chairman, I have been over there
several times, and I have talked to many
of our American troops. I want to say
that at no time have I found one man
who was not proud that he was an Amer-
ican and proud of the job he as doing.
They did ask the question as to why we
did not try to win. They asked the ques-
tion as to why Americans were demon-
strating against their county. They
could not understand with all that Amer-
ica means to the world, all of t he great-
ness of America; they could not under-
stand why our own people would bitterly
attack America for its effort unselfishly
being made in Vietnam.
Mr. Chairman, I heard that question
raised many times. I went to the hos-
pitals and talked with dozens of young
men and boys there. I talked to men
who had an arm off or a leg off. At no
time did I hear one man comr lain. He
was proud he was an American.
Mr. Chairman, the only questions they
were asking were what are we doing to
win on the home:front, and in by these
anti-American demonstrations are tak-
ing place in America.
Now, Mr. Chairman, the GI in Vietnam
has only one thing in his mind; that is,
that the United States may win, and I
deeply hope that in some way these
wounded American patriots can transfer
that patriotism; that same will to win
to the homefront.
Mr. RIVERS of South Carolina. Mr.
Chairman, I yield such time as he may
consume to the gentleman from New
York [Mr. FARBSTEIN].
(Mr. FARBSTEIN asked and was given
permission to revise and extend his re-
marks.)
Mr. FARBSTEIN. Mr. Chairman, in
the past, I have expressed reservation
about some of the administration's ac-
tions in Vietnam. Recently, I joined a
number of other Representatives in urg-
ing the President, among other things,
to deescalate our military efforts in Viet-
nam as a further effort to bring the war
from the battlefield to the conference
table. I still feel no good can come from
further escalation and do not wish this
vote to be considered otherwise. I desire
to create a climate leading to the confer-
ence table.
Today we are faced with the task of
voting on an appropriation for $4.8 bil-
lion for Vietnam. Each Member must do
some soul searching before casting his
vote. I, for one, have carefully reviewed
my predilections and balanced them
with the Nation's well-being.
American boys are committing their
lives and honor to this fight in the Far
East. These young men must not be de-
prived of equipment, necessary hospitals,
medical treatment, essential supplies,
and helicopters needed to help them sur-
vive in this jungle war. The Congress,
regardless of any reservations and unan-
swered questions on administration pol-
icy, must not fail to grant the funds to
supply these brave men. I do not desire
to be in the position of turning my back
on our young men who are presently sac-
rificing their lives in Vietnam.
On the scale, I find I must vote in
favor of the appropriation.
Mr. PIRNIE. Mr. Chairman, I yield
myself 5 minutes.
Mr. Chairman, the hearings that pre-
ceded the approval of H.R. 12889 by the
Armed Services Committee represented
a very earnest effort by our members to
determine the urgent needs of our mili-
tary and to support them by this bill.
We are aware of the scope of our in-
volvement in southeast Asia and wish
to provide what is required to achieve
victory at the earliest possible time.
It is apparent that as yet our full
military capabilities have not been em-
ployed in Vietnam nor have we followed
the strategy that full military consider-
ations would dictate. We trust that our
actions are understood to reflect, our de-
sire to resolve the differences by Peace-
ful means. However, there ia a real
danger that our enemies will exoloit our
restraint through propaganda designed
to create the impression we are losing
the war, know we cannot win, and are
plagued by disunity on the hoinefront.
Certain events and actions might tend
to give credence to such claims but our
debate here today is not one of them.
We are here attesting that we are de-
termined to win and will meet the needs
of our forces in their effort to do so. We
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on the committee have asked our service
chiefs and department heads to tell us
what they required and by this legisla-
tion we are seeking to meet their needs
in full.
I have been disturbed that certain
items have been transferred from the
fiscal 1967 program without any real as-
surance that procurement will be so ac-
celerated that inclusion in this bill is
necessary. To the extent such technique
is employed, it does not have my ap-
proval. However, I have found it diffi-
cult to remove this criticism without in
some way interfering with sound objec-
tives. Therefore, I rely upon the good
faith which must be implicit in the un-
derlying request.
Another important element in this
legislation is the provision for ,military
construction totaling over $11/4 billion.
Our involvement in southeast Asia
necessitates prompt action to provide
needed facilities in support of supply,
housing and hospital operations. Al-
though many of the items have been
specified, the bill makes available to the
Secretary of Defense an additional $200
million for expeditious accomplishment
of emergency contruction needed to
meet any crisis which might develop. It
is proposed that this authority will be
fully funded.
This bill will appeal to all as a timely,
and we hope adequate, response to needs
paramount in our thinking. We trust
none shall misread our intent. Our de-
termination to achieve our valid objec-
tives in Vietnam is clear and in this spirit
we support H.R. 12889.
The action we take today will have an
impact on our fighting men. Too fre-
quently the headlines suggest confusion
or division on the home front. This is
detrimental to their morale and makes
their task more difficult. We can be
sure that our support of this measure will
furnish unmistakable evidence that this
House will respond to their needs
promptly and completely.
Mr. CUNNINGHAM. Mr. Chairman,
will the gentleman yield?
Mr. PIRNIE. I yield to the gentle-
man.
Mr. CUNNINGHAM. It is my im-
pression and the impression, I believe,
of others that the French lost the war
over there not an the battlefield but in
Paris. Would the gentleman agree with
that?
Mr. PIRNIE. There is reason to be-
lieve that is true. But we certainly have
something more working in our favor as
compared with the French.
Mr. CUNNINGHAM. Yes, I certainly
hope that is true. But the French
soldiers over there were left with nothing
to fight with because of decisions re.
suiting from agitation and dissent in
their capital city of Paris. Is that not
true and is it not so that that resulted
in their defeat?
Mr. PIRNIE. I hope that history will
not repeat itself insofar as our effort and
our operations are concerned.
Mr. CUNNINGHAM. We must give
our fighting men every support on the
battlefield and I commend the gentle-
man on his statement and certainly agree
with him.
Mr. PIRNIE. I thank the gentleman.
(Mr. PIRNIE asked and was given
permission to revise and extend his
remarks.)
Mr. HEBERT. Mr. Chairman, I yield
8 minutes to the gentleman from Vir-
ginia I Mr. Many] .
Mr. HARDY. Mr. Chairman, there is
no doubt in my mind that this bill is es-
sential to the support of all of our forces
in Vietnam.
I have visited Vietnam in the recent
past and have seen the construction at
Da Nang, Chu Lai, and Cam Ranh Bay
and at a number of other locations. I
was very pleased by the construction ac-
tivities that I saw, In fact, I made par-
ticular note of my feelings in this regard
when Defense Department construction
witnesses were before the committee.
This is not to say that I am completely
happy about the form of this present bill.
The bill authorizes construction in a
number of different areas as will be seen
from pages 17 and 18 of the report.
There is construction in the Philippines,
Guam, at Midway and Wake Islands and
about $63 million worth of construction
right here in the United States. And, in-
cidentally, that U.S. construction is set
out by State and installation on page 26
of the report.
The majority of the construction in
this bill, over $736 million worth, is in
Vietnam itself. The construction pro-
gram involves almost every type from
training facilities to ammunition stor-
age. Some of it is for the Navy, some
of it is for the Air Force and the largest
part, some $407 million, is for the Army.
We have a lot of people in Vietnam and
maybe we will have more in the not too
distant future. These people have to
have, in great part, much the same kind
of facilities that they would have to have
here in the United States. They have to
have barracks, hospitals, airfields, fuel
and ammunition storage, and every other
kind of facility which is a normal part of
a military operation. I guess food and
weapons come first in priority, but phys-
ical facilities such as I have named run a
very close second. And we have got to
provide them.
Of course, there are special problems
involved in construction in a place like
Vietnam. Vietnam is an undeveloped
country, and any kind of logistic support
is difficult.
Right now, there is only one major
port, Saigon. Transportation within the
country is practically nonexistent. Sim-
ply stated, there was nothing in Vietnam
for us to start with as there would be in
a developed country. We have to provide
everything ourselves. We have to pro-
vide port and warehouse facilities. We
have to construct roads, and all of this
has to be done under the most difficult
circumstances and, obviously, at costs
that are much greater than they would
be here in the United States.
Notwithstanding a full appreciation of
these difficulties, I think I should say, as
I mentioned a moment ago, that I was
not at all pleased with the way the De-
partment presented the construction pro-
gram for this bill. I am against any kind
of blank check to the Department of De-
fense. And I am not alone in this.
Many members of the committee feel the
same way. But that is the kind of pro-
gram that was handed to us in commit-
tee. I tried as hard as I could to keep
some congressional control, realizing the
difficulty in predetermining exactly what
was going to be built where, and haw
much it was going to cost. I know that
General Westmoreland needs to have a
good bit of flexibility. I know he cannot
predict the exact course of this war and
for this very reason he cannot predict
exactly where he is going to need a par-
ticular facility or the exact cost of it.
Notwithstanding these understandable
difficulties, the Congress, in my mind, has
a responsibility to see to it that it keeps
itself informed as to just how our funds
are being spent.
It was with this in mind that I offered
an amendment in committee which now
appears as section 401(b) of the bill. The
department has contended that this lan-
guage is too rigid?that it will cause de-
lays. I do not think the problem is as
great as they contend. But anyway we
have agreed on substitute language which
I think will serve the purposes I had in
mind about as well as the original lan-
guage.
The new language which is in the
form of a committee amendment and
will be offered by your chairman reads
as follows:
The Secretary of Defense shall furnish to
the Committees on Armed Services of the
Senate and House of Representatives a de-
scription of all construction projects, in-
cluding cost estimates and periodic reports,
made available to the Secretary of Defense
simultaneously with the receipt of such in-
formation from the persons responsible for
the construction of such projects in sup-
port of Vietnamese and other free world
forces in Vietnam. Whenever such construc-
tion projects, involving $1,000,000 or more,
are performed by private contractors, the
Secretary of Defense or his representative
in Vietnam shall report to -the Committees
on Armed Services of the Senate and House
of Representatives the name or names of
such private contractors. The amounts in-
volved in each contract a copy of the report
in support of each progress payment, and
a complete report prior to final payment.
The new language still does not pro-
vide an ideal situation but it will enable
us to keep our finger on the construction
program.
I want to stress that I have no doubt
as to actual need for this construction,
but I want to know and I think that
you and I have a right to know just what
is being done and how it is being done.
Mr. FASCELL. Mr. Chairman, I rise
in support of the pending bill, H.H. 12889,
authorizing appropriations for equip-
ment, materiel, construction, and other
purposes in support, primarily, of our
effort in Vietnam.
Our fighting men are engaged in one
of the bloodiest, dirtiest, most brutal
conflicts ever witnessed. It is the re-
sponsibility of this Congress to provide
full support promptly for all equipment,
materiel, and facilities which will aid in
saving the lives of our fighting men and
hasten a successful conclusion of our ef-
fort in Vietnam.
I strongly endorse this legislation for
weapons procurement and other pur-
poses in full support of our commitment
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in Vietnam, Just as I voted for the re-
cently adopted supplemental authoriza-
tion for economic aid and assistance. As
have previously stated, the military
effort and the economic effort in Viet-
nam are inseparable policy of the United
States in dealing with the problem of
Vietnam and southeast Asia.
I also support this resolution as a logi-
cal supplement of the policy decision
made by the Congress in 1964 in the
adoption of House Joint Resolution 1145,
which authorized the President to take
all necessary steps including the use of
armed forces, since we regard as vital to
our national interest and to world peace
the maintenance of international peace
and security in Vietnam and in south-
east Asia.
A vote for this legislation today is a
vote to support our fighting forces, a vote
to support previously adopted congres-
sional policy, and support for the Presi-
dent of the United States and the poli-
cies of this country in the critical con-
flict in Vietnam. Some might have
doubts; others might have reservations;
we may debate our respective positions;
but support of this legislation is sup-
port for the policy of President Johnson.
We ought to overwhelmingly support
this legislation because it is the right
Wing to do and the only thing to do.
I. congratulate the distinguished chair-
man from South Carolina IMr. MyEris],
and the members of the Armed Services
Committee who have brought this legis-
lation to the floor. They have given it
the most thorough consideration, and yet
have acted expeditiously on a matter of
We most urgent need. The whole ques-
tion of Vietnam has been discussed, re-
viewed. and debated very thoroughly in
the halls of this Congress. On the For-
eign Affairs Committee, of which I am a
member, we have been meeting and hold-
ing hearings on this subject almost daily
since we reconvened this year. Both in
subcommittee and full committee, we
will, as other legislation comes before us,
particularly the foreign aid authoriza-
tion bill, debate Vietnam and other world
issues for many weeks and months dur-
ing the balance of this session. There
have been discussions and debate on pre-
vious days on this floor just as there is
today. Everyone has had ample oppor-
tunity to project his viewpoint, to criti-
cize, to support, or to say what he has to
say on behalf of himself and his con-
stituents.
Notwithstanding voices of dissent,
and I do not discourage proper dissent, it
is clear that by vote after vote in this
body, the overwhelming number of repre-
sentatives of the people of this country,
in carrying out the desires of their con-
stituents, have time and again supported
the President of the United States and
the policies of this country as they apply
to Vietnam.
also suport this resolution because I
am opposed to unilateral withdrawal by
the United States from Vietnam. Such
a course of action is unthinkable surren-
der, and would accomplish nothing, while
its results would be disastrous. There
are those who maintain that we have no
business in Vietnam at all. I disagree
with this viewpoint because we Amen-
cans have learned the bitter lessons of
two world wars when aggression is al-
lowed to succeed. Aggression under any
name, technique, or strategy must not
succeed. Nevertheless in determining
our policy course and in support of this
legislation whether the United States
should be in Vietnam is almost moot.
We must face the facts of life is they are.
The fact is that the United States is
committed in Vietnam in principle, in
manpower, and in materiel.. We are
committed by treaty, the pledges of three
Presidents of the United States, a joint
resolution of the Congress, and other
declarations. We have approximately
250,000 men in southeast Asia, and the
prospects seem apparent that we may
have 400,000 or more, if necessary. By
way of comparison I note that at the
peak of the conflict in Korea. we had
327,000 men. there. Our expenditures for
Vietnam are at the rate of $21/2 billion
a year and climbing steadily. With these
facts, I find very little comfort; or logic
in the argument which alleges that the
United States should not be in Vietnam
for political reasons, military reasons,
moral and humanitarian reasons, or that
the United States is there illegally; or
that the United States should not be
there because this is a Vietnamese prob-
lem; an Asian problem; a problem for
the United Nations: or a problem of
someone else.
Another blunt fact is that there is no
doubt in my mind that South Vietnam
is and has been fighting for its life
against a brutal campaign of terror and
armed attack inspired, directed, sup-
plied, and controlled by the Communist
regime in Hanoi. Vietcong', National
Liberation Front, or any other group of
alleged or real indigenous dissent to the
contrary, the fact remains that there is
a determined aggressive and violent cam-
paign to take over the government and
the people. et South Vietnam. General
Giap, leader of the North Vietnamese
Army recently said:
If the special warfare that the 'U.S. im-
perialists are testing in South Vietnam is
overcome then it can be defeated everywhere
in the world.
In other words, if the United States
wins in Vietnam, we will have effectively
destroyed the new technique of aggres-
sion, the so-called wars of national lib-
eration. Vietnam therefore is a big test
of the Communist strategy of a; gression.
The United States has in vain sought
to substitute words for bullets. We have
talked to every nation in the world; we
have gone to the United Nations; we
have temporarily ceased bombings; we
have made it clear that we di not in-
tend to use more force than is necessary;
and yet?we have had no favorable re-
sponse from the National Liberation
Front, the Vietcong, the North Vietnam-
ese, the Red Chinese, or anybody else.
The reasan it seems to me that we have
had no response is that the enemy thinks
that the United States and its allies will
tire of this fight and that they, the en-
emy, therefore can win it.
It seems to me that we cannot fail or
unilaterally pull out of South Vietnam
without dire consequences.
The people of South Vietnam are fight-
ing for self-determination, a principle
we strongly believe in. Therefore, the
South Vietnamese ought to have that
right without any infringement or inter-
ference by the North Vietnamese, the
Red Chinese, or anybody else.
By our action here today we will make
it clear to the world that the majority of
Americans support our strong military
help to the people of South Vietnam to
resist subversion and foreign military
intervention plotted, directed, and sup-
plied from the north; and snake sure
that the Communist doctrines of guer-
rilla warfare and wars of national lib-
eration will not succeed against the de-
termined people with firm allies.
We seek an end of the war by nego-
tiation or other honorable means not in
conflict with our obligations. I support
our efforts to do so. I also support the
purpose of moving on as rapidly as pos-
sible with the more constructive task of
laying foundations for a better future
for all the people of southeast Asia.
But our fighting men know why they
are fighting in South Vietnam and they
need our support. U.S. Army Capt.
James Spruill, who was killed in Vietnam
just last April, recorded his own convic-
tion on Vietnam in simple and eloquent
words in one of his letters. I quote a
passage:
Above all, this is a war of mind and spirit.
And it is a war which can be won no matter
what present circumstances are. For us to
despair would be a great victory for the en-
emy. We mast stand strong and unafraid
and give heart to an embattled and confused
people. This cannot be done il America
loses heart. At the moment my heart is big
enough to sustain those around me. Please
don't let them back where you are sell me
down the river with talk of despair and de-
feat. Talk instead of steadfastness, loyalty,
and victory?for we must and we can win
here. There is no backing out of Vietnam,
for it will follow us everywhere we go. We
have drawn the line here and the America
we all know and love best is not or to back
away.
Mr. Chairman, I urge unanimous ap-
proval of this vital Presidential request,
because the United States must perse-
vere.
Mr. EDWARDS of California. Mr.
Chairman, I would like to be announced
as for the $4.8 billion supplemental ap-
propriation for Vietnam, although I have
opposed and will continue to oppose the
policies that have made this appropria-
tion necessary. I support the appropria-
tion because our men in Vietnam are the
victims of that policy and they must have
the support they need.
I believe that the President eincerely
wants peace, but I also believe that peace
is unattainable unless the assumptions
upon which our current Far Eastern
policy is based are drastically changed.
Specifically, if we continue to treat every
Chinese move as a major threat to world
peace, our panic policies will serve to
translate that potential into action which
will endanger not only Asia, but the en-
tire world.
There is evidence that China, despite
her bellicose statements and her harsh
and cruel internal life, is cautious in deed
if not in word. It is clear that she has
a paranoid fear of being attacked and
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this fear can only be intensified by U.S.
efforts to encircle China. The Chinese
have developed a nuclear capability that
may soon be operational. Therefore,
China must begin to share?along with
the other great powers?the responsibil-
ity of keeping the peace and protecting
the integrity of other nations.
Our success in containing Russian ex-
pansion since World War Ills insufficient
argument for applying exactly the same
policy in Asia. We have forgotten that
that policy of containment was estab-
lished among nations sharing our tradi-
tions and values, who had sufficient
wealth and wisdom to maintain their
own independence, and who had a demo-
cratic foundation to sustain the ideals
that we were defending. But we cannot
defend freedom and democracy in south-
east Asia the same way we did in Europe
precisely because Asia is not Europe.
Much of southeast Asia is anti-Chinese;
but, because of its immediate colonialist
background, it is also anti-Western?
perhaps more so.
Unfortunately, the people of south-
east Asia do not yet have the institutions,
the training or the leadership to make
Western democracy work?no matter
how much we insist and no matter how
much we help. But, they do not want to
be pawns in a forever shifting cold war.
They want more than anything else to be
left alone?left alone by the Chinese and,
more importantly, by us. They want no
entangling alliance, no binding treaties,
and, no depreciation of their already
meager resources through war.
It would appear that a sound Asia poli-
cy would be to foster the neutrality of
southeast Asia and do all we can to help
bring China into the community of na-
tions so that her fears of the West, and
of the United States particularly, could
be brought to the level of rational dis-
cussion.
This cannot be done so long as we are
forcing her hand through attempting to-
beat North Vietnam into diplomatic sub-
mission. This can only be done through
the relaxation of tensions in southeast
Asia, through a negotiated settlement in
South Vietnam and through the peaceful
and faithful implementation of such a
settlement.
We must, I believe, be ready to sit with
the Vietcong at the conference table and
to allow them participation in the future
political life of South Vietnam. And we
must stop the bombing of North Vietnam
lest we draw in China and destroy hope
for peace in that region of the world.
I anounce myself as for this measure
because I don't want to see our boys die
In the wrong war, at the wrong time, in
the wrong place for lack of domestic
support. But I would hope that our ef-
forts for peace in southeast Asia would
be intensified to end not only that war
but also the threat of world war III.
The CHAIRMAN. The Chair recog-
nizes the gentleman from Louisiana [Mr.
HEBERT].
Mr. HEBERT. Mr. Chairman, I
should like now to discuss the Army's
fiscal year 1966 supplemental program
for procurement of aircraft, missiles, and
No. 36-17
tracked combat vehicles, for which au-
thorization is requested under the pro-
visions of section 412b, Public Law 86-
149, as amended.
This program has as its principal ob-
jective the availability of military hard-
ware to equip the Army. Because of the
expansion of the Army's operations in
Vietnam during the past year, equipment
shortfalls will occur unless procurement
actions are continued in several com-
modity areas.
The supplemental request reflects
Army plans to make heavy current-year
investments, especially in long leadtime
Items, to sustain our buildup in south-
east Asia, to permit orderly expansion of
the Army to authorized force levels, and
to replenish inventories reduced by draw-
downs resulting from increased combat
consumption or new unit activations.
Authorization is requested, under the
fiscal year 1966 PEMA, supplemental
budget submission, for $825.6 million for
aircraft and aircraft spares and repair
parts; $64.0 million for missiles and mis-
sile spares and repair parts, and $75.8
million for tracked combat vehicles.
This is the first time that tracked combat
vehicles have been included as a separate
budget activity, and the first time for
which special congressional authoriza-
tion has been required.
AIRCRAFT
The budget figure of $825.6 million for
aircraft and aircraft spares and repair
parts represents approximately 34 per-
cent?slightly more than one-third?of
the total PEMA request of $2,465 million.
The aircraft category is second only to
the ammunition category in projected
dollar outlay, and reflects the continued
emphasis on the role of Army aircraft
in support of both combat and logistical
operations in Vietnam.
Funds budgeted under the fiscal year
1966 supplemental estimate will permit
inventory add-ons to aircraft which are
urgently needed to enhance combat ca-
pabilities in Vietnam, assist in meeting
deployment schedules, and pay back,
with preferred items, drawdowns from
reserve assets.
Additional buys of the CH-47A cargo
transport helicopter?Chinook?and
UH-1B/D tactical utility helicopter?
Iroquois?are projected. These are
the workhorses of Army air operations
In Vietnam. The Army also plans to fi-
nance the initial PEMA procurement of
the CH-54A heavy lift helicopter?Fly-
ing Crane?and to expedite procure-
ment of the OH-6A observation helicop-
ter?Pawnee?to replace several mar-
ginally adequate aircraft types cur-
rently in use in Vietnam. Additional
procurements of helicopter trainers and
fixed-wing surveillance aircraft are also
evisioned.
Other costs relate to the modification
or retrofit of in-service aircraft, $16.6
million; ground and support equipment,
$16 million; component improvement,
$2.1 million; production base support,
$2.2 million, and first destination trans-
portation, $0.2 million. Included is
$220.9 million for accelerated require-
ments of aircraft spares and repair parts.
MISSILES
The $64 million estimate for missiles
and missile spares and repair parts rep-
resents 2.6 percent of the total PEMA
submission. The projected funding is
to cover costs of replacing Hawk air de-
fense equipment connected with south-
east Asia deployments and for providing
similar equipment to support new unit
activations. No new missiles are in-
cluded. The estimate for missile spares
and repair parts is $28.5 million.
TRACKED COMBAT VEHICLES
For tracked combat vehicles the sup-
plemental request comprises approxi-
mately 3 percent of the overall PEMA
total. Estimated costs, in almost all
cases, are related to the replacement of
combat losses or the equipping of new
units. Approximately $22.8 million is
projected for add-ons of self-propelled
artillery and mortar carriers, to include
the 155 millimeter medium howitzer,
M109; the 8-inch heavy howitzer; M110;
the 175 millimeter field artillery gun,
M107, and the 81 and 107 millimeter
mortar carriers, M125A1 and M106A1.
Some $9 million is included for additional
buys of the full-tracked cargo carrier,
M548; the command post carrier,
M577A1, and the light armored recov-
ery vehicle, M578. A total of $44 million
is also budgeted for repair parts and
support materiel.
Mr. Chairman, I support the unani-
mous recommendation of the House,
Armed Services Committee that the
Army's fiscal year 66 supplemental re-
quest for missiles, aircraft, and tracked
combat vehicles be approved and I rec-
ommend its favorable consideration by
this body.
(Mr. HEBERT asked and was given
permission to revise and extend his re-
marks.)
Mr. HEBERT. Mr. Chairman, I yield
to the gentleman from Florida [Mr.
BENNETT] such time as he may consume.
Mr. BENNETT. Mr. Chairman, I rise
In strong support of this legislation and
its implications of backing the Presi-
dent in his efforts to bring about world
peace in our time and security and free-
dom throughout the world.
Mr. Chairman, this bill is a carefully
drafted piece of legislation and should
have the support of every Member of
Congress. It will provide the tools now
necessary to pursue our objectives in
South Vietnam. I am happy to support
the President and the troops 100 percent
in this noble effort to preserve freedom
and stop aggression.
Our President has said:
To know war is to know that there is still
madness in this world.
The truth of this is borne out in South
Vietnam. There we are vigorously re-
sponding to the requests of the local
government to assist in preserving the
independence of that tiny nation.
In so doing we are upholding the non-
aggression and freedom-seeking objec-
tives of the southeast Asia collective
defense treaty, approved by the over-
whelming vote of our Senate, 82 to 1. We
are also following the overwhelmingly ap-
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ULN LIKE, IS ION A March 1, 1966
proved resolution of the entire Congress
in support of our national efforts there,
allowing the use of armed force" to
assist South Vietnam upon its request
for "assistance in defense of its free-
dom."
Yet the whole matter could come to an
end and bloodshed could cease and the
avowed objectives of most of mankind
could be achieved if?as President John-
son suggested in his latest state of the
Union speech?everyone would "stand by
the Geneva agreements of 1954 and
1962." We are willing to do so.
These agreements are certainly reason-
able, providing as they do for free elec-
tions and local self-determination. If
in fact North Vietnam and the comma-
1st world have confidence in the popu-
larity of their cause, their aggressions
in South Vietnam should come to an
immediate halt; and we could proceed
together to bolster up the local govern-
ment of South Vietnam with free elec-
tions and assured independence.
Our own Government has sent,
throughout the world, topflight repre-
sentatives seeking to find some channel
to bring peace while preserving the in-
dependence of South Vietnam in fulfill-
ment of the accords of Geneva.
It is appalling that thousands of per-
sons are losing their lives and billions
of dollars are being expended in the
machinations of war, when these lives
and these treasures?both of life and
of materials?could be much better spent
in the forward progress of mankind.
These thoughts all underline the
statement of the President:
know war is to know that there is still
madness in this world.
Nevertheless the responsibilities are
on our shoulders at this time and we
must fulfill them to the best of our
ability, as disagreeable and as tragic as
they may appear from time to time.
When I spoke in Jacksonville on
May 30, 1964, Memorial Day of that year,
1 said something about the Vietnam War
which I think is appropriate to repeat
at this time. I said:
Under these circumstances we, the Amer-
ican people, should be careful that partisan
political considerations have nothing to do
with the decisions that must be made, and
we should be in constant prayer that what-
ever decisions are made are in the best in-
terests of the country and of mankind gen-
erally.
As I conclude my remarks I would like
to give you an analogy which seems fit-
ting: in the world of business, no busi-
nessman would put great responsibilities
on the shoulders of his office boy. He
would not send that inexperienced lad
to conclude some important contract
transactions or any other deed of large
proportions. In the troubled times of
1956, it is true that our country has these
grave responsibilities of which we all are
soberly thinking today.
But if we believe, as I am sure we all
do, that there is a God in heaven, he
earely would not be giving us, in these
Limes, these responsibilities unless he
Lhought that we were indeed capable of
fulfilling, them.
So, although our tasks may be hard
and the sacrifices great, I share with
you the hope that we will each here today
take courage and rededicate ourselves
not only to our beloved Nation, but to the
highest of human principles: sharing as
we must these great responsibilities
called forth by the challenging times in
which we live.
(Mr. BENNETT asked and was given
permission to revise and extend his re-
marks.)
Mr. HEBERT. Mr. Chairman, I yield
4 minutes to the gentleman from New
York {Mr. STRATTON 1.
Mr. EDMONDSON. Mr. Chairman,
will the gentleman yield to mc?
Mr. STRATTON. I am glad to yield
to the gentleman from Oklahoma.
Mr. EDMONDSON. Mr. Chairman, I
support this bill and commend the com-
mittee for bringing it to the floor of the
House, with full provision for all recog-
nized needs of our Armed Forces in south-
east Asia.
The fight being waged in South Viet-
nam is a fight for freedom. In the long
run, it is also a fight for peace, for no
real peace will be possible for men any-
where unless; the forces of aggression are
stopped in southeast Asia.
I cannot conceive of any action by the
Congress that would do more to encour-
age aggression, in all parts of he world,
than the defeat of this measure. The
evidence that Congress was not prepared
to back its Armed. Forces with the sup-
plies and equipment needed to carry out
our policies?which defeat of this bill
would mean to the world?would under-
mine the faith of every friend and ally
we have It would also encourage the
enemies of freedom to embark on new
conquests and invasions all over the
world.
On the other hand, overwhelming ap-
proval of this bill will demonstrate our
determination to do all that is necessary
to back our men and to provide them
with what they need to do their difficult
and dangerous duty in Vietnam.
I hope and trust the bill will be over-
whelmingly approved.
(Mr. EDMONDSON asked and was
given permission to revise and extend his
remarks. :i
Mr. STRATTON. Mr. Chairman, I
rise in support of this bill. It is a simple
bill. It simply represents a recognition
of the requests of our fighting services
for what they need to do the job to which
our servicemen are presently committed
in Vietnam. And I think we have no
alternative in this body except to support
this legislation.
I have been a little concerned by those
Members of this House and of the other
body who have suggested that one can
support this bill today without support-
ing the policy of our Government. That,
to me, is nonsense, self -delusion. What
is Congress supposed to do in a fighting
situation anyway?
We do not make decisions on strategy.
We do not consult with the commanders
in the field at every point. Rather we
pass authorization bills, like this one.
We pass appropriation bills. That is
what we have done before with regard
to Vietnam, and that is what we are
doing again today. Obviously we are
supporting the policy of our Government
in this legislation, a policy of resisting
the spread of communism in southeast
Asia and thereby proving to the Com-
munist aggressors that aggression does
not pay.
I would submit, Mr. Chairman, that it
just is not possible to have it both ways:
either you support that policy of our
Government or else you are against it.
And you vote today registers your posi-
tion on that vital question.
Mr. Chairman, what we are facing
today in South Vietnam represents in my
judgment a very serious test, indeed an
acid test, in our history as a government.
As the majority leader indicated a
moment ago, it is a showdown test of our
ability as a democracy to survive the
continuing challenge of communism.
People in Communist countries have
said that we are paper tigers?not be-
cause they do not recognize that we have
bigger bombs or greater carriers or more
planes than do the enemy countries, but
because they are convinced that when
the chips are down, we in America just
do not have the courage to see things
through.
It is about time that we recognize that,
whether we like it or not, we are in a
fighting war in Vietnam and that we
must give to our fighting forces and to
the administration, which has been pur-
suing a policy backed by the overwhelm-
ing votes of this Congress and the people,
the support that they deserve and should
have.
Debate is a good thing in a democracy.
But even in a democracy there must
come a time when debate ends and when
we get behind the decision that has been
taken and back up our men on the fight-
ing fronts. That is what this bill does,
Mr. Chairman, and that is what the com-
panion appropriation bill will do when
it, too, comes to this floor.
The time has come now for us to put
an end to further harassment of our Viet-
nam policy, to these attacks on our
policy, these proposals which seem to
come forward every day or so, of sonic
new concessions that somebody thinks we
ought to make to the Communists to
somehow lure them to the negotiating
table.
This is. a time now for national unity.
Let us not forget that it was President
Kennedy who describe the Communist
method of negotiation by saying, "What
is mine is mine, and what is yours is
negotiable."
That's what the Communists are trying
to do in Vietnam. That is what our
forces out there are trying to prevent.
Let us support them, not add to their
burdens and problems.
I say, Mr. Chairman, it is time for us
to have a little confidence in our Armed
Forces, to have a little unity in support
of our policy. As President Johnson
indicated in the White House briefing
the other day, no politician ever gets
elected by constantly predicting his own
defeat. The question in Vietnam is
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whether we can prove to the Communists
and to the world our determination, our
patience, and our fortitude under pres-
sure. Let us put an end to these doubts
and fears that undermine our will and
our resolution, and let this House join
now in an overwhelming expression of
confidence in our policy and confidence
in our Armed Forces.
Mr. BATES. Mr. Chairman, I yield
12 minutes to the distinguished gentle-
man from Michigan [Mr. CHAMBERLAIN].
(Mr. CHAMBERLAIN asked and was
given permission to revise and extend his
remarks.)
Mr. CHAMBERLAIN. Mr. Chairman,
I rise in support of H.R. 12889 and say
to my colleagues that this bill should not
only pass, but it should pass with an
overwhelming vote. This would serve
notice on the world that when it comes
to supporting our servicemen, who are
defending freedom wherever challenged,
that the American people are ready, will-
ing, and able to provide whatever they
may need to carry out their missions.
This legislation was approved by the
Armed Services Committee, as the ac-
companying report states, "solely in or-
der to achieve more rapid procurement
of replacements of articles consumed,
and to provide proper equipment for a
larger force in a shorter period of time."
But, Mr. Chairman, I would like to call
the attention of my colleagues to the
reservations expressed by the committee
on page 3 of the report regarding the
necessity for this legislation. I cannot
but have the feeling?which you will note
from the report is shared by most mem-
bers of our committee?that many of the
Items involved in this legislation may
simply have been removed from the regu-
lar 1967 authorization to this supple-
mental 1966 authorization without any
real program for acceleration. I am not
satisfied that the actual need for this
legislation has been sufficiently estab-
lished and that the procurement of
essential items will, in fact, be appre-
ciably accelerated by the enactment of
this bill today.
Again, Mr. Chairman, I would refer
my colleagues to the language of the
report on page 3 wherein it is stated
that:
Testimony on this subject was indecisive
and the committee has not yet been pro-
vided with sufficient definitive data to pin-
point the exact degree of real acceleration,
or to determine the amounts involved in the
proposed legislation which could safely and
should properly be deferred until the regular
1967 authorization.
So, as you read this report, which I
remind you again was a unanimous re-
port, it is certainly not unfair to conclude
that the Department of Defense has
failed to sustain the burden of proof
with respect to the necessity for this
supplemental authorization and that,
being realistic, we are participating in
a substantial bookkeeping exercise that
obviously offers little military advantage.
In saying this, however, I do not mean
to infer that what has been asked for in
support of our troops will not be needed
within the time frame of the budget for
fiscal year 1967 which will be before the
House for approval within the next few
months. It is for this reason that I have
no hesitation in my support for this bill.
But as I said at the outset of my remarks,
I nonetheless feel that by our actions
today we should let our voices be heard
loud and clear so all may know that we
are going to provide our troops in the
field with whatever they may need in
supporting the interests of our Govern-
ment and our determination to resist
communistic aggression at this crucial
hour.
Now, Mr. Chairman, if I may, I would
like to use the balance of my time to
make two other points. While they may
not be directly related to the legislation
before us, they certainly have a vital
bearing on the conduct of the war in
Vietnam.
My second point is simply this: Our
concern today in seeking to provide all
the supplies necessary to our troops
should not be permitted to pass without
drawing attention to the similar prob-
lems confronting our enemy. Ho Chi
Minh is dedicated to a policy of total
victory. Anything that the Hanoi re-
gime needs and is denied cannot help
but put roadblocks in their path to the
south. The traffic of free world ships
into North Vietnamese ports, regardless
as to whether their cargoes are Com-
munist or free world, strategic or non-
strategic, simply must be stopped. Our
governmental policy has clearly been too
tolerant of this free world assistance to
our enemy. The administration's in-
difference has created a leadership vac-
uum which the maritme unions have re-
cently sought to fill through independent
action because of this apparent tacit
abdication of this aspect of foreign pol-
icy to private effort. Bills exist in Con-
gress which would do what the maritme
unions seek to acocmplish, but the ad-
ministration has shown only a negative
interest. Regardless of official efforts to
depreciate the importance of this trade,
I simply cannot comprehend how the tol-
erance of even one free world ship in
the harbor of Haiphong can be justified.
Now, in January of this year there was,
in fact, a decided increase in this traffic
over the previous month. The Depart-
ment of Defense publicly admits that
there were three British, one Cypriot,
and three Greek vessels in North Viet-
nam. While again the classified report
indicates that the true figure is well
over double that?well over double it,
I tell you?and that is what we are not
being told?actually the secret reports
given to me by the Department of De-
fense show that free world arrivals in
North Vietnam in January are actually
more than in any month since last July.
I will say that again. Free world ar-
rivals in January in North Vietnam were
more than during any month since last
July.
Now, Mr. Chairman, I submit that we
cannot say that we have provided our
fighting men with the supplies they need
without looking at the other side of the
coin, without having done everything
that we can to interdict the enemies'
lines of supply.
We should close every possible valve
in their lines of supply and the higher up
in the pipeline the better it will serve our
interests. That is why I say that we
should make sure that nothing destined
for North Vietnam is ever loaded aboard
a free world ship.
Now, Mr. Chairman, my third point
focuses not upon military hardware
needs but, rather, upon that which this
hardware seeks to accomplish.
Mr. Chairman, the struggle in South
Vietnam is essentially no different from
that encountered in many other places
in the world, where we are confronted
with communistic aggression and sub-
version. It is simply nothing but a
struggle for the minds of men.
Mr. Chairman, the U.S. presence in
South Vietnam, to be successful in less-
ening the spread of communism, must
win the support of the South Vietnamese
people by convincing them that we share
a common cause, and that the United
States is determined to help them
achieve security and to establish a better
way of life.
Mr. Chairman, this effort can only be
successful if the South Vietnamese are
fully and accurately informed about the
problems which we are facing jointly,
and what is being done to solve these
problems.
Mr. Chairman, early last summer
General Westmoreland made it clear to
our special subcommittee of the House
Armed Services Committee that was sent
to South Vietnam by the chairman of
the Committee on Armed Services, the
gentleman from South Carolina [Mr.
Rivzits], that in his judgment television
offered a tremendous opportunity to help
unify a country where communication is
extremely difficult, if not totally non-
existent. With proper encouragement,
this project was finally approved. I have
followed its progress closely. While I am
apprised of some initial technical diffi-
culties, I am informed that it is now op-
erational and performing well since its
inauguration in early February, and that
there are airborne transmitters beaming
daily television signals to the Saigon
area.
Mr. Chairman, I was privileged to see
these flying TV stations as they were
being assembled right here in the Wash-
ington area, at the Andrews Air Force
Base. I talked to the officers and men
that were actually installing the equip-
ment. I saw what went into these planes.
It was the biggest scavenger hunt I have
ever heard of?spare parts and obsolete
equipment were sought wherever they
could be found, and if they could not be
found, makeship parts were fabricated
on the spot.
I was even told that some essential
components were found on the local
shelves of the Sears & Roebuck stores.
Mr. Chairman, I have never witnessed
a greater dedication than that of the
crews who worked 24 hours a day, really
around the clock, in order to get these
planes operational and send them on
their mission.
Mr. Chairman, just this past week I
had an opportunity to talk with the
Vice President, following our White
House briefing?that was last Thursday
morning?and I asked him how this
television project was getting along and
whether or not he had heard anything
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4276 CONGRESSIONAL R ECOR1) ? HOUSE March 1. 1966
about it while he was in Saigon. I am
pleased to report to my colleagues of the
House that he was most, enthusiastic
about the great potential of this pro-
gram. He concurred in the need for its
expansion just as fast as possible.
So, Mr. Chairman, I say to the mem-
bers of the Committee of the Whole
house on the State of the Union today
that if this program is a good program
and if it can perform a vital function in
helping to convince the people of South
Vietnam of our determination to help
them resist a ruthless advance of com-
munism in their homeland, it is time we
got to work here procuring the proper
equipment with which to do this job,
rather than sending them wornout, dis-
carded, obsolete equipment held togeth-
er with coathangers, baling wire, paper
clips and Scotch tape.
Mr. Chairman, I have heard rumors to
toe effect that there are requests now
pending for new and better equipment,
including more suitable aircraft for this
job, and as soon as I can learn more of
the details as to what will be required,
am going to do what I can to get it
and get it quick, and get it to South Viet-
nam. I urge your help in providing
whatever may be needed in order to real-
ize fully this dramatic potential of tele-.
vision in South Vietnam.
Mr. Chairman, the bill now pending
before us calls for the authorization of
$4.8 billion. The total of the President's
recent supplemental request was $12.3
billion. These are only supplemental
funds. No one knows how much we
have spent in the past, and certainly all
of us are certain that much more is going
to be required in the future. I have been.
told that the original program, this tele-
vision program, in South Vietnam called
for the expenditure of $1.4 million.
The CHAIRMAN. The time of the
gentleman from Michigan has expired.
)4r. BATES. Mr, Chairman, I yield
the gentleman 3 additional minutes.
Mr, CHAMBERLAIN. I thank my
rolleague for yielding to me this addi-
tional time.
The original program to provide this
television network in South Vietnam
called for only $1.4 million, to provide a
network throughout the country that
would reach from 80 percent to 90 per-
cent of its inhabitants, and that this
could be accomplished within, a year.
When we are talking about a $12 billion
supplemental appropriation, I say $1.4
million is a modest sum. The Govern-
ment could afford it as much as the Gov-
ernment could afford my taking a sip of
water from this glass.
So, Mr. Chairman, as we provide the
hardware and equipment that will be
needed for our troops in South Vietnam
let us be bold to also think in terms of
ming one of our greatest assets, one we
have not used heretofore to the fullest.
You know, Mr. Chairman, we hear so
much about bold and imaginative pro-
grams. But when we come up with
something truly bold and imaginative we
put it together with obsolete equipment.
(c1; us do all we can to convince the
South Vietnamese of our good intentions
especially when we have a program that
can serve our purpose and be expanded
without bloodshed. Now boar that in
mind. We are not going to try to kill
people with television. Why do we have
to appropriate all this money and send
our boys by the hundreds of thousands
crawling through the jungle and wreak-
ing destruction on the countryside just
to convince the South Vietnamese peo-
ple that we mean business when no na-
tion in the world can claim the abilities
we have achieved with television?
By way of conclusion, Mr. Chairman, I
should like to add. that the or rasion of
this bill is a time for unity aid not a
time for dissension. The debate in
recent weeks over our policy in Vietnam
has had its purpose and its day in court.
It has properly served to get a lot of
thinking out in the open. How ever, the
criticism that has been prompted, I
believe, has reached the point of
diminishing return.. After all that has
been said, we are still confron ted with
the stubborn fact that there is no real
alternative to the basic premise of our
present policy. We do not iotend to
abandon the South 'Vietnamese peoPle
and our own long-range interests to the
aggressive demands of commuidsm. It
is timely for us to put Ho Chi Minh on
notice of our firm, united determination
to support such a policy. There should
be no other interpretation as to the
meaning of what we do here today.
Mr. BATES. Mr. Chairman, I yield to
the gentleman from California I Mr. DON
H. CLAUSEN ] .
(Mr. DON H. CLAUSEN asked and
was given permission to revise and ex-
tend his remarks.)
Mr. DON H. CLAUSEN. Mr. Chair-
man, I rise in support of this le;:islation.
The Speaker of the House, Mr. Mc-
CORMACK. the distinguished majority
leader, Mr. ALBERT. the chairman and
ranking members of the Armed Services
Committee have all presented a strong
position of support. The cemmittee
members have passed the bill unani-
mously.
I do not believe this is the time to
project an image of disunity to our free
world friends or our enemies. I do not
believe any real service would be ren-
dered by not providing our men serving
in Vietnam with the best in equipment
to carry out their military mission.
The debate here today suggests that
many Members of Congress are becom-
ing increasingly disenchanted with the
inconsistent and sometimes ambiguous
reports coming out of Vietnam. The
American people have expressed an in-
creasing amount of doubt about our
policies. I believe this attitude arises
because the people do not feel they have
been told the entire story. I further
believe the American people will back
a firm policy that is designed to win, if
they are told the complete facts.
I have felt for some time that we
should find out who our friends really
are in southeast Asia and this includes
our allies in both NATO and SEATO.
As the gentleman from Michigan sug-
gests, the shipping in and out of
Haiphong has increased appreciably this
year?this is, of course, understandable
during times of military conflict. But
the deplorable fact that our allies?our
friends, if you will, are among those
who are carrying supplies and materiel
for the support of our enemies. Why can
not we be equally firm with these so-
called friends who choose to make a
profit from both sides of this war? To
me, this borders on the brink of inter-
national treason. Not only does this
problem exist in Vietnam but they con-
tinue their normal trade relations with
Cuba and other puppet countries of the
Soviet Union and Red China. &miner or
later we are going to have to get tough
with our friends and ask them to ap-
propriately decide which side of the
fence they are really on.
I sincerely believe President Johnson's
place in history will be determined by
his ability to strengthen the SEATO al-
liance to bolster their ability to provide
for their own security in that section of
the world?thereby minimizing the num-
ber of American boys required to up-
hold our commitment in that faraway
section of the world. The same thing
can be said of our relationship with the
NATO countries. Heaven forbid the day
when our traditional alliances (Tumble.
The only way we can expect to retain
the respect of mankind is through a
policy of firmness and fairness?be it
military, economic, or political.
Therefore, I support this bill today,
but in closing I would like to admonish
my colleagues to continue to seek other
means to win this war. We can and must
escalate the peace offensive throughout
the world through the application of an
economic, political, psychological, tech-
nological, and humanitarian offensive?
employing techniques that are creative,
bold, and imaginative. This will require
a broader commitment from all Amer-
icans and our free world friends as we
jointly uphold our firm resolve to sustain
freedom for all mankind.
Mr. BATES. Mr. Chairman, I yield
to the gentleman from Missouri [Mr.
HALL I such time as he may require.
Mr. HALL. Mr. Chairman, as has
been well stated, this bill represents
authorization for our troops of all the
services in South Vietnam. I rise in
support of it because I think the way it
has been reviewed, albeit hastily but by
line item, whether in areas of research
and development or in procurement of
military equipment, tanks and missiles,
or whether in the area of construction?
indicates the proper approach to all
authorizations by a legislative com-
mittee.
Many of us are extremely proud of the
logistical support that is being rendered
to our troops there.
A vote for this bill is a vote for con-
tinued support of these people and I
would like to assure one of the e;entle-
men who queried our distinguished
chairman that medicine is again making
a record in South Vietnam that has never
been made before, based on the modern
state of the art, to the point where we
are having less than 1 percent of deaths
from all battle casualties that reach any
kind of aid. However, Mr. Chairman,
all the supplies will not help if we are
handicapped too much by a lack of will
to win and by dissension in the ranks
back home.
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March 1, 1966 CONGRESSIONAL RECUEu riu
We have perhaps in the past overex-
tended ourselves and not defended our-
selves to the maximum. It is poor mili-
tary policy if we do not use a maximum
offense as the best defense.
Perhaps there are items here in this
supplemental or deficiency bill that have
been moved from the fiscal year 1967 in-
to the supplemental or deficiency author-
ization in many areas. But there is cer-
tainly much here that is needed imme-
diately in follow-on and long leadtime
items, and your committee is convinced
this is the most appropriate way to get
the materiel into the hands of our
troops. Perhaps there is much here that
was lopped off a year or so ago by a
penny wise and pound foolish Secretary
of Defense or Bureau of the Budget. But
now the equipment is needed and to my
mind it is proper and not further debat-
able, in view of the committee hearings,
report, and unanimous action.
Perhaps there has been too long a
delay in the proper interdiction of logis-
tical supply lines of the North Vietnam-
ese but now it is time to get on with
the job.
Yes, Mr. Chairman, a vote today is not
In support of any of the Secretary of
Defense's multiple mistakes or lack of
State Department foreign policy. This
is a vote for all our men in all the serv-
ices in southeast Asia on a basis where
we have undoubted superiority, in the
air and sea, and should be about the
job with adequate supplies.
I strongly recommend a unanimous
vote in favor of this supplemental au-
thorization bill for the men in south-
east Asia.
(Mr. HALL asked and was given per-
mission to revise and extend his re-
marks.)
Mr. RIVERS of South Carolina. I
yield to the distinguished gentleman
from Washington [Mr. Mem] whatever
time he might require.
(Mr. HICKS asked and was given per-
mission to revise and extend his re-
marks.)
Mr. HICKS. Mr. Chairman, I rise to
support this bill.
My office is now tabulating the returns
from a questionnaire I sent out last
month-13,000 have been returned, and
they are still arriving in large numbers.
The questionnaire has a good deal of
blank space, which the respondents have
used liberally for comments. Mr. Chair-
man, these comments, as well as answers
to the questions I asked, show that the
people of my district overwhelmingly
support the President's policy in Viet-
nam. Therefore, they would support
this bill as I do.
But, Mr. Chairman, along with their
concern about Vietnam they are tremen-
dously concerned about inflation. I con-
fess that I too am worried about infla-
tion, and have been for some time. The
bill before us is a supplemental authori-
zation bill. Why must it be supple-
mental? Because we did not properly
evaluate the situation last year. Now
military expenditures are rising relent-
lessly, while unemployment continues its
downward trend, and unemployed skilled
labor virtually no longer exists. All of
these things show inflationary pressures,
and those pressures are tremendous now.
We must not ignore the inflationary
danger. We must not allow ourselves to
take half measures and pretend that we
are facing the problem squarely with all
its implications. We must not let our-
selves underestimate the danger by al-
ways dealing with parts but never with
the whole. If we do, we will continue to
have supplemental instead of compre-
hensive legislation.
What is the answer? Because infla-
tion is caused by rising demand, meas-
ures must be taken to curb demand.
Many approaches are offered, and several
of them together seem to me to offer the
best approach. The Federal Reserve
Board has already raised the price of
money. This alone will not solve the
problem. However, combined with other
measures it can help to restrain invest-
ment and reduce demand in that way.
We must also look to decreased Govern-
ment spending and increased taxes.
Nonmilitary spending must be cur-
tailed where it is possitle to do so with-
out jeopardizing what is best in our Great
Society programs. And that does not
mean cutting down impacted areas
school aid, or school milk, and hot
lunches. It does mean that we must re-
double our critical scrutiny o_ every
measure for the expenditure of funds to
be sure that it will achieve the purpose
as economically and efficiently as pos-
sible.
As for taxes, last week I voted against
the tax bill the purpose of which was to
raise revenue to pay for increAsed spend-
ing of the Vietnam war. I voted against
it not because I think we do not need a
new tax measure but because it seemed to
me a palliative ar.d not a cure. I do not
oppose the withholding changes, and I
think it is sensible to graduate the with-
holding rates to coincide more closely
with tax rates. And since it is true that
the Government needs funds now, a
speed-up in collection will obviously help
in the short run. The excise tax reim-
position does bother me because excise
taxes are not the most equitable kind of
tax. But above all, I consider the meas-
ures in that bill too little and too late.
The tax which was not even discussed
last week but which will be paid regard-
less of the tax bill approved by this body,
the tax which is the most discriminatory
of all, is inflation.
We cannot avoid taxation of some
kind. The question then is whether we
should tax through inflation, ignoring
the problem and letting it take its course,
or face the problem squarely and make
the decision to tax in an orderly and
evenhanded way. I think the choice
is clear. Although it is never popular
to raise taxes, we will have to do so.
But we must do so in a meaningful way,
not by halfhearted measures which lull
us into thinking we have met the need.
The sooner we recognize this fact and
move to act the better.
If we do not take well-planned meas-
ures soon, then we will surely give rein
to inflation. By so doing we may im-
pose the cruelest tax of all on those least
able to bear the burden, on the elderly
4277
and disabled living on fixed incomes, on
the poor, the unemployed.
A minute ago I mentioned the ques-
tionnaires I am receiving from my con-
stituents. A comment on one of them
seems to me to reflect the responsible
thinking of the people of my district on
the need to be realistic about paying for
our programs, both foreign and domestic.
The writer said:
We all want the benefits of the Great
Society but nobody seems to want to foot
the bill?if we are going to spend let us raise
taxes (I might point out that I make over
$10,000 a year with two dependents so I will
feel it) but it has to be done.
I was pleased to find in last Sunday's
Washington Post that my views coincide
with those of a most eminent economist,
Dr. Paul A. Samuelson. He points to the
latest estimates of our gross national
product in this coming year, now ex-
pected to rise about $5 billion above what
has been forecast. His most telling
point, in my view, is that our economic
expansion is becoming rapid and frantic
instead of orderly and durable, that it
cannot benefit the country, and that it
will harm those at the bottom of the
economic ladder. It should be restrained
so that orderly growth can be continued.
I fully agree with Dr. Samuelson's con-
clusion that a new tax plan is needed,
and that work on such a plan should go
forward at once.
In closing, Mr. Chairman, I want to
reiterate my support for this bill and to
express the hope that all my colleagues
will support it too. At the same time
I urge them to face without flinching
the need to keep our economy in hand
and the responsibility to do so.
Mr. ROSENTHAL. Mr. Chairman,
will the gentleman yield?
Mr. HICKS. I yield to the gentleman
from New York.
(Mr. ROSENTHAL asked and was
given permission to revise and extend
his remarks.)
Mr. ROSENTHAL. Mr. Chairman, I
vote for this supplemental authoriza-
tion with reluctance and apprehension.
The policy which such a vote would
seem to endorse is one with which I
have often disagreed. It is one with
which, in many respects, I disagree now.
Bombing of North Vietnam has been af
negligible military effect and has in-
volved serious diplomatic drawbacks. I
have also felt that any settlement, any
negotiations, any provisional govern-
ment, and any elections which excluded
the participation of the National Libera-
tion Front would be highly impractical.
Indeed, I think one of the principal ob-
stacles to peace, in addition to the pres-
ent hostility of North Vietnam, is our
apparent refusal to acknowledge the
existence of the National Liberation
Front which is composed largely of South
Vietnamese, and is clearly in control of
much of South Vietnam. We do not in-
tend to exterminate that force. We
therefore must deal with it. And we
must make clear to all that we shall
deal with it. That concession I believe
to be a prerequisite for settlement.
I believe, therefore, that there are
diplomatic alternatives to further escala-
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CONGRESSIONAL RECOP, I) ? HOUSE March 1, 1966
tion of this war. Not being sure if these
alternatives have been adequately ex-
plored, indeed having some feeling that
they have been too quickly passed by, I
am unable to accept any contention that
we must escalate in Vietnam. Yet, I fear
that this authorization permits such an
escalation_
f am, moreover, puzzled by many of
the provisions in this authorization it-
self. I share the reservations expressed
in the committee report:
"If there is one reservation felt by many
members of the committee regarding the
necessity for this legislation, it arises from
the possibility that many of the items in-
volved, in all three categories of procure-
ment, research, and development, and con-
struction, rlia.y simply have been moved from
the regular 1967 authorization to this sup-
Tilemental 1906 authorization without any
,:ofit program for acceleration. Obviously no
military advantages would be gained by such
a bookkeeping situation. Testimony on this
subject was indecisive and the committee
has not yet been provided with sufficient
definitive data to pinpoint the exact degree
of real acceleration, or to determine the
amounts involved in the proposed legisla-
tion which could safely and should properly
be deferred until the regular 1967 authoriza-
tion."
With these misgivings, however, I still
feel constrained to vote for the measure
before us today. I can find no adequate
reason to refuse American forces the
support necessary for their survival. I
question the policies which brought over
200,000 men to Vietnam. That being
said. I still cannot find acceptable
grounds for refusing those forces the
means to defend themselves and to sur-
vive in war.
Here is a deeper problem, a more
fundamental issue. The President's pri-
macy in foreign affairs is nothing to be
treated lightly. Its ultimate source of
legitimacy is the Constitution. I do not
believe that the congressional role in for-
eign affairs is such that we should feel
completely free to deny the President the
means to pursue a policy, particularly in
war, once that policy has been reached
with ample consultation. Clearly, Con-
gress must reserve the right to act in such
a manner, 'rhe proper constitutional
vehicle for such action, however, is a
declaration of war. In any case, I be-
lieve that the right to deny the President
in war should be exercised only in cir-
cumstances of the greatest clarity, or in
issues about which there is little ambigu-
ity. Vietnam is not such an issue,
despite the misgivings many have about
policy.
I. am not happy with the minimal role.
to which Congress is thus consigned.
Nor am I convinced that the Congress
has been adequately consulted or respect-
fully attended in the formulation of poli-
cies in Vietnam. But I do not accept the
proposition that this vote today consti-
tutes a considered and broad sense of
Congress.
do not believe my own vote, simply
as a vote, properly represents my view-
point on this matter, any more than the
total vote of Congress adequately repre-
sents the total sentiment of Congress.
Complicated positions on matters of war
and peace are not to be abbreviated by
such simple symbolism. So I deny the
legitimacy of this vote as a deep expres-
sion of Mdividual or collective viewpoint
on the full range of policy in Vietnam.
I am voting for support and supplies for
the American troops already committed
to Vietnam.
Mr. RIVERS of South Carolina. I
yield to the distinguished minority
leader, the gentleman from Louisiana
[Mr. BO,;GS I, whatever time he might re-
quire,
(Mr. BOGGS asked and was given per-
mission to revise arid extend his re-
marks.)
Mr. BOGGS. Mr. Chairman, I am
happy to commend the chairman of the
distinguished Armed Services Committee
and the members of that committee, in-
cluding my colleague, the lientleman
from Louisiana [Mr. HEBERT], arid many
others. This committee rep,:,rted this
legislation unanimously. It is a com-
mittee that debates issues thoroughly and
completely. In my judgment, lhis com-
mittee ROHM not have reported this bill
unanimcusly had it not felt that it was
absolutely essential for the s(,,eurity of
our Nation and for the freedom of our
Nation.
should also like to come end and
congratulate the Members of this body,
the House of Representatives, for the
unity which they have shown in the face
of this challenge to our country.
In my judgment, the only way we can
be defeated is not by the Communists
from the North Vietnam or by the sup-
port which they receive from the Chinese
Communists, who have declared time and
time aga n their announced intention of
conquering all free world, but we can be
defeated if we divide among ourselves.
We can be defeated if the word goes out
to Hanoi and Peiping that we will not
stand united in Vietnam, and that we
will talk when we should be defending
the bastions of freedom there and help-
ing the men who are fighting in the name
of freedom.
I hope that this bill will be am opted by
an overwhelming vote?I hope by a
unanimous vote.
For 25 years this country, known as
the hallmark of freedom, has faced first
one, then. another threat to freedom?
to our own and to that of our friends.
One after another these threats have
been confronted and eventually con-
tained. But still the threats persist.
It has been a trying quarter ,if a cen-
tury for the forces of freedom. At times
we become exasperated with the
continuing need to defend freedom. It is
at those times that we need to remind
ourselves that freedom is not entirely
free; it must constantly be defended to
be assured. If there has been any time
in the hlstory of the changing world
that we could not afford to tjre, it is
now.
I believe that we must reexamine the
quarter-century that has just pissed us
to see where we have gone, what we now
have, and what we should be striving
for. Let me take a minute or two to
try to gain that perspective.
In the Second World War the chal-
lenge to liberty quickly became obvious
and direct, and the call for our response
became apparent. After 1945 the new
challenge of communism in the form of
the Red army moving across Europe be-
came clear-cut; our measured response
to that advance was clearly called for.
It was successful; the adversary was
stopped, but not before he had engulfed
much of Eastern Europe.
The Communist threats in southern
Europe and the Middle East in the late
1940's were not as direct and open, but
they soon became clear. The bold re-
sponses of the American Government and
of the threatened peoples themselves
brought about a subsidence of tile threat,
and again Communist expansionism was
stifled.
In Asia, meanwhile, the calamities of
the World War and its aftermath were
permitting Communist rule to establish
itself on the Chinese mainland and on
the northern part of the Korean Penin-
sula. The free world was at a loss to
stop it. But, by 1950 when the Commu-
nists were sufficiently organized in power
to openly attack South Korea. the free
world no longer stood by passively, and
as in Europe, the Communist thrust was
eventually stalled.
Shortly thereafter, the southeast Asian
independence movements, which were
soon to drive European colonial power
from that area, were usurped by the
Communists. A Communist regime, in
the guise of anticolonialist liberators,
was installed in North Vietnam under
terms of the 1954 Geneva agroements.
Not satisfied with the territory they al-
ready had, the Communists that same
year began stockpiling arms in the south
and infiltrating some 10,000 Communist
guerrillas into the South Vietnamese
peasantry. The groundwork for an ex-
tensive insurgency was laid in the south.
By 1956-5'7 the insurgents began to
act, when it became evident the t South
Vietnam would not fall peaceably under
Hanoi's control. By 1959 terrorist at-
tacks, assassinations, and kidnapings
had claimed an estimated 1,000 South
Vietnamese civilian victims. Another
Communist thrust was underway against
a free world country.
An earlier campaign against the
French in Indochina had not been
stopped until the Communists were able
to establish another Communist-ruled
nation. By 1960 that new Communist
country was pressing in a now push into
Laos and actively into South Vietnam,
and it was making progress.
If the new thrust of communism was
to be stopped, it had to be done in Viet-
nam and Laos. It was clear that Com-
munist forces were gaining new terri-
tory. The free world had been relatively
successful in stalling Communist ag-
gression elsewhere in the world. Was it
to falter in southeast Asia? That ques-
tion was posed in the 1960-62 period. It
is still posed for us in 1966 with regard
to Vietnam.
Asia then has become the locale for
the Communist offensive. But they are
different Communists than the free
world faced in Europe, and they are
using different techniques. There is no
longer direct, open aggression. Instead
the Chinese and their North Vietnamese
agents are perfecting the art of national
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liberation wars--of subtle, covert, and
ambiguous external assistance to inter-
nally based guerrilla units.
What we face in Vietnam today is this
kind of ambiguous, elusive military con-
frontation. But the world is not preoc-
cupied with other major wars at this
moment, or with other major respon-
sibilities that are of overriding concern.
Nor is there a decolonization battle wag-
ing in Vietnam. There are no excuses
for us not to see this conflict in Vietnam
as aggression by one state against an-
other. A properly measured and positive
response to this aggression must be found
and pursued.
To those who would ask proof of ag-
gression against the South Vietnamese,
I would ask the purpose of the 80,000
Communists, taken from the south to
Hanoi in 1954, who were infiltrated back
into the south beginning in 1961. I would
also ask why nine or more regiments of
regular North Vietnamese forces have
been brought into South Vietnam in the
past year. And I would ask the mean-
ing of open boasts by the Hanoi leader-
ship of its support for the so-called lib-
eration movement in the south as a step
toward reunification on Communist
terms.
That there has been aggression from
North Vietnam, there is no question.
This aggression against the south is di-
rected and supported politically and
militarily from Hanoi. The weapons,
equipment, and other supplies for it are
supplied largely by Hanoi, which in turn
is supported by Communist China. .
That the South Vietnamese deserve
and must have help from us and other
allies, I believe, is without question. How
can we, or anyone, expect the South
Vietnamese to meet successfully the
growing power of all Asian communism?
It is not by our choice that we are there.
It is by the decision of the North Viet-
namese, supported by the Red Chinese,
that we are forced to respond to their
aggression. The initiative has been on
their part. Our actions have only been
in response to their determined and
growing aggression.
Our actions have been in accord with
our commitments under the Southeast
Asia Treaty and with our bilateral com-
mitments to the South Vietnamese made
and confirmed by three Presidents. Our
commitment to South Vietnam is firm.
Under the SEATO terms we have agreed
that "each party recognizes that aggres-
sion by means of armed attack would en-
danger its own peace and safety, and
agrees that it will in that event act to
meet the common danger in accordance
with its constitutional processes." That
obligation has been called.
It seems to me that our obligation is
even more than this. It is to come to the
defense of freedom. "Let every nation
know, whether it wishes us well or ill,
that we shall pay any price, bear any
burden, meet any hardship, support any
friend, oppose any foe to assure the sur-
vival and the success of liberty." Those
words of the late John F. Kennedy are
still our guidelines.
Mr. Chairman, at this point, I should
like to insert into the RECORD a recent
speech on the war in Vietnam which I de-
livered in Chicago to the annual con-
vention of the National Sand & Gravel
and the National Ready Mixed Concrete
Associations. The address was given on
February 10, 1966, and the text of this
speech follows:
ADDRESS OF REPRESENTATIVE HALE BOGGS,
DEMOCRAT, OF LOUISIANA, BEFORE THE NA-
TIONAL SAND & GRAVEL AND THE NATIONAL
READY MIXED CONCRETE ASSOCIATIONS, CHI-
CAGO, ILL., FEBRUARY 10, 1966
Mr. Chairman, ladies and gentlemen, it is
a pleasure to come here today. You stand
In the tradition that has made this country
great: That of individual enterprise and ef-
fort. Your work contributes to the well-
being and security of all Americans. And,
because this is America, you too reap the
benefits.
I could speak with you about some of the
legislative proposals now pending in the
Congress, or at some length of the relation-
ship of Government to business and labor.
Today, however, because of the limitation
of time, I would like to speak on a subject
that now transcends all other. It is an issue
that, despite the best efforts of President
Johnson, Secretary Rusk, and many others,
requires broad discussion and understanding.
I shall talk to you of Vietnam. I shall try
to tell you why we are there, what we are
trying to do, and the means we are employ-
ing. I shall consider some of the alternatives
which have been proposed by critics.
You are intelligent businessmen. Your
profession impels you to be realistic. You
look at the hard facts. Thus, I shall not
demean your intelligence with platitudes.
Your time is limited. The subject is com-
plex. Our cause is still misunderstood. So
let us begin.
First, let us speak of old realities and new
myths. The old reality is that the Commu-
nist world is still predatory. Now it is China
more than the Soviet Union which casts
covetous eyes on her neighbors. Communist
China believes that it can conquer the world.
It believes that it can do this through so-
called wars of national liberation, In South
Vietnam, such a bloody war of so-called
liberation is raging. The Communist Viet-
cong are trying to take over South Vietnam.
They are being abetted, with men and arms,
from North Vietnam. The root instigator is
Communist China.
We are in South Vietnam to help the
South Vietnamese people retain their inde-
pendence and freedom. This is our immedi-
ate goal. Our whole history impels us to
protect our weak friends from aggression.
Our resistence to militant communism in
South Vietnam is part of a long series of
events in which we have defended freedom.
It started with the Truman doctrine in 1947.
Congress and the country agreed with Presi-
dent Truman, and American aid was sent to
Greece. The policy was a brilliant success
and Greece and the Mediterranean were
saved for the West.
So South Vietnam Is in the tradition of
our help to Greece and Turkey in 1917, For-
mosa and Korea in 1950, and Berlin since
1948. All these stands in defense of freedom
were successful. All these areas remain in
the free world.
But we have an even more important task.
Vietnam is a crucial test between our coun-
try and Communist China. If we leave
without a just and honorable peace, the
word will quickly spread around the world,
like a prairie fire, that the West has quit
and communism is the victor. The impact
of this is obvious.
First, it would demonstrate that the Chi-
nese brand of communism which repeatedly
and explicitly says it wants no peace will
become dominant. The Sino-Soviet split will
be resolved in favor of the militant and ag-
gressive Chinese.
As Secretary of State Rusk recently point-
ed out: "A central issue in the dispute be-
tween the two leading Communist powers
today is to vhat extent it is effective and
prudent to use force to promote the spread
of communism. If the bellicose doctrines
of the Asian Communists should reap a sub-
stantial reward, the outlook for peace in this
world would be grim indeed."
Now the leadership of the Communist
Chinese?the average age of the 17 men
who make up the top leadership is 68?face
many problems of their own. One is what
Communists call revisionism. This is the
tendency to forsake militant revolution for
internal development, using some of the same
incentives employed by free enterprise soci-
eties outside the Communist orbit. This is
what the Russians are experiencing, and by
resisting aggression in South Vietnam, we
are encouraging such revisionism in China.
The effect of such a withdrawal on Japan
would be serious. There a laborious effort
has been quite successful in creating a peace-
ful and democratic society. Its economy and
industry are now harnessed to the ways of
peace. I was in Japan recently and I am
convinced that it could not continue as a
free society if we, in effect, surrender in Viet-
nam and withdraw from southeast Asia.
Similarly, what do you think would have
happened in Indonesia had we not been in
Vietnam? Do you think the recent over-,
throw and demise of one of the largest and
most powerful Communist parties in the
world would have been successful had not
the Indonesians known that we were in
southeast Asia and would remain until an
honorable peace is attained.
Equally important, we stand in Vietnam
because we know that if we retreat there,
then Thailand, Laos, Cambodia, Indonesia,
Pakistan, India, would all fall very quickly.
The probable result would be world war III.
President Johnson has stated our reasons
for being in Vietnam. If the Communists
win, he said: "They would know they can
accomplish through so-called wars of na-
tional liberation what they could not accom-
plish through naked aggression in Korea?or
insurgency in the Philippines, Greece, and
Malaya?or the threat of aggression in Tur-
key?or in a free election booth anywhere in
the world."
Our military effort in Vietnam, then, is
vital to the ultimate success of the South
Vietnamese people in achieving a stable,
viable, government with a free society. But
the fact is that military success in defeating
the Vietcong is only the initial step in a long,
tough, task of rebuilding the South Viet-
namese society to meet the challenges and
responsibilities of self-government as a mod-
ern state.
The military difficulties are compounded
by the state of the South Vietnam economy
and political organization. The Communists
have wreaked havoc. In the dense jungles
and broad deltas they have employed every
conceivable method of terror and coercion.
Imagine, if you will, the United States with
half of the cities and towns under Communist
control. Imagine no road or railroad or
canal or river safe for communication and
transportation. Imagine the farmer unable
to produce his crop because of terror, mur-
der, and assassination. And picture a ter-
rain of jungles and swamps largely inacces-
sible, Then you will have some notion- of the
problems in Vietnam. Add to this the fact
that most of the leadership?mayors, coun-
cilmen, educators, editors, physicians, law-
yers, and engineers have been assassinated.
It is under these conditions that we seek
to join with the forces of the South Vietna-
mese Government to pacify their country.
This is why our military leaders do not claim
victory.
The economic and social challenge is very
great. But you do not hear enough of our
efforts in these areas. That was the princi-
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re' son fer the P:esident's visit to Hawaii
this week.
Today more than 1,000 employees of the
.A]oncy for International Development?
many of Ii]lem striving in the countryside
and the small hamlets and villages?are en-
iriered in helping the South Vietnamese peo-
ple in every conceivable eras.
Our Government is now providing more
1,11f1.11 $300 million a year for our technical
sonnet to work with the South Viet-
witnese. '1 his economic assistance is a four-
ye,nt effort in four major areas:
Geant eisl, to finance imports to help
miiintain the South Vietnam economy on a
daystosday niierating basis, and to prevent
serious infliition, and (nal) the balance-of-
pennons 0 ]i t.
Cspital. projects assistance, to broaden
the economiir Mine and improve urban facil-
ities with water supply systems, electrifica-
tion, improved harbors, roads, and transport
:o' ilities
a. Technical assistance, to improve human
ekeils throi 1.7,11 education in agricultural
Illethoris, public, health, public safety, public
adininistration, logistics and ether areas, and
Counterinsurgency, to maintain basic
services for the pemile by providing food-
Etatte, farm tools, reefing, and cement, and
other materiels. Included In this part of
the program is strengthother of the national
police force.
Now I have discussed with you why we are
in South Vietnam and wiilPt we are laying to
do there. I have a further duty. This is
In frankly dissuss with you what the critics
of our policy, both in and out of Congress,
are saying. A President can be right and
the entice country diregrce with him.. Or
he may be wrong and still enjoy mass appro-
bation.
We have an obligetion I. answer these
arguments. Co one ride Fnala advocate at
worst, complete surrender- libot we get out
right away. At best, they poise this defeat-
'him in an enciave theory which would effec-
tively give the bulk of the country over to
the Communists and leave us isolated.
Others advocate mass boinblinr:. They
want, us to take the wits to the Chine ,e main-
land. Their intention is honorable. The
result would be devastation. Mit not victory.
And their proposals might unleash a world
war.
D.sparate as these critics are in the solu-
tions they propose, they are similar in their
eagerness to be relieved of the burdens of
world leadership. They both want us to
get the whole thing over with. Both views
smack of the sentiments of Prime Minister
Chamberlain, Mr. Chamberlain once spoke
to the British, Nation and I emote: "Of a
quarrel in a feraway country between peo-
ple of whom we know nothing?why should.
we get involved."
This was appeasement. The result was 6
years of the bloodiest war in the history of
mankind.. That appeasement would work
was a myth then?it remains a myth now.
These critics despair too soon. We have
lsen in South Vietnam in force for a scant
0 months. Only now is our presence being
lett. Six months ago, village after village
was being surrounded and overcome, and
the government forces had retreated to the
town squares and to the city of Saigon itself.
Today, many of the villages have been re-
taken and pacified. More than that, the
people know that we are there, They know
that we intend to stay as long as necessary.
The impact is one of enormous significance.
Met over a month ago I was in Vietnam.
I went there to see for myself. I saw the
condition of the country. I saw the mag-
nitude of the job. I saw that we were do-
ing that job.
I. was impressed by the will of the Viet-
namese people. But I must pause to tell
you about our magnificent men. Our forces
are extremely able, alert, and intelligent.
Most of bite men in our Aimed Forces today
are high school graduates. Most of our offi-
cers are college graduates. Most of them are
trained in government, in economics and
political systems. And most of them, thank
God, understand the philosophica. and polit-
ical thee it of communism so that they know
what the war is all about. The morale of
our men is tremendous. Inspiring is the
only word for it. They know ieiby we are
there, They know what we must "do. And
they have the ability and will to do it.
What linin are the pie ipects for immediate
victory? Viciory in this instance is not like
that of s, conventional war, in Het it must
mean the containment of comxrc reism, and
this will undoubtedly take time end effort
and siierifice, But the etakes arc enormous,
recall is vividly as any experience of my
life, the days of the Cuban crisis; You may
remember that Congress had just adjourned
and President Kennedy riummoncii all of the
coogressienal leaders back to Veshington.
There i,s the Cabinet :Room of the White
House he outlined in derail the Reesian mis-
sile threat to the United State a For one
terrible week the Nation looked down the
nuclear barrel. On. the Monday after the
Sunday morning that Khrushcher wrote his
letter to the President ihdica dog withdrawal
of the missiles, Preside] t Kinney said, at
his final briefing: "The military threat of
Russia is receding,. Now the three will come
from Communist China as it develops the
hydrogen bomb."
Two years later, almeet to the lay, gath-
ered in the same room, with 'Limo' the same
people, with the exception of President Ken-
nedy, President Johnson briefed is on the
explosion of the first nuclear device in China.
There were many questions directiid at Sec-
retary Ru be mad Secretary McNamera. One
prevailed above all the others. What threat
does this pose to the free world? The answer
came back, candid and lneef?very :ittie as of
now, but a major and dangerous o' c' 10 years
from a now, barring no change in Ulf! aggres-
sive government now dominant in lihina.
And as I talked with our leaders i.. Vietnam
and Saigon, these meetings kept recurring
in my mind.
Si) this is the ultimate challenge of Viet-
nam. Whether we turn back the threat now
or whether we repeat the events of other days
and ultimately face a China infinitely
stronger than it is today and determined to
conquer the rest of mankind.
This is the challenge, but what it the fu-
ture? Our objectives are clear. We intend
to contain communism in Vietnam. We do
not believe that the Communists will stop
unless we stand firm. Thus we are erecting
a wall, not a wall of brick and itone and
barbed wire., but a wall of will and resolution.
Yet at the same time, T want to mi sure you
that President Johnson It: doing meerything
possible to get the Vietnam conflict to the
conference table where we can achieve a just
and honorable settlement. Our emissaries
range the world for peace Now we take our
search for peace into a new forum at the
United Nations.
We will rtey :in Vietnam no longer than is
necessary. We seek no territory or bases. We
support free elections in South Vietnam if
they can be conducted in ;ieeace and without
Communist intimidation.
The problem is, as the most ret tint pro-
nouncements from Hanoi so graphecally re-
veal, that the Communists do not yet want
peace. They still think that they can win.
Our enemies hope that we are a callow
nation. They confuse our reluctance to ac-
cept our destiny of world leadership with lack
of resolve and thus call us a paper tiger.
They hope that we will be unwilline to bear
the weight of world leadership when the
mantle grows heavy. They dream that the
mightiest nation in the world, with a gross
national product of nearly three quarters of
a trillion dollars, will fall for the ,thurious
alternative of gains or butter. They hope that
the Democratic Party, fearful of being char-
acterized as a war party, will hesitate to con-
duct our Vietnam policy with vigor. They
cling to the vain expectation tied our nii-
tional determination will crumble.
They are wrong and their hopes futile.
We are strong, and we are resolvid. Presi-
dent Johnson has the vast major ay of our
people behind him. And even Al Inc faced
substantial public opposition to our policy,
he would still do what is right in Vietnam.
His duty is to the national interest of the
United States, not partisan political con-
cerns.
So we will persuade the Communists that
the price of aggression is too high. And in
the process, we will prevent world war III.
Mr. RIVERS of South Carolina. Mr.
Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the dis-
tinguished gentleman from California
[Mr. LEGGETT].
LEGGETT. Mr. Chairrna is, I yield
to my colleague from California I Mr.
BURTON].
Mr. BURTON of Califon).a. Mr.
Chairman, once again, as with the spe-
cial appropriation of $700 million for
the war in Vietnam which was voted last
May 5, I am required, by conscience, to
vote in apposition to the overwhelming
majority of the Members of this House
and to question, by that vote, the course
and conduct of our policy in Vietnam.
I do this with sadness, for I do not
like to be in opposition to the President
who, no less than myself or any other
Member of this House, is acting out of
conscience and a profound desire to
serve the best interests of this Nation.
I am not ignorant of, nor lacking in
appreciation for, the terrible sacrifice:;
made each day by our fighting men on
the battlefields of Vietnam. Indeed, it
is what these men are going through
that has moved me to studied and deep
reflection on this war.
I oppose this bill as a futile attempt to
achieve, by additional force of arms, so-
lutions to problems which are not pri-
marily military but essentially political,
economic, and social.
I am concerned lest the money that is
voted today be interpreted as a support
of this most futile course. I am con-
cerned for the lives, American and Viet-
namese, that this act of expansion of
the war will cost.
Last week, I supported and voted for
an authorization of funds to pursue a
program of peace to relieve the hunger,
misery, and suffering of the Vietnamese
people.
Today, I cannot now vote funds to
permit us to expand the war.
Time does not permit us, under the
limited debate rule, to discuss the wis-
dom of our initial involvement in Viet-
nam. Suffice it to say, we did, in fact,
go astray, and now we find ourselves
sinking deeper and deeper into a, land
war in Asia for goals which become in-
creasingly obscure and at costs which
we dare not fully assess.
Somehow, we find ourselves in the role
of a nation attempting to preserve the
era when Western nations determined
the fate of Asia. That era is gone for-
ever.
The course we follow runs counter to
the sweep of history and puts this Naticai
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March 1, 1966 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? HOU
in opposition to the forces of national-
ism which history has demonstrated
ca i not be contained by military action.
We have been repeatedly warned of the
dangers of committing ourselves to a
course which involves us in a land war.
in Asia. Yet, the funds we are asked to
vote today finance such a commitment
and reinforces the notion that with more
men, more weapons, and the inevitable
higher casualty lists, we can achieve
stability of the political situation in
Vietnam, foster support by its people of
the government, develop its economic
potential, and alleviate the suffering of
its people.
This course is counterproductive in my
estimation.
If we continue along this course and
wander ever more deeply into the jungle
mists of Asia, I fear that many more
innocent Vietnamese will die, many
more brave American soldiers will per-
ish, many mothers and fathers will weep,
and the honor of this great Nation will
be cast over with a shadow that only
time will dispel.
It diminishes, in the eyes of the world,
our very real desire for peace.
The era has long since passed when we
must arm to negotiate?for negotiate we
must. We must negotiate with all par-
ties to this conflict. The Vietnamese
people must be represented in these ne-
gotiations by all parties, including the
Saigon government and the NLF.
We must pursue peace through the
United Nations and work toward the
achievement of the Geneva accord.
Peace in Vietnam, in all of southeast
Asia?indeed in the entire world, dic-
tates this course as it dictates my nay
vote on this supplemental authorization
of funds.
(Mr. BURTON of California asked
and was given permission to revise and
extend his remarks.)
Mr. LEGGETT. Mr. Chairman, I
should like to ask the Chairman of the
Committee if he would give me 4 minutes.
Mr. RIVERS of South Carolina. I do
not have 4 minutes to give to the gentle-
man, but I will give him 2 minutes; I have
already given him 2 minutes.
(Mr. LEGGErri' asked and was given
permission to revise and extend his
remarks.)
Mr. LEGGETT. Mr. Chairman, it is
unfortunate that the only record that
will really be made in the House of
Representatives this 1st day of March
1966, is that virtually unanimously, with
few exceptions, the Congress of the
United States votes $4.8 billion additional
authorization to defend freedom in
South Vietnam.
I support the President and this appro-
priation?the loyalty to the United States
of those who do not certainly is no issue
here. There are perhaps some outside
this hall who would question the
patriotism of anyone who expresses
trepidation with respect to our commit-
ment in southeast Asia. I would say
that anyone who is not concerned with
discussing choices of procedure to ac-
complish peace and the freedom and
progress of southeast Asians in the face
of the obvious threats to the existence of
mankind is a superpatriotic fool.
No. 36-18
All Americans, I believe, are impressed
with our own ability in this country to
aecumulate one-half of the production
of the world by private enterprise, demo-
cratic, reasonably bloodless, hard work.
There are none of us who would not want
our system to work for the world as it
does here.
American policy since post-World War
II is to spread the benefits of our system
worldwide through Marshall plan aid,
Agency for International Development,
Alliance for Progress, food for peace, and
kindred international organizations. We
supplement our program through the
most extensive military oversight sys-
tem ever designed on this globe, Peace
Corps, tourism, and sundry other State,
private, and Federal technical assistance
programs. We have spent more money
and given more people assistance under
this program than other nation or group
of nations in history.
By and large we have been extremely
successful with sophisticated people. The
threat of communism which I under-
stand to be as a forsaking of liberty and
justice and individual freedom in favor
of a precisely managed socialistic dicta-
torship has been met and has been suc-
cessfully challenged.
The trend for the left in Britain, Italy,
France and Japan after World War II
is now only a whisper because through
our aid and their own creativeness these
countries are economically successful.
Were this not a fact, all of our guns and
rockets could not have changed the tide.
In the underdeveloped countries, how-
ever, of Africa, Asia and South America
where poverty is rampant and popula-
tions are exploding, our "do good" policy
has been questionably successful. A suc-
cess record for Japan, Taiwan and West-
ern Europe should be closely evaluated
in relation to other restless countries un-
able to fathom the precedents we give
to them.
The problem is that we become mes-
merized with the term "communism."
We know of the doctrine of Stalin, Khru-
shehey and Mao Tse-tung that they
peacefully or forcefully plan to capture
the imagination of peasants and rural
people first in south Asia, then Africa,
then South America, and we are set in
panic. We remember Hitler said what he
would do and in 10 years he almost did it.
We see the Communists restless in their
containment and we fear they will do the
same.
Communism should be contained?
there are many other ways where liberty
Is not irrevocably lost by which people
might develop and progress. History will
no doubt record our age, I hope, as the
great era when mankind conquered space
and poverty through the programs de-
veloped in the competition between de-
mocracy and communism. I hope that
the programs which ebb to the top as suc-
cessful are democratic.
We Should not become paranoid, how-
ever, when the competition is discussed.
I and many Americans would like to see
the United States develop the leadership
and the programs that will bring peace
and prosperity to the underdeveloped
world. When war breaks out, usually
all hope of real progress is jeopardized.
The problem is that if the United
States is going to assume the stature of
policeman of the world we should develop
a realistic policy of helping people de-
clare effective wars on poverty and stag-
nation worldwide. We are the only na-
tion that literally has a military ring
around the world?the only nation that
can provide that needed cloak of protec-
tion. When we use that cloak to stamp
out dictatorships of the right or left, we
are working for the good of mankind.
When we use that cloak and the CIA to
stultify programs of people and per-
petuate military coups and dictatorships,
we many times militate against the prog-
ress of peoples.
When people's movements are ground-
ed in communism we are in a dilemma.
The people's program to change poverty
we should support?communism we fight,
and rightfully. Not to recognize that
Communist programs with their ham-
and-egg offerings appeal to many
people, however, is to misread human
nature. To handle such a movement of
change when war does not break out is
relatively easy. We step up our military
assistance program to maintain the
status quo and simultaneously step up
AID efforts to promote economic devel-
opment. A military coup many times is
superimposed and our purposes are con-
founded in local public opinion. The
point is that we want to help people
develop because that gives us security in
the United States. However, we do not
act with vigor until we are hit on the
head with communism.
When local war breaks out we are
totally confounded as in southeast Asia
today. We want to help people but
things are so confused we do not know
who to help or who to hurt. We are en-
gaged in a war which it is to our own
and the world's interest not to formally
declare. We want to fight communism
wherever it might be, but we are obvi-
ously confused because we are forced to
support six successive dictatorships, none
of which were popularly elected, one of
which only this morning very demo-
cratically announced the summary exe-
cution of a number of too enthusiastic
merchants for the American dollar.
I am pleased to see the United States
now announce the $1 billion effort to
solve the economic problems of South
Vietnam, this sum apparently to consti-
tute the balm to salve the pangs of any
would-be Communist supporters for a
better economy. We certainly were not
prepared to offer this kind of "dough"
while the French had control and it is
only now that we are psychologically
prepared to support this kind of one
small country commitment. If we want
to be the policeman of the world, which
role I frankly support, I think we should
have better reflexes than this.
We are now in this position where to
prove our point we are dropping' bombs
at a greater daily rate than during
World War II. Our commitment as re-
ported in the newspapers is better than
50,000 tons of TNT per month, or 500,-
000 250-pound bombs per month. It is
obvious that if we only wound one Viet-
cong with every 10 bombs we would cas-
cade the enemy to the conference table
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4282 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? HOUSE March 1, 1966
in 30 days. We now have in excess of
200,000 men committed, joining 500,000
South Vietnamese, plus 40,000 allied
soldiers. Civilian casualties, I under-
stand, are fantastic, though American
military deaths are light to date. We
have a program to liberate territory and
are making modest gains. However, the
Vietcong today is twice as strong as they
were last year this time, control more
territory, and their main units are yet to
be engaged.
We are raising our level of support by
a substantial percentage and I believe
the fiscal year 1967 military budget, when
it is properly supplemented next year,
will again extend substantially our com-
mitment.
We are expending ammunition at the
greatest rate in history, perhaps expend-
ing on this undeclared war one-fourth
of our national income?approximately
$24 billion. We are thus drawn in. bat-
tle to defeat a so-called Vietcong and
North. Vietnam who have a less budget
for a year than we have in a month, who
need but a few truckloads of materials a
day to sustain them, who have no air
force, no navy and certainly not a mod-
ern army. They do have tunnel and
jungle sanctuaries that are difficult to
penetrate.
think then my judgment under these
circumstances would be to gage care-
fully not only what we do but how we do
it. We are really not so much ourselves
trying to beat the Vietcong but trying to
supplement the force of the free South
Vietnamese so that the people them-
selves will want to rid themselves of the
Vietcong. Barbarous executions by
South Vietnamese and massive land
scarring by B-52's and our artillery will
not get the support of the people if
nearly a million injured, refugees are
forced into Saigon as was reported to-
day.
it is possible that we can try too hard
and lose the people. In a jury trial you
can have a perfect plaintiff's case, but
spend too much money on diagrams and
witnesses and lose the jury.
So in an election you can have an
electable candidate, spend too much
money and he is defeated by the elec-
torate because the money shows.
The point is that money along will not
win the war of ideas in South Vietnam.
I do not think we can say realistically
for long that the peasant just wants to
be left alone, he has no philosophy, yet
by night many of them make the best
soldiers in the world.
The people of South Vietnam are
erupting in part by northern stimulation
and in part by conditions. The stimu-
lation we can control, but we must de-
velop and sell long-term economic pro-
grains to change conditions, to control
corruptions, to expand education, to
democratize leadership, to abort class
and caste systems and foreign economic
domination.
We must outline workable programs.
it is not enough that we carry on a for-
eign aid program at the $3 billion-plus
authorized level and $1 billion-plus ap-
propriated level and carry on a program
largely with surplus grains and through
the many times corrupt private sector
and channel that aid to scores of coun-
tries.
'We appropriate at the $2 billion level to
change poverty in our domestic program
in 3,000 counties-0E0. Are we suc-
cessful? How can we do the job world-
wide at this level where per capita in-
come is not $2,000 as in the United
States but $100 as in nearby Mexico or
less.
The point is that we cannot ship sur-
plus materials with hands clasped across
the boxes even at the greatest rate in
history worldwide and then under our
assumed worldwide police power declare
that nations in our favor can qualify for
this aid to more or less do as we do but
that if this program is obviated by creep-
ing poverty, local corruption, dynastic
domination or population explosion, we
will blow your head off if you try to revolt
if you are Communist tinged.
Rightfully and in a good moral con-
science if the United States would stim-
ulate people rebellious against dictator-
ship oppression and poverty, where our
aid programs are ineffective, maybe more
rebellious people would be oriented to-
ward the U.S. middle ground rather than
the extreme right or extreme left.
In our efforts to maintain and per-
petuate our own security we should not
be satisfied with a good try to defeat
poverty worldwide. We should make our
programs work. Where poverty and
domination swell behind dormant dic-
tatorships, then should American foreign
policy be to effect change by democrati-
cally oriented revolution if need be.
Declare to the world, then, that the
impoverished and the dominated will re-
ceive our support, not just a halfhearted
effort and not just when communism is
the competitor. This policy declared and
followed then will mean a successful U.S.
foreign Trolley?people will rally around
us worldwide?this is the best and only
effective containment policy?tins policy
also will have a natural fallout of giving
us security at home.
It will mean a worldwide effort for
perhaps our lifetimes by the United
States and other successful democracies
at a dollar level commitment not at cur-
rent foreign aid rates, but at. current mil-
itary South Vietnam rates.
By my words of trepidation to the
President concurrent with 77 of my col-
leagues this is what I mean.
Mr. CLANCY. Mr. Chairmaa, I yield
myself 10 minutes.
(Mr. CLANCY asked and was given
permission to revise and extend his re-
marks.)
Mr. CLANCY. Mr. Chairman, I whole-
heartedly support HR. 12889 and the
$4.8 billion of supplemental military au-
thorizations, primarily for southeast
Asia.
This supplemental authorization is
needed in support of the American effort
to help block Communist efforts to sub-
jugate all ,of Vietnam.
Today, the one most compelling prob-
lem demanding our attention is the
situation in Vietnam, and it is up to us
to see that our military needs there are
adequately funded. Our Nation's pri-
mary obligation is to fully support our
men who have been sent to combat in
South Vietnam. Wherever American
boys are sent to battle they should be sup-
plied with the best possible weapons and
with the best logistical support that we
can give them.
The passage of the bill we are now con-
sidering is indispensable to our military
posture and preparedness. It is designed
to insure that there will be no shortages
in Vietnam so that our fighting men in
the field can perform their mission with
maximum efficiency. Overwhelming
passage of this legislation will give
needed assurance to our men in Vietnam
that we are standing behind them 100
percent.
We now have more than 200,000 men
actually deployed in South Vietnam.
Added to this figure are the many thou-
sands who directly support them in
southeast Asia. And our commitment in
South Vietnam is growing daily in terms
of men, material and money.
We must not be content to fight just
to keep from losing; rather, we must
marshal our resuorces and concentrate
our energies on winning this conflict in
the shortest possible time. We must
strive to avoid a long and bloody stale-
mate dragging on for years. It appears
the Communists are testing our will and
determination at this time and in this
place to see how long they can drain our
resources?particularly our manpower.
They are counting heavily on a collapse
of the American will to resist their ag-
gressive designs.
Yes, our will and staying power are
being tested by the Communists in this
hard and bitter contest. It is obvious
that the principal Communist objective
is to get the United States involved to a
maximum extent in a ground war of at-
trition in Asia in which our superiority
in weaponry remains unused.
It is mandatory that we undertake
effective action to bring this struggle to
a successful conclusion as quickly as
possible.
Certainly we would all prefer not to
have to be there. However, aggressions
left unchecked will continue to grow. It
is in our best interests to repel this ag-
gression, but I urge that we do so with
all deliberate speed.
The legislation before us provides in
the main authorization for appropria-
tions for the procurement of aircraft,
missiles, and tracked vehicles, and for
the construction of military installa-
tions. The authorization totals $4,857,-
450,000, which exceeds by $50 million
the sum requested by the administra-
tion. It will provide the required author-
ity for the necessary appropriations to
support military operations in southeast
Asia.
Section 401 of the bill provides that
funds for the support of the South Viet-
namese armed forces and the other free
world forces fighting in South Vietnam
shall be derived from the regular appro-
priations for the support of our own
military forces rather than from funds
carried in the military assistance pro-
gram. We are advised that a transfer
of this authority will result in improving
procedures for supplying military items
to the United States, Vietnamese, and
other free world forces in Vietnam.
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It is unfortunate that the appropria-
tions requested last year were insufficient.
I would be the first to concede that de-
velopments in a situation such as we find
ourselves in Vietnam cannot be predicted
precisely, and we must allow for flexi-
bility in our planning and judgments.
My colleagues and I on the Armed
Services Committee must rely to a great
extent on the information and facts fur-
nished us in briefings by the Secretary
when he appears before us. Yet, even a
cursory review of the record indicates
that he, too, is sometimes wrong in his
assessments of the war in Vietnam, the
U.S. role in that war, and in his
short-term predictions of the outcome.
It is my earnest hope that Secretary
McNamara will give greater heed to the
combined judgment of the Joint Chiefs
of Staff and that he will follow more
closely recommendations made by them
on military matters. The military ad-
vice he receives represents many years
of experience. Experienced professional
military judgments are most essential in
aiding the Secretary to arrive at the
crucial decisions he must make.
Before closing my remarks I would like
to urge once again that we lose no time
in passing the bill under consideration.
To win the struggle in Vietnam, we must
unite as a nation to let the entire world
know that we are going to make the nec-
essary sacrifices and bear the necessary
costs to defeat the Communist aggres-
sion there.
It is well to remember that the war in
Vietnam is not primarily a war about
Vietnam. It is a war which concerns the
future of Asia, a war which could very
well determine the future of the entire
free world. I hope we will continue to
honor our commitment to freedom in
Vietnam, and we should take every step
possible to insure that the struggle is
brought to a successful conclusion in the
shortest possible time.
Mr. Chairman, I now yield to the
gentleman from Alabama [Mr. GEORGE
W. ANDREWS].
Mr. GEORGE W. ANDREWS. Mr.
Chairman, I am supporting this bill 100
percent. I think the sooner it becomes
law the better off our fighting men in
South Vietnam will be.
Mr. Chairman, I want to say that in
my opinion the vast majority of the peo-
ple in Alabama are supporting our Pres-
ident in this vicious war against com-
munism. Mr. Chairman, I want to say
that there has not been a draft card
burned in Alabama; there has not been
a beatnik-led demonstration against our
foreign policy in Alabama. We have had
some beatnik-led demonstrations down
there that did not concern our foreign
policy. I will predict to you if such a
demonstration as that occurs in Ala-
bama, somebody is going to get hurt.
Now, Mr. Chairman, I think the sooner
we fight this war to win the better off
the whole world will be. I think the
greatest, most courageous decision made
in the history of this Nation was made
by former President Harry Truman when
he ordered the use of an atomic weapon
on Hiroshima. He served notice on the
Japanese Government that if they did
not surrender, they could expect further
bombings within 3 days. Hearing
nothing from the Japanese, the second
bomb fell on Nagasaki. You know the
story. That courageous action fore-
stalled the bloodiest invasion that had
ever been planned in the history of this
world and saved hundreds of thousands,
if not millions, of lives. If I were run-
ning this war, Mr. Chairman, I would
pick up the telephone and call Hanoi
and say, "We will give you 30 days to
get out of South Vietnam lock, stock, and
barrel. If you are not out at the end of
that time, then you can expect ,us to drop
whatever type bombs we desire, wherever
we choose to drop those bombs," and let
us get this thing over with and bring
those boys back. I know the argument
against that is that you might endanger
the lives of the people in this country.
Now, this is war that we are in, Mr.
Chairman.
We should all share the jeopardy. I
am thinking of that kid in that rice
paddy and in that snake-infested, ma-
laria-infested, sniper-infested jungle
whose life is in danger and in jeopardy
24 hours a day. Let us bring this war
to an early conclusion. I tell you in my
opinion there is nothing that the Com-
munists respect more than power. We
have it today; let us use it and get
through with this war.
Mr. RIVERS of South Carolina. Mr.
Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gen-
tleman from New York [Mr. BiNGHAml.
(Mr. BINGHAM asked and was given
permission to revise and extend his re-
marks.)
Mr. BINGHAM. Mr. Chairman, ear-
lier today the distinguished gentleman
from California [Mr. COHELANI submit-
ted a brief joint statement on behalf of
78 members of this House. I was priv-
ileged to be among the sponsors of this
statement.
I shall vote for HR. 12889 for the pur-
pose stated in the committee report.
But, in so voting. I do have reservations,
and these reservations go somewhat be-
yond the terms of this joint statement.
My vote does not mean that I am wholly
satisfied with the administration's poli-
cies with respect to Vietnam. While I
agree with President Johnson that we
cannot withdraw from Vietnam and let
the Communists take over, and while I
salute him for resisting the pressures of
those who would expand and escalate
the war, I do not believe that we have
yet been sufficiently resourceful or flexi-
ble in our efforts to get negotiations
started. In fact, recent developments
create the impression that the adminis-
tration is no longer giving much thought
to the question of how to achieve a
negotiated settlement.
Why, then, am I voting for this sup-
plemental authorization bill? First, for
the simple and obvious reason, mentioned
in the joint statement, that we must give
our forces in Vietnam all the support
they need, so long as they are there. The
second reason is more complicated: I fear
that a substantial vote against the au-
thorization might actually impede our
objective of getting talks started by en-
couraging Hanoi to continue its appar-
ently total intransigeance.
This leads to a question which I sub-
mit we should all pander. It is certainly
one of the key questions before us at this
time. The question is: Why, in spite of
all the President's efforts since last April
to get discussions started with Hanoi, has
Iianoi steadfastly refused to budge?
Rather than discuss this question to-
day, in the atmosphere of a debate on
this defense authorization bill, I intend
to examine it at some length tomorrow
under special orders, and I would be glad
to have any Members join in a discussion
of the question at that time.
Mr. CLANCY. Mr. Chairman, I yield
3 minutes to the gentleman from New
York [Mr. KUPFER1VIAN].
(Mr. KUPFERMAN asked and was
given permission to revise and extend his
remarks.)
Mr. KUPFERMAN. Mr. Chairman, I
sin voting for this appropriation because
I cannot leave our American troops in
the lurch without proper protection on
a foreign shore. But it must be pointed
out that it was a great mistake to have
put them and us in this position.
The biography of General Ridgeway,
in discussing the filling of the vacuum in
Indochina when the French pulled out
in 1954, shows that we could only be in-
volved in a stalemate at great loss to the
United States in lives and money.
We should not have been put in our
present position. We should not have
been involved in an escalation. We
should not have waited so long to bring
the question to the United Nations.
When the administration states that
it seeks no blind escalation, we must
question whether it has not already done
so and left us in the lurch.
An article by Murray Kempton in the
New York World-Telegram and Sun on
Friday, February 25, 1966 entitled, "Clear
Sighted Escalation" well describes the
situation into which we have been led.
I should like to insert Mr. Kempton's
article in the RECORD at this point.
The only course left to us to pursue,
as my predecessor, now Mayor Lindsay,
has said, is hard diplomacy to seek
peace.
CLEAR-SIGHTED ESCALATION
(By Murray Kempton)
"The tide of battle in Vietnam has turned
In our favor."?Vice President Humsrmsy on
his return.
It will be 5 years in June since another
Vice President came back from Saigon.
"There has been a substantial improve-
ment in the situation in Vietnam," Lyndon
Johnson said then.
There were 685 American military advisers
In South Vietnam at the time. The Vice
President brought a promise to raise the
total to 1,600 or so. But the real danger, he
said, Is not from communism but "from
hunger, ignorance, poverty, and disease."
Privately, the Vice President told President
Kennedy that "American combat involve-
ment at this time was * * * undesirable
because it would revive anticolonial emo-
tions throughout Asia."
For this is a war that has always been
going well.
Even so, by October of 1961, Gen. Maxwell
Taylor went to Saigon and came back to re-
port that, while only the Vietnamese could
beat the Vietcong, more American troops
were needed to show them how to do the
job. President Kennedy was skeptical.
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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD HOUSE March
"The troops will march in," he said, "and
in 4 days everyone will have forgotten. It's
like taking a drink. The effect wears off and
you have to take another."
Still, in December 1962, he ordered larger
commitments to Saigon. Everyone was en-
couraged. That spring, Secretary of Defense
McNamara went, to South Vietnam for the
that time. "Every quantitative measure-
ment we have," he reported. "shows that we
are winning the war."
Taylor came back in October of 1962. and
Found "a, great national movement" assem-
bling to destroy the Vietcong. "The spear
point of aggression has been blunted in
South Vietnam," the President said in his
1963 state of the Union message.
Prime Minister Ngo Dinh Diem was hay-
MT, his troubles by then and none of our
official tourists echoed Vice President John-
son's assessment of Diem as the Churchill
of Asia. Still, in October, Secretary Mc-
Namara, said that a thousand of the 16,000
American troops in Vietnam could be
brought home by the end of the year and
that the major part of the military job
would be finished by 1965.
So, by Christmas of 1965, we had more
than 200,000 Americans under arms in
South Vietnam, and the Vietcong had risen
from their 12,000 at the time of Lyndon
Johnson's confident introduction to the
problem in 1961, to more than 230,000.
There was never a time when the thing
was not said to be going well, and here we
are at a moment when it is impossible to
deny that, until now, it has all along been
going very badly indeed.
There is no way to imagine the delight
of our enemies in our situation except to
think what would be our own pleasure if
there were 200,000 Chinese struggling
through Indonesia or 200,000 Russians wal-
lowing in Albania without one of our soldiers
to the smallest degree inconvenienced.
Ilaad poor President Johnson, since all
these disasters come from the careful plans
of Democrats, is reduced to a dreadful
mangling of history in order to argue that a
series of decisions, which time has proved
to have been based on mistaken estimates,
where part of a sober, coherent plan now
turning toward fulfillment. We can believe
lam when he says that we have no cause to
fear a mindless escalation. It is quite
enough to remember the history of the last
5 years and recognize that everything that
was done was so carefully thought out.
Mr. CLANCY. Mr. Chairman, I yield
1 minute to the gentleman from New
York I Mr. Rm.!.
(Mr. REID of New York asked and
was given permission to revise and ex-
tend his remarks.)
Mr. REID of New York. Mr. Chalr-
man, I rise in support of HR. 12889, a
supplemental authorization of $4.8 bil-
lion for necessary procurement, research
and development, and military construc-
tion.
Mr. Chairman, I have been in Vietnam.
I have been with our troops, and I can
report to this House that their morale
is absolutely magnificent and is deserv-
ing of the fullest support.
Further, Mr. Chairman, there should
be no doubt whatsoever in Hanoi or
Peiping that the United States of Amer-
ica will totally and completely back its
men in the field while at all times utiliz-
ing every resource of diplomacy--includ-
ing the U.N.?to reach the conference
table and an honorable and viable
peace.
:However, Mr. Chairman, I believe that
this debate today is important. It is on
a serious subject. It deals with many
implications for the future of American
policy, the chances for peace, and the
opportunity?free from terror and ag-
gression?for South Vietnam to do the
job that must be done in rural recon-
struction and pacification backed by
major reforms?including education and
land reforms?by the government in
Saigon.
Mr. Chairman, I am sorry that the
debate here in this House, compared with
the other body, is very limited; that we
are only devoting 3 hours to one of the
most important subjects ever to come
before these United States Frankly,
we have not conducted a serious national
debate here today, and I regrei it. How-
ever, I strongly support this authoriza-
tion.
Mr. RIVERS of South Cart dia. Mr.
Chairman, I yield such time as he may
require to the gentleman from Louisiana
[Mr. LONG].
(Mr. LONG of Louisiana ask t A and was
given permission to revise and extend his
remarks.)
Mr. LONG of Louisiana. Mr. Chair-
man, I rise to give my full support to
H.R. 12889 and urge its immediate pas-
sage.
The duty we owe to our fighting men is
clear. Those men and women who to-
day are performing so nobly to guarantee
a continuing place for freedom in our
world must be as fully supplied with the
equipment necessary for them to do their
jobs as it is possible for us to give them.
Their sacrifices are incalculable. We
must not fail in our duty to them,
Few individuals outside our own mili-
tary forces are acquainted with the tre-
mendous effort being made by our forces
in Vietnam. Focus your attent, on on the
wide role played by any one of our serv-
ices. Our Navy, for example, is involved
in almost every facet of the conflict. Its
flexibility, mobility, and ability to extend
our national power through every medi-
um has been well demonstrated.
In the air, fighters and boothers are
flying combat sorties well into North
Vietnam. Three carriers from the 7th
Fleet are on station off Vietnam at all
times. Two of these giant warships,
each with their 100-plane airwings,
strike at North Vietnamese infiltration
routes 24 hours a day. The third car-
rier, operating further south off the Viet-
namese coast, provides air support for
United States and Allied ground forces
in South Vietnam.
Destroyers, the workhorses of the fleet,
cruise the waters of the South China Sea.
These ships have fired an average of
12,000 rounds a month?more :,,han 160
tons of o.rdnance?against the Vietcong
targets. In addition to bombardment,
our destroyers are carrying out missions
in antisubmarine warfare, search and
rescue, and protection of the fast carrier
striking forces. Other craft are on con-
stant alert for possible shipment, of sup-
plies into South Vietnam. Thousands of
junks are detected: and searched each
week. Still other ships carry thousands
of marines ashore and thousands more
are ferried in behind the enemy in heli-
copters from amphibious assault ships.
1, 1966
Logistics is an area of naval activity
which cannot be overlooked. Over 94
percent of the logistic support for all
U.S. Forces operating in Vietnam is
brought in by sea. Ashore, more than
10,000 Navy personnel are providing sup-
port. Seabee units are at work con-
structing bases in the jungles of Viet-
nam, Navy hospital corpsmen are car-
rying out their duties with units, arid of-
ficers are performing advisory roles with
the Vietnamese Navy and river assault
groups.
Gentlemen, these operations depend on
our authorization of the appropriations
for the procurement of the aircraft, mis-
siles, and equipment needed for the job.
This bill enables us to continue acquisi-
tion of these things during the remainder
of fiscal 1966. The committee under the
leadership of its illustrious chairman has
studied carefully the needs reflected by
this bill and is convinced of the sound-
ness of the bill. Their vote on the bill
was unanimous. I heartily endorse that
. RIVERS of South Carolina. Mr.
vote.
Mr.
I yield 1 minute to the gentle-
man from Missouri [Mr. Iceman].
Mr. ICHORD. Mr. Chairman, I rise in
support of Ha. 12889 authorizing the
appropriation of $4,857,450,000 for the
procurement of aircraft, missiles, naval
vessels, tracked combat vehicles, re-
search, development, test, evaluation,
and military construction for the support
of our troops in South Vietnam. This
authorization, Mr. Chairman, represent-
ing a supplemental authorization for the
fiscal year of 1966 is vitally needed to
support our troops.
It has been asked for by the President
of the United States, the Commander
in Chief of our Armed Forces as neces-
sary to accomplish our objectives, in
South Vietnam. It has been supported
by the Secretary of Defense and Joint
Chiefs of Staff. It has been unanimously
recommended by the House Committee
on Armed Services. This measure must
be passed to meet the commitment this
body itself made when it passed the
Tonkin resolution of August 10, 1964 by
a vote of 416 to 0.
The time for debate is past. The time
for action is now. This is not only to
carry out a commitment of the Executive.
This is a commitment of the Congress
itself and we should show the Communist
aggressors not only in southeast Asia but
all over the world that we are united in
our determination to stop Communist
aggression.
Mr. Chairman, Winston Churchill
said:
It is the duty of every citizen in time of
trouble to do or say or even think of nothing
that can weaken or discourage the energies
of the state.
This statement, in my opinion, can well
serve as a standard of conduct for all
Americans in regard to South Vietnam.
The questioning of our policy now which
we committed ourself to on August 10,
1964 can only serve to weaken the state
and give encouragement to our enemies.
This is our time to say something which
will strengthen and encourage our men
in South Vietnam. We should speak out
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March 1, 1966 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? HOUSE 4285
with an overwhelming vote in favor of
this measure.
Mr. RIVERS of South Carolina. Mr.
Chairman, I yield 3 minutes to the gen-
tleman from Ohio [Mr. Lays].
Mr. LOVE. Mr. Chairman, I sup-
ported this bill and in so doing support
the administration and its policy in Viet-
nam. I naturally feel that this bill is
necessary to support our forces in south-
east Asia but I especially like the psy-
chological impact it can make at this
time in the world of ideas and the need
for unity in our own country. My re-
marks are in extension of research, de-
velopment, test and evaluation supple-
ment for the Air Force as set forth in
pages 5 of the committee's report.
The fiscal year 1966 southeast Asia sup-
port supplemental for the research, de-
velopment, test and evaluation, Air
Force appropriation amounts to $71,-
085,000. These funds are required for
immediate initiation of developments in-
volving two aircraft weapons systems, de-
velopment and test of an item under the
chemical/biological operational support
program, development and test of a num-
ber of items in the conventional muni-
tions program, and a classified project.
The aircraft and related equipment
program amounts to $36,300,000 which
provides for two engineering develop-
ment programs under the close support
fighter program. These developments,
which will increase our capabilities for
close air support of ground forces in
southeast Asia, consist of $10 million for
development and test of modifications to
the F-4 (TSF) aircraft to improve its
performance capabilities, and $26,300,-
000 for development and test of modifica-
tions to the A-7A aircraft to adapt this
Navy aircraft to meet Air Force re-
quirements.
The other equipment program amounts
to $34,785,000 which provides for an ad-
vanced development program require-
ment, a number of items in the engineer-
ing development program, and a
general support program development
requirement. In the advanced develop-
ment program, $1,600,000 is included
for development and test of a conven-
tional munitions component. In the en-
gineering development program, $250,000
is provided for development and test of
a munition under the chemical/biological
Operational support program, and $7,-
735,000 is provided for a number of
munitions and other projects under the
other operational support program. The
general support program includes $25,-
200,000 for development of a specialized
collection activities program system.
The fiscal year 1966 southeast Asia
support supplemental for this appropria-
tion includes only the most urgent devel-
opments which can be made available to
combat forces before June 30, 1967.
Therefore, the items selected are those
whose lead times are so long that they
cannot be deferred until the fiscal year
1967 appropriation becomes available.
Mr. BATES. Mr. Chairman, I yield
to the gentleman from rilinois [Mr.
ANDERSON] such time as he may require.
(Mr. ANDERSON of rilinois asked
and was given permission to revise and
extend his remarks.)
Mr. ANDERSON of Illinois. Mr.
Chairman, I rise in support of H.R. 12889,
the supplemental defense authorization
bill. At an hour when more than 200,000
American men are locked in mortal com-
bat with the enemy in southeast Asia,
it is inconceivable to me that as Rep-
resentatives of the people in the Congress
we would do less than support this bill.
It is a bill designed purely and simply
to authorize the necessary supplemental
funds required to fund military procure-
ment of needed items. There have been
some suggestions both in the debate here
on the floor today and elsewhere that
something more should be read into this
vote than an approval or authorization
of necessary funding for the American
Armed Forces. Indeed, there have been
times today when it seemed as if certain
Members of this body wished that there
could be two separate and distinct votes
on this measure. One vote would permit
those who are simply in favor of doing
something for the boys to vote "aye."
The other vote would be for those who
not only wished to authorize funds for
the Department of Defense but simul-
taneously to give a ringing and rousing
approval to everything past, present, and
future that has been or will be done by
the Johnson administration.
Certainly, there is nothing in the word-
ing of the legislation now before us which
explicitly commits anyone to an approval
of the various policies that have been
pursued by the administration with re-
spect to the matter of Vietnam. It
could be argued that implicit in the ap-
proval of this authorization bill is the
approval of current policy. However, I
think that we would be establishing an
unwise precedent indeed if we were to
attempt to read too much into the passage
of a military authorization bill. By the
same token, I think that the 76 Members
of this body who have signed a manifesto
or declaration that their vote for this
measure does not carry with it approval
for th escalation of the war or our
deeper involvement in southeast Asia will
also "carry coals to Newcastle."
Mr. Chairman, I have no qualms at
all concerning the legality of our present
position in South Vietnam as expressed
In a recent resolution of the American
Bar Association. I think our presence
there is legal under international law,
under the SEATO treaty to which we
are a signatory, and under the Charter
of the United Nations. However, I think
that the future actions of the present
administration with respect to the con-
duct of the war in South Vietnam must
be based on a clear declaration of what
our ultimate purpose there is to be. I am
not convinced that the administration
has been absolutely clear in this regard.
In particular, I am concerned at the
obvious attempts that have taken place
recently to gloss over the differences that
apparently were opened up between the
administration and the junior Senator
from New York when the latter spoke
in favor of admitting the Vietcong to a
share of power and responsibility in
South Vietnam. Rather than attempt to
paper over internal differences of such
fundamental nature, I think that the
administration should make it crystal
clear that our boys are not dying in South
Vietnam merely so that we can ultimately
repair to the bargaining table perhaps
to hand over a portion of the government
of that country to the Vietcong. There-
fore, Mr. Chairman, I take this time to
set down these words so that my position
may be irrevocably clear. I support this
measure and with it the heroic sacrifices
being made by our men in South Viet-
nam. At the same time I do not want
history to record that by this vote I gave
this administration my blank check with
respect to its future conduct of policy in
South Vietnam.
Mr. BATES. Mr. Chairman, I have no
further requests for time, and yield back
the balance of my time.
Mr. RIVERS of South Carolina. Mr.
Chairman, I yield 3 minutes to the gentle-
man from Missouri [Mr. RANDALL].
Mr. RANDALL. Mr. Chairman, our
fighting men are committed in Vietnam
and we have passed the time for much
more debate. It seems to me we should
be more concerned about getting the im-
plements and tools of war to them so that
they can do the job. I think we might
pause for a monment to reflect that this
is the first time in all of our American
history that we have ever stopped in the
middle of a fighting war to debate how
we got into the war and why and whether
it was a wise thing to do. That is ex-
actly what we have been doing for far
too long.
Mr. RYAN. Mr. Chairman, will the
gentleman yield?
Mr. RANDALL. I yield to the gentle-
man.
Mr. RYAN. Has war been declared
by the Congress?
Mr. RANDALL. It has been brought
out crystal clear that the joint resolution
unanimously agreed to by this House,
416 to 0 on August 7, 1964, is a sufficient
declaration to authorize the President
to conduct military operations in south-
east Asia.
The southeast Asian resolution stated
"that the Congress approves and sup-
ports the President as Commander in
Chief to take all necessary measures to
repel any armed attack against the forces
of the United States and to prevent
further aggression." The resolution was
very firm and included the recitation:
The United States regards as vital to its
national interest and to world peace the
maintenance of peace and security in south-
east Asia.
Mr. RYAN. Does the gentleman con-
strue that resolution to be a declaration
of war?
? Mr. RANDALL. Not a formal decla-
ration, but for my part the resolution
provides ample authority and I think
also, for the overwhelming majority of
fellow Members, as will be shown by the
vote on this bill today.
The situation as to Vietnam is that
the President has ordered a gradual
buildup of forces only after frequent con-
sultations with the Congress. The Con-
gress has repeatedly expressed its ap-
proval not only through the August 1964
resolution but by monetary appropria-
tions for the war. Exclusive of the
measure before us today, the Congress
has overwhelmingly approved two sup-
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4286 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? HOUSE March 1, 1966
plemental appropriations including the
$1.7 billion southeast Asia emergency
fund passed on September 17, 1965, di-
rectly after the President announced his
intention to increase our military par-
ticipation. in that area. There have been
frequent consultations by the President
with Congress, both by resolution arid by
appropriation and by both means we have
overwhelmingly approved the President's
policy. The Congress' strongest weapon
in foreign policy is through control of
appropriations. Approval of these mone-
tary sums should be recognized as con-
stituting firm support of the President's
authority to conduct war in Vietnam
without a formal declaration of war by
the Congress. There exist some valid
reasons why there should not be a formal
declaration of war.
Mr. Chairman, there has been a lot .of
humanitarian concern about injury or
harm to a few Vietnamese civilians in the
.jungles of Vietnam. If this has hap-
pened, it has been accidental and un-
avoidable and not by design or
intentional.
But I want to take the time to discuss
sonic items in this authorization that
were touched on briefly by the gentleman
from Missouri I Mr_ HALL 1.
refer to funds for more and better
'field hospitals and evacuation facilities.
know you have heard about the new
hospital ship and also those new portable
operating rooms that can be brought in
by helicopter and permit on operation to
be performed very near the scene of com-
bat. Let in; remember the present rate of
fatalities among our American wounded
is less than I percent. That represents
a drop from the 2.5 percent level of
1.