VIETNAM--LETTER BY PROF. BERNARD FALL

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP67B00446R000400040009-5
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 40
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 20, 2005
• Sequence Number: 9
• Publication Date: March 21, 1966
• Content Type: OPEN

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6102 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE March 21, 1966
between French and Communist forces had
finally dropped to 1.2 to 1 in a situation
where (as is visible today) a 5-to-1 ratio
even with all the firepower in the world
gives rise to little optimism, and 10 or even
221 to 1 is considered a useful superiority
level.
By that time also (spring 1953) the Viet-
minh had conquered all 'Of Tonking (North
Vietnam) shy of the Red River Delta, a for-
tified "enclave" in which the French con-
trolled 1,800 vilages out of 5,000. All of
northern Laos had fallen to Giap in one swift
offensive.
VIETMINH HOLDINGS
In South Vietnam an unbroken expanse
of Vietminh territory existed from a few
miles south of Danang to almost the gates
of Saigon save for yet another French "en-
clave" in the mountain plateau area. Beyond
the Mekong Delta, Camau Peninsula, and the
whole Cardamom Mountain chain of Cam-
bodia were in Vietminh hands.
The French Army had failed 'in every one
of its offensives in which it attempted to
"find, fix, and destroy" the enemy-although
it, too, could point to reassuring casualty
statistics. A 25,000-man stab into the
northern hinterland netted a few hundred
dead in late 1952; an airborne attack on the
Chinese border in 1953 found a few tons of
weapons but no troops; a 10,000-man opera-
tion near Hue brought in 76 weapons.
' By 1954 the French Army had lost 1,500
officers (including over 1,100 platoon com-
manders) and was exhausted-even without
the Dienbienphu disaster. No French poli-
tician did that; the war did it, because it's
that kind of war.
In fact, year after year, the Communists
and a few of their associates excepted, the
French Parliament voted the credits for the
war and voted for the reinforcements which
could be squeezed out of a weakened postwar
France.
I have read every French parliamentary
debate on Indochina since 1945, and they
make instructive reading as bewildered but
honest men were faced, on one hand, with
glowing reports that the war was being won
and, on the other, with new requests for
more funds and troops. Even when the
United States made available to the French
in 1953-54 almost unlimited funds and in
many fields, more equipment than they could
usefully handle, the war was not being won
on the battlefield.
ONLY ARMY LIMITATION
The only political limitation on the French
Army was that it could not, after 1950, use
draftees in Vietnam until the much-
maligned Mendes-France, after Dienbienphu,
threatened to use two divisions with draftees
from France. And considering that the
French, like King Canute, were fighting the
combined waves of Vietnamese nationalism
and communism, a Parisian show of unity or
even the sending of draftees would have made
little difference.
It is rather curious, finally, to see observers
who, for two decades, have berated the
French Army for all sorts of true or imagined
failings, now resort to the German stab-in-
the-back myth to club their own opposition
here. Surely there must be better arguments
than that to justify the war in Vietnam.
BERNARD B. FALL.
WASHINGTON, February 25, 1966.
THE PEIPING ENIGMA
Mr, FULBRIGHT, Mr. President, the
March 11 Issue of the New York Times
contained an article by Mr. Tom Wicker
entitled "The Peiping Enigma." In the
article Mr. Wicker commented on the
fundamental contradiction between the
statements of administration officials on
China and--the statements of the re-
nowned China experts before the Foreign
Relations Committee last week. Mr.
Wicker remarked that the recent state-
ments by the President, the Vice Presi-
dent, the Secretary of State, and the
Secretary of Defense "have pictured a
relentlessly expansionist China, dedi-
cated to spreading communism and Chi-
nese power throughout the world, ad-
vancing toward threatening nuclear
strength, and needing to be stopped
now-in Vietnam-as the world should
have stopped Hitler on the Rhine."
Thus, Mr. Wicker continued:
The United States not only refuses to rec-
ognize Peiping and accede to her member-
ship in the United Nations but also regards
China as a pentup aggressor waiting to spring
upon the world.
On the other hand, Mr. Wicker pointed
out:
Quite a different picture of China is be-
ing painted, however, by American scholars
in testimony before the Senate Foreign Re-
lations Committee.
Mr. Wicker said that these scholars
"saw the policy of isolating China as
working against the sensible long range
objective of bringing her into peaceful
relations with the world."
He noted that Professor Fairbank
"pictured China as more Chinese than
Communist, more frustratd than expan-
sionist, seeking leadership and the
world's deference more than new terri-
tory and using Communist rhetoric and
theory to explain how the imperialist
had destroyed what ancient China con-
sidered for hundreds of years her right-
ful preeminence in the world." Profes-
sor John Fairbank and Professor Barnett
advocated "a policy of drawing China
into international affairs, from sports to
the United Nations, while the United
States competed sharply with her over
the model to be followed by developing
nations and met any military adventures
with adequate force." In short, as Mr.
Wicker commented in his concluding
paragraph, the view expressed by Pro-
fessors Fairbank and Barnett "suggests
that an effective approach to the con-
flict in Vietnam can only grow out of a
hard-eyed resolution of the question of
whether modern China represents ag-
gressive, expansionist communism or an
ancient culture seeking to reestablish it-
self and its influence."
Mr. President, I have never been to
China and I do not pretend to be an
expert on China. I do not think that any
of us in the Senate can claim to be. it
is for this reason, because all of us in
the Senate and.I believe all but a few
Americans need to be educated on the
subject of China, that the Foreign Rela-
tions Committee is holding hearings.
But it'has struck me forcefully, as it
has struck Mr. Wicker, that the experts
on China have a view of China, and of
what would constitute a wise policy to-
ward that country, that is totally differ-
ent from the view of our senior admin-
istration officials. It seems to me that
if the experts are right about China, and
their opinions are based after all on
profound knowledge of the country, our
leading officials must be wrong. They
both cannot be right because they dis-
agree fundamentally. I would hope that
this fact would give the administration
some cause for concern. It certainly
disturbs me.
Mr. President, I ask unanimous con-
sent that Mr. Wicker's article of
March 11 from the Times be inserted
at this point in the RECORD.
There being no objection, the article
was ordered to be printed in the RECORD,
as follows:
[From the New York Times, Mar. 11, 19661
THE PEIPING ENIGMA-ADMINISTRATION AND
SCHOLARS EMBRACE CONFLICTING VIEWS OF
CHINA'S INTENTIONS
(By Tom Wicker)
WASHINGTON, March 10.-Will the real
Communist China please stand up?
That question has suddenly arisen here,
providing a welcome intellectual diversion
from the Capital's fixation on the war in
South Vietnam and, for those willing to
accept it, a new perspective on that war. On
the one hand, recent statements by Presi-
dent Johnson, Vice President HUMPHREY,
Secretary of State Dean Rusk and Secretary
of Defense Robert S. McNamara have pic-
tured a relentlessly expansionist China, dedi-
cated to spreading communism and Chinese
power throughout the world, advancing
toward threatening nuclear strength, and
needing to be stopped now-in Vietnam-=as
the world should have stopped Hitler on
the Rhine.
In Honolulu, for Instance, Mr. Johnson
said, "In the forties and fifties, we took our
stand in Europe to protect the freedom of
those threatened by aggression. Now the
center of attention has shifted to another
part of the world where aggression is on the
march. Our stand must be as firm as ever."
A PLEDGE AGAINST PEIPING
Mr. McNamara, in Senate testimony, de-
scribed the Vietnamese war as "a test case of
the Chinese Communist version of the so-
called 'wars of national liberation,' one of
a series of conflicts the Chinese hope will
sweep the world."
Mr. Rusk called a recent speech by Lin
Piao, Peiping's Minister of Defense, "as can-
did as Hitler's `Mein Kampf: " And in Aus-
tralia, Mr. HUMPHREY made a ringing pledge
that Chinese expansionism would be halted
because "the United States of America and
Its allies will not let it win."
Thus, the United States not only refuses
to recognize Peiping and accede to her mem-
bership in the United Nations but also re-
gards China as a pent-up aggressor, waiting
to spring upon the world, and has openly
expressed the determination to stop her with
as much force as necessary, in Vietnam,
Korea or elsewhere.
Quite a different picture of China is being
painted, however, by American scholars in
testimony before the Senate Foreign Rela-
tions Committee.
OPPOSITION TO U.S. POLICY
Both A. Doak Barnett of the East Asian
Institute at Columbia University and John
K. Fairbank of the East Asian Research Cen-
ter at Harvard saw the policy of isolating
China as working against the sensible long-
range objective of bringing her into peaceful
relations with the world.
Mr. Fairbank, an outstanding Asian
scholar, testified today and pictured China
as more Chinese than Communist, more
frustrated than expansionist, seeking leader-
ship and the world's deference more than
new territory, and using Communist
retoric and theory to explain how the "im-
perialists" had destroyed what ancient China
considered for hundreds of years her rightful
preeminence in the world,
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 !'>,'W: t Approved For Release 2005/06/29 : CIA-RDP67B00446R000400040009-5
March 21, 1966 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD -SENATE
the influence of water quality on these
plants, Clarkson.
A-006-WVA: Influence of topographic fea-
tures on rainfall in West Virginia, Dickerson.
A-007-WVA: Algal relationships to the re-
covery of acid mine streams, Bennett.
A-008-WVA: Geochemical behavior of Iron
and manganese in a reservoir (Lake Lynn,
W. Va.) fed by streams containing acid mine
drainage, Corbett.
A-009-WVA: Geochemical and sedimento-
logical analysis of the Tygart River Reservoir,
Collin.
WISCONSIN
A-001--WIS: Use of lake sediment cores to
estimate the rate of eutrophication of lakes,
Lee.
A-002-WIS: Biological aspects of eutro-
phication on Lake Mendota, Crystall, and
Trout Lake, Wis., Hasler.
A-003-WIS: Methods for harvesting or con-
trol, aquatic plants, Grant.
A-004-WIS: Circulation and mixing pro-
cesses in lakes, Hoopse.
A-005-WIS: Unsteady flow of ground water
and dispersion in ground water movement,
Monkmeyer.
A-006-WIS: An investigation of the rela-
tionship between the filtering properties of
particulates in water and the filter medium
as applied In water reuse system, Polkowski.
A-007-WIS: A model to estimate the eco-
nomic effects, water-based recreation proj-
ects, on local political subdivisions, Lord.
A-008-WIS: Legal-economic analysis of
irrigation in Wisconsin, Rose.
A-009--WIS: Water quality management on
the Wisconsin River, a model study of the
technical, economic, legal, financial, and ad-
ministrative aspects, Beuscher.
WYOMING
A-001-WYO: Water resource operations
study, Bellamy.
EDWIN CHRISTIANSON ELECTED
VICE PRESIDENT OF NATIONAL
FARMERS UNION
Mr. McCARTHY. Mr. President, the
delegates at the annual convention of
the National Farmers Union, held last
week in Denver, elected Mr. Edwin
Christianson as the new vice president
of the organization.
I have known Ed Christianson for
many years. He has been president
of the Minnesota Farmers Union since
1950 and he is one of the distinguished
farm leaders of the State. I know of his
concern for the welfare of farm families
and of his many efforts to develop prac-
tical programs, both within his own or-
ganization and also at the national level,
to improve economic and social condi-
tions for farm families and rural com-
munities.
The election of Ed Christianson is a
tribute to his record, and it is an honor
for him and for the farm families he has
worked with in Minnesota for many
years. I am sure that he will bring to
the National Farmers Union, as its new
vice president, the same enthusiasm and
dedication for improving farm and rural
conditions as he has demonstrated over
the years in Minnesota..
WILL CLAYTON
Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President,
when Will Clayton died last February 8,
the Nation lost one of its greatest men,
Will Clayton had that rare combination
of qualities which enabled him to suc-
ceed in all his endeavors and to retain
the respect and high regard of all who
ever knew him.
He succeeded in his role as father of
a fine family. He succeeded in the de-
velopment of an enormously profitable
business establishment. He succeeded as
a statesman and a servant of his country
in many difficult and challenging as-
signments. No man could have been
more faithful and diligent in the use of
his talents and in the devotion of his
efforts to the building of a better world.
Will Clayton was still at work at the
time of his sudden and fatal illness.
During the week prior to his death, he
participated in conferences of the At-
lantic Council and the U.S. Citizens
Commission on NATO. Both of these
organizations seek the further develop-
ment of ideas and programs conceived
by Will Clayton during his service as As-
sistant Secretary of Commerce and as
Assistant Secretary of State for Eco-
nomic Affairs over 20 years ago.
I considered Will Clayton a friend
since the day I met him in the forties. I
knew him as a private! citizen and as a
Federal official. I knew him as a selfless
servant of his country, always eager to
share his time, his talent, and his per-
sonal fortune in the interest of his fel-
lowmen and in the interest of interna-
tional peace and prosperity. The Nation
will not soon replace Will Clayton.
Will Clayton had an unusual talent in
dealing with people. He was soft spok-
en, pleasant, and unobtrusively persua-
sive. I have a personal reason to be in
his debt. But for his assistance in Per-
suading it reluctant and obtuse Member
of the other body, the Student Exchange
Act of 1946 probably would not have been
enacted. His talent for reconciling dif-
ferent views, of achieving agreement
among men of diverse opinions was un-
surpassed. In a word, he understood
human beings and knew how to lead
them to cooperation rather than con-
flict.
Will Clayton's children, grandchil-
dren, and great-grandchildren have a
proud heritage. I extend to them my
profound sympathy in this time of grief.
All the Nation grieves with them. All
the Nation is grateful for the life and
work of Will Clayton. May we all be
worthy? il(Ai of the contributions of this
VIETNAM-LETTER BY PROF.
BERNARD FALL
Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, in
the March 11 issue of the New York
Times there appeared a letter to the edi-
tor by Bernard Fall. Professor Fall, a
French citizen now a resident in Wash-
ington, is a renowned expert on Vietnam.
He has written extensively on the sub-
ject and has appeared recently on many
television programs. Few men, if indeed
there are any at all, know more than he
does about the past and present of this
embattled land.
During the recent hearings In the For-
eign Relations Committee on the war in
6101
Vietnam, Gen. Maxwell Taylor appeared
as a witness. He testified on February
17. In his prepared statement read at
the beginning of the hearing he said:
The Vietminh won more in Paris than in
Dienbienphu and believe that the Vietcong
may be as fortunate in Washington.
Now this remark of General Taylor
was important because it implied that
the French lost the war in Indochina
because of political dissension at home
and that, consequently, dissension in
Washington was dangerous because it
could have the same effect.
Professor Fall's letter disputes General
Taylor's statement. Professor Fall
states categorically:
The hard and brutal fact is the French
lost the Indochina war in the field.
He then describes the military situa-
tion in which the French found them-
selves despite the fact, and it is an im-
portant fact in the context of the sub-
ject of the letter that-
Year after year, the Communists and a
few of their associates excepted, the French
Parliament voted the credits for the war
and voted for the reinforcements which
could be squeezed out of a weakened postwar
France.
There are two other sentences in Pro-
fessor Fall's letter which I would like
to quote. The first is the following:
I have read every French parliamentary
debate on Indochina since 1945 and they
make instructive reading as bewildered but
honest men were faced, on one hand, with
glowing reports that the war was being won
and, on the other, with new requests for
more funds and troops.
I have only one comment, perhaps
an obvious comment, to offer on this sen-
tence. We are also bewildered but hon-
est men. We are faced with reports that
the war is being won and with simulta-
neous requests for more funds and troops.
Let us hope, and pray, that this is where
the analogy ends.
The second sentence in the letter that
I would like to quote reads as follows:
It is rather curious, finally, to see observ-
ers who, for two decades, have berated the
French Army for all sorts of true or imag-
ined failings, now resort to the German stab-
in-the-back myth to club their own op-
position here.
I think that this sentence can stand
without comment as the last word on
General Taylor's remark.
Mr. President, I ask unanimous con-
sent that Professor Fall's letter `to the
editor in the March 11 issue of the Times
be inserted at this point in the RECORD.
There being no objection, the letter
was ordered to be printed in the RECORD,
as follows:
FRENCH IN INDOCHINA
To the EDITOR.
C. L. Sulzberger's editorial page column of
February 25 somewhat lacks the serenity and
even urbanity which I have come to asso-
ciate with him. But the point which con-
cerns us here Is whether such a war as that
in Vietnam can be lost by debate, and
whether-as Gen. Maxwell Taylor said, and
Mr. Sulzberger says is true-the French lost
the Indochina war In Paris, or in the field.
The hard and brutal fact is the French
lost the Indochina war in the field. One year
before the battle of Dienbienphu the ratio
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 AP Approved For Re lea SSIONAL `REW
7BgWJ A040004000 rch 211966
but left out by the conferees in the au- overall military strength of our active funds, likewise, are requested in House
thorization bill. This is a correct state- Armed Forces. The largest item of in- Document 405 and will be included in the
ment, is it not? crease is 281,000 in the Department of next supplemental appropriation bill.
Mr. PASTORE. That is absolutely the Army. The next largest increase is By all odds, the largest single item of
correct, and I thank my distinguished 85,000 additional members of the Marine this
urement.00,000 a propriation is for
friend and colleague, the Senator from Corps. proc It is for he
Massachusetts, for his fine contribution. Provision is made for $440 million in of ammunition, aircraft, vehicles, elec-
Mr. President, I suggest the absence of new obligational authority, in lieu of a tronics, communications, and a vast
a quorum. transfer of a like amount from the vari- number of incidental items that are
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The ous working capital funds of the Depart- necessary for the support of troops in to-
clerk will call the roll. ment of Defense. As is customary, the day's modern warfare. A further break-
The legislative clerk proceeded to call Department of Defense Appropriation down of these figures will be found on
the roll. Act for 1966 authorized the transfer of page 12 of the committee report.
Mr. PASTORE. Mr. President, I ask $470 million from the working capital The bill provides considerable funds
unanimous consent that the order for funds to the military personal appropria- for research and development, tests, and
the quorum call be rescinded. tions, in lieu of new obligational author- evaluation. That amounts to $151,600,-
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without ity. However, the additional require- 000. Generally speaking, all of these
objection, it is so ordered. ments imposed on these working capital funds are requested for programs related
Mr. RUSSELL of Georgia. Mr. Press- funds by combat operations in southeast to our operations in southeast Asia.
dent, as will appear from the bill which Asia have allowed the transfer of only They include such programs as malaria
is on the desk of each Member, the Sub- $30 million of the $470 million author- research undertaken to deal with a new
committee on Appropriations consider- Ized. Money simply was not available and very virulent form of malaria which
ing the budget request for the Depart- to make the transfers, so we must there- has incapacitated a number of our fight-
ment of Defense has considered supple- fore make these additional appropria- ing men. It includes limited war labora-
mental estimates totaling $12,720,719,000 tions, which amount to $440 million. tory programs, the development of
and has approved these estimates in It might be well to invite the atten- light-armored assault vehicles, and the
toto. tion of the Senate to a recent develop- development and improvement of air-
Of this amount $12,345,719,000 is for ment with respect to the strength of the craft and missiles for the Navy and the
military functions of the Department of Army and the Marine Corps. It now Air Force.
Defense and $375 million is for military appears that the Army and the Marine The bill contains supplemental esti-
assistance. -Corps will be able to increase their mates for military construction totalling
This is a considerable_sum of money strengths faster than was originally $1,238,400,000.
but I do not believe that any Member of planned, and the Secretary of Defense The committee report also contains a
tl* body could claim surprise at this has authorized them to do so. However, breakdown indicating, where these funds
mount of these supplemental requests. it is possible that the faster buildup will will be expended among the several serv-
During the last session of Congress require some additional funding during ices.
It will be noted that the total requests
smaller supplemental estimates for the current fiscal year.
southeast Asia were submitted and ap- I should also invite the attention of indicate that $561,600,000 will be spent
.proved. In discussing one of these sup- the Senate to the fact that the estimates for construction in South Vietnam and
plementals for $1,700 million for the cost and the funds carried in the bill do not that $63,400,000 is for construction in
of operations in southeast Asia, the dis- include the $761.1 million required for the United States.
tinguished Senator from Mississippi [Mr. increases in military pay, authorized in That is dealt with in more detail on
STENNIS] stated that it must be recog- the Uniform Services Pay Act of 1965. page 18 of the committee report.
nized unless the situation changes sud- These funds were requested in House The supplemental estimate of $375
denly and drastically, next January will Document 405 and will be considered in million for military assistance is to re-
find us faced with substantially larger connection with the next general sup- imburse the Department of Defense for
requests for supplemental funding. plemental bill. the amount transferred to the military
I had the temerity on one occasion on The supplemental estimates provided assistance program during the fiscal
a television program to suggest that the by the bill for operation and mainte- years of 1965 and 1966.
estimate would run more than $10 bil- nance total $2,316,269,000. These funds Section 510 of the Foreign Assistance
lion. I was criticized for making such will be used to meet the following actual Act of 1961, as amended, provides that
extravagant predictions. costs: up to $300 million worth of defense arti-
It appears now that my predictions Costs relating to the increase of cles, to be found in the military stocks
were on the conservative side, because strength of the Active and Reserve and defense services, may be ordered in
even the amounts that have been here- Forces, such as unit activation costs; in- any one fiscal year for military assist-
tofore appropriated, added to the duction center costs; training costs; per- ance purposes, subject to reimbursement
amount that is contained in this bill, sonnel processing costs; and items of that from subsequent appropriations made
may not be adequate to defray the costs nature. available for military assistance in the
that have been incurred by our military Funds are also included to cover costs event the President determines such or-
actions in southeast Asia. relating to increases in the number of ders to be vital to the security of the
The $12.3 billion is for the following personnel deployed in southeast Asia, United States.
purposes: Military personnel, $1,620 such as transportation of equipment and The President made two such deter-
million; operation and maintenance, supplies, overhaul and rebuilding of miniations with respect to this power.
$2,316,269,000; procurement, $7,019,400,- equipment and weapons, additional He authorized $75 million to be made
000; .research, development, test, and medical costs, and additional civilian available in the fiscal year 1965, and
evaluation, $151,650,000; military con- personnel to support these forces. The $300 million to be made available during
strgction, $1,238,400,000; and $375 mil- logistics of supporting a large number the fiscal year 1966. The item of $375
lion to reimburse the Department of of armed men 10,000 miles from our million is to reimburse the Department
De'Tense for stocks transferred to the shores becomes a very expensive pro- for these orders., theerellarthat e some
gen-
I should
military assistance program from the cedure. eral regular stocks of the Department of We also are involved in the support of perhaps discuss very briefly.
Defense during fiscal years 1965 and the South Vietnamese and other free Section 101 contains a provision deal-
1966. world forces that are employed in South ing with the working capital fund cash
During the course of my discussion of Vietnam. That subject may be discussed balances. The pending bill amends the
the bill, if any Member of the Senate has in more detail before this bill has been existing law with respect to the cash
a question with respect to any of them, I passed. balances that must be maintained in the
shall be happy to undertake to answer I should also state that these estimates various working capital funds of the De-
him do not include the $102,400,000 required partment of Defense. At the present
As is well known, there has been a for civilian pay increases under the Fed- time adequate cash must be maintained
considerable increase-453,000-in the eral Employees Pay Act of 1965. These to cover accounts payable. Under this
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 March 21, 1966 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD -SENATE
SUPPLEMENTAL DEFENSE APPRO-
PRIATIONS, 1966
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Under
the order entered on Thursday, March
17, the Chair lays before the Senate the
umflnished business.
The Senate proceeded to consider the
bill (H.R. 13546) making supplemental
appropriations for the fiscal year ending
June 30, 1966, and for other purposes,
which had been reported from the Com-
mittee on Appropriations with amend-
ments.
Mr. HAYDEN, Mr. President, the
Committee on Appropriations recom-
mends concurrence in the House allow-
ance of the budget requests totaling $13.1
billion for those programs included in the
supplemental defense appropriation bill,
1966. Of this amount $12.7 billion Is for
programs and activities of the Depart-
ment of Defense directly related with
combat operations in. southeast Asia.
The balance of $415 million is for eco-
nomic aid.
The requests of the Department of De-
fense were considered by the Department
of Defense Subcommittee under the
chairmanship of the senior Senator from
Georgia (Mr. RUSSELL] and the eco-
nomic aid requests were considered by
the Deficiencies and Supplemental Sub-
committee under the chairmanship of
the senior Senator from Rhode Island
[Mr. PASTORE]. These gentlemen will
explain their respective sections of the
bill.
Mr. President, there are two commit-
tee amendments which will restrict the
availability of special authorities to the
current fiscal year. Under the House bill
one of these special authorities was made
permanent law and the other was made
applicable to fiscal year 1967. These
provisions are discussed an pages 25 and
26 of the report.
I ask unanimous consent that these
amendments be agreed to en bloc.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there
objection? The Chair hears none, and
it is so ordered.
The committee amendments, agreed to
en bloc, are as follows:
On page 7, line 15, after "Sec. 101.", to
strike out "After June 30, 1965" and insert
"During the current fiscal year".
On page 8, line 4, after the word "fiscal",
to strike out "years" and insert "year", and
In the same line, after "1966", to strike out
Mr. SALTONSTALL. Mr. President,
the chairman of the committee has made
only a very brief report, and I know that
the Senator from Georgia [Mr. RvssELL]
has a more detailed report.
Therefore, I suggest the absence of a
quorum.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The
clerk will call the roll.
The legislative clerk proceeded to call
the roll.
Mr. PASTORE. Mr. President, I ask
unanimous consent that the order for
the quorum call be rescinded.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. With-
out objection, it is so ordered.
Mr. PASTORE. W. President, I
should lik9 to make a statement with
regard to the economic aspects of the
bill now pending before the Senate.
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The portion of the bill for which I am
responsible contains two items; namely,
supporting assistance and the general
contingency fund.
For these items, the President re-
quested $415 million, of which $315 mil-
lion is for supporting assistance and the
remainder of $100 million for the gen-
eral contingency fund. The House has
allowed the full amount of the budget
estimate for both items, and the Com-
mittee on Appropriations recommends'
that the Senate concur with the House.
The funds appropriated for support-
ing assistance are being provided for
four countries; namely, South Vietnam,
Laos, Thailand, and the Dominican Re-
public. Almost 90 percent of the $315
million, o $275 million, will be used In
South Vietnam. Laos and Thailand will
each obtain $7,500,000 and the Domini-
can Republic will be the beneficiary of
$25 million.
Mr. President, supporting assistance
funds are used primarily for the pur-
chase of raw materials and other essen-
tial imports which the recipient coun-
try is unable to finance from its own
foreign exchange earnings. The private
exporter, which normally will be a U.S.
firm, provides the commodities and is
paid in dollars. The local importer pays
the full value in local currency to his
government, which then. uses the funds
to finance defense or other programs of
mutual benefit to the recipient country
and our own country. In this bill, $175
million of the amount provided for South
Vietnam will be used to acquire essential
imports. In this connection, Mr. Presi-
dent, I ask unanimous consent to have a
list of the commodities that will be im-
ported by South Vietnam printed in the
RECORD.
There being no objection, the list was
ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as
follows:
Commodity list for South Vietnam funded
in supplemental defense appropriation bill,
1966
(In thousands)
Rice------------------------------
$21,000
Raw sugar--.:__------------.._------
600
Fertilizer -----------------------------
4, 500
Medicines and pharmaceuticals-----
9, 000
Chemicals -------------------------
2,500
Yarn and fabrics -------------------
7,400
Pulp and paper --------------------
600
Coal------------------------------
8,000
Petroleum products--------------
12,000
Nonmetallic minerals--------------
21,000
Iron and steel---------------------
50,000
Nonferrous metals----------------
1,000
Industrial machinery--------------
16,000
Vehicles and parts----------------
9,000
Tires and tubes------------------
3,000
Other-----------------------------
9,500
Total------------------------- 175, 175,000
Mr. PASTORE. Mr. President, In
addition to financing commodity im-
ports, supporting assistance funds are
also used for the direct financing of spe-
cific projects. In these instances, it is
similar to technical cooperation and de-
velopment grants in that it finances
technicians, training, and other project
costs. The difference is that support-
ing assistance projects are primarily for
security or political purposes, while tech-
nical cooperation and development
grants projects are for economic develop-
6105
ment. In the pending bill, $100 million
of supporting assistance funds is being
furnished South Vietnam to finance such
projects, which embrace public safety
activities, logistics management, public
works, refugee relief, construction, wel-
fare, and development.
Mr. President, I do not believe it is nec-
essary for me to comment extensively on
the general contingency fund. As every-
one knows, this fund enables the Presi-
dent to meet emergency requirements
that occur fortuitously in any area of
the world. I believe that there is no bet-
ter testimony, attesting to the need for
a $100 million contingency fund, than
that presented in the schedule I hold in
my hand, and I ask unanimous consent
to have it printed in the RECORD.
There being no objection, the schedule
was ordered to be printed in the RECORD,
as follows:
Agency for International Development sched-
ule of uses-Fiscal year 1966 contingency
fund to date programed through Mar. 10,
1966
[In thousands of dollars]
Total ---------------
Africa_______________
Somali Republic..
204
Public safety (grant).
Zambia,,,,,,,,,,,
1,000
Airlift of petrol and oil
d s (grant).
productmaintenance.
Roa
NESA: Ceylon__.__
7,600
Commodity financing
Latin Amerfca------
44,725
(loan).
Bolivia -______-_-_
1,0()0
British Guiana- __
628
Public safety (grant).
Colombia ---______
1,475
Do.
Dominican Re-
300
Do.
public.
Do--------------
35, 859
Budgetary support
Do--------------
1,163
(grant).
Commodity procure.
Panama----------
3,500
ment (grant).
Budgetary support
Peru .... ---------
goo
(loan).
Nonroglonal --------
W. W. disaster re-
lief.
Includes 250 for Am-
bassador's fund and
60 allocated to State(
10 for pledge to
ICRC.
Current unprogramed
balance of the con
tingeney fund.
1 Represents total estimated availability for the year.
Actual availability as of this data is $64,314,000 against
which $53,345,000 has been allotted and allocated.
Mr. PASTORE. Mr. President, this
schedule shows the uses to which the
President has put the moneys appro-
priated to him in the contingency fund
thus far this year, thus indicating pos-
sible future uses during the balance of
this fiscal year.
Mr. President, that concludes my for-
mal remarks. If there are any ques-
tions, I shall be glad to answer them.
Mr. SALTONSTALL. Mr. President,
will the Senator from Rhode Island
yield?
Mr. PASTORE. I yield.
Mr. SALTONSTALL. This report,
which the Senator is submitting, is a
unanimous report. We had a rather full
discussion in the executive session of the
committee on certain pros and cons, and
we had quite a long explanation of the
original amendment which was put in
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Marc 21, 1966 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD -SENATE
provision a cash requirement will be
maintained at the level required to cover
cash disbursements.
This provision also authorizes unlimi-
ted transfers between these funds. The
purpose of the provision is to obtain a
greater use of our cash available. The
Secretary of Defense has stated that if
this provision is not adopted, it will be
necessary to appropriate at least $325
million in addition to provide capital for
these working funds. The House bill au-
thorizes this change on a permanent
basis.
However, the committee recommends
to the Senate that the provision be adopt-
ed so as to be applicable only to the cur-
rent fiscal year in order that the opera-
tions of these funds under this new
procedure may be reviewed annually.
Mr. SALTONSTALL. Mr. President,
will the Senator yield?
Mr. RUSSELL of Georgia. I yield.
Mr. SALTONSTALL. Mr. President,
is it not the opinion of the chairman of
this extremely important committee that
if we were to do otherwise Congress would
lose practically all control of the capital
funds if the Secretary of Defense were
able to move them anywhere he wanted?
Mr. RUSSELL of Georgia. I think if
Congress is undertaking to supervise to
any degree the expenditure of these vast
funds and all the ramifications of the
transfers, it is absolutely necessary that
this not be made permanent legislation.
It would be very unfortunate for that
to be done. There should at least be the
most thorough and exhausting hearings
so that the entire Congress would be
apprised as to what the effect of that
transfer, would be.
Mr. SALTONSTALL. We set up the
capital funds a comparatively few years
ago with the idea of having a more ef-
ficient and quicker action, because the
money was appropriated for these pur-
poses and came back into the account.
Those are very substantial sums of
was to provide needed aircraft and weap-
ons and ammunition.
Mr. RUSSELL of Georgia. The Sena-
tor is correct. That would be military
hardware that would be mainly utilized
in the prosecution of the war.
Mr. COOPER. Considering the fact
that it will take a considerable time to
procure all the equipment that will be
needed, would there be any period of
time when there would be a shortage of
the needed equipment in Vietnam?
Mr. RUSSELL of Georgia. We were
assured that there would not be. The
contracts for a great deal of this pro-
curement, particularly of ammunition
and weapons, have already been nego-
elated. We have done everything we
could to assure that adequate supplies
of all kinds, medical, sustenance, am-
munition, and weapons, would be avail-
able to those who are serving our coun-
try so far from home, to maintain this
country's position is an very unusual,
dirty war.
I would be very much disappointed if
those assurances did not prove to be ac-
curate. I will not say that there may not
be shortages,' but we have had more
trouble in distribution really than in
shortages with respect to a great many
of these items. We did not have the
facilities in South Vietnam to unload the
ships rapidly enough. When we did have
the facilities, we did not have warehouses
in which to store the equipment, but had
to stack the equipment on the shore.
There was naturally a great deal of
confusion and some loss; and even in
such rudimentary and essential items as
cleaning oil and patches for cleaning
rifles, losses were involved and we had
to fly the material out there for the
Marine Corps.
Mr. COOPER. I had an opportunity
to be in Vietnam in December and in
January. I took note of the supply sit-
uation when I was there.
Statements have been made in the
newspapers that there have been short-
ages of needed aircraft, particularly heli-
copters, and that there have been short-
ages of spare parts and of ordinary am-
munition for rifles, and other weapons.
These matters are of concern to all and
I have received letters from parents of
soldiers fighting in Vietnam. Does the
Senator believe, from his wide knowledge
in this field and from facts adduced in
the hearings, that with this appropria-
tion, the Department of Defense can
provide the equipment anticipated to be
necessary?
Mr. RUSSELL of Georgia. I do not
think there is any question that we will
have ample supplies. However, whether
there will be complete and perfect dis-
tribution of the supplies is another mat-
ter.
We have had some shortages of heli-
copter parts. I understand that has now
been remedied. We are greatly increas-
ing the number of helicopters being em-
ployed in Vietnam. Were it not for these
helicopters, we would have had more
difficulty in seeing that our men were
supplied with food and ammunition.
Mr. COOPER. I am not much in-
terested in trying to place the blame on
6107
what has been done in the past. We are
interested now in seeing to it that there
is sufficient equipment for our forces.
Mr. RUSSELL of Georgia. The Sena-
tor is correct.
Mr. COOPER. There have been short-
ages. I have read statements made by
responsible Members of Congress to the
effect that last year the Defense Depart-
ment reviewed and rejected the efforts of
the Senators of the committee to provide
helicopters and other needed aircraft and
weapons.
Mr. RUSSELL of Georgia. There
was a small reduction in the procure-
ment of helicopters in 1965. That could
have affected the situation there.. But
the First Cavalry Division had more
helicopters when they went into Viet-
nam than the entire U.S. Army had
some 10 or 12 years ago; and those have
been supplemented by procurement of
a number of others. The number of
helicopters assigned to each military
unit on a permanent basis is being in-
creased.
Mr. COOPER. I know the Senator is
always very tough with the Defense De-
partment if it does not recommend
what he believes to be sufficient equip-
ment and ammunition. Does the Sen-
ator feel comfortable about the suffi-
ciency of the proposed procurement?
Mr. RUSSELL of Georgia. My pri-
mary concern, as to the Department of
Defense, the taxpayers, or anything else,
is to see that we do not send one Amer-
ican boy out to fight under the flag of
the richest nation on earth without his
being better supplied than a soldier of
any other nation.
Mr. COOPER. I agree. Let me ask
the Senator one more question: Can he
give figures on the strength of the forces,
say, what they were 1 year ago, what
they are today, and what is projected
for the end of the current calendar year,
to show the buildup?
Mr. RUSSELL of Georgia. Yes, we
have that.
Mr. COOPER. What are the num-
bers?
Mr. RUSSELL of Georgia. We plan to
increase the Army by a net total of 280,-
589, the Navy by 43,025, the Marine
Corps by 84,994, the Air Force by 44,225.
That is an overall net increase in
strength of 452,833 personnel.
It is estimated that these goals will be
practically met by June 30 of this year.
Mr. COOPER. I ask the Senator, does
the administration intend to secure the
additional strength by means of volun-
tary enlistment and the draft alone?
Mr. RUSSELL of Georgia. The Sen-
ator from Kentucky knows, of course,
that every time you increase the draft
by one, you bring 3 or 4 volunteers into
either the Army, the Navy, the Marine
Corps, or the Air Force, because the
young men like to select the branch of
service in which they are to perform
their duty; and when they see the draft
approaching, it has a very salutary ef-
fect on increasing enlistments in all
branches of the service.
For that reason, there has been a
slight reduction in the quota of draftees
for next month, because enlistments
. If we were to give the Secretary this
authority, we would lose control of very
large funds for all of the three services.
Mr. RUSSELL of Georgia. I think we
would lose control of very large sums and
it is altogether possible that even larger
sums would be involved in future years.
I would be very much opposed to this
being made permanent legislation in the
absence of the most thorough and care-
ful scrutiny by the proper committees of
Congress. Though I am a member of
the Committee on Appropriations and
happen to be chairman of the subcom-.
mittee which handled the bill, I do not
thank that this should be done without
apprising the other committees of this
fact.
Mr. SALTONSTALL. As the senior
Republican member of the committee,
I agree with the chairman.
Mr. COOPER. Mr. President, will the
Senator yield?
Mr. RUSSELL of Georgia. I yield.
Mr. COOPER. Mr. President, I noted
that the distinguished chairman of the
subcommittee called to the attention of
the Senate that a major portion of the
funds sought in the bill, over $7 billion,
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L RECORD - SENATE March 21, 1966
were greater than had been anticipated. pile, and, since the President's order excess milk was not included In the
Mr. COOPER. I thank the senator. would decrease the stockpile to 400,000 "commuted ration" allowance that is
I must say, for myself, that I feel very tons, I feared, if there should be some paid to enlisted men who are authorized
safe with the Senator from Georgia.. and escalation of this war, or another war of to mess separately or who are on leave.
the Senator from Massachusetts handl- similar nature were to break out else- The Department of Agriculture Budget
ing this bill. where, that we would be hard pressed for fiscal 1966 did not include funds for
Mr. RUSSELL of Georgia. I am sure for copper. this excess milk, and the Department of
the Senator from Massachusetts and I I have made no study of it. I intend Defense appropriation was amended to
will do everything within our power and to, because I am certainly as anxious to authorize the Department of Defense to
within our knowledge to see that our maintain adequate raw material re- purchase the excess milk. The amend-
fighting men have everything-in the way serves-and it is just as important-as to ment in the 1966 act was written so as to
of equipment and supplies that they have the ammunition itself. exclude the value of this milk from the
may need. It it not always possible to I am sure that, so far as the fighting commuted ration allowance. Section 103
get it to them in exact amounts and on in Vietnam is concerned, we have an ade- would include the value of the excess milk
exact schedules; and, of course, the c- quate stockpile of copper; but if diffi- in the commuted ration allowance. Un-
ration is not the most palatable dish for culty should break out elsewhere, I think der this amendment the commuted ra-
human consumption over a period of we might be in a very shaky position with tion allowance in the United States will
time-it is all right for a day or two, but respect to our copper reserves. I say that increase from $1.10 to $1.17 per day.
can get extremely tiresome. without having studied the matter, mere- Overseas it will increase from $1.14 to
But we are certainly doing all that we ly because we have been told in the past $1.17 per day. While these are small in-
can to measure up to our responsibilities that about 800,000 tons was a proper creases, the Department of Defense has
to the Senate, to give the Senate a amount of reserve for us to maintain. advised that the estimated cost of this
chance to vote for adequate funds to Mr. COOPER. I am sure the Senator amendment for a full fiscal year is $19.7
take care of these men, who are not in and his committee will look into this million.
Vietnam of their own volition, but who question and others dealing with critical Mr. President, I will be glad to respond
are there under the command of the materials. to any questions that Members might
properlj constituted authorities of this Mr. RUSSELL of Georgia. I thank the have with respect to the Committee's
country. Senator. recommendations totaling $12.3 billion
Mr. SALTONSTALL. Mr. President, Mr. President, I was dealing with the for the Department of Defense.
will the Senator yield for a brief addi- question of military assistance. Section I believe that is all I have to say at
tional statement? 102 of the bill is in accord with a similar this time with respect to the bill.
Mr. RUSSELL of Georgia. I yield. provision in the recently approved au- Mr. SALTONSTALL. Mr. President,
Mr. SALTONSTALL. I have listened thorization act to authorize the use of will the Senator from Georgia yield?
to what the chairman of our committee funds appropriated for the support of The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. HAR-
has said, and agree with him entirely. U.S. forces to support the South Viet- RIS in the chair). Does the Senator
I would simply add this: The Prepared- namese and other military assistance from Georgia yield to the Senator from
ness Committee, of which I am a mem- recipients fighting in South Vietnam. Massachusetts?
ber, under the chairmanship of the Sen- The House bill authorized this change Mr. RUSSELL of Georgia. I am
ator from Mississippi [Mr. STENNIS], has on a permanent basis. However, the happy to yield now to the Senator from
heard from the Army, the Navy, and the Committee has recommended that the Massachusetts, the ranking minority
Air Force on their supplies and equip- provisions be amended so as to be appli- member of the committee.
ment in Vietnam today. I think espe- cable only to the "current fiscal year"
cially as to ammunition, which the Sen- in order that the operations of these appreciate Mr. SALTO e fact Mr. the Sen a Senat, I
ator from Kentucky mentioned, there are funds under this near procedure can be fGtothe fact RUSSELL] yielded
ample supplies, and there is simple build- reviewed annually. co m from o m at this time. CMr. Let me add has yielded
up going on now behind the lines to keep SEC. 102-SUPPORT OF SOUTH VIETNAMESE AND e tt this unanimous in that the
the supplies adequate. OTHER FREE WORLD FORCES aommial was ey ova lab making this
To add further to what the Senator This provision is in. accord with a simi- additional money available during this
from Georgia has said, I call to the at- lar provision in the recently approved As fiscal year
tention of Senators that the so-called Authorized Act to authorize the use of this Proposed with the thi k it is
Red Ball Express has been rejuvenated funds appropriated for the support of the imperative sed legislation remember I thank it is
and is now in operation, and is making South Vietnamese and other military as- his legislation that o all do and what what
It possible to repair an ordinary helicop- sistance forces fighting in South Viet- thu legslwould d6 and wit
ter and put it back in service again, I nam. The budget estimates include would not ado. l H.R. r atio sprovides for the well within 48 hours from the $203.7 million for this purpose. How- fen se Department e appropriations for the De-
time it needs repair. ever, wider this authority more could be 000; $1including 12totaling for r mil it tit ary funcary func-
Mr. COOPER. My inquiries are used if it is determined that it is in our Lion i f-
prompted, of course, by my own desire interest to do so. personnel, pianitems ma military
for information and assurance, but they The purpose of including these funds procurement, operations and maintenance,
have also been sparked by a remark the in this bill is to eliminate the require- ment test and test an and evaluation and ntng to
distinguished Senator made on the floor ment for separate accounting of military meet evaluation amounting includes
this morning at the time the proposed equipment purchased. with Military As- for military 00. In addition, the enArmy,
order of the President to dispose of some sistance appropriations. Under this pro- for military Force, and Def of the Army, a
copper from the stockpiles was discussed., vision, General Westmoreland can Navy, Air Force, and Defense agencies the
The Senator stated, I recall, that he did vide equipment to our forces andt the total of $1,238,400,000, the amount of the
not like it, because the supplies were not South Vietnamese without regard to the budget esclmatds for the military There
very large, and that, the disposal of source of funding, for also included in the and $375 million
scarce copper at this time could be a very The House bill included this authority for economic assistance
ass stage and million
critical matter if fighting should be for the current fiscal year and fiscal year proogr grams di-
with our operations in
extended. 1967. The committee' recommends that rectly uh ast Asia.
In the event of an extended war, does the provision be restricted to the current southeast Asia.
the
the Senator believe that there are critical fiscal year. i It will be recalled that in the were ses-
available to manufacture the SEC. 103--INCLUSION OF THE VALUE OF -EXCESS vide d this Congress, funds were the
weapons which unfortunately will be MIL-" IN THE COMMUTED RATION ALLOWANCE mu especially
of $700 for southeast Asia in of a
amount of $700 million-in the form of a
needed? to cal year , milk efense for the fiscal year
Mr. RUSSELL of Georgia. As I have topenlist d peronnel in6excess ofrthe 1965, andpamenedments or supplements
stated, I have made no exhaustive study statutory and executive order ration of to the 1966 budget for both military
of this question, but testimony has been 8 ounces was paid for with funds appro- functions and such civilian operations as
glt'en us in years past that about 800,000 priated to the Department of Agricul- economic assistance, USIA activities, and
tons of copper was a reasonable stock- ture. During this time the value of the so forth. As recently as September 21,
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March 21, 1966 CONGRESSIONAL RAC -~`
have ample that number of 452,000, how many does
1965, Congress completed action on the as soon as possible. We will
regular Defense Appropriation Act for opportunity to review the request for new the Pentagon estimate could be put into
fiscal year 1966, which included $1.7 bil- obligational authority for the fiscal year South Vietnam and increase our present
lion for the special cost of our military 1967, but I believe that the immediate force there?
operations in South Vietnam. At that passage of this supplemental appropria- ing r. Sand O is T L. My understand--
time, it was understood that additional tion bill should be expedited.
funds would be needed. However, It Mr. President, I join wholeheartedly standing-that there are some 220,000
was not then possible to make any rea- with the chairman of the Appropriations men there, or over 200,000. I will not
sonable, accurate forecast of specific re- Subcommittee on Defense, the Senator state an exact figure.
quirements. Last year, when we consid- from Georgia [Mr. RUSSELL], who has Mr. CLARK. That is only the Army;
ered the regular Department of Defense gone into this subject with a great deal is it not?
appropriation bill, I estimated that the of care. As I say, it was a unanimous Mr. SALTONSTALL. It is all military,
military would request between $10 and report of the Appropriations Committee. I am informed-Army, Marines, and so
$12 billion in additional funds early in It was also a unanimous report of the forth.
the calendar year 1966. The accom- Committee on Armed Services on the Mr. CLARK. Does that include the
panying bill represents the present esti- military authority required for the bill, Air For Rce and the N Georgia` Yes.
mate of the additional needs for fiscal and I hope that it will be passed imme- Mr. CLARK. So tGe s the Yes. mili-total
year 1966. Perhaps some, of these funds diately. _
might have been deferred to the regular Mr. CLARK. Mr. President, will the taMr. RUSSELL of Georgia. No; this
fiscal year 1967 estimates without ad- Senator from Massachusetts yield? 235,000 figure Lin the ga Forces in
verse effect. Mr. SALTONSTALL. I am glad to is .S.
I believe that the chairman would yield to the Senator from Pennsylvania. South Vietnam. There are some large oth agree with me we felt that time was of Mr. CLARK. I have a number of Tconti heyngent sst of 35er, surrounding areas
to 50 000 of o r
the essence, as was pointed out in col- questions I should like to develop. It oc-
loquy with the Senator from Kentucky curred to me that since the Senator from personnel. So that there are almost 300,-
[Mr. COOPER], and that, therefore, it Massachusetts and the Senator from 000th re. Does that include the
would be better to go ahead with these Georgia are both in the Chamber, the and the Air Force?
appropriations now rather than wait for Senator from Massachusetts would be Navy Mr. Rd the Air Georgia. Yes.
the regular appropriation bill which willing to answer some questions with Mr. RCLAR. USSE That is close to 300,000.
might be delayed until next August or the help of the staff. I do not wish un- Mr. of Georgia. Yes. It
September. duly to fatigue anyone. might R slightly more than that.
However, total requirements are so evi- Mr. SALTONSTALL. I should be very Mr. SALTON more was going to
dently large that they should be provided glad to try to answer them, but the chair- say it is L personal L. I was understanding going to that
promptly. The major items provided in man of the committee is here. Perhaps is a want to say it is
the bill are: I should join with him in any answers, there say a is at-thhint-and I want will be subs
First. Increases in numbers of both but I am always sensitive to the fact that only i more than buildup
is u present.
will bemilitary and civilian personnel and in- the Democrats are in control of the Sen- ya hint-that
Mti CLARK. I is ms understanding
creases in the operation and mainte- ate and therefore the immediate respon- that . and if the byl pass
nance cost of men, machines and struc- sibility is with the Senator from Georgia, thal whvote for iif the b will s be 4 and I
tures. but I will be glad to try to answer any additional personnel.
I would agree, as the Senator from questions the Senator may have. My question is, Is it our best judgment
Georgia has stated, that there is no Mr. RUSSELL of Georgia. After that that they will be used to build up the
"nonpartisan" statement, I suppose I
money my this rst for the increased will be should undertake to answer them. force in South Vietnam if it became desir-
It is the understanding that it wn an Mr. SALTONSTALL. We will both able to do that?
a the next 51ll, in on do it. Mr. SALTONSTALL. I will try to
more. . mount That approximating is the only $7 item, 1 I am in- million Mr. CLARK. I know that I am rash answer that question on my own personal
o judgment. There are available a num-
supplemental for military purposes in the next to undertake to take on both Senators at bed of divisions in the vaila States and
are available a number of divisions
supplemental bill, although I believe that once. I am perfectly happy to try, be- ber
the chairman will agree with me that cause really what I am trying to do is there h deployment in other overseas areas.
possibly another supplemental bill will elicit information. Mr. CLARK. And two in Korea.
be submitted before the first of July for Let me ask my good friend, the Senator Mr. SALTONSTALL. And two in
additional expenses in this fiscal year. from Massachusetts, perhaps first-al- Korea. I know what we are trying to do.
Second. Production of aircraft, ord- though if he chooses, the Senator from is to get some assistance from other
nance, ammunition, and other materiel. Georgia [Mr. RusSELL], and it is quite all countries.
Third. Military construction projects. right with me-concerning the commit- Mr. CLARK. I know-
Fourth. Selected and specialized re- tee report, on page 4, which states in Mr. SALTONSTALL. One division
part as follows: has just come in from Korea. The Aus-
search and development programs. The planned end strength increase over the tralians are building up their force. We
Fifth. Economic assistance. original fiscal year 1966 submission is 452,833 read in the newspapers-and there is
The budget estimates for the military for the active forces, and 41,000 for the Re- some testimony to that effect, although
operations of the Defense Department serve forces, st is not firm on to the Phi alth may i-that
amount to $12,345,719,000. The majority Mention is also made of the substitu- send some troops. So we are trying to
of the amounts provided outside of per- tion of civilian for military personnel. get more help from allies rather than
sonnel requirement ili will be devoted to the Then, as the Senator knows, this is send in more of our own men.
procurement of of military hardware with broken down into succeeding sections, Mr. CLARK. I understand, and I am
short leadtime items, such as ammuni- into increases for the Army, for the Navy, very sympathetic with that effort; but if
tion, as well as long lead items, such as for the Marine Corps, for the Air Force, we have 300,000 men there and we are
jet aircraft. and to some extent for the Reserves. providing now for 452,000 more-that
Mr. President, the proposed legislation I do not think it is necessary to stop would set a ceiling-assuming movements
should be supported by every Member on those more specific increases, because among divisions in Germany and pos-
cf airman Senateof, he and I so urge. I join the my first question is, can the Senator sibly Japan-of about 750,000 troops for
Tense Appropriation t Subcommittee the pas- s- relate that 452,000- South Vietnam. Is that correct?
sense in urging the AMr. SALTONSTALL. The Senator Mr. RUSSELL of Georgia. As a mat-
p means 452,000 men, does he not. ter of mathematics, the Senator may be
this sfun are f rur rgenenltly y needed I feel that back the
up
thhe e over 200,000 Americanmen Mr. CLARK. Yes, the increase in correct, but that is not the idea of the
-fighting
now engaged in military operations in men. Can the Senator relate that to the buildup. The idea of the buildup is to
southeast Asia. I believe that we should potential buildup of our strength in replace men who have gone out of this
provide this support for our fighting men South Vietnam? In other words, out of country and to make allowance for ad-
No. 48-16
i
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 ditional personnel who may go. As a Mr. President, I ask unanimous con- saying he thought it might go as high as
practical matter, we have practically de- sent that that extract from Secretary 600,000.
nuded our strategic reserve of trained McNamara's statement from the hear- I take it the Senator thinks that that
combat troops. But the main purpose of ings be placed at this point in the is high.
this increase, as I see it, is to replace the RECORD.
strike forces that have been practically There bet Mr. RUSSELL of wGeorgia.
as the higt is
hest
ng no eliminated from this continent. Their was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, maximum fixed by i one witness, but that
assigned purpose is to put out fires, and as follows:
they have been employed against the fire IMPLEMENTATION OF TIIE AUGUST 1965 FORCE might witness agas not one who makes policy, I
In Vietnam. AUGMENTATIONS Mr. SALTONSTALL. I might add
Mr. CLARK. But essentially it is to Since my appearance here last August, our that I heard no testimony that I would
build up the Ready Reserve primarily in requirements in support of the military effort have confidence in that would lead, at
this country? In Vietnam have continued to grow. We 4-1.
try who have been sent to Vietnam, be- eluding the elements of the 7th Fleetlnow Mr. RUSSELL of Georgia. I do not
cause we have the cream of the crop operating off the coast of Vietnam. And we see that now, but I do not want to be put
must be prepared to deploy even more forces in the position of excluding that possi-
there. We have the 1st Cavalry there. if the Communists choose to expand their bility.
We have the 1st Infantry Division there. operations in South Vietnam.
We have a marine division. The 25th The force augmentations a, Mr. ONSTALL. I do not either,
Division, which was stationed in Hawaii, August included- pprovea in but not t now now.
Is there. I do not recall the others that For the Army: An increase of one division Mr. CLARK. Is there a logistical lim-
we have there. This proposed increase force, three brigade forces, and a large num- itation on the number of troops we could
is
to get trained men to replace them and her of aviation companies. adequately support in South Vietnam?
Is available here. For the Marine Corps: An increase of two Mr. RUSSELL of Georgia. We are
heilcopter training squadrons and additional rapidly remedying that. We are build-
Frankly, it may be said, In all candor, communications, engineer, and military po- ing large harbor facilities there at a tre-
they will not only be replaced, but there lice battalions, will be a margin to be used for our de- For the Navy: An increase of 25 active ship. to support cost. I think we will be able
pleted strike forces in the United States. in the fleet plus 4 for MSTS, for a total of 29. to support a much larger force with these
We could never pin the officials down as For the Air Force: An increase in airlift new facilities.
to how many they were going to send out aircraft utilization rates, from 5 to 8 hours Mr. CLARK. Would it be a fair sum-
there or how many they needed. They per day for Military Airlift command mart' of the views of the two Senators
said they were going to send as ma (formerly MATS) aircraft, and from 1.5 to 5 as of now, recognizing that the military
said they needed. That was as near ay moulds per day for C--130E's in other com- situation might change, that we can look
forward we could get to a definite number. But For all the active forces: Additional per- with reasonable confidence tt the
we can say that the purpose is to sup- sonnet to round out the manning of units ceiling ling of nro more than 4r arm serv-
ply ply replacements for forces that are out to be deployed in Vietnam and for increased number of troops be the four armed erv-
of the country, so that units can be training and logistic support. ices which will be deployed in South
trained as speedily as possible units be avail- For the Reserve components: Additional Vietnam?
drill pay space to raise the manning and Mr. RUSSELL of Georgia. I speak
able In this country for any contingency readiness levels of 3 divisions and 6 brigades only for myself. I would not wish to put
elsewhere in the world. and necessary supporting forces in the Army that ceiling on It if the Senator is going
Mr. SALTONSTALL. Mr. President, Reserve components, 24 squadrons in the Air to include all four armed services, the
If the Senator will yield, I am glad to Force Reserve components. and the Mwrhne
the Committee on Appropriations and direct hire civilian personnel were approved in any one of a number of contingencies,
Armed Services Committee. to support these force increases, depending on what will happen, it might
Mr. CLARK. To what page does the Mr. CLARK. My question is designed exMr. that.
CLARK
Senator
. refer? to try to find out-and, from what the assachusetts . Would the to that? from
Mr. SALTONSTALL. Page 7 of the Senator from Georgia said, I have an MM. SALTO care L add to that?
I agre-
hearings of the Committee on Appropria- Idea that maybe 'cannot-what is the with th the ALTO Chairman. rman. . We c c No.
tions and the Committee on Armed ceiling, if the bill is adopted and imple- annot happen,
Services. I will read only this portion, mented, in the number of men that we but at foresee what is going oo aagree
Secretary McNamara said: might expect to go to South Vietnam. but at the present time I would agree
with M what the Chairman said.
Since my appearance here last August, our Mr. RUSSELL of Georgia. I could not Mr. CLARK. Essentially, we have an
requirements in support of the military supply that information, because we open-ended situation, do we not, as per-
effort in Vietnam have continued to grow. could not get any definite estimate from haps the majority leader indicated in his
We have already deployed a total of about the Secretary of Defense or the Chair- report?
190,000 U.B. military personnel to South man of the Joint Chiefs. They did state
Vietnam. And we must be prepared to de- they were going to supply what General Mr. RUSSELL of Georgia. I think any
ploy even more forces if the Communists war is open ended, as far as I have ever
choose to expand their operations in South Westmoreland needed.
Vietnam. Mr. CLARK. And he did not say what been able to ascertain.
i
Mr. CLARK.
uary.
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s needed. Mr. CLARK. And so this one is, too.
Mr. RUSSELL of Georgia. They did Mr. RUSSELL of Georgia. I do not
not tell us what he needed. know of any way you can prescribe rules
Mr. CLARK. Maybe he does not of war, or whether the other side is going
know. to expand; but until you do that, any
Mr. RUSSELL of Georgia Of co r war is open ended
Mr. SALTONSTALL.
1966.
Mr. CLARK. We have had a buildup
since then.
Mr. RUSSELL of Georgia. We have
sent nearly two divisions out there since
then.
Mr. SALTONSTALL. I ask unanimous
consent to put in the RECORD that part
of Secretary McNamara's statement
which appears on page 7 of the hearings.
Mr. CLARK. Should not that request
Include over to the top of page 8, to com-
plete the statement?
Mr. SALTONSTALL. Yes.
they are available. If you want to trip Mr. CLARK. Does the Senator have
other places you can send 1 million addi- any idea as to the amount of uncommit-
tional men to South Vietnam, but I have ted PAVN forces there are in the North?
no Idea on earth there will be any such How many trained divisions do they have
buildup as that. I have personally, as in reserve, not committed? Does the
an amateur, never thought the total Senator have any idea?
number of men we would have there Mr. RUSSELL of Georgia. We re-
would run over 400,000. ceived some testimony as to that, but it
Mr. CLARK. The Senator will recall was classified when it was given to us.
that one of his colleagues on the commit- I do not know why. Certainly Hanoi
tee was asked how many additional men knows how many divisions they have.
would be needed, and he was quoted as They have a large number of divisions,
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March-211.1966 CONCRESSIC T __ ECD onth
jo construct
s~orjje
of these greater than they have already commit- items, a d Is think we would be derelict were draftees ,tand so forth. gNeverthe-
ted.
Mr. CLARK. That is good enough for in our appropriation. If we are notegofor inghto rect-and I ask the two senators if it
me. seems
to me tha I have a good many questions, but the support those men, we should bring them tionitrate high enoughtto give us much
Senator esom Rhode Island may wish to home.
ask a question. Mr. CLARK. Does the Senator from concern. I wonder if either Senator
Mr. PELL. No. I was listening. Massachusetts wish to add to that? would comment on that statement.
Mr. CLARK. In the opinion of the two Mr. SALTONSTALL. Yes. The impli- Mr. RUSSELL of Georgia. I do not
Senators, are we going to be able to om- cation is that colleagues on my side--- recall that that figure was included in
mit this large sum of money before the Mr. RUSSELL of Georgia. ; didnot ttheeStestimon , Irhea erreed it inbthe has
end this fiscal year? say that, uite high. There is no blinking at that
Mr. . RUSSELL of Georgia. It will be Mr. CLARK. In the other body. q
obligated. It will not be expended, but Mr. SALTONSTALL. In the other fact. It is most remarkable that most t occur
the the Secretary of Defense testified it would body. I beg your pardon. I agree with of the desertions d fightingo ding to the
be all obligated or programed before the what the chairman said. heig of the end of this fiscal year. in addition, the chairman and I went uncontradicted testimony. It is at times
Mr. CLARK. And It cannot be obli- over these appropriations requested be- when the men are in rest camps, or sim-ilar gated Rbefore it is USSELL of pGeorg aid That is went thereo hthe fl eartily in ac ord with them come back in a short time; some e
number correct. So, if we are going to supply each other that we should appropriate of tthem hen Bear a they rfor ba ack to their
these goods and furnish these supplies the full amount.
to the men in South Vietnam, it Is neces- The $10 million which the chairman units.
sary that these appropriations be made. described I brought up in that committee, Mr. CLARK. Perhaps It is a little
Mr. CLARK. Would the Senator from we agreed it should go in. That $10 mil- easier to get away when one is in a rest
Georgia agree with me that the com- lion is for the planning and designing of camp than when he is under the eye of
ments made by some of our friends on a new logistical ship. To hold it over a sergeant.
the other side of the aisle that some of would delay construction of the ship that R RUiSSSSrue.ELL of f Georgia. I men should
ould
this money was put into the fiscal year which is a new type and a way of doing say reluctan 1966 to make the deficit less In 1967 is it. Outside of that, I would say all of wgreat hom they have been leave those awit llh
not correct? these items were necessary. under Mr. RUSSELL of Georgia. I do not i personally asked the question when they are
f ern his fire experience The Senator
agree with that statement. I have whether any of these items should go ete
stay
they mGe eral Johnson t stiff dl thatrin the
with h care. this budget estimate f with great speaking sdo ernindiv dua , th opinion
that should not, go over because they were course of the last year there had been
men.o a There e carp was one believe, item $ 10 for million develop-
ment
might be carried over. But t out of a $13 long leadtime items. It was essential an improvement in the desertion rate;
that we should get started. but unquestionably, it has been high.
billion appropriation that is insignifi- Mr. CLARK. I thought Secretary Mr. COOPER. Mr. President, will the
cant. MeNamara's testimony on that was very Senator yield?
a This whole idea comes out of of the very convincing. Mr. CLARK. I am happy to yield.
hcom as st a of the other of the report which Would the two Senators mind turn- Mr. COOPER. When I was in Saigon,
there w the body the part of says ing to page 56 of the hearings, where I spoke with the military staff about this
some e of was the the members that the there was a Secretary McNamara stated that South very issue-the rate of desertions. I was
some y memd be Vietnam has about 640,000 total effect- told that the rate was high, but a part of
carriarrieedit s over. me I of thinkinese that is funds could b Ives in Regular and paramilitary activ- the explanation given my staff may be of
cd splitting sties. interest.
hairs. I believe that goes all the way down I was told that the South Vietnamese these We nreVieetnatnarm or going to bring them b support back, ck, to the local police whose duties are forces have no regulation that deals with
men bring less onerous in terms of the men absent without leave, such as is ap-
and irlg them home. ' chances of their getting shot than the plied to our own forces. And, furloughs
Hite is the language( Regular Army. or leaves of absence are not granted.
If bars of the c one commotion felt by many I take it that figure is pretty well sub- Mr. CLARK. Certainly the men are
necessity y et o committee regarding the
n for this legislation, it arises from stantiated in the minds of the two Sen- paNlrVCOOPER. They are fighting, any-
the possibility that many of the items in- ators. That is on page 56. a, ay.
y. But when the men enlist are
ment, all three categories procure- lbestt testimony we could get. That drafted, they are not given leaves or
mint, research and and development, , and con- the furloughs; they are in for the duration.
sttuction, may simply have been moved is the opinion of the intelligence sources
from the regular 1967 authorization to this and includes not only those on full-time As a result, there are many cases of men
supplemental 6 authorization without. duty but also the regular militia who absent without leave. I was told that
any real prograamm for acceleration. guard the villagers. men absent themselves in these circum-
It goes on to say: Mr. CLARK. I imagine that the stances to go home to help with the crops
Obviously no military advantage would method of keeping a census of military and be with their families. Sometimes
be gained by such a bookkeeping situation. personnel in South Vietnam is not too they return to the same unit; sometimes
But it is an "iffy" statement unless highly developed. Would the Senator to another unit.
agree? Mr. CLARK. Sometimes they stay
based on hard testimony. Mr. RUSSELL of Georgia. That is home. f is careful
aout I say, b there any one man who true. I must say that there has been Mr. COOPER. Sometimes they stay
t my tinu scrutinizing the budget quite a high turnover in some of the home.
c is et distinguished
have nd been from Marra- honored combat areas. But the point was made that despite
with hg whom hem I friend
to wk for so many years. He did not Mr. CLARK. What information did the high rate of desertion there had been
to work t
of a military unit,
come up with any specific item that he the committee receive about the deser- no even known defectors s a platoon, of Suit,
thought could go over, other than this tion rate among the South Vietnamese? squadron ro the North Viet-
$10 million vessel. It has been published in the newspapers, V forces
. I though that was a
I agree it was possible that could go and I wonder if this is substantially in namese se rather sigorfieant statement.
over but I saw no real reason for carry- accord with the testimony that the com-
ing it over. mittee received, that in 1965 there were, Mr. RUSSELL of Georgia. I find that
In my opinion all of this appropriation as I recall, a gross number of 113,000 the Secretary did delete the number of
is absolutely necessary. Some of these desertions from the South Vietnamese desertions that occurred in 1965, out of
items have a very long leadtime. It armed forces. Many of them, of course, the total force of more than 640,000.
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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE March
The number was omitted as being clas-
sified. However, it Involves a large
number of men.
As I have said, the South Vietnamese
military organization is not identical
with ours. It would be a mistake to
write off the courage and the fighting
power of those troops, because at times
they have shown themselves to be super-
ior in combat. They have demonstrated
great valor and ability.
Going home to see one's family is not
a new thing. Neither is it confined to
the Vietnamese Army. Some of the best
soldiers in the Civil War left their or-
ganizations and went home to see their
wives and children and to help to gather
the crops. For a while, some of them
were shot; but eventually the point was
reached where their punishment was
mitigated, so as to induce them to re-
turn.
Mr. CLARK. Someone told me that
the total number of desertions on both
the Union and Confederate sides during
the Civil War was 2 million.
Mr. RUSSELL of Georgia. I have read
that figure somewhere, but I believe that
those who were absent without leave
were included.
Mr. CLARK. The purpose of raising
this particular line of questions was to
get the judgment of the Senator from
Georgia and the Senator from Massa-
chusetts as to whether the high rate of
desertions-and i am taking my figures
from the newspapers; I suspect they are
not very different from the figure de-
leted from the testimony-raises any
concern in the minds of the two Sena-
tors as to whether the fighting effective-
ness and the morale of the South Viet-
namese forces is Increasing or decreas-
ing, or Is remaining about what it was
when the South Vietnamese were on the
verge of defeat, and we really went In
and saved them.
Mr. RUSSELL of Georgia. I concur in
the Senator's last statement. At the
time our troops went into action in South
Vietnam, I do not believe the South Vi-
etnamese forces would have lasted an-
other month, because they were on the
verge of disintegration.
It is difficult to answer the Senator's
question categorically, but I should say
that all the evidence tends to show that
tie South Vietnamese have been fighting
much better since we sent considerable
forces of our own into South Vietnam.
Certainly they are fighting much better
than they were just before our troops
arrived there.
Mr. CLARK. A very ugly story was
published in the newspapers a few days
ago. When the Vietcong overran one
of our special forces camps, it was stated
that the officers actually had to shoot
some of the South Vietnamese troops to
prevent them from hanging on to the
helicopters that were trying to remove
the wounded from the scene. I suspect
that that incident occurred after the
hearings were closed. But it was a dis-
turbing story.
Mr. RUSSELL of Georgia. I read
that article in the press, it was indeed
a most disturbing story. I intend to
examine into it fully and ascertain the
facts. I have not had an opportunity
to do so until now. I know that the
Senator from Massachusetts has read it
and is likewise concerned about it.
That occurred at one of the special
forces camps, where we were trying to
train the Vietnamese. I do not know
the degree of training they had received.
Mr. CLARK. As I understand, it was
quite far out in the jungle.
Mr. RUSSELL of Georgia. It was.
The Senator asked about morale.
General McConnell testified:
The Vietnamese Air Force is very high.
Since we started pretty extensive bombings
over there, the Vietnamese ground forces
morale has continually gone up, and I think
they are in much better shape now than
they were 5 or 6 months ago.
That would have been about the time
that we went into Vietnam in force.
There is no question in my mind that the
morale of the South Vietnamese forces
has improved.
There are many reasons why the
average Vietnamese soldier should not
have felt enthusiastic about the war.
Much favoritism had been displayed in
taking men into the forces and com-
missioning them as officers. There was
irregularity in the pay, and the food was
of poor quality. On top of that, there
was a good deal of tough fighting.
Mr. CLARK. And some corruption.
Mr. RUSSELL of Georgia. That is
what I meant to imply by referring to
the food and to the pay. A number of
things have tended to shake the morale
of the very best fighting troops. Noth-
ing in the world is more destructive of
morale in any armed force In the course
of history than the feeling that one
group is being given favoritism and soft
jobs while another group must do the
dirty work.
I think that feeling was prevalent at
one time in the South Vietnamese forces.
I understand that the Vietnamese lead-
ers are making every effort to straighten
that out.
Mr. SALTONSTALL. Mr. President,
will the Senator yield?
Mr. RUSSELL of Georgia. I yield.
Mr. SALTONSTALL. Perhaps this is
not pertinent. However, it was my feel-
ing from the testimony we received that
improving the social and economic con-
ditions in the villages and giving some
confidence to the leaders that they will
not have their heads chopped off has in-
creased the spirit of the lightening men.
Mr. CLARK. I hope that Is true.
However, the number of villages which
we completely control issubject to some
question. It was only about a month ago
that I read about a splendid village
leader who had been enticed to return to
his home village and the Vietcong sur-
rounded him and, promptly killed him.
Mr. RUSSELL of Georgia. He was at-
tending a funeral.
Mr. CLARK. The Senator is correct.
He was attending it funeral. I wonder in
that regard whether the Senators have
any information as to whether we have
not about reached the bottom of the
barrel as far as increasing the number
of effectives is concerned and whether
we would not be fortunate if we were able
to hold the total. of effectives to the
figure of 630,000.
21, 1 066
Mr. RUSSELL of Georgia. The testi-
mony tended to support an affirmative
answer to the question of the Senator,
But In all fairness it is inconceivable to
me that they have reached the bottom
of the barrel in a nation having from 14
to 15 million people.
I think that if the Vietnamese will go
back over all of their. rolls and get all of
those who have avoided duty, and who
should be doing duty, and get all of them
into the service the South Vietnamese
can not only maintain this ratio but also
increase it.
It must be said that a number of the
so-called militia and paramilitary men
are over the suitable age for active duty
in the field of battle day and night.
They are defense troops. However,
there have also been stories about the
number of young men In the two or three
cities of the country who have seen no
duty and have not yet been called on.
In my opinion, if they really summon
their people to the colors without any
partiality and distribute the burden of
this war equally among all the South
Vietnamese, probably two or three ad-
ditional divisions of young men could be
brought into their armed forces.
Mr. CLARK. We must remember that
the amount of actual real estate which
we control, as opposed to that which is
either held by the Vietcong or is con-
tested, puts some limitation on the power
to draft people outside of the area which
is secured.
Mr. RUSSELL of Georgia. It is the
view of the Vietcong that they can take
people who are able to walk and put
them at some kind of duty, digging tun-
nels, if nothing else.
Mr. CLARK. It occurs to me that one
test of the effectiveness and morale of the
South Vietnamese Army might come
from taking a look at the situation in the
Mekong Delta as it is today, as opposed
to what it was a year ago.
It is my understanding that we do not
have any American troops of any number
in the Mekong Delta and that that op-
eration Is being conducted almost en-
tirely by the South Vietnamese Army.
Mr. RUSSELL of Georgia. Very few
troops, other than South Vietnamese,
have been in the Mekong Delta accord-
ing to my best information.
Mr. CLARK. The Senators have seen
the rather unsatisfactory maps in the
newspapers and in the Defense Depart-
ment. They would not declassify them,
and they said they were no good.
As shown on page 145, 146, and 147
of the hearings, Secretary McNamara
did finally present a map before the
committee.
The map did not show much as to
whether the situation in the Mekong
Delta had improved. According to the
newspaper, the situation is not any
better than it was a year ago.
Mr. RUSSELL of Georgia. I cannot
say that it is any better throughout the
country as far as the territory we are
permanently holding is concerned. We
have not undertaken to fight that kind
of war. We have not enough soldiers
with which to fight that kind of war.
We are not able to garrison a locality
and then move on to another place.
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That is the reason that the so-called Mr. RUSSELL of Georgia. No; I do it looks very much like a civil war to
search-and-destroy tactics are em- not. That has been increased somewhat me-a civil war which is supported on
ployed. They try to find the enemy and since this testimony was given, but I one side by the United States of Amer-
destroy his forces and sources of support. doubt if it has increased more than ica, and on another side with troops from
They have not undertaken to hold the enough to replenish the losses they have Ham i, China, material s and equipment
from
and me help
ground that they have taken. We have suffered in battle. fro
taken some areas two or three times. Mr. CLARK. It is probably less than Russia; but that fundamentally it is a
Mr. CLARK. We move out and do 10 percent of the total effectiveness, is it civil war. I wonder if my friends will
not garrison it. not, that is, 15,000 out of 235,000? comment on that.
Mr. RUSSELL of Georgia. The Sen- Mr. RUSSELL of Georgia. Yes; that Mr. RUSSELL of Georgia. This war
ator is correct.' is correct. Understand, of course, they does have a great many of the aspects of
Mr. CLARK. Do we not always turn sent down the best troops they had. a civil war. But I am sure that it is a
it over to the South Vietnamese in the Mr. CLARK. I understand. civil war that could be brought to a con-
.hope that they can garrison it, and too Mr. RUSSELL of Georgia. These elusion if the Vietcong would be willing
often they do not? were the best they had available. to arrange some reasonable plan of elec-
Mr. RUSSELL of Georgia. We turn Mr. CLARK. There are no Russians tions in South Vietnam that would en-
it over to the South Vietnamese, but and no Chinese fighting in South Viet- able us to determine the relative strength
sometimes the forces are not very for- nam, as far as the Senator knows? of allegiance to either the Saigon gov-
midable. We appoint the Governor of Mr. RUSSELL of Georgia. None. I ernment or the Communist government.
a village and give him a half dozen have asked that question. They have Of course, there is a long history in-
villages, and they do no last too never found a dead Chinese or a dead volved, as the Senator well knows.
armed
long if the Vietcong come back. Russian in any of the death counts they There is the background of the long
The Senator from Massachusetts has have made after any of the conflicts. struggle that took place for several years
shown me some of the testimony. The I may say, there has been testimony between all of the forces, whether they
Senator has read the testimony and is that a number of Chinese engineer forces were North Vietnamese, South Vietnam-
familiar with the testimony of the Sec- have been engaged in North Vietnam, re- ese, or Vietcong-they were all called
retary of Defense in which he said. pairing railroad and highway bridges. Vietminh back in those days-against
I think if you applied the definition of But as far as combat is concerned, there the French. Under the leadership of Ho
control that our field representatives do, has been no indication of any Chinese Chi Minh and General Giap, they finally
both the political and military representa- participation. defeated the French at Dienbienphu; the
Lives in South Vietnam, they would say that Mr. CLARK. So that actually, the French people were tired of the war and
the Government controls today 53 percent number of North Vietnamese troops, wanted to get out of it, and they with-
of the population of the country, the Viet- while it represents, of course, the best drew their forces from southeast Asia,
cong control about 23 percent. That makes they have, is a pretty small percentage of and agreed to the Geneva accords.
a total of around 76 percent, and the re- the total force. One group undoubtedly wished to fol-
I think g 24 that percent is in the disputed areas. If the Senator will look at page 62 of low the leadership of Ho Chi Minh. He
thin Ky's estimate is a much more the committee hearings, he will note that was the popular idol of the hour when
t appraisal of Government control Secretary McNamara stated that a the French were defeated. The French
thalisthan is c Is the 53 percent. majority of the Vietcong are individuals had selected about as poor a character
I would say with all candor that I who were born in South Vietnam, or who as they could have, in Bao Dal, to rule
think the numerical superiority we en- came there as part of the Viet Minh dur- over the country; he was ruling from
joy is due to the fact that we hold the ing the war with the French. Cannes or somewhere on the French
large cities. Then, if the Senator will turn to page Riviera, and naturally had no chance on
Mt. CLARK. General Ky said that 341, he will see that Secretary Mc- earth of capturing any respect of his
only about 25 percent of the population Namara testified-that 80 percent of the people.
was sufficiently free from coercion as to Vietcong are recruited in the South. I think that a good deal of the Viet-
be able to engage in free elections with- I take it the Senator has no reason to cong affiliation is a legacy from the war
out intimidation. I think that is what question that testimony, does he? against the French, where Ho Chi Minh
the Secretary was referring to when he Mr. RUSSELL of Georgia. No, I am was the leader of what they believed,
referred to General Ky's statement. It not in a position to question that. with considerable reason, was a call of
is contained on page 109. Mr. CLARK. The thing that concerns liberation.
Mr. RUSSELL of Georgia. It is also me- Of course, we supported the efforts of
on page 146. Secretary McNamara testi- Mr. RUSSELL of Georgia. I do not the French with substantial funds for
fied: , know. The Secretary of Defense should military assistance. But I do not know
However, this morning, earlier, I gave have better means of information that I just how much the Vietcong support is
an estimate of Prime Minister Ky to the have. because of a firm belief in communism
effect that his government controls only Mr. CLARK. Than any Member of as a system of government, or even any
25 percent of the population. Now, the Senate. understanding of communism, and how
these figures are not necessarily contra- Mr. RUSSELL of Georgia. Yes. much of it is really dedication to Ho Chi
dictory because of the difference in the There is no question but that a tremen- Minh. I rather believe that a greater
definition of "control." Prime Minister dous number of South Vietnamese are part of it is personal affection, respect,
Ky, when he gave the figure 25 percent fighting under almost incredible odds, and admiration for and belief in Ho Chi
as being controlled by the government, not having any air force whatever to Minh, rather than any set of political
was thinking of the population that protect them, but they are fighting, and principles.
could participate freely and without fighting very bravely. Mr. CLARK. Does not the Senator
Co . Mr. CLARK. My understanding is also think that at least until a few months
Mr. CrLARK. "
Mr. vote freely." that the strength of the Vietcong has ago, both the Vietcong and Hanoi were
of " Mr. RUSSELL Georgia. Partici- more than doubled during the last 12 convinced they were going to win, and
pat@ freely" means s "vote freely." months, from 103,000 to over 235,000. If drive us out?
Mr. CLARK. The same testimony ap- we subtract the casualties and the deser- Mr. RUSSELL of Georgia. I do not
pears on page 109. tion of defectors, and if'we add the in- think there is, any question about that.
Mr. RUSSELL of Georgia. That was filtrators and the 15,000, more or less, in Mr. CLARK. That is one reason why
a repetition of something that he testi- their regular forces, it would seem to me they fought so well.
fled to that morning. that Secretary McNamara's conclusion Mr. RUSSELL of Georgia. And there
Mr. CLARK. Secretary McNamara that 80 percent of the recruits in the is no question in my mind that what-
testified on page 144, that of the 235,000 Vietcong forces come from South Viet- ever the genesis of these Vietcong troops,
enemy effectives in South Vietnam, only nam is pretty well substantiated. wherever they may have originated, that
15,000 were PAVN or North Vietnamese That causes me to raise the question- the war is being directed out of Hanoi.
regulars. and I should like the Senator's observa- Mr. CLARK. But the Senator will
I take it that the Senator has no rea- tion on it-that perhaps the Secretary of agree, will he not, that if our pounding
son to question the testimony of the Sec- State is not entirely correct when he of those people with our enormously
retary of Defense in that regard. says this is not a civil war. In large part, severe firepower, particularly since we
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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD -SENATE March 2,, 1966
have built up our forces, has had any whether he wishes to read it into the friends-is that Peiping is never going
effect at all-and I would think it would RECORD at this time, but I believe it to talk, because Peipingwill fight to the
have-the conviction that they are going would be a good quotation. last Vietcong and the last American.
to win must be slowly but surely ebbing Mr. RUSSELL of Georgia. I would be Hanoi apears to be, at the moment,
-from the minds of the Vietcong? glad to have the Senator from Massa- rather under the domination of Peiping,
Mr. RUSSELL of Georgia. I would chusetts read it. It shows that there although we would hope that there
think their leadership, at least, would has been an increase in desertions in the might be some slippage there. My un-
begin to doubt it. Vietcong, but it also shows that there derstanding is that there is a "dove"
Mr. SALTONSTALL. Mr. President, has been an increase in desertions in party in Hanoi, just as there is a "hawk"
will the Senator permit an interruption the q-+1,
at that point?
Mr. RUSSELL of Georgia. Yes.
Mr. SALTONSTALL. Carrying for-
ward what the Senator from Georgia has
said regarding control of the Vietcong
from the north, one thing that has ap-
pealed to me all through this matter, as
I have stated when I have been asked
that question a number of times, is the
fact that we do not know today-unless
the Senator from Pennsylvania knows
through his Foreign Relations Commit-
tee-who the leader of the Vietcong is.
How are we ever going to get to him?
I do not wish to get into a diversion, but
how can we arrange for peaceful nego-
tiations with the Vietcong, when we do
not know where their leadership is?
Everything we have read indicates that
their leadership is coming from the
north.
Let me quote one paragraph, one point
Secretary McNamara made, shown on
page 343 of the hearings:
- It may have some of the aspects of a civil
war but, in my opinion, these are of little
importance compared to the initiatives taken
by the North Vietnamese Government to or-
ganize the movement, to supply it, to expand
it, and to turn it into a military aggression
against the political institutions of the
South. These facts we have documented
through prisoner reports and through other
forms of intelligence and through, as a mat-
ter of fact, the oral and written statements
of the political leaders of the North.
Again he said, as shown on page 344:
There is no individual in this Government
that I know of, who has studied the relation-
ship between the, Vietcong and the asso-
ciated forces in the South and the North
Vietnamese, who believes other than: (1)
that they are under the direct supervision
and hour-to-hour control of the North; (2)
that without that control, they could not
possibly accomplish militarily what they are
presently capable of; (3) that without the
North's support of the Vietcong, the South
Vietnamese Government forces would be
capable over a reasonable period of time, of
suppressing the aggression being directed
against it. I think this is such an important
subject that, if there is any doubt on this
question, I would hope that the committee
would call on those who are experts in this
field.
Again I repeat, out of my, own per-
sonal knowledge-and that is all, and I
do not say that I am thoroughly in-
formed-who is the Vietcong leader we
can say is leading the civil war, or who
could end the civil war by sitting down
at the negotiating table? In all the
testimony to which I have listened, I
have not heard that statement answered.
If I may proceed-
Mr. CLARK. Yes, indeed.
Mr. SALTONSTALL. I would invite
the attention of the Senate to page 25
of Secretary McNamara's testimony on
the subject of desertions of the Vietcong.
Let me say to the Senator from
-Georgia [Mr. RUSSELL], I do not know
Mr. CLARK. I do not believe that is ligerent group is in y control 1 i1We had
a very happy statement to make, but I hoped that, Russia might help. There
have no objection, to having it included was a period when it looked as though
in the RECORD. Russia would help, but recently they
Mr. SALTONSTALL. I will not take have taken the line that they do not
the time of the Senate to read it into the wish to join with England in calling the
RECORD, Geneva Conference back into session.
Mr. CLARK. I: should like to make Thus, it seems to me that the only way
this observation, with respect to what we will ever get peace in South Vietnam
the Senator from Massachusetts has just will be to talk to the Vietcong. But that
stated: I would, with deep regret, take is the one thing we will not do. I can-
issue with him about the situation re- not see why we are so unwilling to talk
specting the Vietcong. This does not to these people on what seems to me to
come from anything I have learned- be the legalistic ground that they are
Mr. SALTONSTALL Will th
S
e
ena-
tor from Pennsylvania kindly repeat
that?
Mr. CLARK. With all deference to
the Senator, I would take issue with him
on the statement he has just made,
about our not knowing who is running
the Vietcong.
Mr. SALTONSTALL. We have heard
that the Foreign Relations Committee
does know, but I make that statement
because I have never heard it said be-
fore our committee, and I have never
seen any sign sign of it in the news-
papers.
Mr. CLARK. If the committee knows,
it has not told me.
Mr. SALTONSTALL. There we are.
Mr. CLARK. And I am a member of
the committee. But, I have heard It
said by individuals, who I believe know
something about the situation, and
whose veracity I have no reason to doubt,
that there are at least six Vietcong mis-
sions in various European and African
capitals with whom we not only could
talk but also, in fact, have been talking
off the record from time to time, and
that the Vietcong have had three sepa-
rate leaders in the last year or so. One
of them, I believe, was killed. The next
one was dismissed because his wife had
nized them as a government, that they
are the arm of Hanoi. I do not deny
that Hanoi has given enormous assist-
ance to the Vietcong, but I also suspect
that they have not given the Vietcong
anything like as much assistance as we
have given to the Army of South Viet-
nam and its people.
As I stated earlier, Russia, China, and
Hanoi are helping the Vietcong, and we
are helping the Vietnamese Army; but
the soldiers who are killing our boys are
largely, although not entirely-because
there are some regular North Vietna-,
mese troops there-South Vietnamese.
Many a guerrilla war has been ended
in the past by getting into communica-
tion with the enemy at battalion level.
I believe that we are making a grave
mistake in this insistence by the Depart-
ment of State asserting that under no
circumstances will we negotiate or talk
with the Vietcong.
I point out that, of course, the Viet-
cong are disreputable characters. I have
no doubt that they have their fair share
of murderers and unreliable individuals.
This was true in North Korea. With all
due deference to the Senator from Geor-
gia, I suspect that during the Civil War
the same was thought to be true of Union
forces b- the Cnfed M
o
namese and he was therefore thought to vice versa; but n
the end, If we wish to
have somewhat of it conflict of interest. stop this war, we have got to talk with
The third, whose name I do not have or those who are doing the shooting. I hope
I would be happy to give it to the Senator the Senator would respond to that ob-
right now, is a relatively-and I use that servation.
word "relatively" with great emphasis- Mr. SALTONSTALL. If the observa-
reasonable fellow with whom, if he tion was directed to the Senator from
could be convinced that their side is Georgia, I will not speak. If it was
not going to win, and that we are not directed to me
going to let them throw us out, it might Mr. CLARK. Both Senators.
be possible to do some business. Mr. SALTONSTALL. I would just say
I would make this comment and then that-
ask for observations and from my
friends: I believe that everyone in the Mr. CLARK. The twins-the biparti-
Armed Services Committee, and every- san twins.
one in the Senate, would like to see this Mr. PASTORE. Mr. President, will
war over with just as quickly as possible the Senator from Pennsylvania yield
on some honorable basis. I do not be- there?
lieve there is a single Senator who wishes Mr. CLARK. I yield.
to fight this war to total victory and the Mr. PASTORE. The two Senators
complete destruction of Vietnam. from Georgia and Massachusetts, I am
The way I would analyze the situa- sure, are tired, Perhaps I should get
tion--on which I should like to have the into this colloquy and make an observa-
comments of my more experienced tion.
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Mr. CLARK. The Senator should.
Mr. PASTORE. What does the Sena-
for from Pennsylvania believe the Presi-
dent means when he says that this issue
is not insurmountable?
Mr. CLARK. Personally, let me say to
my good friend, the Senator from Rhode
Island, that I have some confidence that
in the not too distant future=and this is
not based on.any inside information-
the President will come around to the
point of view which I have expressed,
and which the Senator from Rhode
Island has expressed. My controversy-
if it is a controversy-is with the Secre-
tary of State.
Mr. PASTORE. I make the point to
the Senator that I do not believe we
should be picayune concerning those
with whom we are willing to talk. But,
to come back to what the Senator from
Massachusetts said about our contacts,
we will get a response from Hanoi. For
instance, when Linus Pauling, the great
pacifist and physicist who had so much
to do with the, development of the atomic
bomb, made a direct appeal to Ho Chi
Minh-I believe it was the latter part of
last year-an authoritative answer came
back from Ho Chi Minh. He did not say,
"Now take this up with the Vietcong."
He did not say that. He enunciated, I
believe at that time, his four points-
Mr. CLARK. That is right.
Mr. PASTORE. One of the major
points was that there would be no dis-
cussion of the whole matter unless we
recognize the Vietcong as the sole spokes-
men for South Vietnam.
Mr. CLARK. That is absurd. We
will never do that.
Mr. PASTORE. The point I am mak-
ing is rather, subtle, that every time we
get a response from the other side, the
answer comes ' from Hanoi-it comes
from Ho Chi Minh. I might say that I
am one of those who feel that the Viet-
cong should be invited to the conference
table, if we can ever find who the re-
sponsible authority is. I believe that we
should talk to anyone, provided we can
reach a peace agreement predicated
upon nobility. It must always be upon
that basis. There is no question about
that. I am inclined to feel, no matter
.what has been said heretofore, that there
is a strong inclination on the part of this
Government to sit down as responsible
people and talk with those who have the
responsibility in this whole matter, in
the hope that we can resolve it.
Mr. CLARK. I quite agree with the
Senator from Rhode Island, but the fac-
tual question is whether control of
Hanoi over the Vietcong is as absolute as
we have been told by the State Depart-
ment. Before the Senator from Rhode
Island came into the Chamber we had
observed that 80 percent of the members
of the Vietcong army are South Viet-
namese.
Mr. PASTORE. I was here. I was in
the Chamber. I have been here for a
long while.
Mr. CLARK. I am glad to be cor-
rected. The Senator has been very
quiet.
Mr. SALTONSTALL. Mr. President,
will the Senator from Pennsylvania
yield?
Mr. CLARK. I am happy to yield to
the Senator from Massachusetts.
Mr. RUSSELL of Georgia. If I may
interpolate here, I merely wish to say this,
in reply to the Senator's observation, it
seems to me that the President of the
United States has done almost every-
thing he can possibly do to find a respon-
sible person with whom to discuss an
honorable settlement of the conflict in
South Vietnam.
Starting with his Johns Hopkins
speech, and repeated time and again
since then, he has said the question is
open for discussion; that he will discuss
it with anyone who is in a position of
responsibility that will enable us to bring
this matter to an honorable conclusion.
Mr. CLARK. I agree.
Mr. RUSSELL of Georgia. I do not see
how the President can go further than
that. He cannot bring in some little
Vietcong prisoner in black pajamas and
say to him, "I want to talk to you about
ending the war in Vietnam." This pris-
oner, who may be a private first class in
the 3d squad in the 2d Company, may
say, "I cannot do anything about it. You
have taken me as a prisoner, and the war
is ended as far as I am concerned."
Until the President can get someone to
sit down and talk, who has enough in-
fluence to deliver whatever he agrees to,
I do not see how the President can
proceed any further.
Ho Chi Minh has said this country
must withdraw. We have to even get
out of the country before he will talk.
He said we must abandon those people to
their fate and bring all of our people
home. Then he might, if we conform to
the other three conditions, deign to talk
about peace.
Mr. PASTORE. Mr. President, will
the Senator yield?
Mr. RUSSELL of Georgia. I yield.
Mr. PASTORE. Ho Chi Minh has
never said, "Talk to so and so, who is the
head of the Vietcong." He has never
said that. He has always answered. He
is. acting as the kingpin. As the Presi-
dent said, "I am a pretty good cowboy
from Texas, but I cannot lasso anybody
to talk to."
Mr. RUSSELL of Georgia. I assume
every normal person in this country
wants to bring this war to a conclusion
as soon as it can be done honorably. Cer-
tainly, we do not stand to gain one thing
over continuing the war. We cannot
possibly enhance our wealth, prestige, or
position internationally, by carrying the
war on any further or by completely de-
stroying both North and South Vietnam.
It would not help us. In fact, it would
injure our cause and all we stand for.
But here is the President of the United
States, who is really, in a way, not au-
thorized to speak for General Ky and the
South Vietnamese Government; but he
says that so far as our position is con-
cerned and our participation in the war
is concerned, we are willing 'to talk to
anyone, anywhere, anytime, and he re-
peated it recently in a speech in New
York.
So, until someone is willing to talk,
other than our surrendering uncondi-
tionally before they will discuss it, we
are somewhat handicapped in our efforts.
Mr. SALTONSTALL. Mr. President,
assuming for the purpose of the question
that someone could sit down and talk, is
Ho Chi Minh going to be bound by what
that man says for the Vietcong? As a
member of the Armed Services Commit-
tee and the Subcommittee on Appropria-
tions, I listened for days to the testi-
mony. We still do not know who the
Vietcong are. In answer to questions by
the Senator from Ohio [Mr. YouNGI,
Secretary McNamara said:
Well, again this is a foreign policy ques-
tion I think should be addressed to the Sec-
retary of State. The President and the Secre-
tary of State have both made public state-
ments on this matter.
The chairman of the committee
brought that out.
They have said that we would deal with
any government that is represented in the
conflict and that other parties could find
means of being represented.
What is "any government?" Is the
Vietcong a government, and if so, who
are its leaders?
Mr. CLARK. If the Senator will per-
mit me to answer the question somewhat
obliquely, in the first place, I do not
disagree with a single word that any one
of my three distinguished colleagues has
said about the attitude of the President
of the United States, and particularly
what was so eloquently said by my friend
the Senator from Georgia. I agree with
that 100 percent, but in the meanwhile
the Secretary of State is saying we will
never talk with the Vietcong because
they are only the tools or instruments of
Ho Chi Minh. The Vice President has
said we will never sit down with those
murderers and talk with them.
My point is that the only avenue we
have not explored, and which I urge be
explored-and I think our intelligence
sources know this already-is whether
there is not some method by which we
could get the leadership in the Vietcong
divorced from Ho Chi Minh, in view of
the fact that his interest is in a united
Vietnam, while the others want an in-
dependent South Vietnam. I do not
think we have explored the possibility
of getting next to the Vietcong, and by-
passing North Vietnam, China, and Rus-
sia. At this time we find great difficulty
with the Government of South Vietnam,
which is even more belligerent than the
Secretary of State, because General Ky
is strongly of the view that he will never
sit down and talk with the Vietcong.
I wonder if the Senator has any
thoughts on that aspect.
Mr. RUSSELL of Georgia. I cannot
answer the question. I do not want to
say anything here that is likely to cause
embarrassment to our allies in this war.
Some of us have had a specific interest
in the war there, other than a general,
patriotic interest. But I do not, for the
life of me, see how we can deal with any-
one to bring this war to a conclusion un-
less Hanoi is willing to participate. We
do not know who the Vietcong are. I
think the Vietcong are somewhat in the
position of General Ky, and that if we
wanted to make peace on certain terms
over there, General Ky would eventually,
see the light and go along and agree with
what we found was an honorable peace.
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I think if Hanoi would agree to some-
thing, the Vietcong would then we the
light and would say it was an honorable
peace. But I do not think there is any-
one we can talk to in the Vietcong, if we
made an agreement, that will take the
hand of Ho Chi Minh off a majority of
the Vietcong. I do not know with whom
we could deal. If he was willing to sit
down and talk, I do not think he could
deliver on anything, when it came to the
point of delivery, because these people
are attuned to Hanoi, which they have
been for 20 years, to the people running
North Vietnam.
Russia at one time indicated it was in-
terested in bringing this matter to a con-
clusion, but then the Chinese made a re-
newal of their charges that Russia had
sold out on them; that it had gone back
on the principles of Marxism and
Leninism, and Russia withdraw such
good offices as she had extended.
We cannot as a Nation unite South
Vietnam. That has got to be done by
the forces of that contiguous area and
the people of that nationality. We can-
not do it.
This matter of people coming in from
the outside and imposing their will is
gone. I think sometimes it is a little too
fast in some areas of colonialism, but
when we went in the business of getting
the world out of colonialism we moved
with .tremendous rapidity and effective-
ness, and we got them out.
I think perhaps in Sukarno's Indonesia
and perhaps the Congo we would have
done well to let them stay there a few
more years. We would not have had as
much trouble.
I will say to the Senator from Penn-
ttylvania that I do not yield to anyone in
wanting to bring this matter to a con-
clusion. But for the life of me I cannot
see any reasonable prospect of ending
that war over there by talking to the
Vietcong when we do not, know who they
are, where they are, or hat they are or
how that can bring into reality any
agreement they might sign.
Mr. CLARK. In the last analysis this
is a matter of judgment and I have no
assurance that my view is correct.
Mr. RUSSELL of Georgia. That is our
trouble about the entire matter. We do
not know the facts about who is in con-
trol of the Vietcong.
Mr. CLARK. My own view would be
that Ho Chi Minh would be quite reluct-
antto make peace now.
My view would be that if we had a gov-
ernment in Saigon more interested in
bringing the war to an end instead of
saving face-
Mr. RUSSELL of Georgia. Did it ever
occur to the Senator that those in control
in Saigon might be in the same predica-
ment as those in Hanoi, or the same
predicament as Ho Chi Minh? They
have people on both sides of the issue
there, and some power over and above
General Ky or whoever succeeds him as
the head of their government. Someone
else is going to take the initiative in
bringing this war to a conclusion because
some. of the leaders of their military
forces are not too anxious to bring it to
a conclusion.
Mr. CLARK. This is what concerns
me. Some of the military leaders are
riot interested in bringing it to a con-
clusion.
Perhaps other Senators wish to inter-
ject further.
Mr. COOPER. Mr. President, will the
Senator yield?
Mr. CLARK. I am happy to yield to
the Senator from Kentucky.
Mr. COOPER. I would like to make
a comment.
After I went to Vietnam in December
and January, I felt, as the Senator feels
today the Vietcong should be included in
negotiations. The main bulk of the
forces fighting against our forces are the
Vietcong and South Vietnamese, even
though trained in the north, and brought
back to the south, they are chiefly South
Vietnamese and do the fighting.
It is my view, as I said on January 10,
and later in the Senate, that if we can
reach negotiations, that the Vietcong
would have to be included.
That is entirely different from talking
about the National Liberation Front.
The National Liberation Front is an
arm of North Vietnam, it is a political
and propaganda front attempting to
speak for the Vietcong.
- If we negotiated with them it will be
because we are negotiating with North
Vietnam.
But when I was there I found it was
very difficult to find out who the leaders
of the Vietcong are.
. So I would say to my good friend who
serves on the Foreign Relations Commit-
tee, and has every opportunity to secure
all information, to find out if he can,
if anyone knows who these leaders are.
Mr. PASTORE. Mr. President, will
the Senator yield?
Mr. COOPER. If anyone knows who
they are, it would be valuable in any ap-
proach to negotiations.
Mr. PASTORE. Mr. President, would
the Senator yield?
I am in favor of any additional effec-
tive action on our part.
Mr. CLARK. That is the problem.
Look at the test ban treaty. In the end
we seemed to work it out.
Mr. PASTORE. I agree-the commit-
ment in Vietnam is great on the part of
America. I think we are being picayune
when. we say we will talk to A but will
not talk to B.
I agree, although I must say in sincer-
ity it strikes me that the strategists of
the north are in Hanoi. There is no
doubt about it.
I think it is just as much a mistake
to leave the impression with the Ameri-
can people that because we have not
come out categorically and said we will
deal with the Vietcong that that is the
reason why this struggle continues.
I think that we simplify it too much.
I take the position if President Johnson
will say tomorrow, "I will talk to the Viet-
cong," that will not be the end of it.
I think that would be too naive.
Mr. CLARK. I agree with the Sena-
tor from Rhode Island.
Mr. PASTORE. I think stories are be-
ing exaggerated in Hanoi. Ho Chi Minh
is doing it. He has indicated it in every-
thing he has done.
I agree with the Senator from Pennsyl-
vania that we ought to take a more flexi-
ble position in saying "Yes, we will deal
with Hanoi and they can bring along
whomever they want." I think the
President has said that. He said that
the problem is not insurmountable. I
do not know how else he can say it.
Mr. CLARK. I am not asking the
President to say anything other than
what he said. I am asking the Secre-
tary of State to change his tune. I am
saying there is a potential which has not
been adequately explored at the grass
roots in South Vietnam. This must be
a question of judgment. I have no rea-
son to contend that I am right and that
anyone else is wrong. The Senators are
3 to 1 against me. Maybe they are right.
Mr. SALTONSTALL. Mr. President,
will the Senator yield?
Mr. CLARK. I yield.
Mr. SALTONSTALL. The Senator is
correct. It would be naive. I would
go further and say if the President of the
Unted States said that it would be an
interpretation that all we have done over
there is of no avail.
I am sure that the Senator from Penn-
sylvania has read it, but I believe the
President's speech in the Heritage of
Freedom in New York, was the best ex-
pression of our position in this country
that I have seen.
He said he would sit down with the
leadership. He said he would sit down
with the leadership of the North Viet-
namese and they could bring whom they
wanted, which the Senator from Rhode
Island said.
But to sit down with the Vietcong
without the North Vietnamese, it would
seem to me, using the word of the Sena-
tor, naive.
Mr. CLARK. Naive is a very good
word in that institution of higher learn-
ing to which we both went. It is a
sopthisticated word.
Mr. PASTORE. The Senator did not
include the Senator from Rhode Island
in that category. I never went to col-
lege.
Mr. CLARK. The Senator used the
word.
Mr. PASTORE. I read the dictionary,
not at Yale or Harvard, but I read it.
Mr. CLARK. The Senator read it
well, too. The Senator is one of our
most eloquent orators.
I believe we should try to see what
can be done. Some of our intelligence
people might explore this matter fur-
ther.
I would like to turn to the problem of
what territory in South Vietnam is still
sufficiently under our control and the
control of the South Vietnamese Gov-
ernment, to make it possible to promote
and carry into effect social and economic
programs, of which so much was made
at Honolulu.
The other day the Secretary of Health,
Education, and Welfare returned from
Vietnam. I read his statement as indi-
cating substantial reservations as to
whether much could be done with this
program in the foreseeable future.
This gets back to the maps, about
which I have had a friendly disagree-
ment with Mr. Bell and Secretary Mc-
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sion-and the reason, Mr. Gershen points
out, lies with a few of the members-of the
press themselves. During my recent trip
to South Vietnam, I had occasion to dis-
cuss this problem with some of our mili-
tary commanders. Their comments
were uniformly to the effect that the
great majority of members of the press
handled themselves and their reporting
commendably, but there were always a
few who had to abuse the situation. Mr.
Gershen's article gives examples of the
"abuse." I ask unanimous consent that
it be printed in the RECORD.
There being no objection, the article
was ordered to be printed in the RECORD,
as follows:
PRESS VERSUS MILITARY IN VIETNAM: A
FURTHER VIEW
(NOTE-Martin Gershen, who wrote the
following observations, is a feature writer-
photographer for the Newark Star-Ledger, on
leave to study in Columbia's advanced inter-
national reporting program. He covered the
war in Vietnam last summer.)
There is a basic law of journalism which
says that every story should have at least
two sides.
Yet, in too many reports involving censor-
ship in Vietnam, the press seems to have the
last word.
And that word leaves the reader-or
viewer-at home no alternative but to as-
sume that the American war in southeast
Asia not only is against communism, but
against the entire U.S. Military Establish-
ment.
In an article, "Censorship and Cam Ne,"
by Richard Rustin, which appeared in the
fall, 1965, issue of the Columbia Journalism
Review, the writer made some attempt at
giving both sides of the controversy that
continues between the press and the brass.
But one had to read carefully and dig
deeply to learn that the possibility exists
that the press may be partly to blame for
its troubles with the censors.
Edward P. Morgan suggested this possi-
bility when he was quoted as saying there
was a "passel" of young stringers in Viet-
nam who are trying to become the Ernie
Pyles of this war by baiting military officials
at press briefings.
But generally the article seemed to con-
sist of quotations from one famous bylines
after another who self-righteously attacked
censorship In Vietnam and blamed the mili-
tary for shackling the free press.
One of the more disturbing quotations was
reported to have been made by UPI foreign
news analyst Phil Newsom, who said: "It is
doubtful * * * if the story of U.S. Marines
burning a village near Da Nang ever would
have come out if newsmen had not seen it."
Newsom, of course, was referring to a CBS
television report of the burning of Cam Ne-
a report which aroused much controversy at
home because it suggested that marines arbi-
trarily burn Vietnamese villages. ' He Im-
plied that a hard-digging U.S. press corps
took on a hard-to-get-along-with U.S. Ma-
rine Corps and uncovered a terrible secret.
If this were true,,t.hen bully for the news-
men.,
But it wasn't true. The fact is that it is
doubtful if newsmen ever would have seen
the village razed if it weren't for the U.S.
Marines inviting them to the burning.
I was at the Da Nang press camp when
the marine invitation was extended. I
turned it down because I had a previous
commitment to go on an air raid aboard a
B-57 fighter bomber. The squadron took
newsmen on flights only 1 day a week.
The real reason for burning Cam Ne, of
course, was that it was a Vietcong strong-
hold and William F. Buckley, Jr., who also
was quoted in the Rustin article. made this
point clear.
To report properly the story of the Marine
operation at Cam Ne would have meant
explaining that villages and their civilian
populations play a key role in guerrilla
warfare.
This is the why of the story, which of
course is too complicated. to make a good
lead.
One of. the major problems facing U.S.
forces in Vietnam is being able to distin-
guish friend from foe.
The Marines, like all the services there,
are, aware too that they must win the people
if they are to win the war and they lean
over backward to avoid antagonizing local
populations.
It must have taken Marine Intelligence a
long time to determine for certain that Cam
Ne was a Vietcong stronghold.
Then, when they decided to destroy the
village, they invited the press to come along.
Is it any wander that they became an-
noyed when stories of their operation
depicted Marines as no better than SS troops
who burned villages and pushed around
women, children, and old men?
But even more annoying to military men
in Vietnam is the caliber of many of the
correspondents out there.
A ranking Pentagon officer observed
recently that editors told him they were
having- difficulty getting good newsmen to
cover Vietnam.
The problem, he said, was money. It
costs about $1,300 round trip to fly a news-
man to the other end of the world and for
that amount of cash you would expect him
to stay for a while.
But if he is an experienced newsman he
has a wife and family so the news service
would have to bring them along and settle
them in Hong Kong or Bangkok.
Add periodic trips for the newsman to his
family, additional life and accident insur-
ance, education expenses for the kids and
war becomes an unprofitable news story.
As a result, the Pentagon officer said,
"American news services are hiring people
out there they would never touch at home."
It's obviously cheaper to pick up a "pas-
sel" of young stringers who have already
paid their way to Vietnam and who will
work for peanuts.
In an effort to encourage the U.S. press to
cover the war in Vietnam, the Defense De-
partment last year flew 84 newsmen to
southeast Asia.
"We did it, frankly, to prime the pump,"
the Pentagon officer said.
The military believed that by encouraging
more newsmen to come to Vietnam, com-
petition would become keener, resulting in
less sensational stories and in more straight
reporting.
The project was discontinued last sum-
mer as escalation of the war began in ear-
nest because "we reasoned the American
press was Interested enough to pay its own
way to Vietnam."
It didn't work out that way.
Of the 106 civilian news organizations
from around the world who were represented
in Vietnam last August, about 40 were
American. Of the 260 newsmen present,
approximately 175 were American.
Three months later, In November, the
number of news organizations in Vietnam
had increased to 136 but the proportion of
U.S. services to the total rose less than 10
percent while U.S. troop strength had In-
creased by the tens of thousands.
Of the 298 accredited newsmen covering
the war, fewer than half were Americans.
Foreign newsmen were hired by nearly all
the American media. In some of the larger
organizations 20 to 60 percent of the staff
was foreign.
In the last 2 weeks of 1965, the number of
U.S. services and staffers had begun to in-
crease slightly, according to a Pentagon of-
ficial.
Obviously, a certain number of foreign
newsmen are needed on American staffs to
overcome language barriers. The rest prob-
ably are hired to overcome budgetary prob-
lems.
I remember meeting one of these r.Dn-
American U.S. correspondents the day after
the Cam Ne Incident. We both were leav-
ing Da Nang. He was carrying a pouch of
television film, which he was bringing to
Saigon. I was returning to Pleiku.
We were picked up at the press camp by
two U.S. enlisted men who were ordered to
drive us to the airfield where we were to
catch a military flight south. -
On the way to the airfield my' colleague
began berating the two enlisted men over
the Cam Ne operation.
He implied that the Marines were no bet-
ter than the Gestapo.
"Imagine you Yanks burning a village. I
never saw anything like that in my life," said
this correspondent, who obviously was too
young ever to have covered a war before. -
Enlisted men are taught to treat civilians
with respect, especially if. they are from the
press. The two GI's looked at each other
but said nothing.
I tried, at first, to keep from getting in-
volved, because we newspapermen have to
stick together even if we're wrong.
But his criticism continued and finally I
said, "For Christ's sake, shut up."
He looked at me in surprise. Then he said,
partly as an explanation, partly as an appeal
to my journalistic loyalties and partly to get
the last word in:
"But I actually saw a Marine push an old
man around."
I thought of the night I had spent with
a Marine company surrounded in a jungle
outpost by 300 Vietcong. I remembered the
next morning walking down a road with a
Marine sergeant who smiled at all the vil-
lagers he met because he couldn't tell the
good guys from the bad guys and he didn't
want to antagonize friendly Vietnamese.
I thought what a crazy, mixed-up war this
is, where you can't tell the front from the
rear, Vietcong from Vietnamese, civilians
from soldiers. I turned to this young cor-
respondent and very gently said:
"Look, it was a Vietcong village. How did
you expect the Marines to handle that situ-
ation?"
He hesitated for a moment, then said,
"Why don't you Yanks get out of Vietnam?"
And if he is typical of U.S. press repre-
sentation in Vietnam, then the military peo-
ple there have been very kind to us.
-MARTIN GERSHEN.
A BUSINESSMAN'S FORMULA TO
HEAD OFF INFLATION
Mr. MILLER. Mr. President, in the
March 7 issue of U.S. News & World Re-
port appears a timely article entitled "A
Businessman's Formula To Head Ofd In-
flation." This contains excerpts from
a recent address by Roger Blough, chair-
man of the board of United States Steel
Corp. and one of the most progressive,
clearest thinking members of the busi-
ness community. Mr. Slough points out
precisely what the Republican section of
.the Joint Senate-House Economic Report
for 1966 points out; namely: that re-
straint in spending on the part of Con-
gress holds the key to stopping inflation.
I ask unanimous consent that this ar-
ticle be printed in the RECORD.
There being no objection, the article
was ordered to be printed in the RECORD,
as follows: -
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HOW CONGRESS CAN EASE THE PRESSURE
But restraint is not a one-way street, and
no matter how diligently and patriotically
business and labor may try to plug the leaks
in the economic boiler, they cannot succeed
unless someone stops pouring, on the coal.
And that, I believe, is where Congress comes
in. On the monetary side, the Federal
Reserve Board is authorized and equipped to
retard the expansion of currency and credit;
and I would not anticipate that Congress
would seek to oppose the necessary exercise of
these powers
On the fiscal side, Congress can ease the
pressure by the judicious use of taxation;
and the President has already recommended
the reinstatement of certain excise taxes and
a speedup in the payments of personal and
corporate income taxes.
But it is in the area of restraint in ap-
propriations and other legislation that the
hardworking "men on the Hill" (Congress)
face both their most difficult problems and
their greatest opportunity to prevent a fur-
ther heating up of the economy; for it is
they who control the purse strings.
It is their prerogative to authorize ex-
penditures. It is their obligation to view the
economic picture as a whole and act in their
own best wisdom.
This is a plea to recognize the free-market
economy for what it is-the most efficient,
productive source of our material freedom;
and to acknowledge that interference with
the market's operation leads to inefficiency,
VIETNAM AND RED CHINA
Mr. MILLER. Mr. President, in the
Des Moines Register for March 17 ap-
pears an excellent and timely article by
the knowledgeable and able columnist,
Richard Wilson, entitled "Fulbright's
China Hearings Give Viet Policy a Boost."
I ask unanimous consent that this article
be printed in the RECORD so that the
readers will have a better perspective of
the scare talk which has been making
the rounds over the threat of Red China
coming into the war in Vietnam.
There being no objection,'the article
was ordered to be printed in the RECORD,
as follows:
FULBRIGHT'S CHINA HEARINGS GIVE VIET
POLICY A BOOST
(By Richard Wilson)
WASHINGTON, D.C.-An unexpected byprod-
uot of Senator FULBRIGHT'S China hearings
In the Foreign Relations Committee has been
an expression of academic and intellectual
support for American policy in Vietnam.
What is being brought into focus is the
war in Vietnam as an essential element in
containing China, the reasons for doing that
the importance of it. Senator FULBRIGHT
perhaps did not anticipate this result. His
emphasis has all been on the risk of war
with China, and the undesirability of taking
that risk.
DIGNIFY, CLOTHE
Vice President HUMPHREY, as the adminis-
tration's most articulate spokesman in this
field, has taken advantage of this turn of
events to dignify and clothe in logic a policy
of containing China without isolating the
Communist government.'
. There is nothing new in this. It repre-
sents no shift in policy. The Vice President's
'words do not change any of the realities-of
the problem, which remain about the
same as they were when John Foster Dulles
was Secretary of State.
But the words the Vice President is using
apparently fall softer on doubtful ears and
this makes possible a rational discussion of
the risk we are taking in Asia, and why we
are taking it.
HISTORICAL CONSISTENCY
Asian specialists and students from both
Harvard and Columbia Universities have
found a historical consistency in American
action in Asia with that of other great powers
in the past which have sought to enforce
political stability so that economic expan-
sion might be carried on.
. These experts-A. Doak Barnett, of Colum-
bia, John K. Fairbank, of Harvard, and now
also A. M. Halpern, of Harvard-have their
differing ideas on how China might be
handled, but they all seem to agree that it is
in the interest of the United States to con-
tain China.
Thus there emerges from a respected aca-
demic world quite a different attitude than
that expressed by Senators FULBRIGHT, MORSE,
GRUENING, MCCARTHY, HARTB:E, and a few
others. No resemblance at all is found be-
tween the views of these experts and those
of various poets, liberalists, humanists,
drama critics, novelists, and columnists who
have been expressing their abhorrence of any
kind of ground-based intervention in Asia.
INTELLECTUAL RATIONALE
The result is that President Johnson is
finally getting his intellectual rationale for
the war in Vietnam from highly qualified
show to be the majority sentiment of the
country, and it sounds also as if it might
come from the lips of those well-indoctri-
nated American soldiers in Vietnam who
simply cannot understand the protest move-
ment at home.
From now on it appears that the argu-
ment will veer into the field of whether or
not we are doing enough to draw the Red
Chinese into respectable world society. This
concerns both Barnett and Fairbank. Far
Eastern Expert Halpern thinks there is a good
chance that Asia is settling down, and
dramatic changes might make possible a
military disengagement in a few years-but
not now.
To those who say that we must now ap-
proach China with the olive branch, Vice
President HUMPHREY has an impregnable
answer. We have. We do so every month
or two in talks with the Red Chinese repre-
sentative in Warsaw. The answer is always
the same: Support the surrender of the
Government of Formosa to the rule of Peip-
ing. When we say, "No," to that, the con-
versations come to an end.
DOESN'T WISH IT
To those who say let Red China Into the
United Nations, HUMPHREY's answer is also
impregnable. Red China does not wish to
join the United Nations as it is presently
constituted. The charter must be amended
and the Republic of China must be excluded
before Peiping would accept an invitation to
join. On the question of diplomatic recog-
nition of Red China, the Formosa problem
again intervenes. _
All the probes for a new understanding
with China, like the President's peace over-
tures of earlier in the year, lead down a
blind alley.
These aspects of the problem are now com-
ing to the fore for closer public scrutiny as
the dimensions of the risk of war with China
are being measured. What the administra-
tion is getting out of the current debate is
a better public understanding of what it is
trying to do, and why.
The China hearings are therefore a definite
plus for the administration so far, much to
the discomfiture of Senator FULBRIGHT and
the others.
POEM BY MARINE LANCE CPL.
CHARLES R. ALLEN
Mr. MILLER. Mr. President, the an-
guish of Vietnam is felt in many homes
throughout this Nation.
There have been families who have
lost a son, a husband, a father, or a rela-
tive in that far-off land. And there are
others with someone near and dear to
them fighting there.
A great debate has been and is being
waged over why we are there, why so
man have to give their lives for a cause,
ie seems, so little understood by so many.
Why are we there?
One youth who knew was Lance Cpl.
Charles R. Allen, whose mother lives in I
St. Louis, Mo., and whose aunt, Mildred
L. Davis, lives in Sioux City, Iowa.
In a poem written by his mother last
Thanksgiving, Corporal Allen said:
And as long as freedom rings in hearts of
men,
South Vietnam freedom we will help defend.
To this man-and he was a man-
freedom meant the opportunity to live
in peace, but he knew that peace could
not be unless one was willing to lay
down his life so that all could enjoy
it.
For as he wrote:
For men who died here didn't die in vain,
But, died for freedom and died in fame.
And as this Marine declared:
To preserve world freedom we must pay the
price.
Mr. President, Marine Lance Cpl.
Charles R. Allen paid that price.
On January 1, a few hours after the
birth of a new year and only a few days
after he turned 21, Corporal Allen was
killed in action in that far-off land where
he felt a stand had to be taken to pre-
serve freedom.
Did he die in vain?
I do not think so for he knew that-
Even our forefathers died to keep freedom
alive,
And in Vietnam we will make sure it survive.
I think the draft-card burners, the
demonstrators, and others could learn a
lesson from Lance Cpl. Charles R. Allen.
I ask unanimous consent that the en-
tire poem, entitled "The U.S. Forces in
Vietnam," be placed in the RECORD.
There being no objection, the poem
was ordered to be printed in the RECORD,
as follows:
THE U.S. FORCES IN VIETNAM
(By Lance Cpl. Charles R. Allen)
Some people think to fight here is wrong.
But, we must fight here or fight at home.
For Communist Victory in this torn land.
Will encourage them to fight in other lands.
Many people talk about our dying sacrifice.
But, to preserve world freedom we must pay
the price.
Just look at the accidents on a holiday.
Then our total dead won't seem bad in any
way.
For men who died here didn't die in vain.
But, died for freedom and died in fame.
Even our forefathers died to keep freedom
alive.
And in Vietnam we will make sure it survive.
To Vietnam the President has given his
word.
And this message all the world has heard.
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A BUSINESSMAN'S FORMULA To HEAD OFF
INFLATION
(Can the United States fight the war in
Vietnam and still avoid shackling industry
and labor with controls over prices, wages,
and materials? Yes, says one of this coun-
try's business leaders-but only if Congress
"stops pouring on the coal" under the eco-
nomic boiler. Roger M. Slough, chairman of
the board of United States Steel Corp., calls
for efforts to hold prices and wages in check,
and for postponement of some nonmilitary
programs that would involve billions of dol-
lars in new spending at a time when inflation
threatens.)
(Excerpts from an address by Roger M.
Blough, chairman of the board of United
States Steel Corp., delivered in St. Louis,
Mo., February 19, 1966)
There is one basic point, I believe, upon
which true Americans can never disagree:
that everything needed to protect the lives
of our soldiers in Vietnam shall be provided
to the limit of our national resources, both
material and human. If the sacrifice of
economic freedom will, in fact, hasten the
winning of the peace in Vietnam and reduce
our casualties there, there can hardly be any
"loyal opposition" to such a sacrifice. But
if, on the other hand, the economic free-
doms which have made this Nation the most
productive in the world are-as I believe
them to be-a unique source of our military
and economic strength, then we should, and
must, defend and preserve them in the na-
tional Interest.
In short, the question before us is: To
what degree may we assist in the fight for
freedom by relying upon freedom-freedom
in production, freedom to buy and sell and
freedom in occupation? Or must we revert
to wartime types of wage controls, or price
controls, materiel controls and even controls
of movement among occupations, in order, as
a nation, to wage the defense of freedom?
In World War II and again during the
Korean conflict, controls were imposed upon
production, distribution, wages and prices in
order to channel the necessary portion of
our gross national product into the war
effort. How then do conditions today com-
pare with those that existed before?
Well, at the peak of World War 11, defense
expenditures averaged about 84 billion dol-
lars a year and exceeded 40 percent of the
total gross national product. At the height
of the Korean war, they were almost 49 bil-
lion and accounted for 131/3 percent of the
gross national product.
During the present year it is estimated that
our total defense expenditures may rise to
$60 billion, which would still be less than 81,2
percent of the anticipated gross national
product; and they would have to mount to
an astronomical $100 billion in order to
reach the 131/2 percent rate that prevailed at
the height of the Korean war. That is far
beyond any projected requirement of the
action in Vietnam.
As for manpower, it must be noted here also
that the national labor force has substan-
tially increased in numbers during the past
20 years.
At the end of World War II, there were 11.5
million men in our Armed Forces-or 171/2
percent of the total labor supply. During
Korea, there were 3.5 million men In the mili-
tary, representing over 5 percent of the labor
force, and about 475,000 of these were actu-
ally engaged in Korea.
Last year, some 2,8 million men were in the
Armed Forces, and this accounted for only
3.6 percent of the labor supply. Future re-
quirements, as presently projected, could call
for an additional 300,000 men in the services;
but even if that number were to rise to
600,000, the military drain on the national
labor force would amount to only about 4
percent as compared to more than 5 percent
during the Korean conflict.
So it is evident, I think, that Vietnam is
not the primary source of the economic pres-
sures we are experiencing. Vietnam may
provide aif excuse for the advocacy of con-
trols. But it is not a reason for them; and
if we seek out the major cause of these pres-
sures, we must look to the unusually rapid
rate of our economic growth in the nonmili-
tary areas.
Last year, the American economy grew at
a greater rate than that of any other major
industrial nation in the world. After cor-
recting for rising prices, the "real" rate of
growth was 51/2 percent; and all of this new
activity increased the demand. for manpower,
and the upward pressure on wages and prices.
During the 1960's, the expansion of the
supply of money and credit has been at twice
the rate prevailing in the late 1950's. Gov-
ernment expenditures at all levels Federal,
State, and local-have increased 65 percent
since Korea, even though there has been no
appreciable rise in military outlays. Thus,
virtually all of this increase has occurred on
the nondefense side of the ledger.
As a result, a head of economic steam is
building up to a point which is beginning to
cause national concern lest it break out in a
burst of rising wages and prices.
Trying to find out how long we can con-
tain this mounting head of steam while con-
tinuing to heat up the boiler is something
like playing Russian roulette. Certainly we
cannot continue indefinitely, no matter how
hard we try, to hold back the hand on the
pressure gage. For the present, we are
pinning our faith upon the willingness and
the ability of both industry and labor to
comply voluntarily with the governmental
guideposts established some years ago; and
while a considerable degree of price stability
has been achieved during this period-espe-
cially in the more "visible" industries where
a certain amount of "persuasion" could be
applied-the boiler is clearly beginning to
leak.
For the entire nongovernmental sector of
the economy, employee compensation per
man-hour has risen more than output per
man-hour in each of the past 3 years; so unit
labor costs have kept mounting.
Under the pressure of these rising costs
and of the increased economic activity gen-
erally, the consumer price index has risen
11 percent since 1957-59, and the tempo has
accelerated. recently.
Further energizing this trend toward
higher wages and consequent rising prices
Is the fact that we now have practically full
employment, and there is an actual shortage
of skilled workers * * *. Among married
men, unemployment is now down to 2 per-
cent and is still declining.
Under all of these circumstances, it will
clearly become increasingly difficult to main-
tain an acceptable degree of wage and price
stability through the publication of guide-
posts and the powers of presidential persua-
sion; and the question arises: "What next?"
THE ROAD TO CONTROLS
So the situation that confronts us today
is much like that which prevailed at the end
of 1950, when the United States had started
down the road to wage and price controls.
Then, as now, the road was paved with re-
quests for a voluntary freeze; and standards
for the freeze were being drawn up. Under
the pressures of that day, the prices of many
products were rising; and the prospect of
price control, itself, added greatly to these
pressures, as producers and merchants sought
to cover their rising costs before the freeze
hit them. Production shifted from lower
price lines to more expensive, and more prof-
itable, goods; and retailers built their in-
ventories to a record high, thus adding to
demand in an already over-heated economy.
But before we travel that road again, let
us stop, look and listen, for it is one thing
to talk of controls and quite another thing
to survive them. There is no doubt that for
a limited period they can and do hold down
the lid on prices. There is also no doubt,
however, that they create scarcity and thus
add to the economic pressures that caused
their adoption in the first place.
Some of us whose memory goes back to the
controls of 20 years ago will recall the butter
that was sold from under the counter to
favored customers, and the deterioration in
the quality of merchandise that occurred as
producers and merchants were often forced-
at the peril of their own survival-,to pay
higher-than-ceiling prices on purchases in
order to get the materials to keep their busi-
nesses running.
Then, too, there is the wasteful deploy-
ment of manpower at a time when a shortage
of manpower already exists. Under the nor-
mal operation of a free market, the people
themselvs-as buyers-determine what man-
power will be allocated to what production.
If they do not choose to buy a certain prod-
uct, then that product will no longer be
made and the manpower will go elsewhere to
produce what is wanted and needed.
Controls not only wipe out this self-adjust-
ing, competitive mechanism, but-Jby their
almost unbelievable complexity-they create
enormous new manpower demands in the ad-
ministration and the application of the regu-
lations.
But, you may ask, can the Defense Depart-
ment-in the absence of controls-get what
it needs to carry on its military efforts? The
answer is that it can and it does. We al-
ready have a system of priorities under which
defense has first claim on essential produc-
tion.
But will not the Government have to pay
more than it should? And the answer to
that is also simple; for the Government is
the sole buyer of war material, while there
are many sellers competing for its business.
Thus we have the opposite of a monopoly-a
monopsony. And as a monopsony, the Gov-
ernment imposes conditions of purchase
under which it exercises the right to re-
negotiate contracts and to reclaim an ad-
judicated part of the purchase price if the
profits on the sale are deemed too large.
But then, you may ask: How about the
average fellow, the pensioner, or widow liv-
ing on a fixed income? Without controls,
is there any better way of keeping prices
from skyrocketing? * * * There must be bet-
ter solutions; and I believe that there are.
In the first place we must recognize that
our productive capacity in America is ex-
panding substantially every year, so there is
an ever-increasing supply of goods and
services to meet our Nation's demands, both
military and civilian.
The President has called upon business to
exercise restraint in its pricing policies; and
has asked labor unions to keep their demands
within certain bounds. Here it must be said
that the two problems are somewhat dif-
ferent. Among businesses there is a high
degree of competition which tends to repress
prices; but among unions there is also a high
degree of competition-more in the nature
of political competition-which tends con-
versely to escalate wages.
It is the inescapable obligation of business
managers to keep their enterprises healthy
and to generate the profit necessary to keep
America's industrial facilities modern and
competitive-not only in the interest of the
owners, but in the national interest as well.
So there must be some wage and price flex-
ibility to accommodate the myriad changes
that occur from day to day. Yet I believe
that the wiser heads in the leadership of
both labor and business will recognize that
the exercise of restraint in the highest pos-
sible degree is imperative at a time when the
probable alternatives are rising costs and
runaway prices or disruptive controls.
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 Parch: 2J~ j roved For 7B P00400040009-5
Namara. " Rowever, they., finally dis- firm base on which to start to rebuild.
played a map in the Committee on -So I believe that a good deal of psycho-
Armed Services, I had been told that logical warfare is involved.
the Vietcong control a substantial We should tell the Vietnamese to come
:amount of the real estate, but that the in and help us to clean up their country;
"real estate Is not heavily populated; and to get the people to understand that they
that also there are other areas wbere'jhe must work with them; that in many in-
Vietcong are in control at night, and we stances, the people whom they are fight-
are in control in the daytime. I should ing are their blood brothers; that they
,think it would be difficult indeed, to all ought to work together; and that the
make a social and economic program United States will help them-and we
'work if we hold territory only during the will. We have helped everybody else in
daytime. the world; there is no reason why we
I ask the Senator. from. Georgia and should draw any line where the Viet-
the Senator. from Massachilsetts.,if they namese are involved.
can give us any information as to the Very frankly, I consider this to be an
areas in South Vietnam, outside of activity in the nature of psychological
Saigon, outside of Danang, and outside warfare. We will deliver when we have
of Cam Ranh Bay, in which we can really a place to spend the money and know
put substantial amounts of mqnpy to that it will reach those who are trying
`work to turn the'blinds and hearts of to help themselves. But I would not ad-
the South Vietnamese people our way, vocate spending money on permanent
through taking care of their basic phys- improvements now.
Ical needs. Mr. CLARK. In the foreign aid au-
My suggestion is-and perhaps the thorization bill, which is funded in the
Senators will rebut it-that not much bill which the Senator from Georgia and
terrain is really that secure and that we the Senator from Massachusetts are pre-
are not. going to be able to do a great deal senting to the Senate today, $175 million
to keep the South Vietnamese economy was authorized for expenditures which,
from collapsing, under the threat of in- in my judgment, although Mr. Bell did
flation and the shortage of rice and of not entirely agree, were to bolster the
other Items, and to help the people who South Vietnamese economy. Mr. Bell
Fare still under the control of our allies, told us in the opening session that in-
Mr. RUSSELL of Georgia. The Sen-_ fiation since the first of this year had
ator's committee reported the authorize- increased the price level in Saigon by
.tion for the economic aid in the bill; it about 10 percent, and that most of the
did not come from the Committee on $175 million was really a rescue operation
.Armed Services. to keep the South Vietnamese economy
Mr. CLARK. We could not get any- from collapsing. The other $100 million
thing out of that committee, was supposed to go into rural areas
Mr. RUSSELL of Georgia. In my and into villages.
judgment, while I do not. question at all A number of us raised a serious ques-
te good faith of the offer, there is a . tion as to how that money could be
great deal of, psychological warfare in- spent. We tried to get Mr. Bell to show
volved in all of these- cpmmitments. us some maps which might be of use in
That is. true with-respect to the Presi- deciding that question. He was not
.dent's offer of $1 billion to remake North willing to do that, so we had to take his
Vietnam, as well as South Vietnam. statement on faith.
Mr. CLARK. Through the Asian De- I supported that bill. Indeed, I shall
velopment Bank. support this bill. But I am worried about
Mr. RUSSELL of Georgia. It has a whether we are appropriating large sums
great deal to do with the Asian Bank. of money that cannot be spent, so far as
We have put some hard money In Viet- aid is concerned.
nam, and it will do great good in some Mr. SALTONSTALL. Mr. President, I
areas. -should like to add to what the Senator
But so far as making permanent in- from Georgia [Mr. RUSSELL] has said.
vestments in outlying villages in Vietnam I listened to Ambassador Lodge several
is concerned, I think that would, be fool- times when he spoke on this subject. I
hardiness on our part, because we would feel certain that the Senator from Penn-
.really be. helping our enemies, the Sylvania believes that Ambassador Lodge
Vietcong. feels we should go into the communities
As the Senator from Pennsylvania" well and give the people confidence and help
says, we do not now have adequate forces them socially and economically.
to hold the different areas. I do think . I_shall quote a statement by General
.that we can offer medical aid and provide Greene of the Marine Corps. We are all
that way generate, perhaps, some appre-
ciation and gratitude, although that is
something we do not even find, as we go
through this life, in other areas. Even
within this country, it is a rather scarce
commodity at times. But we are dealing
with human beings; certainly we can
Bind up .their wounds; we can provide
41, sistafc , tg.thejr children; we can cure
many o the diseases. That is about all
we can do there now, in my opinion, in
the way of rebuilding, because we have no
6117
have separated the Vietcong from the vil-
lages in which they have been living for
years and we have pushed them outside,
either into the unoccupied territory outside
of the perimeters or into the mountains and
jungles back from the coastal plain, and they
don't want to be pushed into these areas,
because their entire concept or philosophy
is based on mingling with the people, getting
the people's support, getting their rice and
..food from the people, putting taxes on the
people, and organizing them as Communists,
and we are separating them from the people,
Senator, like fish from the sea.
General Greene also said, as appears
on page 278 of the testimony:
Well, we aren't executing this program by
the rifle and the sword as far as the civic
action program is concerned. Right, today
we are treating in our frontline aid stations
over 2,000 cases every single 24 hours, Sena-
tor. These are the cases in which we are
curing skin diseases, eye diseases, among
the men, women, and children that are with-
in our area. That is the sort of program,
just one part of it, that we are doing.
There is no gun or sword attached to this.
We are distributing food, we are distributing
.clothing, we are distributing tools. We are
helping these people to help themselves to
restore their villages and to rebuild their
economy and some sort of a political entity.
That is some of the best and most help-
ful testimony that the committee re-
ceived. As I recall-and I hope the Sen-
ator from Georgia will check me on this-
the marines control about 100 square
miles of territory. That is the area or
district for which the marines are
responsible.
Mr. CLARK. I yield to no man in my
admiration for the U.S. Marines. I have
no doubt that wherever they have the
opportunity, they are doing magnificent
work. The Senator from Massachu-
setts just read a very appealing excerpt
from General Greene's testimony.
But I pointed out that the South Viet-
namese general in charge of the First
Corps area has been dismissed. One
must only assume that the dismissal was
for incompetence. He almost started a
revolution to overturn the Ky Govern-
ment, but finally decided not to. If he
had been an effective military man, I
should think he would still be command-
ing the First Corps.
More' than that, if the Senator from
Massachusetts will look at a map of the
terrain, he will find that a majority of
the individuals who are being cared for,
as the General said, are refugees who
came in off the land, such as Da Nang
and Cam Ranh Bay, which we control.
I doubt whether there is much of an area
in which we could place a school or a
housing development. What does the
Senator say about that?
to a question by me, which appears on Mr. SALTONSTALL. Mr. President,
page 275 of the hearings, General Greene I think that we must make haste slowly.
said: We must get the people to be sympathetic
Well, taking our own area as a specific with us. There is no better way to get
example, the I Corps area, we have three pert- people on our side than to treat their skin
meters there established now, as you know, diseases and eye troubles and make them
sir. These three perimeters actually only healthy.
encompass a small portion of the total popu- I think that a well person is a happy
lation in I Corps area. Some 2 million Viet-
namese live in that area. person. If the people are happy,' they
Within the enclaves that have been estab- will be on our side and this will be ac-
lished by our forces in the I Corps, pacific. Complished in a very simple manner.
tion is well underway. In other words, we Mr. CLARK. If we can-get to them.
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 Approved For Release 20Q /Q2J tt?WP6~gpj 8000400040( ~5ch ~1 1966
6118 CONGRSSI
Mr. SALTONSTALL. If we can get to place large numbers of American troops General JOHNSON. I do not belive that
them. We must get to them. in the field with their magnificent fire- what General Gavin proposed would accom-
Mr. CLARK. That is my problem. If power in an effort to search out and kill plish anything beyond what Senator SrMiNG-
the Vietcong controls so much of the real Vietcong, to destroy their morale, and to TON said, tying down forces.
.estate, how will we get to them? cut their fighting effectiveness. How- I interpolate that Senator SYMINGTON
Mr. SALTONSTALL. I state to the ever, this inevitably has resulted, I is a strong, and from his point of view,
Senator from Georgia and the Senator should think, in a very substantial in- quite effective opponent of General
from Pennsylvania that I appreciate very crease in the rate of American casual- Gavin's theory.
much this opportunity to engage in col- ties. This has been more and more obvi- I continue to read from page 266:
loquy with them. I always try to work ous in the last 2 months. Our casualty Chairman RUSSELL. Our people would not
with the chairman of the committee in rate has accelerated quite substantially. be captured and killed if they had these en-
an effective and nonpartisan manner at I appreciate that nobody in the Penta- claves there and could defend them by air
all times. gon Building or on the Armed Services and by artillery and by the Navy.
Mr. CLARK. Mr. President, I should Committee agrees with General Gavin General JoHNsoN. But we would be serv-
be terribly disappointed if the Senator and Ambassador Kennan'that the proper ing no useful purpose in enclaves.
from Massachusetts were to leave. I policy would be to stay where we are serving ving n Chairman on usefuRUSSELL. l ful purpose, We would be
, but we would be
have a few more questions. and make do with what we have. serving a useful purpose in saving our people
Mr. SALTONSTALL. I would not I recall that the Senator from Geor- from being killed-
think of leaving. gia made a comment in the testimony. There is then a security deletion, as is
Mr. CLARK. If the Senators will look I do not have the page number at this often the case when the testimony
at page 116 of the hearing, they will see time, but perhaps he will recall his state- so
that General Wheeler testified, in the ment in which he indicated, at least in begins n I continue get nue interesting.
read-
of Secretary McNamara, that part, that such a policy would substan- there would think
the object of the war is to cause the Viet- tially decrease our casualties. and t our was a forces ty who useful were purpose.
rang and primarily Hanoi to cease and Frankly, I am very concerned over the I remember when I first came here, I was
.desist their aggression in South Vietnam. way in which the American casualty rate talking big to Senator Gore, the blind Sen-
Secretary McNamara said that our is increasing. I am concerned as to how ator from Oklahoma, and something came up
policy is to achieve our limited objective long the American people will stand for about the Spanish-American War. I said
with the fewest personnel losses possible. an increasing casualty rate. that wasn't much of a war. There were 748
Then, on. page 171, General Wheeler I ask the Senators whether, in their people killed in the whole war.
said: opinion, there is not some way in which I interpolate that there were 987 Amer-
I believe that this is a war that we can our limited objective could be achieved icans killed in the last 2 months in South
win. I believe this, and if I did not believe it, with the fewest possible personnel losses, Vietnam.
I never would have recommended it to the as Secretary McNamara has said, with- Mr. RUSSELL of Georgia. Mr. Presi-
c ommander in Chief that we put our ground out sending our boys into the elephant dent, I said 348. That was the number
forces in there, or any forces, for that matter, grass and jungle, and incurring casual-
was killed in the Spanish-American
at the beginning. ties, from the 3d of January 1966 to the War.
I wonder if the Senators would agree 7th of :March 1966, of 848 combat deaths, War'
with me that General Wheeler is using and 139 deaths from accidents which Mr. CLARK. Mr. President, I ask
that the RECORD be
unanimous consent
the word "win" in connection with our resulted outside of combat. That is a corrected accordingly.
policy and our objective, which is to total of 987 casualties in 2 months. The PRESIDING OFFICER Without
cause the Vietcong and primarily Hanoi The casualty rate seems to be increas- objection, it is so ordered.
to cease and desist their aggression. Ile ing as our search and destroy policy takes Mr. CLARK. Mr. President, I con-
does not mean total victory resulting in hold. I wonder if the Senators would tinue to read from the statementof Sen-
the destruction of the enemy. Would comment on my concern over the heavy ator RUSSELL:
the Senators agree? rate of American casualties. There were 748 people killed in the whole
Mr. RUSSELL of Georgia. I think in Mr. SALTONSTALL. I sincerely re- war, and there were more than that killed at
the whole context of his testimony, and gret the American casualties. So far as Manassas.
the testimony of the Secretary of De- the Massachusetts boys are concerned, it is sknorth
fense, it is quite clear that when the gen- hurts me every time I write a letter to Manassas
of the Maas is sometimes om Line, known,
Bull Run.
eral uses the expression "win the war," the parent or wife of a boy who has been I continue to read:
he means to force Hanoi or any other killed.
proper and responsible representatives of It is not our objective in using the Old Senator Gore said: "Well, I guess that
the enemy forces in Vietnam to come to words "win the war" to do nothing other 748 thought it was a pretty big war." Since
then
the conference table and agree on an than to make sure that the representa- I have been more careful about my esti-
mate of things.
honorable peace. tives of North Vietnam and Hanoi will sit
Mr. CLARK. I would agree with that down at the conference table. At the I must say that I find myself in accord
objective. present time that has not been done. with the statement of the Senator from
Mr. RUSSELL of Georgia. That was With regard to holding these areas along Georgia, who may or may not want to
the tenor of their testimony throughout. the seacoast, as General Gavin and Am- make any further comment. If not, I
Nobody ever talked about going in there bassador Keenan have mentioned, I shall go on to something else.
and destroying North Vietnam or South think from everything I have heard that Mr. RUSSELL of Georgia. Mr. Presi-
Vietnam. Of course, as long as the war Gavin has been misinterpreted. dent, I was being more or less a Devil's
is being waged over any piece of ground, It seems to me that we must carry on advocate there, in seeing what General
there will be terrible destruction and a the fight. We must make it clear that Johnson, the Chief of Staff of the Army,
good many innocent people will be killed. we are there to force these people to thought about that situation.
There is ono difference, however. The come to the conference table. Of course, I do not want one, single
people whom we kill are killed by acci- We are in the effort so far now that American boy to- spill one drop of blood
dent. The people who are killed by the we cannot turn around, even with the over there unnecessarily; and I grieve
Vietcong are killed with premeditated increased casualties and the increasing with those who do, and particularly with
brutality. amount of materiel that we bring to their families, especially of those who
Mr. CLARK. The statement which I Vietnam, but the most serious thing is leave young ones behind. -
read from page 120 of Secretary McNa- the increased casualties. When we talk about search and de-
mara's testimony refers to achieving a Mr. CLARK. The figures which i stroy, I think the whole purpose of that
limited objective with the fewest person- quoted did not include the wounded, is to make this war so unpopular and so
nel losses possible. which are usually far greater in number devastating for the Vietcong that they
My understanding is that our present than those who have been killed. will eventually be compelled to quit it.
military policy-and I ask the Senators Turning to page 266 of the testimony, We cannot wage any other kind of
to comment on this-is to engage in a se- I find myself in complete accord with war, unless we go into the enclaves. We
ries of operations known as search and what the Senator from'Georgia said. do not have the men or the equipment to
destroy, in the carrying out of which we I read from the testimony: hold the territory that we take. We can
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 March 21,
1-bgroved
present casualty rate? I remind the I should like to put to my friend, the
Senator that, while we like to be states- Senator from Massachusetts, but I
men while discussing this sort of matter, should like to yield to the Senator from
there is an election coming up in Novem- South Dakota for that purpose.
ber, with which we should naturally be Mr. McGOVE,RN. Mr. President; I had
concerned. no particular remarks I wished to make.
After all, in the case of Korea, the I did have a few more questions that I
people got pretty tired of that war, and should like to have raised, either for the
many people believe President Eisen- Senator from Massachusetts or the Sen-
hower was elected because he undertook ator from Georgia, with reference to the
to go to Korea and stop it, and he did. bill.
The other thing that concerns me is One question relates to the proposal
whether the more provocative policy that has been made by a ? number of
which the Senator from Georgia thinks people about the possible sealing of the
we may have to follow involving an port of Haiphong.
escalation and acceleration of the war It has been my understanding that
might bring the Chinese into the war the Senator from Massachusetts would
against us. know more about this than I would:
Mr. RUSSELL of Georgia. Of course that there is a sense in which both the
that would be most unfortunate, and I major cities in the south and those in
should hope that would not happen. the north are held hostage by the other
But, as the Senator from Pennsylvania side. In other words, the Vietcong, with
knows, we took a calculated risk when the help of North Vietnam, are in a
we put the first man in uniform in South position to do great damage to the port
Vietnam. We did not know what the of Saigon. It is my understanding that
response of the Chinese would be. We that port is reached through a river
did not know what it would be when we that it would be quite possible to close
added to that, and built our airbases off by the sinking of a single ship.
in surrounding areas. We did not know Various other things could be done,
what the response of the Chinese would through terror, to cause great difficulty
be when we started bombing North Viet- in Saigon. We have also understood
nam. that one of the reasons why steps of
Mr. CLARK. . And we do not know that kind have not been taken is the
yet. fact that, so far, we have stayed away
Mr. RUSSELL of Georgia. But my from bombing or mining Haiphong, or
own opinion-and not as one posing as other principal cities in, North Vietnam.
an expert, by any means, on Chinese I am wondering whether-if we were to
affairs-is that as long as we do not land take that step, let us say, to mine or
forces near the Chinese border, we will bomb the key port of Haiphong-we
probably not bring the Chinese into the could not anticipate severe reprisals on
war, if we were to land forces near the the part of the other side against Saigon,
Chinese border, I think we would un- which is an essential port in terms of
doubtedly bring them in. If we were to our supply situation.
attack China somewhere, I think we Mr. SALTONSTALL. I would say
would undoubtedly bring them in. But that my knowledge of this subject is not
I cannot set why the Chinese would per- completely fundamental, but it is my
mit us to bomb up to within 2 or 3 miles understanding that Saigon harbor has a
of their borders, and knock out railroad channel which could be mined very
bridges and road bridges, and not come easily, but that it has not been mined.
into the war, and then come into the The ship which was hit the other day
war because of something that is clear went out of the channel in order to keep
across North Vietnam from the Chinese the channel clear. We did receive testi-
boundary. mony that if we mined Haiphong-and it
I concede it is a calculated risk, but would have to be done by mines, not by a
we have taken calculated risks before, blockade or other way- there could be
and we will be compelled to take calcu- an opportunity for the opposition to drop
lated risks if we are ever to bring this mines and make it more difficult for us
war to a conclusion. on the scene. There was general and
I am in favor of taking the next step little testimony, really, on this subject.
now, and closing Haiphong, saying, "We I know that some military chiefs feel we
are going to put a stopper on this bottle; could go further regarding the mining or
you are not going to pour any more bombing of Haiphong; but, of course,
munitions in there to go down through there is a difference of opinion on that
the many prongs of the Ho Chi Minh subject. They have to take their orders
trail and kill American boys." from the Commander in Chief.
That is my own individual view, and Mr. McGOVERN. Does the Senator
I have urged it at the very highest levels. from Massachusetts believe that might
If we cannot, in any other way, get these be a possible response which we would
people to do the very elementary thing have to anticipate, if we were to extend
that has prevailed since the stone age, the war by attacking Haiphong or other
of men who are at loggerheads sitting principal cities of North Vietnam, that
down and discussing their differences- there would then be an increase in the
if they are not willing to do that, I do activities of the other side in reprisals?
not see that we have any other option Mr. SALTONSTALL. Just speaking
but to try and put them in such a post- as one individual-for myself, and my-
tion that they are compelled to. self alone, and that is all I can speak
Mr. CLARK. Mr. President, the Sen- for-that is probably the reason the
ator from South Dakota has a few re- present administration has not allowed
marks he wishes to make on the pend- the military chiefs to go as far as they
Ing bill. I have a few more questions might like to go. However, I emphasize
For RCO 0SSIONAL R CORD -SENATE 0400040009-5 6119
'take it all right, but we cannot hold it,
because we do not have a sufficiept num-
ber of men there.
But when we search and destroy, that
does not mean just destroy the Vietcong;
that means destroy their system of tun-
nels, it means destory their rice supplies,
it means destroy their munition dumps,
and the things with which they wage
war.
I have concluded that the American
people will not tolerate indefinitely the
kind of war that we are waging over
there now. I think we must hit the
North Vietnamese hard enough to make
them come to the conference table,
whether they want to or not-to make
them forget those four conditions they
have imposed..
Personally, I have come to the conclu-
sion that we should close the port of
Haiphong, and that we should push this
war until the North Vietnamese would
be willing at least to permit their alter
egos or "Charlie McCarthys," or whoever
they are, in the National Liberation
Front, to 'join them at the conference
table and bring this war to a conclusion.
If they are correct in their insistence
that a majority of the people in South
Vietnam want their form of government,
let them come and have an election, and,
if the majority of the people there vote
for that form of government, I say let
them have`it because, if there is any one
principle to which this Nation has been
dedicated in its relations with all other
countries on earth since our very begin-
ning, it is the principle of self-deter-
mination.
But I do not think we can afford to
let this war drift on and on as it is now.
Search-and-destroy tactics may, after 10
or 12 years, bring the Vietcong to their
knees; but the American people are
going to be very unhappy about it, and
someone who comes along and. says, "I
will go in there and clean this thing up
in 6 months," will, I am, afraid, have
some advantage over the Senators who
say, "Let's play this thing along for 10
or 12 years, as we are going now."
Because this is not a popular war, gen-
tlemen; we can bear that in mind right
now. The average American has a sense
of national pride that will not let him
tuck in his tail and run there in South
Vietnam, but he wonders, every time he
thinks about it, why we are there; and
I must confess that I share that feeling
at times myself.
It is going to be necessary to have a
change in policy in some direction in the
very near future, in my opinion, or this
war will assume political proportions
that will absolutely force it upon any
man who has to go before the electorate
of this country and seek public office.
Mr. CLARK. Two things concern me
about the position taken by the Senator
from Georgia, with which I would ordi-
narily have great sympathy, because I,
like most Americans, tend to be impa-
tient and wish to get things over with
pretty quickly, and do not like these
halfway measures,
But, ] w,u3d by concerned, with respect
to the, Ejenator's view with two things:
First, how, much .longer will the. Amer-
ican people be content to put up with the
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that I am speaking only for myself when
I say that.
Mr. McGOVERN. With regard to the
general policy of bombardment in the
North, there has been a considerable
amount of discussion on that question.
Mr. SALTONSTALL. If the Senator
will yield right there, it has been called
to my attention that the feeling is we
would not gain enough by mining Hai-
phong to make it worth while.
Mr. McGOVERN. I thank the Sen-
ator.
In addition to possible reprisals against
Saigon, would not it also raise all kinds
of problems with reference to some of
our allies-
Mr. SALTONSTALL. It might very
well.
Mr. McGOVERN. And other inter-
national problems?
With regard to the overall policy of
bombing, particularly the bombing of
the north, this has been going on now,
as I understand it, for a year. It began
in February of 1965, I believe. It is my
further understanding that the theory
behind the bombing was possibly two-
fold; one, that it would interdict the
flow of manpower and supplies from
North Vietnam into the South; and, two,
it might bring the kind of pressure to
bear on Hanoi which would lead them to
the negotiating table.
If I properly state the purpose of the
bombing-and I am not sue that that
is the reason for it, having watched that
as a member of the Armed Services
Committee for the past year-would the
Senator say that, in general, the bomb-
ing has been a success, judged by any
reasonable standards?
Mr. SALTONSTALL. I believe that
we could say the testimony we have
heard shows it to be a reasonable suc-
cess. I would not say it has been a tre-
mendous success. It is my understand-
ing that there is a great difference be-
tween bombing Hanoi and the bombing
of Germany in World War II. During
World War II, Germany's industrial fa-
cilities were in an area which, by bomb-
ing, prevented the Germans from build-
ing materials of war. In the case of
Hanoi, very little materiel goes to the
Vietcong and into South Vietnam from
Hanoi which is built or made there. I
believe they have a steel plant in that
area. How big it is, I do not know. I
believe that there is a difference of opin-
ion, there again, about the oil fields
around the outskirts of Hanoi. The
feeling has been not to bomb Hanoi and
kill and mutilate civilians. What we
wish to do is bomb the Ho Chin Minh
trail and the railroads that come from
China into North Vietnam. In other
words, to bomb the areas of transporta-
tion.
As Secretary McNamara pointed out,
it is almost impossible to bomb success-
fully a comparatively small number of
tons of supplies coming down the roads.
But now the supplies for the Vietcong
being built up are between, I believe it is
12 to 18 tons a day-perhaps more.
Therefore, we can successfully bomb the
roads by making the Ho Chi Minh Trail
inoperable and preventing the movement
of the railroads. In other words, Viet-
cong supplies have been built up as they
come down, and now it is worth while
to try to stop them on. the roads. That
is the essential goal of our bombing, as
I understand it, at the present time.
Mr. McGOVERN. Can the Senator
from Massachusetts tell me whether
there is anything in the supplemental
bill which would lead anyone who would
vote for it, or who supports it, into the
position that he would seem to be en-
dorsing an increase or an acceleration of
the bombing attacks, and other efforts
of that kind which we are carrying on
in Vietnam?
Mr. SALTONSTALL. I do not believe
that we could answer that question cate-
gorically. I believe that what we are
trying to do in this bill is to supply
enough ammunition, supply enough
planes, supply enough manpower, if we
will, and operation and maintenance, to
carry on the Vietnamese war in the way
the leadership of our country and the
chiefs of staff believe to be the wisest
under the determinations which they
may make from time to time.
Mr. McGOVERN. If I could be a
little more specific about that, one of
the things I have been very much con-
cerned about is trying to do whatever I
can, as one Senator-and I know there
are other Senators who feel the same
way-to stop this war from widening.
The President has stated that he
seeks no wider war, that he wants to do
what he can to restrict it. Could it be
said that the funds contained in the bill,
or any of the funds in the bill, will be
earmarked, let us say, for extending the
bombing attacks into Cambodia, sending
troops into Laos, or bombing the main-
land of China and hitting areas which
would significantly expand the theater
of operations?
Mr. SALTONSTALL. No. Let me say
again that we cannot be categorical on
this point, but the purpose of the bill is
essentially to supply our 200,000-odd men
in Vietnam, and to make it possible for
them to gain victory.
Mr. McGOVERN. But it does not
constitute, in the Senator's view, funds
for a major buildup, that it is something
in the nature of a holding operation-
and I am not referring to the "enclave
theory"--but to holding the present level
of military activity, or at least not to ex-
pand it in any major or substantial way?
Mr. SALTONSTALL. I could not
truthfully answer that question by the
Senator in a way which he would want;
namely, as a "No, it does not" answer.
I do not believe that today the Senator
or I, the Chiefs of Staff, or the Presi-
dent of the United States could say that
that was the fact. We have got to be
guided by circumstances. We have got
to do what we believe to be necessary.
I do not believe that Ave can-be categor-
ical in saying what the pending bill will
do, and what it will not do. --
What it will do, in effect, is make it
possible for our men who are over there
to fight to the best of their ability and
as safely as possible to bring about the
results that we want.
Mr. McGOVERN. If I read the report
and bill correctly, there is a considerable
amount of funds provided both for in,
creased artillery shells and bombs. I
think I remember the figure of about
$100 million a month in ammunition
and artillery of different kinds, and per-
haps $110 million a month in bombs. So
there is something like $200 million a
month every month spent for those pur-
poses at the present level.
I am wondering whether, in the kind
of guerilla war we are now engaged in,
where the enemy and soldiers are inter-
mingled with civilian population, ' how
we can use that kind of firepower with-
out killing many civilians, children and
defenseless men and women, who I think
would become the victims of firepower on
that scale.
Mr. SALTONSTALL. In the first
place, a substantial amount of ammuni-
tion is being used. I do not have the fig-
ure per month in mind with respect to
what is being used.
Mr. McGOVERN. These are Secretary
McNamara's figures.
Mr. SALTONSTALL. Then I would
say what the Senator has quoted is cor-
rect.
I may mention that in the Prepared-
ness Subcommittee, under the Senator
from Mississippi [Mr. STENNIS], as I said
before the Senator from South Dakota
entered the Chamber, we have received
testimony which seemed to indicate that
there was enough 'ammunition over there
to supply our needs in all forms and that
we were building up our supplies at home
to keep them up to what we need.
So far as concerns killing civilians, I
have never seen any figures of the num-
ber of South Vietnamese civilians who
have been injured or killed as a result
of our bombing or shooting.
I think the Senator is making an un-
derstatement of the activities involved in
South Vietnam when he says it is guer-
rilla ' warefare. I think it ceased to be
guerrilla warfare with the number of
regiments that have come down into
South Vietnam from the North, and with
our search and destroy activities, going
into underground trenches, to destroy
tons of rice, and so forth. I hope I have
answered the Senator's question. I have
tried to the best of my ability to do so.
Mr. McGOVERN. I appreciate the
Senator's statement.
One further question. Up until about
a year ago, the estimates-and I think
these estimates came out of the Defense
Department as well as from other
sources-were that about 80 percent of
the weapons that were used by the Viet-
cong were American weapons that they
had captured or stolen or bought in the.
black market or obtained in various
fashions from the troops we had equipped
in Vietnam. I am talking about a year
or a year and a half ago. In other words,
in a sense, we were acting as a supply
source for both sides.
Mr. SALTONSTALL. I think that is
one statement I can categorically de-
ny-
Mr. McGOVERN. As far as today is
concerned?
Mr. SALTONSTALL. Yes, because
weapons made in China or Russia were
brought into our committee. As far as
could be determined, the enemy did not
have any of our weapons. I will not say
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March 21, 1966 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE
that they do not have, because they must
have, but I think essentially they are be-
ing supplied from those other two
sources.
Mr. McGOVERN. I wish to thank the
Senator for his patience in answering
these questions as a member of the com-
mittee.
Mr. SALTONSTALL. It is a subject
matter we are all interested in. We all
ought to know as much as we can about
it. I appreciate the questions of the
Senator.: I have tried to answer to the
best of my ability
Mr. McGOVERN. I thank the Sena-
tor.
Mr. President, I suggest the absence of
a quorum.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. ' The
clerk will call the roll
The legislative clerk proceeded to call
the roll.
Mr, McCARTHY. Mr. President, I ask
unanimous consent that the order for
the quorum call be rescinded.
The PRESIDING O1'FICER. Without
objection, it Is so ordered.
Mr. MORSE. Mr. President, I rise to
oppose the pending bill. My vote will be
cast against this 'legislation because it
provides the means of conducting a war
that is unauthorized through our con-
stitutional processes. '
We are not acting in immediate self-
defense in Vietnam; we are not in a con-
dition where the President must act pre-
cipitately to repel a sudden armed at-
tack. We are planning, managing, or-
ganizing, and conducting a war effort
of a magnitude exceeded only a few times
in our history. To do that requires a
declaration of war by Congress, under
our Constitution.
Supporters of the war who seek to
justify an exclusively executive war fall
back upon the old saw: Who would we
declare war on? My answer is, who-
ever we are fighting, and that surely is
the National Liberation Front and North
Vietnam.
The only reasons given for not declar-
ing war on them are that it would'be de-
grading for the United States to declare
war formally on such puny adver-
saries, and secondly, that our relations
with other countries would suffer. But
we are making war and the s ame disad-
vantages are accruing to us, anyway.
I am not for a declaration of war in
Vietnam. I do not believe there are suffi-
cient -grounds for it.
I do not think there is any justifica-
tion for an executive war in Vietnam.
But neither are there grounds for an
American war to destroy the Vietcong
and reestablish General Xy and his
-cronies as the .undisputed masters of
South Vietnam. To the extent that we
continue to do that, we are only replac-
ing the French in Vietnam and will suf-
fer all the disadvantages and debilities
that the, French suffered.
However different our motives may be
from those of postwar France, we still
are trying to remake a country to suit
our hollow interests. How hollow our
purposes' are. We say first we are there
to preserve the blessings of freedom for
the people of ,South Vietnam, and then
we announce a vast program to reshape
the political, social, and economic insti-
tutions of that sad, unfortunate, war-
torn country.
The plain fact Is we are in South Viet-
nam for purely American interests and
no one else's. We will remain as long as
necessary to protect U.S.Interests as we
see them, and we are not interested in
any cessation of the fighting unless
American security Interests are first
guaranteed, irrespective of what happens
to the lieople of South Vietnam.
My objection to this bill go to the ob-
jectives for which we say we are In South
Vietnam, and the fact that we are pur-
suing them without regard for the con-
stitutional processes which are supposed
to govern the conduct of war by the
United States.
The bill carries the money not only to
hold on where we are in South Vietnam,
but to expand the war into Thailand,
Laos, and elsewhere in southeast Asia
where the Defense Department sees fit.
We are doing all this in the name of con-
taining Communist China. But China
has no men In Vietnam, and has ex-
pended little money, relatively speaking,
In support of the fighting.
Indeed, once we began in 1962 to build
up our airbases deep in the heart of
Thailand and naval bases on her sea-
coast, the threat of guerrilla subversion
of Thailand began to grow. Prior to
1962, there was virtually no mention of
any subversive or guerrilla threat to
Thailand. Today In this bill, we are
called upon to provide tens of millions of
dollars to forestall a threat to Thailand
that we did as much as anyone to in-
stigate and create in the first place.
Thailand has become an American
military sanctuary and we had no right
in the first place to turn it into an
American military sanctuary. Neither
had we any right to send a single boy
to South Vietnam in violation of the
Geneva accords of 1954; nor any legal
or moral right to send a single tank,
a single airplane, a single piece of war-
making materiel into South Vietnam, to
say nothing of establishing in South
Vietnam our first puppet, by the name of
Diem, and each and every puppet we
have financed and militarized since we.
proceeded to violate the Geneva accords
of 1954, section after section, article after
article.
The $13.1 billion of this bill, plus the
$1.7 billion of last year, is all for expenses
for the Vietnam war for fiscal year 1966.
This total of $14.8 billion is in addition
to the regular Defense Department
budget. As described by the committee
report, the money is needed not only for
what it calls "continued support of op-
erations in southeast Asia." The com-
mittee says :
It includes increases in the size of our
Armed Forces; additional funds for the
n aintenance and operation of new and en-
larged bases; stepped-up supply and depot
operations; procurement of a variety of air-
craft, missiles, munitions, vehicles, and other
equipment; increased research activities
related to the Vietnamese requirement; con-
struction of bases, depots, troop housing
facilities, airfields, and other facilities both
in the United States and abroad; military
assistance funds to reimburse the military
services for the procurement of goods pro-
6121
vided, and economic assistance-to foreign
countries.
This money will carry us until June 30,
1966.
. It is impossible to find any witnesses
from the administration who are willing
to say what the costs will be next year.
It is impossible to find any witness from
the administration who is willing to say
what the cost will be less next year.
Let me say to the American taxpayers:
Get ready for more. Let me say to the
American taxpayers: As this administra-
tion, outside the Constitution, escalates
this war and sends additional thousands
of American boys to be slaughtered in
South Vietnam, the war bill will go up.
That is why I said last Thursday, in
preparation for this speech today, that
the American people are the only ones
left to check this administration, for I am
satisfied that Congress never will. I am
still waiting for my colleagues in Con-
gress, who keep telling me that they are
waiting for the proper vehicle to check
this administration, for the proper ve-
hicle in which they can e?cpress them-
selves. The country is still waiting for
them to name what they consider to be
the proper vehicle to check this President.
I say regretfully that, in my opinion,
they are never going to find such a ve-
hicle; they are never going to name one.
They are just going to hope and hope
that in some way, somehow, this ungodly
slaughter will disappear from the face of
the earth. In my judgment, it will not
disappear until we formally change
America's policies. That is why we
ought to proceed, legislatively, to exercise
those checks that our constitutional fore-
fathers left to us to exercise when a
President proceeds to follow a course of
action that this President has followed
since he was elected in 1964 on pledge
after pledge, and on the representation
to millions of Americans who voted for
him, that he opposed the warmaking
policies of Barry Goldwater. As I said
last Thursday, he has out-Goldwatered
Goldwater.
In my judgment, the American people
now have to check the President, they
are going to have the check him by exer-
cising the precious right `hat they have-
the free ballot. They are going to have
to hold politically responsible those who
are not willing to check him, and to
proceed to demonstrate their disapproval
of the slaughter that is taking place in
southeast Asia.
This fund is necessary to carry out a
war effort said to be mounted by North
Vietnam, whose annual gross national
product has been estimated at under $1
billion. It has been stated in the Com-
mittee on Foreign Relations hearings on
China that the real challenge to us in
Vietnam is to fine the ways and means
to bring together the factions that could
provide it with a stable government. But
that challenge is derided by administra-
tion spokesmen as being tantamount to
putting a fox in charge of the chicken
coop-which was an insult to our intelli-
gence, by the way. No doubt it is undip-
lomatic to point out that the fox is al-
ready in charge of most of the area of
the chicken coop, and in charge of many
of its people. It is + also undiplomatic
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these days to point out that South Viet-
nam is apparently regarded by the ad-
ministration as "our chicken coop" for
they take upon themselves the right to
say who shall run it and who shall not.
If that is not a substitution of Amer=
lean interests for French interests, I do
not know what is. If General Ky is a
more viable head of state than Bao Dai
was, there is no evidence to support it.
Ky consumes vastly more American fi-
nancial and military support to hang on
even to a vestige of authority than Bao
Dai required of the French.
Today's New York Times carries a let-
ter to the editor by Robert S. Browne, a
one-time American aid official in South
Vietnam. I ask unanimous consent that
Mr. Browne's letter be printed in full at
the conclusion of these remarks.
There being no objection, the letter
was ordered to be printed in the RECORD.
(See exhibit 1.)
Mr. MORSE. In his letter, Mr. Browne
points out;
If the administration were really inter-
ested in an honorable solution in Vietnam
it would revise its 11-year-old policy of blind
and total support for tyrannical Vietnamese
opportunists and have the courage to throw
its support behind some sort of coalition
government of popular groupings in South
Vietnam. If we would permit such a gov-
ernment truly to assume the reins of power
(a reasdnably satisfactory method of select-
ing representatives could be worked out) we
might have, for the first time since Vietnam
has been independent, some effective chan-
nel for the expression and assessment of
popular feeling in South Vietnam. It would
be the proper province for such a govern-
ment, rather than for ill-formed U.S. politi-
cians, to decide whether or not it wished to
go into coalition with the National Libera-
tion Front.
The Ky government, which rules only be-
cause of its unlimited support from the
United States, unabashedly denies any ex-
pression of Vietnamese popular feeling as re-
gards the question of war or negotiations.
Yet the President of the United States
chooses to fly 7,000 miles to demonstrate his
support of this tyranny, while straight-
facedly proclaiming our objective as being
that of self-determination for the people
of Vietnam.
I point out that Mr. Browne was one
of the men in charge for a good many
years of our aid program to South Viet-
nam. He is aware of the tyranny that
we have supported with the expenditure '
of millions of American taxpayers' dol-
lars. He is aware of the duplicity of our
whole American program in southeast
Asia. He is aware of the difference be-
tween the talk of our Government lead-
ers and their acts. He is aware of the
speech of the President of the United
States at the so-called freedom banquet
in New York in which he said to the
American people, and through that pro-
gram, to the world, that we seek no
American base in southeast Asia. Is that
so? Well, I want to say that will be sur-
prising news to the major Asian powers
and, for that matter, to the leaders of
the governments of the world.
As I went with a Senate delegation
through Asia last fall, I soon discovered
that the Asian leaders are well aware of
the bases that the United States has
built and is building in southeast Asia.
We are not going to spend these hun-
dreds and hundreds of millions of dollars
for American bases in southeast Asia
and walk out on them, and everybody
knows it.
These bases are being built for U.S.
military presence in southeast Asia for
years to come, until finally Asia throws
us out, which is what will happen in the
due course of time. For, as I have said
so many times in my speeches here on
the floor of the Senate, no Western power
is going to be allowed to maintain and
dominate footholds in Asia. All the
other Western powers that have tried it
have learned through bloodletting that
sad lesson, except the United States.
We are apparently slow learners, we
Americans. Apparently it is going to
take us a much longer time than it took
the other powers who have already
learned this blood lesson, that Asia is
not going to let the United States main-
tain and dominate for long a military
foothold, or, for that matter, economic
foothold in Asia.
We do not like to talk about colonial
policies. We like to attach that term
only to European nations. But come
with me through Asia, and when we talk
about the imperialistic policies of the
United States in Asia, that means the
new kind of colonialism that the United
States seeks to impose upon Asia, a mili-
tary and economic colonialism in form
after form.
Mr. President, the repeated claim by
the U.S. Government that we are in
South Vietnam to preserve freedom of
self-determination for its people is per-
haps the most patently farcical of all
our public pronouncements on that sub-
ject, and there are many. We have the
Vice President's word for it that we-
the United States, the administration,
the White House, the Pentagon, and the
State Department-do not intend to let
anyone into the Government of South
Vietnam who does not have our blessing.
Where did we get that power from on
high? The United States should stop
playing God in Asia. The leaders of our
Government should stop playing -God
in Asia. We ought to recognize also that
most Asians do not have faith in our
God.
Mr. President, the determination for
South Vietnam lies with Government
officials in Washington, D.C., and not
among the people of South Vietnam. It
is our chicken coop, said the Vice Presi-
dent in his unfortunate use of that figure
of speech, and we will have in charge
whom we please, no matter how long
it takes.
That is the story of this administra-
tion. But it does not make it right. It
does not make it defensible. It does not
make it justifiable, for it is a wrong
policy.
This unilateral, American dictatorial
attitude toward southeast Asia cannot
be reconciled with the glorious, historic
record of this Republic.
That is why I find myself so com-
pletely at a loss to understand what has
happened to our ideals in America.
What has happened to our professings
about believing in the application of the
principles of morality to our relation-
ship with foreign peoples.
Mr. President, we cannot square our
course of action in southeast Asia with
principles of morality. As the American
people come to understand it, they are
going to make very clear to this adminis-
tration that it had better get back inside
of the framework of the Constitution and
the framework of our country's morals.
Mr. President, I do not doubt that out
of our wealth and power we can sustain
this war in South Vietnam, and probably
in North Vietnam, too, so long as there
are any people left to fight in either
place. But we are not creating anything,
even with the billions we are being asked
to spend to remake the social structure
of South Vietnam. What we are creating
is a social and political desert that the
United States will have to occupy and
govern for the foreseeable future.
This is now being elevated into an ele-
gant new version of the "white man's
burden." It is talked up as an obliga-
tion to the yellow races of Asia that are
as deserving of American help as are the
white races of Europe. But it is not
help in a common purpose. It is the en-
forcement of American goals upon peo-
ple who have little or nothing to say in
the matter. Our commitment to South
Vietnam was made in, Washington to
people in Washington who were then
sent to South Vietnam to enforce it, and
who are still being sent there to enforce
it. That is a commitment to ourselves,
not to the people of South Vietnam.
No doubt Ho Chi Minh says with equal
fervor that he, too, has a commitment to
the people of South Vietnam to finish the
unifying of Vietnam that was short-cir-
cuited by the halt in the election in 1956.
I do not know of any opportunity the
people of the south have had to make
themselves heard or to manage their own
affairs at all.
For the people of South Vietnam, there
is no hope of peace in this bill. There is
no hope of an end to war, only the prom-
ise of more war. We are told in support
of mass bombing by B-52's that it was
good for the morale of the Ky govern-
ment; but the introduction of helicopters
in 1961 did wonders for the morale of the
Diem government for a few months, and
the introduction of American jet bomb-
ers into the fighting did a lot for the
morale of the government that preceded
General Ky's. Somehow the morale al-
ways needs a new shot in the arm, like
a drug addict who requires bigger and
bigger doses to get the same lift.
This bill will increase the level of the
fighting, the number of Americans to do
the fighting, and the extent of the terri-
tory made subject to warfare.
There is no declaration of war, which
could state the objectives and purposes
of the United States in fighting, even as
Woodrow Wilson asked for a declara-
tion of war "to bring the Imperial Gov-
ernment of Germany to terms and end
the war."
We have no such objective or purpose
in Vietnam. No one in the administra-
tion is talking about ending the war or
how it can be ended. We are being told
only of how it can be prosecuted, riot how
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it can be either won or ended. It is in-
creasingly fashionable, too, to berate
Americans for wanting quick solutions,
as though to drag on a war for 5 or 10
or 20 years is more likely to secure the
peace of Asia than a settlement would.
As a final exhibit to these remarks, I
call attention to the article appearing in
the current issue of Frontier magazine by
Senator FRANK CHURCH, of Idaho. It is
a review of "Vietnam and the United
States," by Prof. Hans Morgenthau, and
I ask unanimous consent that it be
printed as exhibit 2 at the conclusion of
my remarks.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without
objection, it is so ordered.
(See exhibit 2.)
Mr. MORSE. Mr. President, I ask
unanimous consent that there be printed
in the RECORD as exhibit 3 to my remarks
an editorial from the St. Louis Post-Dis-
patch of March 19, entitled: "Congres-
sional Abdication."
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without
objection, it is so ordered.
(See exhibit 3.)
Mr. MORSE. As exhibit 4, Mr. Presi-
dent, I ask unanimous consent that there
be printed at the close of my speech this
afternoon, from today's issue of the New
York Times, a statement of outstanding
scholars and authorities on China, signed
by 180 of them, proposing drastic
changes in American foreign policy to-
ward Communist China.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without
objection, it is so ordered.
(See exhibit 4.)
Mr. MORSE. Mr. President, I know
full well that voting against this appro-
priation bill will stir up the superpatriots
in this country, all those who seem to
think that flag waving is a substitute for
reason, those who feel that the best way
to show your patriotism is to drain, sev-
eral times a day, your adrenal glands
and respond emotionally-I full well
know the tactics they resort to. They
have used them on the senior Senator
from Oregon before. They are using
them'now in my State, Mr. President. In
fact, I think when I finish this speech, I
shall call the Chief Justice of the United
States and goodnaturedly suggest to him
that he move over; because those super-
patriots are circulating buttons, on which
there is printed, "Impeach Morse."
Mr. President, they are also circulat-
ing petitions In my State. They started
with petitions to recall me, not knowing
anything about constitutional law-
which is so characteristic of this breed
of patriots. They learned from their
legal advisers that they were without
legal authority to recall a U.S. Senator,
so they changed the petition and are
circulating them now, to be sent to the
Senate, to have me expelled from the
Senate.
. Many of my friends have called and
asked me if there was anything I wanted
them to do. I said, "There is nothing I
want you to do." I said, "Let those peo-
ple do it. They have the right, and I
would stanchly defend their right to get
up any petitions they wish. It is a con-
stitutional right; let them exercise it. I
am Perfectly willing to let the people of
Oregon answer them."
But their line is based upon the charge
that those of us who are opposed to this
legislation are in someway, somehow,
supposed to be letting down the boys in
southeast Asia. They say, "They pro-
pose to vote against the appropriation to
escalate and expand the war." And that
is exactly what I propose to do, as a con-
stitutionalist.
A Hamilton, a Madison, a Gerry-all
the great constitutional fathers of this
form of government, Mr. President-
wrote that check into the Constitution.
It is known as the check of the purse
strings. They wrote check after check
into the Constitution, to check a Presi-
dent of the United States when he seeks
to exercise such unchecked power as this
President is exercising, and has succeed-
ed thus far in getting the Congress to go
along with him in exercising. They
wrote into the Constitution the check of
the purse strings, which means, Mr.
President, that no President of the
United States can initiate a foreign pol-
icy that requires funding without an au-
thorization bill. He cannot implement
and effectuate such a foreign policy
without the, appropriation to carry it out.
To deny him the ,authorization is what
two of us sought to do on this floor not so
many days ago, when we voted against
that.$4.8 billion proposal for supplemen-
tary authority to expand this war in
southeast Asia.
Some of my colleagues tried to argue
that it authorized no new policy. I could
not believe my ears. To rebut them,,all
one had to do was read the bill and the
committee report.
That bill authorized the sending of
more than 452,000 additional boys into
southeast Asia, whenever the President
should decide to exercise the discretion
of doing it. I said then and repeat today,
I would never vote to give that arbitrary
discretionary power to any President, I
do not care who he is. It takes a Presi-
dent only 20 minutes or less to get up
here from the White House to present
his proof of the need for any specific
amount that he needs from time to time.
I warn the American people again, "If
you don't stop your Congress from abdi-
cating their checking responsibilities
under the Constitution, you will be led
into a government of executive suprem-
acy in this country."
That great basic abstract principle of
freedom is pretty vital in these critical
days.
But that is not the only new policy
in that $4,800 million bill.
As I pointed out in that debate that
bill provided new policy in the amount
of hundreds of millions of dollars for
the building of permanent military bases
throughout southeast Asia, Thailand,
South Vietnam, Laos, the Philippines,
and any place else the Secretary of De-
fense, in his discretion, decided it was
necessary to build them.
What unchecked power? The con-
stitutional fathers wrote the authorizing
bill procedure into the Constitution, to
check that kind of discretion. Congress
Waived it, in effect. But that is not the
only thing the bill did.
That bill also authorized payment by
the American taxpayers of the costs of
6123
all the military mercenaries being sup-
plied to the United States by South
Korea, the Philippines, Thailand, and-
as I said in debate-if Australia and New
Zealand decide to submit a bill, the Gov-
ernment can pay for its soldiers, too.
This is.a blanket .coverage for the cost
of the military operations of these so-
called allies in South Vietnam, not one
of them a major power, not one of them
an independent power; each and every
one of them, really little but a depend-
ency of the United States. It is the
U.S. taxpayer who is paying their billo..
That new policy was authorized in tine
bill.
Then, to my great regret, the bill also
provided $100 million in a supplemental
authorization-$ 100 million as a con-
tingency fund for the President of the
United States, granting him vast dis-
cretion and the unchecked power which
goes with a contingency fund where,
last year, in the general bill, the Presi-
dent received $50 million for the con-
tingency fund. That was $50 million
because I, assisted by 2 or 3 other Sena-
tors in the Committee on Foreign Re-
lations, presented a case that caused
the majority on the Foreign Relations
Committee to cut the contingency funa
to $50 milion.
Oh, Mr. President, we did not exercise
that check which the Founding Fathers
wrote into the Constitution with regard
to authorization legislation. Thus, to-
day, I talk about the check of the purse
-strings.
Who is letting our boys down in South
Vietnam?
Not those of us who are making the
argument that we should exercise the
check on the purse strings.
Do not forget that the funds are there
to protect the boys as of now, until the
President has time to follow a course to
action of restriction in South Vietnam,
which would be necessary if we denied
him the funds under the appropriation
bill, or cut them back.
That means, in my judgment, that this
check is important because, as I have
been heard to say before-as I said in
New Hampshire this morning, and in
Manchester, N.H., last night-if we
follow the course of action that I am
proposing, we will provide that lull
period. We will provide the necessary
procedure to make it possible for the
noncombatant nations of the world to
give further consideration to an obliga-
tion of theirs of making clear to the com-
batants that the war must be stopped.
To that end, they should propose to en-
force the stopping of it, propose a fair
cease-fire order and assure the combat-
ants in the war, including the United
States, that they will enforce it and send
over whatever divisions of men necessary
t. enforce it, as they mark out in South
Vietnam the buffer zones necessary to
separate the combating forces.
I know that it will be said it will not
work. Whenever we do not wish to meet
an issue on Its merits, it is easy to say
that it will not work. But there is no
question as to what the. commitment of
the noncombatant nations is. The sig-
natories to the United Nations Charter
assumed the responsibility, when they
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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD SENATE March 21, 1966
signed it, to meet a threat to the peace
of the world, no matter what nation or
combination of nations joined in creat-
ing that threat to the peace of the world.
In this instance, the United States is
one of those nations.
That is why I have been heard to say
on the floor of the Senate, and across
the country, that there is a great speech
which I should like to hear by President
make. I should like to have my Presi-
dent make perfectly clear to our Ambas-
sador at the United Nations that all the
influence and prestige of this great coun-
try shall be brought to bear on the Se-
curity Council to have it proceed with
the world debate necessary on this issue,
and then come to a vote and find out
who it is in the Security Council that
might veto it-and put that country, or
countries, on the spot, and take my
country off the spot.
But I would also have my President
make clear to our Ambassador at the
United Nations that he should make
clear to the members of the Security
Council that we are not going to wait
indefinitely, that we are going to clear
up the reports coming out of New York
City that no real serious attempt is being
made by any country, including our own,
to force a consideration of this matter
before the Security Council and bring it
to a vote.
Thus, I would have my President make
clear to our Ambassador at the United
Nations that we are not going to wait
indefinitely, that we are going to exer-
cise the rights we have under sections of
the Charter. If the Security Council is
not going to face the issue, then we are
going to call upon the General Assembly
of the United Nations to proceed to carry
out the commitment and the obligation
of each signatory to the Charter to en-
force the peace and to lay down a cease-
fire order.
I would have my President then go to
an extraordinary session the General
Assembly and pledge to the world that
this great and powerful Nation of ours
will cooperate in carrying out that cease-
fire order.
If the world were assured that the
United States really wants a cease-fire
order enforced, then, for the first time, as
the President is so prone to quote, the
nations of the world might sit down at
the United Nations and reason together.
For there is a growing recognition on the
part of the nations of the world that the
holocaust in southeast Asia cannot con-
tinue to expand to an even greater and
greater holocaust, because if it is not
stopped, it can end only in a massive war
in Asia.
Already, we have Mr. Maxwell Tay-
lor-who has ill advised our Presidents
for a long time in this country-without
even a declaration of war, taking the po-
sition last week that the United States
should mine the Haiphong Harbor.
Well, Mr. President, we cannot mine
the Haiphong Harbor without greatly in-
creasing the risk of world war III.
In my judgment, we cannot mine the
Haiphong Harbor and have the Sags of
many nations respect the mining,
I wish to say, as I proceed to close my
speech, that I would have the American
people watch the propaganda coming out
of the Pentagon, for it usually is the first
signal of what the administration is up
to.
What is the latest propaganda coming
out of the Pentagon?
Why are they trying to poison further
the thinking of the American people?
Why is the Pentagon seeking to inis-
lead the American people once again, as
Secretary McNamara has so many times?
Some way, somehow, they must find
some propaganda that can meet the un-
deniable fact that up until now this
Government cannot produce a top mili-
tary adviser of this country in the years
gone by who will testify that we can suc-
cessfully fight a war against China.
The testimony, without exception, is
that we must not bog down an American
ground force in Asia. Generals Mac-
Arthur, Eisenhower, Bradley, Collins,
Vandenberg, Marshall, and Ridgway-
great military leaders of this Republic-
have warned the American people that
we must not bog down American ground
forces in Asia. This administration is
doing it. This administration already
has a minimum of 235,000 American boys
in southeast Asia, with an additional
100,000 American boys in that area when
we take into account Thailand, the naval
forces off the area, and the soldiers who
are waiting for orders.
The body of evidence against fighting
a war with China has to be answered by
propaganda, and the Pentagon Build-
ing is busy with the propaganda. So last
week we got the first installment.
But let me tell the American people, it
is only the beginning. The first install-
ment says China is an aggressor.
It was not so many years ago that the
German people were fed the big lie tech-
nique, and that technique led them into
a holocaust, with all the terrible con-
sequences that history records.
Let me say from the floor of the Sen-
ate this afternoon that the big lie tech-
nique of the Pentagon Building and the
State Department, if the American peo-
ple do not negate it, will lead millions of
Americans to their death in a massive
war that will result from the conduct of
the warmongers in the Pentagon Build-
ing and the State Department.
Mr. President, who is letting down the
boys in southeast Asia? The officials of
this administration who-are proposing to
send thousands more there to die. They
are the ones who are letting down the
boys.
I would not think of trading the ob-
jective judgment and clearheadedness of
a General Gavin, of a General Ridgway,
and of a George Kennan for the whole
caboodle of the military advisers of the
President of the United. States at the
present time, adding to them his Secre-
tary of Defense, his Secretary of State,.
and his Ambassador to Vietnam, Mr.
Lodge.
I am not happy to find myself in such
irreconcilable disagreement with my
President and his. advisers.
In 1964 I waspl'oud to urge his election
because, as I said across the country, the
election of Goldwater, in my judgment,
would endanger the security, of my coun-
try and angered a massive war in Asia.
I quoted the President's statements in
that campaign. They left no room for
doubt of his complete and total disagree-
ment with the foreign policy of Gold-
water.
I pray jhat my President returns to
the policy that he enunciated from coast
to coast, from north to south, which, in,
my judgment was the primary issue of
the campaign, and because of which, in
support of his representations, millions
of Americans voted for him for Presi-
ident and gave him a mandate.
It is not too late for either the major-
ity party in the Congress or the President
of the United States to carry out that
mandate.
Mr. President, I yield the floor.
EXHIBrr 1
[From the New York (N.Y.) Times,
Mar. 21, 1966]
SETTLEMENT WITH VIETNAM, NOT CmNA
To the EDITOR:
All the thinking Americans must certainly
welcome the belated attention the Senate is
directing toward our China policy, exempli-
fied by the recent hearings with Profs. A.
Doak Barnett and John K. Fairbank.
Nevertheless, there is a danger that this
focusing of public attention on China will
further strengthen the erroneous belief that
the cessation of the Vietnamese war must
somehow depend on our reaching an overall
accollynodation with China.
Despite the widespread acceptance of this
view, which has been assiduously propagated-
by the administration, there is little evidence
to support it. It is certainly not the view
articulated by the Vietnamese people gen-
erally, nor even by so responsibly situated a
person as Tran Van Do, the current Foreign
Minister of the Saigon government.
Despite Washington disclamers, the basic
quarrel in Vietnam remains an all-Vietnam-
ese dispute, with the United States present
ese dispute, with the U.S. presence creating
the sole significant internationalization of
the conflict. Any lasting settlement of this
quarrel must of necessity be a Vietnamese
settlement, not one manufactured in Wash-
ington or eiping.
SUPPORT FOR COALITION
If the administration were really interested
in. an honorable solution in Vietnam, it
would revise its 11-year-old policy of blind
and total support for tyrannical Vietnamese
opportunists and have the courage to throw
its support behind some sort of coalition gov-
ernmentof popular groupings in South?Viet-
nam.
If we would permit such a government
truly to assume the reins of power (a reason-
ably satisfactory method of selecting repre-
sentatives could be worked out), we might
have, for the first time since Vietnam has
been independent, some effective channel for
the expression and assessment of popular
feeling in South Vietnam. It would be the
proper province for such a government, rath-
er than for ill-informed U.S. politicians, to
decide whether or not it wished to go into
coalition with the National Liberation Front.
POPULAR FEELING IGNORED
The Ky government, which rules only be-
cause of its unlimited support from the
United States, unabashedly denies any ex-
pression of Vietnamese popular feeling as re-
gards the question of war or negotiations.
Yet the President of the United States
chooses to fly 7,000 miles to demonstrate his
support of this tyranny, while straightfacedly
proclaiming our objective as being that of
"self-determination" for the people of Viet-
nam.
I submit that if we took steps to permit
the Vietnamese people genuinely to say what
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 iviarurt ;G1y tUvv
they want, the war could begin to move to- which has just freed Itself from Western rule,
ward a settlement-quite independently of we import new legions of white troops to fight
any grand design on the part of either Wash- the natives.
ington or Peiping. Indeed, any "deal" struck And still we are confounded by the failure
by the United States and China can hardly of other countries to rally behind us. Even
he considered as self-determination for the the white nations in closest proximity-Aus-
Vietnamese, nor is it likely to bring any real tralia and New Zealand-send us only token
stability within Vietnam itself. help, while South Korea, dependent on us for
ROBERT S. BROWNE, sustenance, remains the only other Asian
Assistant Program Officer, U.S. Eco- country to contribute a substantial number
nomic Aid Mission to Vietnam, 1958- of fighting men.
1961. As for our European allies, they have been
TEANECK, N.J., Marcia 11, 1966. so mystified by our deepening involvement in
_ Vietnam that we are now explaining it to
EXHIBIT 2 them in terms of the importance of keeping
our word. "It is the integrity of the Ameri-
[Fram Frontier, March 19661 can commitment which is at stake," Dean
ON THE ROAD To NOWHERE IN VIETNAM Rusk has solemnly warned. Traveling to
(By Senator FRANK CHURCH) Europe to plead for better understanding
("Vietnam and the United States" by Hans among our NATO allies, the Secretary of
Morgenthau. Public ? Affairs Press. 112 pp. State repeatedly compared Saigon to Berlin-
$2.) equation which had never occurred to the
2) Germans. If the United States failed to keep
Hans J. Morgenthau must be a lonely man,
His dissenter's role.is not to be coveted in
these drab days of consensus and conform-
ity. With criticism of American foreign
policy confined mostly to the campuses, de-
bate over the basic premises underlying our
posture in Asia has all but disappeared with-
in the Government.
The cloak of "bipartisanship" has smoth-
ered organized dissent; it is no longer fash-
ionable for the opposition party to oppose.
The American people have been pretty much
persuaded that, whatever differences may ex-
ist between the two political parties on do-
mestic questions, they should stand together
where foreign policy is concerned. Constant-
ly we are admonished that argument among
us must stop at the water's edge.
The desultory effect of all this has been to
transform Washington into what Mr. Patrick
O'Donovan, a keen British observer, has
called a "one-man, one-policy town," where
any discussion on the only topic that really
matters can be stopped dead with the ques-
tion, "Well, what else would you do?"
In "Vietnam and the United States," Pro-
fessor Morgenthau defines what else we
might have done to have avoided the present
tragedy in southeast Asia, Anyone looking
its pledges in southeast Asia, the Secretary
demanded, how could we be trusted to keep
our pledges in Europe? Surely this will go
down as one of the strangest diplomatic mis-
sions in our history.
So we find ourselves practically alone wag-
ing a war on the mainland of Asia. The
thyism was made possible by the timorous-
ness which for a time it intensified. The
"mysteries" of scientific weaponry also con-
tributed to the abandonment of discussion.
Often they had to be taken on faith-and
the word of the administration. And the
absence of information made it easier for
special interest groups such as "the China
lobby" to spread their propaganda.
Granted, it is not easy for Members of so
large and cumbersome a body as Congress
to be efficient in searching for the essential
facts. Senators and Representatives, further,
are concerned with many other matters, large
and small-including political campaigns. It
is easier-and more expedient-to support
the administration. It helps to have the
door of the White House open, rather than
closed. In any case, isn't it probable that
the President is right-at least most of the
time?
Such an attitude, however, is no real favor
to the President. At best, it deprives him of
the constructive criticism which enables him
to test his own conclusions and the advice of
his associates. At worst, it may encourage
a dangerous self-assurance and the manipu-
lation rather than the enlightening of Con-
gress and the Nation.
Coequal with the executive, Congress
should be the agency for national participa-
tion in shaping policies. This does not pre-
clude Presidential leadership, nor does it for-
bid a reasonable degree of Presidential dis-
cretion. It does recognize, however, that
democratic government involves more than
the support of decisionsafter they have been
made. There has been too little of this par-
ticipation on Capitol Hill. The Fulbright
hearings may be the sign of a happy change,
of a revulsion from government in a "one-
man, one-policy town."
6125
illusion that we are thereby thwarting China,
or even the belief that we are holding a line
in Asia against communism, are notions not
likely to survive a careful reading of "Viet-
nam and the United States."
But the reader will not be left devastated
and forlorn; rather, he will be left rewarded
with a better insight into the nature of our
past mistakes in Asia, and with a set of logi-
cal guidelines toward a more realistic Amer-
ican policy in the future.
EXHIBIT 3
St. Louis Post-Dispatch, Mar. 21,
1966]
CONGRESSIONAL ABDICATION
The most hopeful significance of the hear-
ings conducted by Senator FULBRIGHT may
well be that more Members of Congress are
beginning to take a belated but proper in-
terest in foreign policy. 'If so, it's high time.
"Debate over the basic premises underlying
our posture in Asia has all but disappeared,"
Senator CHURCH said recently. He might well
have agreed with a British observer that
Washington is a "one-man, one-policy town."
There has been foreign policy debate of a
peripheral sort, especially in connection with
the voting of money for arms and aid. And
some administration decisions have been dis-
cussed after the event. But there has been
little of the searching examination which
illuminates fundamentals, informs the pub-
lic, prevents mistakes and brings reason to
the support of action. Instead, there has
been an almost abject acceptance of admin-
istration initiatives, covered by the false
argument that foreign policy is exclusively
the President's concern. Criticism and dis-
sent have been left to a few, mostly outside
the Government. And those few often have
d n
n e
e
l
EXHIBIT 4
[From the New York Times, Mar. 21, 1966]
EXPERTS ON CHINA UGRE UNITED STATES To
SEEK A PEIPING ACCORD-DECLARE IT IS
NECESSARY FOR WASHINGTON To DROP ITS
OPPOSITION TO U.N. SEAT -
(By Tom Wicker)
WASHINGTON, March 20.-A large group of
scholars on Asian affairs declared today that
"it is up to the United States to try to move
the Chinese to a greater acceptance of the
principles of coexistence in the emerging
world community." -
This would be "a long and difficult process,"
the scholars contended. To begin it, they
urged Washington to drop its opposition to
admitting Communist China to the United
Nations and to open negotiations for the
establishment of formal diplomatic relations
with Peiping.
They also recommended American efforts
to begin negotiations on such matters as
arms control. They called for an end to the
total trade embargo now imposed on Com-
munist China, and advocated cultural, edu-
cational, and social exchanges between the
two countries.
PLAN FOR TAIWAN
for that elusive escape hatch through which
we might now catapult ourselves free from
the consequences of our past mistakes, will
not find it in this book-or any other. But
those who search for the fundamental fallacy
in our Asian policy will find this book illumi-
nating and instructive.
As Morgenthau sees it, we have been the
bull in the Asia ring, while China has played
the matador. Charging furiously into the red
cape dangled before us, we pursue a mis-
taken target. We confuse the suppression of
communism in South Vietnam with the con-
tainment of China. "The United States can
no more contain Chinese influence in Asia
by arming South Vietnam and Thailand,"
Morgenthau writes, "than China could con-
tain American Influence in the Western
Hemisphere by arming, say, Nicaragua and
Costa Rica." -
We would do well, in this regard, to reflect
upon the direction of Russian diplomacy in
Asia. The Soviet Union, with even greater
reason to fear Chinese expansion, practices
her - "containment" in the king's row, by
strengthening at Tashkent the peace between
India and Pakistan. We play the game in
the pawn's row, by mixing into a Vietnamese
war in `'the Balkans of Asia."
There, in the name of defending Asia
against China, we fight against North Viet-
naln. We insist that Ho Chi Minh is our
enemy, the very man who won independence
for all of Indochina by driving out the
French, -Charging him with aggression, we
bolster. Saigon's collapsing resistance with a
huge. American. fighting force, brought from
the opposite 'side of the globe. Into a region.,
ness a
v
been regarded with coo
The Nationalist Chinese regime on Taiwan,
suspicion.
Without this failure of interest-and tour- they suggested, should be supported but re-
age-how could the United States have be- garded only as the Government of Taiwan,
come increasingly involved in Vietnam de- not as a potential ruler of mainland China.
spite confusion as to its interest and its These changes in the "out of date" Ameri-
purpose? - And has there been much more can policy toward China, the scholars said,
clear-sightedness about involvements in "will not solve the major political and mili-
other parts of the world? tary challenges to the United States in Asia,
Whether the concern was with Soviet Rus- but they can improve the ability of the
sia, or Formosa, or Guatemala, or the Middle United States to deal with these - problems
East, or the Dominican Republic, the major- and reduce the likelihood that a crisis could
ity in Congress accepted the administration's turn into a major military confrontation."
explanation, the managed news and the se- In an interview today on the Columbia
crecy imposed in the name of security, Why? Broadcasting System television program
McCarthyism, of course, contributed to the "Face the Nation," Secretary of State Dean
shaping of this timidity by threatening hon- Rusk said that repeated U.S. efforts to
est questionerswith ostracism. Yet McCar- attempt to narrow the differences with China
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 6126 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD -SENATE March 21, 1966
were met by invariable instransigence. On arises "from factors independent of com- 4. The Government of the. Republic of
the question of admitting Peiping to the munism" although the existence of "an ex- China on Taiwan will be- a member of the
United Nations, .the main obstacle is the pansionist communist. force in Asia" inten- international community for the indefinite
insistence by the Communists that this must sifles. it. future, but only as the Government of
involve the ouster of. the representatives of HOSTILE OPINIONS CITED
Nationalist China, he said. Taiwan, and not as a potential government
The document was signed by 198 academic In a long "position paper" accompanying for mainland China.
exThes on Chin signed
such leading the statement, it was suggested that a hos- 5. The major problems for the United
fin the field including John K. such leading of tile opinion in the United States was one States in Asia have to do with establishing
the figures
East Asian field as J Center at Harvard factor "inhibiting" Washington's view of stable and mutually satisfactory relations
?Research staof the University Harvard China. between the United States and Asian na-
and Alexander Asian
Both recently testified the "Therefore," the position paper said, "it is tional governments, while helping to de-
Michigan. y important through discussion and sober ex- velop social and economic viability within
Senate Foreign Relations Committee's hear- changes of views to persuade the Govern- Asian countries through technical and eco-
ings on China. ment that there is widespread support for a nomic aid programs. Although the problems
All the signers, ranging from private citi- change in its policy toward China and that are intensified by the existence of an ex-
zens and high school teachers to university the United States by changing its y
professors, were members of the Association g policy pansionist Communist force en Asia, they
for Asian Studies, among, whose membership within parameters dictated by its own best arise m factors independent of com-
of about 2,700 the document was circulated. interests can contribute ultimately to t- munism itself and must dealt with in
t
ient in relations b between y n the e two the context he conof the total situation.
The principal authors of the paper and
oun
r
In.
th
h
U
e
e phase Uai Iactors and
nited Nations, which is of immediate
,
Lawrence College, and Mrs . Betty Goetz Lail
concern in Washington, the scholars sug- others, we urge that the U.S.S. Government
of Cornell University's School of Industrial Bested not merely acquiescence in other adopt the following policies:
and Labor Relations. countries' insistence but that the United 1. The United States should cease to use
Mrs. tall, who formerly was a State De- States should "cease to use its influence" to its influence to prevent the admittance of
partment arms control expert and the staff keep Peiping out. the People's Republic a China l bodies. United of to the
director of the Senate Foreign Relations The position paper said this would im- the Nations and other international pence and the
Committee's Subcommittee on Disarmament, prove Washington's relations with other interests international States,
nd the
said about 300 scholars had responded to a United Nations members since "the United government interests at Peiping the should United be a cce the
request for endorsement of the statement States pays a heavy price in good relations over accepted
on China. with some countries by its pressure on them into these institutions, without conditions
us or by Of these, 198 signed it, 60 approved gener- to vote against China." posed by U . G Peiping.
ally, but not in every particular, 18 approved The position paper also suggested that the 2. The U r Government should announa-
it but did not sign; 19 opposed all or part of problem of Peiping's opposition to having ttion hat it with pewared, while maintaining rela-
no opinion. e recommended policy changes, and 5 gave "two Chinas" in the United Nations might regarding the establishment of full and fonrs-
th
Mrs. Lail said the document had been writ- be solved through an agreement that the
future of the Taiwan re ime would be nego- mal diplomatic relations with the People's
ten by a small group of China scholars, who tinted by Peiping and T gipei and guaranteed
public of China.
consulted with such experts as Morton H. by an international arrangement. 3. The United States should propose to the
's of of Halperin of the Center for International Af- new phase of Republic
bilateral nego an opening at a
fairs at Harvard, John H. Lewis, an associate (From the New York Times, Mar. 21, 1966 new phow of items would negotiations which
professor of government at Cornell, both TEXT ) the following items wbe discussed:
signers, and A. Doak Barnett of Columbia OF STATEMENT AND EON CHINA POSI- (a) Exchange of diplomatic rreseiita-
University's East Asian Institute. TION PAPER BY EXPERTS ON CHINA POLICY tion;
Professor Barnett said today he was "ex- WASHINGTON, March 20.-Following is the (b) Renunciation of force as an instru-
tremely sympathetic" to the document's rec- text of a statement on China policy sup- ment of policy:
ommendations. He did not sign It because ported by 198 Asian scholars and. excerpts (c); Arms control including problems of
when it reached him, he was "in the process from the position paper on which it was the control over nuclear weapons.
of formulating a statement of my own pre- based: - 4. The United States should announce that
cise views." STATEMmNT it is prepared to accept accredited news-
In testimony before the Senate Foreign We, the undersigned, submit the following papermen, scholars, and others from the
Relations Committee on Barth 8, he urged statement for the consideration of the ex- People's Republic of China and call upon the
the seating of Communist China in the ecutive branch, the Congress, and members People's Republic to reciprocate. American
United Nations and an American policy to- of the public. willingness to accept Chinese visitors should
ward China of "containment but not isola- That the formal China policy of the not, at least in the short run, depend on
tion." United States has long since been out of reciprocation.
The recommendations will be submitted date is widely recognized and tacitly ac- 5. The United States should end its total
to theForeign Relations Committee and the cepted even by officials of the American embargo with Communist China and permit
House Foreign Affairs Committee. Government. Changes in this policy will the importation and exportation of non-
Mrs. Lail said the Council for a Livable not solve the major political and military strategic materials.
World, a Washington-based political action challenges to the United States in Asia, but We believe that the measures suggested
organization, had agreed to undertake fur- they can improve the ability of the United here would only initiate what must be a long
ther circulation of the document and to seek States to deal with these problems and re- and difficult process leading, we hope, to the
official and public consideration of the views duce the likelihood that a crisis could turn normalization of relations between the
expressed in it. Into a major military confrontation. United States and the People's Republic of
Five "factors on which United States poi- We believe that the following represent China and a reduction of hostilities between
icy on China should now be based" were put accurately factors on which U.S. policy on the two countries. We believe, despite the
forward by the China scholars. They were China should now be based. antagonism shown by the Chinese Govern-
as follows: 1. The People's Republic of China with its ment, that it is up to the United States to
Communist China is a "reality of interna- capital at Peiping is a reality of international try to move the Chinese to a greater accept-
tional politics" of growing importance and politics, whose importance to the course- of ante of the principles of coexistence in the
therefore "there is increasing danger in the international affairs will grow. There is emerging world community.
isolation of the United States from China and increasing danger In the isolation of the THE ASIAN SCHOLARS
of China's relative isolation from other na- United - States from China and of China's Arizona
tions and international institutions." relative isolation from other nations and In.. University of Arizona, Tuscon: Earl H.
Hostility to the United States has become ternational institutions. , chairman, Comttee on Oriental
"a cornerstone" of Chinese foreign policy. 2. The People's Republic of China is now Studies; PritchardArizona State Unniiv sity, Temple:
Despite this hostility, which will not soon committed to a policy of hostility to the Guilford A. Dudley, associated professor of
be changed, Washington can still hope to United States and has made opposition to history.
convince Peiping that "while prepared to U.S. policies a cornerstone of its foreign California
respond when challenged, the United States policy.
is at the same time interested in exploring California State
College
r o at Los Angeles:
re:
areas of mutual interest and normalizing 3. In the immediate future the United D. F. Gleming, professor of international re-
rel
areas wherever possible." States Is unlikely to persuade Peiping that it lotions; Saar Stanley, associate professor of
The future of the National Chinese can Is not its most implacable enemy. But the anthropology; California State Polytechnic
only-be as a Go the
t ion Taiwan, not can United States can hope to convince Peiping College, San Luis Obispo: Francis V. Cata~
m. of
mainland China. that, while prepared to respond when chat- Tina; Claremount Graduate School and Uni-
lenged, the United States is at the same time varsity Center, Ciaremount; Cyrus H. Peake,
The major problem for the United States interested in exploring areas of mutual inter- professor of East Asian history; Los Angeles
In Asia is to help Asian countries to develop est and normalizing relations wherever Valley College, Los Angeles; Maria Naidis,
economic and social stability; this problem possible.
associate professor of history; Mills Col-
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 Approved For Release 2005106/29; CIA-RDP67B0O44,0000400040009-5
March. 21,7 1966 CONGRESSIONAL wL . uxli - 3iriVt11r
lege, Oakland; Edward Le Fevour; Pomona
College, Claremont;. Charles Leslie, San
Bernardino Valley College, San Bernardino;
William J. Moore, chairman of the political
science department, Stanford University,
Stanford;. Harumt Befu, department of
anthropology, Mark Mancall, assistant pro-
Lessor of Asian studies; Harold H. Fisher,
professor of history and chairman emeritus,
Hoover Institute and Library; G. William
Skinner, professor of anthropology; J. T.
Wixted, Department of Asian languages.
University of California, Berkeley: Gerald
D: Berreman, associate professor of anthro-
pology; James Cahill, department of art;
Chauncey D. Leake, University of California,
San Francisco Medical Center; Joseph R. Lev-
enson, professor of history; J. M. Potter, as-
sistant professor of anthropology; University
of California, Santa Cruz: Bruce D. Larkin,
assistant professor of international relations;
University of California, Los Angeles: Michael
Moerman, assistant professor of anthropol-
ogy; Nikki Keddie, assistant professor of his-
tory; University of Southern California, Los
Angeles: George O. Tauten, associate profes-
sor of political science; A. Elgin Heinz, high
drool teacher, San Francisco; J. P. Richards,
Berkeley; Mrs. Beryl F. Zimberoff, Los An-
geles; William P. Norberg, Ackerman, John-
ston,; Johnston & Matthews, San Francisco.
E. Hill, associate professor of Old Testament
language and literature; Indiana University,
Bloomington: Leon M. Zolbrod, assistant
professor of East Asian languages and litera-
tures; Saint . Mary-of-the-Woods College,
Bloomington: Sister Mary Gregory, S.P., di-
rector of Asian studies.
6127
Pfebraska
Robert H. Stoddard, Lincoln.
New Hampshire
University of New Hampshire, Durham:
Allen Linden, department of history; W.
Findley Guffey 3d, Exeter.
New Jersey
Drake University, Des Moines: C. Walter Drew University, Madison: Changboh Chee;
Clark, Jr., political science department; Charles W. Estus, instructor in sociology;
Barbara Teters, Ames. Robert Friedricks, professor of sociology;
Newark State College, Union: Howard Dis-
Kentucky bury, professor of history. Princeton Uni-
University of Kentucky, Lexington; Walter versity: William W. Lockwood, professor of
Lang lots, associate professor of modern for- politics and international affairs, Rutgers
eign languages. University, New Brunswick: Katharine S.
Louisiana Diehl, assistant professor of library science;
Tulane University, New Orleans: Henry Charlotte Furth, Princeton; Jesse G. Lutz,
Orenstein, associate professor of anthro- East Brunswick; Lawrence H. Mandel, Par-
pology. sippany.
Massachusetts New York
Boston University, Boston: Amiya Chakra- Brooklyn College: Brijen K. Gupta, de-
varty, professor of comparative Oriental re- partment of history; Charlton M. Lewis, de-
liglons and literature; Harvard University, partment of history; Colgate University,
Cambridge: Robert N. Bellah, associate pro- Hamilton: Theodore Herman, chairman, de-
fesor of sociology and regional studies; partment of geography; Kenneth W. Morgan,
Jerome A. Cohen, professor of law; Albert professor of religion.
Craig, department of history; Rupert Emer- Columbia University: Mr. and Mrs. Edwin
son, professor of government; John Fairbank, Allen, department of anthropology; William
director, East Asian Research Center; Morton R. Bryant, graduate student; L. Carrington
If. Halperin, Center for International Affairs; Goodrich, professor emeritus of Chinese;
Donald' W. Klein, East Asian Research Cen- Frank Kehl, graduate student, East Asian In-
ter; Ezra F. Vogel, East Asian Research Cen- statute; Joan P. Mencher, research associate,
tar; Edward Wagner, associate professor of department of anthropology; Wayne Wil-
Korean studies; Massachuetts Institute of cox, department of government; Cornell Uni-
Technology, Cambridge: William N. Locke, versity, Ithaca; Knight Biggerstaff, profes-
director of libraries;. Tufts University; Mel- sor of history; Alice Cook, professor of Indus-
ford: Freeland Abbot, chairman, department trial and labor relations; Claire Holt, re-
of history; Allan B. Cole, professor of East search associate, Asian studies; Lauriston
Asian Affairs, the Fletcher School of Law and Sharp, professor of anthropology; John W.
Diplomacy; Wellesley College, Wellesley: Paul Lewis, associate professor of government;
A. Cohen, department of history. Dutchess Community College, Poughkeepsie;
Michigan Carolyn C. Landau, associate professor of
Alma College, Alma: Edwin C. Blackburn,. political science; Hamilton College, Clinton:
associate professor of history; Oakland Uni- Edwin B. Lee, associate professor of history;
versity; Rochester: Sheldon Appelton, asso- Long Island University.
date professor of political science; David C. Brooklyn: Khalil A. Nasir, associate profes-
Potter, associate professor of political sci- sor of history and political science; Nek York
ence; University of Michigan, Ann Arbor: University: James T. Crown, associate pro-
J. H. Broomfield, associate professor of his- fessor of political science; State University
tort' Jason L. Finkle, consultant, Ford College, Oswego: Johnson G. Cooper, profes-
Foundation, associate professor population sor of non-Western history; State University
planning; Alexander Eckstein, professor of College, Potsdam; Luther H. Gulick, Jr.,
economics; Victor Kobayashi, associate pro- chairman, department of geography; State
fesor of education; Stephen S. Large, student University College, Genesco:, Donald Innis,
of China and Japan; Rhoads Murphey, de- chairman, department of geography; State
partment of geography; Wayne State Uni- University of New York, Albany: Dewitt C.
versity, Detroit: Shanti S. Tangri, associate Ellinwood, associate professor of history;
professor of economics; Western Michigan State University of New York, Stony Brook:
University, Kalamazoo: Chester L. Hunt; Charles Hoffman, professor of economics;
Charles O. Houston, associate professor, In- Union College, Schenectady: Malcoln Willi-
stituto of International and Area Studies; son, assistant professor of sociology; Union
Alton L. Becker, Ann Arbor; Mr. and Mrs. Theological Seminary: Herbert- C. Jackson,
Seymour Kavesky, Madison Heights; Ronald professor; Edward P. Gottlieb, national chair-
N. Montaperto, Ann Arbor; C. P. Paul Siu, man, War Resisters League; Thomas L.
Harper Woods. Havill, Syracuse; Chang Hsin-hat, Great
Minnesota Neck; Eileen Koppelman, Bronx; Prafulla
Carleton College, Northfield: Tetsuo Najita, Mukerji, Brooklyn; Richard and Elsie Orb,
associate, professor of history; Bardwell L. Keuka Park; Romesh Shah.
Smith, associate professor of religion; Robert North Carolina
E. Will, department of economics; University Meredith College, Raleigh: Lillian Parker
of Minnesota, Indianapolis: Joseph E: Wallace; University of North Carolina, Ra-
Schwartz, department of geography; Romeyn leigh; W. L. Highfill, department of philos-
Taylor, department of history. ophy and religion; Wake Forest College,
Missouri Winston-Salem: Robert G. Gregory, asso-
University of Missouri, Columbia: James elate professor of history.
W. Hamilton, department of sociology and Ohio
anthropology; University of Missouri at St. Denison University, Granville: Louis F.
Louis: Lyman Tower Sargent, assistant pro- Brakeman, chairman, department of govern-
fessor of political science; Washington Uni- ment; Maylong H. Hepp, professor of philos-
versity, St. Louis: N. J. Demerath, professor ophy; James L. Martin, coordinator of non-
of sociology; social sciences consultant, Ford Western studies; Miami University, Oxford:
Foundation, New Delhi; Donald A. Gibbs, John H. Badgley, department of government;
assistant professor of Chinese; Webster Col- Ohio State University, Dayton; Byron S.
lege, St. Louis; Sister' M. Bernard Barbato, Weng, instructor in government; Ohio Uni-
S. L., department of history. versity, Athens: John F. Cody, professor of
Ntontana history; Western College for Women, Ox-
Montana Z t' State University, Bozeman: ford: T. A. Sisson, cliairinan, department of
Richard B. Landis, assistant professor of intercultural studies; Robert Brank Fulton,
Asian history, associate professor of intercultural studies.
C`onneetidut
Yale University,. New Haven: Harry J.
Renda, Department of History; Kenneth
Scott Latourette, professor of missions and
Oriental history, emeritus; Arthur F. Wright,
Charles Seymour, professor of history; Mary
C, Wright, professor of history; John de
Francis,, Madison.
Washington, D.C.
American University, School of Interna-
tional Service:Millidge P. Walker, associate
professor of Southeast Asian studies; How-
ard University; Trene Tinker, assistant pro-
fessor of department of government; Bar-
bara Rieman Alperovitz, Arms Control Divi-
sion, the 8endix Corp.; John Melby; Andrew
E, Rice. '
Florida
Mortimer Graves, Key West.
Hawaii
Institute for Student Interchange, East-
West Center, Honolulu: Robert Aitken, eval-
nation of alumni liaison officer; University of
Hawaii, Honolulu: Willard D, Keim, depart-
Ment of political science; Oliver M. Lee,
assistant professor of political science; Eliza-
beth Wittermans, Center for Cultural and
.Technical Interchange Between East and
West; John Singleton, associate director, In-
formation Development Fellowship and Sem-
inars, Center for Cultural and Technical
Interchange Between East and West; George
H. Gadbois, Jr., associate director, Exchange
of Persons Programs,. Center for Cultural
and Technical Interchange Between East
and West.
Illinois
Bradley University,' Peoria George E.
Stoner, Jr., instructor in geography; Knox
College, Galesbu"rg: M. Hane; Northern Illi-
nois University, ]le Kalb: James R. Shirley,
department of history; Northwestern Uni-
versity, Evanston: James E. Sheridan, de-
partment of history; Southern Illinois Uni-
versity, Carbondale: H. B, Jacobini, professor
of government; University of Chicago: Clif-
ford Geertz, department of anthropology;
Benson Earl Ginsburg, associate dean of the
college; McKim Mariott, professor of anthro=
pology; Manning Nash, professor of anthro
pology; Melforcl t. Spiro, department of
anthropology Frederick M. Asher, Chicago;
Douglas Wayne Johnson, Rockford; Norman
J. Palmer, De Kalb,
rndi'ana
Earlhai3l Oollee, Richmond: Jackson
Bailey, associate professor of history; Inds-
ana School 'of Religion, Bloomington: Harold
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 6128
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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD.- SENATE March 21
Oregon
Lewis and Clark College, Portland: Hideo
Hashimoto, professor of religion; University
of Oregon, Eugene: Kathleen G. Aberle, re-
search association in anthropology.
Pennsylvania
Carnegie Institute of Technology, Pitts-
burgh: M. Bronfenbrenner, Graduate School
of International Affairs; Franklin and
Marshall College, Lancaster; Thomas Hop-
kins, associate professor of religion; Gettys-
burgh College: John Roger Stemen, depart-
ment of history; Haverford College: Holland
Hunter, chairman of department of econom-
ics; Ohio Methodist Theological School:
Ernest E. Best, associate professor of theol-
ogy; University of Pennsylvania, Philadel-
phia: Derk Bodde, professor of Chinese; F.
Hilary Conroy, professor of history; Leigh
Lisker, professor of linguistics; Jonathan
Mirsky, oriental studies; Donald E. Smith,
associate professor of political science; Wil-
son enilava
tribute to a growing consensus within the .1
United States that our China policy should The United Nations ought to be a uni-
be modified, that our Government should versal organization. Its main u
indicate willingness to undertake changes, p rpose is to
and that these ro maintain international peace and security
p posed changes should be a
debated and discus nd its effectiveness to do this will be lim-
sed increasingly by citi- ited, if not drastically curtailed, as long as
zens throughout the country.
There are occasions when important nations are not members. China,
i the largest country in the world population-
government T are reluctant to o embark o o ken a a
given policy change because they think such wise and one of the great powers in Asia,
a change would not be supported by the pub- should be permitted to become a United
lie. With respect to U.S. policy toward China Nations members and encouraged to assume
it appears that this factor is one of those in- all the obligations and responsibilities that
hibiting United States governmental action. membership entails.
Therefore, it is important, through discus- Some argue that China does not qualify
Sion and sober exchange of views, to per- for membership because Article 4 of the
suade the Government that there is wide- United Nations Charter states that:
spread support for a change in its policy to- `Membership in the United Nations is
ward China and that the United States, by open to all other peace-loving states which
changing its policy within parameters dic- accept the obligations contained in the pres-
tated by its own best interests, can contrib- ant charter and, in the judgment of the or-
ute ultimately to an improvement in rela- ganization, are able and willing to carry out
General considerations i.oavaia6 uaiue one legai argument, the ques-
Townsend, professor of economics; Helen tion remains as to whether China is able and
Lee Jones, Frederick Gaige, Philadelphia; A. The United States has always been opposed willing to abide by the obligations of the
Gutkind Bulling, Philadelphia. to Communist expansionist and aggressive United Nations Charter as stated in Article
Tennessee policies. In the past the Government has 2. These obligations include willingness to
also refused to deal with Communist govern- settle disputes by peaceful means, to refrain
Memphis State University: Ram Mohan ments. We have believed communism to be from the threat or use of force against the
Roy, department of political science. an antidemocratic force, inimical to the
territorial Utah growth of freedom and self-government, and of any d state, integrity
to , to give e every ery assistance sisttancance to the
bent on the destruction of those govern- United Nations in e a the
Brigham Young University, Provo: Paul any action it takes in
Byer, coordinator of Asian studies; Univer- ments whose economic systems were based accordance with the present charter, and to
sity of Utah, Salt Lake City: Helmut G. on a measure of free enterprise and capital- refrain from giving assistance to any state
Callis, chairman of Asian studies, profes- ism. At times we assumed that Communist against which the United Nations is taking
sor of history and political science. governments wanted to destroy any society preventive or enforcement action.
Vermont or government that was not Communist.
University of Vermont, Burlington: Hor- Because of the above considerations the
United States waited for 14 years before it
race Briggs 2d, instructor,, department of established diplomatic relations with the
political science. Soviet Union in 1933, and then the fact of
Virginia recognition in no way implied approval of
Sweet Briar College: Richard C. Rowland, its Government policies, but rather accept-
department of English; University of Vir- ance of the Soviet Union as a government in
ginia, Charlottesville: Richard J. Coughlin, control of a large population and important
professor of sociology; Maurice Meisner, as- territory.
sociate professor of East Asian history. After World War U, while the United
Washington states never severed diplomatic relations
with the Soviet Union, our Government,
Eastern Washington State College, Cheney: nevertheless, felt that the Soviet Union had
Charles H. Hedtky, division of history and to be contained in what we believed were
social science; Gonzaga University, Spokane: aggressive and expansionist policies. Today
Jack D. Salmon, assistant professor of po- the Soviet Union has given indications of
litical science; University of Washington, changes in its foreign policies and many
Seattle: Paul R. Brass, assistant professor of its internal characteristics, so much so
of political science; Charles F. Keyes, as- that the United States and the Soviet Union
sistant professor of anthropology; Marwyn have reached mutually satisfactory relation-
S. Samuels, modern Chinese studies. ships on a variety of subjects.
Wisconsin U.S. relations with China, in contrast to
University of Wisconsin, Madison: Eugene U.S. relations with the Soviet Union and
Boardman, professor of History; Ripley Moor, Communist States in eastern Europe, have
assistant professor of Indian studies. grown from bad to worse. Whereas shortly
Canada after the Communists came to power in
China in. 1949, the United States stated that
University of Toronto: Donald E. Willmott, it did not intend to take further sides in the
associate professor of soci
l
o
ogy. civil war between the Communists and the
Ceylon Nationalists and appeared to be actively con-
University of Ceylon: Gananath Obeyes- sidering recognition of the Chinese Commu-
kere, lecturer in sociology. nist regime, today there is increasing hostil-
France
T. D. Long, Organization for Economic
Cooperation and Development, directorate
for scientific affairs, Paris.
India
Margaret L. Cormack, director of U.S. Edu-
cational Foundation in India.
Japan
Tokyo University: Toshio,
emeritus.
Taiwan
Mark Selden, Taipei.
POSITION PAPEk
Introduction
The purpose of this paper is to set forth
reasons Supporting certain recommended
changes in United States policy toward
China. It is hoped that the paper will con-
Ito between the two countries.
Beginning with the Korean war in 1950
it is not difficult for a U.S. citizen to
construct excellent arguments as to why
the deterioration of relations with China
has been the fault primarily of China, but The United States would have a better
conversely it does not take a lot of imagina_ chance of securing a balanced settlement over
tion to construct a Chinese viewpoint to the the future of Taiwan if it accepted China
effect that the cause of bad relations has in the United Nations.
been mainly the responsibility of the United Many countries, especially several in Latin
States. America and Africa, refused to vote a set
RECOMMENDED POLICY CHANGE NO. 1 for China because the wording of the pro-
The United States should cease to use its posed U.N. resolution simultaneously would
influence to prevent the admittance of the have evicted the Chinese Nationalist regime
People's Republic of China to the United on Taiwan. Had that resolution been worded
Nations and other international bodies. In differently there 'are some observers who feel
the interests of international peace and the that a majority vote in favor of Chinese ad-
national security of the United States, the mission would have occurred.
Government at Peiping should be accepted RECOMMENDED POLICY CHANGE NO. 2
into these institutions, without conditions The U.S. Government should announce
posed by us or by Peiping. that it is prepared, without prejudice to
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Peace and security in Asia will be more
difficult to secure and maintain with China
outside rather than inside the United Na-
tions; thus, the security interests of the
United States are better served if China be-
comes a United Nations member.
If the restoration of peace and security in
Asia is made difficult or impossible in some
cases because China is denied admission to
the United Nations to present its case, to
negotiate there to end the dispute, or to hear
the complaints of others, then the security
of the United States, with its widespread
commitments in Asia, is also threatened.
Whether the Chinese, once admitted to the
United Nations, would do all in their power
to wreck it would seem to depend on how
such behavior hurt or helped its foreign pol-
icy interests. If the Chinese want to win
friends among the nonalined countries of
the world they would not act to alienate
these countries by improper behavior in the
United Nations. If the Chinese want to trade
and have normal relations with countries in
western Europe and elsewhere they may not
want to antagonize them by attempting to
obstruct progress in various areas of inter-
national cooperation.
3
U.S. interests in the United Nations would
be better served if the United States re-
moves its objections to membership for
China than if China is admitted over the
negative vote of the United States.
 *
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March 21, 1966 CONGRESS-TONAL RECORD - SENATE 6129
the maintenance of its relations with Tai- try to justify such wars on the ground that Mr. MUSKIE. Mr. President, I suggest
wan, to enter into negotiations regarding the people in these countries are being op- the absence of a quorum.
the establishment of full and formal diplo- presed, usually with the help of the im- The PRESIDING OFFICER. The
matic relations with the People's Republic perialist United States. clerk will call the roll.
of China. By indicating that it is prepared In the United States view the Chinese The legislative clerk proceeded to call
to recognize and have diplomatic relations Government's sanction of force labels it as
with the present Government of China, the an enemy of peace and it is the principal the roll.
United States would be taking a first step reason today for the large U.S. military pres- k Mr. FULBRIGHT. unanimous consent Mr. President, order I
toward normalizing its relations with China. ence and involvement in Asia. Before the as
China may reject the United States offer, United States could consider any significant for the quorum call be rescinded.
but this is not an argument why it should withdrawals of its military power from Asia,. The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without
not be made. it would want an understanding that Chi-
I nese policy would not encompass military objection, it is so ordered.
Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President,
The main reason why the United States aid to Communist subversion groups in other
areas. with regard to the pending business, we
should try to have formal relations with It is unlikely, however, that there is much discussed this matter at some length in
ment, is that through world peace recognition will of be jitseopardigovern-zed the United States can do at this juncture to the authorization stages only a few days
eat, persuade China to drop its policy of support- ago. I supported the authorization be-
cont et between the eecontinued e two lack than n ing, in principle at least, wars of liberation. cause of the necessities of supporting the
by increased con tntact. these two While co the recognition But what would be desirable is an agree-
by ment to the effect that China would not sup- Army in the field in Vietnam.
was
that
point
The
s and
In no way
g
that peaceful relati assures it a would improvement
that the Uply arms to nited Statesrwou di not u ermiillitary force time was a question of oU policy in V et-the two countries were attempting to reduce to thwart every attempt to install a Com- nam and also in China, about which we
tensions between them. munist government into office. are now holding hearings in the Foreign
Bilateral discussions over arms control is- Relations Committee.
Recognition of China by the United States, sues including the control over nuclear weap- These hearings, in my opinion, have
if reciprocated by China, would mean that one should not be regarded in any way as opened the subject up for healthy debate.
contacts at various levels might. be made. a substitute for international discussions. There are some differences of view among
While some U.S. citizens could be permitted Such bilateral discussions are thought to be the committee members as well as among
to travel to China and Chinese citizens per- advisable because they could provide an op- the witnesses.
matted to travel to the United States, this portunity for the United States and China
would be very limited if there were no diplo- to exchange their views on the subject with- I am hopeful that as a result of these
matic relations between the two govern- out having them subjected immediately to deliberations by the committee members,
ments. Contacts at various levels-scholars, public reaction. the public, the Senate, and by the ad-
'Government officials, journalists, scientists, As stated earlier, the main benefit to be ex- ministration, a more effective policy, tak-
artists, businessmen, and so forth-would pected from exchanges of persons in different ing account of the very obvious changes
permit renewal of exchange of information fields .is that the degree of ignorance about that have taken place in Asia, as well as
about life,. conditions, and thought in the the society in the two countries would be parts of the world, will be de-
two countries. reduced. Increased contact does not al- in in. other
3 ways result in improved relations or under-
Recognition offers a means of conducting standing, but it usually succeeds in reducing In Europe, for example, the attitude on
business and settling disputes. It provides misconceptions. the part of our closest allies under NATO
a channel by which the countries can reach RECOMMENDED POLICY CHANGE NO. 4 has certainly undergone some change re-
as announced by the consortium
formal agreements about such matters as The United States should announce that cently
trade, exchange of persons, and political it is prepared to accept accredited newspa- which negotiated to supply a steel plant
problems. Some might argue that the United. permen, scholars, and Other from the Pea- to mainland China.
States and China have reached agreements pie's Republic of China and call upon the In a way, this entire procedure reminds
and resolved differences before without resort People's Republic to reciprocate. American me very much of the policy we followed
to recognition; the case most often cited is willingness to accept Chinese visitors should
after
the negotiation to end the Korean war. not, at least in the short run, depend on World War I in regard to Soviet
Furthermore, some: officials argue that the reciprocation. Russia.
current occasional meetings between a U.S. I think it is high time we reevaluated
and Chinese representatives at Warsaw pro- It has been stated earlier that the full im- Our policies, considered them Objectively;
vide a channel through which disputes can plementation of this recommended change in our o changes are red warranted, that
they
be. settled. U.S. policy for all practical purposes depends , if upon the success in negotiations over recog- be made.
RECOMMENDED POLICY CHANGE NO. 3 nition and an exchange of Ambassadors. I believe some changes are warranted;
The United States should propose to the Some exchanges, nevertheless, could occur although there are differences of opinion
People's Republic of China an opening of while such negotiations were being under- in the committee, and I am sure in the
a new phase of bilateral negotiations at taken or even before they were convened, administration, such is quite natural,
.which the following items would be dis- The United States refused to undertake an healthy, and proper in our system of goV-
cussed: exchange of newsmen at a time when the I pr hopeful that system will move
(a) Exchange of diplomatic 'represents- Chinese were receptive to such a step in the ernment. tion; mid-1950's. When the United States de- toward modernizing our policy as a result
(b) Renunciation of force as an instru- cided a few years later that this might be a of this reevaluation.
met of policy;. good step, the Chinese retracted their offer. I think all of us would agree that, re-
-(c) Arms control Including problems of As a result, no Chinese from China come to gardless of our views, we should work for
the control over nuclear weapons. the United States and practically no Ameri- restoration of the peace.
Discussions on the exchange of diploma- cans visit China. There is evidence that lim- The difference is how we achieve that
tic representatives might include such mat- ited exchanges could now take place prior to there
ters as how each Government was prepared diplomatic recognition if this could be done Ctooemmon people objwhoective. It advocate is said that preventive war.
to treat citizens of the other traveling within quietly and without extensive publicity.
No one appeared and testified before our
its boundaries. Some issues left over from RECOMMENDED POLICY CHANGE NO. 5
1949, such as economic arrangements, might committee to that effect. These rumors
be usefully treated. Similar talks with gen- The United States should end its total about extreme views are always current.
artily beneficial results took place between trade embargo with Communist China and There may be something to them, but I
officials of the United States and Soviet Gov- permit the importation and exportation of ernments prior to U.S. recognition of the nonstrategic materials. do not believe responsible, influential
Soviet Union in 1933. In the past few years 10 West European members of either the executive or the
A discussion of the renunciation of force countries have'sent trade missions to China legislative branches would support such
as an instrument of policy is of concern to (Austria, Belgium, Denmark; Finland, an extreme position. They may get im-
the United States in view of the implications France, Italy, the Netherlands, Sweden, the patient with our present policies. But
of the Chinese policy to take Taiwan by United Kingdom, and West Germany.) Ja- that is natural.
force and to support so-called wars'of libera- pan and Canada have also sent missions. By voting in favor of this appropria-
tion in. the developing nations of Africa, Asia, The results have not been substantial and it tion, I consider it a vote to support our
and Latin America. To the United States, is not likely that a great deal of trade can be Armed Forces in the field. I do not
the Chinese position suggests that the Chi- developed immediately between the United consider i Forces
endorsement of our do
or
nese will be,fomenting revolution, subver- States and China; a start, however, could be past
alto, and violence in as many pmts of the made. This would be another channel for Current policy in South Vietnam. I
world as It can. The Chinese,'for their part, opening up contacts. thoroughly disapprove of the course of
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6130 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD -SENATE March 21, 1966
events which has led us into the situa- age it will do and is doing not only in conference table ready to surrender and
tion in South Vietnam. It is very diffi- South Vietnam but to our economy at apologize. Then we shall work out the
cult to say how we should extricate our- home. details of ending hostilities."
selves. I believe we made a great and Finally, I have been anticipating for The Senator said "saving face" or
serious mistake in becoming involved in several years, because of the cold war, a "saving honor." In dealings between
a colonial war on the side of a colonial time when we could concentrate on our nations, face is always being saved.
power in 1950. I do not want to review domestic affairs. I made two or three There is constantly an interaction of
all this; it has been covered before. But speeches last year and the year before in friction between great nations; they are
I do believe we made a mistake in renew- which I said that the time had come for always saving face. That is a part of
ing that involvement in 1954. us to become more preoccupied and to diplomacy.
I remind Senators that the chairman give more attention to our domestic af- That is what diplomacy is for. It is
of the Committee on Armed Services and fairs. We have allowed our cities, our to allow people to compromise their dif-
the ranking Democrat said at that time schools, our streams, and our air to de- ferences in an honorable way. There is
that they considered it involvement in a teriorate through neglect-both of atten- nothing wrong with saving face, which is
minor way. But now, having become tion and of money. It is a great tragedy actually compromise or accommodation,
greatly involved, we have become in- that just as we thought we were making if you like. In certain circles, these
volved in a way I do not agree with. this breakthrough in the quality of our words all take on a kind of ominous
But the difference is not a matter of living at home, the war in southeast Asia meaning. To me, they do not. The
principle; it is largely a matter of degree. arose to intefere. If the war is not point is to get a settlement in which the
In any case, I want to make it plain that stopped, I predict that we shall further faces of both sides are saved. It is an
I am not objecting to our present situa- deteriorate domestically; and our exam- endeavor to see if a ceasefire can be
tion so long as it does not become an ple to the world as a great and sue- brought about, and then to see if negoti-
expanded one. cessful democratic nation will be drawn ations can be had with an open mind,
I should like to see some efforts made into question, which after all, is the with the idea of allowing the area to
to find ways to end the war. If the war strongest appeal we can have to other determine its own future, in the kind of
Is expanded in a major way, engaging peoples, to other lands. In conclusion, society it desires to have.
hundreds of thousands of troops, there our concept of society and the validity of We say we believe in self-determina-
is always a danger, whether we like it or our approach to the solutions of the tion. That is supposed to be one of the
not or plan it or not and whether the many prblems of society rest on the res- principles of our foreign policy. If it is-
President wishes it or not, that due to olution of the conflict in southeast Asia. and I believe it ought to be-we should
miscalculations, accidents, or to other Mr. CLARK. Mr. President, will the seek some adjustment by which this ac-
unforeseen incidents, the war may be- Senator from Arkansas yield? tion could be brought about. I sug-
come a major war, which would probably Mr. FULBRIGHT. I yield. gest, though I do not pretend it is the
be a nuclear war. Mr. CLARK. The Senator knows that only answer,. that we should give consid-
We can never forget what happened in I am generally in accord with the views eration to a form of neutralization of
1914. I do not really believe that any of he has just quite eloquently expressed. Vietnam, and then to look forward to
the major countries wished to have the The Senator from Oregon [Mr. MORSE] the neutralization of Thailand and the
kind of, world war that followed. But is in the Chamber, and he, too, is one perimeter of what was formerly Indo-
the plans got beyond their control, and who thinks we cannot unilaterally pull china. This possibility should be exam
they came very close to disaster. Cer- out of Vietnam. I am sure that all three ined and analyzed. There may be dif-
tainly that war maimed the most ad- of us are most anxious to see this war ficulties. But there are grave difficulties
vanced civilization of the Western Eu- brought to an end under terms which will in any suggestion that I have come
rope of that day, and the countries of be, as it is said, honorable to the United across.
Europe have never recovered. Yet it was States. Once people start to fight, their tem-
really an accident, or in part an acci- I sometimes wonder if we do not pers are flared; they develop an attitude
dental war. What happened was ridic- identify "honorable" with "saving face." that is uncompromising. So it is a war
ulous. There were no really serious Perhaps we do; perhaps we do not. to the death; it is unconditional sur-
grievances. The differences that were Also, the Senator from Oregon is of render, which is what we had in the last
said to have caused that war were all the view that we had best get out of this war. It created more problems than it
triflng; particularly the issue concerning war, a war which I think all three of solved. And I am merely trying to ap-
the assassination of the heir to the us agree we should never have gotten proach the matter in this way.
throne of the practically extinct Austro- Into, through the good graces of the In doing so, I realize that it is difficult
Hungarian Empire by an irresponsible United Nations. I have been somewhat to cite an historical example of a power-
private citizen, skeptical as to whether that agency as ful country like the United States not
Nevertheless, I shall support this ap- presently situated is in any position to be proceeding to complete victory. I am
propriation to pursue the war, much as of much use in bringing the war to an also quite certain that in nearly every
I regret having to do so. The war is ter- end. case such action has created more prob-
ribly expensive. It will certainly infringe My question to the Senator is: How lems than it has solved. It is not a satis-
upon our domestic programs, about would he propose that we bring the war factory way, and much less so with nu-
which we were so enthusiastic only a to an end and reach some sort of a solu- clear weapons in the offing.
year ago. As I recall, I supported all of tion which we could persuade the peo- I do not know whether the words "face
the administration's programs in the ple of the United States was in their in- saving" are bad words. Perhaps we could
domestic field. terest, and save face in South Vietnam? 'think of a better term.
Within a year, however, we are feel- Mr. FULBRIGHT. The Senator from In a total victory, one side abjectly
ing the pressure. Talk of inflation is be- Pennsylvania does me great honor even surrenders and the other side dictates the
ginning. Undoubtedly, some measures to insinuate that I have a solution of terms. Then the side that surrendered
will be taken to restrain its occurrence this problem at the tip of my tongue. likes awake at night to find a way by
and, indeed, those measures may threat- There is no simple solution. The prob- which 'they may breach that agreement.
en a recession. Whether the domino lems are complex and involved. But And they will find a way. It has hap-
effect exists in foreign policy, it certainly what. strikes one who evaluates our pol- pened every time.
exists in domestic policy, when applied icy is not any specific program. That It will happen this time unless we
to our economy. I deeply regret it. went particularly bad but rather a gen- choose to stay there to enforce neutrality.
My only interest in holding hearings eral attitude that one assumes to be I do not know how long we would be able
and having a discussion is to try to make present. It developed in our hearings. to maintain this kind of operation either
an Improvement so that we may better It seems to me that implicit in this atti- physically, financially, or morally. I do
understand our policies. It is my hope tude is the necessity of requiring a com- not know whether the people would
that they may bring this very tragic war plete surrender of the opponents. That tolerate it.
to some kind of conclusion through nego- attitude says, "We do not want any com I would not like to be driven out for
tiations and, at the very least, to limit promise. You must surrender, quit do- any of those reasons. I would prefer to
its extent and thus the amount of dam- ing what you are doing, and come to the find a voluntary solution where we might
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March 21, 1966 CON
enter into an agreement with the other What. are the views of the senator I do not know whether it is proper to
side. I believe such an agreement might from.Arkansas on that? say that they are happy. I do not know
have a chance of survival, at least for a. Mr. FULBRIGHT. The Senator is how even the Chinese could be happy
generation or two. That is all that we quite correct that we should be examin- about this situation. I do feel that they
can expect in this kind of world. I ing all of these approaches. It is not think it serves their long-term purposes,
would not like to see any agreement break quite accurate to say that the adminis- because we are obviously spending our
down in 4 or 5 years. tration or even the Secretary of State material resources and our moral re-
Mr.. CLARK. Mr. President, will the would not talk to the Vietcong, sources. We are beginning to be very
Senator yield further? They have said that they would tol- abrasive with some of our best allies in
Mr. FULBRIGHT. I yield. crate them at a conference at which complaining about their policies, such
Mr. CLARK. The Senator will recall Hanoi would be the principal party. They as their policy of trading with China.
that we did not fight the Korean war to would be given a place at the table, how- I believe they feel it suits their policy.
a total victory. Quite the contrary, we ever. These differences, on a purely ra- I think that we are the only losers.
had total victory within our grasp at one tional basis, do not have great appeal. I judge that China is not inclined to
point, but we did no seize it. The Chi- I think the excuse for taking such a seek any negotiations, or even to ap-
nese then came in with their "volun position is that it would undermine the prove any negotiations. Judging from
teers," and, in the end, we stabilized the stability of the South Vietnamese Gov- the testimony we have head I do not be-
lines of the contending. parties about ernment. The South Vietnamese Gov- lieve that, on balance, this necessarily
where they should have been in the first ernment has been quite a disappoint- controls either the Vietcong or Hanoi.
instance. ment; not only to the present adminis- If it is made to appear to their interests,
That would be more difficult to do in tration, but also to the former one, if we could ever make them believe that
Vietnam for a variety of reasons that I Surely we should be able to influence we mean what we say, and if we say the
shall not go into. that government. We are supporting it right thing, it might be different. I
Mr. FULBRIGHT. This is a much very strongly, and they are threatened realize that is a lot of "ifs." That is why
more complicated situation. with some difficulty now arising out of one cannot be dogmatic about it.
Mr. CLARK. I should like to have the this new change. There is certainly a great problem of
observation of the Senator on this mat- I agree with the Senator that the Viet- convincing them that we mean what-
ter. I do not believe that the Commu- cong leaders are well known. Mr. Fall ever reasonable proposal we make-not
nist Chinese at this_ point will encourage in a private session with the commit- so much because of our past connec-
Hanoi to,talk and to settle the matter, tee gave us resumes and biographical tions, but because of the way they have
for, after all, they are fighting to the last sketches of the leading figures in the suffered since World War II in the be
American and to the last North Vietna- Vietcong. I do not think it true that trayal that has been mentioned. In
mese. They are not losing any of their these people are not known. 1954 they also think they were betrayed;
own people. I think they are quite happy For instance, one of the leaders is a and I think they were in 1946. After
with the. situation. 'Judging from the well known and formerly, highly re- actions which would lead a reasonable
belligerent conduct of the Chinese lead- garded nationalist lawyer from Saigon. person to believe the French were going.
ership, I see very little prospect that they He fell into disfavor with the tyrannical to peacefully give up their colonial power,
would be willing to discuss the kind of rule of the late Diem. At one time he the French reneged on their agreement,:
settlement in Vietnam which the Amer- was a non-Communist. I am not sure and resumed the war to establish their
icans would consider. that he Is a formal member of the control.
Nobody knows the extent to which Ho Communist Party. In any case these That creates suspicion, and what is
Chi Minh and North Vietnam are under people are known and can be found if generally called a credibility gap that.
Chinese domination. There can be two we wish to find them. applies to us even though we are not re
schgols of thought on that. My own view Mr. CLARK. They have diplomatic sponsible for having created it-certainly
is that at the moment it is not very likely groups abroad. not wholly if at all. We have been a
that Hanoi would be willing to talk, be- Mr. FULBRIGHT. The Senator is party, with the French, in helping them
cause they are not yet convinced that correct. There was some discussion in to reestablish their control. Anyway,
they and their allies, the Vietcong, are the committee this morning about Hanoi that is ancient history, although I think
not going to win and drive us out. and China. There is a difference of it is significant in explaining the atti-
They have the view, I fear, that we opinion among the experts. tudes and the difficulties that we now
may get tired, and I think some of us And I can only judge on the basis face.
who have been opposing the present of the testimony from the experts who Mr. CLARK. I thank the Senator.
policy in Vietnam may lend some, but study this matter. Dr. Zagoria, of Co- Mr. FULBRIGHT. I yield the floor.
not much, credence to that view. lumbia, stated only this morning that Mr. CLARK. Mr. President, the Pend-
The one thing that disturbs me is that he felt there was more ill feeling toward ing supplemental defense appropriation
the Secretary of State and others in high Hanoi on the part of the Vietcong than bill for the fiscal year 1966, which ends
authority-although the President has is generally understood. es a the of $13,-
not been as clear on this as have the Dr. Zagoria mentioned particularly on on5, J1une ne 3 30, This includes
amount 3,-
13,000. is re
others-have said that we will not talk the fact that Hanoi had betrayed them quested by the President, and is also the
to the people who are shooting Ameri- after the 1954 agreement and that amount provided by the House of Repre-
can boys. Hanoi had sold them out. He feels that sentatives.
L think the soundest way of eventually they could be disposed to negotiate on broken down as defense ap-
be at a satisfactory solution would their own. He is not positive of this. It is broken
isti ken are as broken down,
be to make every earnest effort to get the These are estimates based upon past but riat on generally bills speaking, the bill provides
Vietcong leaders to negotiate. I have connections and past differences. pu buded funds for continued support provides
great difficuly in believing that we do Mr. CLARK. That is also the view of needed in sAsia for the re-
equal know who those leaders are. I have Bernard Fall, I believe, judging from a operations s in southeast
tre asyear.
equal difficulty in believing that it is private conversation I had with him last me Tndee of
also u rn bilfiscal addition to
not possible to get Hanoi to sit down and week. is in , in
see if this thing cannot be. worked out. Mr. FULBRIGHT. Under certain cir- the normal military categories, some-
Actually, I hope that a negotiation be- cumstances. I do not believe that these thing in excess of $400 million for eco-to foreign tween either ourselves and the Viet- men actually know. This is their best nomic part assistance which goes to South countries, the
tong-or, if we can only get a govern- Judgment about the situation.
ment in South Vietnam which would be We do know that priority of punish- nam, and results bfrom an authorization
y the Congress which
willing to talk with their own fellow ment has gone to the Vietcong. They measure
came out approved of the by the Foreign hick
countrymen-would offer the best hope are being killed and bombed and at- tions Committee not too long ago.
for an immediate solution, and, in fact, tacked by the full force of our power.
at the moment practically the only hope Surely, they do not enjoy that. Next are With this supplemental appropriation,
to prevent this war from not only con- the North Vietnamese. And, of course the combined total for the Department of
timing for a good long while, but also through all of this China, as the Senator Defense which Congress will have ap-
ccelerating. said a moment ago, is having a free ride. propriated for fiscal 1966 amounts to
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6132 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE March 21, 1966
$60,868,733,000, excluding military as- Japanese during World War II; but nam. Unfortunately, the Saigon govern-
sistance to foreign countries. after V-J Day and total victory on the ment was unable to put down the guer-
That is a sizable amount of our gross part of ourselves and our Allies, the rilla war which, to a very substantial
national product to devote to the mili- French went back, only to be thrown out extent, was supported, and to some ex-
tary. I regret that it needs to be so by an indigenous revolution headed by tent, unquestionably, was controlled, by
large; and yet I see no alternative ex- Ho Chi Minh, the father symbol of Viet- Hanoi, where Ho Chi Minh was head of
cept to vote for the bill. Nevertheless, I nam, south as well as north. state.
wish to be quite specific about my That revolution was a cruel one, it re- By the time the end of 1964 rolled
reservations in backing the military to sulted in many casualties and vast bad around, it was quite apparent that the
this extent, and about a number of the feeling and, in the end, while France was South Vietnamese Army was about to
policies of the State Department and the not actually driven out of the country by collapse; that the Vietcong, supported
Department of Defense. military means, her position after Dien- by Hanoi, were about to overrun the
I am concerned about the war hawks in bienphu became untenable. She was country; and that we had to make a
the press and one or two of them in Con- wise enough to enter into negotiations basic policy decision-intervene with
gress. Senators will recall that the which resulted in her withdrawal from massive American troops or see the coun-
phrase "war hawks" was originally ap- North Vietnam and in turning South try taken over by the North Vietnamese,
plied to several young Congressmen, Vietnam over to a puppet, who turned who were, to all intents and purposes,
notably Henry Clay and John C. Cal- out to be quite incapable of governing communists, as were most, but not all,
houn, when they practically forced the the country. their South Vietnamese allies. And so
Congress and the country into the War At that point, we intervened and in President Johnson moved in massively.
of 1812-a war which I think most his- effect put our own man, Ngo Dinh Diem Our troop strength on the ground,
torians now view as having been quite into the leadership of South Vietnam. consisting of Marines and Army units,
unnecessary. It resulted in the burning For a while, all seemed to go well; but increased from the approximately 10,000
of Washington and of the Capitol, and in short order he, turned out to be a ruth- which were there at the time of Presi-
that is about all that it did effectuate, al- less totalitarian with no real interest in dent Kennedy's speech to what is now
though there was some diminution in the the democratization of his country around 220,000 members of the Armed
arrogance of the British in attacking our or in carrying through the social and Forces, Marines, and Army, in South
merchant shipping after the war was economic reforms which were essential Vietnam.
over. to bring in a species of freedom and well- In addition, there are perhaps a total
But I do not believe the war hawks being, much less democracy, to South of upward of 80,000 additional Air Force
then turned out to be very good prophets. Vietnam. and Navy military personnel engaged in
I do not believe they are turning out to be In due course, he was assassinated by assisting land forces in their battle
very good prophets now. I hope very his own original supporters. against the Vietcong, and those regular
much, and in fact I believe that the A series of ineffective governments suc- army troops of North Vietnam known as
President of the United States will not ceeded each other, one general or one PAVN, which have been identified as
accept the advice of the war hawks of civilian head after another being unable fighting in South Vietnam against us and
the press, supported as they are by some, to maintain themselves in power in Sai- against the forces of the Saigon Govern-
but certainly not all of the military, and gon and having no effective control over ment.
by a few but not many of Members of the countryside. The results of this escalated war have
Congress. These governments also pretty well been, first, that we did prevent the Viet-
Mr. President, I am prepared to sup- alienated the peasants in South Vietnam. tong and Hanoi from taking over. The
port the President of the United States It was not too long before, the commit- South Vietnamese forces have rallied.
in his onerous task as Commander in ment made to have free elections in In many parts of the country they are
Chief of our Armed Forces. I hope that South Vietnam having been violated by fighting gallantly. We turned the tide.
he will continue to heed the advice of Diem, a civil war broke out, which has Now, we have arrived at a point that is
those who advocate caution, of those who continued to this date. something of a stalemate in Vietnam.
are opposed to a unilateral escalating of The result has been the progressive My view is that without an unaccept-
the war on our part. deterioration of the economy and of the able rate of American casualties, a rate
I hope that he will discard the advice South Vietnamese society. far higher than the expanded rate we are
of those few warhawks who have no The unfortunate people of South Viet- now sustaining, we cannot win that war
fear of the possibility of becoming in- nam have really lived under wartime in the sense that we can clear out the
volved in a war with Communist China conditions since the Japanese first moved countryside of the Vietcong and the
which might easily turn into a nuclear in in 1941. troops of Hanoi, and pacify it, and create
war and pose a grave threat to civiliza- The American commitment made a free and hopefully democratic govern-
tion as we know it. originally to Diem, who was actually ment in South Vietnam.
But in order to indicate my reserva- installed as the head of South Viet- I do not believe that such a result is
tions with respect to our present policy nam under the prodding of some very feasible, except, as I say, at a cost of
and my hope that the President will give important Americans, not all of them in American casualties at a rate which I,
careful consideration to these reserva- public life, was to give assistance to the for one, would not be willing to accept.
tions, I should like to state my position economic government assistance, terms o of training On the other hand, it is becoming in-
as explicitly as I can. economic and d some training
of troops to enable the South Vietnamese creasingly clear, particularly since the
First, I see no alternative but to vote people themselves to :put down the civil first of this year, that the North Viet-
for the bill. The lives of our men are war which had broken out-in large part, namese and the Vietcong are not going
in jeopardy in South Vietnam. As long I suggest-as a result of the cruelty and to be able to win the war either, and that
as a peace there seems a good ways off, the ineffectiveness of the Diem govern- we cannot and will not be driven out, de-
I could not with good conscience do any- ment. spite the criticism which has come from
thing except to give them, by my vote, Our assistance, both economic and a number of Members of the Senate
the money which the Commander in technical, including technical military about our policy in Vietnam, and the de-
Chief, the Joint.Chiefs of Staff, and the assistance, continued to grow. But as sirability of arriving at some kind of
Secretary of Defense think is needed to late as September of 1963 President John sensible compromise and solution under
maintain them and to minimize their F. Kennedy stated-and I paraphrase which the shooting could be stopped and
casualties. what he said-that this was a war for peace brought to that tortured land and
Second, we should never have been in the South Vietnamese to win or lose. It its economy revived with our help.
South Vietnam in the first place. It was was not our war. We could help with In order to achieve all of these results
a grave error, which brought over 200,000 money. We could help with technical I believe we are going to have to find some
of our Army into that small and unfor- advice, military assistance, training of way of getting into negotiations with the
tunate country. How we got there is their troops; but it was their war, not our opposite side and bring them to the con-
well enough known, and I shall not dwell war. ference table.
on It at any length. The French em- At that time we had no more than 10,- In my judgment, neither our national
Aire in Indochina was broken up by the 000 Americans in uniform in South Viet- honor nor our national security are in-
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68-March21., 10,66 CONGRESSIONAL 1tECOR7~ - S~N
volved in Vietnam, despite the strong I say again that neither the SEATO wars to be fought without any Chinese
statements to the contrary by members Treaty nor the Gulf of Tonkin resolu- economic involvement and with no
of the administration. tion, nor the informal exchanges of cor- Chinese military involvement, but merely
With respect to our national honor respondence between President Eisen- to give Chinese advice and technique as
we made no commitment to anybody hower, President Kennedy, and President to how to conduct a war of national
other than that we would help with Johnson with various and constantly liberation.
money, with military equipment, and changing leaders of the Saigon govern- I should say, furthermore, that the
with military advice. ment affect our national honor. economic, social, and political conditions
Most of the individuals to whom we Equally clearly I would think national in the countries where China would like
originally made that comitment are security is not involved by the situation to foment a series of national liberations
dead, and the governments they repre- in South Vietnam. South Vietnam is a are entirely different from the conditions
sented have been overthrown. We have tiny country in terms of the huge land in China at the time the Communists
expended $2 billion of our fortune and expanse of Asia. Only about 7 percent defeated Chiang Kai-shek and took over
the lies of a good many American boys of the population of Asia is in that coun- Mainland China.
in order to keep that quite informal com- try. - So the advice that China is giving to
mitment, never really formalized in any its economy is primitive. Its natural other underdeveloped countries is funa-
treaty. resources are largely a rice bowl. At one mentally wrong and has proved to be
Now, it is said that the SEATO Treaty point, Vietnam exported rice overseas. wrong. In country after country the
binds us to do what we are doing in Viet- The devastation caused by the present Chinese effort to create Communist par-
nam. With that I strongly disagree. war has resulted in Vietnam's becoming ties, such as are proposed to take over the
The SEATO Treaty, reduced to simple a rice deficit country instead of a rice governments of countries in Latin Amer-
terms which nonlawyers can understand, surplus country. Its economy is para- ica, Asia, and Africa, has turned out to
merely obligates us to confer with the lyzed. It is being held up only by a mas- be a disaster.
other parties to that treaty to see what sive injection of American economic aid. So I suggest that we need not be too
kind of action, conformable to the con- To give one small example, prices in Sai- much concerned, in terms of our national
stitutional processes of each of the sign- gon have risen 10 percent singe January security, by the danger that China would
ers might be desirable under whatever 1 of this year. There is substantial doubt be able to move south and take over,
circumstances we might find ourselves, whether the South Vietnamese economy effectively, countries which have hated
if the Geneva agreements were upset, as can be made to survive, even with more China for well over a thousand years.
Indeed they have been upset, in my massive help from us. The three countries in southeast Asia
opinion, by both sides, and not only by If we were to win a total victory from which have been most-successful in re-
the Vietcong and Hanoi. the Communists in South Vietnam, we sisting a communist takeover have been
So while a case can be made, and the would be confronted with a massive bill countries where not a single American
American Bar Association did make such to rehabilitate the country. Indeed, we soldier was involved, where not a single
a case, to the effect that our intervention have already committed ourselves to the American soldier was ever asked for or
in South Vietnam with a massive mili- Southeast Asia Bank and have put our given. Those are the countries of
tary force is perfectly legal-and with hard cash on the line to develop that Burma, Indonesia, and the Philippines.
this the able Senator from Oregon dis- part of Asia. Moreover, we are in a po- U Thant, the able Secretary General
agrees and has made a powerful legal sition where we shall certainly be called of the United Nations, said not long ago
argument to the contrary-nevertheless, upon to make massive additional con- that if any Burmese Government had re-
while possibly legal it is quite clearly tributions to the economic and social quested the intervention of American
not a treaty which required us to do well being of the country in the foresee- troops to prevent a military takeover by
what we are doing. able future. Communists, either now there would be
I take the strong position that our Yet if we were to lose all of South raging in Burma the kind of vicious civil
national honor would not be involved by Vietnam, in my judgment, the domino war that is now taking place in South
reason of the SEATO Treaty or by reason theory would not take hold. China could Vietnam or, in the alternative, the Com-
of the informal comitments we made to nonetheless be contained. Our vital in- munists would have taken over the Gov-
long-dead leaders of the South Viet- terests, our security, are not involved. ernment of Burma, and communism
namese Government, if we were to termi- A few days ago, I had occasion to would then have appeared further, be-
nate the war and withdraw. point out on the floor of the Senate that yond the boundaries of India.
Similarly, I place no reliance at all on the four pillars of Asia, which in the long I do not imagine that any Member of
the argument that the Gulf of Tonkin run must be called upon to contain the Senate thought that an anti-Com-
resolution requires us to do what we are Chinese expansion, are Pakistan, India, munist revolution in Indochina could be
doing. Indonesia, and Japan. We shall have to successful without the intervention of
In my opinion, it did no such thing. hold the fort for a while until their own $1 of American money or one American
Actually, the Gulf of Tonkin-resolution economies and possibly their military soldier; yet that happened. Indonesia
did not add one iota to the already ex- strength are augmented to a strength ' now has a strong anti-Communist mili-
isting powers of the President of the capable of enabling them to contain tary government, and the United States
United States as Commander in Chief Chinese expansion southward. Yet I am did not do anything to help them.
of our Armed Forces. of the view, particularly so as a result Similarly, while we gave substantial
He could have done just what he did of having listened, as a member of the economic assistance and some military
without the Gulf of Tonkin resolution. Committee on Foreign Relations, to the hardware to the Philippines, the Filipinos
He acquires no new stature; his powers testimony of a number of Chinese experts were able to put down the Communist
are not expanded by reason of that reso- with respect both to the intentions and revolution of the Hukbalahaps without
lution. Moreover, the Gulf of Tonkin the capabilities of the Chinese Commu- the intervention of a single American
resolution was applicable to a situation nist government, that that government soldier.
entirely different from the one which has very little power to take offensive So I suggest that the precedents are
confronts us now. military operations beyond its own strongly against our national security
At that point there had been an armed immediate borders. being involved by continuing a massive
attack on naval vessels of the United I am also convinced that the Chinese military intervention in South Vietnam.
States which the President quite proper- Communist government is primarily pre- Thus, I conclude that we should never
ly resisted. He struck out against not occupied with its own serious domestic have been in South Vietnam. Our prin-
only the North Vietnamese Navy, but by problems and has no real stomach for cipal objective now should be to get out
bombing certain installations in North military adventures overseas. of there as promptly as we can, with some
Vietnam in retaliation for what was To me, it is reasonably clear that reasonable compromise which will give
done. Chinese efforts to expand that country's that war-torn country some chance to
At that point there was no thought, on influence, and with it the peculiar lick its wounds, pick itself up from the
the basis of what was done, that we Chinese brand of communism, are pretty floor, and attempt to become a viable,
would have committed 300,000 Armed well confined to encouraging wars of and, hopefully-possibly-democratic
Forces and personnel to South Vietnam. national liberation in other countries, state.
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 6134 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE March .01,, 1966
Mr. HART. Mr. President, early to-
day, the able majority leader, the Senator
from Montana [Mr. MANSFLELD] ob-
tained from the Senate an agreement to
set aside the earlier agreement to vote at
5:15 o'clock today.
I wonder whether the distinguished
Senator from Pennsylvania, in view of
the opportunity now provided for him to
bring to the attention of the Senate be-
fore It votes tomorrow, his own views,
would be In a position to agree that We
should vote at not later than 2:15 o'clock
p.m. tomorrow on the pending matter.
Mr. CLARK. Mr. President, reserving
the right to object-and I shall not ob-
ject-I have no question of that sugges-
tion if I am given the opportunity to
complete my remarks, which I shall be
unable to do tonight, and ask some fur-
ther questions of the Senator in charge
of the bill, the Senator from Georgia
[Mr. RUSSELL], and the Senator from
Massachusetts [Mr. SALTONSTALL], which
might take as much as half an hour.
I would suggest that perhaps we could
agree to come In at 11 o'clock tomorrow
morning and I would undertake to re-
sume the floor as soon as the morning
hour is over in order to complete what
i have to say and possibly the Senator
from Georgia and the Senator from Mas-
sachusetts would be willing to come into
the Chamber. In that event, I would
have no objection to the proposed unani-
mous-consent agreement, but I do not
wish to be rushed. I have perhaps 2
hours of material and it will take me 2
hours to present matter which I have not
yet had an opportunity to present to the
Senate.
Mr. HART. Mr. President, there is
only one dilemma which confronts us.
A very' dear friend of all of us died in
the last few days, and many of us desire
to pay our respects tomorrow at his fu-
neral. I refer, of course, to our able
chief reporter and good friend, Mr.
Gregor Macpherson.
For this reason I believe that we should
seek to develop an agreement which
would avoid the early convening of the
Senate. Yet, certainly, we must insure
that the opportunity which the Senator
from Pennsylvania seeks is accorded
him.
Mr. CLARK. I wonder whether we
could not solve this, as one of the able
members of the Policy Committee staff
has suggested, by recessing tonight, in-
stead of adjourning, in which case we
would have no morning hour and, sub-
ject to the pending request of the Senator
from Michigan, I ask unanimous consent
that when the Senate convenes tomorrow
at noon I may have the privilege of the
floor not to exceed 1 hour, for the pur-
pose of completing my remarks.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there
objection?
Mr. HART. If the Senator would fur-
ther yield to me, in view of that under-
standing, I renew the request: Is it
agreed that we shall vote at not later
than 2:15 o'clock tomorrow on the pend-
ing matter? This request, of course, I
make on behalf of the able majority
leader, the Senator from Montana [Mr.
MANSFIELD].
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Under
the provisions stated by the Senator from
Pennsylvania, is there objection?
Mr. CLARK. Mr.. President, assum-
ing that the request includes the request
that I be allowed the privilege of the floor
when the Senate comes in tomorrow, I
have no abjection.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Under
the proviso stated by the Senator from
Pennsylvania, is there objection that the
Senate vote no later than 2:15 o'clock
tomorrow?
Mr. HART. It having been agreed,
Mr. President, I understand, that we
shall recess tonight?
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Yes. Is
there objection to the proposal made by
the Senator from Michigan? The Chair
hears none, and it is so ordered.
The unanimous-consent agreement
was subsequently reduced to writing, as
follows: -
UNANIMOUS-CONSENT AGREEMENT
Ordered, That on Tuesday. March 22, 1966,
immediately after the prayer the Senator
from Pennsylvania [Mr.. CLARK] shall be rec-
ognized for not more than 1 hour for further
debate of the bill (H.R. 13546) making sup-
plemental appropriations for the fiscal year
ending June 30, 1966, and for other purposes,
and that the Senate proceed to vote on the
final passage of the bill not later than 2:15
p.m. on that date.
MARCH 21, 1966.
RECESS
Mr. CLARK. Mr. President, I move
that the Senate stand in recess, subject
to the unanimous-consent agreement
earlier entered into, until 12 o'clock noon
tomorrow.
The motion was agreed to and (at 6
o'clock and 49 minutes p.m.) the Senate
took a recess until tomorrow, Tuesday,
March 22, 1966, at 12 o'clock meridian.
NOMINATIONS
Executive nominations received by the
Senate March 21, 1966:
COMMISSIONER OF INDIAN AFFAIRS
Robert LaFoilette Bennett, of Alaska, to be
Commissioner of Indian Affairs.
THE JUDICIARY
William N. Goodwin, of Washington, to be
U.S. district judge for the eastern and west-
ern districts of Washington to fill a new po-
sition created by Public Law 87-36, approved
May 19, 1961.
U.S. MARSHAL
Harry M. Miller, of Kentucky, to be U.S..
marshal for the western district of Kentucky
for the term of 4 years. (Reappointment.)
ASIAN DEVELOPMENT BANK
Henry H. Fowler, of Virginia, to be U.S.
Governor of the Asian Development Bank.
William S. Gaud, of Connecticut, to be
U.S. Alternate Governor of the Asian Devel-
opment Bank.
Bernard Zagorin, of Virginia, to be U.S.
Director of the Asian Development Bank.
CONFIRMATIONS
Executive nominations confirmed by
the Senate March 21, 1966:
U.S. ARMY
The following-named officer to be placed on
the retired list in the grade indicated under
the provisions of title 10, United States Code,
section 3962:
To be lieutenant general
Lt. Gen. Charles Granville Dodge, 018072,
Army of the United States (major general,
U.S. Army).
The following-named officer to be placed
on the retired list in the grade indicated,
under the provisions of title 10, United States
Code, section 3962:
To be lieutenant general
Lt. Gen. Alva Revista Fitch, 018113, Army
of the United States (major general, U.S.
Army).
The following-named officer, under the pro-
visions of title 10, United States Code, section
3066. to be assigned to a position of im-
portance and responsibility designated by the
President under subsection (a) of section
3066, in grade as follows:
To be lieutenant general
Maj. Gen. Austin Wortham Betts, 019373,
U.S. Army.
FARM CREDIT ADMINISTRATION
R. D. Pennewell, of Missouri, to be mem-
ber of the Federal Farm Credit Board, Farm
Credit Administration, for term expiring
March 31, 1972.
A. Lars Nelson, of Washington, to be mem-
ber of the Federal Farm Credit Board, Farm
Credit Administration, for term expiring
March 31, 1972.
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P ,arch 21, 1966 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - APPENDIX A1597
The mild-mannered, almost shy, young
man is the third oldest of a family of eight.
A younger brother now is with the Army.
From Okinawa, Powers then began TDY as-
signments in Laos, Thailand, and Vietnam.
TDY hitches are brief 6-month periods of as-
signments. Staff Sergeant Powers served for
the most part as an adviser to Laotian, Thai,
and Vietnamese troops.
In South Vietnam, he based his operations
with the primitive Montagnards, a people he
said made fine warriors.
"We learned as much from them as they
did from us," Staff Sergeant Powers related,
"We attempted to instruct them into the
more technical aspects of waging guerrilla
warfare, while they taught us a great deal
about how to survive in the lush jungles of
that country."
Next stop on his itinerary Powers said is
what is hoped to be a lengthy educational
period in Washington at the Special Warfare
Center.
"I'm going to see if ; can get my orders
changed so I can enter a 47-week language
course. No, I don't think I will be going back
to Vietnam. I probably will get what I'm
after, but if I have to go back I will."
Besides a short visit with his mother, Ser-
geant Powers also dropped in on his aunt,
Mrs. Florence Noyes of 97 West Street, and
his sister, Mrs. Ella Marks of 108 Geary
Avenue.
Now You Can Complain About TV Com-
mericals-Some Advice From One of
the Top Women in Advertising in the
United States, Bea Adams of St. Louis
EXTENSION OF REMARKS
HON. LEONOR K. SULLIVAN
Vl" MISSOURI
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Thursday, March 17, 1966
Mrs. SULLIVAN. Mr. Speaker, Miss
Beatrice Adams of St. Louis, a vice presi-
dent of Gardner Advertising Co., is one
of the top women in advertising in the
United States, and we in St. Louis are
proud of her as a person and as a busi-
nesswoman. I am personally proud to
count her as a friend.
Recently, the St. Louis Post-Dispatch
Carried an excellent article by Peggy
Johnson about Bea Adams and the work
of the Committee for Improvement of
Advertising, on which she is one of two
women members:
I think the advice given by Miss Adams,
as relayed by Peggy Johnson in the Post-
Dispatch, is good advice for any parent,
and for any television viewer, to follow.
If the commercials are offensive-or
worse-as they sometimes are, the com-
plaints should go to the advertising in-
dustry as one way to clean up practices
within the industry.
As a consurper spokesman in the Con-
gress, I do not join those who attack ad-
vertising for all ills; I think advertis-
ing-good advertising-serves a highly
useful purpose. Our economy would
never have grown to today's fabulous
heights without it.
But advertising should be held respon-
sible for its actions-under law, wherever
necessary, and under effective standards
of good practice and high ethics within
the industry.
Many of the commercials on television
are good fun. Some are horrible, just
horrible. I intend to follow Bea Adams'
advice hereafter when a commercial of-
fends me, and I hope other citizens will
do the same thing and contact the Com-
mittee for Improvement of Advertising
of the Association of National Adver-
tisers and the American Association of
Advertising Agencies. The address of
the committee, as given in this article, is
155 East 44th Street, New York City, at-
tention Mr. William Heimlich, secretary.
Mr. Speaker, under unanimous consent
I submit for inclusion in the Appendix of
the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD, Peggy John-
son's Post-Dispatch article of March 11,
1966, about Miss Beatrice Adams, as
follows:
Now YOU CAN COMPLAIN ABOUT TV
COMMERCIALS
(By Peggy Johnson)
Do certain television commercials make
you long to throw your coffee cup through
the screen? Does the drip-drip-drip of
stomach acid spoil your morning bacon and
eggs?
Then complain to William Heimlich, secre-
tary of the ANA-AAAA Committee for Im-
provement of Advertising. His group com-
prises representatives of the Association of
National Advertisers and the American Asso-
ciation of Advertising Agencies, 155 East 44th
Street, New York, N.Y.
This advice comes from Miss Beatrice
Adams, a vice president of Gardner Adver-
tising Co., 915 Olive Street, St. Louis, and one
of the two women on the committee. She
says that if the offending advertisement is
printed, it should accompany the complaint
with name and date of publication. If it is
a radio or television commercial, the station
call letters or network and the time and
date of the broadcast should be given.
She believes that advertising that offends
the standards of good taste and decency, that
deliberately misleads or that appears to smear
rival businesses is bad for the entire.adver-
tising profession. Therefore the committee
was set up as a clearinghouse for complaints.
Members of the committee are experienced
ad men and women. As soon as the major-
ity have looked into a complaint, the secre-
tary notifies the advertiser and its agency.
Complainants are never Identified to mem-
bers of the committee, to the advertiser, or
to the agency. The committee found that
nearly 25 percent of the complaints repre-
sented justifiable criticism. Findings are
relayed usually through friendly personal
meetings with offenders. In the latest re-
ported year, seven out of eight (advertisers
criticized) quickly fell back into line.
"It must be noted that the committee's
is not a fact-and-figure job. Misleading or
illegal advertising is handled by Government
regulations or the Better Business Bureau,"
Miss Adams pointed out.
The most flagrant offenses are suggestive-
ness, excessive nudity, repulsiveness, Illness
too graphically displayed (audiences some-
times object that drug and hygienic ads ap-
pear on television during their dinner hour).
Improper reference to patriotic or religious
themes is sometimes an offender, as is im-
plied endorsement of bad habits. A televi-
sion commercial builds dramatic impact by
showing a tantrum, but it may make parents
wince because they fear that their children
may copy the behavior.
She pointed out that, as a whole, producers
of commercials try to be in good taste and
not offend anyone.
"A good deal of thought and psychology go
into producing a television commercial,"
Miss Adams said. "Most commercials are
aimed at the middle-class houseWlfe, and 85
.percent of all goods are bought by women.
There are still more in the middle than on
the top or bottom.
"The emotional reaction to.your product is
what makes all the difference. Women re-
act strongly to the stunning white knight
on the white charger. Psychologically he
takes them back to their fairy tale days.
They also like to think of the muscular Mr.
Clean helping them in the kitchen. But
they can react just as strongly against a com-
mercial which offends their good taste."
Miss Adams was asked about one of my
favorite commercials for a packaged soup
mix. It starts out with a catchy little tune;
"How do they do it at the price?" Then a
little man pops up and says (confidentially)
out of the side of his mouth, "They steal the
rice."
Miss Adams explained that only a very
imaginative advertiser would buy this sort
of commercial.
"Some commercials are conversation
pieces," she continued. "They are so well
done that people talk about them. The Mu-
seum of Modern Art in New York periodically
selects commercial classics and shows them
in the museum like old movies."
She modestly refrained from telling us of
her own commercials that became classics,
but a friend remarked that one Adams com-
mercial featuring a baby and a lullaby for
an evaporated milk company ran for more
than 8 years.
"I'll bet that kid is in college by now,"
Miss Adams said.
She is working on television commericals
for the Australian market. "It must be hard
to do when you're so far away," I ventured.
"Ouch my pouch," she roared.
Mr. Sparling's Views on Vietnam
EXTENSION OF REMARKS
HON. GEORGE P. MILLER
OF CALIFORNIA
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Thursday, March 17, 1966
Mr. MILLER. Mr. Speaker, Mr. Wil-
liam A. Sparling, Jr., is currently working
in Vietnam as assistant personnel man-
ager for Morrison-Knudsen on their. very
important construction projects there.
Recently, Mr. Sparling, in a letter to
his father, set forth his impressions on
the American position in Vietnam. The
young man, who is the author of this
statement, has had a great deal of ex-
perience in living and working abroad
and I believe is quite learned in matters
of this kind.
In view of this, I am pleased to insert
in the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD that por-
tion of Mr. Sparling's letter which gives
his candid views on our Vietnam policy.
EXCERPTS FROM LETTER FROM W. A. SPARLING,
JR., TO HIS PARENTS, MARCH 6, 1966, FROM
SAIGON
Don't doubt our being in Vietnam-one
set of circumstances, defense against agres-
sion, got us in here-and other circumstances
have come to bear on the situation since-
these, our doubters and detractors seem
to prefer to regard as the whole issue, and
conveniently overlook what got us here in
the first place-but while they may quibble
and lie by omission, you can be assured no
one here is suffering from such confusion
or delusion. There is an enemy; he does
come from the Communists; he is a terror-
ist and oppressor; and our fighting him is
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 A1598
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.
CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - APPENDIX March 21, 19t"
the last chance for the whole population of
South Vietnam. This the South Vietnamese
understand well. It can be confusing at
home, because the real enemy never gets
hit; and because of the American-South
Vietnamese effort- to salvage the enemy's
pawn, not destroy it; but let me just assure
you of this-the more I see, the more I'm con-
vinced that not only are we right-but even
a little more than that-and the prouder I
am of Americans.
Resignation of David Dubinsky as Presi-
dent of the International Ladies Gar-
ment Workers Union
=TENSION OF REMARKS
Or
HON. JOHN J. ROONEY
o1 them spend time In a Czarist Jail In U.S. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION,
Poland for leading a strike against their Washington, D.C., March 17, 1966.
father's bakery. This is not meant to Subject: Issuance of General Policy on
denegrate today's labor leaders, it Is Responding to Requests for Names of
Employees and Identifying Information.
just that, as it always must, the old order Heads of Departments and Independent
changeth. Establishments.
I have been privileged over the years, From time to time a Federal agency may
Mr. Speaker, to make many friends with- be asked for the names alone, or for the
in the ILGWU. I am sure they join me names and certain Identifying information,
in a genuine sadness at the sight of of some or all of its employees. The Civil
Service Commission holds that the names,
David Dubinsky stepping down and I position titles, grades, salaries, and duty
am also sure that they join me in wish- stations of Federal employees are public fin-
ing David Iubinsky an affectionate formation. As an example of the public
mazel tov. nature of this information, the Official Reg-
ister of the United States for many years
contained the names of all Government em-
New Policy Lifts Restrictions on Govern- ployees, with title, salary, State of origin,
and duty station.
ment personnel Information The Commission believes, therefore, that
standard Government policy generally should
EXTENSION OF REMARKS be to release names, position titles, grades.
1 ries and duty stations in response to
saa
OF NEW YORK
IN THE HOUSE OF'REPRMSENTATIVES
Monday, March 21,1966
Mr. ROONEY of New York. Mr.
Speaker. David Dubinsky, one of the
true titans of the American labor move-
ment, has stepped down and he will be
hard to replace. For 34 years he has
been president of the International
Ladies Garment' Workers Union and
tinder his direction the union workers
and the industry have prospered.
. In 1932 when he assumed command of
the union it was bankrupt and the sweat
shop was a way of life in the industry.
Today the ILGWU has almost a half
million members and. finds itself finan-
cially in the position of lending money to
the Rockefeller interests for civic proj-
ects in Puerto Rico.
In his years as president, the little
giant of the ILGWU fought and defeated
a strong Communist element that sought
to bleed the union and which had
brought it to the verge of extinction.
He fought for and won a host of social
reforms in the industry including better
working conditions, reduced hours, re-
tirement and medical benefits and low
rent housing. The union built, under
David Dubinsky's leadership, an orphan-
age In China, a trade school in Prance,
and lent large amounts of money to the
fledgling Israeli Nation, while at the
same time fostering training and ap-
prenticeship programs for American
workers. Last year, Mr. Speaker, I had
occasion while In Mondello, Sicily, to
visit an orphanage and school known
as Instituto Franklin D. Roosevelt, a
project heavily supported by the ILGWU.
I wish that every Member here could see
LY_
HON. JOHN E.. MOSS
IN THE ROUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Thursday, March 17, 1966
Mr. MOSS. Mr. Speaker, the Civil
Service Commission last week made a
major contribution toward the removal
of Government secrecy when it issued a
policy statement which, for the first time,
sets forth Government-wide guidelines
for access by the pi blic and the Congress
to the names axed salaries of Federal em-
ployees. This is an area which long has
been criticized as an information vacuum
in many departments and agencies. A
glaring example occurred only a few
months ago when the Post Office Depart-
ment refused to release the names and
salaries of summer employees, even to
Members of the Congress.
The Subcommittee on Foreign Opera-
tions and Government Information, of
which I am chairman, made its first in-
vestigation of the availability of names
of Federal employees in 1956. The Civil
Service Commission recognized at that
time that basic information about em-
ployees was clearly within the public do-
main and it responded by establishing a
set of internal information guidelines
that provided for the release of the
names and salaries of its own employees.
Unfortunately, these guidelines were ig-
nored by other departments and agencies
and they continued to lay down their
own rules and regulations which, in
many instances, permitted in my opinion
an unlawful information blackout about
their employees.
Throughout the years as the subcom-
mittee chipped away-agency by
,
requests.
For assistance in carrying out that broad
policy when lists are requested, the Com-
mission has issued the following guides,
based on its own experience and after con-
sultation with interested groups:
The agency should comply promptly with
every request for the names, position titles,
grades, salaries, and duty stations of Federal
employees unless (a) there is a definite
showing that the release would be contrary
to the public interest; (b) it is evident that
the list is sought for purposes of commercial
or other solicitation; (c) there is reason to
believe that the names would be used for
purposes which may be in violation of the
Hatch Act; or (d) the costs or labor involved
in the preparation of the list would require
an unwarranted expenditure of agency funds
or interruption of the work of the agency.
If unwarranted time or cost would be in-
volved, the person requesting the list should
be told that and what costs must be paid
or work arrangements made by him before
the list will be furnished.
The guides may be applied to specific re-
quests along the following lines:
From Congressmen or congressional com-
mittees: The information should be fur-
nished promptly; if furnishing lists precisely
as requested would entail undue cost, this
should be reported to the requesting party
along with suggestions of any possible al-
ternatives that would be helpful but more
economical.
From the press and other information
media on behalf of the public: The infor-
mation should be furnished promptly if it is
available without unreasonable public ex-
pense or interruption of regular work;
otherwise, estimate the necessary time and
costs, inform the requesting party what is
involved, and determine if the needs can be
met with information that can be furnished
at reasonable cost or expenditure of time.
When information media desire lists for
solicitation purposes, they are treated like
other commercial firms.
From commercial firms and individual
solicitors: Such requests should ordinarily
--- r..__-.-_- agency-as employee Inlorm UOI1 re-
to a large degree by the ILGWU support be refused; exceptions should be made only
of this orphanage and school. strictions, the Civil Service Commission when it is clear that the public interest will
In New York the garment industry is gave its full cooperation in helping to set be served (for example, requests from com-
a major .industry and around the world, the stage for a Government-wide policy pliers of widely used directories) and there
the New York garment center is regarded which would make it mandatory for de- will be negligible public expense or inter-
partments and agencies, with few excep- furnished t rrsolicit tionvpurposes. awes be
a dons, to o release information about their SQ without the, stability `that Mr. Dubin- employees to the public and to Congress. From charitable organizations: Few if any
sky and his union have provided to the requests should be received from charitable
Industry. The Commission's policy statement of organizations since the arrangements for
Today's new labor leaders, Mr. March 17, 1966, which is patterned after charitable fundraising in the Federal service
Speaker, are not of the Dubinsky leader , heri- its own internal guidelines, achieves this are prescribed by the Federal Fundraising
long sought objective. Manual. Mail solicitation of employees at
Loge, and in fact how could they be? place of employment is not authorized, and
They did not have to fight in the streets Mr. Speaker, I include herewith the this should be emphasized to any group re-
for what are now considered the normal Civil Service Commission Policy State- questing a list of names. If a charitable or-
rights of the workingman nor did any meat and guidelines: ganization desires a list for other than solid-
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 March 21, 1966 Aipprov glA-R PPP6ENDIX 68000400040009-5 A1599
tation purposes, it should be treated like
other nonprofit organizations.
From nonprofit organizations such as pro-
fessional societies, schools, unions, veterans
organizations, State societies, etc.: In gen-
eral, it should be the policy to cooperate
fully with these organizations when it is
evident that little cost to the agency or in-
terruption of work would result. Otherwise,
estimate the necessary time and costs, inform
the requesting party what is involved, and
determine if the needs can be met with in-
formation that can be furnished at reason-
able cost or expenditure of time.
By direction of the Commission:
NICHOLAS J. OGANO VIC,
Executive Director.
Milwaukee County Property Owners' As-
sociation Makes Its- Case Against the
Property Tax
EXTENSION OF REMARKS
of
HON. HENRY S. REUSS
OF WISCONSIN
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Mr. REUSS. Mr. Speaker, the Mil-
waukee County Property Owners' Asso-
ciation, in a recent issue of its publica-
tion, the Property Owner, listed 25 rea-
sons why the property tax should not be
the sole source of revenue for local gov-
ernment.. In the, thought that many of
my colleagues may be interested in this
thought-provoking analysis of the draw-
backs of a property tax, I include it
herewith:
A STRONG CASE AGAINST THE PROPERTY TAX
To all of; those, who have. not given this
much thought heretofore:
1. The property tax is no longer a public
tax, since it does not cover all persons equi-
tably.
2. It is only a selective tax because $750
million of tax assessed property is tax exempt.
The amount is 29 percent of total assess-
ments in Milwaukee.
3. Property tax does not carry any credit
refund like the sales tax for heads of fami-
lies, who were forced to build or buy living
accommodations.
4. It carries no exemptions for large fami-
lies like the income tax, but only a complete
exemption for certain institutions and cor-
porations that could very well afford to pay
it.
6, It is unfair, because it may be possible
to put a price on property, but not a true
value. A dollar has. the same value for all.
6. It is not a direct tax to all people. To
many it is only an indirect tax.
7. An indirect tax does not carry the same
bite as the direct tax.
8. The property tax is not based on ability
to pay.
9. The Constitution does not say anywhere
that a property tax be used as support for the
bulk of our Government costs.
10. A property tax should cover only the
costs of city services to property owners, and
not also benefits,, that all property owners
do not get.
11. A change to a nonproperty tax does
not shift the tax load from one pocket to
another,. but froiq the pockets of the few to
the pockets of the many or all.
12. A man with a high loan pays a high
property tax on the portion of the property
he does not own.
13. Persons depending upon the public tax
for a living should not insist that their earn-
ings come only from a property tax.
14. The cost of administration and collec-
tion of the property tax is most cumbersome
and expensive and subject to political
maneuvering.
15. A man's hom}Ie is subject to government
seizure, if the tax for it is not forthcoming.
16. Only one-third of the heads of families
in Milwaukee are property owners, but foot
80 percent of the local government costs.
17. The property tax is decreasing in im-
portance in many States.
18. Property assessments are not flexible
enough to adjust themselves to fluctuating
values.
19. Standards of property assessments vary
with the various. units of government.
20. Income-producing property is taxed
two ways: (1) through property values, (2)
through income produced, which is illegal.
21. A sales tax is said to take the milk and
shoes from babies. The property tax pulls
the pants off the old man.
22. Properties are depreciated in value
through high property tax, and special
assessments.
28. High property taxes only prevent proper
maintenance and modernization, causing
slums.
24. No income tax deduction is allowed
for property tax on homes in the State in-
come tax law. So we pay in the State a
property tax on our homes and also an in-
come tax. That is double taxation.
25. Too many doctors of economy are try-
ing to juggle conditions around to bring
forth a larger tax return, but they will con-
tinue to fail, because all economy is based
on proper balance in competitive factors.
Message From a Teenager
EXTENSION OF REMARKS
OF
HON. JOE SKUBITZ
OF KANSAS
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Wednesday, March 16, 1966
Mr. SKUBITZ. Mr. Speaker, such has
been written and demonstrated as to the
irresponsibility of the modern teenager.
Fortunately, the great majority of high
school and college students in America
are dedicated, hard working, clear-
thinking individuals and theirs is a voice
which must be heard and heeded. The
following letter received from a teenager
constituent demonstrates this clearly and
I would like to share it with my col-
leagues:
Congressman JOE SKUBITZ,
U.S. House of Representatives,
Washington, D.C.
MY DEAR SIR: There has been, as you well
known, an extreme amount of controversy
over the Vietnam war.
It is my firm belief that it is the duty of
the United States to curtail communism in
southeast Asia. Communism is an extreme
and real threat to all of us. We, as a people
who love and honor freedom must not allow
these masses of people to be conquered and
imprisoned by a totalitarian state. Of
course, there will be those who will suffer
and die, but we should be proud that we as
Americans have a cause worth fighting, suf-
fering and dying for. War is never pleasant,
but on the other hand which is worse-living
in a world without freedom or fighting for
the rights of all men?
I, as a citizen, do not even suggest what
steps need to be taken militarily or diplo-
matically, but steps must be taken. I urge
you to do whatever is necessary to assure vic-
tory.
Respectfully yours,
WILLIAM T. NORTH,
Vice Chairman,
Chase County Teenage Republican.
The Dividends Accruing From a Strong
Stand Against Communism in South-
east Asia
EXTENSION OF REMARKS
OF
HON. ABRAHAM J. MULTER
OF NEW YORK
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Monday, March 21, 1966
Mr. MULTER. Mr. Speaker, Roscoe
Drummond, in the following column
from the March 16, 1966, edition of the
New York Herald Tribune, lists some of
the important changes in policy on the
part of Asian countries during the past
year.
Although no one claims that our policy
of resistance to Communist aggression in
Vietnam is solely responsible for them, it
is quite clear that our actions have cer-
tainly contributed to those changes.
Mr. Drummond's column follows:
U.S. CAUSE ON OTHER FRONTS ADVANCED BY
VIET SHOWING-LAOS, CAMBODIA CITED
(By Roscoe Drummond)
WASINGTON.-One thing the American
people do not want about Vietnam is false
optimism. We know the road ahead will be
anxious and painful.
But since it became clear that the United
States is prepared to stay the course in Viet-
nam, there have been heartening dividends.
What has happened during the past year
following the strong stand-and successful
battles-by the United States and South
Vietnam?
The evidence is showing up in many na-
tions in Asia and the far Pacific. When you
add them up, they begin to show how sig-
nificantly events have begun to move during
the very period the once immiment Vietcong
victory has been moving farther away from
their reach.
The record tells its own story:
Laos: Twelve months ago the Laotian
Communists were a mounting peril to the
government. Today they are badly splin-
tered.
Cambodia: Twelve months ago it seemed
that Prince Sihanouk was trying to win merit
points with the Communists as a hedge
against the future. Today he is warning his
own people that, if North Vietnam prevails,
they can expect no mercy from their own
Communist Party.
Philippines: Twelve months ago the Phil-
ippines were wracked with, riots in protest
against even the small support the govern-
ment was giving to Saigon. Now the gov-
ernment is preparing to send troops.
Korea: Twelve months ago Korea had con-
tributed only token forces to the defense of
South Vietnam. Now it is at the point of
bringing the total of its combat troops there
to 44,000-more, in proportion to its popu-
lation of 28,500.000, than the United States
itself.
Peiping-Moscow: Twelve months ago the
American and, foreign critics of U.S. policy
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A1600 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD -APPENDIX March 21, 1966
irl Vietna,i a were In unanimous chorus declar- other unfit persons in circumvention' of sent; cutting the investment credit by half;
that one consequence of the U.S. deei- State laws. The sale of destructive devices,, jiggering a few other items. All on a tempo-
'pn,tri d end South Vietnam was bound to
happen: ft would end the 5in6-Soviet feud
and dride Moscow and Peiping back into
each other's arms. It did just the opposite.
Japan: Twelve months ago Japan was
movin toward a new modus 'vivendi with
Red lia and was the center ? of harsh
criticismiof 13.S. policy. Today the Japanese
Government is helping to focus world pres-
sure on Hanoi to accept peace talks.
i'iidonesia: Twelve months ago the unpre-
dictaple Sukarno held total sway; he was
surrounded by pro-Communist associates
and buttressed by the third largest Commu-
lust party in the world. Indonesian policy
was pro-Red China and anti-Western.
Today Indonesian policy is anti-lied China
and less anti-Western. The Indonesian Corn-
munlst party is no more. Sukarno 'has either
lost most of his power to the anti-Communist
leaders of the army-or all'of it.
And on top of these events, not a single
dissident South Vietnamese political leader
Who left Saigon for involuntary exile in pro-
test against. past regimes has given his sup-
port to the Vietcong.
I am not ?, suggesting that the overturn in
xt}donesia or that all of the other events stem
directly from the strong U.B. stand in Viet-
riain That is` honestly arguable. What I
believe is not arguable is that the evident
will of the 'United States to stay the course
ln' Vietnam made these heartening 'dividends
more attainable.
National Wildlife Federation
Resolution
EXTENSION' OF REMARKS
or
HON. JOHN D. DINGELL
oI''ViCinCAit I
IN TII HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Tuesday, March 15, 1966
Mr. DINGELL, Mr. Speaker, pursuant
to permission granted I insert into the
Appendix of the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD
a resolution of the National Wildlife
Federat or In, opposition fo'unwise legis-
Iatton which would infringe upon' the
0ghts of law-abiding citizens to buy and
use, for lawful and legitimate sporting
purposes, firearms of different kinds.
This outstanding national organiza-
tion of outdoorsmen, sportsmenand con-
servationIsts has taken' the wise and
proper position that it is much better to
use'rigo'rously the provisions of the many
criminal laws for punishment' of crimes
by criminals armed with guns than it is
to deny honest and law-abiding citizens
the'right to purchase firearms for lawful
and legitimate sporting purposes.
The resolution, adopted at the 30th an-
nual meeting of the National Wildlife
Federation on March 12, 1666, is as fol-
lows :
The National Wildlife Federation reiter-
ates its conviction that the constitutional
right to possess, bear, and' use firearms for
lawful purposes must not be infringed and
that the registration of guns beyond that al-
ready required would serve no beneficial pur-
pose. This organization, however, supports
greater controls which would impose manda-
tory prison sentences upon those who coin-
hilt crimes when armed with guns and pre-
Vent the interstate sale and n}ai1-order ship-
ment of handguns to felons, juveniles, and
How To Up Taxes and Not Say So
EXTENSION OF REMARKS
OF
HON. DONALD RUMSFELD
OF ILIJNOIS
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Monday, March 21, 1966
Mr. RUMSFELD. Mr. Speaker, there
Is growing concern both inside and out-
side of Congress that the President is
playing politics with taxes.
This concern is expressed in the article,
"How To Up Taxes and Not Say So," by
Charles Nicodemus, Washington bureau
correspondent for the Chicago Daily
News. The article, which appeared in
the March 18, 1966, editions of the Daily
News, follows:
How To UI' TAXES AND NOT SAY SO
(By Charles Nicodemus)
WASHINGTON-Lyndon Johnson is treat-
ing the people to another of his major public
relations gambits, this one designed to have
the, Nation itself persuade a reluctant Presi-
dent that he should raise taxes still further.
E4r. Johnson is, of course, well aware that
taxes are going to have to be raised, and
sooner rather than later. Every economic
indicator shows the economy Is becoming
superheated.
The Vietnam war is becoming more costly
every month and will need more taxes to
fuel it.
Virtually every politician on Capitol Hill,
on either side, of the aisle, acknowledges this.
In fact, in debate on the recently passed
stop-gap tax measure, many of them came
right out and said it.
Economists of every philosophical stripe
are now crying for it. Columnists are rais-
ing desperate alarms, warning that the
President had best act before inflation runs
away with us all.
Yet the President tarries. Why?
Any good politican-and the President is
a very good politican-knows that raising
taxes in an election year can be deadly,
particularly when saddled with another
problem-Vietnam-that is bound to cost
substantially at the polls.
phasize, and accentuate that he's doing so
reluctantly, and only because nearly every-
one-and particularly Republicans-insists
that the harsh move must be made.
The administration's handling of the
whole affair-the ambiguous, cautious state-
ments by Cabinet officers; the leaked specu-
lation on what approaches are likely, when
and if the time comes-are typical of pre-
vious Johnson public relations gambits.
But there is a difference this time.
Tax cuts can't be instituted overnight, and
their impact Is several monts in coming.
Nor can they be begun quietly in advance,
like troop movements and budget policies.
There is always the danger, therefore, that
the President's, public relations gambit on
taxes can be carried on too long-and that
by the time he finally decides to move, the
actions he takes may no longer be sufficient
remedy for the problems they were designed
to solve.
Hoosier Journalist Explodes a Number of
Irish Myths
EXTENSION OF REMARKS
OF
HON. BERNARD' F. GRABOWSKI
OF CONNECTICUT
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Wednesday, March 2, 1966
Mr. GRABOWSKI. Mr. Speaker,
every American regardless of his na-
tional ancestral heritage celebrates St.
Patrick's Day each year. The reason is
obvious. St. Patrick is the symbol of
'Ireland and Ireland's history is studded
with glorious examples of devotion to
freedom.
During this year's celebration there
came to my attention an excellent article
by the distinguished Hoosier journalist,
Mr. John Ackelmire. In this piece he
explodes a number of the unfortunate
myths regarding the Irish and puts their
noble heritage in a better perspective.
This article, which appeared in the
Indianapolis Observer, merits the atten-
tion of the entire House:
Joan ACKELMIRE: TiE IRISH
he the problem that faced the President Ireland is the real or imagined homeland
Increase, how do you ease of all who will march or toast in honor of
Ino a the turn needed of tax the year
rag, while causing as St. Patrick next Thursday. Being Irish for
little political hamge as possible? the day Is like being a Notre Dame television
until everyone the best way that the to ( wait alumnus. It isn't a matter of national orig-
is nenessary, and (2) until appreciates
who ho Is s increase ins or diplomas; it's the spirit that counts.
aeven Ireland is one of the smallest of the world's
anyone is nation-islands, being just about the size of
Then, you urging
(B3) ) the e spread action. o the impact o the Indiana. It is smaller than Iceland, and con-
Mr. and as thinly possible. siderably smaller than Cuba. It also is a
The as broadly a what
The first two antes are e strong ongs on is now ow solitary island, a big toe of Europe stuck out
third doing. is The what he will chances ch do shortly. that the In the cold Atlantic.
w
In fact, many astute Congressmen believe The first thing that strikes any visitor to
he has already begun. They're convinced Ireland, even before the plane lands, 1s its
that the newly enacted potpourri of excise unspoiled beauty. It is even greener and
tax adjustments and tax collection speed- lovelier than it is supposed to be, and much
ups I. just the first part of a preplannetl greener and lovelier than any country has
package which the President decided he'd a right to be.
best ease through first. The beauty of the land is matched by the
What's next? quality of the people. Ireland is one of the
Liberals have called for revocation of the great bastions of the individualist. Every
7 percent investment credit as the best way Irishman is different, and there isn't a jig-
to' pick up some cash while slowing down' dancing chowderhead or a bog-trotting harp
the boom. Conservatives have called for plunker anywhere in sight.
a 5-percent increase in personal income taxes. The Irish of Ireland, are lively, courteous
It would be typically Johnsonian to split people and among the handsomest and most
the difference--raising income taxes 2% per- literate in the world. They are a people
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A1612 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - APPENDIX March 21, 1966
Were you in Boston, one wouid~say, "Top
of the morning to you." And your re-
sponse would be, "And the rest of the day
to YOU."
It was in the year 387 that St. Patrick
came from Heaven on the mission for
which he was preordained which was, of
course, the conversion of the Irish peo-
ple to the faith of Christianity.
At that time St. Patrick used the sprig
of the shamrock as his symbol.
Today we have had shamrocks flown
here to Washington from Ireland. They
came as a courtesy of the Irish Embassy
and to the Irish Embassy all of us are
indeed grateful.
Last year Congressman JAMES BURKE
read a little poem which I would like to
read to you now:
A little sprig of shamrock
Is a symbol we hold dear
A little sprig of shamrock
force of 4,500 men. These will include two
infantry battalions, a special air services
squadron, and support units. Helicopters
will also be sent to Vietnam to fly support
missions for the task force units.
A glance at the map reveals quite clearly
Australia's vital interest in the war in South
Vietnam. Should Vietnam fall, the way to
Malaysia, Indonesia and, finally, Australia,
lies open to Communist grasp.
Australia's contribution is small, but sig-
nificant.
It is a clear demonstration that those
closest to the problem recognize the danger
of Communist expansionist aims in south-
east Asia.
It should not be forgotten that the strug-
gle in Vietnam is not totally an American
enterprise.
When we wear it every year; of
A S little may things k HON. JOHN S. MONAGAN
As it travels out across the world
To be worn on St. Patrick's Day.
Mr. Speaker, all of us today are wear-
ing carnations and for these carnations
we are extremely grateful because they
Australia Recognizes Importance of
Vietnam
EXTENSION OF REMARKS
OF
HON. JACK BROOKS
pF TEXAS
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Monday, March 21, 1966
OF CONNECTICUT
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Monday, March 21, 1966
Mr. MONAGAN. Mr. Speaker, the
Hartford Times praised the recent get-
together of the Governors with the Pres-
ident to discuss domestic and foreign
issues.
The item of most immediate impact was
the Governors' unanimous endorsement of
the President's handling of the Communist
containment in Vietnam-
The paper points out. It adds that as
a move for unity in our stressful- times
the session was important and- mean-
ingful.
Others may want to read the article
to which I refer, and I therefore sug-
gest that we include it in the RECORD.
[From the Hartford Times, Mar. 14, 19661
L.B.J. AND THE GOVERNORS
Reputedly the President, politically astute
and thoroughly informed, always knows what
is going on back home in the various States.
But if President Johnson has not lost touch
with the Governors and officials of the States,
many of them feel that they have lost contact
with him since he began to concentrate so
intently on the problems of . international
affairs.
The weekend session at the White House,
attended by 38 Governors, including Gover-
nor Dempsey, served therefore as a sort of re-
get-together meeting, an all-purpose chance
to discuss domestic concerns, to pass the word
either up or down, to peddle a little influen-
tial observation and to reestablish internal
diplomatic relations.
The item of most immediate impact was
the Governors' unanimous endorsement of
the President's handling of the Communist
containment in Vietnam. This must have
been heartening to the administration, for
besides its evidence of bipartisan support the
resolution expressed the political judgment
of the various State houses which are in di-
rect local contact with sectional public senti-
ment.
It is natural that a chief executive who
likes to make his own judgments should
bring in the Governors now and then to
check their opinions against what the Con-
gressmen and the pollsters are telling him.
And one expects that each Governor will go
away braced by a considerable acquisition
of the presidential sentiments and opinions.
There was some speculation that calling
in the Governors indicates serious develop-
Mr. BROOKS. Mr. Speaker, the Gov-
ernment of Australia recently announced
its intention to triple its forces in South
Vietnam. An editorial appearing
March 12, 1966, in the Houston Post, a
well-known Texas newspaper, com-
mented on this action taken at the re-
quest of the South Vietnamese. The edi-
torial suggests that Australia, with its
proximity to the conflict in Vietnam, has
a vital interest in its outcome. As this
editorial points out, the struggle in Viet-
nam is not totally an American enter-
prise and those who are closest to the
problem realize the danger of Commu-
nist expansionary aims in southeast
Asia.
I feel this concise editorial, which fol-
lows, will be of interest to my fellow col-
leagues:
AUSTRALIA BOOSTS VIETNAM FORCE
It is clear that Australia understands the
importance of the war in South Vietnam,
even if some Members of the U.S. Senate
do not.
The government of the great island con-
tinent has agreed to triple its forces in
South Vietnam to 4,500 men. The increase
is in response to a request by the Saigon
government.
Some 1,500 Australian combat troops have
been. serving in South Vietnam since June.
They w1ll be replaced in May by a task
ments abroad that require conference. Noth-
ing along those lines came up. Still, as a
move for unity in our stressful times, the
session was not unrelated to the pressures
that exist.
The Problems of America's Merchant
Marine Are Important to All Americans,
Not Just the Shipping Industry
EXTENSION OF REMARKS
OF
HON. LEONOR K. SULLIVAN
- OF MISSOURI
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Thursday, March 3, 1966
Mrs. SULLIVAN. Mr. Speaker, it was
my great pleasure last month to attend a
meeting of the Propeller Club of New
Orleans and, in my capacity as ranking
member of the House Committee on Mer-
chant Marine and Fisheries, discuss some
of the problems of the merchant marine.
These problems are of vital concern to
all of us, as events in Vietnam have dem-
onstrated particularly.
Under unanimous consent, I submit for
inclusion in the Appendix of the CoN-
GRESSIONAL RECORD my remarks in New
Orleans on a subject which is now before
the Congress and will be of increasing
interest and importance to the Members.
The address referred to is as follows:
ADDRESS BY CONGRESSWOMAN LEONOR K. SUL-
LIVAN BEFORE THE PROPELLER CLUB OF THE
PORT OF NEW ORLEANS AND THE U.S. MER-
CHANT MARINE ACADEMY ALUMNI ASSOCIA-
TION AT A LUNCHEON ON FEBRUARY 16, 1966,
AT ROOSEVELT HOTEL
I am delighted to be here this afternoon,
both as a member of a propeller club myself,
and as ranking member of the Hoitse Com-
mittee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries, a
committee which has a great deal to do, I
realize, with how happy you people are-or
how unhappy, perhaps-about maritime con-
ditions and issues.
As you know, I am a Democrat, but to give
a bipartisan flavor to the occasion, I must
thank a Republican for my being able to
come here today. The Republican I refer to
is Abraham Lincoln, in whose name the
Republicans in Congress always insist on a
congressional recess at this time of year in
order to try to raise some money for the
forthcoming campaign. Later on, we Demo-
crats give them a few days off from congres-
sional chores while we celebrate and do some
money raising of our own in the names of
Thomas Jefferson and the hero of New Or-
leans, Andy Jackson.
But thanks to the extended Lincoln's
birthday recess, I was finally able this year
to arrange my schedule so as to accept at
long last the flattering and repeated invita.
tions I have received from the Propeller
Club over the years to come and meet with
you. HALE BOGGS, our majority whip and one
of the outstanding leaders of this Congress,
has been urging me for a long time to come
to New Orleans, and so has my closest neigh-
bor in the Rayburn House Office Building,
EDDIE HEBERT, who has a huge photographic
mural of your city forming an entire wall of
one of the rooms in his office, and who never
loses an opportunity to boost this city.
Across the hall from the photographic mural
of New Orleans he has a huge painting of
American soldiers fighting in the jungle, with
murderous fire streaming from machineguns
and rifles-and I got the message-come to
.New Orleans or- else.
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